[
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
		"context": "Id. And rightly so, for this Court has always been \"reluctan[t] to attribute unc onstitutional motives\" to 22 government officials, especially when \"a plausible secular purposes\" is appa rent on a law's face. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, there is at least a plausible argument that the Proclamation's primary purpose is to protect national security. The Pr oclamation's plain text reveals why.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "In addition to frequently facing strategic, moot- ness-happy defendants, free exercise plaintiffs are of- ten deprived of the ordinary antidote to mootness — compensatory damages. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents blithely as- sert that eliminating nominal damages as a check on strategic mooting will have no practical effect, because 15 litigants will always be able to assert claims fo r com- pensatory damages instead. BIO.9-13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "This Court's precedent in the realm of eq- uitable relief already recognizes as much. In Elrod v. Burns , this Court held that \" [t]he loss of First Amend- ment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, un- questionably constitutes irreparable injury\" sufficient to support an injunct ion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Irreparable injury\" is, of course, \"injury that cannot be adequately measured or compensated by money.\" Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "For, while this Court has held that Section 1983 plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for \"mental and emo- tional distress ,\" Memphis Cmty. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], many circuits have imposed heavier evi- dentiary burdens for such injuries , holding that they generally can't be proved by the plaintiff's \" subjective testimony, standing alone .\" Patrolmen 's Benevolent 310 F.3d 43 . Instead, in some circuits, a plaintiff is expected to offer evidence that she \"suffered physically\" or \"sought professional psychiatric counseling,\" 806 F.2d 1198.4 Hurdles like these will often discourage free exercise plaintiffs from asserting compensatory -damages claims in the first place , particularly given the often \"internal,\" \"private and somewhat invisible\" nature of many deprivations of religious freedom .",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Sch. 477 U.S. 299, many circuits have imposed heavier evi- dentiary burdens for such injuries , holding that they generally can't be proved by the plaintiff's \" subjective testimony, standing alone .\" Patrolmen 's Benevolent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, in some circuits, a plaintiff is expected to offer evidence that she \"suffered physically\" or \"sought professional psychiatric counseling,\" 806 F.2d 1198.4 Hurdles like these will often discourage free exercise plaintiffs from asserting compensatory -damages claims in the first place , particularly given the often \"internal,\" \"private and somewhat invisible\" nature of many deprivations of religious freedom . Christopher C. Lund, Martyrdom and Religious Freedom , 50 Conn. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 F.3d 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "477 U.S. 299, many circuits have imposed heavier evi- dentiary burdens for such injuries , holding that they generally can't be proved by the plaintiff's \" subjective testimony, standing alone .\" Patrolmen 's Benevolent 310 F.3d 43 . Instead, in some circuits, a plaintiff is expected to offer evidence that she \"suffered physically\" or \"sought professional psychiatric counseling,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 Hurdles like these will often discourage free exercise plaintiffs from asserting compensatory -damages claims in the first place , particularly given the often \"internal,\" \"private and somewhat invisible\" nature of many deprivations of religious freedom . Christopher C. Lund, Martyrdom and Religious Freedom , 50 Conn. L. Rev. 961, 961 -965 (2018) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "806 F.2d 1198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Under other statutes often invoked by free exercise plaintiffs , meanw hile, compensatory -damages claims may be barred outright . Congress enacted RLUIPA to protect the religious exercise of inmates, a group it rec- ognized as particularly vulnerable to religious liberty violations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But t his Court held in Sossamon v. Texas that sover- eign immunity bars damages claims brought against state officials in their official capacities under RLUIPA. 563 U.S. at 285-286.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "563 U.S. at 285-286. And some circuits have extended Sossamon to bar monetary damages in indi- vidual -capacity claims as well. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"the 'unequivocal expression' standard [applied in Sossa- mon] does not apply to suits against non -sovereigns 4 See also, e.g., 93 F.3d 1241; 145 F.3d 691; 653 F.2d 1164. Perhaps for these re asons, some civil rights litigators have been leery of bringing compensatory damages claims at all . See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity , 56 L. & Contemp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "763 F.3d 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "563 U.S. at 285-286. And some circuits have extended Sossamon to bar monetary damages in indi- vidual -capacity claims as well. See 763 F.3d 554 (\"the 'unequivocal expression' standard [applied in Sossa- mon] does not apply to suits against non -sovereigns 4 See also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 145 F.3d 691; 653 F.2d 1164. Perhaps for these re asons, some civil rights litigators have been leery of bringing compensatory damages claims at all . See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity , 56 L. & Contemp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "93 F.3d 1241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "563 U.S. at 285-286. And some circuits have extended Sossamon to bar monetary damages in indi- vidual -capacity claims as well. See 763 F.3d 554 (\"the 'unequivocal expression' standard [applied in Sossa- mon] does not apply to suits against non -sovereigns 4 See also, e.g., 93 F.3d 1241; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 653 F.2d 1164. Perhaps for these re asons, some civil rights litigators have been leery of bringing compensatory damages claims at all . See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity , 56 L. & Contemp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 F.3d 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "563 U.S. at 285-286. And some circuits have extended Sossamon to bar monetary damages in indi- vidual -capacity claims as well. See 763 F.3d 554 (\"the 'unequivocal expression' standard [applied in Sossa- mon] does not apply to suits against non -sovereigns 4 See also, e.g., 93 F.3d 1241; 145 F.3d 691; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Perhaps for these re asons, some civil rights litigators have been leery of bringing compensatory damages claims at all . See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity , 56 L. & Contemp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "653 F.2d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Ibid. In light of Section 1997e(e), the circuits are split over whether inmates can ever bring damages claims for the d eprivation of constitu- tional rights , absent some showing of physical injury.5 But \"every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of Section 1997e(e) , agrees that nominal damages are available in this context.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 F.3d 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Ibid. In light of Section 1997e(e), the circuits are split over whether inmates can ever bring damages claims for the d eprivation of constitu- tional rights , absent some showing of physical injury.5 But \"every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of Section 1997e(e) , agrees that nominal damages are available in this context.\" 833 F.3d 242; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "226 F.3d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Ibid. In light of Section 1997e(e), the circuits are split over whether inmates can ever bring damages claims for the d eprivation of constitu- tional rights , absent some showing of physical injury.5 But \"every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of Section 1997e(e) , agrees that nominal damages are available in this context.\" 833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 F.3d 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Ibid. In light of Section 1997e(e), the circuits are split over whether inmates can ever bring damages claims for the d eprivation of constitu- tional rights , absent some showing of physical injury.5 But \"every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of Section 1997e(e) , agrees that nominal damages are available in this context.\" 833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.3d 720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Ibid. In light of Section 1997e(e), the circuits are split over whether inmates can ever bring damages claims for the d eprivation of constitu- tional rights , absent some showing of physical injury.5 But \"every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of Section 1997e(e) , agrees that nominal damages are available in this context.\" 833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "251 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "Ibid. In light of Section 1997e(e), the circuits are split over whether inmates can ever bring damages claims for the d eprivation of constitu- tional rights , absent some showing of physical injury.5 But \"every circuit, regardless of its interpretation of Section 1997e(e) , agrees that nominal damages are available in this context.\" 833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "800 F.3d 1295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 . 18 266 (D. C. Cir. 2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "877 F.3d 161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 . 18 266 (D. C. Cir. 2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.3d 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 143 F.3d 1210; 833 F.3d 242 . 18 266 (D. C. Cir. 2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "196 F.3d 778",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 833 F.3d 242 . 18 266 (D. C. Cir. 2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 F.3d 1210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "833 F.3d 242; 226 F.3d 247; 404 F.3d 371; Roya 375 F.3d 720; 251 F.3d 869; 800 F.3d 1295. In contrast, five circuits have held that the PLRA allows compensatory dam- ages claims for some injuries that are not physical, mental, or emotional , such as constitutional injuries under the First Amend- ment . See 877 F.3d 161; 788 F.3d 207; 196 F.3d 778; 143 F.3d 1210; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 18 266 (D. C. Cir. 2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 F.3d 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "These churches take Jesus' words —\"if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat , give your cloak as well\" —to require as much.6 When they feel compelled to litigate, religious plaintiffs may be reluctant to seek damages because money is inadequate to compensate them for the loss of their religious exercise . The Lakota Nations lost a c- cess to the Black Hills through a \"rank case of dishon- orable dealings\" and nineteenth -century treaties bro- ken by the U.S. government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When this Court acknowledged in 1980 that the governm ent had unlawfully taken the Lakota's land, id. at 422, the only remedy offered was money damages with interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.",
		"context": "\"7 He insisted that the local authorities personally escort him out of the prison, thus publicly establishing that he, and by im- plication those who followed the same faith, were not guilty of any crime. In a more recent context, the Fish and Wildlife Ser- vice conducted an undercover raid of a Native Ameri- can powwow , confiscated dancers' sacred eagle feath- ers, and impos ed criminal fin es on this core religious practice. McAllen Grace Brethren [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After a grueling nine - year legal battle, the Department of Interior finally agreed to return dancer and pastor Robert Soto's feathers and sought to moot the case. Yet as an issue of justice, and to protect others from similar harm, Pastor Soto insisted that the case go forward .",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Courts Must Defer to a Religious Organization's Sincere Determination as to Who Qualifies as a \"Minister.\"",
		"context": "The decisions of this Court already establish that courts may not examine religious doctrin e to deter- mine a n individual 's claim that his religion prevents or compels some action . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]573 U.S. 682. Furthermore, this Court noted in Employment Division v. Smith , that determining religious doctrine is not the role of a judge . The plaintiff in Smith ar- gued that if a course of conduct is \"ce ntral\" to an indi- vidual's religion, then the Court should require the government to show a compelling interest in prohibit- ing the conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 829",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Courts Must Defer to a Religious Organization's Sincere Determination as to Who Qualifies as a \"Minister.\"",
		"context": "Furthermore, this Court noted in Employment Division v. Smith , that determining religious doctrine is not the role of a judge . The plaintiff in Smith ar- gued that if a course of conduct is \"ce ntral\" to an indi- vidual's religion, then the Court should require the government to show a compelling interest in prohibit- ing the conduct. Employment Div [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court rejected that argu- ment, finding that \"[j]udging t he centrality of differ- ent religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims'\" (quoting 455 U.S. 252) . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Courts Must Defer to a Religious Organization's Sincere Determination as to Who Qualifies as a \"Minister.\"",
		"context": "The plaintiff in Smith ar- gued that if a course of conduct is \"ce ntral\" to an indi- vidual's religion, then the Court should require the government to show a compelling interest in prohibit- ing the conduct. Employment Div 494 U.S. 872 . The Court rejected that argu- ment, finding that \"[j]udging t he centrality of differ- ent religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims'\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Id. Such evaluations are not permissible, because \"[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of p articular liti- gants' interpretations of those creeds.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals' Application of Sears's Pragmatic \"Working-Law\" Standard to the Particular Facts in This Record Does Not Warrant Certiorari",
		"context": "\" Elec. Frontier Found. , 739 F.3d at 7 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Documents that are \"n ot issued in final form, signed off on . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.2d 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals' Application of Sears's Pragmatic \"Working-Law\" Standard to the Particular Facts in This Record Does Not Warrant Certiorari",
		"context": "or otherwise adopted as official policy\" may still describe \"the 'final views' \" of an agency, Pet. 14, and consequently fall outside the deliberative pro- cess privilege. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]684 F.2d 517. \"Documents reflecting [an agency's] formal or in- formal policy as to how it ca rries out its responsibil- ities fit comfortably within the 'working law' framework\" by which Sears identifies conclusive, ra- ther than predecisional, material. Public Citizen , 598 F.3d at 875 (D.C. Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals' Application of Sears's Pragmatic \"Working-Law\" Standard to the Particular Facts in This Record Does Not Warrant Certiorari",
		"context": "or otherwise adopted as official policy\" may still describe \"the 'final views' \" of an agency, Pet. 14, and consequently fall outside the deliberative pro- cess privilege. 925 F.3d 576[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Documents reflecting [an agency's] formal or in- formal policy as to how it ca rries out its responsibil- ities fit comfortably within the 'working law' framework\" by which Sears identifies conclusive, ra- ther than predecisional, material. Public Citizen , 598 F.3d at 875 (D.C. Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "684 F.2d 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 14(e) lacks \"rights-creating\" language",
		"context": ". intended to create a private right of action [is] definitively answered in the negative ' where 'a statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class.'\" Gonzaga [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create 'no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.'\" Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 14(e) lacks \"rights-creating\" language",
		"context": "Sec. Litig. , 823 F.2d at 1354 (quoting Universities Research [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Section 14(e) by its terms only \"proscribes certain conduct,\" Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. 444 U.S. 11; it thus focuses entirely \"on the person regulated,\" not the person benefited.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 14(e) lacks \"rights-creating\" language",
		"context": ", 823 F.2d at 1354 (quoting Universities Research 450 U.S. 754). Section 14(e) by its terms only \"proscribes certain conduct,\" Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; it thus focuses entirely \"on the person regulated,\" not the person benefited. Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 289. Section 14(e) accordingly lacks the \"'rights-creating' language so critical to the Court's analysis in\" the few cases where it has recognized an implied right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Rule 32.1(g) does not deprive defendants of the ability to vindicate federal constitutional rights",
		"context": "Nor is Cruz correct that the Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) deprives defendants of \"a reasonable opportunity\" to assert federal rights. Pet. Br., at 31 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Cruz had the opportunity to raise a Simmons claim at trial and on direct appeal, but failed to do so. And when he did invoke Simmons , Cruz did not seek the remedies it provides —instead, he asked the trial court to \"presentence\" him and sought to present witness testimony regarding parole procedures , neither of w hich Simmons permits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Rule 32.1(g) does not deprive defendants of the ability to vindicate federal constitutional rights",
		"context": "Pet. Br. at 33 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Rule 32.1(g) relief is reserved for extraordinary situations where the rule a defendant seeks to apply to his case did not previously exist. As noted above, Cruz had opportunities to present a claim based on Simmons ' existing rule at trial and on direct appeal , but he inexplicably failed to avail himsel f of them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Rule 32.1(g) does not deprive defendants of the ability to vindicate federal constitutional rights",
		"context": "at 33. The baselessness of Cruz's cha rge is evidenced by the multiple cases following Lynch in which the Arizona 27 Supreme Court has remanded for a new capital sentencing proceeding based on the lack of a parole unavailability instruction. See 408 P.3d 408 ; 404 P.3d 240 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Further, Arizona's standard jury instructions now instruct that a sentence of life with the possibility of release does not include parole: If the defendant is sentenced to \"life with the possibility of release,\" parole is not currently available. The defendant's only option is to petition the Board of Executive Clemency for release.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 P.3d 798",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": ". additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a con- trary legislative intent. '\" TRW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, petitioner's reading of the statute turns the expressio unius canon on its head. Instead of respecting Congress's con sidered choice to itemize specific occupations , petitioner treats the statute as 14 also exempting jobs that are neither fish nor fowl but \"hybrid\" or \"'functionally similar'\" to those three oc- cupations .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 10, 15 , 34 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Congress rejected that amorphous, analogical a p- proach in favor of three carefully d rawn occupations delimited in the statute. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 F.2d 1095",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": "55. This Court has made clear that the employer has the burden of proving that FLSA exemptions apply. 15 See Idaho Sheet Metal Works, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioner cannot carry that bur- den. In claiming that service advisors are \"unque s- tionably,\" \"plainly\" salesmen, petitioner ( Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": "Petitioner effectively reads the statute as if it e xempted \"anyone who is primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles\" at an automobile 16 deale rship. Eliding the subject violates \"'a cardinal principle of statutory construction,'\" the canon against surplusage. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] independently limit the scope of the exemption, over and above the verb phrase. Even if service advisors occasionally or inci- dentally sell, that does not suffice to make them salesmen. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": "The FLSA Canon Reinforces the Expressio Unius Inference. The expressio unius inference is e s- pecially strong here because Congress legislated against the backdrop of this Court's \"well settled\" canon of construing exemptions to the FLSA \"nar- rowly. \" Mitch [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]523 U.S. 57. Congress was aware of this settled canon and e n- acted the 1966 and 1974 FLSA Amendments against this backdrop. Discussing what beca me the 1974 FLSA Amendments, the House floor manager of the 1966 and 1974 Amendments explained that the ex- emptions for \"salesmen, part smen, and mechanics\" 17 would \"be strictly interpreted\" by courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": "The FLSA Canon Reinforces the Expressio Unius Inference. The expressio unius inference is e s- pecially strong here because Congress legislated against the backdrop of this Court's \"well settled\" canon of construing exemptions to the FLSA \"nar- rowly. \" Mitch 359 U.S. 290[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress was aware of this settled canon and e n- acted the 1966 and 1974 FLSA Amendments against this backdrop. Discussing what beca me the 1974 FLSA Amendments, the House floor manager of the 1966 and 1974 Amendments explained that the ex- emptions for \"salesmen, part smen, and mechanics\" 17 would \"be strictly interpreted\" by courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": ". define what it catches.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The effect of the term \"any\" depends on context. For instance, if a statute refers to \"any court,\" one need not read it to include foreign courts, b ecause Congress is presumed to legislate only dome stically.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors",
		"context": "The effect of the term \"any\" depends on context. For instance, if a statute refers to \"any court,\" one need not read it to include foreign courts, b ecause Congress is presumed to legislate only dome stically. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 388 –89 (2005 ). Likewise, even if a pet -friendly landlord allowed tenants to bring \"any cat\" into their apar tments , no one would dispute the landlord's right to turn away a Bengal tiger. In context, only housecats are permit- ted, not all felines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "When federal courts find a constitutional violation, they have broad equitable discretion to determine the appro priate remedy. Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 433 U.S. 267. In so doing, courts must \"take ac- count of the public interest.\" U.S. Bancorp Mortg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "When federal courts find a constitutional violation, they have broad equitable discretion to determine the appro priate remedy. Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In so doing, courts must \"take ac- count of the public interest.\" U.S. Bancorp Mortg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "In so doing, courts must \"take ac- count of the public interest.\" U.S. Bancorp Mortg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When remedying a constitutional defect in the composition of a government entity, courts have long weighed the public interest in avoiding harmful disruption of government activities against the private interests in remedying whatever injury occurred. For centuries, courts protected the public interest in avoiding disruption through the de facto officer 35 doctrine, which held that \"the acts of an officer de facto (although his title may be bad) are valid so far as they concern th e public or the rights of third per- sons who have an interest in the things done.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "50 Mo. 593; 38 Conn. 449. The doctrine, which prevented adjudication of appointments challenges, was intend- ed to pro tect \"the public and individuals whose inter- ests may be affected\" by retrospectively invalidating actions taken by an improperly appointed official. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More recently, this Court has treated the validity of an unconstitutionally appointed official's past acts as a question of remedy, rather than a question of justiciability. In Buckley v. Valeo , for instance, the Court held that the commissioners of the Federal Election Commission were appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause, but accorded their acts \"de facto validity\" instead of retrospectively invalidating them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "In Buckley v. Valeo , for instance, the Court held that the commissioners of the Federal Election Commission were appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause, but accorded their acts \"de facto validity\" instead of retrospectively invalidating them. 424 U.S. at 142. The Court rejected the chal- lengers' request to invalidate the Commission's ena- bling statute, Reply Brief of Appellants, Buckley , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Nos. 75 -436, 75- 437), 1975 WL 171458, at 88- 90, 111, which would have nullified opinions and regulations already issued by the Commission. In granting only prospective relief, Buckley observed that the Court had done the same \"with respect to legislative acts performed by\" invalidly elected legis- lators.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "75 -436, 75- 437), 1975 WL 171458, at 88- 90, 111, which would have nullified opinions and regulations already issued by the Commission. In granting only prospective relief, Buckley observed that the Court had done the same \"with respect to legislative acts performed by\" invalidly elected legis- lators. 424 U.S. at 142 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Similarly, in Northern Pipeline Construction 458 U.S. 50, the Court granted retrospective relief to the party before it in the context of a two- party contract action, but cited Buckley in holding that 36 broader \"retroactive application\" to other cases would \"surely visit substantial injustice and hardshi p\" upon other litigants. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects",
		"context": "In granting only prospective relief, Buckley observed that the Court had done the same \"with respect to legislative acts performed by\" invalidly elected legis- lators. 424 U.S. at 142 (citing 404 U.S. 549). Similarly, in Northern Pipeline Construction [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court granted retrospective relief to the party before it in the context of a two- party contract action, but cited Buckley in holding that 36 broader \"retroactive application\" to other cases would \"surely visit substantial injustice and hardshi p\" upon other litigants. Id. at 88 n.41.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board Members Are Officers of the United States, not Officers of the Puerto Rico Territorial Government",
		"context": "But because the Board members are \"officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, these appointment provi-sions violate the Constitution. That is so whether the Board members are \"principal\" or \"inferior\" officers. This Court's \"framework\" for determining whether an individual is an \"officer of the United States\" for purposes of the Appointments Clause was recently confirmed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pursuant to that framework, an individual is an \"of- ficer of the United States\" subject to the Appoint- ments Clause if (1) the appointee occupies a \"continu-ing\" position established by federal law; (2) the ap-pointee \"exercis[es] significant authority\"; and (3) the significant authority is exercised \"purs uant to the laws of the United States.\" See 138 S. Ct. 2044.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board Members Are Officers of the United States, not Officers of the Puerto Rico Territorial Government",
		"context": "This Court's \"framework\" for determining whether an individual is an \"officer of the United States\" for purposes of the Appointments Clause was recently confirmed in 138 S. Ct. 2044. Pursuant to that framework, an individual is an \"of- ficer of the United States\" subject to the Appoint- ments Clause if (1) the appointee occupies a \"continu-ing\" position established by federal law; (2) the ap-pointee \"exercis[es] significant authority\"; and (3) the significant authority is exercised \"purs uant to the laws of the United States.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying that framework, the First Circuit correctly held that the Board mem-bers are officers of the United States. JA164 -65.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board Members Are Officers of the United States, not Officers of the Puerto Rico Territorial Government",
		"context": "With this much San Juan agrees: the reality of fed- eral control and supervision is strong evidence that an appointee is an \"officer of the United States.\" As de-tailed below, t his Court should therefore be mindful that a significant amount of federal supervision and control over the Board members has been uncovered by ongoing litigation in Puerto Rico, and should there-fore not blindly accept the invitation to follow Con-gressiona l labels. The United States and the Board also argue that Lu- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not set out the appropriate test to distinguish between federal and territorial officers, and that different case law con-trols. See U.S. Br. 43–45 (\"The more relevant distinc- tion is between statutes that apply nationwide and those that apply only in a territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Interpretation Creates Glaring Incongruities",
		"context": "See supra Part I.B. The other is § 7212( b)'s prohibition against the \"forcible rescue\" of seized property, which requires proof that the defendant took property by force from the IRS that he knew had been seized. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section § 7212(b) has a maximum sentence that is a year less than what § 7212(a) allows, yet anyone who violates it would necessarily have also violated the government's conception of § 7212(a) by impeding the IRS in order to obtain an unlawful benefit ( i.e., the repossession of lawfully seized property). The government opaquely suggests in a footnote, Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "731 F.2d 1138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Interpretation Creates Glaring Incongruities",
		"context": "As this Court has held, the willful mens rea is already a highly demanding standard that requires proof that that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily violated the law. For example, to be guilty of the misdemeanor of willfu lly failing to make a tax payment, § 7203, the defendant must \"know\" that the law obligates him to make the payment and nevertheless \"voluntarily and intentionally\" choose not to make it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That leaves the government to argue that someone who intentionally did not pay taxes he knew were due might not have done so corruptly, i.e., to obtain an unlawful benefit, such as retaining the money he knew he was obligated to pay over. If those defendants exist, they are rare indeed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Interpretation Creates Glaring Incongruities",
		"context": "If th e government can prove that a defendant willfully violated the tax laws, it will virtually always be able to prove that defendant did so to obtain some unlawful benefit. 4 Indeed, in its brief in 4 The government also cannot ex plain why Congress would have wanted to make the willful failure to maintain required documents a misdemeanor but the failure to maintain other documents a felony, 16 opposition, the government seemingly agreed with this proposition when it approvingly cited the Second Circuit's observation that \"the term 'corruptly endeavors' in Section 7212(a) is 'as comprehensive and accurate as if the word \"willfully\" was incorporated in the statute.'\" BIO at 12 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see 746 F.3d 987. b. The government now conjures defendants who commit these misdemeanors out of \"willful but passive neglect,\" \"embarrassment,\" or some other motive, with no intent whatsoever to obtain an unlawful benefit or advantage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "147 F.3d 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Interpretation Creates Glaring Incongruities",
		"context": "If th e government can prove that a defendant willfully violated the tax laws, it will virtually always be able to prove that defendant did so to obtain some unlawful benefit. 4 Indeed, in its brief in 4 The government also cannot ex plain why Congress would have wanted to make the willful failure to maintain required documents a misdemeanor but the failure to maintain other documents a felony, 16 opposition, the government seemingly agreed with this proposition when it approvingly cited the Second Circuit's observation that \"the term 'corruptly endeavors' in Section 7212(a) is 'as comprehensive and accurate as if the word \"willfully\" was incorporated in the statute.'\" BIO at 12 (quoting 147 F.3d 172); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. The government now conjures defendants who commit these misdemeanors out of \"willful but passive neglect,\" \"embarrassment,\" or some other motive, with no intent whatsoever to obtain an unlawful benefit or advantage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.3d 987",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Interpretation Creates Glaring Incongruities",
		"context": "42. That conjecture does not account for what willfulness entails in the context of a tax crime and the cases the government cites do not support the distinction. For example, the government invokes [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] for the proposition that a defendant may engage in \"willful but passive neglect\" in intentionally failing to pay taxes he knows are due. Gov't Br. 42.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 U.S. 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it",
		"context": "17 As this Court has repeatedly recognized, welfare benefits like SSI merit constitutional protec tion. \"[T]he interest of an in- dividual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 'property' interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accrued welfare benefits are afforded such constitutional protections because, \"[f]or qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.\" 397 U.S. 254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it",
		"context": "424 U.S. 319. Accrued welfare benefits are afforded such constitutional protections because, \"[f]or qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given the recognized importance of such (cont'd) 13 According to a 2013 report from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, families receiving \"means-tested gov-ernment assistance,\" such as SSI and Medicaid, spend approximately 77% of their family budget on essen-tials such as housing, food, and transportation. 18 Against this backdrop, the current law thwarts its stated objective by denying essential SSI benefits to many Americans who need it most by excluding resi- dents of territories other th an the NMI.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it",
		"context": "Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fol- lowing the lapse of these tax advantages, which led to businesses leaving the island en masse, \"the public debt of Puerto Rico's government and its instrumen- talities soared, rising from $39.2 billion in 2005 to $71 billion in 2016.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' claims fail under Section 112(a) because undue experimentation would be required to make and use the claimed antibodies",
		"context": "App. 40a . Given that petitioners' initial research pro- duced their 26 exemplar antibodies, their roadmap may produce additional claimed antibodies with the same functions , but only because the specifications effectively instruct scientists to engage in the sort of \"inde pendent invention\" that petitioners employed in developing their antibodies in the first place. Loom [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Holland Furniture recognized, \"[a] claim so broad, if allowed, would operate to enable  Petitioners assert (Br. 45 n.5) that this finding was so weak that respondents did not defend it on appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "105 U.S. 580",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "As this Court has frequently explained, \"[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of th ose who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under- mined.\" Wesberry , 376 U.S. at 17; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Burson , 504 U.S. at 198-199 (plu- rality op.). The Constitution grants States authority to regulate elections so they can protect that fundamental right. See U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "1. Because voting rights ar e of such bedrock im- portance, a polling place— like a courtroom—can rea- sonably be restricted to reflect the solemn and weighty nature of the function that occurs there. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Grace , 461 U.S. at 182 (acknowledging th e government's interest in \"proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds\"). This Court therefore has expressly recog-nized the \"State's power to regulate conduct in and around the polls in order to maintain peace, order and decorum\" and its strong interest in enacting such regu-lation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "; see also id. at 220 n.4 (Stevens, J. , dissenting)—and it is therefore reasonable in that setting to extend the prohi- bition beyond campaign materials to encompass politi-cal apparel. Cf., e.g., Citizens for Poli ce Accountability Political [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2 F.3d 117. Assessment of the reason ableness of Minnesota's regulation in preventing voter confusion and intimida-tion is not limited to consid eration of the effect that would result from only one or two voters wearing politi- cal apparel in a polling place, \"[f]or if [petitioners are] given access, so too must other[s].\" Lee, 505 U.S. at 685.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F.3d 1213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "; see also id. at 220 n.4 (Stevens, J. , dissenting)—and it is therefore reasonable in that setting to extend the prohi- bition beyond campaign materials to encompass politi-cal apparel. Cf., e.g., Citizens for Poli ce Accountability Political 572 F.3d 1213; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Assessment of the reason ableness of Minnesota's regulation in preventing voter confusion and intimida-tion is not limited to consid eration of the effect that would result from only one or two voters wearing politi- cal apparel in a polling place, \"[f]or if [petitioners are] given access, so too must other[s].\" Lee, 505 U.S. at 685.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 F.3d 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "Me\" buttons in the polling place thus was prevented only by the fact that Minnesota's restrictio n extends beyond campaign ap- parel. 48 op. ); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A core state function is es tablishing a participatory process that ensures electoral results are an accurate reflection of the will of the electorate. 25 More than 100 years ago, at a time when th e State's elections were cha- otic, see, e.g., Burson , 504 U.S. at 203-205 (plurality op.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "Those polling places also protect the secrecy of the ballot, see ibid. (discussing centrality of secret ballot to American electoral prac- tice), by ensuring that vote rs are not treated disparately by election authorities based on the political preferences 25 That is, at least in part, why States possess such broad con- stitutional powers to control the conduct of elections, including \"supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices,\" and authority \"to enact the numerous re-quirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.\" Smiley , 285 U.S. at 366; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 displayed on the voters' apparel. Minnesota's restriction is an integral part of an el ectoral structure designed to guarantee that elections are conducted reliably and fairly with maximal citizen participation.26 Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "49 displayed on the voters' apparel. Minnesota's restriction is an integral part of an el ectoral structure designed to guarantee that elections are conducted reliably and fairly with maximal citizen participation.26 Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1965 ) (recognizing State's prerogative to \"adopt safe guards necessary and appro- priate to assure that the admi nistration of justice at all stages is free from outsid e control and influence\"). Minnesota's restriction also serves the State's com- pelling interest in election integrity because the law en-sures that the public has conf idence in the electoral pro- cess. A regime allowing election judges, election observ-ers, and the majority of vote rs and others present at a polling place to all wear a pparel strongly signaling sup- port for one side of the cons ervative/liberal divide could well be viewed with suspicion by the public, who would wonder if the workings of the polling place (and the elec-toral results) have been undu ly influenced by a particu- lar political viewpoint.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "But that is demonstrably untrue—and, in any event, Minnesota could reasonably conclude otherwise. As petitioners themselves acknowledge, \"p owerful messages can some- times be conveyed in just a few words,\" Br. 26 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and Burson recognized that passive displays of campaign messages can have harmful effects. See Burson , 504 U.S. at 210 n.13 (plurality op.) (rejecting argument that statute was overbroad because it reache d \"display\" of a bumper sticker or simi lar displays); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Co mmunity School District , for example, the Court—in the course of finding viewpoint 27 See https://www.supremecourt .gov/visiting/visitorsguide- tooralargument.aspx (last visited Feb.2, 2018). 52 discrimination because the sc hool did not bar \"wearing of all symbols of political significance\"—said only that \"the wearin g of armbands in the circumstances of this case was divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; compare Morse , 551 U.S. at 408. And in Jews for Jesus , the Court characterized, in passing, the \"wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a polit- ical message\" as \"n on-disruptive\" to ot her passengers at an airport who were not themselves en gaged in any po- litical endeavor. 482 U.S. at 576.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place",
		"context": "That argument—which was soundly rejected in Burson despite the exacting scrutiny applied in that case, see 504 U.S. at 206-207 (plurality op. )—lacks me rit. Under the reasonableness test applic able in a nonp ublic forum, the speech restriction \"need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation\" imposed in the forum, Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 808, and there is nothing \"im- proper in [a legislature] pr oviding alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and the sa me interest,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Talkin , 799 F.3d at 1165-1166. In addition , with respect to protection of vot- ing—the most central and sacred act in our democ- racy—the State need not restrict itself to addressing only actual physical disrupti on of the polling place, or actual intimidation of voters, that is witnessed by the authorities. As the Burson plurality explained, \"[i]ntim- idation and interference laws fall short of serving a 53 State's compelling interests be cause they deal with only the most blatant an d specific attempts to impede elec- tions\" and do not adequately address attempts that go \"undetected.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.2d 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-443 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , PETITIONER v. DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV ON PETITION FOR A WR IT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER This is no ordinary capital case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-443 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , PETITIONER v. DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV ON PETITION FOR A WR IT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER This is no ordinary capital case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-443 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , PETITIONER v. DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV ON PETITION FOR A WR IT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER This is no ordinary capital case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 5 516 U.S. 1 .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-443 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , PETITIONER v. DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV ON PETITION FOR A WR IT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER This is no ordinary capital case. It is a prosecution for terrorism, involving horrific crimes that struck at the entire Nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "................... 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 283 U.S. 308 .................... 6 373 U.S. 83 ................................ 9 500 U.S. 415 ...................... 4, 5, 6 402 F.2d 314, cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 ............. 3 Rosales 451 U.S. 182 ........... 6 561 U.S. 358 .............. 2, 3, 4 904 F.3d 111 , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 949 ..................... 5 447 U.S. 727 ....................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 9 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-443 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , PETITIONER v. DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV ON PETITION FOR A WR IT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER This is no ordinary capital case. It is a prosecution for terrorism, involving horrific crimes that struck at the entire Nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "1. This Court has made clear that \" [n]o hard -and- fast formula dictates the necessary depth or bre adth of voir dire \" in a federal criminal trial. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, determining \"the measures necessary to ensure [ juror] impartiality — 3 including with respect to pretrial publicity —lies \" 'par- ticularly within the province of the trial judge. ' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "Respondent contends (Br. in Opp. 32 -33) that the court of appeals ' turnabout was not unexpected because its post -trial decision cited language in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,393 U.S. 1022 . But respondent does not explain why, if the \" Patriarca rule\" (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.2d 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "The court of appeals ' rule was no t only unex- pected, but wrong. This Court has recognized that a \"trial court requires great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire .\" Mu' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals ' rule, in contrast, dictates \" questions \" that must \" be asked on voir dire \"—the antithesis of \"the wide discre- tion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "26 -33) that the court of appeals ' rigid voir dire rule is a permis- sible exercise of its supervisory authority. The super- visory power is not a blank check for an appellate panel 5 to impose any rule it might deem desirable. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the power must be exercised with \"some cau- tion\" and within the \" considered limitations \" of the sur- rounding law. 447 U.S. 727.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "See, e.g., 461 U.S. 499. Rather, the power must be exercised with \"some cau- tion\" and within the \" considered limitations \" of the sur- rounding law. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, \"the supervisory power does not authorize \" a suppression rule where the Court 's own \"Fourth Amendment decisions have estab- lished beyond any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence, \" as the \"values assigned to the competing in- terests do not change because a court has elected to an-alyze the question under the supervisory power in- stead. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "30) that this Court has \" used its own supervisory powers to regulate discrete aspects of voir dire by compelling specific in-quiries about racial prejudice in certain circumstances. \" 6 But the cited decisions involved \"fail[ures] to ask any question which could be deemed to cover the subject \" of racial prejudice. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And this Court has distinguished the general in- quiry required by those decisions from a more specific scripting requirement of the sort the panel erroneously imposed here. See Mu 'Min , 500 U.S. at 424.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "14; see id. at 1-2, 13, 16. The 9 court of appeals ' subsidiary concl usion that withholding particular Waltham evidence violated [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was not an \"independent ground[ ]\" for the court of appeals ' judgment (Br. in Opp. 10).",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The questions presented warrant review.",
		"context": "86a) (brackets omitted). But \" mere spec- ulation \" that disclosure of withheld evidence \"might have led [defense] counsel to conduct additional discov- ery that might have led to some additional evidence that could have been utilized \" is not a proper basis for a Brady claim. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 10 (per curi am). In any event, any additional evidence would have been about the Waltham crime. If this Court rejects the court of appeals ' conclusion that evi- dence of the Waltham crime was necessary for a valid verdict —as the second question presented asks this Court to do —then respondent 's ability to further inves- tigate that crime was immaterial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Forfeiture of land is a longstanding practice in the United States",
		"context": "29 Moreover, this Court \"h esitate[s] to place great emphasis\" on the Magna Carta and the \"particulars of 13th-century English practice, particularly when the interpretation we are urged to adopt appears to con-flict with the lessons of more recent history.\" Brown- ing-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner also relies heavily upon historical trea- tises, such as those by Th omas Cooley, to establish a historical right to a surplus. Yet even Cooley points to no definitive right to a surplus, explaining only that the states adopted \"[v]arious methods .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Forfeiture of land is a longstanding practice in the United States",
		"context": "Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation, at 343 (1876). In contrast to Petitioner's claims, the practice of tax forfeiture in American law is longstanding and has been considered and approved by this Court, when ac- companied with sufficient due process. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Nelson , 352 U.S. at 110. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "171 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Text and Structure of the Provisions Make Clear That \"Knowingly Violates\" Applies to Both the Status and Possession Elements of section 922(g)",
		"context": "A plain reading of the statute s shows that the \"knowingly violates \" provision applies equally to the status and possession elements of a § 922(g) crime. The starting point when construing a statute is the language of the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"As in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress, and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. \" Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Text and Structure of the Provisions Make Clear That \"Knowingly Violates\" Applies to Both the Status and Possession Elements of section 922(g)",
		"context": "\"As in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress, and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. \" Am. Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has instructed \"time and again \" that courts presume Congress \"says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. \" Conn. Nat 'l 503 U.S. 249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Text and Structure of the Provisions Make Clear That \"Knowingly Violates\" Applies to Both the Status and Possession Elements of section 922(g)",
		"context": "Tobacco 456 U.S. 63 ( 1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has instructed \"time and again \" that courts presume Congress \"says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. \" Conn. Nat 'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statutory text here is unambiguou s. Thus, the \"knowingly violates \" language of § 924(a)(2) applies to both substan tive elements of a § 922(g) violation: (1) the status that makes a person 's possession illegal (here, that Mr. Rehaif was \"illegally or unlawfully in the United Stat es\") and (2) the possession of a firearm. A person does not knowingly violate § 922(g) with out knowing the one fact that makes his possession of the firearm illegal – i.e., his status.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Text and Structure of the Provisions Make Clear That \"Knowingly Violates\" Applies to Both the Status and Possession Elements of section 922(g)",
		"context": "With this sequencing, the most natural reading of the statute s is that the \"knowingly violates \" requirement applies to bo th status and possession elements. To construe the provisions otherwise, one must \"read[] the word 'knowingly ' as leapfrogging over the very first § 922(g) element and touching down only at the second \" – an interpretation that \"defies linguistic sense – and not a little grammatical gravity. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of this section, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act had not attained the age of 12 years\"). 14 J., concurring in judgment). \"[T]he law before us that survived the gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment couldn 't be plainer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "667 F.3d 1136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Text and Structure of the Provisions Make Clear That \"Knowingly Violates\" Applies to Both the Status and Possession Elements of section 922(g)",
		"context": "\"[T]he law before us that survived the gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment couldn 't be plainer. By their exp ress terms, § § 922(g) and 924(a)(2) do not authorize the government to imprison [persons] unless and until the government can show they knew of their felon status at the time of the alleged offense. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en",
		"citation_value_orig": "695 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Act does not discriminate based on viewpoint",
		"context": "§ 123471(a)(5). Nor would any possible disparate im-pact establish viewpoint discrimination. See McCul- len, 134 S. Ct. at 2531 (a law that \"'serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neu-tral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speak- ers or messages but not others'\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; U.S. Br. 31. In any event, the record includes no evidence that the law applies only to facilities that oppose abortion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Act does not discriminate based on viewpoint",
		"context": "Instead it ensures that, regardless of what petitioners choose to say, pregnant women will receive, from the State, certain minimal information that allows them to acquire more information if they wish. In rejecting the conclusion that California's law was motivated by antipathy towards religious, anti-abortion viewpoints, the district court here reached 52 the same conclusion as every other court that has con- sidered the issue.43 That conclusion would be correct in any procedural posture, and is all the more correct given the more stringent standard that this Court has indicated applies to proof of discriminatory purpose in the context of requests for preliminary relief. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. By Its Text, The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Of The United States And Not To Officers Of The Territories",
		"context": "2 . In considering the ambit of the Appointments Clause, this Court has highlighted two important limitations: the position (1) must be one of continuing employment (2) that carries significant authori ty pursuant to the laws of the United States. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 138 S. Ct. 2044 ; 99 U.S. 508 ; 137 U.S. 310 . 18 But the First Circuit erred in relying on just these limitations in formulating its Appointment Clause test. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. By Its Text, The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Of The United States And Not To Officers Of The Territories",
		"context": "2 . In considering the ambit of the Appointments Clause, this Court has highlighted two important limitations: the position (1) must be one of continuing employment (2) that carries significant authori ty pursuant to the laws of the United States. See 424 U.S. 1 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 99 U.S. 508 ; 137 U.S. 310 . 18 But the First Circuit erred in relying on just these limitations in formulating its Appointment Clause test. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. By Its Text, The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Of The United States And Not To Officers Of The Territories",
		"context": "2 . In considering the ambit of the Appointments Clause, this Court has highlighted two important limitations: the position (1) must be one of continuing employment (2) that carries significant authori ty pursuant to the laws of the United States. See 424 U.S. 1 ; 138 S. Ct. 2044 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 137 U.S. 310 . 18 But the First Circuit erred in relying on just these limitations in formulating its Appointment Clause test. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. By Its Text, The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Of The United States And Not To Officers Of The Territories",
		"context": "2 . In considering the ambit of the Appointments Clause, this Court has highlighted two important limitations: the position (1) must be one of continuing employment (2) that carries significant authori ty pursuant to the laws of the United States. See 424 U.S. 1 ; 138 S. Ct. 2044 ; 99 U.S. 508 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 18 But the First Circuit erred in relying on just these limitations in formulating its Appointment Clause test. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "First, it bypassed the requirement of a federal -law gap by failing to recognize the limiting function of \"applicable ,\" in context, as meaning \"suitable .\" Only some state laws are suitable to be applied on the outer continental shelf—those that fill gaps by addressing subjects not already covered by federal law. See Gulf Offsh ore Co. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, whe re there is already -applicable federal law, then state law is not \"applicable\" under OCSLA. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Such a wooden reading of a single word in isolation —which deprives it of any practical meaning —cannot and should not displace the statutory context and purpose of this federal choice of law provision. It \"is a ' fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used .'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The purpose and structure of OCSLA, as well as its ample legislative history, all demonstrat e that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of \" applicable \" makes no sense. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "So even if \"applicable\" cou ld be read as broadly as the Ninth Circuit would have it, OCSLA's inconsistency criterion would still rule out the borrowing of California wage and hour law . Our federalist system \" adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elem ents of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Preemption doctrine, implementing the Supremacy Clause, addresses the \" possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross -purposes \" when there are two sovereigns. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "67 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Given this backdrop of mutual respect between dual sovereigns, although Congress may expressly or implicitly preempt state laws , id., Congress may also do the opposite. For example, some federal regulatory schemes are based on a \"cooperative federalism\" model . See New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 167–68 (19 92) (listing an array of federal statutes deploying a cooperative federalist approach). 8 Congress also may enact saving s clauses that preserve some of a State's pre- existing regulatory authority over an area that is also subject to federal control . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "8 Congress also may enact saving s clauses that preserve some of a State's pre- existing regulatory authority over an area that is also subject to federal control . See, e.g. , Rush Prudential HMO, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction where only federal law applies , savings clauses meant to preserve state authority have no role to play . Such is the case u nder OCSLA, where there are not two sovereigns who need to be accommodated on the outer continental shelf —there is only one: the federal government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "§ 1333(a)(1); Rodrigue , 395 U.S. at 35 7. Even before the passage of OCSLA, this Court recognized that the protection and control of the outer continental shelf was solely a function of federal sovereignty , where the \"national interest is unencumbered.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, because States have no sovereign control over the outer continental shelf , and have never had any , there is no residual state authority for Congress to preserve via a savings clause. In transposing Congress's decision under the FLSA to preserve state authority regarding wage standards within state jurisdiction, 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "20 –21. Courts presume that ordinary congressional authorization of state regulation does not authorize regulation of a federal enclave unless Congress's purpose to do so is manifest. Goodyear Atomic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no such manifest intent in the FLSA's savings clause or anywhere else in the FLSA . The savings clause provides that \" No provision of this Act .",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "States could th us override long-established federal law on federal land, and employers operating in compliance with established federal law would no longer be able to implement uniform procedures across all of their outer continental shelf operations . 12 \"shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States \").3 That is exclusive federal jurisdiction in name only, and it is little different fr om the proposals to adopt state law as OCLSA 's governing standard that Congress rejected , because there, too, state law would have been subject to ordinary preemption . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in the text of OCSLA commands this topsy -turvy result. The ordinary meaning of \"inconsistent\" easily rules out the borrowing of California wage and hour law in lieu of the FLSA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "The provision for federal administrators to apply state law comes into play primarily where Congress has made explicit that state regulations should apply in the outer continental shelf, such as for workers' compensation. See Pac. Operators Offshore, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Had Congress wanted to invoke the test the Ninth Circuit applied, it could have authorized borrowing of state law s to \"the extent that they are applicable and not [preempted by] this Act or . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
		"context": "§ 31151(e)(2)(A ). 14 invent new federal com mon l aw. See Cont'l Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But nothing in OCSLA's text, history, or purpose indicates that Congress wanted to displace comprehensive existin g, enacted federal standards with competing standards borrowed from state law .",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F.2d 1030",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is an imperative need for the court to consider fully the concept of viability as a temporal line for purposes of review of abortion regulations.",
		"context": "Although the Court has re -examined and modified many aspects of its abortion jurisprudence since Roe v. Wade , it has yet to consider fully the concept of via- bility as a line that demarcates the state's predomi- nant interest in preserving the life of the developing fetus. In Roe, the Court identified two different com- pelling state interests: to protect the health a nd well- being of the mother, and to protect the \"potential\" life of the unborn child . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But, the Court declared that these interests were separate and distinct and \"[e]ach grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during preg- nancy, each becomes 'compelling.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is an imperative need for the court to consider fully the concept of viability as a temporal line for purposes of review of abortion regulations.",
		"context": "Id. at 160. Although the Court was not explicit regarding the standard of review for the abortion right in Roe itself, Carhart , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Planned 505 U.S. 833 , however, the Court modified both the timing and nature of the state's interests in relation to abor- tion as well as the level of scrutiny afforded any such regulation. The Court specifically rejected the tri- mester -based framework as a \"rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life\" and not part of the \"essential holding\" of Roe.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is an imperative need for the court to consider fully the concept of viability as a temporal line for purposes of review of abortion regulations.",
		"context": "at 160. Although the Court was not explicit regarding the standard of review for the abortion right in Roe itself, Carhart , 550 U.S. 124 . In Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , however, the Court modified both the timing and nature of the state's interests in relation to abor- tion as well as the level of scrutiny afforded any such regulation. The Court specifically rejected the tri- mester -based framework as a \"rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life\" and not part of the \"essential holding\" of Roe. 505 U.S. at 873.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is an imperative need for the court to consider fully the concept of viability as a temporal line for purposes of review of abortion regulations.",
		"context": "Id. at 872 - 73. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the Court rejected the trimester -based framework, based on its analysis of the \"essential holding\" of Roe, the Court maintained viability as a \"line\" before which a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U. S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is an imperative need for the court to consider fully the concept of viability as a temporal line for purposes of review of abortion regulations.",
		"context": "The reason ar- ticulated by the Court was tha t viability was \"the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overri des the rights of the woman .\" Id. The Court continued to develop the nature of the state's interest and qualify the standard of review in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Gonzales , the Court expanded on the interests that a state has in regulat ing abortion. It upheld Congress's stated in- terest of prohibiting a procedure that would \"further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The breadth of Austin's restriction is particularly pernicious to political speech",
		"context": "speech. \"The argument that\" Austin's law is content-neu- tral \"is reminiscent of Anatole France's sardonic re- mark that '[t]he law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While ostensibly neutral, the law is a de facto ban on political and ideological speech. 4 Some facial distinctions are obvious, defining reg- ulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its func- tion or purpose, but both are subject to strict scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The breadth of Austin's restriction is particularly pernicious to political speech",
		"context": "937 F.3d 721. \"Billboards are a well-established medium of com- munication, used to convey a broad range of different kinds of messages.\" Metromedia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner's on-premises/ off-premises distinction threatens to cut off all political and noncommercial speech fr om this important me- dium of communication. 5",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Bankruptcy Clause Has No Bearing Here",
		"context": "31 n.13; see Pet'rs Br. 36. Just as it is \"absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention to which they were not even parties,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it is absurd to analyze tribal sovereign immunity under cases holding that state sovereign immunity has no place in bankruptcy. The same can be said of Respondent's argument that \"the 'narrow' nature of [a] bankruptcy court's 'chiefly in rem ' jurisdiction 'does not implicate state sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction.'\" Resp't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Court's Open Departure From The Declaration's Meaning Of Equality Is Morally Shocking",
		"context": "hocking. William B. Allen , Ph.D. and former director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, showed great insight when he realized the court had rejected the meaning of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence after its ruling in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He observed: Ten years ago it did not occur to me that the Supreme Court did not accept the principle of equality as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. The history of civil rights decisions since that time has proved that, indeed, the equa lity recognized by the Court is only a gift of government the result of human legislation rather than God given rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Fifth Amendment accommodates governmental interests",
		"context": "Hoffman , 341 U.S. at 489-90. The imperative to safeguard individuals from compelled self -incrimi- nation \"transcend[s] any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of crime.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. In the years since this Court first determined that a government employer may not in subsequent \"criminal proceedings \" make use of statements that it \"coerce[s]\" from an employee \"under threat of removal from office,\" see Garrity , 385 U.S. at 500, law enfor ce- ment agencies around the country have developed ef- fective means of accommodating law enforcement interests and the Fifth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Fifth Amendment accommodates governmental interests",
		"context": "The U.S. Department of Justice employs similar procedures when it investigates police officers for criminal wrongdoing following an internal affairs in- vestigation by the local department. In order to com- ply with the protections given to statements generated during the internal investigation, the De- partment of Justice's review of internal affairs mate- rial will involve \"personnel who are not involved in the investigation or prosecution … redact[ing] privi- leged testimony before either the grand jury or the prosecuting attorneys see the statement.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also In re478 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2007 ); In re40 F.3d 1096. And those investigating civil rights violations are directed not to review inter- nal affairs statements but to instead forward them to the FBI in a sealed envelope so that any compelled statements can be removed before the materials a re reviewed by the Department of Justice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F.3d 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Fifth Amendment accommodates governmental interests",
		"context": "The U.S. Department of Justice employs similar procedures when it investigates police officers for criminal wrongdoing following an internal affairs in- vestigation by the local department. In order to com- ply with the protections given to statements generated during the internal investigation, the De- partment of Justice's review of internal affairs mate- rial will involve \"personnel who are not involved in the investigation or prosecution … redact[ing] privi- leged testimony before either the grand jury or the prosecuting attorneys see the statement.\" In re75 F.3d 446; see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir. 2007 ); In re40 F.3d 1096. And those investigating civil rights violations are directed not to review inter- nal affairs statements but to instead forward them to the FBI in a sealed envelope so that any compelled statements can be removed before the materials a re reviewed by the Department of Justice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 F.3d 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Fifth Amendment accommodates governmental interests",
		"context": "In order to com- ply with the protections given to statements generated during the internal investigation, the De- partment of Justice's review of internal affairs mate- rial will involve \"personnel who are not involved in the investigation or prosecution … redact[ing] privi- leged testimony before either the grand jury or the prosecuting attorneys see the statement.\" In re75 F.3d 446; see also In re478 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2007 ); In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And those investigating civil rights violations are directed not to review inter- nal affairs statements but to instead forward them to the FBI in a sealed envelope so that any compelled statements can be removed before the materials a re reviewed by the Department of Justice. U.S. Dep't of 51 Justice, Civil Rights Resource Manual No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "40 F.3d 1096",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The ACCA's force clause requires force targeted at another, and reckless offenses do not satisfy that requirement",
		"context": "1954) (\"[a]ct of employing anything\"); Random House Dictionary 2097 (2d ed. 1987) (\"act of employing, using, or putting into service\"); Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990) (\"[a]ct of employing,\" \"application\"); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a matter of grammar, \"against the person of an- other\" is an adjectival prepositional phrase, used restric-tively to modify (and limit) the phrase \"the use of physical force.\" See Margaret Shertzer, The Elements of Grammar 7 (1986).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The ACCA's force clause requires force targeted at another, and reckless offenses do not satisfy that requirement",
		"context": "Put anothe r way, the adjectival phrase describes the type of \"use of physical force\" that constitutes the required offense element: namely, \"the use of physical force against the per- son of another.\" The phrase thus supplies \"words of limi- tation designed to restrict\" the provision's otherwise ex-pansive scope. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Within the phrase \"against the person of another,\" in turn, the preposition \"against\" introduces the target of the preceding action (\"the use of physical force\"). See, e.g., Webster's New Intern ational Dictionary 46 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 824",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The ACCA's force clause requires force targeted at another, and reckless offenses do not satisfy that requirement",
		"context": "1954) (defining \"against\" as \"[i]n opposition to\"; \"coun- ter to\"; \"adverse to\"); Random House Dictionary 36 (2d ed. 1987) (defining \"against\" as \"in opposition to; contrary to; adverse or hostile to\"; \"in resistance to or defense from\"); Black's Law Dictionary 61 (6th ed. 1990) (defin- ing \"against\" as \"[a]dverse to; contrary\"; \"in conflict with\"); see also, e.g., District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accord- ingly, in this context, the phrase \"the use of phys-ical force against the person of another\" clarifies that only 20 a certain kind of use of physic al force suffices: one that is directed or aimed at another person. The distinction between an ac tion that is targeted at another person, on the one hand, and an action that in- volves a substantial risk of ha rm to another person, on the other, maps onto the broa der distinction between pur- poseful or knowing conduct, on the one hand, and reckless or negligent conduct, on the other.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
		"context": "San Antonio Indep. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, as this Court explained in San Antonio , \"it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system\" than o ne seeking to \"abrogate systems . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
		"context": "These concerns are particularly evident when it comes to matters of State government. In similar set- tings, this Court has rightly blanched at constitutional interpretations that would \"subject a wide range of gov- ernmental operations to invasive judicial superintend- ence.\" Borough of Duryea, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And so the Court has \"often reco g- nized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.\" Engquist , 553 U.S. 599.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
		"context": "That leeway, moreover, does not diminish for claims raising First Amendment challenges of the sort ad- vanced here. Quite the opposite: Public employers may regulate even core First Amendment activities when they have sufficient interest as an employer in doing so. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Civil Service Comm 413 U.S. 548; United Public 330 U.S. 75 . Wer e it otherwise, the First Amendment could be used to blue pencil all manner of State man- agement deci sions —an outcome roundly \"inconsistent -13- with sound principles of federalism and separation of powers.\" Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 423.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
		"context": "That leeway, moreover, does not diminish for claims raising First Amendment challenges of the sort ad- vanced here. Quite the opposite: Public employers may regulate even core First Amendment activities when they have sufficient interest as an employer in doing so. See 413 U.S. 601 ; Civil Service Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United Public 330 U.S. 75 . Wer e it otherwise, the First Amendment could be used to blue pencil all manner of State man- agement deci sions —an outcome roundly \"inconsistent -13- with sound principles of federalism and separation of powers.\" Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 423.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
		"context": "That leeway, moreover, does not diminish for claims raising First Amendment challenges of the sort ad- vanced here. Quite the opposite: Public employers may regulate even core First Amendment activities when they have sufficient interest as an employer in doing so. See 413 U.S. 601 ; Civil Service Comm 413 U.S. 548; United Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Wer e it otherwise, the First Amendment could be used to blue pencil all manner of State man- agement deci sions —an outcome roundly \"inconsistent -13- with sound principles of federalism and separation of powers.\" Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 423.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
		"context": "There is no one \"preferred\" system for matters of State labor policy. Instead, States have used their regulatory flexibility to fashion \"effective and creative programs for solving local problems.\" Reeves , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Montana's longstanding and effective choices in this regard should be celebrated, not m a- ligned.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Is Essential To Protect Children Born Into Domestic Violence",
		"context": "The actual-agreement requirement takes heed of the special concerns and challenges that domestic vi-olence creates by preventin g an abusive parent from establishing the habitual residence of a child based on the abused parent's coerced \"consent.\" In cases of \"verbal and physical abuse of a spouse,\" courts have recognized that \"the conduct of the victimized spouse asserted to manifest 'consent' must be carefully scru- tinized.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also , e.g., A, [2013] UKSC 60, ¶ 65 (finding \"highly relevant\" \"[t]he circumstances in which the[ ] children came to be in Pakistan, and the coercion to which their mother was subject\"). An actual-agreement requirement ensures that \"[h]abitual residence is not established when the removing spouse is coerced involuntarily to move to or remain in another country.\" Silverman , 338 F.3d at 900.",
		"citation_value_orig": "176 F. Supp. 2d 1045",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
		"context": "Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; see Julian , 486 U.S. at 8 (citing FOIA's \"mandate\" of \"b road disclosure\"). This general policy is not a legitimate basis for a narrow-construction canon. This Court rejected a similar narrow-construction canon for FLSA exemptions in Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's analysis in Encino requires rejecting the narrow-construction canon for FOIA exemptions as well. 10 The FLSA is structured similarly to FOIA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
		"context": "Circuit to make the opposite error: to arbitrarily broaden the scope of a different FOIA exemption based on a perception that FOIA, as written, did not protect law enforcement interests well enough. Exemption 2 of FOIA protects materials \"related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,\" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), yet in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated by 562 U.S. 562, the D.C. Circuit expanded that exception to apply to any materials that might risk \"circumvention of agency regulations or statutes,\" in li ght of its assessment that Congress would not have wanted to undermine \"the effectiveness of law enforceme nt agencies.\" 670 F.2d at 1074.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.2d 1051",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
		"context": "Circuit to make the opposite error: to arbitrarily broaden the scope of a different FOIA exemption based on a perception that FOIA, as written, did not protect law enforcement interests well enough. Exemption 2 of FOIA protects materials \"related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,\" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), yet in 670 F.2d 1051, abrogated by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the D.C. Circuit expanded that exception to apply to any materials that might risk \"circumvention of agency regulations or statutes,\" in li ght of its assessment that Congress would not have wanted to undermine \"the effectiveness of law enforceme nt agencies.\" 670 F.2d at 1074.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
		"context": "Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; see Julian , 486 U.S. at 8 (citing FOIA's \"mandate\" of \"b road disclosure\"). This general policy is not a sound basis for ignoring the plain language of a statute. This Court rejected a similar narrow-construction canon for FLSA exemptions in Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's analysis in Encino requires the same result for FOIA exemptions as well. The FLSA is structured similarly to FOIA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
		"context": "Circuit to make the opposite error: to arbitrarily broaden the scope of a different FOIA exemption based on a perception that FOIA, as written, did not protect law enforcement interests well enough. Exemption 2 of FOIA protects materials \"related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,\" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), yet in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated by 562 U.S. 562, the D.C. Circuit expanded that exception to apply to any materials that might risk \"circumvention of agency regulations or statutes,\" in li ght of its assessment that Congress would not have wanted to undermine \"the effectiveness of law enforceme nt agencies.\" 670 F.2d at 1074.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.2d 1051",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
		"context": "Circuit to make the opposite error: to arbitrarily broaden the scope of a different FOIA exemption based on a perception that FOIA, as written, did not protect law enforcement interests well enough. Exemption 2 of FOIA protects materials \"related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,\" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), yet in 670 F.2d 1051, abrogated by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the D.C. Circuit expanded that exception to apply to any materials that might risk \"circumvention of agency regulations or statutes,\" in li ght of its assessment that Congress would not have wanted to undermine \"the effectiveness of law enforceme nt agencies.\" 670 F.2d at 1074.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is no obstacle to this Court's review",
		"context": "Pet.6. SFFA satisfies Hunt 's well -known, three -part test for associational standing: (1) its mem- bers have \"standing to sue in their own right\"; (2) this litigation is \"germane to [ SFFA's ] purpose\"; and 3 (3) this litigation does not \"require[] the participation of individual members.\" App.34 5-46 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Harvard has never \"dispute[d] that the three Hunt prerequisites are met.\" App.345, 52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is no obstacle to this Court's review",
		"context": "But the Court rout inely decides cases brought by membership associations. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Harvard knows that individuals' claims for prospective relief expire once they graduate, Pet.30, and that few young adults could endure the threats, insults, and harassment that Abigail Fisher suffered , Dkt.150-4 . This case has reached th e Court only because thousands of Asian -American students and families came together to \"vindicat[e] interests that they share with others .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is no obstacle to this Court's review",
		"context": "And Harvard knows that individuals' claims for prospective relief expire once they graduate, Pet.30, and that few young adults could endure the threats, insults, and harassment that Abigail Fisher suffered , Dkt.150-4 . This case has reached th e Court only because thousands of Asian -American students and families came together to \"vindicat[e] interests that they share with others .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Harvard's standing argument is predictable . Uni- versities who use racial preferences regularly invo ke flawed standing arguments to try to avoid this Court 's review .",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Revisit Teague's Watershed Exception to Cover New Rules that Replace Rules that Are the Product of Discriminatory Animus.",
		"context": "\"[I]n the years since Teague , [this Court has] rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status\" and has stated that \"it is unlikely that any such rules\" have \"yet to emerge.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather than continue to recite that there are two exceptions to non- retroactivity under Teague when there is effectively only one, this Court should revisit Teague 's watershed exception. The Court should consider the application of the watershed rule to new rules that replace prior rules that are the product of discriminatory animus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Revisit Teague's Watershed Exception to Cover New Rules that Replace Rules that Are the Product of Discriminatory Animus.",
		"context": "Rather than continue to recite that there are two exceptions to non- retroactivity under Teague when there is effectively only one, this Court should revisit Teague 's watershed exception. The Court should consider the application of the watershed rule to new rules that replace prior rules that are the product of discriminatory animus. Although amicus recognizes that the Court has—in cases prior to its Teague ruling—declined to retroactively apply rules replacing those rooted in discriminatory animus, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], such a consideration under Teague would better balance the interests at stake. A state cannot have an interest in the finality of a conviction that is the product of a rule adopted for discriminatory purposes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress's Use Of \"Financial Condition\" Is Telling",
		"context": "financial condition\" language to the bankruptcy laws in the first place. Congress's use of \"financial condition,\" as opposed to something like \"finances\" or \"financial information\" (either of which would cover a broad universe of items regardless of one's overall state), therefore is telling — and, like the rest of the statute, must be given effect. See Cooper Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. TRANSUNION'S TYPICALITY ARGUMENT HAS NO SUPPORT",
		"context": "Typicality serves as a guarantee that the class representative has \"the same interest and suffer[s] the same injury as the class members.\" Gen. Tel. Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have repeatedly echoed these principles. See, e.g., 910 F.3d 1030146 S.Ct. 607687 F.3d 583.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. TRANSUNION'S TYPICALITY ARGUMENT HAS NO SUPPORT",
		"context": "Co. of 457 U.S. 147. Courts have repeatedly echoed these principles. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]146 S.Ct. 607687 F.3d 583. 44 Under TransUnion's rule, for example, in a class action lawsuit seeking refunds for defective tires, a class member who narrowly escaped an accident would be disqualified as a class representative, even if that person was seeking only a refund. Neither TransUnion nor its amici cite any case in which typicality was not satisfied because the plaintiff was \"too strong.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F.3d 1030",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. TRANSUNION'S TYPICALITY ARGUMENT HAS NO SUPPORT",
		"context": "Co. of 457 U.S. 147. Courts have repeatedly echoed these principles. See, e.g., 910 F.3d 1030146 S.Ct. 607[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44 Under TransUnion's rule, for example, in a class action lawsuit seeking refunds for defective tires, a class member who narrowly escaped an accident would be disqualified as a class representative, even if that person was seeking only a refund. Neither TransUnion nor its amici cite any case in which typicality was not satisfied because the plaintiff was \"too strong.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. TRANSUNION'S TYPICALITY ARGUMENT HAS NO SUPPORT",
		"context": "And TransUnion never sought to bar Ramirez from testify- ing or to limit his testimony in any of its five motions in limine , or with trial objections that would have preserved the issue for appeal. Instead, TransUnion made a calculated trial deci- sion to focus on advocacy, not evidence, in an effort to 12 See, e.g. , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 46 persuade the jury that there was no harm to other class members. In summation, TransUnion argued: \"You have seen no evidence that any [absent] class members were harmed … [or] even faced any signifi- cant risk of harm or hardship .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "837 F.3d 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. BACKGROUND",
		"context": "A trademark license can be oral. See, e.g. , Transgo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It may be incomplete or ambig- uous . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.2d 1001",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. BACKGROUND",
		"context": "It may be incomplete or ambig- uous . See, e.g. , Intersport, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This complexity and variety make it difficult to agree on simple rules for how to treat trademark li- censes in bankruptcy. In fact, the legislative history of the enactment of Section 365(n) plainly states that Congress recognized trademarks were unique and, because it required more study, expressly postponed congressional action in this area to allow bankruptcy courts to develop an equitable treatment for trade- mark licenses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 N.E.2d 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. BACKGROUND",
		"context": "Wi th a directive to apply non-bankruptcy law from this Court, bankruptcy courts may apply and, as nec- essary, further develop that law to reach equitable treatments of trademark licenses in bankruptcy. This is not to say that bankruptcy courts may resort to \"un- defined considerations of equity \" in determining the effect of rejection in a particular case. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the bankruptcy court's treatment of a breached trade- mark license should rest o n applicable non-bank- r uptcy law, including, where appropriate, recognized equitable doctrines that would be available had the breach occurred outside of bankruptcy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Constitution Forecloses Arthrex's Test",
		"context": "Final formulations of broadly applicable federal policy require principal-officer sign-off: for example, \"metrics and standards\" for the railroad industry, Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. , 575 U.S. at 62–64 (Alito, J., con- curring), or ratemaking determinations on which \"the fates of entire industries can ride,\" SoundExchange, 25 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that Congress has made certain Medicaid participation decisions by the Department of Health and Human Services' Depart-ment Appeals Board the \"final decision of the Secre- tary,\" subject only to reconsideration by the Board it- self or judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(e)(2)(B).",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 F.3d 1220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Constitution Forecloses Arthrex's Test",
		"context": "501 U.S. at 882. Yet the Court implicitly rejected Freytag's argument that \"a special trial judge is a principal rather than an in-ferior officer,\" Br. for Pet'rs 28 n.26, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—and upheld STJs' ap- pointment in a manner permissible only for inferior Officers, see Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892. Similarly, the SEC ALJs in Lucia had \"last-word capacity\" and is- sued many decisions that were not reviewed \"at all.\" 138 S. Ct. at 2054.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "T o begin , there is no question tha t trademarks and trade dress es help consumers make informed choices. These marks make it possib le for co nsumers to iden- tify the products they l ike made by manufacturers they know and trust. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addi- tion, trademarks benef it consumers because th ey \"foster competition an d the ma intenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputa- tion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "See B & B Hard- ware, 575 U.S. 138. Of course, prote ction of trademark s also ben efits mark owners by \"secur[ing ] to the owner of the mark the goodwill of hi s busine ss.\" Park 'N F ly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For this reason, Camp bell Soup —like many other companies that use trademarks and trade dress es to market their products —is vigilant about protecting its trademark and trade dress rights from affront. See, e.g., CSC Brands LP v. Chicken Soup for the Soul Publ 'g, LLC , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "See, e.g., CSC Brands LP v. Chicken Soup for the Soul Publ 'g, LLC , No. 1:12 -cv-06569 -JEI- KMW (D.N.J.) (suit to enjoin proposed launch of line of chicken soup products inf ringing Campbell Soup's trademark s and trade dres ses); Nabisco, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d C ir. 199 9) (affirming grant of prelimina ry in junction to Campbell Soup subsidiar y Pep peridge Farm , Inc., and holding that another compan y's goldfish -shaped cheddar cheese cracker would dilute the GOL DFISH® configuration mark ). 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "191 F. 3d 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "2. A s the owner o f iconic ma rks, Campbell Soup has confronted countl ess trademark issues similar t o those in the ins tant case for many years. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd,830 F.2d 197 . In Grey, for exampl e, the maker of \"DO GIVA\" dog biscuits and a \"CATIVA\" product for cats sued Campbell Soup in federa l district court in California seekin g declaratory relief.2 Campbell Soup, which at 2 As in Grey and the instant case, infringers often file preemptive dec larato ry judgment act ions against trad emark owner s in their foru m of choice . The decision below makes the Ninth Circui t even more attractive to poten tial Lanha m Act de- fendants shopping for a fa vorable forum and will allow those in- fringers to avoid the plain text of the statut e applied by the oth- er circu its.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F. Supp. 1166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "2. A s the owner o f iconic ma rks, Campbell Soup has confronted countl ess trademark issues similar t o those in the ins tant case for many years. See, e.g., 650 F. Supp. 1166 , aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Grey, for exampl e, the maker of \"DO GIVA\" dog biscuits and a \"CATIVA\" product for cats sued Campbell Soup in federa l district court in California seekin g declaratory relief.2 Campbell Soup, which at 2 As in Grey and the instant case, infringers often file preemptive dec larato ry judgment act ions against trad emark owner s in their foru m of choice . The decision below makes the Ninth Circui t even more attractive to poten tial Lanha m Act de- fendants shopping for a fa vorable forum and will allow those in- fringers to avoid the plain text of the statut e applied by the oth- er circu its.",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.2d 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "The cases ci ted in the petitio n, moreover, repre- sent jus t the tip o f the iceberg. Numerous additional reporte d case s involv e humorous commer cial prod- ucts that mimic the tr ademarks of leading food and beverage br ands. See, e.g., Starb ucks [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]666 F. Supp. 2d 97435 F. Supp. 2d 727850 F. Supp. 232 . And these are just the cases involv- ing food and beverage trademarks . Many more cases 12 could be cited involv ing marks in a variety of other indus tries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "736 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "The cases ci ted in the petitio n, moreover, repre- sent jus t the tip o f the iceberg. Numerous additional reporte d case s involv e humorous commer cial prod- ucts that mimic the tr ademarks of leading food and beverage br ands. See, e.g., Starb ucks 736 F.3d 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]35 F. Supp. 2d 727850 F. Supp. 232 . And these are just the cases involv- ing food and beverage trademarks . Many more cases 12 could be cited involv ing marks in a variety of other indus tries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F. Supp. 2d 974",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "The cases ci ted in the petitio n, moreover, repre- sent jus t the tip o f the iceberg. Numerous additional reporte d case s involv e humorous commer cial prod- ucts that mimic the tr ademarks of leading food and beverage br ands. See, e.g., Starb ucks 736 F.3d 1666 F. Supp. 2d 974[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]850 F. Supp. 232 . And these are just the cases involv- ing food and beverage trademarks . Many more cases 12 could be cited involv ing marks in a variety of other indus tries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F. Supp. 2d 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "The cases ci ted in the petitio n, moreover, repre- sent jus t the tip o f the iceberg. Numerous additional reporte d case s involv e humorous commer cial prod- ucts that mimic the tr ademarks of leading food and beverage br ands. See, e.g., Starb ucks 736 F.3d 1666 F. Supp. 2d 97435 F. Supp. 2d 727[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And these are just the cases involv- ing food and beverage trademarks . Many more cases 12 could be cited involv ing marks in a variety of other indus tries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F. Supp. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.",
		"context": "Although one might question how one naughty spaniel could befoul so much legal ground, the Ninth Circuit's d ecision will encourag e a proliferation of purportedly humorous co mmercial products that in fact infring e trademarks and deceive consumers . A brand's ca refully cultivated imag e may be irreparably dama ged as a result . See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit 's decision here rewr ote the Lanham Act to remove its bite for trademark infringers . This Court should grant review to restore t he protections Con- gress pr ovided for trademark o wners and consumers alike .",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Petitioner had no state law right to surplus equity",
		"context": ". Petitioner presents a \"s elf-created conundrum\" on which the \"meaning of the Constitution should not turn.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). \"People must pay their taxes, and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax delinquency by taking their property.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Facebook's reading of the statute would unleash the torrent of robocalls Congress wrote the TCPA to stop.",
		"context": "Congress's continuing attention to the problem of illegal robocalls, and its decision to amend the TCPA to provide stronger remedies to reinforce its prohibi- tion of those calls, weighs heavily against reading the statute to negate its application to most current auto- dialing technologies. Interpreting a statute in context as a \"harmonious whole\" often requires consideration of how \"subsequent acts can shape or focus\" its mean-ing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Scalia ex- plained, the \"classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to 'make sense' in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the impli-cations of a later statute.\" 484 U.S. 439.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Facebook's reading of the statute would unleash the torrent of robocalls Congress wrote the TCPA to stop.",
		"context": "529 U.S. 120. As Justice Scalia ex- plained, the \"classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to 'make sense' in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the impli-cations of a later statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Opening the door to unlim- ited autodialed calls and texts to cellphones, regardless of consent, as long as they do not employ the senescent technology of random or sequential number generation, is inconsistent with the 30-year history of action against robocalls by \"the people's rep-resentatives in Congress.\" Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2343.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Facebook's reading of the statute would unleash the torrent of robocalls Congress wrote the TCPA to stop.",
		"context": "Concerns about excessive litigation also cannot justify setting aside Congress's decision to regulate autodialers. Despite the billions of robocalls Ameri- cans receive each year, TCPA cases averaged only about 1,600 per year between 2014 and 2017, 13 less than 1% of cases filed in the federal courts.14 To the extent industry's real worry is the possibility of high statutory damages awards, th at is a matter properly addressed by Congress or, if circumstances warrant, through due-process protections against excessive damages. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 950",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "In keeping with this general rule, the average American is more likely to be put off or upset when encountering Islam than when encountering Christianity. For instance, a public invocation addressing \"Allah \" is more likely to offend or divide than an invocation addre ssed to \"God.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, when the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro Tennessee began building a new mosque to accommodate its growing congre - gation, its efforts were met with hostile protests from a small group of local residents culminating in acts of vandalism, arson, and even a bomb threat, which resulted in a federal indictment. See MSMV -TV, Islamic Center of Murfreesboro Receives 9/11 -related threat (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.wsmv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 F.3d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "A Virginia county, for example, was forced to close its public schools following an influx of threats ag ainst a teacher and the school due to a lesson in which she 5 Similar animus born of ignorance is directed at other minority religious groups. For example, seve ral municipalities in New York were incorporated out of sheer \"animosity toward Orthodox Jews as a group.\" LeBlanc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,539 U.S. 942 (noting the Borough had refused to allow demarcation of an eruv on telephone poles after Tenafly residents \"expressed vehement objections prompted by their fear that an eruv would encourage Orthodox Jews to move to Tenafly,\" \"that the Orthodoxy would take over,\" and that \"Jews might stone [] cars th at drive down the streets on the Sabbath\") (citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) . 20 asked students to try writing in Arabic calligraphy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "67 F.3d 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "For example, seve ral municipalities in New York were incorporated out of sheer \"animosity toward Orthodox Jews as a group.\" LeBlanc 67 F.3d 412, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting the Borough had refused to allow demarcation of an eruv on telephone poles after Tenafly residents \"expressed vehement objections prompted by their fear that an eruv would encourage Orthodox Jews to move to Tenafly,\" \"that the Orthodoxy would take over,\" and that \"Jews might stone [] cars th at drive down the streets on the Sabbath\") (citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) . 20 asked students to try writing in Arabic calligraphy. See Moriah Balingit, Schoolwork about Islam triggers backlash in Virginia County , Dec. 18, 2015, available at https://www.washington post.com/n ews/education/ wp/2015/12/17/furor -over-arabic -assignment -leads -vi rginia -school -district -to-close -friday/?utm_term=.a76 7a410c2fe.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "Accordingly, minority or disfavored religious groups are particularly susceptible to suits asserted by offended observers wh o seek to silence religious speech. This \"heckler's veto\" is \"one of the most persistent and insidious threats to first amendment rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Allowing citizens standing in federal court solely to compla in about religious offensive speech \"effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.\" 403 U.S. 15; see also 562 U.S. 443 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "779 F.2d 992",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "779 F.2d 992. Allowing citizens standing in federal court solely to compla in about religious offensive speech \"effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 562 U.S. 443 . Indeed, targeting religious speech just because of its religious nature is a \"blatant\" form of unconstitutional discrimination. 515 U.S. 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "779 F.2d 992. Allowing citizens standing in federal court solely to compla in about religious offensive speech \"effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.\" 403 U.S. 15; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, targeting religious speech just because of its religious nature is a \"blatant\" form of unconstitutional discrimination. 515 U.S. 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "403 U.S. 15; see also 562 U.S. 443 . Indeed, targeting religious speech just because of its religious nature is a \"blatant\" form of unconstitutional discrimination. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hence this Court's longstanding precedent against \"a modified heckler's veto\" which sought to ban a group's religiou s activity on the basis of what others might perceive. Good News 533 U.S. 98.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "515 U.S. 819. Hence this Court's longstanding precedent against \"a modified heckler's veto\" which sought to ban a group's religiou s activity on the basis of what others might perceive. Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More broadly, the Constitution rejects the notion that \"adult citizens\" are undone by mere exposure to religious expression. Town of Greece , 134 S. Ct. at 1823 (noting that \"adult citizens\" are presumed by law to be \"firm in the ir own beliefs\" and 21 able to tolerate exposure to others' expression of faith).",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "1178, 1187 (2005) (noting the inclination \"to find 'good cause' in familiar religions and 'fault' in unfamiliar or minority faiths\"); J. David Cas sel, Defending the Cannibals , 57 CHRISTIAN HISTORY & BIOGRAPHY 12 (1998) (noting that in the early centuries A.D., the ruling Roman upper -class believed that the tiny early Christian church was hom e to \"cannibalistic, incestuous ass-worship\"). In keeping w ith this general rule, the average American is more likely to be put off or upset when 5 Though not a focus of Petitioners' briefs, standing , which implicates jurisdictio n, may be considered at any time. Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Adarand Constructors, Inc 534 U.S. 103 (2001 ). 19 encountering Islam than when encountering Christianity. For instance, a public invocation addressing \"Allah \" is more likely to offend or divide than an invocation addres sed to \"God.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "1178, 1187 (2005) (noting the inclination \"to find 'good cause' in familiar religions and 'fault' in unfamiliar or minority faiths\"); J. David Cas sel, Defending the Cannibals , 57 CHRISTIAN HISTORY & BIOGRAPHY 12 (1998) (noting that in the early centuries A.D., the ruling Roman upper -class believed that the tiny early Christian church was hom e to \"cannibalistic, incestuous ass-worship\"). In keeping w ith this general rule, the average American is more likely to be put off or upset when 5 Though not a focus of Petitioners' briefs, standing , which implicates jurisdictio n, may be considered at any time. Steel 523 U.S. 83; Adarand Constructors, Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2001 ). 19 encountering Islam than when encountering Christianity. For instance, a public invocation addressing \"Allah \" is more likely to offend or divide than an invocation addres sed to \"God.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "19 encountering Islam than when encountering Christianity. For instance, a public invocation addressing \"Allah \" is more likely to offend or divide than an invocation addres sed to \"God.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, when the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro Tennessee began building a new mosque to accommodate its growing congre - gation, its efforts were met with hostile protests from a small group o f local residents culminating in acts of vandalism, arson, and even a bomb threat, which resulted in a federal indictment. See MSMV -TV, Islamic Center of Murfreesboro Receives 9/11 -related threat (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.wsmv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 F.3d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "com/story/154 04274/islamic -center -of-murfreesboro - receives -threat.6 6 Similar animus born of ignorance is directed at other minority religious groups. For example, several municipalities in New York were incorporated out of sheer \"animosity toward Orthodox Jews as a group.\" LeBlanc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting the Borough refused to allow demarcation of an eruv on telephone poles after Tenafly residents \"expressed vehement objections prompted by their fear that an eruv would encourage Orthodox Jews to move to Tenafly,\" \"that the Ortho doxy would take over,\" and that \"Jews might stone [] cars that drive down the streets on the Sabbath\") (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) . 20 Similar examples of unfounded \"offense\" at exposure to minority religions such as Islam abound. A Virginia county, for example, was forced to close its public schools following an influx of threats aga inst a teacher and the school due to a lesson in which she asked students to try writing in Arabic calligraphy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "67 F.3d 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "Accordingly, minority or disfavored religious groups are particularly susceptible to suits asserted by offended ob servers who seek to silence religious speech. This \"heckler's veto\" is \"one of the most persistent and insidious threats to first amendment rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Allowing citizens standing in federal court solely to complain about religious offensive speech \"effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.\" 403 U.S. 15; see also 562 U.S. 443 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "779 F.2d 992",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "779 F.2d 992. Allowing citizens standing in federal court solely to complain about religious offensive speech \"effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 562 U.S. 443 . Indeed, targeting religious speech just because of its religious nature is a \"blatant\" form of unconstitutional discrimination. 515 U.S. 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "779 F.2d 992. Allowing citizens standing in federal court solely to complain about religious offensive speech \"effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.\" 403 U.S. 15; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, targeting religious speech just because of its religious nature is a \"blatant\" form of unconstitutional discrimination. 515 U.S. 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "403 U.S. 15; see also 562 U.S. 443 . Indeed, targeting religious speech just because of its religious nature is a \"blatant\" form of unconstitutional discrimination. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hence this Court's longstanding precedent against \"a modified heckler's veto\" which sought to ban a group's religiou s activity on the basis of what others might perceive. Good News 533 U.S. 98.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
		"context": "515 U.S. 819. Hence this Court's longstanding precedent against \"a modified heckler's veto\" which sought to ban a group's religiou s activity on the basis of what others might perceive. Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More broadly, the Constitution rejects the notion that \"adult citizens\" are undone by mere exposure to religious expression. Town of Greece , 134 S. Ct. at 1823 (noting \"adult citizens\" are presumed by law to be \"firm in their own beliefs\" and able to tolerate exposure to others' expression of faith).",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": ". The Constitution vests the states with a \"broad power to prescribe the 'Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]285 U.S. 355 . Certainly, \"[c]ommon sense, as well as consti - tutional law, compels the conclusion that government 4 must play an acti ve role in structuring elections ; 'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.'\" 504 U.S. 428.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": ". The Constitution vests the states with a \"broad power to prescribe the 'Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.'\" 544 U.S. 581[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Certainly, \"[c]ommon sense, as well as consti - tutional law, compels the conclusion that government 4 must play an acti ve role in structuring elections ; 'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.'\" 504 U.S. 428.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": "544 U.S. 581285 U.S. 355 . Certainly, \"[c]ommon sense, as well as consti - tutional law, compels the conclusion that government 4 must play an acti ve role in structuring elections ; 'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And while the importance of the right to vote cannot be overstated, \"the right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": "Burdick , 504 U.S. at 433. Indeed, \"[e]very decision that a state makes in regulating its elections will, inevitably, result in somewhat more inconvenience for some voters than others.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir. 2016 ); see also 768 F.3d 744. This could be as innocuous as the fact that, for example, \"every polling place will, by necessity, be located closer to some voters than to others.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": "Indeed, \"[e]very decision that a state makes in regulating its elections will, inevitably, result in somewhat more inconvenience for some voters than others.\" 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016 ); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This could be as innocuous as the fact that, for example, \"every polling place will, by necessity, be located closer to some voters than to others.\" Lee, 848 F.3d at 601.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": "Specifically, as aptly discussed at length in the Petition, the circuits have divided over how to determine whether a law produces an unlawful \"discriminatory burde n\" as prohibited by Section 2 , as opposed to a mere disparate inconvenience. Recent Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit decisions have held that Section 2 \"does not condemn a voting practice just because it has a disparate effect on minorities\" or produces a \"statistical disparity.\" Frank , 768 F.3d at 753, 752 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Ohio Democratic 834 F.3d 620 ; Lee, 843 F.3d at 601. Rather, in line with Section 2 (b)'s language, these circuits ask whether, considering \"the entire voting and registration system,\" the practice at issue makes the election \" not equally open\" to minorities, or leaves them with \" less oppor - tunit y\" to vote. Frank , 768 at 753 (emphasis in orig- inal) ; accord Lee , 843 F.3d at 601 ; Ohio Democratic Party , 834 F.3d at 637 -638; Veasey , 830 F.3d at 253- 254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.3d 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": "Specifically, as aptly discussed at length in the Petition, the circuits have divided over how to determine whether a law produces an unlawful \"discriminatory burde n\" as prohibited by Section 2 , as opposed to a mere disparate inconvenience. Recent Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit decisions have held that Section 2 \"does not condemn a voting practice just because it has a disparate effect on minorities\" or produces a \"statistical disparity.\" Frank , 768 F.3d at 753, 752 ; see also 830 F.3d 216 ; Ohio Democratic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Lee, 843 F.3d at 601. Rather, in line with Section 2 (b)'s language, these circuits ask whether, considering \"the entire voting and registration system,\" the practice at issue makes the election \" not equally open\" to minorities, or leaves them with \" less oppor - tunit y\" to vote. Frank , 768 at 753 (emphasis in orig- inal) ; accord Lee , 843 F.3d at 601 ; Ohio Democratic Party , 834 F.3d at 637 -638; Veasey , 830 F.3d at 253- 254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS",
		"context": "44, 46, 86 -87. 3 See, e.g. , Ohio Democratic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "I ). This Court has long held that a law that limits or prohibits a particular method or medium of communication is subject to substantial constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment by \"examin [ing] the effect of the challenged legislation \" to ensure that the law does not unduly burden the \" free enjoyment of the right [ ]\" to free speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has also recognized that \"[e]ach method of communicating ideas is a law unto itself and that law must reflect the differing natures, values, abuses and dangers of each method .\" Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490.",
		"citation_value_orig": "308 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "308 U.S. 147 . This Court has also recognized that \"[e]ach method of communicating ideas is a law unto itself and that law must reflect the differing natures, values, abuses and dangers of each method .\" Metromedia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To help guide this sensitive, context -dependent analysis, this Court has held that a content -neutral regulation on the use of a par ticular method or medium of speech can survive only if the regulation is \"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest .\" Ward , 491 U.S. at 791; accord Schneider , 308 U.S. at 162–63.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "at 791, 802. This Court has also broadly recognized the core First Amendment interests in communications through various methods and mediums . Today, speakers communicate through the Internet, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; \"movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com,\" Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ; see also Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ; radio broadcasting, Red Lion Broad. 395 U.S. 367 ; sound trucks, 334 U.S. 558 ; mail, 463 U.S. 60 ; or books, pamphlets, and papers , see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "at 791, 802. This Court has also broadly recognized the core First Amendment interests in communications through various methods and mediums . Today, speakers communicate through the Internet, 137 S. Ct. 1730 ; \"movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com,\" Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ; radio broadcasting, Red Lion Broad. 395 U.S. 367 ; sound trucks, 334 U.S. 558 ; mail, 463 U.S. 60 ; or books, pamphlets, and papers , see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "This Court has also broadly recognized the core First Amendment interests in communications through various methods and mediums . Today, speakers communicate through the Internet, 137 S. Ct. 1730 ; \"movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com,\" Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ; see also Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; radio broadcasting, Red Lion Broad. 395 U.S. 367 ; sound trucks, 334 U.S. 558 ; mail, 463 U.S. 60 ; or books, pamphlets, and papers , see, e.g. , Schneider , 308 U.S. at 162.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "Today, speakers communicate through the Internet, 137 S. Ct. 1730 ; \"movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com,\" Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ; see also Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ; radio broadcasting, Red Lion Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; sound trucks, 334 U.S. 558 ; mail, 463 U.S. 60 ; or books, pamphlets, and papers , see, e.g. , Schneider , 308 U.S. at 162. This Court has also held that the First Amendment's protections apply to commercial speech, such as th e speech th at is often a t issue in TCPA cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "Today, speakers communicate through the Internet, 137 S. Ct. 1730 ; \"movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com,\" Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ; see also Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ; radio broadcasting, Red Lion Broad. 395 U.S. 367 ; sound trucks, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; mail, 463 U.S. 60 ; or books, pamphlets, and papers , see, e.g. , Schneider , 308 U.S. at 162. This Court has also held that the First Amendment's protections apply to commercial speech, such as th e speech th at is often a t issue in TCPA cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "Today, speakers communicate through the Internet, 137 S. Ct. 1730 ; \"movies, television comedies, or skits on YouTube.com,\" Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ; see also Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ; radio broadcasting, Red Lion Broad. 395 U.S. 367 ; sound trucks, 334 U.S. 558 ; mail, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; or books, pamphlets, and papers , see, e.g. , Schneider , 308 U.S. at 162. This Court has also held that the First Amendment's protections apply to commercial speech, such as th e speech th at is often a t issue in TCPA cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools",
		"context": "This Court has also held that the First Amendment's protections apply to commercial speech, such as th e speech th at is often a t issue in TCPA cases. \"The mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.\" 44 Liquormart, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (19 96). Rather, when a statute neither seeks \"to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices,\" nor \"requires the disclosure of benefi cial consumer information,\" such a ban on commercial speech is \"unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process,\" and First Amendment protections apply. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Conclusion about Reviewability of FWS's Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1 is Correct and Does Not Conflict with Any Other Court",
		"context": "A-36. An agency action is committed to agency discretion by law when a \"statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA gives FWS discretion to exclude an area from a critical habitat designation if it \"determines that the benefits of such exclusion out- weigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat, unless [it] determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned.\" 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Conclusion about Reviewability of FWS's Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1 is Correct and Does Not Conflict with Any Other Court",
		"context": "at 35,141. Petition-ers do not claim that the question of whether benefits would outweigh costs is itself a question that merits this Court's review. Petitioners mischaracterize the law in arguing that the court of appeals' decision conflicts with this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bennett involved a claim that \"imposition of minimum water elevations constituted an implicit de-termination of critical habitat\" for an endangered fish that violated Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA \"because it failed to take into consideration the designation's eco-nomic impact.\" 520 U.S. at 160.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Conclusion about Reviewability of FWS's Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1 is Correct and Does Not Conflict with Any Other Court",
		"context": "Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's decision is con- sistent with the only other circuit court that has con- fronted the issue. See Bear Valley Mut. Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. , the Ninth Circuit explained that the ESA \"cannot be read to say that the FWS is ever obli- gated to exclude habitat that it has found to be essen-tial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.3d 977",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evaluating the Appearance of a Social Media Page Proves Shallow",
		"context": "Though LinkedIn is an inherently personal social media site used to promote an individual, the account would meet the 14. Requiring such a disclaimer creates its own First Amendment concerns, as \"[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15. Stein v. Ocasio-Cortez , 1:23-cv-628 (D.D.C., filed Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Other Considerations Do Not Warrant Raising Plaintiffs' Burden of Production",
		"context": "But notwithstanding the potential procompetitive benefits, the \"standard\" rule of reason applied. Id. at 898 ; see also McWane, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amex's anti-steering re- straints , although vertical in nature, restrict inter- brand competition and thus cannot warrant more favorable treatment. On the contrary, Leegin sug- gests stricter scrutiny is appropriate for a vertical restraint on interbrand competition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 814",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Arbitration Provides Numerous Benefits to Contracting Businesses",
		"context": "See, e.g., Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 345 (Arbitration \"reduc[es] the cost and increas[es] the speed of dispute resolution. \"); Stolt-Nielsen S.A , 559 U.S. at 685 (Arbitration provides \"lower costs\" and \"greater efficiency and speed. \"); 14 Penn Plaza [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in 2018, the median civil lawsuit in the federal court took more than two years to reach trial. See U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts—Nat'l Judicial Caseload Profile (2018), https://bit.ly/2NRgwAU.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Arbitration Provides Numerous Benefits to Contracting Businesses",
		"context": "3073 (1999). \"Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This \"ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes,\" Stolt-Nielsen S.A. , 559 U.S. at 685, has special force in the context of disputes involving international contracts, which are often highly technical and complex, see, e.g., John W. Hinchey, International Construction Arbitration Handbook § 1:1 (2018) (describing the extreme complexity of international construction disputes).",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Arbitration Provides Numerous Benefits to Contracting Businesses",
		"context": "See, e.g., Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 345 (Arbitration \"reduc[es] the cost and increas[es] the speed of dispute resolution. \"); Stolt-Nielsen S.A , 559 U.S. at 685 (Arbitration provides \"lower costs\" and \"greater efficiency and speed. \"); 14 Penn Plaza [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in 2018, the median civil lawsuit in the federal court took more than two years to reach trial. See U.S. Courts, U.S. District Courts—Nat'l Judicial Caseload Profile (2018), https://bit.ly/2NRgwAU.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Arbitration Provides Numerous Benefits to Contracting Businesses",
		"context": "3073 (1999). \"Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This \"ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes,\" Stolt-Nielsen S.A. , 559 U.S. at 685, has special force in the context of disputes involving international contracts, which are often highly technical and complex, see, e.g., John W. Hinchey, International Construction Arbitration Handbook § 1:1 (2018) (describing the extreme complexity of international construction disputes). 15",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If This Court Does Not Presume Prejudice Here, Defendants Will Have No Choice but to Proceed Pro Se to Demonstrate Prejudice Because They Had Constitutionally Deficient Trial Counsel Who Failed to Obey Them",
		"context": "It is fundamentally unfair to require defendants to proceed pro se to demonstrate prejudice simply because they had constitutionally deficient trial counsel. This Court held that every individual, regardless of wealth, has a constitutional right to access appellate counsel with whom to consult, review the record, and litigate issues on appeal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, there is no such right in post -conviction proceedings. See 501 U.S. 722 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If This Court Does Not Presume Prejudice Here, Defendants Will Have No Choice but to Proceed Pro Se to Demonstrate Prejudice Because They Had Constitutionally Deficient Trial Counsel Who Failed to Obey Them",
		"context": "See 372 U.S. 353. However, there is no such right in post -conviction proceedings. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As a result, if this Court does not presume prejudice where a lawyer ignores a client 's instructions and refuses to file a notice of appeal because the client 's plea contained an appeal waiver , the client will have to demonstrate that the lawyer 's constitutional deficiency resulted in actual prejudice. By virtue of being appointed a constitutionally deficient trial lawyer who ignored express instructions, the client will be deprived of the benefit of a constitutionally competent lawyer on appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If This Court Does Not Presume Prejudice Here, Defendants Will Have No Choice but to Proceed Pro Se to Demonstrate Prejudice Because They Had Constitutionally Deficient Trial Counsel Who Failed to Obey Them",
		"context": "Id. Where a defendant has already entered a guilty plea, one issue that cannot be waived is whether the plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (199 5). An appeal on these bases is more complex than other appellate issues in two primary ways . The first is that these may occur where a client has a diminished capacity, and thus will have a particularly difficult time representing himself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If This Court Does Not Presume Prejudice Here, Defendants Will Have No Choice but to Proceed Pro Se to Demonstrate Prejudice Because They Had Constitutionally Deficient Trial Counsel Who Failed to Obey Them",
		"context": "A lawyer who independently decides not to file such a notice and runs out the clock on that period deprives a defendant of the right to an appellate counsel who might have found meritorious grounds for appeal as guaranteed in Douglas . The lawyer also prevents the client from exercising the right to self -representation on app eal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Were the Court not to presume prejudice where lawyers override their clients ' decisions to appeal their cases, criminal defendants will bear the unfair burden of having to demonstrate prejudice pro se. Additionally, defendants will be denied access to 27 appellate counsel who might find meritorious arguments where trial counsel (looking at his or her own conduct) found none.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion in SSA ALJ Proceedings Would Be Unworkable and Inequitable",
		"context": "31. The government's authorities (at 30-31) do not show otherwise. Sims repudiated [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 172 F.3d 1111. The government's post- Sims authorities either ignore Sims , e.g., 344 F.3d 809; 694 F. App'x 670, or apply pre-Sims law, e.g., 883 F.3d 1102. These cases incorrectly assume that the same forfeiture rules in court automatically apply in SSA proceedings, and often proceed to reject claimants' argu- ments on the merits, illustrating that courts have no diffi- culty with these issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 F.3d 1384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion in SSA ALJ Proceedings Would Be Unworkable and Inequitable",
		"context": "31. The government's authorities (at 30-31) do not show otherwise. Sims repudiated 103 F.3d 1384, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government's post- Sims authorities either ignore Sims , e.g., 344 F.3d 809; 694 F. App'x 670, or apply pre-Sims law, e.g., 883 F.3d 1102. These cases incorrectly assume that the same forfeiture rules in court automatically apply in SSA proceedings, and often proceed to reject claimants' argu- ments on the merits, illustrating that courts have no diffi- culty with these issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "172 F.3d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion in SSA ALJ Proceedings Would Be Unworkable and Inequitable",
		"context": "The government's authorities (at 30-31) do not show otherwise. Sims repudiated 103 F.3d 1384, and 172 F.3d 1111. The government's post- Sims authorities either ignore Sims , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 694 F. App'x 670, or apply pre-Sims law, e.g., 883 F.3d 1102. These cases incorrectly assume that the same forfeiture rules in court automatically apply in SSA proceedings, and often proceed to reject claimants' argu- ments on the merits, illustrating that courts have no diffi- culty with these issues. Professors' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 809",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion in SSA ALJ Proceedings Would Be Unworkable and Inequitable",
		"context": "§ 405(g) generally prohibits claimants from introducing new evidence in district court proceedings and allows the SSA to move for a remand to address issues that arise on ju dicial review. Further, un- der section 405(g)'s substantial- evidence standard of judi- cial review, claimants cannot pr evail so long as more than a mere scintilla of evidence supports the agency's deter-mination. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Davis Br. 35-36. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion in SSA ALJ Proceedings Would Be Unworkable and Inequitable",
		"context": "Finally, the government (at 22) sees no \"useful pur- pose at all\" in remedying these Appointments Clause vio- lations because they produced no \"personal injustice.\" That would be news to the fo unding generation, which be- lieved that \"[t]he structural principles secured by the sep- aration of powers protect the individual as well.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless, the injustice here is personal: petitioners may well get a dif- ferent result from a differe nt ALJ. The Constitution would be an empty promise if the government could avoid remedying rampant, undisputed violations based on in- convenience.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 145's Legislative History Does Not Support The PTO's Position",
		"context": "As threshold a matter, this Court has been reluctant to rely on legislative history in determining whether a statutory provision is sufficiently clear to displace the American Rule. See Buckhannon Bd., 532 U.S. at 608 (\"Particularly in view of the 'American Rule' that attorney's fees will not be awarded absent 'explicit st atutory authority,' such legislative history is clearly insufficient to alter the accepted meaning of the statutory term.\") (quoting Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 819); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This makes sense. The American Rule presumption would hardly produce the clarity and certainty it is meant to afford if potential litigants had to pore over legislative history to determine whet her the statutory language authorized an award of attorney s' fees (especially in a case like this one where the statute was passed more than 170 years ago).",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 145's Legislative History Does Not Support The PTO's Position",
		"context": "29. But if § 145 was really designed to help the PTO recoup these labor costs, then it makes no sense why the PTO failed to avail itself of this mechanism for the subsequent 170 years. 14 The PTO also cites to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—a case that post-dates the passage of the § 145 by nearly thirty years. Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "122 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "June Medical cannot demonstrate a sufficiently closerelationship in this case because it has a conflict of interest with its patients. Generally, a party cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he can show thathe is within the class whose constitutional rights areallegedly infringed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This rule has been relaxed in certainunique circumstances. In Barrows , the court held it would be \"difficult if not impossible\" for the injuredparties to bring their grievance before the court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "Id. at 257. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and its progeny, the party asserting third-partystanding faced criminal conv iction if the statute at issue was enforced. Id. at 481.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "Griswold , 381 U.S. at 481 (holding that the requirements of Article III standing should be appliedstrictly when declaratory relief is requested). Courtshave held that when the only constitutional attack isthe request for a declaration based upon the alleged 17 deprivation of the life or liberty of another, standing does not exist. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, June Medical is not affected in the same way by this statute as its patients; June Medical'sconstitutional challenge should not be allowed. Nevertheless, courts have shown a \"troubling tendency to bend the rules\" when abortion is at issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "See Kowalski , 543 U.S. at 138 (Ginsburg, J., 18 dissenting). Additionally, this Court has refused special treatment of abortion cases in the context offacial overbreadth challenges. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, reliance onSingleton is misplaced. This Court has held that the requisite close relationship does not exist when the party seekingthird-party standing has a conflict of interest with thereal party in interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "They have an incentive to fail to comply withthe law in order to support their constitutionalchallenge. This \"lackluster approach\" is inconsistentwith the interests of patients in ensuring theirmaximum safety. See WWH , 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (holding that states have a legitimate interest in\"seeing to it that abortion, like any other medicalprocedure, is performed under circumstances thatinsure maximum safety for the patient.\"). This Court should therefore hold that the Singleton blanket rule affording third-party standing to abortionpractitioners does not apply when the benefits of healthand safety standards are at issue. A contrary rulewould allow the fox to guard the henhouse.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "Finally, the interests of abortion providers will always be adverse to the interests of the unborn child. This Court has held that the state has a legitimate 21 interest in protecting \"the life of the fetus that may become a child.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 505 U.S. 833). In fact, Louisiana has a longstanding policy favoring the right to life. June Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert",
		"context": "Finally, the interests of abortion providers will always be adverse to the interests of the unborn child. This Court has held that the state has a legitimate 21 interest in protecting \"the life of the fetus that may become a child.\" 550 U.S. 124 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In fact, Louisiana has a longstanding policy favoring the right to life. June Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "A. A State has the power to decide who its repre- sentatives will be in court . See Va. House of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And while that representative is often the State's attorney general, it need not always or only be. See Hol- 570 U.S. 693 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "See Va. House of 139 S. Ct. 1945 . And while that representative is often the State's attorney general, it need not always or only be. See Hol- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . While some States might make the policy decision \"to speak as a sovereign entity with a single voice\" through the attorney general, States have every right to authorize other branches \"to litigate on the State's behalf, either generally or in a defined class of cases .\" Bethune -Hill, 139 S. Ct. at 1952 ; see also Hollingsworth , 570 U.S. at 710 (noting a State \"may provide for other officials to speak for the State in federal court\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "To be sure, t he federal court may balance the re- maining intervention factors, such as timeliness of intervention, but it cannot rebalance the State's deci-sion by statute about who its representatives will be. Just as a federal court would take state law as it found it in deciding who a proper defendant in an action ought to be, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 634 F.3d 1314 , or whether a state defend- ant has an interest under state law sufficient for standing, see, e.g. , Democratic Nat'l 977 F.3d 639 , a federal court must take the state laws above as it finds it in deciding who a proper intervenor may be. 3 Such state laws reflect the reality that the inter- ests of the attorney general can be different than those of the l egislature, the body that wrote a law and saw through its passage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 1094",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "To be sure, t he federal court may balance the re- maining intervention factors, such as timeliness of intervention, but it cannot rebalance the State's deci-sion by statute about who its representatives will be. Just as a federal court would take state law as it found it in deciding who a proper defendant in an action ought to be, see, e.g. , 899 F.3d 1094 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , or whether a state defend- ant has an interest under state law sufficient for standing, see, e.g. , Democratic Nat'l 977 F.3d 639 , a federal court must take the state laws above as it finds it in deciding who a proper intervenor may be. 3 Such state laws reflect the reality that the inter- ests of the attorney general can be different than those of the l egislature, the body that wrote a law and saw through its passage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 1314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "3 Such state laws reflect the reality that the inter- ests of the attorney general can be different than those of the l egislature, the body that wrote a law and saw through its passage. Most attorneys general are elected politicians who are not necessarily \"long -term 3 There might still be other circumstances where legislative in- tervention is appropriate, either because of the nature of the legislature's interest in the suit or because of the inadequacy of the existing state defendant or both, e ven in a State without a statute expressly permitting intervention. See, e.g., Sixty -Sev- enth Minn. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The existence of state law expressly affirming the legislature's interest is suffi-cient condition for the interest and adequacy prongs of intervention; it is not a necessary one. 7 players before the courts,\" making them \"less likely to genuflect before them\" and more likely to \"curry favor with those who might back their aspirations for higher elected office.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "With respect to the state or federal government in particular, this Court has not hesitate d to allow mul- tiple voices to speak on behalf of a government. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo , the U.S. Attorney Gen- eral and the Federal Elections Commission , both appellees, diverged on the question of the scope of the Commission's powers over federal campaign finance rules. The Commission retained special counsel on that question, while the Attorney General —in a brief authored by then- Solicitor General Robert Bork and 12 Assist ant Frank Easterbrook —argued that the Com- mission could not exercise executive power.4 Similarly in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , multiple New Jersey government officials were involved in the dis- pute over a New Jersey school prayer law. The named defendants remained in the suit, but did not defend the law. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "The Speaker of the New Jersey Gen- eral Assembly and President of the New Jersey Senate intervened and \"carried the entire burden of defending the statute.\" Id. More recently in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the U.S. Attorney General declined to defend the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Id. at 753.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "None of these cases permitted only a singular rep- resentative for the government. And none suggests that involvement by one government official was de- pendent upon the absence of another. 4 See Brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Elections Commission 2 n.4, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\" This brief does not address any of the issues aris- ing out of the law enforcement powers of the Commission. With respect to those questions, the Commission is separately repre-sented by Special Counsel, who have filed a further brief on behalf of the Federal Election Commission. The Attorney General has filed a separate brief, which is combined with the amicus brief of the United States … discussing those questions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
		"context": "With respect to those questions, the Commission is separately repre-sented by Special Counsel, who have filed a further brief on behalf of the Federal Election Commission. The Attorney General has filed a separate brief, which is combined with the amicus brief of the United States … discussing those questions. \"); Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus C uriae, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 More fun damentally, the State is not merely its attorney general. The State comprises co- equal branches of government , and each State has the last word on what function each of those branches of gov- ernment may serve—even when it affects federal court proceedings .",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The district court correctly determined that the Bruton exception did not apply here",
		"context": "In answering the prosecutor's questions about what Stillwell had said, the DEA agent used phrases like \"some body else,\" \"the other person,\" and the \"other individual.\" J.A. 7 5-77; see Gray , 523 U.S. at 197 (citing the approach in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with approval) ; Garcia , 836 F.2d at 389 -391 (finding no Bruton violation where the statement was modified to refer to the co - defendant delivering drug proceeds to \"someone\") . And because the substance of Stillwell's confession was relayed through back -and-forth questioning —rather than the agent reading the written transcript of Still- 27 well's interview verbatim —the prosecutor's and the agent's use of phrases like \" the other person \" did not leap out as unmistakable alterations of what Stillwell had actually said. To the extent that a juror might nevertheless have been tempted to infer that the phrases referred to petitioner, cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "836 F.2d 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The district court correctly determined that the Bruton exception did not apply here",
		"context": "The jurors in this case had other alternative infer- ences to draw . A juror might have thought that the nondescript phrasing came verbatim from Stillwell, who deliberately declined to identify his accomplice out of loyalty, fear, or some other reason. Cf ., e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even beyond that, LeRoux r an a siza- ble criminal organization, with numerous \"mercenar- ies\" and employees other than petitioner working for him, including in the Philippines. See J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 F.3d 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "Pet'rs Br. 26 n.4. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is therefore consistent with our argument; there was no state- imposed free, first-come, first-served rule there. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "191 F.3d 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "Petitioners have not raised—because they cannot raise—either contention. The first is the extent to which the government's action is consistent with the Takings Clause. In PruneYard Shopping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that the state's requirement allowing individu- 21 Additionally, the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes state and local governments from regulating Internet websites. See 477 U.S. 131. 49 als \"rights of free expression and petition on shop- ping center property clearly\" was not an \"unconstitu- tional infringement of property rights under the Taking Clause.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "The first is the extent to which the government's action is consistent with the Takings Clause. In PruneYard Shopping 447 U.S. 74, then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that the state's requirement allowing individu- 21 Additionally, the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes state and local governments from regulating Internet websites. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 als \"rights of free expression and petition on shop- ping center property clearly\" was not an \"unconstitu- tional infringement of property rights under the Taking Clause.\" In 512 U.S. 374, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that a taking \"different in character\" from that in PruneYard could state a constitutional claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "See 477 U.S. 131. 49 als \"rights of free expression and petition on shop- ping center property clearly\" was not an \"unconstitu- tional infringement of property rights under the Taking Clause.\" In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that a taking \"different in character\" from that in PruneYard could state a constitutional claim. Because this case does not involve the designa- tion of private property as a public forum, this case is outside the takings analysis entirely. That is likely why MNN has never made a takings argument.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "MNN had no private property rights in the public ac- cess channels. Moreover, there was no use of \"the government's power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if MNN has a proper- ty interest in the public access channels, nothing has ever been taken from it; the administrative authority over the channel that the City gave MNN has always been subject to the first-come, first-served require- ment. Second, the First Amendment generally pre- cludes the government from obligating individuals or companies to speak, or to host others' speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "Second, the First Amendment generally pre- cludes the government from obligating individuals or companies to speak, or to host others' speech. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Miami Herald Publ'g 418 U.S. 241. But petitioners have not advanced any such ar- gument. Nor could they.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "Second, the First Amendment generally pre- cludes the government from obligating individuals or companies to speak, or to host others' speech. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. 475 U.S. 1; Miami Herald Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But petitioners have not advanced any such ar- gument. Nor could they.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property",
		"context": "Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 841. Absent such a fear, requiring MNN to merely provide space for the speech does not unconstitution- ally compel MNN to speak. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87-88.22 Petitioners have never—here or below—raised either a takings or a compelled speech claim. That is for good reason, as neither doctrine provides peti- tioners any support in the context of this case. In dif- ferent circumstances, however, these constitutional protections may limit state authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Westminster Theological Seminary is independent from church control as a matter of principle",
		"context": "6 Ironically, it is because Westminster's founders 6 As such, the \"religious employer\" exemption, reinvigorated by the decision below, violates an important public policy rooted in the First Amendment. Courts must avoid adopting or endorsing structures that \"risk disadvantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and membership are outside of the 'mainstream.'\" Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This may \"cause a religious group to conform its beliefs and practices\" to \"the prevailing secular understanding\" out of \"fear of liability\"—a \"dange[r] that the First Amendment was designed to guard against.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Westminster Theological Seminary is independent from church control as a matter of principle",
		"context": "This may \"cause a religious group to conform its beliefs and practices\" to \"the prevailing secular understanding\" out of \"fear of liability\"—a \"dange[r] that the First Amendment was designed to guard against.\" Id. ; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[I]t is a significant burden on a religious 15 put their convictions ahead of their careers that, under the prior regulations, Westminster was denied status as a \"religious employer.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should clarify Hardison by reinforcing the EEOC's longstanding interpretation of that decision",
		"context": "Such decisions are a real problem, but the solution is not to ove rrule Hardison and unsettle the EEOC guidance and body of precedent that has devel- oped over five decades and that affords substantial pro- tection to religious observance . Instead, as it has done with other precedents, the Court should reaffirm Har- dison while also clarifying its scope and \"reinforcing [its] limits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Halliburton , 573 U.S. at 269, 274, 279- 283 (finding no \"special justification\" for overruling precedent , but clarifying its scope ). 39 First, the Court should make clear that the EEOC has correctly understood Hardison 's reference to \"more than a de minimis cost\" to refer to the sort of \"substantial\" costs the Court considered there —that is, the costs associated with regularly operating sho rt- handed or paying premium wages to substitute work- ers. 432 U.S. at 83 -84 & n.14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "That reasoning cannot be reconciled with this Court's statement that the judg- ment bar is triggered \"once a plaintiff receives a judg- ment ( favorable or not ) in an F TCA suit.\" Simmons , 136 S. Ct. at 1847 (emphasis added). Rather than engage with this Court's explanation of the judgment bar in Simmons , the panel majority simply stated that Simmons \"does not conflict with\" its own decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff 'd on other 31 grounds, Simmons , 136 S. Ct. 1843. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "That reasoning cannot be reconciled with this Court's statement that the judg- ment bar is triggered \"once a plaintiff receives a judg- ment ( favorable or not ) in an F TCA suit.\" Simmons , 136 S. Ct. at 1847 (emphasis added). Rather than engage with this Court's explanation of the judgment bar in Simmons , the panel majority simply stated that Simmons \"does not conflict with\" its own decision in 766 F.3d 576 , aff 'd on other 31 grounds, Simmons , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "Pet. App. 11a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this case is the converse. The district court did not dismiss re- spondent's case in j urisdictional, non- merits terms; the court rejected his FTCA claims for failure of proof: respondent's factual allegations and evidence failed to establish the liability of the United States as a matter of law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "And even if a judgment dis- missing an FTCA claim for failure to prove t he torts alleged were thought to have some jurisdictional conse- quences, the structure of Section 1346(b)(1) —by tying the waiver of immunity to claims that satisfy the ele- ments of the FTCA cause of action —demonstrates that 34 the FTCA would be an exc eption to the general princi- ple that jurisdiction must be resolved before the merits. Cf. Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At bottom, it blinks reality to say, as the panel ma- jority did, that \"the district court did not reac h the mer- its of [respondent's] FTCA claim[s].\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Appellees' constitutional claims should be rejected for the same reasons",
		"context": "In or- der to dispose of both cases, and in light of the impend- ing deadlines for the Secretary and President to make their reports , this Court should address and reject the constitutional c laims, especially because they fail for the same reasons as the statutory claims. Cf. Depart- ment of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As for the Enumeration Clause, it provides that \"[t]he actual Enumeration\" upon which the apportion- ment of Representatives is based \"shall be made\" every ten years \"in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Appellees' constitutional claims should be rejected for the same reasons",
		"context": "at 120a, San Jose , supra (No. 20 -561). The premise is in- correct for the reasons above, and the conclusion does not follow re-gardless, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 48",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. A TLD Indicator Added to a Generic Term Does Not Make the Composite Term Per Se Functional",
		"context": "Although functional features of a product cannot form the basis for trademark protection of a mark, marks function to identify a source. As this Court has stated in TrafFix and Qualitex, \"'in general terms a product feature is functional,' and cannot serve as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.'\" TrafFix Devices, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if such a doctrine can be applicable to word marks, a TLD indicator added to a generic term does not make the composite term per se functional under the doctrine. A domain name, such as Wine.com (to use the \"Wine\" example from the Goodyear's case), is not essential to the use or purpose of wine or the service of selling wine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit's decision violates not only the Religious Freedom Restoration Act but also the Free Exercise Clause",
		"context": "In its opinion below, the Third Circuit failed to give religious freedom the respect it deserved. First, the Third Circuit questioned whether federal law permits a federal agency to create religious and moral exemptions from Obamacare's contraception mandate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, it concluded that the Obama administration's accommodation was good enough for religious adherents with objections to the contraceptive mandate. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": ". The Due Process Clause protects, at a minimum, \"those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England.\" Murray 's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1856 ). The common law did not permit prolonged confinement without a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to assess whether detention was necessary. See generally Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. Pa. L. Re v. 959, 966– 68 (1965) (detailing pre - founding English history and practices regarding bail).",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "VIII (providing that \"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required\"). The Due Process Clause thus embodies the English common law tradition affording core protections to noncitizens and citizens alike. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[F]or so long time as he continues within the king's dominion,\" the king \"affords his protection to an alien . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "169 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "\"). Likewise , at common law, the writ of habeas corpus was available to noncitizens \"to challenge Executive and private detention in civil cases as well as criminal,\" including to contest \"the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The protection against \"arbitrary detention is [thus] as ancient and important a right as any found within the Constitution's boundaries.\" Rodriguez , 138 S. Ct. at 863 (Breyer, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 31 That principle applies with equal force to immigration detention, because \"civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.\" Addingto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In keeping with that understanding, this Court has repeatedly refused to permit prolonged imprisonment by executive officials without a hearing before an independent decisionmaker to assess whether the detention \"bear[s] [a] reasonable relation\" to a valid government purpose —such as preventing flight or protecting the community against dangerous individuals. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting 406 U.S. 715).",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "Addingto 441 U.S. 418. In keeping with that understanding, this Court has repeatedly refused to permit prolonged imprisonment by executive officials without a hearing before an independent decisionmaker to assess whether the detention \"bear[s] [a] reasonable relation\" to a valid government purpose —such as preventing flight or protecting the community against dangerous individuals. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). While the Due Process Clause governs any deprivation of liberty —even for a short period —this Court has required heightened procedures for individuals faced with prolonged confinement, in order to ensure that the length of detention remains reasonable in relation to its purpose. See 407 U.S. 245; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 736, 738 (holding that detention beyond the \"initial commitment\" for an individual found 32 incompetent to stand trial requires additional safeguards).",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting 406 U.S. 715). While the Due Process Clause governs any deprivation of liberty —even for a short period —this Court has required heightened procedures for individuals faced with prolonged confinement, in order to ensure that the length of detention remains reasonable in relation to its purpose. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 736, 738 (holding that detention beyond the \"initial commitment\" for an individual found 32 incompetent to stand trial requires additional safeguards). The p rinciple that prolonged deprivations of liberty require greater procedural protections runs throughout this Court's precedent. For example, an individual can be initially arrested on a police officer's finding of probable cause, but only for a brief period , presumptively 48 hours.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "For example, an individual can be initially arrested on a police officer's finding of probable cause, but only for a brief period , presumptively 48 hours. Cnty. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any further detention must be authorized by a \"neutral and detached magistrate.\" 420 U.S. 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "of 500 U.S. 44. Any further detention must be authorized by a \"neutral and detached magistrate.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further detention pending trial requires a \"prompt\" judicial hearing both to validate the police officer's probable cause finding and to determine whether the detainee presents too great a flight risk or danger to be released pretrial. See 481 U.S. 739.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "420 U.S. 103. Further detention pending trial requires a \"prompt\" judicial hearing both to validate the police officer's probable cause finding and to determine whether the detainee presents too great a flight risk or danger to be released pretrial. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where tr ial proceedings become lengthy, courts consider whether additional prolonged detention is warranted. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "Where tr ial proceedings become lengthy, courts consider whether additional prolonged detention is warranted. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 846 F.2d 167. For these reasons, the Court in Zadvydas held that prolonged detention presents serious constitutional concerns and interpreted a statute that 33 was silent on the length of detention to contain a presumptive six -month limit. 533 U.S. at 701 (observing that \"Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "873 F.2d 796",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "Where tr ial proceedings become lengthy, courts consider whether additional prolonged detention is warranted. See, e.g. , 873 F.2d 796; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For these reasons, the Court in Zadvydas held that prolonged detention presents serious constitutional concerns and interpreted a statute that 33 was silent on the length of detention to contain a presumptive six -month limit. 533 U.S. at 701 (observing that \"Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.2d 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing",
		"context": "533 U.S. at 701 (observing that \"Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months\"). The Court has repeatedly used six months as a benchmark to require additional protections against the loss of liberty. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Foucha , 504 U.S. at 82 (noting that civil detention must be \"strictly limited in duration\"). The constitutional concerns that animated Zadvy das are not limited to cases involving \"indefinite and potentially permanent detention,\" as Petitioners claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Standard Adopted in Bullard, an Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate a Claim in State Court Is Interlocutory, Not Final",
		"context": "See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (directing stay relief where the property in question is not necessary to an effective reorganization and the debtor has no equity in it); United Sav. Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alternatively, a secured creditor may seek stay relief because the debtor is diminishing the value of its collateral in a way that imperils the secured creditor's claim, implicating the adequate-protection lien-preservation process. See 11 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Standard Adopted in Bullard, an Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate a Claim in State Court Is Interlocutory, Not Final",
		"context": "Notably, a motion for stay relief premised on the debtor's bad faith is one of them. See, e.g. , Green v. DeGiacomo (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lower courts, in analyzing whether stay-relief-denial orders are immediately appealable, have found that such orders are not appealable when they do not fully resolve the creditor's claim. For example, in In re Inofin Inc. , the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reasoned that because the hearing on a motion for stay relief is meant to be a summary proceeding and does not involve a full adjudication on the merits, \"it follows that when relief 33 from stay is denied because a moving party has failed to make the necessary showing of a colorable claim in a non- evidentiary hearing, the order denying relief would not be a final order.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 B.R. 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Standard Adopted in Bullard, an Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate a Claim in State Court Is Interlocutory, Not Final",
		"context": "Quoting this Court, the Inofin court noted that, \"so long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal.\" Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 4 4. Other courts have also refused to treat an order regarding stay relief as final when, as is the case here, the merits underlying the dispute between the parties were central to the stay relief requested and were not resolved by the stay-relief order.",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Standard Adopted in Bullard, an Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate a Claim in State Court Is Interlocutory, Not Final",
		"context": "4 4. Other courts have also refused to treat an order regarding stay relief as final when, as is the case here, the merits underlying the dispute between the parties were central to the stay relief requested and were not resolved by the stay-relief order. See Parker v. CSFB 2005-C3 Payson Homes, LLC (In re2016 WL 1535176; WB Family LLC v. Krys (In re2013 WL 6667789[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding that denial of stay relief was not inherently or automatically 34 In the Denial Order, the Bankruptcy Court made no determinations on the merits of Ritzen's state-law breach- of-contract claim or Ritzen's assertion of bad faith. Rather, the Bankruptcy Court withheld any final ruling on both issues, simply determining that there was not a sufficient showing of bad faith at that juncture to warrant stay relief. Critically, the court did not make a final determination regarding bad faith until its final judgment following a bench trial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 B.R. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Standard Adopted in Bullard, an Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate a Claim in State Court Is Interlocutory, Not Final",
		"context": "Critically, the court did not make a final determination regarding bad faith until its final judgment following a bench trial. See, e.g. , United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Fox (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss a case for \"cause\" because the case was filed in bad faith was not a final order, explaining: \"Nothing in the current Order is the final word on the Debtor's good faith. The Debtor's good faith is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case as a whole. The bankruptcy court may or may not revisit the issue of the Debtor's good faith at any time during the pending proceedings.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 B.R. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; 547 U.S. 512; 544 U.S. 93; 543 U.S. 146; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; 547 U.S. 512; 544 U.S. 93; 543 U.S. 146; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; 547 U.S. 512; 544 U.S. 93; 543 U.S. 146; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 547 U.S. 512; 544 U.S. 93; 543 U.S. 146; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 544 U.S. 93; 543 U.S. 146; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 512",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; 547 U.S. 512; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 543 U.S. 146; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; 547 U.S. 512; 544 U.S. 93; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 537 U.S. 280. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "When this pattern arises, the Court simply grants certiorari on the question presented and, if it rules in the petition er's favor, remands for the lower court to consider the remaining issue. See, e.g. , South 138 S. Ct. 2080; 555 U.S. 246; Wash. State 552 U.S. 442; Envt'l 549 U.S. 561; 547 U.S. 512; 544 U.S. 93; 543 U.S. 146; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the Trust's Commerce Clause claim has no bearing on whether this case is an appropriate vehicle. In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "In addition, the Trust's prediction about a return trip to this Court is improbable. Now that the Court 9 has eliminated the physical-presence rule, see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099, the Comme rce Clause issue in this case involves a straightforward application of this Court's precedents. See Complete Auto Transit, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, even if the possibility of a return trip to this Court mattered here, the Trust would have no basis for suggesting that a return trip would be \"likely.\" Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "There are at least two problems with the Trust's logic. First, the Court's due-process jurisprudence has evolved dramatically since this Court last considered the states' power to ta x trusts based on trust beneficiaries' in-state residency. 6 The petition chronicles the development of the law in this area, and how the Court's only guidance on this issue dates back to the era of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Pet. 15– 18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "i, 15–18. 10 Second, the profound technological changes since the Pennoyer era—most notably, the internet, e-mail, and online banking—have made it much easier for settlors and beneficiaries to avoid state taxes by placing investments in trust s administered in other states. 7 Unlike in the 1920s, when the Court decided Safe Deposit & Trust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], trust assets today move across state lines with a single click of a mouse. Thus, the Trust is mistaken when it says there is no reason to revisit outdated precedent in this area. For these reasons, this case is an appropriate and timely vehicle to addre ss the question presented.",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Rather, the statute's general inva-lidity defense and the common law doctrine have coex- isted, and Congress has chosen to leave the statutory language materially unchanged. Where Congress has legislated against the backdrop of an established com- mon law doctrine, and even \"spurned multiple opportu-nities to reverse\" that do ctrine, this \"supports leaving [the doctrine] in place.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; City of 453 U.S. 247. This Court should not, therefore, read the Patent Act's general invalidity defense as abrogating assignor es- toppel. 5 When a doctrine is \"well established at common law,\" this Court \"assum[es] that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Rather, the statute's general inva-lidity defense and the common law doctrine have coex- isted, and Congress has chosen to leave the statutory language materially unchanged. Where Congress has legislated against the backdrop of an established com- mon law doctrine, and even \"spurned multiple opportu-nities to reverse\" that do ctrine, this \"supports leaving [the doctrine] in place.\" 576 U.S. 446; City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should not, therefore, read the Patent Act's general invalidity defense as abrogating assignor es- toppel. 5 When a doctrine is \"well established at common law,\" this Court \"assum[es] that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Newport , 453 U.S. at 263-64. Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly applied equitable doctrines alongside a statute's plain language. See Impression Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Newport , 453 U.S. at 258-271 (common law rule forbidding punitive damages in suits against mu- nicipalities applies to limit the general authorization of municipal liability in 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 287 U.S. 435. When this Court addressed assignor estoppel in 1924, it recognized the doctrine in the context of statu-tory language that was materially the same as it is now.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly applied equitable doctrines alongside a statute's plain language. See Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523; Newport , 453 U.S. at 258-271 (common law rule forbidding punitive damages in suits against mu- nicipalities applies to limit the general authorization of municipal liability in 42 U.S.C. § 1983); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When this Court addressed assignor estoppel in 1924, it recognized the doctrine in the context of statu-tory language that was materially the same as it is now. See Westinghouse Elec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Westinghouse, and in the many years before it, the Patent Act's statutory language governing invalidity as a defense to infringe- ment contained essentially the same language on which Minerva now bases its textual argument. See Act of April 10, 1790, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "See 5 Matthews, Annotated Patent Digest § 35:15 (2008) (\"It is well settle d that an assignor of a patent may not raise the defense to a subsequent in-fringement action that the patent is invalid[. ]\"); Dia- mond Sci. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Deller, 4 Deller's Walker on Patents (2d ed. 1965) § 357, at p.435 (2d ed. 1965) (\"An assignor is estopped to deny the utility, novelty, or validity of 7 the invention assigned.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.2d 1220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THERE IS AN ACKNOWLEDGED SPLIT OF AUTHORITY",
		"context": "See id. at 190–91, 198 (Rule 23(f) \"is clearly a strict and inflexible time limit\" that cannotexcuse a petitioner's mistaken reliance on a districtcourt's scheduling order. ); see also Jenkins , 491 F.3d at 1289–92 (rejecting untimely Rule 23(f) petition eventhough, in light of petition ers' excusable neglect, the district court vacated its or der to restart Rule 23(f)'s deadline); Delta [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lambert believes his case is distinguishable because he filed a motion for reconsideration within the 28-daydeadline in Rule 59(e), however, as explained above, 8 whether Lambert complied with Rule 59(e) is irrelevant. Rather, what matters is whether themotion for reconsideration was filed before the shorter14-day deadline in Rule 23(f) expired.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.3d 1143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Services' draft documents that were not adopted and were not shared in full with EPA did not have binding legal force",
		"context": "at 177- 178. And a final biological opinion is issued only \"[o]nce the consultation process contemplated by [the ESA] has been completed,\" which is after the Services have dis- cussed their findings with the action agency. National Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 50 C.F.R. 402.14(g)(5). If re-spondent or any other party had attempted to bring suit based on something in the Services' December 2013 provisional draft biological opinions, that claim would have been swiftly dismissed f or lack of final agency action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Services' draft documents that were not adopted and were not shared in full with EPA did not have binding legal force",
		"context": "402.14(g)(5). If re-spondent or any other party had attempted to bring suit based on something in the Services' December 2013 provisional draft biological opinions, that claim would have been swiftly dismissed f or lack of final agency action. Respondent invokes United States Army Corps of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this Court in Hawkes referred to the pos- sibility that the agency would revise its completed deci- sion later \"based on 'new information.' \" 136 S. Ct. at 1814 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Services' draft documents that were not adopted and were not shared in full with EPA did not have binding legal force",
		"context": "Circuit hel d that Exemption 5 protected a docume nt prepared within the Department of Home- land Security that s ummarized an alien's asylum inter- view and made a recommendation to a supervisor on whether he should be granted asylum, because the doc- ument was \"written as part of the process by which the super visor came to that final decision.\" 808 F.3d at 898 - 899. I n Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court upheld the privilege for \"an unsigned draft letter\" pre-pared by an agency official, because the letter \"reflects a preliminary position by the [agency] that was subse-quently rejected.\" Id. at 1458.",
		"citation_value_orig": "968 F.2d 1438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Services' draft documents that were not adopted and were not shared in full with EPA did not have binding legal force",
		"context": "Id. at 1458. In American Federation of Government [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the court found that FOIA Exemption 5 pre cluded compelled disclosure of documents recommending p ersonnel actions for agency employees, explaining that those document s re- flected positions \"to which the [agency] was not yet committed.\" Id. at 208.",
		"citation_value_orig": "907 F.2d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": ". \"The rise of administrative bodies\" was arguably \"the most significant legal trend\" of the twentieth cen- tury. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those administrative agen- cies now \"exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law; executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judi- cial power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have violated their rules.\" City of 569 U.S. 290.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": "343 U.S. 470. Those administrative agen- cies now \"exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law; executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judi- cial power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have violated their rules.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet the courts have strained to fit them, by hook or by crook, \"within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": "The Court has repeatedly blessed open-ended delegations of rule- making authority from Congress to the agencies. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To validly hand sweeping power to an agency, the Court has held, Congress need merely \"suppl[y] an intelligible principle to guide the [agency's] use of discretion.\" Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": "Chevron , 467 U.S. at 844. When Congress delegates authority to an agency in an ambiguous statute, and the agency then interprets that statute, a court may not reject the agency's reading of the statute \"simply because the agency's chosen resolution\" strikes the court as \"un- wise.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court must, rather, \"accept the agency's position if . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": "Hence the two doctrines. The delegation doctrine stands on \"a practical understanding that in our increasingly 9 complex society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad gen- eral directives.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the deference doctrine as- sumes that Congress needs help from agencies with \"significant expertise,\" and that the courts must therefore grant \"broad deference\" to agencies' \"exer- cise of judgment.\" Thomas Jefferson 512 U.S. 504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": "488 U.S. 361. Similarly, the deference doctrine as- sumes that Congress needs help from agencies with \"significant expertise,\" and that the courts must therefore grant \"broad deference\" to agencies' \"exer- cise of judgment.\" Thomas Jefferson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[I]t is entirely appropriate,\" under this regime of delegation plus deference, for \"an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibili- ties\" to \"make . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
		"context": "The FCC enjoys the benefits of the delegation- plus-deference framework. Indeed, this Court has ap- plied that framework often in cases involving the FCC's efforts to set media-ownership rules. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nat'l Broad. Co. , 319 U.S. at 218 (\"We would be as- serting our personal views . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "These MPEP statements are of negli- gible assistance because the MPEP self -avowedly \"does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.\" Id. Under United States v. Mead Corp. , such informa l agency guidance is \"beyond the Chevron pale,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, t he government identifies no reasoning or analysis to explain the MPEP's statements , or even any recognition by the agency that there was an inter- pretive issue regarding the meaning of \"person.\" Thus, the MPEP statements do not warrant even patent s \"to the [Atomic Energy] Commission .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "§ 20135(b)(2) (provid ing that \"a patent therefor shall be issued to the United States upon applicat ion made by the Ad- ministrator [of NASA]\"). 17 Skidmore consideration. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, t he Federal Circuit has repeatedly de- clined to defer to the MPEP, and has criticized the validit y of its interpretations . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "Indeed, t he Federal Circuit has repeatedly de- clined to defer to the MPEP, and has criticized the validit y of its interpretations . See, e.g. , Racing Strollers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also EmeraChem Holdings, 859 F.3d 1341 statute is at is- sue. See 513 U.S. 115. In any event, it can- not be reasonably disputed that the Dictionary Act and this Court's presumpti ve meaning of \"person\" would be more familiar to Congress as a guide to word usage when drafting the AIA review provisions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.2d 1418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "Indeed, t he Federal Circuit has repeatedly de- clined to defer to the MPEP, and has criticized the validit y of its interpretations . See, e.g. , Racing Strollers, 878 F.2d 1418; see also EmeraChem Holdings, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] statute is at is- sue. See 513 U.S. 115. In any event, it can- not be reasonably disputed that the Dictionary Act and this Court's presumpti ve meaning of \"person\" would be more familiar to Congress as a guide to word usage when drafting the AIA review provisions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "859 F.3d 1341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Racing Strollers, 878 F.2d 1418; see also EmeraChem Holdings, 859 F.3d 1341 statute is at is- sue. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, it can- not be reasonably disputed that the Dictionary Act and this Court's presumpti ve meaning of \"person\" would be more familiar to Congress as a guide to word usage when drafting the AIA review provisions . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "95/001,970), plus a handful of AIA reviews. Federal agency participation in AIA reviews post-dates enactment of the AIA and is not relevant to whether , at the time of enactment, Congress used \"per son\" to in- clude the government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The infirmity in the government's argument goes beyond the numbers. The government does not point to any recognition by the PTO that the administrative matters cited involved an issue about the meaning of \"person,\" much less any analysis of that issue .",
		"citation_value_orig": "236 U.S. 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference",
		"context": "The matters therefore do not constitute precedent support- ing the government's interpretation. Cf. Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, this handful of unexplained federal agency filings —when viewed next to the significant number of filings by private individuals and entities —under- mines the government's position by demonstrat ing that post- issuance reviews are not a necessary tool for federal agencies .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious assembly demonstrates the danger of the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply the \"substantial relation\" standard from cases addressing electoral integrity",
		"context": ". Religious assembly also illustrates why it was er- roneous for the Ninth Circuit to apply the \"l ess de- manding\" standard of \"exacting scrutiny.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Cir- cuit drew that standard from t he distinct electoral in- tegrity context. See 424 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious assembly demonstrates the danger of the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply the \"substantial relation\" standard from cases addressing electoral integrity",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 2448. The Ninth Cir- cuit drew that standard from t he distinct electoral in- tegrity context. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, r ather than satisfy strict scrutiny's nar- row tailoring, the government may insist on donor dis- closure simply by demonstrating a \"substantial rela- tion between the governm ental interest and the infor- mation required to be disclosed.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious assembly demonstrates the danger of the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply the \"substantial relation\" standard from cases addressing electoral integrity",
		"context": "There, r ather than satisfy strict scrutiny's nar- row tailoring, the government may insist on donor dis- closure simply by demonstrating a \"substantial rela- tion between the governm ental interest and the infor- mation required to be disclosed.\" Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that context , a government's goal of public trans- parency often makes disc losure the point. Sunshine is the best disinfectant —making compelled disclosure \"the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of cam- paign ignorance and corruption .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious assembly demonstrates the danger of the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply the \"substantial relation\" standard from cases addressing electoral integrity",
		"context": "Buckley , 424 U.S. at 68. But even in matters of electoral politics involving \"distastef ul\" facts , the Court has been careful not to turn the exposure of \"corruption\" into a talisman ic in- terest at the First Amendment's expense. See McDon- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing about the electoral integrity context justi- fies importing a standard less than s trict scrutiny into the freedom of assembly. As a corollary , the rationale for compell ing public disclosure in the elec toral integ- rity context make s no sense when applied to a right that—inherently —encompasses private assembly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History and tradition show that state public carry laws like New York's are consistent with the Second Amendment.",
		"context": "Nor could a person evade arrest simply \"b y alleging that such a one threatened him, and he wears it for the safety.\" William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 136 (1762). In the words of Lo rd Coke—who is \"widely recognized by the American colonists as the greatest authority of his time on the laws of England,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The enforcement of public carry restrictions during this period did, however, vary widely based on geographic region. Even un der English law, the general prohibition on travelling armed was most strictly enforced in \"fairs, markets, and other populated areas.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History and tradition show that state public carry laws like New York's are consistent with the Second Amendment.",
		"context": "But o ne cannot reasonably dispute that, in each of these periods, state and local authorit ies enjoyed wide latitude to implement measures restricting the public carry ing of firearms in accordance with local circumstances. Indeed, t his diversity of laws —which allows States and localities to serve as \"laboratories for experimen - tation\"— is at the heart of our federal system. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While there is of course only one United States Constitution, its \"federal structure allows local policies more sensitive to the diverse needs of a hetero- geneous society, permits in novation and experimen - tation, enables greater citizen involvement in demo-cratic processes, and makes government more respon - sive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.\" 564 U.S. 211 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History and tradition show that state public carry laws like New York's are consistent with the Second Amendment.",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 2198. While there is of course only one United States Constitution, its \"federal structure allows local policies more sensitive to the diverse needs of a hetero- geneous society, permits in novation and experimen - tation, enables greater citizen involvement in demo-cratic processes, and makes government more respon - sive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners ignore this diversity. They argue that the Constitution commands every S tate and locality to give individuals unfettered freedom to carry conceal - able firearms in virtually any public place .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "\"[I]nternational commercial arbitration is funda- mentally consensual in nature,\" Born § 10.01, at 1406, and the Convention specifically refers to the agreement of the parties to \"undertake to submit to arbi tration,\" Convention a rt. II(1) , 21 U.S.T. 2519; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Domestic -law doctrines that permit nonsignatories to enforce an arbitration agreement of- ten \"provide a basis for concluding that an entity is in reality a party to the arbitration agreement be- cause that party's actions constitute consent to the agreement, notwithstanding the lack of its execution of the agre ement.\" Born § 10:01[D], at 1414.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "Born § 10.01[E], at 1414. In all cases, \"[a] party who attempts to compel arbitration must show that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, that the mo- vant is entitled to invoke the arbitration clause, that the other party is bound by t hat clause, and that the claim asserted comes within the clause's scope.\" InterGen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in situations in which courts have applied doctrines such as \"incorporation by reference, assumption, veil pierc- ing/alter ego and estoppel,\" the \"court[s] ha[ve] found an agreement to arbitrate\" based on \"the totality of the evidence support[ing] an objective intention to agree to arbitrate,\" Sarhank Gr 404 F.3d 657, with a par ticular focus on the \"con- text of the case,\" Sourcing Unlimited, 526 F.3d 38. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "In all cases, \"[a] party who attempts to compel arbitration must show that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, that the mo- vant is entitled to invoke the arbitration clause, that the other party is bound by t hat clause, and that the claim asserted comes within the clause's scope.\" InterGen 344 F.3d 134. Thus, in situations in which courts have applied doctrines such as \"incorporation by reference, assumption, veil pierc- ing/alter ego and estoppel,\" the \"court[s] ha[ve] found an agreement to arbitrate\" based on \"the totality of the evidence support[ing] an objective intention to agree to arbitrate,\" Sarhank Gr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with a par ticular focus on the \"con- text of the case,\" Sourcing Unlimited, 526 F.3d 38. b. In conducting that analysis, any effort to bind a nonsignatory sovereign nation to a n arbitration agree- 33 ment would raise special concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 F.3d 657",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "In all cases, \"[a] party who attempts to compel arbitration must show that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, that the mo- vant is entitled to invoke the arbitration clause, that the other party is bound by t hat clause, and that the claim asserted comes within the clause's scope.\" InterGen 344 F.3d 134. Thus, in situations in which courts have applied doctrines such as \"incorporation by reference, assumption, veil pierc- ing/alter ego and estoppel,\" the \"court[s] ha[ve] found an agreement to arbitrate\" based on \"the totality of the evidence support[ing] an objective intention to agree to arbitrate,\" Sarhank Gr 404 F.3d 657, with a par ticular focus on the \"con- text of the case,\" Sourcing Unlimited, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. In conducting that analysis, any effort to bind a nonsignatory sovereign nation to a n arbitration agree- 33 ment would raise special concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 F.3d 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "Notably, in suits involving the U.S. Government , this Court has previously recogn ized \"that equitable estop- pel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private litigants.\" Office of Pers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 467 U.S. 51. Similarly, with respect to third -party beneficiary prin- ciples, this Court has recognized that \"the modern ju- risprudence permitting intended beneficiaries to sue does not generally apply to contracts between a private party and the government.\" 135 S. Ct. 1378 ; see also, e.g., 337 F.3d 1024 (\"When a contra ct is with a government entity, a more stringent test [than otherwise] applies: Parties that benefit are generally assumed to be incidental ben- eficiaries, and may not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "Notably, in suits involving the U.S. Government , this Court has previously recogn ized \"that equitable estop- pel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private litigants.\" Office of Pers. 496 U.S. 414 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, with respect to third -party beneficiary prin- ciples, this Court has recognized that \"the modern ju- risprudence permitting intended beneficiaries to sue does not generally apply to contracts between a private party and the government.\" 135 S. Ct. 1378 ; see also, e.g., 337 F.3d 1024 (\"When a contra ct is with a government entity, a more stringent test [than otherwise] applies: Parties that benefit are generally assumed to be incidental ben- eficiaries, and may not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
		"context": "496 U.S. 414 ; see 467 U.S. 51. Similarly, with respect to third -party beneficiary prin- ciples, this Court has recognized that \"the modern ju- risprudence permitting intended beneficiaries to sue does not generally apply to contracts between a private party and the government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also, e.g., 337 F.3d 1024 (\"When a contra ct is with a government entity, a more stringent test [than otherwise] applies: Parties that benefit are generally assumed to be incidental ben- eficiaries, and may not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary. The contract must estab- lish not only an intent to confer a benefit, but also an intention to grant the third party enforceable rights.\" ) (citations, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omit- ted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1378",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Selective Incorporation",
		"context": "As a result, the selective incorporation view has emerged as an unsteady compromise. This view holds that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights are incorporated and applied to the states, and certain others are not. Those prov isions of the Bill of Rights that are incorporated are said to be those which are \"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun damental,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or which are \"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\" 332 U.S. 319. But these formulations make the selective incorporation doctrine highly subjective.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Selective Incorporation",
		"context": "This view holds that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights are incorporated and applied to the states, and certain others are not. Those prov isions of the Bill of Rights that are incorporated are said to be those which are \"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun damental,\" 291 U.S. 97, or which are \"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But these formulations make the selective incorporation doctrine highly subjective. As Justices Harlan and Stewart said in their Duncan v. Louisiana dissent, 7 Today's Court still remains unwilling to accept the total incorporatists' view of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Selective Incorporation",
		"context": "Then the Court merely declares that the clause in question is \"in\" or \"out.\" The Court has justified neither its starting place nor its conclusion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Frankfurter's Adamson concurrence further illustrates the subjectivity of selective incorporation: 8 There is suggested merely a selective incorporation of the first eight Amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment. Some are in and some are out, but we are left in the dark as to which are in and which are out.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision",
		"context": "26-28. But constitutional avoidance applies only \"if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As explained above, the government's interpretation is not a \"reasonable alternative\"; it cannot be squared with the statute's plain text or basic rules of statutory construction. See, e.g., 138 S. Ct. 830 397 (1995) (\"When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 858",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision",
		"context": "490 U.S. 858. As explained above, the government's interpretation is not a \"reasonable alternative\"; it cannot be squared with the statute's plain text or basic rules of statutory construction. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 397 (1995) (\"When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.\"). 34 (constitutional avoidance does not justify \"implausible\" narrowing constructions). In sum, the government cannot evade Congress's actual language by proffering a late-breaking and atex- tual construction of the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Mischaracterize The Legion's Standard",
		"context": ". believe[rs] in a benevolent, o m n i p o t e n t C r e a t o r ...a r e k n o w n t o d i f f e r ( f o r example, the divinity of Christ).\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, they cite Justice Kennedy's Allegheny dissent stating the coercion test would not \"permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.\" 492 U.S. at 661.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort",
		"context": "1. Because the common -law tort of malicious prose- cution is the most appropriate analogy, the Court must determine whic h of the tort's elements should be incor- porated into petitioner's constitutional claim. Although Section 1983 is not \" simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common -law claims ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court has recognized that \"[c]ommon -law principles are meant to guide the definition of [Section] 1983 claims, \" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 921. The relevant question is whether the elements of the common -law cause of action are consistent with \"the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort",
		"context": "T he pending threat of damages may \" chill testimony in the criminal action,\" Keeton § 119, at 874, undermining the truth -seeking function of the criminal proceeding. At the same time, the civil suit might be u sed to obtain from the prosecutor discovery not available in the pending criminal proceeding. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 5 Because favorable termination would be an element of a dam- ages action under Section 1983, rather than a limitation on the scope of the constitutional right, it would not affect the United States' abil- ity to prosec ute those who willfully violate individuals' constitutional rights. See 18 U.S.C. 241, 242.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 820",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort",
		"context": "The adoption of the element here would fur- ther those same interests and prevent a criminal de- fendant from using a Section 1983 claim to \"collat- eral[ly] attack\" his indictment or eventual conviction \"through the vehicle of a civil suit.\" Id. at 484 (citation omitted) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . c. In addition, a favorable -termination requirement would serve an import ant evidentiary purpose. At com- mon law , the favorable -termination element of mali- cious prosecution exists in part \"for what it shows about probable cause or guilt -in-fact\" of the accused.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort",
		"context": "Conversely, where a prosecution ends favorably to the accused, that resolu-tion may serve as \"evidence of the want of probable cause for the prosecutio n.\" 40 Miss. 311; see 9 So. 308; Restatement §§ 663- 665, at 429- 433. In the due -process context, this Court has explained that the knowing use of fabricated evidence to obtain a conviction violates due process only where there is a \"reasonable likelihood\" that the evidence \"could have affected the judgment of the jury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 527 U.S. 263. Although petitioner's due -process claim is based on the deprivation o f his liberty that resulted not from a con- viction, but from the initiation of criminal proceedings , courts of appeals to recognize such a claim have properly required that the fabricated evidence was ma- terial to the charging decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort",
		"context": "In the due -process context, this Court has explained that the knowing use of fabricated evidence to obtain a conviction violates due process only where there is a \"reasonable likelihood\" that the evidence \"could have affected the judgment of the jury.\" 427 U.S. 97; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although petitioner's due -process claim is based on the deprivation o f his liberty that resulted not from a con- viction, but from the initiation of criminal proceedings , courts of appeals to recognize such a claim have properly required that the fabricated evidence was ma- terial to the charging decision. See Black , 835 F.3d at 371 ( requiring \" a reasonable likelihood that, absent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have been criminally charged \"); Morse , 804 F.3d at 547 ( finding that a prosecutor may be liable for harm caused by fab- ricated evidence that was \"mater ial to the grand jury's decision to indict\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort",
		"context": "e. Finally, a favorable -termination element would be consistent with principles of federal -state comity. Petitioner indirectly invokes those principles when he contends (Br. 32 -35) that this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], would inde- pendently prevent a defendant from seeking damages for the initiation of criminal proceedings prior to the fa- vorable termination of those proceedings. In Preiser , 28 the Court held that the federal habeas statute provides \"the exclusive remedy\" in federal court for a priso ner who \"attack[s] the validity of his confinement.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An \"enemy\" is an enemy nation.",
		"context": "E.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, On Treason: A Citizen's Guide to the Law 135–36 (2020) (\"Failure to understand this point contri butes to the most significant misapprehensi ons of Ameri can treason law. \"); The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases) , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (highlighting potenti al confusi on on this point as early as 150 years ago; rejecti ng common-l aw sources of definition of \"enemy \" and instead \"looking to equity, natural law, and public internati onal law as the proper sources to unders tand the Consti tution's use of \"enemi es,\" Blackman & Tillman, supra n.5, at 523). But the parti cular meani ng of \"enemy\" as used in the Consti tution is clear in various venerabl e cases. See The Prize Cases , 67 U.S. at 673–74 (using \"enemy\" to refer to those terri tories \"claiming to be .",
		"citation_value_orig": "67 U.S. 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An \"enemy\" is an enemy nation.",
		"context": "at 22. This means, of course, that \"[a]n enemy can only exist during a war,\" even if undecl ared. Blackman & Tillman, supra n.5, at 523 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, although the same is true of the crime of treason, the \"aid or comfort\" clause of Secti on Three is \"not coextensi ve with\" treason. Blackman & Tillman, supra n.5, at 525.",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Rule Rests On Unreasonable Assumptions",
		"context": "Of course, actually granting preferential access to symbols of one religion would be unconstitutional. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the simple fact that Veterans Memorial Park contains only one memorial with religious symbolism does not demonstrate preferential access. Rather, the Peace Cross has merely been provided the same access to a park dedicated to veterans memorials as the purely secular memorials that surround it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Eighth Circuit's inversion of the categorical approach would produce grave practical difficulties",
		"context": "He pleads guilty to breaking and entering i nto a car. That is not an aggravated felony \" burglary offense \" under § 1101(a)(43)(G) , because the elements of \"ordinary vehicle[]\" burglary (as opposed to burglary of occupied vehicles and structures) is not \"federal generic 'bur- glary.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Shepard , 544 U.S. at 17. But no written plea agreement is drafted , and the court's judgment simply reflects a conviction under the relevant code section . In removal proceedings years later, the govern- ment argues that the \"burglary\" conviction is an 44 aggravated felony that subjects him to mandatory de- portation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Eighth Circuit's inversion of the categorical approach would produce grave practical difficulties",
		"context": "See id. § I.C. That is exactly what hap pened in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the First Circuit's case addressing the question presented here. The noncitizen there \"was unable to secure any … docu- ments\" that \"could clarify under which prong he was convicted\" because \"the Superior Court of the county where he was convicted does not, in misdemeanor cases, maintain copies of the documents he needed .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Eighth Circuit's inversion of the categorical approach would produce grave practical difficulties",
		"context": "Descamps, 570 U.S. at 271. Indeed, \"preserving the [defendant's] right to remain in the 48 United States may be more important to the [defend- ant] than any potential jail sentence\" —and certainly in cases like Mr. Pereida's, in which a noncitizen pleads guilty to a no- incarceration misdemeanor and so likely focuses exclusively on downstream immigra- tion consequences. Jae [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has emphasized , re- peatedly , that the categorical approach should not be understood to fun ctionally \"rewrite\" plea bargains in that \"unfair\" way. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 271 (quoting Taylor , 495 U.S. at 601- 02).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Eighth Circuit's inversion of the categorical approach would produce grave practical difficulties",
		"context": "For those same reasons, adopting the Eighth Cir- cuit's rule would open up wide swaths of prior convic- tions to ineffective- assistance -of-counsel challenges. Noncitizens like our car burglar could argue that his attorney's failure to ensure that the record reflected the particular statutory prong at issue —even if that is not typically recorded in the jurisdiction —violated counsel's duty to mi nd future immigration conse- quences in plea proceedings . See Jae Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. What 's more, the Eighth Circuit's rule will be overinclusive, treating everyone as if they were con- victed of a more serious offense under a statute unless they can prove otherwise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 542 Contemplates A Procedure Under Which Creditors May Raise Statutory Defenses To Turnover",
		"context": "§ 542(a). Furthermore, as this Court recognized in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. , one of the \"explicit limita- tions on the reach of § 542(a) \" is \"that the property be usable under § 363.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (requiring turnover only if the prop- erty is \"property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363\" of the Bankruptcy Code). And the trustee cannot use property under § 363 unless the creditor is provided \"adequate protection\" of its inter- est in the property as a condition to relinquishing pos- session.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 542 Contemplates A Procedure Under Which Creditors May Raise Statutory Defenses To Turnover",
		"context": "If § 362(a)(3) itself requires immediate turnover of property in which the estate has an interest, § 542's turnover provision would be super- fluous. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s carefully de- signed protections for creditors to assert defenses to turnover and secure adequate protection for their property rights before relinquishing possession would become meaningless. United Sav. 484 U.S. 365; id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 542 Contemplates A Procedure Under Which Creditors May Raise Statutory Defenses To Turnover",
		"context": "495 U.S. 552's carefully de- signed protections for creditors to assert defenses to turnover and secure adequate protection for their property rights before relinquishing possession would become meaningless. United Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 371-375 (rejecting reading of § 362 that \"contradict[ed] the carefully drawn disposition of\" other \"provisions … dealing with the rights of secured creditors\"); see also Mission , 139 S. Ct. at 1663 (rejecting reading of Code's executory-contract provision that would permit debtor effectively to \"avoid\" a pre-bankruptcy transfer of property under the contract free of the limitations on achieving that result under the Code's \"avoidance\" provisions).",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. UNDERSTANDING THE INSIDER PROBLEM IN COMPUTER CRIME LAW HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRETCHING THE CFAA IN THIS CASE — AND WHY CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS, HAS THE SOLUTION",
		"context": "The stolen property was transported in interstate commerce either by sending it over the Internet or carrying a copy on a portable disk across state lines. Courts rejected this prosecution theory, however, on the ground that § 2314 requires the stolen property to have tangible form. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 676 F.3d 71. 25 A second strategy was to try the federal conversion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, at least in cases involving fed- eral government employees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.2d 1301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. UNDERSTANDING THE INSIDER PROBLEM IN COMPUTER CRIME LAW HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRETCHING THE CFAA IN THIS CASE — AND WHY CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS, HAS THE SOLUTION",
		"context": "The stolen property was transported in interstate commerce either by sending it over the Internet or carrying a copy on a portable disk across state lines. Courts rejected this prosecution theory, however, on the ground that § 2314 requires the stolen property to have tangible form. See, e.g., 925 F.2d 1301; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 A second strategy was to try the federal conversion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, at least in cases involving fed- eral government employees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "676 F.3d 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. UNDERSTANDING THE INSIDER PROBLEM IN COMPUTER CRIME LAW HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRETCHING THE CFAA IN THIS CASE — AND WHY CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS, HAS THE SOLUTION",
		"context": "On this thinking, perhaps the employee who used a government computer for impermissible personal reasons was converting the government's property to his own use. Courts largely rejected this approach, as well, although the caselaw was more mixed. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]601 F.2d 69. Congress solved an important part of the insider problem in 1996 with the pa ssage of 18 U.S.C. § 1832, the federal criminal law prohibiting the theft of trade secrets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.3d 1416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. UNDERSTANDING THE INSIDER PROBLEM IN COMPUTER CRIME LAW HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRETCHING THE CFAA IN THIS CASE — AND WHY CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS, HAS THE SOLUTION",
		"context": "On this thinking, perhaps the employee who used a government computer for impermissible personal reasons was converting the government's property to his own use. Courts largely rejected this approach, as well, although the caselaw was more mixed. See, e.g., 56 F.3d 1416[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress solved an important part of the insider problem in 1996 with the pa ssage of 18 U.S.C. § 1832, the federal criminal law prohibiting the theft of trade secrets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "601 F.2d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. UNDERSTANDING THE INSIDER PROBLEM IN COMPUTER CRIME LAW HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRETCHING THE CFAA IN THIS CASE — AND WHY CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS, HAS THE SOLUTION",
		"context": "The gov- ernment has used that fact, as in this case, to prosecute insiders on the theory that computer use contrary to expressed limits violates 18 U.S.C. § 1030. See, e.g., 78 M.J. 501; 807 F.3d 508; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the government's argument proves too much. As written, the CFAA offers no way to let the govern-ment bring those cases without also making everyone a criminal who knowingly violates terms of service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "676 F.3d 854",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The stay of acts to prevent a debtor from taking possession of property of the estate is consistent with the broader statutory framework",
		"context": ". Because statutory analysis is a \"holistic endeavor,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the courts in the majority rightly examine § 362(a)(3) in the broader context of the Bankruptcy Code. Especially for debt reorganization cases, the ma- jority's interpretation fits neatly into the larger frame-work. The City and its amici contend that the automatic stay serves only to mainta in the status quo, but the automatic stay \"serves several goals,\" including offer- ing debtors \"breathing room during the period of finan- cial reshuffling.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 973",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The stay of acts to prevent a debtor from taking possession of property of the estate is consistent with the broader statutory framework",
		"context": "Smith v. State of Maine Bureau of Rev. Servs. (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Espe- cially when the property at stake is a debtor's vehicle, the denial of access to the property can be a source of intense financial pressure. See A Car Is A Necessity , Pew Research Center (Sept. 13, 2010), https://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2010/09/ 13/a-car-is-a-necessity/ (finding that \"an overwhelming[ ] number of Ameri-cans consider a car a necessity in life\"); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Deborah Thorne, Driven to Bank- ruptcy , 55 Wake Forest L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F.3d 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The stay of acts to prevent a debtor from taking possession of property of the estate is consistent with the broader statutory framework",
		"context": "The issue is not just debtor protection. \"The object of the automatic stay provision is essentially to solve a collective action problem.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The stay prevents creditors from acting individually in ways that might be detrimental to creditors collectively. Preventing ac-tions that obstruct reorganizations are entirely con- sistent with this purpose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.2d 1467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. AGENCY FEES ARE NOT COMPELLED SPEECH OF THE EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS NO GENUINE CHOICE IN THE FEES",
		"context": "The determination of who exercises \"genuine choice\" over the final recipient of the agency fees resolves the issue of to wh om to attribute the agency attributed to an intermediary debtor—even though they pass through the debtor's account—because the debtor is deemed not to have control over those funds. See, e.g. , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Wes Turner, Agency Fees and the Earmark - ing Doctrine , On Labor, Jan. 16, 2018, https ://onlabor.org/agency - fees-and-the-earmarking -doctrine/ (describing the earmarking doctrine and comparing it to the agency fees at issue in this case). 8 fees when considering their compatibility with the First Amendment. 4",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 F.3d 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A subject's failure to yield affects the duration, but not the existence, of a physical-force seizure",
		"context": "Although the facts of Hodari D. itself involved a show -of-authority seizure, no sound basis exists for dis- regarding its explica tion of the requirements for a physical -force seizure. The court of appeals deemed that aspect of the Court's decision to be \"common law dicta\" and read other decisions of this Court to require that \"physical touch (or force) must terminate the sus- pect's movement \" (or \"otherwise cause the government to have physical control over him\" ) in order to consti- tute a seizure. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,562 U.S. 1200 ; see Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 1213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A subject's failure to yield affects the duration, but not the existence, of a physical-force seizure",
		"context": "The court of appeals erred in viewing Hodari D. 's discussion of physical -force seizures to conflict with 16 other decisions of this Court. As the court of appeals has noted, see Brooks , 614 F.3d at 1219 -1221, this Court has \"oft -repeated\" that \"the 'seizure' of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment\" is the \"mean- ingful int erference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That def- inition, however, is consistent with Hodari D. 's recogni- tion that \"with respect to application of ph ysical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield,\" 499 U.S. at 626. Whether or not a subject yields, the actual \"application of physical force to restrain move- ment,\" ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A subject's failure to yield affects the duration, but not the existence, of a physical-force seizure",
		"context": "See Brooks , 614 F.3d at 1219 - 1221. Two of the decisio ns concerned asserted seizures that did not involve physical force at all. See Brendlin , 551 U.S. at 252 (traffic stop); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One involved accidental , rather than intentional, application of physical force, and found that no seizure had occurred on that ground alone. Lewis , 523 U.S. at 844.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A subject's failure to yield affects the duration, but not the existence, of a physical-force seizure",
		"context": "Lewis , 523 U.S. at 844. And the remainder in- volved physical force, intentional ly applied by police of- ficers, that indisputably terminated the subject's move- ment. See Brower , 489 U.S. at 594 (fatal collision with 17 a roadblock); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Although submission is not a prerequisite for a physical -force seizure, its absence remains relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis, because it affects the seizure's length.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A subject's failure to yield affects the duration, but not the existence, of a physical-force seizure",
		"context": "See, e.g., 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the Eng- lish Language 67 (1828) (defining \"seizure\" as \"the act of laying hold on suddenly\") (capitalization omitted); 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1785) (defining \"seizure\" as \"the act of taking forcible possession\") (capitalization omitted); Thomas Dyche & W illiam Pardon, A New General English Dic- tionary (14th ed. 1771) (defining \"seize\" as \"to lay or take hold of violently or at unawares, wrongfully, or by force\") (capitalization omitted) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 The Fourth Amendment incorporates that limita- tion. As the Court ha s explained , if an officer \"ha[s] laid his hands upon [a s ubject ] to arrest him,\" but the sub- ject \"ha[s] broken away ,\" \"it would hardl y be realistic to say that\" a subsequent event occurred \"during the course of an arrest.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plain language of Section 1447(d) authorizes full review",
		"context": "1447(d). 2 That is, orders remanding a case to state court because of a lack of subject -matter jurisdiction. Thermtron Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated in part on other grounds by 517 U.S. 706. 7 Those sections provide for removal by a federal \"officer (or any person acting under that officer)\" and in civil rights cases. See 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plain language of Section 1447(d) authorizes full review",
		"context": "1447(d). 2 That is, orders remanding a case to state court because of a lack of subject -matter jurisdiction. Thermtron Prods., 423 U.S. 336, abrogated in part on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Those sections provide for removal by a federal \"officer (or any person acting under that officer)\" and in civil rights cases. See 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plain language of Section 1447(d) authorizes full review",
		"context": "If the district court erred in rejecting any of those grounds for removal, then removal was proper, the district court has subject -matter jurisdiction , and the order is errone- ous. As the Seventh Circuit put it, \"[t]o say that a dis- trict court's 'order' is reviewable is to allow appellate re- view of the whole order, not just of particular issues or reasons.\" Lu [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The clause \"from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 ,\" does not narrow the scope of ap- pellate review. That clause identifies which orders are reviewab le: Any \"order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443,\" i.e., any remand order following such a removal .",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 F.3d 805",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Violating reasonable expectations of privacy requires a warrant",
		"context": ". Examining a vehicle within the curtilage is also a search of the home because it invades reasonable expectations of privacy there. See Jardines , 569 U.S. at 12 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The curtilage enjoys the Fourth Amendment 's core privacy protections. \"The prot ection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Violating reasonable expectations of privacy requires a warrant",
		"context": "An entrance into the curtilage to conduct an investigation —whether canine or vehicular —violates expectations of privacy in a \"most intimate and familiar space.\" Id. at 14; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]93 F. App'x 701.",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 S.E.2d 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Plaintiffs' policy argument fails",
		"context": "26-27. But as this Court has long held, \"the assumption that if [petitioners] have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.\" Valley Forge Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 55 Plaintiffs' concerns are unfounded in any event: any number of parties ma y challenge such miscon- duct. ERISA expressly authorizes the Department of Labor to enforce ERISA's fiduciary obligations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Subsequent Acts of Congress and other events confirm that there is no reservation today",
		"context": "2. This Court's decisions underscore the point. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court descri bed a Creek allotment as \"lands within what until recently was the Creek Nation in the Indian Territory.\" Id. at 423; see Woodward , 238 U.S. at 285 (referring to land in Muskogee County as \"formerly part of the do- 24 main of the Creek Nation\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Subsequent Acts of Congress and other events confirm that there is no reservation today",
		"context": "Id. at 423; see Woodward , 238 U.S. at 285 (referring to land in Muskogee County as \"formerly part of the do- 24 main of the Creek Nation\"). In Oklahoma Ta x Com- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court noted that while some \" Indian tribes a[re] separate po- litical entities with all the rights of independent status,\" that \"condition \" \"has not existed for many years in the State of Oklahoma.\" Id. at 602.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The majority's recommendations",
		"context": "at 18. This principle, sometimes referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy, is codified in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. CONTU acknowledged that the line between \"copyrightable computer programs and uncopyrightable processes or methods of operation [under this rule] does not always seem to 'shimmer with clarity,'\" but the commission did not view this limitation as a bar to copy right protection. CONTU Rep. 18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The majority's recommendations",
		"context": "CONTU acknowledged that the line between \"copyrightable computer programs and uncopyrightable processes or methods of operation [under this rule] does not always seem to 'shimmer with clarity,'\" but the commission did not view this limitation as a bar to copy right protection. CONTU Rep. 18. In reaching this conclusion, CONTU relied on this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that a valid copyright in a book describing a system of accounting did not prevent others from using the a ccounting system itself. CONTU Rep. 18-19. With respect to computer software, CONTU concluded, consistent with Baker , that copyright \"protects the program so long as it 8 remains fixed in a tangible medium of expression but does not protect the electromechanical functioning of the machine.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "101 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Congressional Delegations Have Resulted in Over 300,000 Regulatory Crimes, Criminalizing Everything from Mislabeled Marbles to Misshaped Meatloaf",
		"context": "Regulatory criminalization provides a good exam- ple of how widespread legislative delegation endangers individual liberty. There are so many federal crimes to- day that \"scholars actually debate their numbers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After the Department of Justice assigned Ronald Gainer to count all federal criminal laws in 1982, he had to give up because \"[y]ou will have died and resurrected three times\" before counting them all. Gary Fields and John R. Emshwiller, Many Efforts to Count Nation's Federal Criminal Laws , Wall Street Journal, Jul.",
		"citation_value_orig": "745 F.3d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The strategy of conceding elements of the crime and focusing on the weakest elements is not among the trial decisions for which a client's express consent is required",
		"context": "But \"[w]ith the exception of these specifiedfundamental decisions, an attorney's duty is to takeprofessional responsibility for the conduct of the case,after consulting with his client.\" Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court declined to add contesting gu ilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial to that list. Nixon concluded that strategically conceding guilt in a capital case is not \"the equivalent of a guilty plea\"and may be defense counsel's wisest course. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The strategy of conceding elements of the crime and focusing on the weakest elements is not among the trial decisions for which a client's express consent is required",
		"context": "As the Court explained, a \"guilty plea is 'morethan a confession which admits that the accused didvarious acts,' it is a 'stipu lation that no proof by the prosecution need be advanced.'\" Id. at 188 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). A \"plea is not simply a strategic choice; it is itself a 31 conviction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The strategy of conceding elements of the crime and focusing on the weakest elements is not among the trial decisions for which a client's express consent is required",
		"context": "For those reasons, a concession strategy is not inconsistent with the plea of not guilty. \"Winning overan audience by empathy is a technique that dates backto Aristotle.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].Where the prosecution has not agreed to recommend alife sentence in return, \"pleading guilty . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The strategy of conceding elements of the crime and focusing on the weakest elements is not among the trial decisions for which a client's express consent is required",
		"context": "As the United States explained in itsamicus brief, \"If the trial is infected by error and the defendant obtains a mistrial or a reversal, theprosecution may be more willing at that point tobargain for a guilty plea rather than retry the case.\"U.S. Br. at 22, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 If the concession in Nixon was not considered the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, the concession in this case cannot either. Unlike here, Nixon's counsel'sconcession in the closing argument was total; he agreedthat Florida had proven all of the elements of thecharged crime: \"I think that what you will decide isthat the State of Florida .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The strategy of conceding elements of the crime and focusing on the weakest elements is not among the trial decisions for which a client's express consent is required",
		"context": "has proved its case against Joe Elton Nixon. I think you will find that the Statehas proved beyond a reasonable doubt each and everyelement of the crimes charged, first-degreepremeditated murder, kidna pping, robbery, and arson.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev'd , Nixon , 543 U.S. at 193 (citation omitted). Having concluded that conceding guilt is not the equivalent of pleading guilty, this Court held thatcounsel was not \"required to gain express consentbefore conceding Nixon's guilt.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 So.2d 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history",
		"context": "29- 32. Because the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3) resolves the question presented, \"that is where the inquiry should end.\" Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent the Court wishes to consider it, howe ver, the legislative history sheds little light on the question in this case. Petitioner and the governme nt cite the House Judici- ary Committee's report, which sugg ests that \"[s]ervice on an embassy by mail [is] preclu ded under this bill\" in order to \"avoid questions of inconsis tency with [Article 22(1)] of the Vienna Convention.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history",
		"context": "Thus, when the House Report refers to service \"on an embassy\" being prohibited under the 1976 bill (as contrasted with the earlier 1973 bill), it was seemingly referring to mailings sent to ambassadors , not mailings sent to others at embassies. Cf. Hellenic Lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Always the best indicator of congressional intent, the statutory text makes clear that Congress did not do what petitioner and the governme nt say it supposedly in- 51 tended: prohibit the service of process by mail at an em- bassy. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) contains no limita-tion on the location for the se rvice of process, and the leg- islative history cannot (and do es not) supply such a limi- tation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 F.2d 978",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "Because it discriminates against individuals based on their religion and reflects a clear animus towards Muslims, the Proclamation, like its predecessor Executive Orders, violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The \"clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; m cCreary Cty., 545 U.S. 844. 34 34. For similar reasons, the Proclamation violates the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "Because it discriminates against individuals based on their religion and reflects a clear animus towards Muslims, the Proclamation, like its predecessor Executive Orders, violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The \"clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.\" 456 U.S. 228; m cCreary Cty., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34 34. For similar reasons, the Proclamation violates the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "34 34. For similar reasons, the Proclamation violates the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Discrimination against a protected class on the basis of overt animus is the most obvious and fundamental abuse of government authority against which the Equal Protection Clause was created to protect. Vill.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "Discrimination against a protected class on the basis of overt animus is the most obvious and fundamental abuse of government authority against which the Equal Protection Clause was created to protect. Vill. of Arlington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As such, classifications based on religion or national origin are scrutinized to the highest degree. 486 U.S. 456.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "of Arlington 429 U.S. 252. As such, classifications based on religion or national origin are scrutinized to the highest degree. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he Religion Clauses . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": ". all speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that only a \"facially legitimate and bona fide reason\" need be offered to justify certain federal immigration policies. m andel , 408 U.S. at 770. Application of that standard was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in its decision concerning the second Executive Order.",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "m andel , 408 U.S. at 770. Application of that standard was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in its decision concerning the second Executive Order. 35 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even assuming the m andel standard did apply here, it would not foreclose judicial inquiry into improper purpose. Though deferential, m andel nonetheless requires that there be a \"bona fide\" policy justification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "859 F.3d 741",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "Though deferential, m andel nonetheless requires that there be a \"bona fide\" policy justification. As the Fourth Circuit's most recent en banc majority opinion recognized, determining whether a justification is bona fide requires consideration of the purpose of the challenged state action. See int'l Refugee Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]135 S. Ct. 2140. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, Hawai'i i , 859 F.3d at 769 n.9 (9th Cir. 2017), mandel is applicable only when the challenge is to claimed misuse of delegated authority, m andel , 408 U.S. at 770 (\"We hold that when the Executive exercises this power .",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "at 769-70—not when the challenge is to action exceeding delegated authority. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 standard, read through the lens of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Kerry v. Din . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": ". accounts for those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly alleges that a government action runs so contrary to the basic premises of our Constitution as to warrant more probing review. \"); see also int'l Refugee Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Bona Fide , Black's Law Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 1968) (\"bona fide\" reason is given \"sincerely,\" \"honestly,\" and \"with good faith.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 F.3d 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "37 This approach also comports with more recent applications of mandel and Din, where courts have admonished claimants for failing to allege bad faith—comments that would be non sequiturs if no such allegation could overcome deference. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1173 36. \"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.'\" 430 U.S. 188.",
		"citation_value_orig": "826 F.3d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": ", 826 F.3d 1164, 1173 36. \"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37. Although Din recognized that an affirmative showing of bad faith could nullify an executive action, the facts of that case did not address that question, as there was no allegation of bad faith, and the Court recognized that that Petitioner's admission that he \"worked for the Taliban\" provided \"at least a facial connection to terrorist activity.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "was made on a forbidden racial basis\"); Am. Acad. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As described more fully below, the Proclamation clearly discriminates against Muslims. See Section C, infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Strict Scrutiny Dooms the Scandalous-Marks Provision",
		"context": "Section 1052(a)'s scandalous-marks provision is subject to the most stringent judicial review. Laws allowing the government to discriminate among speakers based on viewpoint or content are unacceptable absent narrow tailoring to serve a compelling government interest. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the government asserts interests in (1) \"encouraging the use of marks that are appropriate for all audiences, including children,\" (2) \"the orderly 22 flow of commerce,\" and (3) \"avoiding any appearance of government approval of\" scandalous marks. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A CONCLUSIVE DEFERENCE STANDARD WOULD IMPAIR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND HARM AMERICAN CONSUMERS",
		"context": "But the fact that such a standard of defer- ence has important adverse implications for antitrust enforcement and protecting U.S. consumers from for-eign export cartels should weigh heavily against adopting it. Whether the rubric is the foreign sover- eign compulsion doctrine or the \"true conflict\" re- quired by Hartford Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a conclusive deference standard makes it too easy to exempt international price-fixing cartels from U.S. law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs",
		"context": "If that course is one that reasonable fiduciaries could forswear, and so plausible duty -of- prudence claims based on inside information are rare, that is a feature of the standard, not a bug. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After all , the Court in Dudenhoeffer recognized without regret that plausible claims based on public information would be nearly impossible to plead. See 573 U.S. at 426- 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Unsafe Abortion Poses A Significant Threat To Women's Health",
		"context": "19-1392) (dis- cussing overwhelming weight of medical evidence con- clusively demonstrating that abortion is a very safe medical procedure). 3 In two recent decisions, this Court recognized the safe nature of abortions performed in accordance with this standard-of-care. See Whole Woman's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] abortion: vacuum aspiration or medication abortion ( i.e., mifepristone followed by misoprostol or, where mifepristone is not available, repeated doses of misoprostol alone). For pregnancies later than 12-14 weeks, the WHO recom-mends: dilatation and evacuation or medication abortion ( i.e., mif- epristone followed by repeated doses of misoprostol, or, where mifepristone is not available, repeated doses of misoprostol alone). WHO, Safe Abortion at 31-32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The court of appeals correctly held that the tax refund at issue here is the property of the Bank and therefore is not part of UWBI's bankruptcy estate",
		"context": "The IRS's pay- ment of the refund to the parent as agent for the group's members does not give the parent any ownership inter- est that it would not otherwise possess under applicable state law. That aspect of Bob Richard s was an interpre- tation of the text of a federal regulation; it was \"not fed-eral common law in ' the strictest sense.' \" Burlington Indus ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a lthough most affiliated groups are free 23 to alter interim ownership of their tax refunds by con- tract , the Agreement here confirm ed the parties' intent to maintain UWB I's role as an agent for the Bank with respect to a refund paid by the IRS .",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Prohibiting Sex Stereotyping In The Workplace Benefits Both Employers And Employees",
		"context": "See Br. for Resp't Aimee Stephens, supra , at 41; Br. for Lawyers' Com- mittee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, § III.C; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 7 F.3d 795; 17 F.2d 1273; 442 F.2d 385. In addition, practical experience suggests that such concerns are largely unwarranted. Altria's expe- rience—which, as discussed below, is consistent with that of other consumer-facing businesses—demon- strates that disregarding sex stereotypes, allowing people to express themselves honestly at work, and evaluating them based on their merit, is good for em- ployees, clients, and businesses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "612 F.3d 908",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Prohibiting Sex Stereotyping In The Workplace Benefits Both Employers And Employees",
		"context": "See Br. for Resp't Aimee Stephens, supra , at 41; Br. for Lawyers' Com- mittee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, § III.C; see also, e.g., 612 F.3d 908; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 17 F.2d 1273; 442 F.2d 385. In addition, practical experience suggests that such concerns are largely unwarranted. Altria's expe- rience—which, as discussed below, is consistent with that of other consumer-facing businesses—demon- strates that disregarding sex stereotypes, allowing people to express themselves honestly at work, and evaluating them based on their merit, is good for em- ployees, clients, and businesses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "7 F.3d 795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Prohibiting Sex Stereotyping In The Workplace Benefits Both Employers And Employees",
		"context": "See Br. for Resp't Aimee Stephens, supra , at 41; Br. for Lawyers' Com- mittee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, § III.C; see also, e.g., 612 F.3d 908; 7 F.3d 795; 17 F.2d 1273; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, practical experience suggests that such concerns are largely unwarranted. Altria's expe- rience—which, as discussed below, is consistent with that of other consumer-facing businesses—demon- strates that disregarding sex stereotypes, allowing people to express themselves honestly at work, and evaluating them based on their merit, is good for em- ployees, clients, and businesses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 F.2d 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
		"context": "See p p. 16-17, supra. Moreover, this Court has recognized that Congress used a separate provision of the PLRA to \"mak[e] it clear that the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the Court has an \"established practice of treating exhaustion require- ments \" as nonjurisdictional is belied by cases in which the Court has treated the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional requirement. For example, in Woelke & Romero Framing, 456 U.S. 645, the Court held that 29 U.S.C. 160(e), a stat- ute that bars judicial consideration of an objection \" 'that has not been urged before the [National Labor Relations] Board ,' \" dictat es that courts \"lack[] jurisdic- tion to review objections\" that have not been presented to the Board.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 81",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
		"context": "Moreover, this Court has recognized that Congress used a separate provision of the PLRA to \"mak[e] it clear that the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.\" 548 U.S. 81 that the Court has an \"established practice of treating exhaustion require- ments \" as nonjurisdictional is belied by cases in which the Court has treated the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional requirement. For example, in Woelke & Romero Framing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that 29 U.S.C. 160(e), a stat- ute that bars judicial consideration of an objection \" 'that has not been urged before the [National Labor Relations] Board ,' \" dictat es that courts \"lack[] jurisdic- tion to review objections\" that have not been presented to the Board. 456 U.S. at 665 -666 ( citation omitted); see 530 U.S. 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
		"context": "For example, in Woelke & Romero Framing, 456 U.S. 645, the Court held that 29 U.S.C. 160(e), a stat- ute that bars judicial consideration of an objection \" 'that has not been urged before the [National Labor Relations] Board ,' \" dictat es that courts \"lack[] jurisdic- tion to review objections\" that have not been presented to the Board. 456 U.S. at 665 -666 ( citation omitted); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, this Court has held that even when a statute lacks an express exhaustion requirement , it may be ap- propriate to treat a provision establishing an adminis- trative -review scheme as \"implicitly\" limiting the courts' \"jurisdiction\" w here \"the claims at issue 'are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within the statutory structure .' \" Free Enter .",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has held that even when a statute lacks an express exhaustion requirement , it may be ap- propriate to treat a provision establishing an adminis- trative -review scheme as \"implicitly\" limiting the courts' \"jurisdiction\" w here \"the claims at issue 'are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within the statutory structure .' \" Free Enter . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 327 U.S. 540. Those precedents rest on the presumption that \"when Congress creates 26 procedures 'designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on particular problems, ' \" it generally intends to preclude cour ts from exercising jurisdiction until those procedures have been exhausted. Free En- ter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has held that even when a statute lacks an express exhaustion requirement , it may be ap- propriate to treat a provision establishing an adminis- trative -review scheme as \"implicitly\" limiting the courts' \"jurisdiction\" w here \"the claims at issue 'are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within the statutory structure .' \" Free Enter . 561 U.S. 477; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those precedents rest on the presumption that \"when Congress creates 26 procedures 'designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on particular problems, ' \" it generally intends to preclude cour ts from exercising jurisdiction until those procedures have been exhausted. Free En- ter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
		"context": "Those precedents rest on the presumption that \"when Congress creates 26 procedures 'designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on particular problems, ' \" it generally intends to preclude cour ts from exercising jurisdiction until those procedures have been exhausted. Free En- ter. Fund , 561 U.S. at 489 (quoting Whitney Nat 'l Bank in Jefferson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Because the INA 's exhaustion requirement is ex- press , this Court need not decide whether and to what extent an implicit limit on the courts' jurisdiction might be established by the INA provisions entrusting re- moval decisions to the agency in the first instance. But at a m inimum, this Court's precedents finding that a court's jurisdiction may be implicitly limited by a de- tailed administrative scheme establish that the re is no obstacle to deeming an express exhaustion requi rement jurisdictional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "A. USERRA Is A n Exercise Of Congress's Powers To Raise And Support Armies And Provide And Maintain A Navy Congress's powers to raise and support A rmies and provide and maintain a N avy are \"broad and sweeping.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2006 ) (citation omitted) (FAIR ). By provid- ing civilian -employment protections \" to encourage non- career service in the uniformed services ,\" 38 U.S.C. 4301(a)(1), USERRA fits squarely within th ose powers .",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "at 330 (1891) . Fixing the failed requisition system was among the \"recognized necessities\" for calling the Constitutional Convention. Selective Draft Law Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The first reported draft of the Constitution would have vested Congress with power s to \"raise ar- mies\" and to \"build an d equip fleets.\" 2 Farrand 182 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 U.S. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "P ost-ratification p ractice and precedent have re- inforce d the breadth of the army and navy powers . Con- gress has relied on th ose powers to, inter alia, conscript soldiers and sailors, command private entities to pro- duce military supplies , take over railroads and commu- nications lines , and seize profits. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has upheld those actions , empha- sizing that the \"language of the Constitution authoriz- ing\" them is \"clear and sweeping,\" \" broad rather than restrictive, \" and \" 'given fully, completely, [ and] uncon- ditionally.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "137. Congress later encourage d service by providing education al benefits, insurance coverage, retirement plans , and other means \"to compensate for the disruption that military service causes to civilian lives .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has upheld those measures, explaining that \" [l]egislation to further these objectives is plainly within Congress' Art. I, § 8 power to 'raise and support Armies .'",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "86 Cong. Rec. 10 ,573 (1940) 15 (statement of Sen. Thomas of Utah) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those objectiv es are even more pressing in the era of an all -volunteer military in which members of the Na- tional Guard and Reserves play \" an essential part [in] the military 's operational force \" while m aintaining their civilian jobs. S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "That judgment is well within Congress's \"broad discretion as to methods to be employed, \" in exercising its army and navy powers. Lichter , 334 U.S. at 779; see FAIR , 547 U.S. at 59; cf . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts interpreting USERRA and its predeces- 16 sors thus have agreed that the statutes embody an ex- ercise of those powers . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Courts interpreting USERRA and its predeces- 16 sors thus have agreed that the statutes embody an ex- ercise of those powers . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B. Principles Of State Sovereign Immunity Do Not Bar Suits Against State Employers Under USERRA Principles of state sovereign immunity do not bar pe- titioner's USERRA suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 S.E.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "1. After declaring independence in 1776, \" the States considered themselves fully sovereign nations. \" Fran- chise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . One aspect of \"the States' sovereignty \" during that period \"was 'their immunity from private suits. ' \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Ibid. With the exception of the Eleventh Amendment, which all agree does not directly apply here, the text of the Constitution does not address state sovereign immunity .2 Inste ad, a State's entitle- ment to sovereign immunity is governed principally by \"fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The \"essential postulate\" here, this Court has long explained, is that States \" shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been 'a sur- render of this immunity in the plan of the c onvention .' \" 2 Because this suit was not filed against respondent by a citizen \"of another State, \" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "\" PennEast , 141 S. Ct. at 2258 (citation omitted). States are deemed to consent to suit when they remove a case from state court to fed- eral court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. State sovereign immunity generally does not apply to \"suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other govern- mental entity which is not an arm of the State.\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 756.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 613",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "16 (emphasis added) ). Thus, aside from the narrow militia exception, the delegates at the Convention \"manifestly intended to give all\" responsibility for national defense to the federal government \" and leave none to the states .\" Selective Draft Law Cases , 245 U.S. at 381; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As President Lincoln would later explain , the Constitution does not confer \" a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; it is a power to raise and su pport armies given to Congress by the Constitution, without an 'if.' \" Lichter , 334 U.S. at 756 n.4 (citation omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "at 780 (citation omitted). \"As to such purposes the state does not exist .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Supporters and opponents of the Constitution recog- nized as much . In a letter transmitting the Constitu- tion, Washington explained that certain \" rights of inde- pendent sovereignty \" had to be \"sacrifice[d]\" to \"pro- vide for the i nterest and s afety of al l.\" 2 Farrand 666.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "The Federalist No. 81 , at 549; see Katz , 546 U.S. at 377 n.13 (relying on Hamilton's reasoning in finding a sur render of sovereign immun- ity); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Even if States retain ed some measure of sover- eignty in the war -powers context, th at would not permit them to invoke sovereign immunity to obstruct Con- gress's exercise of its powers to raise and support Ar-mies or provide and maintain a Navy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "See p. 4, supra (discussing Vietnam War veterans) . But if the State's \" claim of sov- ereign immunity were to be honored \" against a result- ing USERRA suit, the State \"would be impairing part of 'the mechanism for manning the Armed Forces of the United States ,' \" in direct contravention of the Framers' plan. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir.) (citation omitted) , cert. denied,441 U.S. 967 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "589 F.2d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "denied,441 U.S. 967 . In keeping with that understanding , the Court has consistently repudiated attempts to impose implicit constitutional limitations on Congress's war powers — including limitations arising from assertions of state sovereignty or similar federalism principles. In Tar- ble's Case , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court rejected a State's a ttempt to retrieve, through a writ of habeas corpus, an individual \"held in the custody of a recruiting officer of the United States as an enlisted soldier\" who had deserted the Army. Id. at 398- 399.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Id. at 408. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that tolled, inter alia , state statutes of limitations in state courts for civil suits against de- fendants who were beyond the reach of legal process be- cause of the Civil War. Id. at 503 -504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "78 U.S. 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "at 354 ( relying on \"structural inferences\" from the Con- stitution's \"allocation of [defense] powers\"). 25 Similarly, the Court rejected a State's challenge to the application of a federal price -control law to the State's sale of timber on state -owned land during World War II . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court noted that the price -control statute had been \"sustained as a Congressional exercise of the war power \" and held that it could be applied to the State even if it interfered with an \" essential [state] gov ern- mental function .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Otherwise, \" the constitutional grant of the power to make war would be inadequate to accomplish its full purpose.\" Ibid. The Court reiterated that principle in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rejecting a State's Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal statute providing that, when veterans die without legal heirs in veterans' homes , their property is distributed to fund other vet- erans' facilities rather than escheating to the State. Id. at 644- 649.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Id. at 648- 649. Notably, when the Court adopted a broader inter- pretation of the state -sovereignty protections conferred by the Tenth Amendment in National League of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , overruled by 469 U.S. 528, the Court specifically cautioned that \"[n]othing we say in this opinion addresses the scope of Congress' a uthor- ity under its war power .\" 426 at 855 n.18. ; see, e.g., 728 F.2d 628.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Id. at 648- 649. Notably, when the Court adopted a broader inter- pretation of the state -sovereignty protections conferred by the Tenth Amendment in National League of 426 U.S. 833 , overruled by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court specifically cautioned that \"[n]othing we say in this opinion addresses the scope of Congress' a uthor- ity under its war power .\" 426 at 855 n.18. ; see, e.g., 728 F.2d 628.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": "Notably, when the Court adopted a broader inter- pretation of the state -sovereignty protections conferred by the Tenth Amendment in National League of 426 U.S. 833 , overruled by 469 U.S. 528, the Court specifically cautioned that \"[n]othing we say in this opinion addresses the scope of Congress' a uthor- ity under its war power .\" 426 at 855 n.18. ; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, the Court has repeatedly refused to read the Constitution \" as a self -defeating chart er,\" by which implicit principles of state sovereignty would be permit- ted to override the express textual grants of military power that were a \" prime purpose of the F ederal Gov- ernment 's establishment .\" Case , 327 U.S. at 102; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "728 F.2d 628",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA",
		"context": ". is at its apogee ' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies .\" FAIR , 547 U.S. at 58 (citation omitted); see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those structural principles dictate the result here. Last Term, the Court held that the \"plan of the Conven- tion contemplated that States' eminent domain power would yield to that of the Federal Government ' so far as is necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. '",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL CONSTITUTES A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
		"context": "To the extent t he decisions upon which Respondent relies speak to this fundamental interpretive question , however, they undermine Respondent's position . 1. For starters, Intel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , does not state —or even suggest —that the provision of § 1782 under review (or any part of it) is a \"general term \" that should be construed broadly . Indeed, in its consideration of whether the DG -General and European Commission were acting as a \"foreign o r 3 international tribunal ,\" this Court recognized the specificity of the phrase at issue: \"We next consider whether the assistance in obtaining documents here sought by an 'interested person ' meets the specification 'for use in a foreign or international tribunal. '\" Intel , 542 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL CONSTITUTES A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
		"context": "In short, nothing in Intel supports Respondent's contention that t his Court considered the word \"tribunal\" and statutory phrase \"international tribunal\" to be a \"general term\" with virtually no bounds. 2. Likewise, R espondent's reliance on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is misplaced . 5 Respondent cites Smith —a case having nothing to do with § 1782 —as establishing a principle of statutory interpretation requiring Petitioners to bear the burden to establish that the ad hoc arbitration panel is excluded from the category of \"international tribunals eligible for discovery under Section 1782 .\" Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL CONSTITUTES A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
		"context": "Smith , as well as two related decisions issued later by this Court, concern the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and the circumstances under which a defendant can be convicted for the \"use\" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime . See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1995 ); 552 U.S. 74 . These decisions hold that, in the absence of a statutory definition, the Court will consider and apply the ordinary or natural meaning of a statutory word or phrase, not in dictionary -definition isolation, but in light of the context and purpose of the statute involved . Smith , 508 U.S. at 228–229.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL CONSTITUTES A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
		"context": "Smith , as well as two related decisions issued later by this Court, concern the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and the circumstances under which a defendant can be convicted for the \"use\" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime . See also 516 U.S. 137 (1995 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . These decisions hold that, in the absence of a statutory definition, the Court will consider and apply the ordinary or natural meaning of a statutory word or phrase, not in dictionary -definition isolation, but in light of the context and purpose of the statute involved . Smith , 508 U.S. at 228–229.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL CONSTITUTES A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
		"context": "But that is not what the statute says, and no reading of § 552b can support the conclusion that Congress meant to include \"international arbitrations\" in the phrase \"international tribunal,\" but that it meant to include only \"domestic\" arbitrations in the phrase \"an arbitration .\" In addition, Respondent's contention that the statute is \"redundant\" runs counter to the settled rule of construction that statutes should be read to avoid redundancy . See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.\") . Moreover, R espondent's contention does not answer why Congress would have separately delineated \"foreign court or international tribuna l[s]\" and \"arbitration[s]\" in § 552b if the former encompassed international arbitration .",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases",
		"context": "App. 16, this Court added an implied -preemption questio n. Importantly, the presumption against preemption applies not only to determining the existence of preemption, but also to determining the scope of preemption. Medtronic, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Applying th at presumption to the scope of pr eemption here is fatal to the preemption claims. Specifically, for implied -preemption c laims, the presumption against preemption makes §1324a(b)(5) amenable to a reading that prohibits using only the I - 9 form and its attachments themselves, without preclud ing States from enforcing facially neutral non - 17 immigration laws based on the same common data – such as names and Social Security numbers – that the State acquires by other means ( e.g., tax forms, license applications).",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Under the de facto doctrine, however, a court need not redress an unlawful appointment through backward -looking relief that sets aside the appointee's past acts. A court may instead treat the \"acts of an of- ficer de facto \" as \"valid and binding,\" even if he was not \"an officer de jure .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1876 ). The de facto doctrine has a long legal pedigree. The earliest English case to discuss the rule dates to 1431 and explains that \"if a man be made abbot or parson er- roneously\" by one who \"had no right\" to make the ap- pointment, the wrongful appointee may be \"ousted by legal process,\" but \"a deed made by him\" in the mean-time need not be set aside.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "38 Conn. 449. This Court 28 recognized the doctrine as early as 184 2, and it has ap- plied the doctrine in over a dozen cases since then.3 The de facto doctrine rests on \"considerations of pol- icy and necessity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First, the doctrine safeguards \"the foundations of law and order and the stability of govern- ment \" by preventing the chaos that c ould result if a de- fect in an officer's appointment required the mass inval- idation of the officer's past acts. 85 P. 571.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "85 P. 571. Second, the doctrine ensures that members of the public who transact business with an officer need not \"investigate his title, but may safely act upon the assumption that he is a rightful officer.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 2089 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 2089 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 2089 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 2089 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]99 U.S. 2089 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "120 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 605[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]89 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 20[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]41 U.S. 71164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "89 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 2089 U.S. 99[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]164 U.S. 657. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "41 U.S. 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Third, the doctrine protects \" innocent men, who have dealt with officers upon the faith of a public appointment,\" from \"difficulty and losses.\" State of Ohio ex rel. New- 17 Ohio 143; 268 U.S. 394158 U.S. 232153 U.S. 649140 U.S. 586120 U.S. 60599 U.S. 2089 U.S. 9941 U.S. 71[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 U.S. 657",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "2. In general, the Constitution does not itself re- quire any particular remedy for violations of its provi- sions . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The applicability of the de facto doctrine to violations of the Appointments Clause thus presents a common -law question about the scope of the doctrine rather than a constitutional question about the meaning of the Clause. The jurisprudence of this Court, the decisions of state courts and courts in other common -law jurisdictions, and the writings of le- gal commentators all make it plain that a court may ap-ply the de facto doctrine to an officer who has been ap- pointed under a statute that a court later declares un-constitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1378",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "II, § 2, Cl. 3, reasoning that \"a conviction is lawful although the judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto .\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31 • Oaths Clause . The Court has refused to set aside legislation enacted by state legislators who re- fused to take the oath to support the Constitution, see U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "173 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "VI, Cl. 3, reasoning that un- sworn legis lators still constitute \"a legislature de facto .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. • Equal Protection Clause . The Court has held that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause's one - person -one-vote rule, see U.S. Cons t. Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "89 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "The Court has held that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause's one - person -one-vote rule, see U.S. Cons t. Amend. XIV, § 1, does not require the invalidation of past elections or past legislative acts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 404 U.S. 549. • Prohibition on secession. After the Civil War, the Court accorded \" de facto \" validity to the acts of secessionist state governments, notwithstanding the unconstit utionality of secession, explaining that acts \"which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "The Court has held that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause's one - person -one-vote rule, see U.S. Cons t. Amend. XIV, § 1, does not require the invalidation of past elections or past legislative acts. See 411 U.S. 526; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. • Prohibition on secession. After the Civil War, the Court accorded \" de facto \" validity to the acts of secessionist state governments, notwithstanding the unconstit utionality of secession, explaining that acts \"which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "• Prohibition on secession. After the Civil War, the Court accorded \" de facto \" validity to the acts of secessionist state governments, notwithstanding the unconstit utionality of secession, explaining that acts \"which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 171 U.S. 388. • State sovereignty . During Reconstruction, the Court sustained a state court's application of the de facto doctrine to a claim that a federal military governor had violated state sovereignty by ap-pointing a state judge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 U.S. 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "• Prohibition on secession. After the Civil War, the Court accorded \" de facto \" validity to the acts of secessionist state governments, notwithstanding the unconstit utionality of secession, explaining that acts \"which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government.\" 74 U.S. 700 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. • State sovereignty . During Reconstruction, the Court sustained a state court's application of the de facto doctrine to a claim that a federal military governor had violated state sovereignty by ap-pointing a state judge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "171 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "• State sovereignty . During Reconstruction, the Court sustained a state court's application of the de facto doctrine to a claim that a federal military governor had violated state sovereignty by ap-pointing a state judge. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 • Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment . Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualifies a person from holding office if he takes an oath to defend the Constitution, but then eng ages in re- bellion or insurrection against the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "This Court has stated that, \"although [an] officer did not comply with the req-uisites of [a state] constitution, yet, having been appointed, and thus having colour of ti tle, his acts are valid in respect to third persons.\" Cocke ex rel. Commercial Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Story, rid-ing circuit, likewise stated that the law may allow \"the acts of officers de facto to be good,\" even where their appointments violate \" the con- stitution of the state.\" 1 F. Cas. 489.",
		"citation_value_orig": "41 U.S. 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "The rule is also close to universal . The courts of 48 states (al l but Iowa and Montana) have concluded that a court may apply the de facto doctrine to unconstitutional appointments . 4 4 See 36 Ala. 273; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; State ex rel. 450 P.2d 383 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,396 U.S. 5; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 P.2d 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "The courts of 48 states (al l but Iowa and Montana) have concluded that a court may apply the de facto doctrine to unconstitutional appointments . 4 4 See 36 Ala. 273; 544 P.2d 75; State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,396 U.S. 5; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel. 65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 P.2d 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "4 4 See 36 Ala. 273; 544 P.2d 75; State ex rel. 450 P.2d 383 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel. 65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel. 345 P.2d 674; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel .",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "450 P.2d 383 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,396 U.S. 5; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel. 65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel. 345 P.2d 674; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel . 258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; 125 P.3d 814; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re961 A.2d 930; Taylor , 3 S.C.L.",
		"citation_value_orig": "76 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "450 P.2d 383 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,396 U.S. 5; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel. 65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel. 345 P.2d 674; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel . 258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; 125 P.3d 814; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re961 A.2d 930; Taylor , 3 S.C.L.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 P.3d 849",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "450 P.2d 383 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,396 U.S. 5; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel. 65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; State ex rel. 345 P.2d 674; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel . 258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; 125 P.3d 814; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re961 A.2d 930; Taylor , 3 S.C.L.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 N.E.2d 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "dismissed,396 U.S. 5; Carroll , 38 Conn. at 472; State 34 ex rel. 65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel . 258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; 125 P.3d 814; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re961 A.2d 930; Taylor , 3 S.C.L. at 569, 2 Tread.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 P.2d 674",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel. 345 P.2d 674; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel . 258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re961 A.2d 930; Taylor , 3 S.C.L. at 569, 2 Tread. a t 697; 39 N.W.2d 667; 370 S.W.2d 557; 195 S.W.2d 368; State ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "125 P.3d 814",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "65 A.2d 810; 12 Fla. 190, error dismissed,76 U.S. 779; 81 S.E. 876; Sierra 320 P.3d 849; 101 P.2d 1; 12 N.E. 726; 263 N.E.2d 266; State ex rel. 345 P.2d 674; 157 S.W. 1115; In re101 So. 3d 936 N.W.2d 7; 106 So. 886; 2 S.W. 286; State 91 N.W. 239; 32 P. 437; Town of 10 N.H. 167; 60 A. 515; City of Al- 174 P. 217; 64 How. Pr. 139; 175 S.E. 313; State ex rel . 258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; 125 P.3d 814; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Taylor , 3 S.C.L. at 569, 2 Tread. a t 697; 39 N.W.2d 667; 370 S.W.2d 557; 195 S.W.2d 368; State ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "961 A.2d 930",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "258 N.W. 558; 42 N.E. 999; 521 P.2d 817; 125 P.3d 814; 1821 WL 1904 ; In re961 A.2d 930; Taylor , 3 S.C.L. at 569, 2 Tread. a t 697; 39 N.W.2d 667; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 195 S.W.2d 368; State ex rel. 125 P.2d 807; Petition of Dusablon , 230 A.2d 797; Griffin's Ex' 61 Va. 31; State ex rel. 157 P.2d 718; 176 S.E. 435; 156 N.W.2d 386; 131 P.2d 300.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 S.W.2d 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "at 569, 2 Tread. a t 697; 39 N.W.2d 667; 370 S.W.2d 557; 195 S.W.2d 368; State ex rel. 125 P.2d 807; Petition of Dusablon , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Griffin's Ex' 61 Va. 31; State ex rel. 157 P.2d 718; 176 S.E. 435; 156 N.W.2d 386; 131 P.2d 300. 35 Similarly, under the common law of England, the de facto doctrine has always extended to violations of the unwritten English constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "230 A.2d 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "a t 697; 39 N.W.2d 667; 370 S.W.2d 557; 195 S.W.2d 368; State ex rel. 125 P.2d 807; Petition of Dusablon , 230 A.2d 797; Griffin's Ex' 61 Va. 31; State ex rel. 157 P.2d 718; 176 S.E. 435; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 131 P.2d 300. 35 Similarly, under the common law of England, the de facto doctrine has always extended to violations of the unwritten English constitution. For example, since the 15th century, English law has treated as valid \"all acts done\" by \"a king de facto \" who has usurped the throne, even if he is not \"a king de jure.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "156 N.W.2d 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "1 Blackstone 202. And after \"the power of Cromwell was overturned, and Charles the Second restored, the judicial decisions un- der the former remained unmolested on this account, and the judiciary went on as before, still looking only to the de facto government for the time being.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1849 ). Jurisdictions that inherited the common -law system from England and the United States have continued to follow that traditional understanding of the de facto doctrine. Courts in countries ranging from Canada to India to New Zealand have determined that the doc- trine extends to those who hold office in violation of the constitutions of those countries .",
		"citation_value_orig": "48 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "And the invalidation of an officer's past acts c ould work an injusti ce to inno- cent third parties who have relied on those acts, even if that invalidation results from a constitutiona l defect. The application of the de facto doctrine to unconsti- tutional appointments also makes sense in light of the \"presumption of constitutionality\" that attaches to stat-utes \"until their invalidity is judicially declared.\" Da- vies Warehouse [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A statute \"cannot be questioned at the bar of private judgment, and if thought unconstitutional resisted, but 37 must be received and obeyed, as to all intents and pur- poses law, until questioned in and set aside by the courts.\" Carroll, 38 Conn. at 472.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "e. There is nothing novel about denying a particular remedy on a constitutional claim on account of such con- cerns. Under ordinary principles of equity, a court may refuse to enjoin a constitut ional violation where such re- lief would be contrary to \"the balance of equities\" and \"the public interest\"; an injunction \"does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.\" Win- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unde r doctrines such as qualified immunity, courts of- ten deny damages for constitutional violations in part to minimize the \"social costs\" of lawsuits against public of- ficials. 457 U.S. 800.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Win- 555 U.S. 7. Unde r doctrines such as qualified immunity, courts of- ten deny damages for constitutional violations in part to minimize the \"social costs\" of lawsuits against public of- ficials. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the exclusionary rule, cour ts may decline to ex- clude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the \"costs\" of exclusion \"outweigh\" the \"benefits.\" 547 U.S. 586 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Under the exclusionary rule, cour ts may decline to ex- clude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the \"costs\" of exclusion \"outweigh\" the \"benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And under similar doctrines that govern tax cases, courts have \"a degree of leeway in designing a remedy\" for \"unconstitutional\" tax laws, and may in some circumstances \"deny\" tax- payers \"the refund that they sought.\" Reynoldsville Casket 514 U.S. 749.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "547 U.S. 586 . And under similar doctrines that govern tax cases, courts have \"a degree of leeway in designing a remedy\" for \"unconstitutional\" tax laws, and may in some circumstances \"deny\" tax- payers \"the refund that they sought.\" Reynoldsville Casket [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as courts have the power to withhold some forms of relief on a constitutional claim in all of those settings, so too 38 courts have long had the authority to decline to invali- date the acts performed by an unconstitutionally ap- pointed officer. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Aureliu s and UTIER advance a series of argu- ments against the application of the de facto doctrine to violations of the Appointments Clause. Those argu-ments lack merit. Aurelius and UTIER rely chiefly on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which thi s Court declined to apply the de facto doctrine to the convictions entered by military judges chosen in violation of the Appoint- ments Clause , so long as those convictions remained pending on direct review . Aurelius Br. 49; UTIER Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Adjud icators issue orders that bind the parties before them; regula- tors issue rules that bind the community at large. See Bi-Metallic Inv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And only a subset of an adjudica- tor's orders is likely to be pending on direct review with a timely and preserved ob jection at the time the chal- lenge to the appointment is ultimately resolved . For ex- ample, the appointments in Ryder affected \"only be- tween 7 to 10 cases pending on direct review.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "239 U.S. 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Id. at 183. Aurelius and UTIER also invoke three other cases: Glidden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where a plu- rality of this Court declined to apply the de facto doc- trine to judges who allegedly held office in violation of Article III, see id. at 535 (opinion of Harlan, J.) ; Ngu- 539 U.S. 69, where the Court declined to apply the doctrine to a judge who heard a case in violation of a statute, see 539 U.S. at 77; and Lucia, where the Court explained that \"the 'appro- priate' remedy for an adjudication tainted with an ap- pointments violation is a new 'hearing before a properly appointed' official,\" 138 S. Ct. at 2055 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Aurelius and UTIER also invoke three other cases: Glidden 370 U.S. 530, where a plu- rality of this Court declined to apply the de facto doc- trine to judges who allegedly held office in violation of Article III, see id. at 535 (opinion of Harlan, J.) ; Ngu- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the Court declined to apply the doctrine to a judge who heard a case in violation of a statute, see 539 U.S. at 77; and Lucia, where the Court explained that \"the 'appro- priate' remedy for an adjudication tainted with an ap- pointments violation is a new 'hearing before a properly appointed' official,\" 138 S. Ct. at 2055 (citation omitted). Aurelius Br. 51 -52, 55; UTIER Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Those cases are inapposite for the same reason as Ryder : they in- volved challenges to the appointments of adjudicators. In addit ion, Aurelius cites (Br. 60 -61) this Court's de- cision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Jus- tice Scalia's concurr ence in the judgment in 481 U.S. 787. But the de facto doctrine was not at issue in ei- ther of those cases, and the Court and Justice Scalia ac- cordingly did not discuss it. \"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Those cases are inapposite for the same reason as Ryder : they in- volved challenges to the appointments of adjudicators. In addit ion, Aurelius cites (Br. 60 -61) this Court's de- cision in 478 U.S. 714, and Jus- tice Scalia's concurr ence in the judgment in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the de facto doctrine was not at issue in ei- ther of those cases, and the Court and Justice Scalia ac- cordingly did not discuss it. \"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 787",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "But the de facto doctrine was not at issue in ei- ther of those cases, and the Court and Justice Scalia ac- cordingly did not discuss it. \"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 41 Aurelius and UTIER argue that the de facto doctrine does not extend to violations of the Appointments Clause because of the unique importance of redressing constitutional violations . See Aurelius Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "72. But this Court has never held that constitutional claims enjoy an automatic exempt ion from the ordinary rules and restrictions governing the availability of rem-edies. Quite the contrary, the Court has held that con- stitutional claims remain subject to standard remedial rules such as the \"principles and usages of law\" limiting the availa bility of mandamus, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has, at most, adjusted the scope of some remedial doctrines to account for the nature of the claim at hand —for instance, by setting the threshold for harmless error higher for constitutional than for statutory violations . See 386 U.S. 18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
		"context": "Quite the contrary, the Court has held that con- stitutional claims remain subject to standard remedial rules such as the \"principles and usages of law\" limiting the availa bility of mandamus, 5 U.S. 137. The Court has, at most, adjusted the scope of some remedial doctrines to account for the nature of the claim at hand —for instance, by setting the threshold for harmless error higher for constitutional than for statutory violations . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The constitutional stat- ure of the claims here thus justifies, at most, requiring a strong er showing of harm before applying the de facto doctrine; it does not justify abandoning that deeply rooted doctrine in its entirety. Aurelius and UTIER persist that the Appointments Clause differs from other constitutional provisions be- cause it is \"structural.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES STRICT SCRUTINY IN CASES OF SEVERE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": ". \"[P]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those ac tivities protected by the First Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Partisan gerrymandering that has the \"purpose and effect of imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters\" selects those it disfavors on the basis of the political beliefs and associations they have manifested. Vieth , 541 U.S. at 25 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES STRICT SCRUTINY IN CASES OF SEVERE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "Vieth , 541 U.S. at 25 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This Court has \"applied heightened scrutiny to laws that are viewpoint discriminatory even as to speech not protected by the First Amendment.\" Nev. Comm'n on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It would clearly be inconsistent with First Amendment principle and precedent to exempt from searching review v iewpoint discriminatory legislation aimed at the core First Amendment activities of political speech and association. The gerrymander at issue in this case is both impermissible in purpose and severe in effect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES STRICT SCRUTINY IN CASES OF SEVERE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "'the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power. '\" Rucho , 318 F. Supp. 3d at 848 (quoting Ariz. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); accord 424 U.S. 1. The 2016 Plan therefore fails strict scrutiny. Given its severity and its viewpoint discriminatory purpose, however, the 2016 Plan is unconstituti onal under any doctrinal framework.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES STRICT SCRUTINY IN CASES OF SEVERE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "'the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power. '\" Rucho , 318 F. Supp. 3d at 848 (quoting Ariz. State 135 S. Ct. 2652); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 2016 Plan therefore fails strict scrutiny. Given its severity and its viewpoint discriminatory purpose, however, the 2016 Plan is unconstituti onal under any doctrinal framework.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Does the law give the government open-ended discretion to make individualized exemptions?",
		"context": "Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 537. Individu- alized exemptions trigger strict scrutiny if they are capable of being \"applied in practice in a way that discriminates against religiously motivated conduct,\" relative to secular conduct equally undermining the government's stated interests. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 F.3d 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. SEC Rules of Practice governing discovery favor SEC",
		"context": "201.230(a)(1)), the respondent's ability to obtain discovery is otherwise significantly more restricted than the permissive discovery allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . Nor does a n SEC respondent b enefit from discovery rights afforded in criminal proceedings under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure , the Jenks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 405 U.S. 150. Two-way discovery is not required in SEC proceedings. The Division has the power to subpoena documents and conduct examinations of potential SEC respondents and witnesses during an investigation, but SEC respondents have no corresponding ability to make demands of the Division .",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. SEC Rules of Practice governing discovery favor SEC",
		"context": "201.230(a)(1)), the respondent's ability to obtain discovery is otherwise significantly more restricted than the permissive discovery allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . Nor does a n SEC respondent b enefit from discovery rights afforded in criminal proceedings under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure , the Jenks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, 373 U.S. 83, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Two-way discovery is not required in SEC proceedings. The Division has the power to subpoena documents and conduct examinations of potential SEC respondents and witnesses during an investigation, but SEC respondents have no corresponding ability to make demands of the Division .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Brandenburg test, only the Ellipse Speech's words may be analyzed to determine whether they were directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action.",
		"context": "The governme nt cannot \"forbi d or proscri be advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or produci ng imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Following Bran denburg, this Court refused to find speech puni shabl e just because it had a \"tendency to lead to violence\" when \"there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.\" 414 U.S. 105 the speaker intends that his speech will resul t in the use of violence or lawless action, and (3) the immi nent use of violence or lawless action is the likely resul t of his speech.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Brandenburg test, only the Ellipse Speech's words may be analyzed to determine whether they were directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action.",
		"context": "395 U.S. 444. Following Bran denburg, this Court refused to find speech puni shabl e just because it had a \"tendency to lead to violence\" when \"there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the speaker intends that his speech will resul t in the use of violence or lawless action, and (3) the immi nent use of violence or lawless action is the likely resul t of his speech.\" Bible 805 F.3d 228. Under this three-pronged approach, the intent prong is a limiting factor, not an expandi ng factor.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Brandenburg test, only the Ellipse Speech's words may be analyzed to determine whether they were directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action.",
		"context": "Following Bran denburg, this Court refused to find speech puni shabl e just because it had a \"tendency to lead to violence\" when \"there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder.\" 414 U.S. 105 the speaker intends that his speech will resul t in the use of violence or lawless action, and (3) the immi nent use of violence or lawless action is the likely resul t of his speech.\" Bible [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this three-pronged approach, the intent prong is a limiting factor, not an expandi ng factor. This conclusion is supported by this Court's observat ion that if a person is found to have incited violence in one speech, evidence of that person's previ ous non-inciting speech could be used as corroborati ng evidence [of intent].",
		"citation_value_orig": "805 F.3d 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Brandenburg test, only the Ellipse Speech's words may be analyzed to determine whether they were directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action.",
		"context": "Under this three-pronged approach, the intent prong is a limiting factor, not an expandi ng factor. This conclusion is supported by this Court's observat ion that if a person is found to have incited violence in one speech, evidence of that person's previ ous non-inciting speech could be used as corroborati ng evidence [of intent]. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both Brandenburg and Hess stand for the principle that inciting speech has to be directed at produc ing imminent disorder—that is, almost immed iate disorder. A speaker's alleged ill intent or history of prior speech cannot be used to remove consti tutional protecti on from otherwise non-i nciting speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Brandenburg test, only the Ellipse Speech's words may be analyzed to determine whether they were directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action.",
		"context": "An evaluation of the speech at issue has to come first—previ ous non-i nciting speech by the same speaker cannot be used to interpret the meaning of the speech at issue when a court evaluates Brandenburg 's first prong—that is, whether the speech explicitly or implicitly encouraged the use of violence or lawless action. This principle is consi stent with the fact that Brandenburg \"thoroughl y discredi ted\" the idea that \"any group that advocates violent overthrow as an abstract doctri ne must be regarded as necessari ly advocati ng unlawful action.\" Communist Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has under stood, throughout its incitement jurisprudence, that to evaluate the meaning of allegedl y inciting speech through the lens of what a particular speaker has said in the past runs a real risk of removi ng consti tutional protecti on from much non-inciting speech. Brandenburg and its progeny's insistence that speec h be tied to imminent lawless action necessari ly means that only the speech closely related in time to the lawless action may be consi dered under the first prong in a court's analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Kansas has reasonably determined that individuals who voluntarily and intentionally commit a crime are blameworthy, even if they do not believe their actions are wrong",
		"context": "The same is true of individuals who murder abortion doctors, believing that their actions are morally justified because they are saving the lives of the unborn. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There are many other scenarios— involving everyone from white supremacists to euthanasia doctors—where people commit crimes believing that their actions are morally justified. But they are still culpable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 P.3d 831",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Kansas has reasonably determined that individuals who voluntarily and intentionally commit a crime are blameworthy, even if they do not believe their actions are wrong",
		"context": "Just as knowledge that one's conduct is morally wrong is not required for culpability, neither is knowledge of its criminality. After all, it is a longstanding principle that knowledge of the law is not required for criminal culpability. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Society frequently punishes people who may not have known that their actions were criminal. Kansas has reasonably determined that there is no basis for creating an exception to this general principle for a certain subset of the mentally ill.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts",
		"context": "For example, Minnesota courts treat equity as property to be divided in a marital dissolution. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 384 N.W.2d 468. The \"equity value of real property\" may be a \"liquid asset\" for purposes of determining whether a criminal defendant is sufficiently indigent to warrant appointment of counsel. In re646 N.W.2d 520.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 N.W.2d 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts",
		"context": "For example, Minnesota courts treat equity as property to be divided in a marital dissolution. See, e.g. , 410 N.W.2d 14; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"equity value of real property\" may be a \"liquid asset\" for purposes of determining whether a criminal defendant is sufficiently indigent to warrant appointment of counsel. In re646 N.W.2d 520.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 N.W.2d 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts",
		"context": ", 410 N.W.2d 14; 384 N.W.2d 468. The \"equity value of real property\" may be a \"liquid asset\" for purposes of determining whether a criminal defendant is sufficiently indigent to warrant appointment of counsel. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Property owners who own their home free and clear can borrow against their equity. Minn. Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 N.W.2d 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts",
		"context": "The context of default offers great opportunity for overreaching. The suspicious attitudes of the courts have been grounded in common sense.\" 11 Even Connecticut and Vermont , which are sometimes identified as the only states using s trict foreclosure , see, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , protect debtors' equity interest where the property is worth substantially more than the debt. Vt. Stat. Ann.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 F.3d 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts",
		"context": "2022). See, e.g. , Shaw Acquisition [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 34 Minn. 545. \"The rights of the parties, as they before existed, are not transposed by th e sale, and the court will apply the fund in accordance with their rights as they existed in respect to the land.\" allowed where \"no substantial value in the property in excess of the mortgage debt\"); 27 Conn.App. 549 (\"It may be that the majority of foreclosure judgments are by strict forecl osure, but, if anything, that would indicate only that the majority of foreclosures arise in situations in which the value of the property is less than the debt owed .",
		"citation_value_orig": "639 N.W.2d 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts",
		"context": "There is nothing about property taxes, utility bills, or code enforcement fines that justifies this unusual treatment. See JA.53 ( district 12 A similar rule generally applies in bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Burton Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"In the absence of an express provision for the orderly devolution of surplus monies or other assets after payment of all debts and administrative costs, the courts have relied upon equitable principles in returning such surplus to the debtor.\"). 13 The federal government likewise returns surplus proceeds when seizing property to collect unpaid income taxes. See, e.g ., 26 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "67 F.2d 796",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "It was free to construe the TCPA for itself and determine that PDR had not violated the statute. The distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is central to administrative law. A legislative rule has the \"force and effect of law,\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and thus binds courts, private parties, and the agency itself to its terms. E.g., Appalachian Power 208 F.3d 1015. Interpretive rules, in con- trast, \"do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "E.g., Appalachian Power 208 F.3d 1015. Interpretive rules, in con- trast, \"do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, their \"critical feature\" is that they are 46 issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it admin- isters.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "Put another way, \"interpretive rules or pol- icy statements will not [bind agency discretion or pri-vate party conduct], regardless of their validity.\" Viet. Veterans of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit did not expressly consider whether the discussion of o ffers for free goods and ser- vices in the 2006 Order is a legislative rule, but that is the only reading that makes sense of the Fourth Cir- cuit's assertion that it would be nonsensical \"[t]o hold that a district court cannot enjoin or set aside a rule but is nevertheless free to ig nore it (or decline[] to de- fer to it).\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.2d 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "§ 402(a), and hence subject to the Hobbs Act's provisions, only if it has the \"force of law\" in the sense that it \"sets a standard of conduct for all to whom its terms apply.\" Columbia Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Inter- pretive rules do not have that effect. Second, the distinction between interpretive and leg- islative rules goes directly to the Fourth Circuit's per-ception that there was something untoward about the 47 district court's refusal to automatically apply the in- terpretation set forth in the 2006 Order.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "In the Fourth Circuit's view, the Hobbs Act barred the district court from declining to treat that interpretation as estab-lishing the rule of decision. But there is no such dis- connect if the FCC's interpretation is properly re- garded as an interpretive rule or general policy state-ment because \"a court is not required to give effect to an interpretative regulation.\" 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The FCC's discussion of \"offers for free goods and services and informational messages\" bears all of the hallmarks of a non-binding interpretive rule or policy statement because it serves to clarify the agency's in- terpretation of the TCPA and expectations for its own enforcement practices. It does not impose new com-mands upon private parties or courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "Perez , 135 S. Ct. at 1204. The Commission's discussion concerning \"offers for free goods and services and info rmational messages\" does 8 Of course, even if the district court were bound by the FCC's rule, PDR's position remains that the district court's interpreta- tion of that rule was correct, in light of the text of the TCPA and the plain language of the 2006 Order itself. See Chevron, U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sandusky , 788 F.3d at 223 (holding that the \"unambiguous terms\" of the TCPA apply only to faxes with \"commercial compo- nents\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. 568 U.S. 597. 48 just that, and nothing more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "The Commission's discussion concerning \"offers for free goods and services and info rmational messages\" does 8 Of course, even if the district court were bound by the FCC's rule, PDR's position remains that the district court's interpreta- tion of that rule was correct, in light of the text of the TCPA and the plain language of the 2006 Order itself. See Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837; Sandusky , 788 F.3d at 223 (holding that the \"unambiguous terms\" of the TCPA apply only to faxes with \"commercial compo- nents\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 48 just that, and nothing more. It explains the Commis- sion's general understanding that the TCPA regulates commercial fax messages while leaving \"noncommer- cial speech\" unregulated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "at 3814–15 & n.187. The FCC's interpretation thus advises the regulated com- munity on how the Commission \"will exercise its broad enforcement discretion ... under some extant statute or rule.\" Ass'n of Flight A [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, unlike a \"legislative rule,\" nothing in the relevant paragraphs of the FCC's order purports to create new, binding obligations for private parties or to alter anything in a prior Commission regulation. See 875 F.2d 345.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 710",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
		"context": "Ass'n of Flight A 785 F.3d 710. Furthermore, unlike a \"legislative rule,\" nothing in the relevant paragraphs of the FCC's order purports to create new, binding obligations for private parties or to alter anything in a prior Commission regulation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is in sh arp contrast to many other sections of the 2006 Order, which made amendments to the Commission's prior legislative rules and thus were presaged by a notice of proposed rulemaking and reflected in amendments to codified regulations. For example, just a few pages pr ior to the \"offers for free 49 goods and services and informational messages\" dis- cussion, the Commission noted that it had \"sought comment in the [Junk Fax Prevention Act] NPRM\" on how to allocate responsibility for transmission of unso-licited faxes between third party agents or broadcast- ers, on the one hand, and th e requesting entity, on the other.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
		"context": "at 119. Other courts have likewise \"balance[d] the anticompetitive effects on competition in one market with certain procompetitive benefits in other markets.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,513 U.S. 1190 ; see, e.g., O'Bannon , 802 F.3d at 1057 -1058, 1072 -1074 (con- sidering procompetitive justifications in other markets in assessing the reasonableness of an NCAA rule re- stricting the markets for \"college education\" and \"group licensing\" of the rights to use athletes' names, images, and likenesses). 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 F. 3d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
		"context": "A rigid rule holding that a court analyzing a re- straint on one side of a two -sided platform is always barred from considering asserted procompetitive bene- fits on the other side of the platform would ri sk con- demning as unlawful business practices that actually serve valid procompetitive purposes. Cf. Leegin , 551 U.S. at 875 (explaining that per se rules \" can increase the to- tal cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procom- petitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage \"); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, a court should consider out-of-market ef- fects at the second step of its rule -of-reason analysis if, but only if, the defendant shows that the challenged re- straint is reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate procompetitive benefits in a closely related and interde- pendent market. That standard is in some respects analogous to the ancillary -restraints doctrine, which \"governs the valid- ity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business col- laboration, such as a joint venture , on nonventure activities.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
		"context": "Instead, a court should consider out-of-market ef- fects at the second step of its rule -of-reason analysis if, but only if, the defendant shows that the challenged re- straint is reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate procompetitive benefits in a closely related and interde- pendent market. That standard is in some respects analogous to the ancillary -restraints doctrine, which \"governs the valid- ity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business col- laboration, such as a joint venture , on nonventure activities.\" T exaco, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When a restraint is ancillary to a legitimate collabora- tion, both are \"typically evaluated as a whole under the 53 rule of reason.\" Major League Baseball Props., 542 F.3d 290.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
		"context": "T exaco, 547 U.S. 1 . When a restraint is ancillary to a legitimate collabora- tion, both are \"typically evaluated as a whole under the 53 rule of reason.\" Major League Baseball Props., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"To be ancil- lary,\" a restraint must be \"subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction,\" and reasonably nec- essary to \"make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.\" Rothery Storage , 792 F.2d at 224, 227. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 F.3d 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
		"context": "Rothery Storage , 792 F.2d at 224, 227. \" Ancillary restraints are generally permit- ted if they are 'reasonably necessary' toward the con- tract's objective of utility and efficiency.\" Schering - Plough [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,548 U.S. 919 . But when a re- straint is \"not reasonably necessary to achieve any of the efficiency -enhancing purposes of a joint venture, it will be evaluated apart from the rest of the venture.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.3d 1056",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
		"context": "Ancillary restraints are generally permit- ted if they are 'reasonably necessary' toward the con- tract's objective of utility and efficiency.\" Schering - Plough 402 F.3d 1056 , cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But when a re- straint is \"not reasonably necessary to achieve any of the efficiency -enhancing purposes of a joint venture, it will be evaluated apart from the rest of the venture.\" Salvino , 542 F.3d at 338 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only Members Of Our National Political Community Should Be Represented In Our National Government",
		"context": "To begin with, it seems a mere matter of definition that representation in our national government shouldnot be given, and cannot be thought to be given in theConstitution, to those outside of our national politicalcommunity. As a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in an opinion bythen-Circuit Judge Kavanaugh, held while upholdinga provision of federal law prohibiting foreign nationalsfrom participating in election speech, \"[i]t isfundamental to the definition of our national politicalcommunity that foreign citizens do not have aconstitutional right to participate in, and thus may beexcluded from, activities of democratic self-government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd565 U.S. 1104. See id. at 284 (defining \"foreign nationals\" as all foreigncitizens who are not U.S. lawful permanent residents).From the holding in Blumen that lack of membership in the national political community justifies exclusioneven from the right to political speech, it is but a shortstep to the conclusion that the same lack, also bydefinition, is ground for exclusion from any right topolitical representation in our national government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "800 F. Supp. 2d 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only Members Of Our National Political Community Should Be Represented In Our National Government",
		"context": "The claim that the Constitution, in the Enumeration and Apportionment Clauses, givesrepresentation to those outside the national politicalcommunity is not in accord with other provisions of theConstitution. See, a fortiori, Pilot Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]573 U.S. 513. Indeed, to make that claim is toembrace the absurdity that \"the People,\" when theyordained and established th e Constitution, U.S. Const. preamble, and when they gave \"the People of theseveral States\" the power to choose members ofCongress, U.S. CONST .",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only Members Of Our National Political Community Should Be Represented In Our National Government",
		"context": "I, § 2, cl. 1, nevertheless conferred political representation in that Congress notjust on themselves—\"the people\"—but on others, aswell. See, e.g., District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]376 U.S. 1. As Appellees pointed out below, Doc. 77 at 25, 7 Alexander Hamilton argued that \"an actual Census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule\" for apportionment of direct taxes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only Members Of Our National Political Community Should Be Represented In Our National Government",
		"context": "I, § 2, cl. 1, nevertheless conferred political representation in that Congress notjust on themselves—\"the people\"—but on others, aswell. See, e.g., District of 554 U.S. 570[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Appellees pointed out below, Doc. 77 at 25, 7 Alexander Hamilton argued that \"an actual Census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule\" for apportionment of direct taxes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Wyoming statehood did not abrogate the Tribe's hunting right; it reflected congressional recognition that the land identified in 1851 as \"hunting districts\" had permanently transformed",
		"context": "Such travel delayed the development of an agrarian lifestyle and magnified the potential for conflict, even on land that was still in the public domain. This is because, th roughout western expansion, non-Indians raised livestock not just on their homesteads but on all nearby unoccupied land. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 10 The Race Horse litigants presented this concern to the Court, noting Race Horse hunted on land that was \"used by the settlers as a range for cattle, and was within election and school districts of the State of Wyomin g.\" 163 U.S. at 507. The Court 46 If the phrase \"unoccupied lands of the United States\" encompassed all land in the public domain anywhere, then the Treaty did not create the separation needed \"to protect [tribal] rights and to preserve for [each Indian] a home where his tribal relations might be enjoyed under the shelter of the authority of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV",
		"context": "23 Article III, the phrase \"of the United States\" refers to the national power of the United States —as opposed to the purely local power of the territory itself. Cin- cinnati Soap, 301 U.S. at 322- 323. In like manner, the Appointme nts Clause's refer- ence to \"officers of the United States\" refers to those officers who exercise national power that is vested in the President under Article II, or in the Judiciary under Article III.11 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Territorial officers ap- pointed pursuant to the Territories Clause do not fall within the Appointments Clause's ambit, because they exerc ise no part of the national Article II or Article III power \"of the United States.\" Instead, they exercise only the local power of the territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses",
		"context": "But by then, the product had evolved in a different direction, and—because of a wrongfully-issued patent—the public was unable to benefit from a useful innovation. The increasing assertiveness of non-practicing entities compounds these problems. See Halo Elecs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recently, nearly 90% of patent litigation in the high-tech industry has involved non-practicing entities. Unified Patents, 2019 Patent Dispute Report– Year in Review fig.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1923",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The exemption irrationally discriminates against ministries whose activities are not \"exclusively religious.\"",
		"context": "8 But it makes no sense in the context of the Mandate, as it denies an exemption to 8 But see Lutheran Soc. Servs. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"predominantly\" or \"very\" religious. It also raises clear constitutional concerns. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F.2d 1283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The exemption irrationally discriminates against ministries whose activities are not \"exclusively religious.\"",
		"context": "It also raises clear constitutional concerns. Cf. Colo. Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F.3d 1245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Austin's regulation is not based on the location of the sign, but on what the sign says",
		"context": "Austin claims that its definition of \"off-premise\" is concerned with the location of the sign itself, and not with what the sign says. This argument defies common sense and was rejected long before this Court's opinion in Reed . See Ackerley Commc'n of Mass., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Ackerley, the law required that a billboard company's noncommercial, off-premises messages must be taken down. The billboard company argued that the law was invalid because it imposed \"an impermissible content-based restriction on speech: whether a sign may remain is determined by the message it carries.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "88 F.3d 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Austin's regulation is not based on the location of the sign, but on what the sign says",
		"context": "... [the] signage ordinance is not content neutral. It prohibits all kinds of speech because of what it says.\" Burkhardt Advertising, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Sixth Circuit made sho rt work of this so-called \"locationally based\" distinction in 937 F.3d 721, cert. denied,141 S. Ct. 194.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F. Supp. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Petitioner's efforts to avoid superfluity misunderstand the Sentencing Guidelines",
		"context": "3553(f )(1)(A)-(C). There is n o sound basis for giving the phrase a different meaning in subparagraphs (B) and (C) than in subpara- graph (A). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, the commentary to Section 4A1 .1 ex- plicitly instructs that Sections \"4A1.1 and 4A1.2 must be read together.\" Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.1 , comment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Claims Based On The Alleged Fabrication Of Evidence Are Time-Barred To The Extent They State A Constitutional Violation At All",
		"context": "\"). Section 1983 is not \"a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-law claims, an all- in-one federal claim encompassing the torts of assault, trespass, false arrest, defamation, malicious prosecution, and more.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 490 U.S. 386. It is only \"[a]fter pinpointing\" the specific right at issue that a court can \"determine the … rules associated with[ ] an action seeking damages for its violation.\" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 920.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Claims Based On The Alleged Fabrication Of Evidence Are Time-Barred To The Extent They State A Constitutional Violation At All",
		"context": "\"). Section 1983 is not \"a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-law claims, an all- in-one federal claim encompassing the torts of assault, trespass, false arrest, defamation, malicious prosecution, and more.\" 566 U.S. 356; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is only \"[a]fter pinpointing\" the specific right at issue that a court can \"determine the … rules associated with[ ] an action seeking damages for its violation.\" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 920.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Claims Based On The Alleged Fabrication Of Evidence Are Time-Barred To The Extent They State A Constitutional Violation At All",
		"context": "In fact, both Petitioner and the federal government greatly overstate the significance of analogies to common law causes of action in determining when a § 1983 claim accrues. The Court has repeatedly cautioned that \"[c]ommon-law principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims, serving 'more as a so urce of inspired examples than of prefabricated components.'\" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 921 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Whatever the proper role of analogies, though, the notion that a plaintiff who pleads two distinct claims, one of which is dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity, can then change course and insist that the remaining claim was, all along, actually \"analogous\" to the one that was dismissed—surely that stretches the use of analogies too far, and is another reminder of the importance of \"'identify[ing] the specific constitutional right' at issue.\" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 920 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Medium-Specific Standards Of Review Have Significant Potential To Undermine First Amendment Freedoms",
		"context": "726 (1978), the Court announced that \"[o]f all forms of communication, broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment protection. \" Id. at 727– 28 (upholding regulations 3 Althou gh Red Lion cites Joseph Burstyn, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that different media justify different First Amendment standards, this citation is misleading. Burstyn acknowledged that \"[e]ach method tends to present its own peculiar problems, \" but in the very next sentence the Court emphasized that \"the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Medium-Specific Standards Of Review Have Significant Potential To Undermine First Amendment Freedoms",
		"context": "453 U.S. at 501; see also, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters , 468 U.S . 364, 367, 377 (1984); S.E. Promotions, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While making technological assumptions to support a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, this Court has also acknowledged the limit s of those assumption s, including the scarcity rationale in Red Lion. Red Lion itself observed that advances in technology \"have led to more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum\" that could reduce concerns about scarcity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Medium-Specific Standards Of Review Have Significant Potential To Undermine First Amendment Freedoms",
		"context": "[and] solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence. \" Columbia Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in FCC v. League of Women Voters , the Court acknowledged critics who argued that \" with the advent of cable and satellite television technology . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Medium-Specific Standards Of Review Have Significant Potential To Undermine First Amendment Freedoms",
		"context": "the scarcity doctrine is obsolete. \" 468 U.S. at 376 n.11; s ee also Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Those critics emerged early in th is Court 's foray into medium -specific standards of review. Even before Red Lion , Nobel- winning economist Ronald Coase had criticized the concept of scarcity as a justification for regulation because \" almost all resources used in the economic system (and not simply radio and television frequencies) are limited in amount and scarce, .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.",
		"context": "715, 754–55 (2011). Since that time, the Copyright Alliance is aware of only one circuit court decision holding that a use was transformative but not fair. See Fox News Network, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.",
		"context": "56 at 2–3 (2021) (citing mashups as an example of derivative sound recording). This common understanding in the recording industry strikes a proper balance: It allows older sound recordings to continue to be profitable, and newer works to adapt and incorporate older 4 In addition, Petitioner's test would cast doubt on previously decided cases that determined the licensing market for book, television, and film guides and other adaptations. See,983 F.3d 443; Penguin Random House 270 F. Supp. 3d 736; Paramount Pictures [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd181 F.3d 83. 19 works, thus permitting and incentivizing future creativity. The sampling generally does not change the purpose of the original song; the new sound recording, like the preexisting one, is recorded music meant to entertain the listener.",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 F. Supp. 2d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The statutory context indicates that jurisdiction applies to the entire \"action\"",
		"context": "The FAA's provisions \"are best analyzed together.\" Cortez Byrd Chips , 529 U.S. at 198; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reading the FAA as a whole reinforces the result that federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce arbitral awards whenever they have jurisdiction to decide the underlying dispute between the parties. Sections 3 and 4 embody the same rule that a federal court can resolve FAA motions if it could decide the underlying dispute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "350 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The statutory context indicates that jurisdiction applies to the entire \"action\"",
		"context": "; see Vaden , 556 U.S. at 62. It is sensible to interpret the scope of jurisdiction under Sections 9 and 10 to be the same as under Sections 3 and 4 because those provisions each govern federal oversight over the same underlying dispute, just at different points of time. This Court has \"long stressed the significance of the [FAA]'s sequencing,\" New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As enacted in 1925, see Pub L. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), the FAA is a short statute that sets forth the federal substantive policy in favor of arbitration and a step-by-step procedure for the enforcement of arbitral awards, which parallels the procedure for a court to decide a dispute in civil litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The statutory context indicates that jurisdiction applies to the entire \"action\"",
		"context": "App. 4a. To that end, in Marine Transit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court stated it \"d[id] not conceive it to be open to question that, where the court has authority under the statute … to make an order for arbitration, the court also has authority to confirm the award or to set it aside.\" So when a party files in federal court before arbitration, there is a single \"action\" throughout the FAA's beginning-to-end process. A federal court with jurisdiction before arbitration thus has jurisdiction after arbitration as well, giving it consistent authority to decide motions throughout the lifetime of the dispute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Commerce Clause prohibits the imposition of excessive burdens on interstate commerce",
		"context": "The Commerce Clause protects interstate com- merce by prohibiting excessive burdens being placed on commerce without congressional approval. Avoid- ing these burdens \"strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate com- merce.\" Comptroller of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has intervened in the absence of legislative action in recognition of the importance attached to preventing excessive burdens on interstate commerce. Twice this Court – in National Bellas Hess and in Quill – has recognized that the systems by which states require remote sellers to collect state and local taxes burden interstate commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1787",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights",
		"context": "Hellerstedt , 136 S. Ct. at 2323 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collectin g numerous cases). If \"Mary Doe,\" the pregnant plaintiff in Roe 's compan- ion case , could challenge a statute requiring abortion s be performed in a hospital, see Bolton , 410 U.S. at 184, there is no reason to presume that women are hin-dered from challenging an admitting -privileges re- quirement . Abortion patients today continue to chal- lenge abortion regulations in their own names, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or through legal gua rdians, see 138 S. Ct. 1790 ; Marga- ret 597 F. Supp. 636 , aff'd sub nom. Margaret S 794 F.2d 994 . Given that history, none of 40 the theoretical hindrances Louisiana women might face—including poverty and other vulnerabilities —es- tablish es a hindrance .",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.3d 1017",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights",
		"context": "Hellerstedt , 136 S. Ct. at 2323 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collectin g numerous cases). If \"Mary Doe,\" the pregnant plaintiff in Roe 's compan- ion case , could challenge a statute requiring abortion s be performed in a hospital, see Bolton , 410 U.S. at 184, there is no reason to presume that women are hin-dered from challenging an admitting -privileges re- quirement . Abortion patients today continue to chal- lenge abortion regulations in their own names, see 788 F.3d 1017, or through legal gua rdians, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Marga- ret 597 F. Supp. 636 , aff'd sub nom. Margaret S 794 F.2d 994 . Given that history, none of 40 the theoretical hindrances Louisiana women might face—including poverty and other vulnerabilities —es- tablish es a hindrance .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1790",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights",
		"context": "Hellerstedt , 136 S. Ct. at 2323 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collectin g numerous cases). If \"Mary Doe,\" the pregnant plaintiff in Roe 's compan- ion case , could challenge a statute requiring abortion s be performed in a hospital, see Bolton , 410 U.S. at 184, there is no reason to presume that women are hin-dered from challenging an admitting -privileges re- quirement . Abortion patients today continue to chal- lenge abortion regulations in their own names, see 788 F.3d 1017, or through legal gua rdians, see 138 S. Ct. 1790 ; Marga- ret [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd sub nom. Margaret S 794 F.2d 994 . Given that history, none of 40 the theoretical hindrances Louisiana women might face—including poverty and other vulnerabilities —es- tablish es a hindrance .",
		"citation_value_orig": "597 F. Supp. 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights",
		"context": "If \"Mary Doe,\" the pregnant plaintiff in Roe 's compan- ion case , could challenge a statute requiring abortion s be performed in a hospital, see Bolton , 410 U.S. at 184, there is no reason to presume that women are hin-dered from challenging an admitting -privileges re- quirement . Abortion patients today continue to chal- lenge abortion regulations in their own names, see 788 F.3d 1017, or through legal gua rdians, see 138 S. Ct. 1790 ; Marga- ret 597 F. Supp. 636 , aff'd sub nom. Margaret S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Given that history, none of 40 the theoretical hindrances Louisiana women might face—including poverty and other vulnerabilities —es- tablish es a hindrance . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "794 F.2d 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights",
		"context": "The potential hindrances in this case are insub- stantial for other reasons as well. Indigency does not hinder women from pursuing their abortion- related rights . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In- deed, the assumption that disadvantaged women are unable to speak for themselves —and in fact depend on sophisticated doctors seeking to sell them medical services to speak for t hem—deprives them of their voice . Vulnerabilities of abortion patients should make this Court more suspicious of self-a ppointed ad- vocates purporting to represent them, especially in the context of challenges to laws designed to protect those patients.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights",
		"context": "In- deed, the assumption that disadvantaged women are unable to speak for themselves —and in fact depend on sophisticated doctors seeking to sell them medical services to speak for t hem—deprives them of their voice . Vulnerabilities of abortion patients should make this Court more suspicious of self-a ppointed ad- vocates purporting to represent them, especially in the context of challenges to laws designed to protect those patients. Wash [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Freilich , 313 F.3d at 215 (\"[W]e cannot simply assume that every disabled or chronically ill person is incapable of asserting his or her own claims.\"). This case and others like it prove the point. Plain- tiffs have been represented by counsel at a national nonprofit litigation center and three law firms of na- tional reputation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": ". .'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]], quoting Linda R. 410 U.S. 614. Accord, Sierra 405 U.S. 727; 409 U.S. 205 has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d).",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": ". .'\" 522 U.S. 490], quoting Linda R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accord, Sierra 405 U.S. 727; 409 U.S. 205 has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d).",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": ".'\" 522 U.S. 490], quoting Linda R. 410 U.S. 614. Accord, Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 409 U.S. 205 has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d). See 386 U.S. 547; 358 U.S. 202.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": ".'\" 522 U.S. 490], quoting Linda R. 410 U.S. 614. Accord, Sierra 405 U.S. 727; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d). See 386 U.S. 547; 358 U.S. 202.",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Accord, Sierra 405 U.S. 727; 409 U.S. 205 has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 358 U.S. 202. Havens Realty specifically held that Plaintiff Colemen - the tester - had standing because the express language of the statute gave the right to sue to \"any person\". Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Accord, Sierra 405 U.S. 727; 409 U.S. 205 has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d). See 386 U.S. 547; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Havens Realty specifically held that Plaintiff Colemen - the tester - had standing because the express language of the statute gave the right to sue to \"any person\". Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "For this reason, six different Circuits held that testers have standing under the ADA. Houston , 733 F.3d at 1332-33.; Civil Rights Educ. & Enforcement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Colo. Cross-Disability 765 F.3d 1205; 380 F.3d 1277.9 With respect to this Respondent's ORS claims, the First Circuit held that Havens Realty is \"right on the nose for Laufer's case\". Acheson , 50 F.4th at 269. \"[W]e think Havens Realty shows the clear path here -- it is so similar to Laufer's case as to render any distinction insufficiently material.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 1093",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "For this reason, six different Circuits held that testers have standing under the ADA. Houston , 733 F.3d at 1332-33.; Civil Rights Educ. & Enforcement 867 F.3d 1093; Colo. Cross-Disability [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 380 F.3d 1277.9 With respect to this Respondent's ORS claims, the First Circuit held that Havens Realty is \"right on the nose for Laufer's case\". Acheson , 50 F.4th at 269. \"[W]e think Havens Realty shows the clear path here -- it is so similar to Laufer's case as to render any distinction insufficiently material.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 1205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "For this reason, six different Circuits held that testers have standing under the ADA. Houston , 733 F.3d at 1332-33.; Civil Rights Educ. & Enforcement 867 F.3d 1093; Colo. Cross-Disability 765 F.3d 1205; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].9 With respect to this Respondent's ORS claims, the First Circuit held that Havens Realty is \"right on the nose for Laufer's case\". Acheson , 50 F.4th at 269. \"[W]e think Havens Realty shows the clear path here -- it is so similar to Laufer's case as to render any distinction insufficiently material.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 F.3d 1277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Lexis 3602, 23. 9. Although not an ADA case, the Second Circuit applied similar reasoning in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where black testers had standing to sue over discriminatory advertisements placed in the newspaper even though they were \"combing the newspapers\" to seek out and eradicate discrimination and had no intention of renting or purchasing a home. 18 By contrast, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits reasoned that Havens Realty does not apply. In Mann , the Fifth Circuit held that the information at issue in Havens Realty had \"some relevance\" to the tester.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 F.3d 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Tandy , 380 F.3d at 1285-87. Tandy did not involve either misrepresentation or race based animus, but was strictly about the rights of disabled testers under Title II of the ADA. Tandy also cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which involved discrimination against disabled persons rather than race. In Looper , the Tenth Circuit addressed this discrepancy by ignoring it entirely. 19 There is nothing in the Havens Realty opinion which supports Looper 's interpretation that it was premised on either misrepresentation or racial animus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 F.3d 1097",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Naranda , 2023 U.S. App. Lexis 3602, 33-34. Moreover, in Spokeo , 578 U.S. at 331, this Court cited Federal Election [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], regarding the right to information. In turn, Akins had cited Havens Realty as standing for this right. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U. S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "In turn, Akins had cited Havens Realty as standing for this right. Id. at 21 (\"See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]][]]10(deprivation of information about housing availability constitutes \"specific injury\" permitting standing)\".11 Both the ADA and FHA prohibit discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Section 3604(d), at issue in Havens Realty, covered 10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "11. In Fed. Election 142 S. Ct. 1638, this Court recently cited Havens Realty and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that an injury is cognizable even if willingly incurred. 20 \"race, color, religion, sex or national origin\". See Havens Realty , 455 U.S. at 373.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Indeed, there is nothing in the FHA which implies that separate standards are to be applied in accordance with the protected group enumerated. The Acheson Court, 50 F.4th at p. 28, fn. 6, reinforced its reasoning that Havens Realty applies on the basis that, on several occasions, this Court compared the ADA to the FHA or Title VII for guidance, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 532 U.S. 598, and Univ. of Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "The Acheson Court, 50 F.4th at p. 28, fn. 6, reinforced its reasoning that Havens Realty applies on the basis that, on several occasions, this Court compared the ADA to the FHA or Title VII for guidance, citing 524 U.S. 624, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "of Tex. Sw. Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Looper also reasoned that Havens Realty is distinguishable on the basis that Coleman was the direct recipient of misrepresentation, whereas Laufer had access to the same information as the general public. 22 F.4th at 879.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Havens Realty",
		"context": "Lexis 3602, 19-20, also rejected Looper 's logic on this point. This and other courts have recognized a plaintiff's 21 statutory right to information subject to public disclosure. See Akins , 524 U.S. at 21 (\"Indeed, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff suffers an \"injury in fact\" when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publically disclosed pursuant to a statute.....\"); Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; TransUnion , 141 S.Ct. At 2214 (discussing plaintiff's rights over denial of information subject to public disclosure); Co. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F .3d 246, 263-64, (4th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U. S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. CUMMINGS IS NO BARRIER TO REVIEW",
		"context": "See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Doe 766 F.3d 1013. After all, the parties litigated this case below under pre- Cummings precedent authorizing emotional-distress damages, see 151 F.3d 564, and Sturgis never challenged Miguel's complaint based on the rationale that prevailed in Cummings . 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. CUMMINGS IS NO BARRIER TO REVIEW",
		"context": "See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); 494 U.S. 472; Doe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After all, the parties litigated this case below under pre- Cummings precedent authorizing emotional-distress damages, see 151 F.3d 564, and Sturgis never challenged Miguel's complaint based on the rationale that prevailed in Cummings . 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. CUMMINGS IS NO BARRIER TO REVIEW",
		"context": "R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); 494 U.S. 472; Doe 766 F.3d 1013. After all, the parties litigated this case below under pre- Cummings precedent authorizing emotional-distress damages, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Sturgis never challenged Miguel's complaint based on the rationale that prevailed in Cummings . 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "151 F.3d 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "While the First Amendment makes no mention of a right \"to listen,\" \"to hear,\" or \"to know,\" this Court has determined that First Amendment protection \"is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.\" Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where one enjoys a right to speak, others hold a \"reciprocal right to receive\" that speech, which \"may be asserted\" in court. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "at 757. A long line of cases recognizes this right to hear. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court confirmed the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad. In 408 U.S. 753, this Court acknowledged that the First Amendment includes a right to \"receive information and ideas,\" and that freedom of speech \"'necessarily protects the right to receive'\" (internal citations omitted). And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "A long line of cases recognizes this right to hear. In 381 U.S. 301, this Court confirmed the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court acknowledged that the First Amendment includes a right to \"receive information and ideas,\" and that freedom of speech \"'necessarily protects the right to receive'\" (internal citations omitted). And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "In 381 U.S. 301, this Court confirmed the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad. In 408 U.S. 753, this Court acknowledged that the First Amendment includes a right to \"receive information and ideas,\" and that freedom of speech \"'necessarily protects the right to receive'\" (internal citations omitted). And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. 367381 U.S. 479; 326 U.S. 501; 323 U.S. 516; 319 U.S. 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]381 U.S. 479; 326 U.S. 501; 323 U.S. 516; 319 U.S. 141. Fundamental to the recipient's right to hear is the right to know the speaker's identity. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, disregards the consumer's right to not be confused about the source of products – or the messages or expressive content they bear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. 367[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 326 U.S. 501; 323 U.S. 516; 319 U.S. 141. Fundamental to the recipient's right to hear is the right to know the speaker's identity. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, disregards the consumer's right to not be confused about the source of products – or the messages or expressive content they bear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. 367381 U.S. 479; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 323 U.S. 516; 319 U.S. 141. Fundamental to the recipient's right to hear is the right to know the speaker's identity. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, disregards the consumer's right to not be confused about the source of products – or the messages or expressive content they bear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. 367381 U.S. 479; 326 U.S. 501; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 319 U.S. 141. Fundamental to the recipient's right to hear is the right to know the speaker's identity. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, disregards the consumer's right to not be confused about the source of products – or the messages or expressive content they bear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "And in 416 U.S. 396, where censorship of prison inmates' mail was under examination, this Court ruled it was unnecessary to examine the rights of the inmates themselves, because censorship of their letters infringed the rights of non-inmate recipients of the correspondence. Numerous other decisions are to the same effect. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. 367381 U.S. 479; 326 U.S. 501; 323 U.S. 516; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fundamental to the recipient's right to hear is the right to know the speaker's identity. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, disregards the consumer's right to not be confused about the source of products – or the messages or expressive content they bear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "at 764. Similarly, in the context of political speech and campaign advertising, this Court has recognized the importance of ensuring that \"voters are fully informed about the person or group who is speaking.\" Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.\" First Nat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH",
		"context": "\"Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.\" First Nat. Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Forcing the public to hear parodic (or cultural, critical or political) expression with no safeguard against confusing source information compromises its ability to meaningfully evaluate the messages it receives. The Ninth Circuit, by elevating the parodist's interests, even in confusing expression, over the trademark owner's own expression also has compromised the public's right to reliable source identification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. THE MEMORIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE LEGAL COERCION STANDARD",
		"context": "Adults often encounter speech they find 12 On appeal, Respondents did not challenge the District Court's finding that the Commission's purpose was secular. Am. Humanist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 12 disagreeable; and an Establishment Clause violation is not made out any time a person experiences a sense of affront from the expression of contrary religious views . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 F.3d 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' analysis of assignor estoppel in this case was inadequate",
		"context": "App. 18a -20a, 58a . Consistent with this Court 's role as \"a court of review, not of first view, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], t he C ourt should vacat e the court of appeals' judgment and remand for that court to de termine in the first instance whe ther the assignor -estoppel doctrine, properly confined to its nar- row equitable core, precludes Minerva from assert ing the invalidity defense that it sought to raise here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "594 U.S. ---, 141 S. Ct. 1761. Similarly, the Court found standing in Clinton v. City of New York to challenge the Line Item Veto Act even though the plaintiffs were immediately injured by the President's cancellation of certain tax benefits to which they were otherwise entitled, not the Act's general provision authorizing that cancellation, ex- plaining that \"traceability\" was \"easily satisfied\" since their \"injury is traceable to the President's cancella- tion of [the benefits].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , the Court allowed homeowners near Washington National Airport who alleged injury from the risk of \"increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents\" posed by the \"increased air traffic\" that would result from a master plan imposed by the Met-ropolitan Washington Airports Authority (\"MWAA\") to challenge the constitutionality of the MWAA's com- position, specifically rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs' \"injuries are caused by factors independent of\" the alleged constitutional violation. 501 U.S. 252; accord Whole Woman's 142 S. Ct. 522140 S. Ct. 2183; 478 U.S. 714; 462 U.S. 919; 424 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "524 U.S. 417. And in MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , the Court allowed homeowners near Washington National Airport who alleged injury from the risk of \"increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents\" posed by the \"increased air traffic\" that would result from a master plan imposed by the Met-ropolitan Washington Airports Authority (\"MWAA\") to challenge the constitutionality of the MWAA's com- position, specifically rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs' \"injuries are caused by factors independent of\" the alleged constitutional violation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Whole Woman's 142 S. Ct. 522140 S. Ct. 2183; 478 U.S. 714; 462 U.S. 919; 424 U.S. 1. Separation-of-powers challenges to the constitu- tionality of agency actions provide yet another in- stance where a plaintiff's injury is traceable to at least two separate provisions that are intertwined with one another. In the typical case, for example, where a party injured by agency action challenges the appoint-ment or removal process of the official who promul- gated it, it is the general statutory provision govern- ing the official's appointment or removal, rather than the specific statutory provision being implemented, that is alleged to be invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "524 U.S. 417. And in MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , the Court allowed homeowners near Washington National Airport who alleged injury from the risk of \"increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents\" posed by the \"increased air traffic\" that would result from a master plan imposed by the Met-ropolitan Washington Airports Authority (\"MWAA\") to challenge the constitutionality of the MWAA's com- position, specifically rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs' \"injuries are caused by factors independent of\" the alleged constitutional violation. 501 U.S. 252; accord Whole Woman's 142 S. Ct. 522[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 478 U.S. 714; 462 U.S. 919; 424 U.S. 1. Separation-of-powers challenges to the constitu- tionality of agency actions provide yet another in- stance where a plaintiff's injury is traceable to at least two separate provisions that are intertwined with one another. In the typical case, for example, where a party injured by agency action challenges the appoint-ment or removal process of the official who promul- gated it, it is the general statutory provision govern- ing the official's appointment or removal, rather than the specific statutory provision being implemented, that is alleged to be invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "524 U.S. 417. And in MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , the Court allowed homeowners near Washington National Airport who alleged injury from the risk of \"increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents\" posed by the \"increased air traffic\" that would result from a master plan imposed by the Met-ropolitan Washington Airports Authority (\"MWAA\") to challenge the constitutionality of the MWAA's com- position, specifically rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs' \"injuries are caused by factors independent of\" the alleged constitutional violation. 501 U.S. 252; accord Whole Woman's 142 S. Ct. 522140 S. Ct. 2183; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 462 U.S. 919; 424 U.S. 1. Separation-of-powers challenges to the constitu- tionality of agency actions provide yet another in- stance where a plaintiff's injury is traceable to at least two separate provisions that are intertwined with one another. In the typical case, for example, where a party injured by agency action challenges the appoint-ment or removal process of the official who promul- gated it, it is the general statutory provision govern- ing the official's appointment or removal, rather than the specific statutory provision being implemented, that is alleged to be invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "524 U.S. 417. And in MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , the Court allowed homeowners near Washington National Airport who alleged injury from the risk of \"increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents\" posed by the \"increased air traffic\" that would result from a master plan imposed by the Met-ropolitan Washington Airports Authority (\"MWAA\") to challenge the constitutionality of the MWAA's com- position, specifically rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs' \"injuries are caused by factors independent of\" the alleged constitutional violation. 501 U.S. 252; accord Whole Woman's 142 S. Ct. 522140 S. Ct. 2183; 478 U.S. 714; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 424 U.S. 1. Separation-of-powers challenges to the constitu- tionality of agency actions provide yet another in- stance where a plaintiff's injury is traceable to at least two separate provisions that are intertwined with one another. In the typical case, for example, where a party injured by agency action challenges the appoint-ment or removal process of the official who promul- gated it, it is the general statutory provision govern- ing the official's appointment or removal, rather than the specific statutory provision being implemented, that is alleged to be invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "524 U.S. 417. And in MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , the Court allowed homeowners near Washington National Airport who alleged injury from the risk of \"increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents\" posed by the \"increased air traffic\" that would result from a master plan imposed by the Met-ropolitan Washington Airports Authority (\"MWAA\") to challenge the constitutionality of the MWAA's com- position, specifically rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs' \"injuries are caused by factors independent of\" the alleged constitutional violation. 501 U.S. 252; accord Whole Woman's 142 S. Ct. 522140 S. Ct. 2183; 478 U.S. 714; 462 U.S. 919; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Separation-of-powers challenges to the constitu- tionality of agency actions provide yet another in- stance where a plaintiff's injury is traceable to at least two separate provisions that are intertwined with one another. In the typical case, for example, where a party injured by agency action challenges the appoint-ment or removal process of the official who promul- gated it, it is the general statutory provision govern- ing the official's appointment or removal, rather than the specific statutory provision being implemented, that is alleged to be invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": ", Financial Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]575 U.S. 43; 573 U.S. 513; Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
		"context": "Bd. for 140 S. Ct. 1649575 U.S. 43; 573 U.S. 513; Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Louisiana's Non-Unanimous Jury Provision Functioned as Intended.",
		"context": "See Ramos , 140 U.S. at 1425-40 (Alito, J., dissenting). But Louisiana's and Oregon's amendments to their non-unanimous jury provisions did not erase the racist history and design of the non-unanimous jury. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor, as discussed below, did they restore accuracy to non-unanimous convictions. 15 Frampton, supra note 7, at 1636–37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Louisiana's Non-Unanimous Jury Provision Functioned as Intended.",
		"context": "Whorton , 549 U.S. at 418. Race must play no role in dispensing criminal punishment because a \"bas ic premise of our criminal justice system\" is that \"[o] ur law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, because of Louisiana's non- unanimous jury law, Black defendants were more likely to be convicted than their white counterparts. This shows that the non-unanimous jury rule seriously diminished the likelihood of an accurate outcome, i.e., an outcome where race has no role in whether a defendant is convicted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The persuasiveness of all the evidence of racial discrimination must be assessed cumulatively",
		"context": ". .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Miller-El did just that: \"It is true . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
		"context": "That definition could be read literally to refer to all water bodies within the United States. Cf. International Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] had been used in prior laws with a more limited reach. When \"a statute includes an explicit def-inition,\" a court \"must follow that definition.\" 530 U.S. 914.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
		"context": "International Paper 479 U.S. 481 had been used in prior laws with a more limited reach. When \"a statute includes an explicit def-inition,\" a court \"must follow that definition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the term being 33 defined nonetheless may shed light on how the defini- tion is best read. See, e.g., 559 U.S. 133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
		"context": "530 U.S. 914. But the term being 33 defined nonetheless may shed light on how the defini- tion is best read. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in SWANCC the Court observed that the \"term 'navigable' has at least the im- port of showing us what Congress had in mind as its au- thority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdic-tion over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.\" 531 U.S. at 172; see pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
		"context": "And any greater simplicity offered by the continuous -surface - connection test would come at the expense of arbitrari- ness an d a profound mismatch with the CWA's design . Cf. County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The significant -nexus test is administra- ble, and the agencies now have \"over a decade of nation- wide experience\" with it. 86 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
		"context": "47 -48) are therefore insubstantial . By design, the significant - nexus test permits jurisdiction over wetlands only if they significantly affect the waters over which Con- gress has unquestioned Article I authority. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 452 U.S. 264. Indeed, although petitioners advo- cate a highly restrictive view of the CWA 's coverage, they (a) recognize that \"Congress's power over the channels of interstate commerce authorizes federal r eg- ulation of \" activities that do not occur on traditional navigable waters \"but nonetheless affect[] them\" (Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
		"context": "47 -48) are therefore insubstantial . By design, the significant - nexus test permits jurisdiction over wetlands only if they significantly affect the waters over which Con- gress has unquestioned Article I authority. See, e.g., 514 U.S. 549; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, although petitioners advo- cate a highly restrictive view of the CWA 's coverage, they (a) recognize that \"Congress's power over the channels of interstate commerce authorizes federal r eg- ulation of \" activities that do not occur on traditional navigable waters \"but nonetheless affect[] them\" (Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Franklin does not require a presumption in favor of personal damages awards against federal officials under RFRA",
		"context": "In concluding that personal damages awards against individual federal employees qualify as \"appropriate re- lief,\" the court of appeals also relied heavily on this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which it understood to en- dorse a presumption that money damages are available under a ll federal cause s of action absent a clear indica- tion to the contrary . See Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Franklin does not require a presumption in favor of personal damages awards against federal officials under RFRA",
		"context": "Franklin does not support the court of appeals' conclusion, both because it does not apply in this context and because , even if it did, the presumption would be overcome for this particular statute . a. Franklin involved the scope of remedies for the private cause of action that this Court had implied un- der Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq ., in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In the absen ce of any statu- tory guidance, t he Franklin Court held that it would \"presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. \" 503 U.S. at 66.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Franklin does not require a presumption in favor of personal damages awards against federal officials under RFRA",
		"context": "Clark , 543 U.S. at 380. Under the lowest -common denominator approach, the unavai labil- ity of damages against the government and its branches, departments, agencies, and instrumentalities dictates the unavailability of damages against all defendants un- der RFRA , even if the considerations of sovereign im- munity that apply to the governmen t itself do not apply to its officers and employees . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Even if the Franklin presumption applied , the presumption is a rebuttable one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "763 F.3d 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The modern right of association is partially anchored in the Assembly Clause",
		"context": "The Court's understanding of the Assembly Clause from 1937 and 1945 did not last. Instead, the Court shifted to a newly recognized right of associa- tion and paid little attention to its Assembly Clause roots. The Court first recognized a right of association in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That case challenged an Alabama law that would have compelled the NAACP to make its mem-bership rolls public. A unanimous Court held that this Alabama law was unconstitutional, reasoning that compelled disclosure of the rolls would likely \"af- fect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster be- liefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The modern right of association is partially anchored in the Assembly Clause",
		"context": "at 460. Cases following NAACP v. Alabama confirmed that the right of association was grounded partially in the Assembly Clause. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court struck down an- other ordinance requiring disclosure of NAACP membership rolls. The Court reasoned that \"[l]ike freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peace- able assembly was considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry,\" id. at 522–23, and then cited both NAACP v. Alabama and De Jonge as having established the right of asso- ciation, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The modern right of association is partially anchored in the Assembly Clause",
		"context": "at 523. Three years later, the Court again struck down a state law requiring the NAACP to reveal its mem- bership rolls, this time relying on the NAACP's \"strong associational interest in maintaining the pri- vacy of membership lists,\" without referencing the Assembly Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Douglas's concurrenc e, however, emphasized the support to be found in the Assembly Clause for the NAACP's claims: Joining a lawful organization, like attending a church, is an associational activity that comes within the purview of the First Amend- ment . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The modern right of association is partially anchored in the Assembly Clause",
		"context": "See, e.g. , United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. References to the Assembly Clause were largely relegated to dicta. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The modern right of association is partially anchored in the Assembly Clause",
		"context": "References to the Assembly Clause were largely relegated to dicta. See, e.g. , Rich- mond Newspapers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Adams has not established standing.",
		"context": "He has thus abandoned any claim based on pre-2017 injuries. Having suffered no past injury when he sued, Ad- ams had to demonstrate \"concrete plans\" to become a judge that would be thwarted by the challenged pro- visions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He failed. His first complaint recited only now-abandoned claims about 2014.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Adams has not established standing.",
		"context": "He says he has standing to challenge not only the major party provision, but the bare ma- jority provision. Yet the court below held otherwise; and having failed to file a cross-petition, Adams can- not raise that issue now. S. Ct. R. 24.1(a); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is unresponsive to the courts' reasoning. Because he is now an Independent, the bare majority provision cannot injure him. Adding an unaffiliated appointee to a court could never cause one of the major parties to exceed its constitutional limit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "642 F.3d 1271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FAITHFULLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S \"UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS\" PRECEDENTS",
		"context": "And when a foster care agency certifies potential foster parents pursuant to its contracts with the City, the agency is acting, and speaking, in its capacity as a governmental contractor carrying out a government program, not as a private entity engaged in its own speech. See Legal Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because the nondiscrimination 30 requirement applies only to the carrying out of the government program and does not restrict the contractor outside that program, it does not impose an unconstitutio nal condition. In 500 U.S. 173 , for example, this Court upheld a content -based restriction on what recipients of Title X funding could tell patients in a government -funded program.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FAITHFULLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S \"UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS\" PRECEDENTS",
		"context": "531 U.S. 533 . Because the nondiscrimination 30 requirement applies only to the carrying out of the government program and does not restrict the contractor outside that program, it does not impose an unconstitutio nal condition. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for example, this Court upheld a content -based restriction on what recipients of Title X funding could tell patients in a government -funded program. The Court rejected a First Amendm ent challenge because the recipients were voluntarily carry ing out the government program and the limitations on their speech applied only to the government program. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FAITHFULLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S \"UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS\" PRECEDENTS",
		"context": "This Court 's precedents on speech by public employees reflect the same distinction. The First Amendment protects the rights of public employees or government contractors to engage in their own private speech, but it \"does not invest [them] with the right to perform their jobs however they see fit.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee 's professional resp onsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employe r itself has commissioned or created.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IRCA Does Not Impliedly Preempt Respondents' Prosecutions",
		"context": "under either field or conflict 19 preemption. The starting point for assessing implied preemption is a strong presumption against preemption based on \"the assumption that the historic police powers of the States' are not superseded\" by federal law \"unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A. Respondents' prosecutions for using stolen social security numbers on state and federal tax forms are not field preempted. The only field they implicate is the field of identity theft, which Congress has not occupied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IRCA Does Not Impliedly Preempt Respondents' Prosecutions",
		"context": "21-22. But Congress has not occupied those fields. That is clear from this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the Court limited its field preemption analysis to \"the field of alien registration,\" and addressed most of the provisions of the Arizona law in question under conflict preemption. Id. at 401.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners rely on inapplicable caselaw prohibiting discrimination against out of state businesses",
		"context": "Petitioners and the United States also rely on C & A [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which only prohibited discrimination against out of state businesses. The issue in C&A Carbone was the town using a local ordinance to steer business to a waste plant in order to pay for construction of the plant, thus openly discriminating against out of state interests for purely economic reasons. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners rely on inapplicable caselaw prohibiting discrimination against out of state businesses",
		"context": "11. The sentence preceding the one quoted by the United States was, \"Nor may Clarkstown justify the flow control ordinance as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-tow n disposal sites that it might deem harmful to the environment.\" C & A Carbone, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Purported \"harm to the environment\" was not an interest actually asserted by the town in C & A Carbone , but the Court was simply cautioning the town that it could not manufacture some other reason regarding some occurrence in another State to justify steering business to its disposal site. Once the waste leaves one State, that State is not free to dictate to another State how to process it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners rely on inapplicable caselaw prohibiting discrimination against out of state businesses",
		"context": "Rather, California is regulating the exact opposite—whether a product may be sold within its jurisdictional bounds. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished C & A Carbone in a case in which the town did not discriminate against out of state competitors but instead evenhandedly prohibited all garbage haulers from participating in the market. USA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]397 U.S. 137 (\" Pike\") balancing. USA Recycling at 1286-1287. Proposition 12 is more like the law at issue in USA Recycling, which did not discriminate between in state and out of state commerce, and is nothing like the law at issue in C & A Carbone .",
		"citation_value_orig": "66 F.3d 1272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners rely on inapplicable caselaw prohibiting discrimination against out of state businesses",
		"context": "Rather, California is regulating the exact opposite—whether a product may be sold within its jurisdictional bounds. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished C & A Carbone in a case in which the town did not discriminate against out of state competitors but instead evenhandedly prohibited all garbage haulers from participating in the market. USA 66 F.3d 1272[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\" Pike\") balancing. USA Recycling at 1286-1287. Proposition 12 is more like the law at issue in USA Recycling, which did not discriminate between in state and out of state commerce, and is nothing like the law at issue in C & A Carbone .",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners rely on inapplicable caselaw prohibiting discrimination against out of state businesses",
		"context": "Proposition 12 is more like the law at issue in USA Recycling, which did not discriminate between in state and out of state commerce, and is nothing like the law at issue in C & A Carbone . As this Court has previously held, the relevant inquiry in a dormant Commerce Clause analysis of a State law is \"to determine whether it regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.\" Fulton [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (cleaned up.) Proposition 12 applies equally to the sale of pork products wherever they are from. Any effects on 23 interstate commerce are only incidental to the State's overriding interest in protec ting public health, safety, and morals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Case Should Be Remanded for Further Proceedings",
		"context": "If Congress had intended such a radical change to longstanding practice , surely there would have been some reference to it in the legislative history. In this case, there is none. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, other federal courts, viewing Convention cases as disputes arising under federal law, apply federal common law. See 1 Born, International Commercial Arbitration § 10.05[A] at 1495 n.463 (collecting cases).",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Case Should Be Remanded for Further Proceedings",
		"context": "§ 10.05[C][1] at 1497-99. Fourth, barring an affirma- tive choice of law governing the arbitration clause, a court might apply the law of the arbitral forum, again drawing on Article V (1)(a). See, e.g., Karaha Bodas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, some foreign courts and arbitral tribunals apply international law or transnational law to deter- mine whether an arbitration clause extends to a party that has not signed the agreement. See 1 Born, International Commercial Arbitration , § 10.05[A] at 1493-94 (collecting case s).",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 F.3d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "In Marks , this Court provided a rule for deter- mining the governing law established by a decision in which the Members of the Court do not agree on a ra- tionale. \"When a fragmented Court decides a case, and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the as-sent of five Justices,\" Marks held, \" 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar- rowest grounds.' \" 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because an opinion \"con- curr[ing] in the judgments on the narrowest ground s\" occupies a \"middle ground\" between Justices with broader and narrower views, Marks ensures that \"lower courts will decide cases consistently with the opinions of a majority of the Supreme Court in the rel- evant precedent.\" 740 F. 3d 604.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "\" 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting 428 U.S. 153. Because an opinion \"con- curr[ing] in the judgments on the narrowest ground s\" occupies a \"middle ground\" between Justices with broader and narrower views, Marks ensures that \"lower courts will decide cases consistently with the opinions of a majority of the Supreme Court in the rel- evant precedent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court, in applying Marks , has not invariably re- quired that one single opinion itself encapsulate the Court's holding. Often, as in Marks itself, the Court ha s designated as controlling a middle -ground opinion fall- ing between plurality and dissenting views that pro- duces results accepted by five Justices in every case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "740 F. 3d 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "This Court, in applying Marks , has not invariably re- quired that one single opinion itself encapsulate the Court's holding. Often, as in Marks itself, the Court ha s designated as controlling a middle -ground opinion fall- ing between plurality and dissenting views that pro- duces results accepted by five Justices in every case. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 551 U.S. 930; Marks , 430 U.S. at 193. On other occasions, however, 19 this Court has taken a different route to the same basic result —asking which litigant would have prevailed un- der the rationales of at least five Justices by running the facts at hand thro ugh multiple opinions. See, e.g., 565 U.S. 23466 U.S. 109; Moses H. Cone Mem'l 460 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "This Court, in applying Marks , has not invariably re- quired that one single opinion itself encapsulate the Court's holding. Often, as in Marks itself, the Court ha s designated as controlling a middle -ground opinion fall- ing between plurality and dissenting views that pro- duces results accepted by five Justices in every case. See, e.g., 560 U.S. 48; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Marks , 430 U.S. at 193. On other occasions, however, 19 this Court has taken a different route to the same basic result —asking which litigant would have prevailed un- der the rationales of at least five Justices by running the facts at hand thro ugh multiple opinions. See, e.g., 565 U.S. 23466 U.S. 109; Moses H. Cone Mem'l 460 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 930",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "See, e.g., 560 U.S. 48; 551 U.S. 930; Marks , 430 U.S. at 193. On other occasions, however, 19 this Court has taken a different route to the same basic result —asking which litigant would have prevailed un- der the rationales of at least five Justices by running the facts at hand thro ugh multiple opinions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]466 U.S. 109; Moses H. Cone Mem'l 460 U.S. 1. Both methods decide cases consist-ently with the view s of a majority of this Court. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "See, e.g., 560 U.S. 48; 551 U.S. 930; Marks , 430 U.S. at 193. On other occasions, however, 19 this Court has taken a different route to the same basic result —asking which litigant would have prevailed un- der the rationales of at least five Justices by running the facts at hand thro ugh multiple opinions. See, e.g., 565 U.S. 23[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Moses H. Cone Mem'l 460 U.S. 1. Both methods decide cases consist-ently with the view s of a majority of this Court. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "See, e.g., 560 U.S. 48; 551 U.S. 930; Marks , 430 U.S. at 193. On other occasions, however, 19 this Court has taken a different route to the same basic result —asking which litigant would have prevailed un- der the rationales of at least five Justices by running the facts at hand thro ugh multiple opinions. See, e.g., 565 U.S. 23466 U.S. 109; Moses H. Cone Mem'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both methods decide cases consist-ently with the view s of a majority of this Court. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "Duvall , 740 F.3d at 609 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). In doing so, Marks serves the purposes that underlie this Court's interpretive rules more generally, by \" 'pro- mot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions,' \" and \"sav[ing] parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , by ensuring that \"whether the majority vote is produced by the adoption of one rationale or two, the rule of law made\" in a deci- sion of this Court will \"produce the same result in the next applicable case,\" 825 F.3d 1014, by ena- bling this Court to create national uniformity on the scope of statutory and constitutional provis ions when a majority of this Court embraces a particular result, even if Members of the Court diverge in their reason- ing. That is critical because federal constitutional and statutory provisions are \"generally intended to have uniform nationwide applicat ion.\" Mississippi Band of Choctaw 490 U.S. 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "Duvall , 740 F.3d at 609 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). In doing so, Marks serves the purposes that underlie this Court's interpretive rules more generally, by \" 'pro- mot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions,' \" and \"sav[ing] parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.\" 135 S. Ct. 2401 , by ensuring that \"whether the majority vote is produced by the adoption of one rationale or two, the rule of law made\" in a deci- sion of this Court will \"produce the same result in the next applicable case,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by ena- bling this Court to create national uniformity on the scope of statutory and constitutional provis ions when a majority of this Court embraces a particular result, even if Members of the Court diverge in their reason- ing. That is critical because federal constitutional and statutory provisions are \"generally intended to have uniform nationwide applicat ion.\" Mississippi Band of Choctaw 490 U.S. 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "825 F.3d 1014",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. 2401 , by ensuring that \"whether the majority vote is produced by the adoption of one rationale or two, the rule of law made\" in a deci- sion of this Court will \"produce the same result in the next applicable case,\" 825 F.3d 1014, by ena- bling this Court to create national uniformity on the scope of statutory and constitutional provis ions when a majority of this Court embraces a particular result, even if Members of the Court diverge in their reason- ing. That is critical because federal constitutional and statutory provisions are \"generally intended to have uniform nationwide applicat ion.\" Mississippi Band of Choctaw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court Should Not Prohibit States from Using What They Determine to be the Most Effective Collective Bargaining System to Fix Employment Terms and Resolve Grievances",
		"context": "Thereisnorequirementthatstatesestablish collectivebargainingsystemsforpublicemployees. ThisCourthasmadeclearthatgovernmentofficials may,consistentwiththeFirstAmendment,negotiate unit-wide contract terms with a majority-chosen representative,Minn.StateBd.forCmty.Colls.v. Knight, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], just as governmentofficialsmay,inthealternative,chooseto consultexclusivelywithindividuals, Smithv.Ark. StateHighwayEmps.,441U.S.463,464-66(1979),or withnoone.Althoughmoststatesuseexclusive representativebargainingtosettermsforatleast somepublicemployees,ninestatesdonotauthorize anyformofpublicemployeecollectivebargaining whatsoever.SeeAppendixtoBr.fortheStatesofNew Yorketal.asA.C.inFriedrichsv.CaliforniaTeachers Ass'n(14-915). Ifastatedecidestouseexclusiverepresentative collectivebargainingtosetemploymenttermsfora unitofworkers,however,thestateshouldhavethe 26 authority to agree to allocate the costs of such representationamongallunitworkers.Petitioner arguesthatstateshavenolegitimatepolicyreasonto makethischoicebecause,accordingtoPetitioner, distributingthecostofcollectivebargainingacrossall employeesdoesnotcontributetounionstability.Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Post-issuance patent review helps the Executive Branch resolve these conflicts and vindicate the public's interests",
		"context": "The Government can, for instance, file a counterclaim of invalidity if a patentee sues it for infringement. If, however, an agency decides that a l ikely invalid patent is problematic enough to justify an affirmative challenge, litigation 13 may not provide a viable solution. Compare, e.g., MedImmune, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, in any event, for many of the same reasons that Cong ress created post -issuance administrative processes in the first place, those processes are often preferable to litigation as a means of resolving conflicts between potentially invalid patents and governmental objectives: they are both more efficient and more cost -effective. See, e.g., H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Post-issuance patent review helps the Executive Branch resolve these conflicts and vindicate the public's interests",
		"context": "Another example is illustrative: IRIS Corporati on holds a patent that covers electronic passport technology. IRIS brought suit against Japan Airlines alleging that, by complying with various U.S. border - security laws requiring electronic passport examination, Japan Airlines had infringed IRIS's patent . IRIS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, IRIS's patent covered the only possible method of complying with those federal security regulations. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "769 F.3d 1359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Post-issuance patent review helps the Executive Branch resolve these conflicts and vindicate the public's interests",
		"context": "Agencies can marshal their consider able technical and specialized knowledge to demonstrate why an issued patent is not meaningfully distinct from prior art, or to explain why the claimed invention is obvious or not novel. Foreclosing the Government from petitioning for review could thus deprive the Patent Office of a resource invaluable to carrying out 16 its responsibility to accurately assess patent applications. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the case of tax strategy patents, for example, the IRS is almost certainly the party most likely to be aware of any rulings or memoranda that could have formed the basis of a patented tax strategy. At a minimum, the IRS seems comparatively more likely to identify and explain such prior art than the Patent Office acting alone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "127 F.3d 1048",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Statute Unambiguously Triggers The Stop-Time Rule Only Upon Service Of Notice That Satisfies The Statutory Definition Of A \"Notice To Appear\"",
		"context": "Id. Determining wheth- er a statute is \"ambiguous\" for purposes of Chevron requires more than asking whether the statutory language could, in the abstr act, be given more than one meaning. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court defers to agency interpretations only if the statute remains ambiguous after applying \"tradi- tional tools of statutory construction.\" Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Statute Unambiguously Triggers The Stop-Time Rule Only Upon Service Of Notice That Satisfies The Statutory Definition Of A \"Notice To Appear\"",
		"context": "Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. Thus, even superficially ambiguous statutory language can unambiguously preclude the agency's interpretation when \"read in context\" using \"normal [interpretive] tools.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If such tools resolve any ambiguity, then \"there is, for Chev- ron purposes, no ambiguity . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "2020 WL 3798875. The rule in those circuits is clear: \"applying pressure to [a person's] back, once he [has been] handcuffed and his legs restrained, [is] constitutionally unreasonable.\" Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1155; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 838 F.3d 55; Abdullahi, 423 F.3d 763. In addition, as the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the ACLU notes (at 8), the Third Circuit has also adopted this rule. It has held that \"a reasonable jury could find that the continued use of force\" on someone who \"was handcuffed and had his ankles tied\" —\"press[ing] down on [his] back\" until he was \"still,\" and he then \"died of asphyxiation\"— \"was excessive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "887 F.3d 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "2020 WL 3798875. The rule in those circuits is clear: \"applying pressure to [a person's] back, once he [has been] handcuffed and his legs restrained, [is] constitutionally unreasonable.\" Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1155; see 887 F.3d 744; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Abdullahi, 423 F.3d 763. In addition, as the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the ACLU notes (at 8), the Third Circuit has also adopted this rule. It has held that \"a reasonable jury could find that the continued use of force\" on someone who \"was handcuffed and had his ankles tied\" —\"press[ing] down on [his] back\" until he was \"still,\" and he then \"died of asphyxiation\"— \"was excessive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "838 F.3d 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "2020 WL 3798875. The rule in those circuits is clear: \"applying pressure to [a person's] back, once he [has been] handcuffed and his legs restrained, [is] constitutionally unreasonable.\" Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1155; see 887 F.3d 744; 838 F.3d 55; Abdullahi, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, as the amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the ACLU notes (at 8), the Third Circuit has also adopted this rule. It has held that \"a reasonable jury could find that the continued use of force\" on someone who \"was handcuffed and had his ankles tied\" —\"press[ing] down on [his] back\" until he was \"still,\" and he then \"died of asphyxiation\"— \"was excessive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 F.3d 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "Rivas, 365 F.3d at 199 -200. Six circuits, then, recognize that \"[n]o reasonable officer would continue to put pressure on [an] arrestee's back after the arrestee was subdued by handcuffs, an ankle restraint, and a police officer holding the arrestee's legs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet that is what happened here. By authorizing this very conduct as a matter of law, the Eighth Circuit created a conflict wit h six circuits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 F.3d 893",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "69a. So its description of the case law, even if it were \"complete\" and accurate, BIO 11, would only underscore the conflict —not undermine it. The respondents cite two other cases in an effort to dispel the split—Estate of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Giannetti v. City of Stillwater, 216 Fed. App'x. 756 (10th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "123 F.3d 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "at 756. Other cases are in accord. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, as this discussion shows, neither the outcomes in these cases nor the rules they announce \"turn on\" whether the decedent became still after being handcuffed, shackled, and held on the ground. Just the opposite: the -6- cases reject the argument that officers may push down into the back of someone who is \"handcuffed and ha[s] his ankles tied\" until he is \"still.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
		"context": "Second, as this discussion shows, neither the outcomes in these cases nor the rules they announce \"turn on\" whether the decedent became still after being handcuffed, shackled, and held on the ground. Just the opposite: the -6- cases reject the argument that officers may push down into the back of someone who is \"handcuffed and ha[s] his ankles tied\" until he is \"still.\" Rivas, 365 F.3d at 200; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By the same token, the governing rule of law in these circuits contains no exception for when a person moves in an \"attempt to breathe,\" as the court below held. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 F. App'x 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Title V money was directed to Tribal governments, and not to Alaska Natives generally",
		"context": "As a preliminary matter, Tribal membership does not cease to exist if a Tribal citizen leaves their Tribal community and moves elsewhere. Furthermore, it is foundational in federal Indian law that Tribes have 18 jurisdiction over the health and safety of their Tribal citizens, and that duty is not dependent on land or the physical residence of a Tribal member. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; C OHEN 'S, supra , at § 4.01[1][b], at 212 (\"Th e powers of Indian tribes over their own members are broad and generally ex- clusive of both federal and state power.\"). Indeed, Tribes throughout the country have provided COVID-19 aid to their Tribal citizens regardless of where their citizens reside. For example, Central Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska used its CARES Act monies to offer a variety of financial assistance pro- grams to all of its Tribal citizens \"regardless of where they reside.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Title V money was directed to Tribal governments, and not to Alaska Natives generally",
		"context": "But this complaint is irrele- vant to the legal question of whether ANCs constitute Tribal governments. The authority to determine Tribal membership is among the most fundamental and hallowed powers of a Tribal government. See Santa Clara [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Tribal membership equates to citizens hip, such that it is a po- litical relationship between a government and an indi- vidual. See 417 U.S. 535.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Title V money was directed to Tribal governments, and not to Alaska Natives generally",
		"context": "See Santa Clara 436 U.S. 49. Tribal membership equates to citizens hip, such that it is a po- litical relationship between a government and an indi- vidual. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While Native Americans and Alaska Native people are descendants of the original inhabitants of this continent, Tribal citizenship and an individual's relationship to a Tribal government is a relationship defined by political representation and association. There are many people who may identify as Native American or Alaska Native, but who, for a variety of reasons, are not members of or eligible for membership in any federally recognized Tribe.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Title V money was directed to Tribal governments, and not to Alaska Natives generally",
		"context": "Contrary to 20 Petitioners' assumption, that is true in the Lower 48 as much as it is in Alaska. \"Federal regulation of In- dian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is no t to be viewed as legisla- tion of a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Title V designated funds specifically for govern- ments, not individuals. In Title V, Congress set aside funding for governments providing government ser- vices.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The PTO's Assertion That The \"Ordinary\" Meaning Of \"Expenses\" Includes \"Attorneys' Fees\" Is Both Unsupported And Irrelevant Under The American Rule",
		"context": "Pet. App. 27a (citing Summit Valley , 456 U.S. at 722, 726 (\"the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit\" did not include attorneys' fees); F. D. Rich [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]135 S. Ct. 2168. Indeed, the PTO concedes th at the phrase \"expenses\" is vague and \"open-ended.\" The PTO quotes Arlington Central School District Board of 548 U.S. 291 for the proposition that \"'an open- ended provision,' such as 'expenses'\" would be suffi- cient to authorize an award of attorneys' fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The PTO's Assertion That The \"Ordinary\" Meaning Of \"Expenses\" Includes \"Attorneys' Fees\" Is Both Unsupported And Irrelevant Under The American Rule",
		"context": "27a (citing Summit Valley , 456 U.S. at 722, 726 (\"the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit\" did not include attorneys' fees); F. D. Rich 417 U.S. 116135 S. Ct. 2168. Indeed, the PTO concedes th at the phrase \"expenses\" is vague and \"open-ended.\" The PTO quotes Arlington Central School District Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] for the proposition that \"'an open- ended provision,' such as 'expenses'\" would be suffi- cient to authorize an award of attorneys' fees. Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The PTO's Assertion That The \"Ordinary\" Meaning Of \"Expenses\" Includes \"Attorneys' Fees\" Is Both Unsupported And Irrelevant Under The American Rule",
		"context": "While this modifier makes clear that a § 145 plaintiff must bear all expenses, it does not specifically and explicitly provide that \"expenses\" include attorneys' fees. A catchall-phrase like \"all\" does not define what it 32 catches. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, as the PTO recognizes, the Court rejected this exact argument in Rimini . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with the plain text of Section 102(b)",
		"context": "Wis. Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (Revised 4th ed. 1968) (\"the means of attaining an object\"); Oxford Am. Dic- tionary 418 (1980) (\"a procedure or way of doing some- thing\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with the plain text of Section 102(b)",
		"context": "7 U.S. 16, petitioner is wrong to read such language into the statute. Moreover, given the \"familiar principle of statutory construction that word s grouped in a list should be given related meaning,\" the phrase \"method of opera- tion\" must be read in view of the other terms listed in Section 102(b). Third Nat'l Bank in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 195 (2012) (under noscitur a sociis canon, \"[a]ssociated words bear on one another's meaning\"). These neighboring terms —idea, procedure, process, system, concept, principle, and discovery —all refer to underlying ob- jects of ex pression, rather than discriminating among the various forms that a given expression might take. \"Method of operation\" \"must be similar in nature.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with the plain text of Section 102(b)",
		"context": "These neighboring terms —idea, procedure, process, system, concept, principle, and discovery —all refer to underlying ob- jects of ex pression, rather than discriminating among the various forms that a given expression might take. \"Method of operation\" \"must be similar in nature.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, this Court's precedents further reinfor ce the plain -text reading of Section 102(b). In 565 U.S. 302, for example, the Court explained that Section 102(b) simply \"codif[ies]\" the \"idea/expression dichotomy,\" a \"'traditional con- tour[]' of copyright protection.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with the plain text of Section 102(b)",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 2355. Finally, this Court's precedents further reinfor ce the plain -text reading of Section 102(b). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court explained that Section 102(b) simply \"codif[ies]\" the \"idea/expression dichotomy,\" a \"'traditional con- tour[]' of copyright protection.\" See also Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. 340 (original alter- ation omitted)). In sum, then, statutory language, con- text, and precedent confirm that Section 102(b)'s plain text merely prevents a monopoly on underlying objects of expression, rather than foreclosing protection of original works that serve some practical function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with the plain text of Section 102(b)",
		"context": "Finally, this Court's precedents further reinfor ce the plain -text reading of Section 102(b). In 565 U.S. 302, for example, the Court explained that Section 102(b) simply \"codif[ies]\" the \"idea/expression dichotomy,\" a \"'traditional con- tour[]' of copyright protection.\" See also Feist Publ'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (original alter- ation omitted)). In sum, then, statutory language, con- text, and precedent confirm that Section 102(b)'s plain text merely prevents a monopoly on underlying objects of expression, rather than foreclosing protection of original works that serve some practical function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief",
		"context": "Ryder , 515 U.S. at 185. When a litigant raises a \"constitutional challenge as a defense to an enforcement action,\" courts cannot make an unconstitutional determination \"without providing relief to the [litigant].\" Accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By not awarding any meaningful remedy, the court of appeals determination is just an advisory opinion. When a court makes a new constitut ional ruling, it \"ha[s] to give [the challenger] the benefit of that new rule\"; this is \"an unavoidable consequence\" of Article III's prohibition against \"advisory opinions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 F.3d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief",
		"context": "By not awarding any meaningful remedy, the court of appeals determination is just an advisory opinion. When a court makes a new constitut ional ruling, it \"ha[s] to give [the challenger] the benefit of that new rule\"; this is \"an unavoidable consequence\" of Article III's prohibition against \"advisory opinions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is evident that if a fe deral officer holds a position without legal authority, his previous and future actions are void until the legal or constitutional defect is cor-rected. See 118 U.S. 425.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief",
		"context": "489 U.S. 288. It is evident that if a fe deral officer holds a position without legal authority, his previous and future actions are void until the legal or constitutional defect is cor-rected. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The proposition that the court of appeals can rule for UTIER and still somehow allow the Board to con- tinue unimpeded is unprecedented because it largely relies on a misconstruction of the remedies granted in Buckley , supra and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. 458 U.S. 50 . In those cases, the prevailing challenger received relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief",
		"context": "It is evident that if a fe deral officer holds a position without legal authority, his previous and future actions are void until the legal or constitutional defect is cor-rected. See 118 U.S. 425. The proposition that the court of appeals can rule for UTIER and still somehow allow the Board to con- tinue unimpeded is unprecedented because it largely relies on a misconstruction of the remedies granted in Buckley , supra and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In those cases, the prevailing challenger received relief. Ryder v. United States , 515 U.S. at 182-84 & n.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief",
		"context": "at 184. 121 There is no precedent of a violation of the Appoint-ments Clause that failed to grant the requested relief. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the Oversight Board is unconstitutional, UTIER is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may be appropriate. See Ryder v. United States , 515 U.S. at 182-83 (1995).",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 F.3d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "In its takings cases, the Court has sometimes invoked the \"bundle of rights\" metaphor to describe property ownership. 4 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that description, a landowner has a bundle of \"strands\" or \"sticks,\" each of which represents an attribute of ownership: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to dispose, and the right to exclude. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "In that description, a landowner has a bundle of \"strands\" or \"sticks,\" each of which represents an attribute of ownership: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to dispose, and the right to exclude. Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[O]ur 'takings' jurisprudence . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "371, 393 (2003) (arguing for an \"integrated theory of property\" that rejects the fragmentation of property rights inherent in the \"bundle of rights\" approach). 8 that they acquire when they obtain title to property. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Loretto , the Court held that \"a permanent physical occupation of another's property\"—\"perhaps the most serious invasion of an owner's property interests\"—\"chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand\" and thereby effects a per se taking. Loretto , 458 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "229 Cal. App. 4th 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "App. A-18. But the panel's holding conflicts with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which extended 9 Loretto to intermittent, periodic, or otherwise \"time- limited\" invasions or occupations. In Nollan , the property owner challenged a state-imposed easement that required him to allow the public to pass and repass across his yard, which abutted the beach. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "Finally, it should be noted that it is not at all clear that the easement created by the Access Regulation must cut across all \"strands\" of the \"bundle of rights\" in order to be deemed a per se taking. The Court's taking s cases suggest that the elimination of just one \"strand\"—such as the \"fundamental\" right to exclude—is sufficient. Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 The regulation has no end date and is, in that sense, permanent. The Ninth Circuit itself seemed to agree on this point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "Id. at 1031-32. Similarly, in Kaiser Aetna , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court found that \"the Government's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond\" of a private party eliminated one \"strand\"—the right to exclude—in a way that effected a categorical taking. Id. at 179-80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "Id. at 167-69. Lastly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered whether appropriation of easements for public storm-drainage improvements and a pedestrian/bicycle pathway effected a per se 12 taking. Id. at 380.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "at 393 (quoting Kaiser Aetna , 444 U.S. at 176). Despite these examples, a number of the Court's opinions contain language to the effect that elimination of one \"strand\" is not a taking. That language appears to be attributable to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the Court remarked in dicta that \"the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not a taking.\" In Andrus , a law barring the commercial sale of eagle feathers was challenged as a taking. The Court rejected the claim, because the law merely restricted one way in which personal property could be disposed of, not because the law eliminated just one \"strand\" in the \"bundle of rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING",
		"context": "Id. ; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council , 535 U.S. at 327 (invoking Andrus for the proposition that \"the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not a taking\"); Keystone Bituminous Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. DAVIS AND JEFFERSON COUNTY ESTABLISH THAT A STATE CANNOT TREAT GROUPS OF STATE RETIREES MORE FAVORABLY THAN SIMILARLY SITUATED GROUPS OF FEDERAL RETIREES",
		"context": "26 -27 (quoting 527 U.S. at 436- 37). But that language was simply used to distinguish the Eleventh Circuit's holding and historical practices that prevented any form of state taxa-tion on the income of federal employees from the modern doc-trine that prohibits only \"discriminat[ory]\" taxation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] blanket exemptions, but exemptions favoring sub- classes of state employees or retires over federal em- ployees or retirees are impermissible. Second , while Davis did involve a blanket state ex- emption, nothing in that case indicates that it is lim- ited to such exemptions, and in fact, the language of the case plainly establishes the contrary. Jefferson County , on the other hand, did involve a much nar- rower tax and exemption and made clear that if such a narrow exe mption discriminated against a subclass of similarly situated federal employees, it would be invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The decision below correctly applied this Court's unconstitutional-conditions precedents",
		"context": "-29- requiring that all who voluntarily contract with the City — to provide City services to City residents with City funds—comply with contractual requirements defining the key terms of the relevant City program (namely, which City residents must be served). CSS does not allege a circuit split on this question, and the only court of appeals decision to address a similar question in an analo- gous context is fully consistent with the decision below. See Teen Ranch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Third Circuit's decision is correct and further review is unwarranted. As the court noted, the City does not seek to control or influence contractors' speech or operations beyond the confines of their implementation of the City's program.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 F.3d 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The decision below correctly applied this Court's unconstitutional-conditions precedents",
		"context": "So any \"speech here only occurs because CSS has chosen to partner with the government to help provide what is essentially a public service.\" Id. As a result, \"the condition pertains to the program receiving government money,\" id., and is therefore permissible under this Court's cases , see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . CSS objects that if it \"declines the contract, it will be completely excluded from Philadelphia's foster care -30- system.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The decision below correctly applied this Court's unconstitutional-conditions precedents",
		"context": "Moreover, it is always true that failure to comply with contract terms governing a public program can lead to exclusion from the program—and it has never been the case that religious entities, or entities with deeply held secular views, are constitutionally enti- tled to enter into government contracts and then defy any terms to which they object. If CSS's sweeping constitu- tional claims were accepted, they would cause mayhem in government contracting. In suggesting otherwise, CSS erroneously relies on Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where Missouri awarded grants to resurface playgrounds but refused to fund any church or religious organization. Id. at 2017.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "Section 1983 forbids local governments from subjecting any person to \"the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws\" of the United States. This Court has held that this language is to be broadly construed to protect the widest array of federal rights. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and it is settled that property rights \" are basic civil rights\" within the broad reach of the statute . 405 U.S. 538. Consequently, the Court has reviewed takings claims arising under Section 1983 on many occasions, without any concern that this is improper.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "This Court has held that this language is to be broadly construed to protect the widest array of federal rights. See 396 U.S. 229, and it is settled that property rights \" are basic civil rights\" within the broad reach of the statute . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, the Court has reviewed takings claims arising under Section 1983 on many occasions, without any concern that this is improper. See, e.g., Suitum , 520 U.S. at 728 (\"Suitum has brought an action for compensation under .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the agency' s determinations amounted to a regulatory taking of her property. \"); Lake Country Estates , 440 U.S. at 399-400; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 3 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 771 F.2d 707 . 11 Nevertheless, the Township hinges its hopes on the text of Section 1983 . Respondents ' Brief at 29- 31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the agency' s determinations amounted to a regulatory taking of her property. \"); Lake Country Estates , 440 U.S. at 399-400; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 480 U.S. 470.3 3 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 11 Nevertheless, the Township hinges its hopes on the text of Section 1983 . Respondents ' Brief at 29- 31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "771 F.2d 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "This right emanates directly from the Just Compensation Clause, and is therefore protected by Section 1983. Id. ; Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728; Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 399-400; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Williamson County 's conclusion that a takings claimant must show a constitutional \"violation\" rooted in the government's failure to compensate (and proven through state litigation) is accordingly wrong even in the Section 1983 context. Id.4 4 Even if the Township is correct that Section 1983 takings claims require a prior denial of compensation, the Court would 12 Moreover, the Township 's defense of Williamson County 's state compensation rule on Section 1983 grounds fails even if the statute does require a \"violation\" of the Just Compensation Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "703 F.2d 1141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "The agency taking property has the duty. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether an action challenged as a taking \"violates\" the Just Compensation Clause because it is uncompensated , should depend on the actions of the responsible \"entity .\" San Diego Gas & Elec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": ".'\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Jacobs , 290 U.S. at 16 (\"[s]tatutory recognit ion [is] not necessary\" for an inverse condemnation claim). Such direct actions are plainly available. id., and trigger federal court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "id., and trigger federal court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1331. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 718 F.2d 789. 13 Township contends is required for a Section 1983 takings claim is already apparent.5 Whether read as a general takings rule or a Section 1983 rule,6 Williamson County erred in concluding that a takings claim does not ripen until a property owner seeks and is denied compensation in state court, because this wrongly assumes that the owner must assert a failure to receive compensation to create a \"complete\" claim. In the inverse condemnation context , the elements of a takings claim are simply: (1) a protected property interest and (2) an injury to property occurring without condemnation proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "id., and trigger federal court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1331. See 287 U.S. 29; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Township contends is required for a Section 1983 takings claim is already apparent.5 Whether read as a general takings rule or a Section 1983 rule,6 Williamson County erred in concluding that a takings claim does not ripen until a property owner seeks and is denied compensation in state court, because this wrongly assumes that the owner must assert a failure to receive compensation to create a \"complete\" claim. In the inverse condemnation context , the elements of a takings claim are simply: (1) a protected property interest and (2) an injury to property occurring without condemnation proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "718 F.2d 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule",
		"context": "5 This reasoning supplies an alternate basis (to Ms. Knick's inverse condemnation arguments) for finding that Williamson County was wrongly decided as a general matter. 6 Notably, under the Township's position, Section 1983 takings claims would be improper even in state courts without prior state procedures —unless the Court created some kind of ad-hoc state court exception. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in general, the Township seeks to keep the Williamson County doctrine intact as a patchwork of ad-hoc and accidental rules that lack any consistent doctrinal thread and which create unpredictable and unjust outcomes in practice. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE \"RETURN TO THE FRAY\" DOCTRINE FURTHER SUPPORTS THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING",
		"context": ". to undertake risk -free litigation at others' expense.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As shown in the procedural history of this very case, distinguished justices from both state and federal courts have disagreed as to the proper application of the doctrine. As the United States' Brief indicates, that alone raises the question of whether contempt 11 proceedings are even appropriate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.3d 1018",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE \"RETURN TO THE FRAY\" DOCTRINE FURTHER SUPPORTS THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING",
		"context": "As shown in the procedural history of this very case, distinguished justices from both state and federal courts have disagreed as to the proper application of the doctrine. As the United States' Brief indicates, that alone raises the question of whether contempt 11 proceedings are even appropriate. California Artificial Stone Paving [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That point aside, the fact remains that an attorney would have little motivation to assert this doctrine in the future for fear of its ultimate rejection. While a debtor is certainly deservin g of a \"fresh start\" under the Bankruptcy Code, that purpose is not served by allow the debtor a free attack on its former creditors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "113 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. EPA's Consideration of Measures Beyond Those That Can Be Implemented \"To and At\" a Particular Source Does Not Implicate Any Major Question.",
		"context": "Through these provisions, Congress made clear that it was not reserving for itself the complex and technical question of how best to reduce emissions of a particular pollutant from a particular sector, but rather was \"entrust[ing] such complex balancing to EPA in the first instance, in combination with state regulators ,\" AEP, 564 U.S. at 427. This case thus does not resemble those in which a federal agency has acted outside of its assigned lane to make decisions of \" vast economic and political signifi- cance ,\" Alabama Ass'n of 141 S. Ct. 2485 , without any statutory basis to believe that Congress intended to delegate such decision - making authority to it. In each of these cases, this Court found that the agency had committed a category error in deeming itself to have authority to regulate in a particular area at all —such as the FDA's assertion of 40 jurisdiction over tobacco, a substance that it had never sought to regulate be fore, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; the Centers for Disease Control and Preven tion's attempt to directly regulate \"the landlord- tenant relationship,\" a domain outside its statutory authority to \"prevent [] the inter state spread of disease by identi - fying, isolating, and destroying the disease itself,\" Alabama Ass'n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2488 -89; or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's recent attempt to issue \"a general public health mea- sure\" rather than one tied more closely to the agency's express authority to regulate \"'occupational' hazards and the safety and health of ' employees ,'\" National Fed'n of Indep. 2022 WL 120952. In these cases, t he Court determined that the agencies had made an error of kind, not just degree, because they had strayed outside of the core regulatory functions that Congress had assigned to them .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. EPA's Consideration of Measures Beyond Those That Can Be Implemented \"To and At\" a Particular Source Does Not Implicate Any Major Question.",
		"context": "See2022 WL 120952, id. at 3 (noting that OSHA had acted outside its \"sphere of expertise\") ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The agencies were thus not just acting outside of their statutory authority, but doing so in ways that this Court found undermined the premise for delegating authority to them in the first instance. Here, by contrast, there is no dispute that Congress has made the choice of what EPA may regulate (CO 2 emissions), whom it may regulate ( existing power plants), and how it should do so ( partnering with the States to establish performance standards based on EPA's determination of the best system of emission reduction ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. EPA's Consideration of Measures Beyond Those That Can Be Implemented \"To and At\" a Particular Source Does Not Implicate Any Major Question.",
		"context": "44 Cf. Department of Tax'n & Fin. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some petitioners also argue that the Clean Power Plan's approach to emission reduction was flawed not solely because of the sheer magnitude of its potential impact, but also because it amounted to a form of energy regulation that is automatically beyond EPA's purview . (Westmoreland Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. EPA's Consideration of Measures Beyond Those That Can Be Implemented \"To and At\" a Particular Source Does Not Implicate Any Major Question.",
		"context": "See AEP, 564 U.S. at 426- 27; Train , 421 U.S. at 79- 80. North Dakota is mistaken in arguing (N.D. Br. 40- 47) that the court of appeals' decision is inconsistent with Alaska , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he statutory provision at issue in Alaska explicitly provided that it was up to the state permitting authority to determine the best available control technology (BACT) that is \"achievable \" on \"a case -by-case basis.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Recognized The Harm That Consumer Reporting Agencies Impose By Disseminating Inaccurate Information To Creditors, Not From Having A Line Of Inaccurate Information Merely Sitting In A Consumer File",
		"context": "§ 1681a (g). So while both a \"file\" and a \"report\" contain consumer information, what distinguishes a consumer report is the communication of that information to a third party. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (11th Cir . 2015 ) (\"A 'consumer repor t' requires communication to a third party, while a 'file' does not. \"); 507 F. App'x 543; but see generally 45 F.3d 1329 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "775 F.3d 1330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Recognized The Harm That Consumer Reporting Agencies Impose By Disseminating Inaccurate Information To Creditors, Not From Having A Line Of Inaccurate Information Merely Sitting In A Consumer File",
		"context": "See 775 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir . 2015 ) (\"A 'consumer repor t' requires communication to a third party, while a 'file' does not. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; but see generally 45 F.3d 1329 . 11 In other words, when a consumer reporting agency \"record[s] and \"retain[s]\" consumer information, the agency has simply c reated a consumer \"file.\" § 1681a (g).",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 F. App'x 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Recognized The Harm That Consumer Reporting Agencies Impose By Disseminating Inaccurate Information To Creditors, Not From Having A Line Of Inaccurate Information Merely Sitting In A Consumer File",
		"context": "See 775 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir . 2015 ) (\"A 'consumer repor t' requires communication to a third party, while a 'file' does not. \"); 507 F. App'x 543; but see generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 11 In other words, when a consumer reporting agency \"record[s] and \"retain[s]\" consumer information, the agency has simply c reated a consumer \"file.\" § 1681a (g).",
		"citation_value_orig": "45 F.3d 1329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Recognized The Harm That Consumer Reporting Agencies Impose By Disseminating Inaccurate Information To Creditors, Not From Having A Line Of Inaccurate Information Merely Sitting In A Consumer File",
		"context": "Only when the agency \"communicat[es]\" that information to a third party has the agency created a consumer \"report.\" Id. § 1681a(d)(1); see Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (noting \"the F CRA applies to companies that regularly disseminate information\"); accord Trans Union [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Or, as the FTC has explained, the \" information furnished to a final user\" is the consumer report under the FCRA, FTC 2004 Report at 10, w hile the information that an agency \"compile[s]\" is the consumer file, id. at 1; accord FTC, 40 Years Of Experience With The Fair Credit Reporting Act: An FTC Staff Report With Summary Of Interpretations (July 2011), 2011 WL 3020575 , at 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "81 F.3d 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Recognized The Harm That Consumer Reporting Agencies Impose By Disseminating Inaccurate Information To Creditors, Not From Having A Line Of Inaccurate Information Merely Sitting In A Consumer File",
		"context": "§ 1681e (b) (emphases added). The statute's repeated uses of \"report\" —rather than \"file\" —\"plainly\" shows that Congress was concerned with \"the dissemination of false information,\" rather 12 than the mere existence of inaccurate information sitting in a consumer file, because, by definition, only reports are disseminated to third parties. See Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (emphasis added); see generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rephrased, Congress required the use of reasonable procedures whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer \"report\"; the fact that Congress chose \"report\" instead of \"file\" demonstrates which intangible harms it crafted § 1681e (b) to prevent: the \"communication of [inaccurate] information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness.\" 15 U .S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": ". This Court has repeatedly instructed that when defining the prerequisites of a Section 1983 claim, courts are to \"look to 'common-law principles that were well settled' \" when Congre ss enacted Section 1983 in 1871. 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because Congress adopts statutes against the backdrop of common-law principles and \"likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.\" 460 U.S. 325. 7 5 Section 1983 codifies what was originally Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly instructed that when defining the prerequisites of a Section 1983 claim, courts are to \"look to 'common-law principles that were well settled' \" when Congre ss enacted Section 1983 in 1871. 5 139 S. Ct. 1715, because Congress adopts statutes against the backdrop of common-law principles and \"likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 5 Section 1983 codifies what was originally Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That is why 1871 is the reference point to identify prevalent common-law principles.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1983); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 See also 137 S. Ct. 911; 566 U.S. 356; 549 U.S. 384; 512 U.S. 477. 7 See also 509 U.S. 259; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; 341 U.S. 367.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1983); 436 U.S. 658. 6 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 566 U.S. 356; 549 U.S. 384; 512 U.S. 477. 7 See also 509 U.S. 259; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; 341 U.S. 367. 7 Examples are easy to find.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1983); 436 U.S. 658. 6 See also 137 S. Ct. 911; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 549 U.S. 384; 512 U.S. 477. 7 See also 509 U.S. 259; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; 341 U.S. 367. 7 Examples are easy to find.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1983); 436 U.S. 658. 6 See also 137 S. Ct. 911; 566 U.S. 356; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 512 U.S. 477. 7 See also 509 U.S. 259; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; 341 U.S. 367. 7 Examples are easy to find.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1983); 436 U.S. 658. 6 See also 137 S. Ct. 911; 566 U.S. 356; 549 U.S. 384; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 See also 509 U.S. 259; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; 341 U.S. 367. 7 Examples are easy to find.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "1983); 436 U.S. 658. 6 See also 137 S. Ct. 911; 566 U.S. 356; 549 U.S. 384; 512 U.S. 477. 7 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; 341 U.S. 367. 7 Examples are easy to find. For instance, in Heck v. Humphrey , the Court identified a common-law princi- ple that civil tort actions are not proper vehicles to challenge a criminal judgment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "1983); 436 U.S. 658. 6 See also 137 S. Ct. 911; 566 U.S. 356; 549 U.S. 384; 512 U.S. 477. 7 See also 509 U.S. 259; Imbler , 424 U.S. at 421; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Examples are easy to find. For instance, in Heck v. Humphrey , the Court identified a common-law princi- ple that civil tort actions are not proper vehicles to challenge a criminal judgment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "7 Examples are easy to find. For instance, in Heck v. Humphrey , the Court identified a common-law princi- ple that civil tort actions are not proper vehicles to challenge a criminal judgment. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying on this pri nciple, the Court decided that plaintiffs may not bring Section 1983 claims that would collaterally attack a st ill-valid conviction or sen- tence. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "See139 S. Ct. 2149. Likewise, in Wallace v. Kato , common-law principles helped determine when a wrongful-arrest claim accrued. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Nieves v. Bartlett , the Court drew upon common-law rules to conclude that probable cause should generally defeat a retaliatory-arrest claim. See 139 S. Ct. at 1726–1727.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "After all, there may be no analogous common-law tort for a certain cause of action under Section 1983. See id. And common-law rules should not be adopte d for Section 1983 claims if doing so would defeat the statute's purpose—which is \"to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally 8 See also University of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Carey , 435 U.S. at 258. But unless the stat- ute's effectiveness requires otherwise, common-law principles that were well se ttled in 1871 largely de- termine the prerequisites for claims under Section 1983. See Isbrandtsen 343 U.S. 779.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "And common-law rules should not be adopte d for Section 1983 claims if doing so would defeat the statute's purpose—which is \"to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally 8 See also University of 478 U.S. 788; see Carey , 435 U.S. at 258. But unless the stat- ute's effectiveness requires otherwise, common-law principles that were well se ttled in 1871 largely de- termine the prerequisites for claims under Section 1983. See Isbrandtsen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This method for identifying prerequisites to re- cover damages is by no means limited to Section 1983. Indeed, this Court has routinely looked to the common law when determining the scope of federally created causes of action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has routinely looked to the common law when determining the scope of federally created causes of action. For example, common-law principles have shaped the conditions for recovery under the Fed- eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Debt Collection Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Jones Act. See, e.g., Norfolk S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]512 U.S. 532227 U.S. 59. But see CSX Transp., 564 U.S. 685557 U.S. 404. And just re- cently in Tanzin v. Tanvir , this Court emphasized the importance of tying statutor y interpretation to his- torical principles, looking to the common law and re-141 S. Ct. 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has routinely looked to the common law when determining the scope of federally created causes of action. For example, common-law principles have shaped the conditions for recovery under the Fed- eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Debt Collection Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Jones Act. See, e.g., Norfolk S. 549 U.S. 158[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]227 U.S. 59. But see CSX Transp., 564 U.S. 685557 U.S. 404. And just re- cently in Tanzin v. Tanvir , this Court emphasized the importance of tying statutor y interpretation to his- torical principles, looking to the common law and re-141 S. Ct. 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has routinely looked to the common law when determining the scope of federally created causes of action. For example, common-law principles have shaped the conditions for recovery under the Fed- eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Debt Collection Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Jones Act. See, e.g., Norfolk S. 549 U.S. 158512 U.S. 532[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But see CSX Transp., 564 U.S. 685557 U.S. 404. And just re- cently in Tanzin v. Tanvir , this Court emphasized the importance of tying statutor y interpretation to his- torical principles, looking to the common law and re-141 S. Ct. 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "227 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "For example, common-law principles have shaped the conditions for recovery under the Fed- eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Debt Collection Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Jones Act. See, e.g., Norfolk S. 549 U.S. 158512 U.S. 532227 U.S. 59. But see CSX Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]557 U.S. 404. And just re- cently in Tanzin v. Tanvir , this Court emphasized the importance of tying statutor y interpretation to his- torical principles, looking to the common law and re-141 S. Ct. 486. The rule that courts should first turn to common- law principles when determining claims' prerequisites also reinforces two interpretive canons: (1) the canon that statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed, see Herd , 359 U.S. at 304–305, and (2) the canon that common-la w terms in a statute are to be interpreted with reference to their meanings at common law, see 530 U.S. 255; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320 (2012) (\"The age-old principle is that wo rds undefined in a statute are to be interpreted and applied according to their common-law meanings.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "For example, common-law principles have shaped the conditions for recovery under the Fed- eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Debt Collection Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Jones Act. See, e.g., Norfolk S. 549 U.S. 158512 U.S. 532227 U.S. 59. But see CSX Transp., 564 U.S. 685[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And just re- cently in Tanzin v. Tanvir , this Court emphasized the importance of tying statutor y interpretation to his- torical principles, looking to the common law and re-141 S. Ct. 486. The rule that courts should first turn to common- law principles when determining claims' prerequisites also reinforces two interpretive canons: (1) the canon that statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed, see Herd , 359 U.S. at 304–305, and (2) the canon that common-la w terms in a statute are to be interpreted with reference to their meanings at common law, see 530 U.S. 255; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320 (2012) (\"The age-old principle is that wo rds undefined in a statute are to be interpreted and applied according to their common-law meanings.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "But see CSX Transp., 564 U.S. 685557 U.S. 404. And just re- cently in Tanzin v. Tanvir , this Court emphasized the importance of tying statutor y interpretation to his- torical principles, looking to the common law and re-141 S. Ct. 486. The rule that courts should first turn to common- law principles when determining claims' prerequisites also reinforces two interpretive canons: (1) the canon that statutes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed, see Herd , 359 U.S. at 304–305, and (2) the canon that common-la w terms in a statute are to be interpreted with reference to their meanings at common law, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320 (2012) (\"The age-old principle is that wo rds undefined in a statute are to be interpreted and applied according to their common-law meanings.\"). All three rules reflect a long- standing presumption that statutes displace estab-lished common-law principles only when the statute's text or its efficacy requires. See generally Texas & Pac.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
		"context": "All three rules reflect a long- standing presumption that statutes displace estab-lished common-law principles only when the statute's text or its efficacy requires. See generally Texas & Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Thus, adherence to common-law principles is en- grained in this Court's precedents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rogers Test Strikes The Right Balance By Granting First Amendment Protection Only To Artistic Works, Not Ordinary Commercial Products.",
		"context": "Id. at 997.4 Consistent with Rogers , courts in the Second Circuit apply traditional trademark principles, not Rogers , when considering the use of a mark on commercial products (including products, like T-shirts, that contain expressive elements) and whether such use is infringing. See, e.g., A.V.E.L.A., 364 F. Supp. 3d 291; see also Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech , 27:2 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 188 (2004) (most trademark cases should be decided under trademark 4. Th e fact tha t artis ti c w o r ks—lik e films—are so l d in th e commerce does not change the analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 F. Supp. 2d 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Do Not Survive Any Level of Scrutiny",
		"context": "However, 22 the government's general interest in protect- ing the public from marks it deems \"off- putting,\" whether to protect the general pub- lic or the government itself, is not a substan-tial interest justifying broad suppression of speech. \"[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.\" Hustler Magazine, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 463 U.S. 60 Pet. App. 34a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Do Not Survive Any Level of Scrutiny",
		"context": "However, 22 the government's general interest in protect- ing the public from marks it deems \"off- putting,\" whether to protect the general pub- lic or the government itself, is not a substan-tial interest justifying broad suppression of speech. \"[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.\" Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Pet. App. 34a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Viability Rule Does Not Comport with Other Areas of the Law Addressing the Rights of Unborn Children",
		"context": "In considering whether to overrule a precedent, this Court considers whethe r the decision is an \"outlier\" among laws that address the same subject. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus , in considering whether to overrule the viability standard, this Court should consider whether other areas of the la w treat unborn children as people only when they become viable. Chief Justice Tom Parker of the Alabama Supreme Court has written extensively on this issue, and the information presented here come from his special writings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. PAGA actions serve the public interest, not the individual interests of aggrieved employees",
		"context": "999 F.3d 668. But that observation does not undercut the lynchpin finding in Kim, Iskanian , and other cases that the State is always the real party in interest in a PAGA representative action. See, Kim, 459 P.3d at 1127; Iskanian , 327 P.3d at 148; Canela , 971 F.3d at 849, n.1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Precedent unequivocally establishes that aggrieved employees and deputized proxies do not have (or own) an individual PAGA claim \"because every PAGA action … is a representative action on behalf of the state. Plaintiffs may bring a PAGA claim only as the state's designated proxy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 F.3d 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. PAGA actions serve the public interest, not the individual interests of aggrieved employees",
		"context": "Iskanian , 327 P.3d at 153. \"But under Article III, an injury in law is not an 13 injury in fact.\" TransUnion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike a traditional qui tam action under the federal False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 S.Ct. 2190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. PAGA actions serve the public interest, not the individual interests of aggrieved employees",
		"context": "seq., a PAGA proxy does not assert a claim for damages on the State's behalf for any proprietary injury that the State suffered. See , Vt. Agency of Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding that a relator in a qui tam action under the FCA had Article III standing under a partial assignment of damages theory flowing from the government's proprietary injury from fraud; but rejecting the relator's claim to standing stemming from the \"injury to its sovereignty arising from the violation of its laws\" and the bounty \"byproduct\" interest that a relator possesses in the suit's successful outcome). Instead, the PAGA representative prosecutes a claim for civil penalties for the sovereign injury that the government sustained arising from the employer's violations of the Labor Code. See,2022 WL 414692; Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 661; Magadia , 999 F.3d at 674- 75.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. PAGA actions serve the public interest, not the individual interests of aggrieved employees",
		"context": "Kim, 459 P.3d at 1130. \"By expanding the universe of those who might enforce the law, and the sanctions violators might be subject to, the Legislature sought to remediate present violations and deter future ones.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. True to its sovereign law enforcement purpose, PAGA's remedial scheme authorizes the imposition of civil penalties that are paid mostly to the State (the primary beneficiary of any PAGA claim), but not injunctive relief or individual damages to aggrieved employees. \"Civil penalties are an interest of the state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 P.3d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "1. Petitione r notes (Br. 33 -34) that in cases involving the Feres doctrine under the FTCA , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the government has argued that dual status technicians' work is \"military in nature and integral to the military mission.\" Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "But the treatment of dual status technicians for purposes of the Feres doctrine has no bearing on whether their technician work triggers the uniformed services exception, and the government's ar- guments regarding the Feres doctrine in cases involving technicians do not conflict with the government's argu-ments here. In Feres , this Court found that s overeign immunity bars members of the military from suing the govern- ment under the FTCA for injuries that \"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] ser- vice.\" 340 U.S. at 146; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court has explained that such claims cannot proceed \"because they are the 'type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would in- volve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the ex-pense of military discipline and effectiveness. ' \" John- son, 481 U.S. at 690 (quoting 473 U.S. 52 ) (emphasis omitted ; brackets in 44 original ); see 462 U.S. 296 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "340 U.S. at 146; see 481 U.S. 681 . The Court has explained that such claims cannot proceed \"because they are the 'type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would in- volve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the ex-pense of military discipline and effectiveness. ' \" John- son, 481 U.S. at 690 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ) (emphasis omitted ; brackets in 44 original ); see 462 U.S. 296 . Because of that and related considerations, \"[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright - line rules; each case must be examined in light of the [FTCA] as it has been construed in Feres and subse- quent cases .\" Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 -58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "340 U.S. at 146; see 481 U.S. 681 . The Court has explained that such claims cannot proceed \"because they are the 'type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would in- volve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the ex-pense of military discipline and effectiveness. ' \" John- son, 481 U.S. at 690 (quoting 473 U.S. 52 ) (emphasis omitted ; brackets in 44 original ); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because of that and related considerations, \"[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright - line rules; each case must be examined in light of the [FTCA] as it has been construed in Feres and subse- quent cases .\" Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 -58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "But as petitioner recognizes, see ibid. , that canon provides that \" interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's f avor ,\" and it therefore has no applica- tion in the abs ence of statutory ambiguity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]328 U.S. 275. Here, there is no ambiguity, so the canon never comes into play. 46 Even if there were any ambiguity here , however, the canon is inapplicable because the treatment of CSRS pension payments resulting from work performed in the civil service does not implicate the concerns that under- lie the canon's application.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "But as petitioner recognizes, see ibid. , that canon provides that \" interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's f avor ,\" and it therefore has no applica- tion in the abs ence of statutory ambiguity. 513 U.S. 115[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, there is no ambiguity, so the canon never comes into play. 46 Even if there were any ambiguity here , however, the canon is inapplicable because the treatment of CSRS pension payments resulting from work performed in the civil service does not implicate the concerns that under- lie the canon's application.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
		"context": "46 Even if there were any ambiguity here , however, the canon is inapplicable because the treatment of CSRS pension payments resulting from work performed in the civil service does not implicate the concerns that under- lie the canon's application. Th is Court has indicated that the canon reflects \"Congress[ 's] expressed special solicitude for the veterans ' cause .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But dual status tech- nicians like petitioner already receive such solicitude when they benefit from the application of the uniformed services exception to their DFAS military retirement payments for work performed in a military capacity . See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Territorial Home Rule Is Fully Compatible With The Appointments Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 547. Citing Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], p etitioners argue that the distinction be- tween local and federal law is meaningless because all territorial authority ultima tely traces back to federal sovereignty. Board Br. 43.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
		"context": "But agencies routinely revise regulations and other agency actions while litigation concerning those actions is ongoing, including with the purpose of remedying the deficiencies alleged in the litigation. See, e.g. , Little Sisters of the Poor , 140 S. Ct. at 2378; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Southern Utah Wilderness All 110 F.3d 724; Nat ural Res. Def. Council, 680 F.2d 810; see also 2022 WL 696459.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
		"context": "But agencies routinely revise regulations and other agency actions while litigation concerning those actions is ongoing, including with the purpose of remedying the deficiencies alleged in the litigation. See, e.g. , Little Sisters of the Poor , 140 S. Ct. at 2378; 340 U.S. 36; Southern Utah Wilderness All [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nat ural Res. Def. Council, 680 F.2d 810; see also 2022 WL 696459.",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 F.3d 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
		"context": ", Little Sisters of the Poor , 140 S. Ct. at 2378; 340 U.S. 36; Southern Utah Wilderness All 110 F.3d 724; Nat ural Res. Def. Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 2022 WL 696459. This Court has never suggested that those 48 agency actions are ultra vires for lack of jurisdiction, and such a rule would have no foundation in the APA. The court of appeals' newly fashioned rule would work both inefficiency and injustice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F.2d 810",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Elections officials cannot predict the potential impact of adopting —or even leaving in place —elections standards, practices, or procedures with the decision's required degree of specificity",
		"context": "§ 10301. But Congress did not intend § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to require Maricopa County decisionmakers to control for an otherwise de minimis and largely unpredictable difference in outcome. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That degree of control is precisely what the Ninth Circuit's decision demands. In doing so, it ignores on-the-ground challenges facing elections officials when setting standards, practices, and procedures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Elections officials cannot predict the potential impact of adopting —or even leaving in place —elections standards, practices, or procedures with the decision's required degree of specificity",
		"context": "In doing so, it ignores on-the-ground challenges facing elections officials when setting standards, practices, and procedures. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] elections officers, have access to imperfect information about racial and ethnic demographics and voter behavior patterns. For starters, Arizona does not track voters and their voting behavior by race and ethnicity. Instead, when allocating polling locations for elections, Maricopa County elections officials consider the available demography of zip codes (and in some areas of the County, neighborhoods) and the general voting patterns at polling locations from past elections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Elections officials cannot predict the potential impact of adopting —or even leaving in place —elections standards, practices, or procedures with the decision's required degree of specificity",
		"context": "Considering the totality of a state's voting laws when determining whether a particular subpart imposes a burden on voting rights presents a familiar analysis. E.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But here, for example, by excluding mail-in voting from its \"baseline,\" the Ninth Circuit's analysis impermissibly left out the largest process in Arizona's voting system. See Hobbs , 948 F.3d at 1015.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States have ample measures to ensure their laws are appropriately defended, including on appeal",
		"context": ". and not simply a tryout on the road to appellate review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Attorney General then consid- ered the traditional \"variety of factors,\" Mendoza , 464 U.S. at 161, and \"determined that continued litigation would not be in the best interest of the Commonwealth or its citizens and that an a ppeal to the United States Supreme Court is thus unwarranted.\" First Stay Op-position at 1. It is no answer to say (as the House repeatedly does) that Virginia's Attorn ey General is an elected of- ficial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2058",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States have ample measures to ensure their laws are appropriately defended, including on appeal",
		"context": "More modest solutions are available as well. For example, a State could require its Attorney General to enforce a statute and take all proper appeals, while permitting others to participate as amicus curiae to de- fend it when the Attorney General decides not to do so. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But regardless of where a particu lar State chooses to land on the spectrum between discretion and valor in de- fending the constitutionality of state laws to the last possible breath, there are ample ways for it to imple-ment that choice. The drawing of fair legislat ive districts is critically important to our democracy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Origins of the Right to Control Doctrine",
		"context": "It originated at a time when courts regularly held that immoral and unethical political and business practices are forms of criminal fraud. Not surprisingly, therefore, the right to control doctrine developed in tandem with the honest services fraud do ctrine and especially with the prong of honest services that condemned people for having undisclosed, selfish financial interests in mind when they interacted with th eir employers or others to whom they might owe some duty. Probably the first time a court discussed the idea that incomplete disclosure in business discussions could constitute fraud came in the Second Circuit's de- cision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rowe noted, in dicta, that a man is \"cheated\" even though \"he gets a quid pro quo of equal value\" be- cause \"he has lost his chance to bargain with the facts before him.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.2d 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Taglieri Endorses A New Standard That His Own Foreign Authorities Do Not Apply To Infants",
		"context": "Trav- elers Cas. & Sur. Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Taglieri has never previously advocated this all-relevant-cir- cumstances standard. In fact, his brief in opposition agreed that an infant's habitual residence \"turns on 'shared parental intent'\" and presented as a counter- question whether \"the 'shared intent' test requires proof of a subjective agreement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Taglieri Endorses A New Standard That His Own Foreign Authorities Do Not Apply To Infants",
		"context": "i, 1. Ta- glieri's \"belatedly assert[ed ]\" new standard is there- fore \"forfeited.\" Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, Taglieri and the United States pro- vide no basis for this Court to reject the shared-paren-tal-intent standard for infants because the foreign au- thorities on which they rely do not actually apply the all-relevant-circumstances standard to infants. Ra- ther, those foreign jurisdictions uniformly apply a dif- ferent habitual-residence standard when a child is too young to acclimate to her surroundings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Taglieri Endorses A New Standard That His Own Foreign Authorities Do Not Apply To Infants",
		"context": "(children aged 4 and 6); In re LC, [2014] UKSC 1, ¶ 3 (UK) (ch ildren aged 5 to 13). As the United States recognizes, the courts of ap- peals already take \"the correct approach\" with respect to such children, U.S. Br. 26, by considering \"all rele- 5 vant indicators\" of the child's habitual residence, Red- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also , e.g., 391 F.3d 540. U.S. courts and Taglieri's foreign authorities ap- ply an entirely different standard, however, when as- sessing the habitual residence of children too young to acclimate to their surroundings. As the Court of Jus- tice of the European Union has emphasized, \"[t]he fac-tors to be taken into account in the case of\" older chil- dren simply are \"not the same as those relevant to an infant.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Taglieri Endorses A New Standard That His Own Foreign Authorities Do Not Apply To Infants",
		"context": "(children aged 4 and 6); In re LC, [2014] UKSC 1, ¶ 3 (UK) (ch ildren aged 5 to 13). As the United States recognizes, the courts of ap- peals already take \"the correct approach\" with respect to such children, U.S. Br. 26, by considering \"all rele- 5 vant indicators\" of the child's habitual residence, Red- 724 F.3d 729; see also , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. U.S. courts and Taglieri's foreign authorities ap- ply an entirely different standard, however, when as- sessing the habitual residence of children too young to acclimate to their surroundings. As the Court of Jus- tice of the European Union has emphasized, \"[t]he fac-tors to be taken into account in the case of\" older chil- dren simply are \"not the same as those relevant to an infant.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 F.3d 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Taglieri Endorses A New Standard That His Own Foreign Authorities Do Not Apply To Infants",
		"context": "in Opp. 30; see, e.g., Whiting , 391 F.3d at 550 (\"[A]cclimatization is not nearly as important as the settled purpose and shared intent of the [very young] child's parents in choosing a particular habitual residence. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like U.S. courts, the foreign jurisdictions identi- fied by Taglieri and the United States also use a proxy for an infant's habitual residence. But rather than fo-cus on parental intent, these courts assume that \"[a]n infant necessarily shares the social and family envi- ronment\" of her caregiver(s).",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. POLICE OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO CONDUCT BRIEF, INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS UNDER A CLEARLY DEFINED REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD",
		"context": ". This Court has analogized the \"usual\" traffic stop to a so-called \" Terry stop.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is undisputed that an officer who lacks probable cause but whose \"observations lead him reasonably to suspect\" that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime may nevertheless briefly detain that person in order to \"investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. POLICE OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO CONDUCT BRIEF, INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS UNDER A CLEARLY DEFINED REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD",
		"context": "It is undisputed that an officer who lacks probable cause but whose \"observations lead him reasonably to suspect\" that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime may nevertheless briefly detain that person in order to \"investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As this Court announced in Terry , where an officer can point to spec ific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, the officer is justified in conducting a brief, inves-tigatory traffic stop. See 392 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. POLICE OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO CONDUCT BRIEF, INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS UNDER A CLEARLY DEFINED REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD",
		"context": "(citing 422 U.S. 873). As this Court announced in Terry , where an officer can point to spec ific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, the officer is justified in conducting a brief, inves-tigatory traffic stop. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, the Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer who lacks probable cause to make an arrest \"to simply shrug his shoulders and al-low a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.\" 407 U.S. 143.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. POLICE OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO CONDUCT BRIEF, INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS UNDER A CLEARLY DEFINED REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD",
		"context": "See 392 U.S. 1. In other words, the Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer who lacks probable cause to make an arrest \"to simply shrug his shoulders and al-low a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, it would be considered poor policing for an officer not to conduct a brief, investigatory stop simply because the driver \"might not\" be the unlicensed, uninsured owner or the owner subject to an outstanding arrest warrant. But that is precisely what the Kansas Supreme Court de- cision would have officers do if they could not somehow independently verify or produce \"more evidence\" that the driver was also the owner of the vehicle in ques- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress Patterned Section 633a(a) On Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision",
		"context": "\"Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Mississippi ex rel. 571 U.S. 161. And when statutory language \"is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress Patterned Section 633a(a) On Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision",
		"context": "\"Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law.\" 569 U.S. 383; see also Mississippi ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And when statutory language \"is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.\" 570 U.S. 729 \"directly after\" Title VII's federal-sector provision, which it had enacted only two years earlier.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress Patterned Section 633a(a) On Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision",
		"context": "571 U.S. 161. And when statutory language \"is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"directly after\" Title VII's federal-sector provision, which it had enacted only two years earlier. 453 U.S. 156; see also 118 Cong. Rec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress Patterned Section 633a(a) On Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision",
		"context": "And when statutory language \"is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.\" 570 U.S. 729 \"directly after\" Title VII's federal-sector provision, which it had enacted only two years earlier. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 118 Cong. Rec. 24,397 (1972) (comments of Senator Bentsen that \"[t]he measures used to protect Federal employees [from age discrimination] would be substantially similar to those incorporated\" in the federal-sector amendments to Title VII).",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress Patterned Section 633a(a) On Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision",
		"context": "30 That identical language carries the same meaning in both provisions. After all, \"when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Government itself concedes that the provisions are \"materially identical\" and that there is \"no apparent reason why the Court should interpret [them] differently.\" Gov't Cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. VACATUR IS NOT WARRANTED",
		"context": "Circuit's decision to ensure that the ruling does not \"spawn[] any legal consequences.\" Pet. 23 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Even if this rationale constituted sufficient grounds for the Court to grant discretionary review and vacate (and the government agrees it does not, see supra Section I), the supposed \"legal consequences\" are wholly illusory. No purpose would be served by the relief the government seeks.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. VACATUR IS NOT WARRANTED",
		"context": "Even rulings on preliminary injunctive relief are not con trolling with respect to subsequent final determinations on the merits . See Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 499 F.2d 514 . The government will be free to seek both appellate court review and this Court's review when the case reaches final judgment on the merits —which is yet another reason for denying the petition . See Mount Soledad Mem'l 567 U.S. 944.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. VACATUR IS NOT WARRANTED",
		"context": "Even rulings on preliminary injunctive relief are not con trolling with respect to subsequent final determinations on the merits . See Univ. of 451 U.S. 390 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government will be free to seek both appellate court review and this Court's review when the case reaches final judgment on the merits —which is yet another reason for denying the petition . See Mount Soledad Mem'l 567 U.S. 944.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 F.2d 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. VACATUR IS NOT WARRANTED",
		"context": "of 451 U.S. 390 ; 499 F.2d 514 . The government will be free to seek both appellate court review and this Court's review when the case reaches final judgment on the merits —which is yet another reason for denying the petition . See Mount Soledad Mem'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At bottom, the government appears to be asking the Court for a do -over in light of its failure to seek immediate review of the court of appeals' decision. But that is a problem of its own making , and it fails to identify any reason this Court's resources should be expended revi ewing the denial of an emer gency stay pending appeal .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 944",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. VACATUR IS NOT WARRANTED",
		"context": "340 U.S. at 41. This Court sho uld therefore decline to vacate the decision below. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 13 For instance, when the district court issued the initial TRO on October 18 at 3:17 p.m., the government filed a notice of appeal, a motion for a stay pending appeal, and an administrative stay by 8:20 p.m. the same day. After the en banc court of appeals issued its October 24 order at 1:49 p.m., respondent's counsel filed a motion for an amended TRO at 3:04 p.m. 23",
		"citation_value_orig": "113 F.3d 219",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Ch icago, B. & Q.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Brandeis wrote in 1918, \"[a]n essential element of individual private property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.\" Int'l News 248 U.S. 215.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "166 U.S. 226. Justice Brandeis wrote in 1918, \"[a]n essential element of individual private property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.\" Int'l News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference , it is practically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the 5 right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 U.S. 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference , it is practically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the 5 right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; 505 U.S. 1003; 483 U.S. 825. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is funda- mental to the right of private property and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. 458 U.S. 419; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference , it is practically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the 5 right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser 444 U.S. 164; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 483 U.S. 825. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is funda- mental to the right of private property and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. 458 U.S. 419; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference , it is practically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the 5 right to exclude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser 444 U.S. 164; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; 505 U.S. 1003; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is funda- mental to the right of private property and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. 458 U.S. 419; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Kaiser 444 U.S. 164; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; 505 U.S. 1003; 483 U.S. 825. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is funda- mental to the right of private property and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832. Exploration of this Court's treatment of the right to exclude over the last forty years begins with Kaiser Aetna v. U.S . Petitioner converted at its expense a private pond into a marina with access to the bay, intended for use by fee -paying members of the com- munity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "6 Next, this Co urt heard PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins , a case in which the right to exclude clashed with the free speech guarantees of the U.S. and California Constitutions . The public was not only invited, but expected to shop or socialize at one of the sixty -five shops, ten restaurants, or the movie theater at the PruneYard Sh opping Center. Prune- Yard Shopping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . These facts were determinative in this nar- row ruling as this Court considered whether the shopping center's policy banning expressive activity unrelated to commerce was permissible under the U.S. and California Constitutions. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "\"If…the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, the natural tendency of human nature would be to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.\" Id . at 1014 ( citing Pennsylva- nia Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Florence Dolan's right to exclude the public from an easement across her private property was the dis-pute at the center of Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.S. at 379-380.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Chicago, B. & Q.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Brandeis wrote in 1918, \"[a] n essential element of in- dividual private property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.\" Int'l News 248 U.S. 215.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "166 U.S. 226. Justice Brandeis wrote in 1918, \"[a] n essential element of in- dividual private property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.\" Int'l News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference, it is prac- tically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the right to ex- clude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are co mmonly characterized as property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 U.S. 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference, it is prac- tically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the right to ex- clude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are co mmonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; 505 U.S. 1003; Nol- 483 U.S. 825. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is fundamental to the right of private prop-erty and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. 458 U.S. 419; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference, it is prac- tically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the right to ex- clude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are co mmonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser 444 U.S. 164; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nol- 483 U.S. 825. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is fundamental to the right of private prop-erty and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. 458 U.S. 419; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Today, the right to exclude is front and center in landmark Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Along with a William Blackstone reference, it is prac- tically a requirement for a law review article, brief, or court decision on the topic to refer to the right to ex- clude others as \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are co mmonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser 444 U.S. 164; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; 505 U.S. 1003; Nol- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is fundamental to the right of private prop-erty and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. 458 U.S. 419; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Kaiser 444 U.S. 164; Dolan , 512 U.S. at 384; 505 U.S. 1003; Nol- 483 U.S. 825. This Court has consistently held that the right to exclude is fundamental to the right of private prop-erty and that physical invasion, whether permanent or temporary, is a violation of that right. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 832. Exploration of this Court's treatment of the right to exclude over the last forty years begins with Kaiser Aetna v. U.S . Petitioner converted at its expense a pri- vate pond into a marina with access to the bay, intended for use by fee-paying members of the community.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Next, this Court heard PruneYard Shopping Cen- ter v. Robbins , a case in which the right to exclude clashed with the free speech guarantees of the U.S. and California Constitutions. The public was not only in- vited, but expected to shop or socialize at one of the sixty-five shops, ten restaurants, or the movie theater at the PruneYard Shopping Center. PruneYard Shop- ping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These facts were determinative in this narrow ruling as this Court considered whether the shopping center's policy banning expressive activity unrelated to commerce was permissible under the U.S. and California Consti- tutions. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "the uses of private property were subject to un- bridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, the natural tendency of human nature would be to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.\" Id. at 1014 ( citing Penn- sylvania Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Florence Dolan's right to exclude the public from an easement across her private property was the dis-pute at the center of Dolan v. City of Tigard. 512 U.S. at 379–380.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "It takes a statutory regime that explicitly directs that almost no arriving aliens shall be released in the United States pending removal proceedings, and transforms it into a regime where almost all arriving aliens are released into the United States pending removal proceedings. That is a \"powerful indication\" 24 that the Government \"has made a mess of this statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] under the circumstances, the discretionary obligation is the only method of fulfilling the obligation; then the discretionary option becomes obligatory. The Government responds by stoutly insisting that \"may\" means \"may\" in § 1225(b)(2)(C), and thus it can \"never\" be ordered to employ its contiguous-territory- return authority. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "16, the Government then pivots to contend that \"shall\" also means \"may\" in (b)(2)(A). Pet. 20-21 (citing Town of Castle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But in 138 S. Ct. 830, this Court rejected the same interpretation of the same phrase \"shall be detained\" in the same statutory provision. Jennings repeatedly held that the phrase \"shall be detained\" in 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "Pet. 20-21 (citing Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748). But in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court rejected the same interpretation of the same phrase \"shall be detained\" in the same statutory provision. Jennings repeatedly held that the phrase \"shall be detained\" in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), like the same phrase in (b)(1)(B)(ii), requires mandatory detention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "\"Unlike the word 'may,' which implies discretion, the word 'shall' usually connotes a requirement.\" Id. (quoting Kingdomware Technologies, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"[Section] 1225(b)(2) requires detention for a removal proceeding.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "Jennings squarely forecloses the Government's argument to the contrary. Sanchez-Avila , on which the Government relies, reached the same conclusion. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sanchez-Avila held that, in § 1225, \"Congress contemplated that aliens seeking admission to the United States, who did not appear to be clearly admissible, in the ordinary course would be detained in custody for further proceedings,\" and that \"[t]he language of section 235(b) [ i.e., § 1225(b)] stating that an alien 'shall be detained for further inquiry' … clearly indicates such an intent.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 I. & N. Dec. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "21. It supports this ipse dixit only with a \"cf.\" citation of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which provides only a generalized statement that \"immigration officials\" exercise \"broad discretion.\" Id. Contrary to the Government, the question where someone should remain while enforcement proceedings are ongoing is not a question of \"enforcement discretion,\" because it presumes that \"enforcement\" is already occurring.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "In any event, the Government's historical argument relies on ambiguous clues from other legislation to infer what Congress was really concerned with doing in IIRIRA, divorced from IIRIRA's s unambiguous text. But \"it is ultimately the provisions of our laws ra ther than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such oblique inferences cannot defeat the \"unequivocal[]\" meaning of § 1225(b)(2). Jennings , 138 S. Ct. at 844.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "App.13a-14a. \"By enacting [IIRIRA], Congress 'specifically narrowed the executive's discretion' to grant parole due to 'concern that parole … was being used by the executive to circumvent congressionally established immigration policy.'\" App.201a n.13 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In a footnote, the Government also contends that the class-wide release of a rriving aliens is a valid exercise of its release authority under § 1226(a). Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "The Government argues that \"[t]he Executive Branch's consistent constructions of the INA's parole provisions are entitled to ju dicial deference.\" Pet. 22 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But Aguirre-Aguirre merely held that INS was entitled to Chevron deference, see id. , and the Fifth Circuit correctly held that \"[t]he Government … forfeited the Chevron issue by failing to mention it in its brief.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": ", and the Fifth Circuit correctly held that \"[t]he Government … forfeited the Chevron issue by failing to mention it in its brief.\" App.43a; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, the Government's position contradicts the plain language of the statute, so no amount of deference under any doctrine could save it. And if the Court were to entertain whether deference could save the Government's interpretation, it should add a Question Presented as to whether any applicable deference doctrine should be overruled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate",
		"context": "Pet.23-24. But the Executive's longst anding disregard for the law provides an additional compelling reason to enforce that law, not to allow the Executive to keep disregarding it \"by a sort of intellectual adverse possession.\" Tyler Pipe Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). MPP was the first attempt by the Executive to take its detention obligations under § 1225 seriously. It was explicitly adopted for the purpose of reducing the illegal release of thousands of arriving aliens into the country.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rejection Is Not An Avoidance Power And Cannot Give The Bankruptcy Estate Any Greater Rights To An Asset Than The Debtor Had Outside Bankruptcy",
		"context": "If a non- debtor has a lien on the debtor's property outside bank-ruptcy, the property comes into the estate subject to the lien. That property thus cannot be distributed to unsecured creditors until the lien is fully satisfied. §§506(a), 725, 1129(b)(2)(A); Associates Commercial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the lienholder is entitled to \"adequate protection\" of its lien to ensure that its interest in the debtor's property is not diminished through the bankruptcy process. §§361, 362(d), 363(e), 364(d).",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 953",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rejection Is Not An Avoidance Power And Cannot Give The Bankruptcy Estate Any Greater Rights To An Asset Than The Debtor Had Outside Bankruptcy",
		"context": "24 As this Court established long ago, however, the principle is not limited to lie ns. Rather, the estate's rights in the debtor's property are limited by any inter- ests other parties have in the property that are valid outside bankruptcy, regardless of the form those inter-ests may take. Board of Trade of City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because the estate does not acquire a non-debtor's interest in the debtor's property, that interest is not part of the value that can be distributed to other creditors in bankruptcy. Chicago Board of Trade set out the relationship be- tween bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law in deter-mining what constitutes property of the estate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rejection Is Not An Avoidance Power And Cannot Give The Bankruptcy Estate Any Greater Rights To An Asset Than The Debtor Had Outside Bankruptcy",
		"context": "Since the debtor could transfer the seat under certain circumstances, it was \"property\" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 10-11, 13; see also, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court also held, however, that the seat came into the estate subject to the restrictions on transfer that existed under the Board's rules. Because, outside bankruptcy, the debtor could not have sold the seat 25 without first paying his debts to other Board members in full, the trustee in bankruptcy could not do so either.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 F.3d 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rejection Is Not An Avoidance Power And Cannot Give The Bankruptcy Estate Any Greater Rights To An Asset Than The Debtor Had Outside Bankruptcy",
		"context": "We explain below, see infra Part III.A, why §365(h) and similar provisions like §365(n) are best read as expressions of the general principle that reject ion does not expand the estate's rights in property, rather than exceptions to a rule that rejection does expand such rights. 29 bankruptcy); Leasing Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As discussed further below, see infra Part II, intel- lectual property licenses work the same way; they are contracts that convey an interest in the debtor's prop-erty to the counterparty before bankruptcy. Andrew 916.",
		"citation_value_orig": "826 F.2d 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Economic Reason Why Congress Would Have Wanted The Myriad Other Provisions In The ACA To Be Invalidated",
		"context": ". The Fifth Circuit also suggested that Congress may have wanted the rest of the ACA to fall if the mandate was invalidated. Even putting to one side this Court's presumption of severability as a legal matter, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the ACA is textbook example of an enactment that serves myriad other policy goals beyond those contained in the provision at issue here. Those hundreds of other provisions can, and do, function independent of the individual mandate. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. 678.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Economic Reason Why Congress Would Have Wanted The Myriad Other Provisions In The ACA To Be Invalidated",
		"context": "Even putting to one side this Court's presumption of severability as a legal matter, 138 S. Ct. 1461, the ACA is textbook example of an enactment that serves myriad other policy goals beyond those contained in the provision at issue here. Those hundreds of other provisions can, and do, function independent of the individual mandate. See Alaska Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The notion that Congress would have wanted to eliminate these provisions in a world in which a $0 penalty mandate was invalidated is nonsensical. In addition to the severability of the marketplaces, the marketplace subsidies, and the insurance market reforms (discussed in supra section IIA), a handful of examples further demonstrate the independence of various ACA provisions from the individual mandate: • The entire Indian Health Service (IHS) was reauthorized by the ACA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Modern Research Shows an \"Appearance of Corruption\" Does Not Threaten Confidence in Representative Government",
		"context": "An \"appearance of corruption\" analysis looks for a \"trust deficit,\" that is, to see if perceptions of the public at large threaten \"confidence in the system of representative Government.\" Buckley , 424 U.S. at 27; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"trust deficit\" must be real, not just \"mere conjecture.\" McCutcheon , 572 U.S. at 210 (\"We 'have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U. S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Modern Research Shows an \"Appearance of Corruption\" Does Not Threaten Confidence in Representative Government",
		"context": "Republican Party of N.M. v. Balderas , No. 11-cv-900- WJ-KBM (D. N.M., Nov. 30, 2021), at 1. Other scholars, \"reinforcing the compelling findings in Primo and Milyo, even with the heightened awareness of campaign finance issues created in the wake of\" Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], ask the same question: \"What happens when the Supreme Court is wrong, when the foundation of decades of - 8 - jurisprudence is simply not true?\" Daron R. Shaw, Brian E. Roberts, and Mijeong Baek, T HE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION : TESTING THE SUPREME COURT 'S ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM , Oxford University Press, 2021 (\"APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION \"), 1. Both new books contend that the conventional wisdom is wrong, undercutting the rationale of a strong governmental interest in combatting the appearance of corruption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The President's constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws requires adequate authority to remove subordinate officers",
		"context": "§ 3, Article II of the Consti tution \"confers on the President 'the general administrative control of those executing the laws.' \" Free Ent er. Fund , 561 U.S. at 492 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The F ramers understood the close connection between the Presi- dent's ability to discharge his responsibilities as head of the Executive Branch and his control over its personnel. As James Madison explained, \"if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and contr olling those who execute the laws.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The President's constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws requires adequate authority to remove subordinate officers",
		"context": "Fund, 561 U.S. at 492. The power to remove, being \" incident to the power of ap- pointment,\" rests with the appointing authority absent an express statement to the contrary. Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[B]ecause that traditional executive power was not 'expressly taken away ' \" by the Constitution, \" 'it remained with the Pres- ident' \" in the first instance. Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The President's constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws requires adequate authority to remove subordinate officers",
		"context": "Ibid. As this Court has explained, \"[o]nce an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as the President's \"selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by hi m, so must be his power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.\" Myers , 272 U.S. at 117.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The President's constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws requires adequate authority to remove subordinate officers",
		"context": "As to inferior officers, this Court has twice upheld res trictions on removal authority. But neither decision provides justification for undercutting the fundamental constitutional requirement that the Executive have adequate means to supervise and in-struct officers in the performance of their duties. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that the Secretary of the Navy could be required by statute, before removing a nav al cadet - engineer during peacetime, to make a misconduct find- ing or convene a court -martial. Id. at 485.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Neither Compels nor Permits Discrimination Against Religious Exercise by Public Employees",
		"context": ". This Court has already rejected the idea that the Establishment Clause created a \"compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state\" that justified content and viewpoint -based regulation of speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1995 ). Far from au- thorizing (or compelling) content or viewpoint -based regulation of religious speech, our nation's history and practice shows that religious activity was meant to be fostered and protected. Since the founding of this na- tion, Congress has confirm ed that \"[r]eligion, moral- ity, and knowledge \" are necessary for good govern- ment rather than antithetical to it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Eliminating Tenure Protections for APJs Defies Congressional Intent",
		"context": "The sheer multitude of remedial options is another reason to reject the court of appeals' remedy. This Court is especially reluctant to sever a provision when there are many ways to proceed and the Court would have to speculate to predict what Congress would prefer. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Bowsher , 478 U.S. at 734-736 (declining to \"weigh[] the importance Congress attached to the removal provisions against the importance it placed on [other provisions]\"); Free Enter. Fund , 561 U.S. at 509-510 (refusing to \"blue-pencil a sufficient number of the Board's responsibilities\" because \"such editorial free- dom belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Eliminating Tenure Protections for APJs Defies Congressional Intent",
		"context": "26a- 27a. That freeform adjustment of statutory language invites even more judicial policymaking. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With so many alternatives, Congress, not the Court, should decide. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Eliminating Tenure Protections for APJs Defies Congressional Intent",
		"context": "Given the range of policy choices better left to Con- gress, the Court should hold the current inter partes review regime unconstitutional, dismiss this inter partes review, and defer to Congress to fix the problem, as it has in the past. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That approach would clear the decks for Con-gress to act rather than distorting legislative debate by imposing this Court's preferred solution as a default. It would also leave parties free to challenge patents through declaratory actions or other avenues in the in- terim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Eliminating Tenure Protections for APJs Defies Congressional Intent",
		"context": "That approach would clear the decks for Con-gress to act rather than distorting legislative debate by imposing this Court's preferred solution as a default. It would also leave parties free to challenge patents through declaratory actions or other avenues in the in- terim. See Medtronic, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alternatively, the Court could simply grant Arthrex the relief it seeks by ordering dismissal of this inter 60 partes review, while leaving any broader questions to Congress. See Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2224 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "In early CSA cases, courts did interpret \"usual course of professional practice\" in §841 as carrying the same meaning as \"legitimate 11 medical purpose\" in 21 C.F.R. §1306.04(a). See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.1975); 584 F.2d 773 (6th Cir.1978). However, those cases assumed the gov-ernment must prove that a doctor did not believe the prescription served a legit imate medical purpose. Rosenberg at 197; 550 F.3d 382.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 F.2d 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "In early CSA cases, courts did interpret \"usual course of professional practice\" in §841 as carrying the same meaning as \"legitimate 11 medical purpose\" in 21 C.F.R. §1306.04(a). See, e.g., 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.1975); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (6th Cir.1978). However, those cases assumed the gov-ernment must prove that a doctor did not believe the prescription served a legit imate medical purpose. Rosenberg at 197; 550 F.3d 382.",
		"citation_value_orig": "584 F.2d 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "See, e.g., 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.1975); 584 F.2d 773 (6th Cir.1978). However, those cases assumed the gov-ernment must prove that a doctor did not believe the prescription served a legit imate medical purpose. Rosenberg at 197; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, Respond- ent repeatedly advocates a standard defined exclu- sively by the \"objective re asonableness\" of a doctor's effort to familiarize hims elf with the standard of care. Respondent argues that the \"knowingly\" mens rea generally required as to other elements under §841 is not required here because the words \"except as author-ized by this subchapter\" precede the words \"knowingly or intentionally.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F.3d 382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "Respondent argues that the \"knowingly\" mens rea generally required as to other elements under §841 is not required here because the words \"except as author-ized by this subchapter\" precede the words \"knowingly or intentionally.\" Resp.Br.24, 34. Respondent relies on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Yermian involved the question of whether 18 U.S.C. §1001 re- quired proof that a defend ant knew her false state- ment was within a federal agency's jurisdiction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "578 U.S. 452. Respondent's reliance on Yermian ignores this Court's long-held presumption in favor of scienter on any element that describes the sub- stantive \"evil Congress seeks to prevent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court imposes a presumption of scienter \"even where 'the most grammatical reading of the statute' does not sup- port one.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 2191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "The Court imposes a presumption of scienter \"even where 'the most grammatical reading of the statute' does not sup- port one.\" Id. at 2197; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent concedes that at least some mens rea is required. Resp.Br.19 (\"A physician who believes in 'good faith' that his activities fall within that standard lacks the requisite mens rea.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "Moore does not stand for the proposition that a defendant may be convicted for misapprehending practices \"generally recognized in the United States\" without reference to subjective intent. Moore testified that he knew his practices were outside the scope of what he recognized as the \"partic- ularly clear\" \"limits of approved treatment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does Moore indicate that deviation from what most doctors do is sufficient for conviction. The Court did not hold that experimentation with new theories is criminal because it deviates from practices of most doc- tors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "Moore did not turn on an objective analysis of his efforts at ascertaining prevailing practices. Similarly, Harrison Act caselaw does not support a purely objective standard. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court upheld the sufficiency of an indictment where the defendant distributed narcotics to an addict \"known by the de- fendant to be so addicted.\" Id. Behrman suggested that 14 treating an addict with narcotics was, definitionally, not legitimate medical practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "Id. Behrman suggested that 14 treating an addict with narcotics was, definitionally, not legitimate medical practice. However, Behrman was modified in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 271 U.S. 104. In Linder , the Court clarified that Behrman \"re- lated to definitely alleged fa cts and must be so under- stood. The enormous quantity of drugs ordered .",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases",
		"context": "Id. Behrman suggested that 14 treating an addict with narcotics was, definitionally, not legitimate medical practice. However, Behrman was modified in 268 U.S. 5 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Linder , the Court clarified that Behrman \"re- lated to definitely alleged fa cts and must be so under- stood. The enormous quantity of drugs ordered .",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress disestablished Creek borders by divesting the land of tribal interests",
		"context": "This conclusion follows from a proper understanding and application of this Court's disestablishment jurispru- dence. Solem starts by acknowledging that \"the notion that reservation status of Indian lands might not be coexten- sive with tribal ownership was unfamiliar at the turn of the century.\" 465 U.S. at 468; see South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, Congress \"sel- dom detail[ed] whether opened lands retained reservation status\" since, at the time, \"the distinction seemed unim- portant.\" Solem , 465 U.S. at 468.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress disestablished Creek borders by divesting the land of tribal interests",
		"context": "Consequently, Congress \"sel- dom detail[ed] whether opened lands retained reservation status\" since, at the time, \"the distinction seemed unim- portant.\" Solem , 465 U.S. at 468. Contrary to petitioner's blinkered search (at 21) for a pre-approved lexical \"cata- logue[],\" Solem has \"never required any particular form of words,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], recognizing instead that many textual formulations can demonstrate disestablishment. Instead of imposing an ahistorical \"clear-statement rule,\" Hagen , 510 U.S. at 411, the central focus of Solem is whether Congress intended land to be \"divested of all Indian interests,\" as opposed to \"merely opened … to set- tlement.\" Parker , 136 S. Ct. at 1079 (quotation marks omitted); see Yankton , 522 U.S. at 344-45, 352 (character- izing the \"total surrender of tribal claims\" as a \"hallmark[] of congressional intent to diminish\"); Solem 465 U.S. at 469 n.10 (noting no \"unconditional divestiture of Indian in- terest in the lands\" in 368 U.S. 351); DeCoteau 420 U.S. 425.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress disestablished Creek borders by divesting the land of tribal interests",
		"context": "Contrary to petitioner's blinkered search (at 21) for a pre-approved lexical \"cata- logue[],\" Solem has \"never required any particular form of words,\" 510 U.S. 399, recognizing instead that many textual formulations can demonstrate disestablishment. Instead of imposing an ahistorical \"clear-statement rule,\" Hagen , 510 U.S. at 411, the central focus of Solem is whether Congress intended land to be \"divested of all Indian interests,\" as opposed to \"merely opened … to set- tlement.\" Parker , 136 S. Ct. at 1079 (quotation marks omitted); see Yankton , 522 U.S. at 344-45, 352 (character- izing the \"total surrender of tribal claims\" as a \"hallmark[] of congressional intent to diminish\"); Solem 465 U.S. at 469 n.10 (noting no \"unconditional divestiture of Indian in- terest in the lands\" in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); DeCoteau 420 U.S. 425. Here, statutory text, historical context, and subsequent history confirm that Congress divested Creek country of all tribal inter- ests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress disestablished Creek borders by divesting the land of tribal interests",
		"context": "Contrary to petitioner's blinkered search (at 21) for a pre-approved lexical \"cata- logue[],\" Solem has \"never required any particular form of words,\" 510 U.S. 399, recognizing instead that many textual formulations can demonstrate disestablishment. Instead of imposing an ahistorical \"clear-statement rule,\" Hagen , 510 U.S. at 411, the central focus of Solem is whether Congress intended land to be \"divested of all Indian interests,\" as opposed to \"merely opened … to set- tlement.\" Parker , 136 S. Ct. at 1079 (quotation marks omitted); see Yankton , 522 U.S. at 344-45, 352 (character- izing the \"total surrender of tribal claims\" as a \"hallmark[] of congressional intent to diminish\"); Solem 465 U.S. at 469 n.10 (noting no \"unconditional divestiture of Indian in- terest in the lands\" in 368 U.S. 351); DeCoteau [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, statutory text, historical context, and subsequent history confirm that Congress divested Creek country of all tribal inter- ests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause",
		"context": ". It is true that Congress may use Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity for the narrow 56 subset of copyright infringement that is actually unconstitutional. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, although the Act's broader abrogation is invalid, the Act is indisputably valid insofar as it authorizes lawsuits against conduct that actually violates the Due Process Clause. Some of Allen's amici claim that Allen has alleged a due-process violation here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause",
		"context": "Second, North Carolina provides a range of alternative remedies that satisfy due process in the circumstances of this case. For example, North Carolina has waived sovereign immunity in its own courts for a number of relevant claims, including claims for breach of contract, takings, and some torts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]527 U.S. 644; Georgia , 546 U.S. at 158 (recognizing that \"Florida satisfied due process by providing remedies for patent infringement by state actors\"). In sum, Allen has never claimed that the alleged copyright infringement here was unconstitutional. And even if he had brought such a claim, it would fail on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 S.E.2d 309",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. CONGRESS MUST ESTABLISH A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF SALES AND USE TAX REGULATIONS BEFORE STATES CAN BURDEN INTERSTATE COMMERCE",
		"context": "31 A signif- icant, manifest burden to interstate commerce would result from granting states the ability to, essentially overnight, audit and assess sales and use tax based on the economic presence of a business. Because a uni- form system is necessary, allowing states to control sales tax based on economic presence would lead to an unlawful encroachment upon the regulation power conferred solely with Congress. 32 The refusal of Con- gress to pass legislation since Quill should not be the basis for allowing states to encroach upon the regula- tion power vested fully in Congress.33 31 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]91 U.S. 275. The SSUTA is a multistate ef-fort to standardize and streamline the administration of sales tax. However, al though SSUTA has made pro- gress in reducing compliance burdens, only twenty-four states, representing 33% of the U.S. population have passed legislation conforming to SSUTA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. CONGRESS MUST ESTABLISH A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF SALES AND USE TAX REGULATIONS BEFORE STATES CAN BURDEN INTERSTATE COMMERCE",
		"context": "31 A signif- icant, manifest burden to interstate commerce would result from granting states the ability to, essentially overnight, audit and assess sales and use tax based on the economic presence of a business. Because a uni- form system is necessary, allowing states to control sales tax based on economic presence would lead to an unlawful encroachment upon the regulation power conferred solely with Congress. 32 The refusal of Con- gress to pass legislation since Quill should not be the basis for allowing states to encroach upon the regula- tion power vested fully in Congress.33 31 135 U.S. 100[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The SSUTA is a multistate ef-fort to standardize and streamline the administration of sales tax. However, al though SSUTA has made pro- gress in reducing compliance burdens, only twenty-four states, representing 33% of the U.S. population have passed legislation conforming to SSUTA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Should Clarify That Groundwater Is Not a WOTUS",
		"context": "§§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5) (directing EPA to address groundwater pollution through information gathering and coordination with the States); 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (imposing a certification requ irement that allows states to prevent the Agencies from issuing permits that would violate state water quality standards). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] per day in an aquifer. \"7 This water \"fills the pores and fractures in underground materials such as sand, gravel, and other rock. \"8 It is not, nor can it ever be, navigable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Should Clarify That Groundwater Is Not a WOTUS",
		"context": "This fact is underscored by Congress' disparate treatment of \"ground waters\" and \"navigable waters\" throughout the Act,9 as well as the Act's legislative history , which confirms that Congre ss expressly decided not to regulate groundwater through the CWA's federal pollution control programs.10 In addition, a s the Fifth Circuit emphasized in Exxon Corp. v. Train, the Act's \"simple requirement\" in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) that EPA find adequate authority \"under State law\" to \"control the disposal of pollutants into wells\" before approving a state National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (\"NPDES\") program demonstrates a n intent on the part of Congress to \"stop short of establishing federal controls over groundwater pollution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .11 This Court , too, has recognized the bifurcated system Congress established under the CWA for protecting groundwater and surface water. Cnty . of 140 S. Ct. 1462.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 F.2d 1310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Should Clarify That Groundwater Is Not a WOTUS",
		"context": "554 F.2d 1310 .11 This Court , too, has recognized the bifurcated system Congress established under the CWA for protecting groundwater and surface water. Cnty . of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. County of Maui found federal authority to regulate discharges conveyed 7 U.S. Geological Survey, What is groundwater? , https://www.usgs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Should Clarify That Groundwater Is Not a WOTUS",
		"context": "10 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 73 (1971) (rejecting adoption of \"[s]everal bills pending before the Committee provided authority to establish Federally approved standards for groundwaters\"). 11 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 via groundwater to \"navigable waters\" un der certain circumstances . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "250 F.3d 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation Produces Results That Congress Plainly Did Not Intend",
		"context": "W. Va . U. Hosps., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Fourth Circuit's attempt to convert the entirety of the 45 Appalachian Trail into National Park System land s lost sight of that principle. It is belied not only by the plain text of the Trails Act, but by the MLA, the Park Service Act, the very Park Service statements on which the court relied, and common sense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's precedents do not support abolition",
		"context": ". is substantially open to state choice,\" not that it is entirely open. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After concluding that \"due process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insani ty,\" id. at 753, the Court analyzed Arizo- na's test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's precedents do not support abolition",
		"context": "37 –40. None of those cases questioned the centrality of the moral -incapacity standard or ad- dressed an attempt to abolish the insanity defense altogether . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]343 U.S. 790. Further, while these opinions rightly counsel against a rule that would \"fre eze the developing pro- ductive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold,\" Powell , 392 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion ), Mr. Kahler does not urge such a rule. Holding merely that states may not abolish the moral -culpability princi ple does not dictate whether any given diagnosis supports the insanity defense — either generally or in any specific case —or what sort of evidence is required.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's precedents do not support abolition",
		"context": "37 –40. None of those cases questioned the centrality of the moral -incapacity standard or ad- dressed an attempt to abolish the insanity defense altogether . E.g., 504 U.S. 71[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further, while these opinions rightly counsel against a rule that would \"fre eze the developing pro- ductive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold,\" Powell , 392 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion ), Mr. Kahler does not urge such a rule. Holding merely that states may not abolish the moral -culpability princi ple does not dictate whether any given diagnosis supports the insanity defense — either generally or in any specific case —or what sort of evidence is required.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 790",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DOES NOT APPLY FOR ELECTED TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "The debates during the Convention, and the evolution of the draft version of the Constitution, seem to us to lend considerable 11 support to our reading of the language of the Appointments Clause itself.\" Buckley , at page 129. Some years later, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] this Co urt again pressed the un- derlying principles behind this constitutional provi-sion. (\"The Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch\"). Two years later, in 520 U.S. 651 this Court again empha- sized the connection betwee n the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of Separation of Powers, citing James Hamilton and The Federalist : \"By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) of- ficers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DOES NOT APPLY FOR ELECTED TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "Some years later, in 515 U.S. 177 this Co urt again pressed the un- derlying principles behind this constitutional provi-sion. (\"The Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch\"). Two years later, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] this Court again empha- sized the connection betwee n the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of Separation of Powers, citing James Hamilton and The Federalist : \"By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) of- ficers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Plaintiffs cannot show a differential undercount injury",
		"context": "4 3a. Instead, the district court tied Plaintiffs ' standing to a differential undercount that purportedly will result from the G overnment 's evaluating the extent to which a census may exclude illegal aliens. While this interest might suffice in an appropriate case, Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it does not suffice here. In this Court 's most recent census case, the likely effect of a citizenship question on undercounting non - citizens was enough for the Government action to be deemed a de facto cause of the individual actions of third parties who would illegally decline to answer the census. Compare id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Plaintiffs cannot show a differential undercount injury",
		"context": "But more would be required under Dep't of Commerce , 139 S.Ct. at 2566, even if any injunctive would not become moot once the Government completes the census counting and begins to evalua te the data and any exclusions. Insofar as federal courts \"presume that [they] lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent or waiv er, FW/PBS, 493 U.S. 215, this Court should find a lack of Article III standing with respect to the differential - undercount injury that Plaintiffs allege .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Plaintiffs cannot show a differential undercount injury",
		"context": "But more would be required under Dep't of Commerce , 139 S.Ct. at 2566, even if any injunctive would not become moot once the Government completes the census counting and begins to evalua te the data and any exclusions. Insofar as federal courts \"presume that [they] lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record, \" 501 U.S. 312, and parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent or waiv er, FW/PBS, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court should find a lack of Article III standing with respect to the differential - undercount injury that Plaintiffs allege .",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When This Court Last Considered the PEG-Channel Requirement, It Did Not Decide the Provision's Constitutionality",
		"context": "This Court has never directly addressed whether this statutory requirement for PEG access is an unconstitutional infringement on cable operators' First Amendment rights. In Denver Area , a plurality of this Court agreed that Congress could not authorize cable operators to restrict obscene or unlawful content transmitted over PEG channels. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But as Justice Stevens noted, the PEG programmers' First Amendment claim in that case \"depend[ed] for its success on the constitutionality of the underlying access rights\" over the cable operator's network. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "E.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that \"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A party without a cognizable interest in property cannot claim to have had that property \"taken\" from her. So, first, a takings plaintiff must identify the specific property right she claims was violated and the source of law giving rise to that property right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "; see also Penn Cent. Transp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Because the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by refe rence to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.\" 524 U.S. 156560 U.S. 702.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "438 U.S. 104. \"Because the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by refe rence to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]560 U.S. 702. Ac- cordingly, when addressing takings claims, courts must look to state law to determine whether a citizen 8 possessed a property interest that was then \"taken\" from her. This principle—that it is state law that creates property rights—undoes Petitioner's claim that a cir- cuit split exists.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "438 U.S. 104. \"Because the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by refe rence to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.\" 524 U.S. 156[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ac- cordingly, when addressing takings claims, courts must look to state law to determine whether a citizen 8 possessed a property interest that was then \"taken\" from her. This principle—that it is state law that creates property rights—undoes Petitioner's claim that a cir- cuit split exists.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "(App. 8a (\"Thus, even as- suming Tyler had a property interest in surplus equity under Minnesota common law as of 1884, she has no such property interest under Minnesota law today. \")); Automatic Art, 2010 WL 11515708; 2006 WL 2987707[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2022 WL 317728, appeal pending , 7th Cir. No. 22-1168; City of 320 A.2d 22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 N.W.2d 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "\")); Automatic Art, 2010 WL 11515708; 2006 WL 2987707558 N.W.2d 9092022 WL 317728, appeal pending , 7th Cir. No. 22-1168; City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 2 Similarly, some courts have relied on an individual state's law to hold that taxpayers had a statutory right to a surplus, and so did not reach the question of whether government's retention of surplus equity was a taking. E.g., Lake County Auditor v. Burks , 10 Still other courts cited by Petitioner did not mean- ingfully address whether government's retention of surplus equity constituted a taking, instead focusing on matters not at issue here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 A.2d 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "E.g., Lake County Auditor v. Burks , 10 Still other courts cited by Petitioner did not mean- ingfully address whether government's retention of surplus equity constituted a taking, instead focusing on matters not at issue here. For example, 38 Miss. 424 concerned the need for tax- payers to receive sufficient notice of forfeiture. See Riverboat Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—which Petitioner cites as a case \"recogniz[ing] a takings claim when government fore-closes on property to collec t delinquent taxes or related debts and keeps more than it is owed\" (Pet. 20)—in fact related to whether the taxpayer had sufficient oppor-tunity to challenge the validity of a tax sale. Baker at 496.",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 So. 3d 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts",
		"context": "As noted below ( see infra § I(C)), the property tax laws of the 50 states vary widely, falling into many more categories than Petitioner's binary classification of \"good\" and \"bad.\" This va riety of state property tax schemes makes discerning any conflict among courts as to the meaning of the Takings Clause difficult. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; City of 624 P.2d 271. 11 Indeed, were there actually a problematic circuit split, this Court would have granted certiorari in Ohio, ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga County Board, et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "802 N.E.2d 896",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE HARDISON TEST HARMS RELIGIOUS MINORITIES",
		"context": "\"Religious beliefs pervade, and religious insti- tutions have traditionally regulated, virtually all human activity. It is a postulate of American life, reflected spe- cifically in the First Amendmen t to the Constitution but not there alone, that those be liefs and institutions shall continue … to exist, to function, to grow, to wither, and to exert with whatever innate strength they may con-tain their many influences upon men's conduct, free of the dictates and directions of the state.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 1972 Title VII Amendment continued this tra- dition of government solicitude for the diverse religious practices of the people. But the Hardison Court's dic- tum, were it to stand, would gut Congress's protection of religious minorities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Enabling Act did not reimpose race-based jurisdiction",
		"context": "The Act has been understood as \"pre-emptive of state jurisdic- tion\" merely as a background \"assumption,\" John , 437 27 U.S. at 651, not because it says so. That background as- sumption falls away whenever Congress exercises its \"plenary authority to alter these jurisdictional guide- posts\"—particularly when it does so \"in reasonably plain terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So while petitioner assumes (at 48-50) that the Indian Territory's admission to the Union was identical to every other territory, he fails to account for the numerous laws, specific to the Indian Territory, in which Congress explic- itly ended disparate treatment between Indians and non- Indians. These laws defined the very jurisdiction trans- ferred by the Enabling Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The District Court Improperly Prevented The State From Enacting A Remedial Map",
		"context": "Even assuming there were some defect with the 2017 Plan, the district cour t independently erred by depriving the General Assembly of the chance to remedy it by enacting a new la w. Plaintiffs assert that giving the State that chance would \"run[] headlong into established precedent,\" Mot.18, but they identify no such precedent. They cite Wise and Reynolds , but Wise did not address the question (the second-round plan was not invalidated), and Reynolds actually forecloses plaintiffs' one-bite-at-the-remedial-apple rule, see JS32. Given this Court's repeated admonishments that a State \"should be given the 12 opportunity to make its own redistricting decisions,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the burden is on plaintiffs to show that this settled principle evaporates after the first replacement plan. They have not met that burden. Plaintiffs suggest there was not enough time for the legislature to enact a new plan, Mot.20, but the only reason the election was \"fast-approaching\" when the district court ruled was because it refused to act expeditiously based on its misconception that the legislature was \"not entitled\" to another chance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress did not intend to insulate the Board's determination of its own statutory authority from judicial review",
		"context": "It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administ ra- tion of its own statutes from being judi-cially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect b e blank checks drawn to the credit of some administr ative officer or board. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to the Board's determinations under Section 314, which the Court expanded in Cuozzo to include other statutory provisions closely related to its determination under Section 314. This restriction is logical in vie w of the statutory and reg- ulatory scheme. By default, preliminary agency action not directly reviewable \"is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress did not intend to insulate the Board's determination of its own statutory authority from judicial review",
		"context": ". leaving to [the claimant] no 15 remedy , no appeal to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no evidence that Congress intended such a surprise here. See Cuozzo , 136 S. Ct. at 2154 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that \"Congress understandably thought that the Patent Office's power should not be wielded in this way\" in relation to the nonreviewabil- ity of Section 315(b) determinations).",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 Pet. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Damages for emotional distress are not available in the implied right of action to enforce the Rehabilitation Act or the Affordable Care Act",
		"context": "the Rehabilita- tion Act and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. A. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court relied on the contractual nature of Spending Clause legislation to hold that a recipient of federal funding may 11 be subject to a particular remedy in a private action to en- force Spending Clause legislation only when it is \" on no- tice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that na ture.\" Id. at 187.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Damages for emotional distress are not available in the implied right of action to enforce the Rehabilitation Act or the Affordable Care Act",
		"context": "In addition, the Court has not employed the contract - law analogy to extend the implied remedies available to enforce Spending Clause statutes beyond the remedies available under non -Spending Clause statutes. But peti- tioner's application of the personal -contracts exception 13 would have precisely that result, because Congress im- posed limits on damages for emotional distress when it first authorized compe nsatory damages under Title VII in 1991. C. Petitioner separately argues that damages for emotional distress should be available under the pre- sumption from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that a federal court has the power to award appropriate relief for the violation of a federal right when federal law pro- vides a cause of action. But as the government recognizes , the notice principle articulated in Barnes provides the governing rule here . That principle plainly qualifies the Bell presumption and acts as a limitation on liability in the context of Spending Clause legislation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences",
		"context": "Banks expressly held that the evil of stacking arises from asking \" the jury \" during a criminal trial—not an investi- gating police officer before a stop is ever made—\"to make a presumption based upon other presumptions,\" rather than relying on facts proven through evidence. Ibid. (em- phasis added); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 2 States may, of course, develop stricter, state-law based reasonable- suspicion standards that disfavor inference stacking. See, e.g., Or. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 P.3d 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences",
		"context": "Rev. Stat. § 131.615(1); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 371 P.3d 1268. But breaches of those more protective state standards do not violate the Fourth Amend- ment. Moreover, by predicating its holding on Fourth Amendment grounds rather than state law, the Kansas Supreme Court effectively precluded Kansas lawmakers from overturning the decision legisla- tively.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 P.2d 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences",
		"context": "Moreover, by predicating its holding on Fourth Amendment grounds rather than state law, the Kansas Supreme Court effectively precluded Kansas lawmakers from overturning the decision legisla- tively. 6 As NDAA's members are intimately aware, the beyond- a-reasonable-doubt standard is a stringent evidentiary bur- den aimed at minimizing the wrongful conviction of inno- cent persons. See, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the beyond-a-reasona- ble-doubt standard cannot apply in assessing reasonable suspicion because the two standards exist in entirely differ- ent contextual spheres, where the policy concerns are markedly different. The only real danger to the law-abiding public of an investigatory stop, for example, is momentary detention for just long enough to investigate—not impris- onment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences",
		"context": "But the beyond-a-reasona- ble-doubt standard cannot apply in assessing reasonable suspicion because the two standards exist in entirely differ- ent contextual spheres, where the policy concerns are markedly different. The only real danger to the law-abiding public of an investigatory stop, for example, is momentary detention for just long enough to investigate—not impris- onment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of sus- picion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and ob- viously less than is necessary for probable cause.\" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The Kansas Supreme Court made no effort to explain why it transplanted beyond-reasonable-doubt strictures into the reasonable-suspicion standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences",
		"context": "Officers can reasonably stack inferences, therefore, to satisfy the reasonable-suspicion standard. In this very context, several federal courts of appeals have held it to be, not prohibited inference stacking, but plain old com- mon sense, that a vehicle's driver is reasonably likely to be its owner. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.3d 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
		"context": ". While four State courts have reached different conclusions on RRTA taxation of FELA judgments, the split is illusory given the more thorough reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court, which concluded FELA judgments are not taxable. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. District Courts also have rejected Heckman and Phillips . Marlin , 163 F.Supp.3d at 580–81; Loy, 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 48824, at 13; Cowden , 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 91454, at 31–32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 S.W.3d 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
		"context": "Heckman and Phillips also fail to address the Code's exclusion from taxation of any portion of an award for personal physical injury. 26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2); Cowden , 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 91454, at 26–29 (citing CSX [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 134 S.Ct. 1395, among others); Mickey , 437 S.W.3d at 211. The Pennsylvania court of appeals followed Heckman and Phillips and rejected Mickey for reasons that are unpersuasive. 2016 PA Super 79.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 F.3d 1328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
		"context": "Heckman and Phillips also fail to address the Code's exclusion from taxation of any portion of an award for personal physical injury. 26 U.S.C. §104(a)(2); Cowden , 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 91454, at 26–29 (citing CSX 518 F.3d 1328, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], among others); Mickey , 437 S.W.3d at 211. The Pennsylvania court of appeals followed Heckman and Phillips and rejected Mickey for reasons that are unpersuasive. 2016 PA Super 79.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S.Ct. 1395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
		"context": "§104(a)(2); Cowden , 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 91454, at 26–29 (citing CSX 518 F.3d 1328, and 134 S.Ct. 1395, among others); Mickey , 437 S.W.3d at 211. The Pennsylvania court of appeals followed Heckman and Phillips and rejected Mickey for reasons that are unpersuasive. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That court addressed §104(a)(2), but rejected its application to the RRTA in light of the RRA's definition of compensation to include pay for time lost on account of personal injury. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2016 PA Super 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
		"context": "at 13–27. It did not explain why satisfactions of FELA judgments that do not expressly include awards of RRTA compensation are \"pay for time lost\" and did not address this Court's rejection of reading the taxing and benefits statutes underlying Social Security as in pari materia. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court below rejected Liberatore because it concluded Congress intended \"compensation\" to have different meanings in the RRTA and RRA. Pet 21a (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe 548 U.S. 53).",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
		"context": "See 532 U.S. 200. The court below rejected Liberatore because it concluded Congress intended \"compensation\" to have different meanings in the RRTA and RRA. Pet 21a (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). No other court has relied on Liberatore . The three State court decisions that erroneously concluded that FELA judgments are taxable have 4 BNSF did not petition for a writ of certiorari.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal Habeas Is Not An Appropriate Substitute For A State Corrective Process",
		"context": "Requiring Cruz to resort to federal habeas without first giving him an opportunity to seek correc- tion of the Simmons error in state court would under- mine comity interests and upend the balance struck by Teague . Federal habeas law is predicated on the recognition that \"state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.\" Har- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A defend- ant's obligation to exhaust state-court remedies pro- motes \"federal-state comity\" by ensuring that states have \"an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights.\" Shinn , 142 S. Ct. 1718 (quoting 454 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal Habeas Is Not An Appropriate Substitute For A State Corrective Process",
		"context": "Har- 562 U.S. 86. A defend- ant's obligation to exhaust state-court remedies pro- motes \"federal-state comity\" by ensuring that states have \"an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights.\" Shinn , 142 S. Ct. 1718 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the exhaustion re- quirement \"presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists.\" Young , 337 U.S. at 238-239.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal Habeas Is Not An Appropriate Substitute For A State Corrective Process",
		"context": "578 U.S. 120. Arizona's interest in finality is at its nadir here given that Cruz's sentence was unconstitutional from the outset. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the countervailing imperative to im- pose criminal punishment only where authorized by law is at its peak given that Cruz seeks application of the law that governed from the start. Requiring the Arizona Supreme Court to address its Simmons error will not require Arizona to \"continually\" marshal re- sources \"to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Step 1: Is There a Continuous Surface-Water Connection to a \"Water\" Such That It Is Difficult to Say Where the \"Water\" Ends and the Wetland Begins?",
		"context": "Cf. S.D. Warren [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To include among \"waters\" such features as \"wet meadows, storm sewers and culverts, directional sheet flow during storm events, drain tiles, man-made drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of the desert\" would not only conflict with the \"commonsense understanding\" of \"waters,\" it would \"stretch[] the term . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "These courts simply assumed , without analysis, that such a private right existed, and went straight to the question of identifying who had standing to assert it. See, e.g., Elec. Specialty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 489 F.2d 579. In keeping with the law at the time, these courts saw \"no need to try to discover 'supposed legislative intent.'\" Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d 341.",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 F.2d 937",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "These courts simply assumed , without analysis, that such a private right existed, and went straight to the question of identifying who had standing to assert it. See, e.g., Elec. Specialty 409 F.2d 937; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In keeping with the law at the time, these courts saw \"no need to try to discover 'supposed legislative intent.'\" Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d 341.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 F.2d 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Specialty 409 F.2d 937; 489 F.2d 579. In keeping with the law at the time, these courts saw \"no need to try to discover 'supposed legislative intent.'\" Chris-Craft Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even after 1975, the cou rts of appeals failed to come to grips with the changed law governing private rights of action. They continued to \"allow[] suits for private enforcement of section 14(e)\"—and did so \"with- out extensive discussion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 F.2d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "But even after 1975, the cou rts of appeals failed to come to grips with the changed law governing private rights of action. They continued to \"allow[] suits for private enforcement of section 14(e)\"—and did so \"with- out extensive discussion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The courts of appeals simply assumed, or continued to assume, the existence of a right of action under Section 14(e) in favor of shareholders without any analysis under this Court's cases at all . See, e.g., Gearhart Indus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "797 F.2d 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "The courts of appeals simply assumed, or continued to assume, the existence of a right of action under Section 14(e) in favor of shareholders without any analysis under this Court's cases at all . See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 741 F.2d 234; 680 F.2d 1286; 672 F.2d 1196; 623 F.2d 422; Ind. Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.2d 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "The courts of appeals simply assumed, or continued to assume, the existence of a right of action under Section 14(e) in favor of shareholders without any analysis under this Court's cases at all . See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , 741 F.2d 707; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 680 F.2d 1286; 672 F.2d 1196; 623 F.2d 422; Ind. Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.2d 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "The courts of appeals simply assumed, or continued to assume, the existence of a right of action under Section 14(e) in favor of shareholders without any analysis under this Court's cases at all . See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , 741 F.2d 707; 741 F.2d 234; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 672 F.2d 1196; 623 F.2d 422; Ind. Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F.2d 1286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "The courts of appeals simply assumed, or continued to assume, the existence of a right of action under Section 14(e) in favor of shareholders without any analysis under this Court's cases at all . See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , 741 F.2d 707; 741 F.2d 234; 680 F.2d 1286; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 623 F.2d 422; Ind. Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "672 F.2d 1196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "The courts of appeals simply assumed, or continued to assume, the existence of a right of action under Section 14(e) in favor of shareholders without any analysis under this Court's cases at all . See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , 741 F.2d 707; 741 F.2d 234; 680 F.2d 1286; 672 F.2d 1196; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ind. Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "623 F.2d 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , 741 F.2d 707; 741 F.2d 234; 680 F.2d 1286; 672 F.2d 1196; 623 F.2d 422; Ind. Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e). In 430 U.S. 1, the Court held that no implied right of action existed in favor of defeated tender offerors under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "578 F.2d 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. , 741 F.2d 707; 741 F.2d 234; 680 F.2d 1286; 672 F.2d 1196; 623 F.2d 422; Ind. Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e). In 430 U.S. 1, the Court held that no implied right of action existed in favor of defeated tender offerors under Section 14(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 F.2d 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Nat'l 578 F.2d 180; 561 F.2d 429. Had these courts correctl y conducted the analysis they elided, they would have concluded that, under this Court's precedents, no basis exists for inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that no implied right of action existed in favor of defeated tender offerors under Section 14(e). The Court in Piper expressly \"limited\" its \"holding\" to whether such offerors could sue, and \"intimate[d] no view\" on \"[w]hether shareholder- offerees ... have an implied cause of action under § 14(e).\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Id. at 42 n.28. Still, the Court's reasoning in 9 Piper, along with its reasoning in later cases—in particular, Touche Ross & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which found no private right for damages under Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, and Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19–24, which found no private right for damages under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940—plainly forecloses any recognition of a private right of action under Section 14(e). In deciding whether a private right should be inferred, the judicial \"task is limited solely to deter-mining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted by [the plaintiffs]. And as with any case involving the interpre tation of a statute, [the] analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "At the same time, the express rights of action in the securities laws themselves establish why an inferred right under Section 14(e) must be rejected. Today there are \"eight express liability provisions contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts\": Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 9, 16, 18, 20, and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Musick, Peeler & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77 l, 77o, 78 i, 78p, 78r, 78t, 78t–1. Each of the express rights very precisely defines who may su e, whom they may sue, 12 for what, and under what circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Each of the express rights very precisely defines who may su e, whom they may sue, 12 for what, and under what circumstances. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, these are \"carefully drawn express civil remedies\" that contain \"carefully drawn procedural restrictions\" that \"Congress regarded … as significant.\" Ernst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Herman & 459 U.S. 375; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 456 U.S. 353; Blue Chip 421 U.S. 723. These express rights of action thus cut strongly against judicially engrafting an additional one onto Section 14(e). \"[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Each of the express rights very precisely defines who may su e, whom they may sue, 12 for what, and under what circumstances. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, these are \"carefully drawn express civil remedies\" that contain \"carefully drawn procedural restrictions\" that \"Congress regarded … as significant.\" Ernst & 425 U.S. 185; see also Herman & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 456 U.S. 353; Blue Chip 421 U.S. 723. These express rights of action thus cut strongly against judicially engrafting an additional one onto Section 14(e). \"[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Each of the express rights very precisely defines who may su e, whom they may sue, 12 for what, and under what circumstances. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, these are \"carefully drawn express civil remedies\" that contain \"carefully drawn procedural restrictions\" that \"Congress regarded … as significant.\" Ernst & 425 U.S. 185; see also Herman & 459 U.S. 375; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Blue Chip 421 U.S. 723. These express rights of action thus cut strongly against judicially engrafting an additional one onto Section 14(e). \"[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Each of the express rights very precisely defines who may su e, whom they may sue, 12 for what, and under what circumstances. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, these are \"carefully drawn express civil remedies\" that contain \"carefully drawn procedural restrictions\" that \"Congress regarded … as significant.\" Ernst & 425 U.S. 185; see also Herman & 459 U.S. 375; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 456 U.S. 353; Blue Chip [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These express rights of action thus cut strongly against judicially engrafting an additional one onto Section 14(e). \"[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "For \"it is highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action.'\" Id. at 20 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The fact that it enacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling to impose any potential monetary liability on a private suitor.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)",
		"context": "Touche Ross , 442 U.S. at 577–78 n.19. Most significantly, that acceptance occurred at a time when, under the governing la w as set forth by this Court, judicial creation of private rights was \"routine.\" Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1855; see Superintendent of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: This Court hit the brakes on inferring rights of action only seven years after Co ngress passed the Williams Act. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 77–85. Just four years after that, as shown above, the Court effectively made clear that judges should not infer any more private rights of action under the federal securities laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's Attempt To Characterize PAGA Claims As Qui Tam Actions Is Both Irrelevant And Wrong",
		"context": "If that is true, th en an arbitration agreement waiving the right to assert a \"representative\" PAGA claim would de facto waive the employee's right to bring the claim at all. And that would implicate Is- kanian 's \"no waiver\" rule under which a plaintiff cannot waive a claim that belongs to the govern- ment. 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is irrele- vant for the same reason. Iskanian (incorrectly) cited Waffle House in support of its holding that the FAA did not preclude its \"no waiver\" rule. Moreover, Waffle House does not even support the California Supreme Court's reasoning because the party who sued here was the same one who signed the arbitra- tion agreement, unlike in Waffle House .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's Attempt To Characterize PAGA Claims As Qui Tam Actions Is Both Irrelevant And Wrong",
		"context": "That type of rule would clearly disfavor arbitration by creating a claim that cannot be arbi- trated at all. And a \"rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim … is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.\" Marmet Health Care Ctr., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"A state may not insulate causes of action from arbitration by declaring that the purposes of the statute can only 24 be satisfied via class, repr esentative, or collective ac- tion.\"). That is all the more true here, because PA- GA is simply a procedural device for asserting un- derlying Labor Code violations. Respondent implicitly recognizes as much, con- ceding that PAGA claims are not fundamentally at odds with arbitration and claiming instead that \"Is- kanian is not premised on objection to bilateral pro- ceedings as long as [those proceedings] allow full as- sertion of PAGA claims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's Attempt To Characterize PAGA Claims As Qui Tam Actions Is Both Irrelevant And Wrong",
		"context": "999 F.3d 668. Most fundamentally, the nature of the govern- ment's injury is different. In Vermont Agency of Natural [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that FCA relators assert the government's \"proprietary injury,\" id. at 771, and thus have standing because the FCA \"can rea-sonably regarding as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim,\" id. at 773.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compulsory Disclosure —Even When Disclosure Is Limited to Government Officials —Imposes Burdens on the First Amendment Right of Private Association",
		"context": "See, e.g. , First Br. on Cross -Appeal, Thomas More Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 57 -60 (9th Cir. filed Sept 11, 20 To the extent amicus United States' brief at the certiorari stage could be interpreted to argue that \"exacting scrutiny\" applies only to compulsory disclosure l aws that \"carry a reasonable probability of harassment, reprisals, and similar harms,\" that would write out of the First Ame ndment the inherent right to privacy in association. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11 -12, Nov. 2020.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 1000",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compulsory Disclosure —Even When Disclosure Is Limited to Government Officials —Imposes Burdens on the First Amendment Right of Private Association",
		"context": "It was the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the House Unamerican Activities Committee armed with secret lists of citizens that persecuted progressives in the 1940s and 1950s. See Victor S. Navasky, Naming Names (Viking Press 1980). The Attorney General of New Hampshire invaded the private membership of the Progressive Party of New Hampshire in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. State Attorneys General launched an inquisition into the private 21 https://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/03/12771/senator - whitehouse -exposes -alec-climate -change -denial . -17- climate policy research of the Competitive Enterprise Institute in order to punish thought with which they disagreed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compulsory Disclosure —Even When Disclosure Is Limited to Government Officials —Imposes Burdens on the First Amendment Right of Private Association",
		"context": "1 (Summer 2016) at 47-52. Years later, New Deal Democrats on the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities subpoenaed the CCG for lists of the people who purchased free - market books from the organization and arrested the CCG leader when he declined to name the names. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although ultimately vindicated by this Court, the inquisition diverted resources and distracted the organization for years, harming its reputation and effectiveness in the process. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Most Prevalent Abortion Procedure From Approximately 12-Week To 24-Weeks Is Dilation and Evacuation.",
		"context": "Code § 41-41- 191(2)(b)(i)(8) (describing that the D&E procedure involves \"the use of surgic al instruments to crush and tear the unborn child apart before removing the pieces of the dead child from the womb.\"). Sometimes, the child dies like any adult human would, by bleeding to death as the doctor, armed with forceps, rips the child's body apart. Stenberg , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]-59 (Kennedy, J ., dissenting). Typically, a doctor takes 10 to 15 passes through the cervix and vagina to pull pieces of the baby out of its mother. Gonzales , 550 U.S. at 136.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
		"context": "Immediate interpretation of a statute has long been strong evidence of its original public meaning. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . We rely upon this principle of contemporanea expositio because we assume that interpreters closer to the time of enactment had a better grasp on the language than we do many decades later. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
		"context": "Id. This principle should be especially strong when it is a neutral court discern ing the contemporaneous meaning of a sta tute or rule and not a self -interested administrative agency or other interested party. Only one year after the amendment to Rule 60 became effective, this Court interpreted its meaning in Klapprott , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Klapprott , a German immigrant sought to reopen a judgment stripping him of his American citizenship. The Government alleged that Mr. Klapprott had lied on his naturalization form 16 and was still loyal to Adolf Hitler.",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
		"context": "However, entirely with the majority opinion but did \"not express an opinion on any matters not before this Court.\" While five justices did not formally join Justice Black's opinion, the Supreme Court has consistently cited Justice Black's opinion as a majority opinion entitled to precedential value. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Pioneer Inv. 507 U.S. 380 . Not only has the Supreme Court treated Klapprott as binding precedent, but so has the Governm ent in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
		"context": "While five justices did not formally join Justice Black's opinion, the Supreme Court has consistently cited Justice Black's opinion as a majority opinion entitled to precedential value. See, e.g., 545 U.S. 524 ; see also Pioneer Inv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Not only has the Supreme Court treated Klapprott as binding precedent, but so has the Governm ent in this case. See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
		"context": "at 17 –18. 18 that reading would violate the Supreme Court's longstanding interpretive principl e that statutes should be read harmoniously and to avoid \"internal inconsistencies.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Furthermore, this Court has consistently read the provisions of Rule 60(b) in harmony. See 486 U.S. 847 ; see also Klapprott , 335 U.S. at 613.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
		"context": "See 452 U.S. 576 . Furthermore, this Court has consistently read the provisions of Rule 60(b) in harmony. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Klapprott , 335 U.S. at 613. Not only would reading \"mistake\" to cover legal errors make subsection (b)(4) redundant, but it would also create a paradox. A legal error serious enough to result in a void judgment would fall under the one -year time limit of subsection ( b)(1), but also under the more expansive \"reasonable time\" limit of subsection (b)(4).",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Appellees Establish Traceability by Showing that Section 304 Was at Least a But-for Cause of Their Injury",
		"context": "Indeed, the Court has found the traceability requirement to have been met in cases in which the causal chain includes multiple links. For example, the Court deemed standing to have been adequately pleaded by plaintiffs who alleged: (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order allowing railroads to collect surcharges on freight rates; (2) the increased freight rates would increase the costs (and thus prices) for recyclable goods; (3) the increased prices of recyclable goods would cause consumers to purchase more nonrecyclable goods; and (4) increased production of nonrecyclable goods would injure the plaintiffs by increasing litter in national parks frequented by the plaintiffs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the Court later described the SCRAP decision as having gone \"to the very outer limits of the law\" of standing, 495 U.S. 149, SCRAP well illustrates that the existence of intervening steps in the causal chain is not an impediment to establishing Article III standing. An injury is \"fairly traceable\" to a challenged action so long as the action is a but-for cause of the injury.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 669",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Appellees Establish Traceability by Showing that Section 304 Was at Least a But-for Cause of Their Injury",
		"context": "For example, the Court deemed standing to have been adequately pleaded by plaintiffs who alleged: (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order allowing railroads to collect surcharges on freight rates; (2) the increased freight rates would increase the costs (and thus prices) for recyclable goods; (3) the increased prices of recyclable goods would cause consumers to purchase more nonrecyclable goods; and (4) increased production of nonrecyclable goods would injure the plaintiffs by increasing litter in national parks frequented by the plaintiffs. 412 U.S. 669. While the Court later described the SCRAP decision as having gone \"to the very outer limits of the law\" of standing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], SCRAP well illustrates that the existence of intervening steps in the causal chain is not an impediment to establishing Article III standing. An injury is \"fairly traceable\" to a challenged action so long as the action is a but-for cause of the injury. \"Proximate causation is not a requirement of 11 Article III standing, which requires only that the plaintiff's injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Appellees Establish Traceability by Showing that Section 304 Was at Least a But-for Cause of Their Injury",
		"context": "An injury is \"fairly traceable\" to a challenged action so long as the action is a but-for cause of the injury. \"Proximate causation is not a requirement of 11 Article III standing, which requires only that the plaintiff's injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct.\" Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The but-for causation standard is satisfied whenever, as here, \"but for the defendant's unlawful conduct, [the plaintiff's] alleged injury would not have occurred.\" Comcast 140 S. Ct. 1009.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Appellees Establish Traceability by Showing that Section 304 Was at Least a But-for Cause of Their Injury",
		"context": "Lexmark Int'l, 572 U.S. 118. The but-for causation standard is satisfied whenever, as here, \"but for the defendant's unlawful conduct, [the plaintiff's] alleged injury would not have occurred.\" Comcast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But for the adoption of Section 403, FEC would not have adopted 11 C.F.R. § 116.11(c)(1), and Appellees would not have suffered an injury.3 FEC's reliance on 141 S. Ct. 2104, is misplaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Appellees Establish Traceability by Showing that Section 304 Was at Least a But-for Cause of Their Injury",
		"context": "In sharp contrast to the facts in California v. 3 Although Appellees are not required to establish proximate causation, they very likely satisfy that more exacting standard as well. Generally, A is deemed a proximate cause of B if B is a \"natural and foreseeable result\" of A. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Appellees' injury was a \"natural and foreseeable result\" of enactment of Section 403. 12 Texas, Appellees have demonstrated a close relationship between Section 304 and 11 C.F.R. § 116.11(c)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage",
		"context": "(emphasis added) (\"[T]he driveway extends past the house, running alongside it after the front yard ends, and continues well beyond the front porch and front door to allow vehicles to be parked beside the house.\"). The Virginia Court of Appeals \"assume[d] without deciding\" that Peti-tioner's motorcycle was parked within the home's curtilage at the time of the officer's entry and physical investigation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 familiar enough that it is easily understood from our daily experience.\") (internal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "773 S.E.2d 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Barnes Was Decided in an Antiquated Certificated Share Environment that Gave Context to the Term \"Tracing\"",
		"context": ". .\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court of Appeals went further. The Second Circuit described the situation for each of the two objectors : Objector Occhi bought 100 shares on November 22, 1963 at about $15 each , whereas objector Zilker purchased twenty -five shares on September 12, 1963 for $23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 F. Supp. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Barnes Was Decided in an Antiquated Certificated Share Environment that Gave Context to the Term \"Tracing\"",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Est. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and In re2015 WL 4313206, as revised (July 30, 2015) . Amicus respectfully submit s that a short recitation of the history will suffice. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, and immediately after Barnes was decided (but with no connection to the decision ), Wall Street faced a 29 paperwork crisis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners negotiated their liability risk related to violations of federal laws and regulations before they accepted federal funds",
		"context": ". we examine closely the propriety of private actions holding the recipient liable in monetary damages for noncompliance with the condition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The facility management agreement between HHC (\"Owner\") and ASC (\"Manager\"), effective January 1, 2003, and updated from time to time, confirms HHC's notice of its liability risk by inclusion of the following: \"Legal Requirements \" means any (i) law, code, rule, ordinance or regulation applicable to [HHC], [ASC] and/or any Facility or the operation thereof ; (ii) any order of any governmental authority having jurisdiction over [HHC], [ASC] and/or any Facility or the operation thereof; and (iii) any law, code, rule, regulation , bulletin, decision, ruling or opinion applicable to reimbursement by Medicare, Medicaid or any other governmental healthcare program for services rendered at the Facilities. 9 \"Litigation \" means: (i) any cause of action commenced in a federal , state or local court in the United States relating to any Facility and/or the ownership or operation of thereof ; (ii) any claim brought before an administrative agency or body (including, without limitation, employment discrimination claims) relating to any Facility and/or the ownership or operation thereof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "But that rea- soning misunderstands this Court's Appointments Clause jurisprudence. As the Court has explained, \"[t]he exercise of 'significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause 17 purposes, but rather … the line between officer and non-officer.\" Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (quoting Buck- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also 138 S. Ct. 2044. Due to its misunderstanding, the Federal Circuit mistakenly relied on analysis that this Court used in prior decisions to find that the federal employees at is- sue were merely \"officers\" of the United States. That APJs are officers of the United States is undisputed here; what is at issue is whether they are principal of- ficers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "But that rea- soning misunderstands this Court's Appointments Clause jurisprudence. As the Court has explained, \"[t]he exercise of 'significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause 17 purposes, but rather … the line between officer and non-officer.\" Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (quoting Buck- 424 U.S. 1); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Due to its misunderstanding, the Federal Circuit mistakenly relied on analysis that this Court used in prior decisions to find that the federal employees at is- sue were merely \"officers\" of the United States. That APJs are officers of the United States is undisputed here; what is at issue is whether they are principal of- ficers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "Id . (\"The power to re- move officers, we have recogni zed, is a powerful tool for control.\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 272 U.S. 52)). Also like the Director, the JAG had \"no power to re- verse decisions of the court.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "Id . (\"The power to re- move officers, we have recogni zed, is a powerful tool for control.\" (citing 478 U.S. 714, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). Also like the Director, the JAG had \"no power to re- verse decisions of the court.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "284a. None of the other precedents relied on by the Fed- eral Circuit held that the federal employee in question was a principal officer or di stinguished that employee from a principal officer on grounds that indicate that APJs are principal officers. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Lucia , 138 S. Ct. at 2051 n.3 (holding that adminis- trative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are officers and noting that \"distinction between 'principal' and 'inferior' officers\" was \"not at issue here\"); Free Enter. 561 U.S. 47738 U.S. 230.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "None of the other precedents relied on by the Fed- eral Circuit held that the federal employee in question was a principal officer or di stinguished that employee from a principal officer on grounds that indicate that APJs are principal officers. See 501 U.S. 868; Lucia , 138 S. Ct. at 2051 n.3 (holding that adminis- trative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are officers and noting that \"distinction between 'principal' and 'inferior' officers\" was \"not at issue here\"); Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]38 U.S. 230.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "None of the other precedents relied on by the Fed- eral Circuit held that the federal employee in question was a principal officer or di stinguished that employee from a principal officer on grounds that indicate that APJs are principal officers. See 501 U.S. 868; Lucia , 138 S. Ct. at 2051 n.3 (holding that adminis- trative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are officers and noting that \"distinction between 'principal' and 'inferior' officers\" was \"not at issue here\"); Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The States Innovated to Elude This Court's Decisions Combatting Post-Reconstruction Jury-Service Suppression",
		"context": "After several decades in which African American jury participation reached a nadir, this Court recalibrated its willingness to look behind facially neutral justifications for decreased participation. In Norris v. Alabama , the Court considered two counties in which no witness could recall African Americans ever serving on juries. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 Looking past Alabama's \"general assertions\" that it simply could not find qualified jurors, the Court determined to \"inquire not merely whether [a federal right] is denied in express terms but also whether it was denied in substance and effect.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 U.S. 587",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The States Innovated to Elude This Court's Decisions Combatting Post-Reconstruction Jury-Service Suppression",
		"context": "2014), https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=32656. 11 years \"consciously omitted to place\" any Black person's name on the jury list. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These cases did not make new law so much as reinvigorate old law. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The States Innovated to Elude This Court's Decisions Combatting Post-Reconstruction Jury-Service Suppression",
		"context": "First, some states interpreted the new cases as simply prohibiting the total exclusion of Black persons from jury pools, and thus worked to ensure that some—but as few as possible—Black persons entered the jury pool. For example, in Akins v. Texas , Dallas County's grand- jury commissioners conceded that their \"intentions were to get just one [African American] on the grand jury[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, after Hill, 12 Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters , 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 511, 556 (1994).",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The States Innovated to Elude This Court's Decisions Combatting Post-Reconstruction Jury-Service Suppression",
		"context": "14 Klarman, supra note 11, at 410 (quoting various News and Courier editorials) (alteration in original). 12 for 21 successive panels between 1942 and 1947, Dallas County's grand juries had no more than one and sometimes no African Americans. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, deviation from the policy of total exclusion raised the specter of African American jurors slipping on to petit juries. 15 To address that eventuality, states began to lean on the discriminatory peremptory strike.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The States Innovated to Elude This Court's Decisions Combatting Post-Reconstruction Jury-Service Suppression",
		"context": "Swain v. Alabama illustrates this tactical shift. In the 1950s and early 1960s in Alabama's Talladega County, African Americans were still underrepresented on venires, likely because of efforts like those employed in Dallas County to limit their presence in the jury pool. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 205–06, 208. While petit jury venires did have an average of six to seven African Americans per venire, no African Americans actually served as petit jurors, including on Swain's petit jury. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourth Circuit's remedial approach both misunderstands the nature of the AAPC's injury and creates serious due-process problems",
		"context": "Yet these debt collectors—whose rights were adjudicated in a way that would ordinarily re- quire their joinder 2—were given no notice or oppor- tunity to be heard. Unsurprisingly, other courts that have considered similar remedial issues have properly refused to \"cure\" First Amendment violations by severing content-based exemptions in order to sweep in more speech. The Third Circuit's ruling in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is illustrative. There, the Third Circuit considered the constitutionality of an 2 See Fed. R. Civ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "18 F.3d 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A common-law arrest required only physical touch with intent to restrain, not physical control.",
		"context": "15-17. Respondents and their amici do not point to a single case in which a court found no arrest when the officer intentionally touched a suspect. Instead, Respondents cite a handful of cases that mostly just describe circumstances that are sufficient to qualify as an arrest; none of these cases denies that a common-law arrest also occurs when the suspect is touched but escapes.6 A few explain what is necessary 6E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Balt. & Ohio R.R. 73 A. 697; United 10 for a formal arrest—the kind that triggers, for in- stance, Miranda obligations—not the more broadly encompassing common-law arrest.7 For their part, Respondents' amici mostly seem to concede that at the time of the Founding, physical touch could amount to an arrest, even in the absence of submission.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A common-law arrest required only physical touch with intent to restrain, not physical control.",
		"context": "73 A. 697; United 10 for a formal arrest—the kind that triggers, for in- stance, Miranda obligations—not the more broadly encompassing common-law arrest.7 For their part, Respondents' amici mostly seem to concede that at the time of the Founding, physical touch could amount to an arrest, even in the absence of submission. NACo Br. 12-17.8 Elsewhere, however, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 285 N.E.2d 871 proves our point: Under a list of \"examples\" of arrest, it states that \"laying on of hands however slightly, without being able to hold and take into actual custody, when more than a mere ges- ture is an assault, and an arrest as well.\" Alexander, supra , at 359; see also 57 N.W. 212149 F. Supp. 839 whether 68 Mich. 480, and 24 F. Cas. 1084, support our posi- tion. They do.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 F. Supp. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. S.B. 8's unique features make it distinct from private torts and other laws",
		"context": "21A85 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2021). 11 the st ate officials involved in effectuating that scheme, including court clerks, would be warranted. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, in a defamation or other tort suit, once the controversy between the injured party and the defendant is resolved, the case is over. In contrast, under S.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The SEC's Argument that the Petitioner Has Taken a Different Factual Position in the Court Below is Without Merit",
		"context": "The Court also has also, on occasion, treated as beingestablished statements of fact from the petition thatthe respondent didn't contest in its brief in opposition. 19 See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents' brief in opposition declined to contest [the assertion that the NarragansettIndian Tribe ... was neither federally recognizednor under the jurisdiction of the federalgovernment]. Under our rules, that alone isreason to accept this as fact for purposes of ourdecision in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "73-792, at 1-5 (1934). As this Court explained more than 40 years ago in Ernst & Ernst , \"[a]lthough the Acts contain numerous carefully drawn ex press civil remedies and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient regulation of securities trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory program.\" Ernst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, as part of the 1934 Act, \"Congress created the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, which is provided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "The Uniform Securities Act was developed by the Uniform Law Commission for adoption by the states. 10 securities regulator the authority to investigate and pursue enforcement actions in cases of securities fraud that occurs, or targets, investors in their states. This interlocking system of state and federal securities laws was expressl y designed \"to root out all manner of fraud in the securities industry\" ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) and \"to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits\" ( id. at 1103 (citing 328 U.S. 293)), by providing regulators with \"the tools to accomplish that job.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1094",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "10 securities regulator the authority to investigate and pursue enforcement actions in cases of securities fraud that occurs, or targets, investors in their states. This interlocking system of state and federal securities laws was expressl y designed \"to root out all manner of fraud in the securities industry\" ( 139 S. Ct. 1094) and \"to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits\" ( id. at 1103 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])), by providing regulators with \"the tools to accomplish that job.\" Id. at 1104.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "Id. at 1104. While this Court has \"long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought [by regulators and law enforcement]\", see, e.g., Tellabs, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], they are a supplement. Both this Court and Congress have made clear that regulators and law enforcement have a unique and distinct role in enforcing the securities laws that is different – and oftentimes broader – than that afforded to private litigants. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "Both this Court and Congress have made clear that regulators and law enforcement have a unique and distinct role in enforcing the securities laws that is different – and oftentimes broader – than that afforded to private litigants. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]552 U.S. 148 10; 9 As the Court explained: In § 10(b), Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in connectio n with the purchase or sale of securities. It envisioned that the SEC would enforce the statutory prohibition through administrative and injunctive actions. Of course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit against violators of § 10(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "Both this Court and Congress have made clear that regulators and law enforcement have a unique and distinct role in enforcing the securities laws that is different – and oftentimes broader – than that afforded to private litigants. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. 444 U.S. 11[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 10; 9 As the Court explained: In § 10(b), Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in connectio n with the purchase or sale of securities. It envisioned that the SEC would enforce the statutory prohibition through administrative and injunctive actions. Of course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit against violators of § 10(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "Of course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit against violators of § 10(b). But the private plaintiff may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b). See also Janus Capital Grp., In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that Central Bank held that, \"Rule 10b-5's private right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "at 162. \"Congress amended the securities laws to provide for limited coverage of aiders and abettors. Aiding and 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].11 Regulators, thus, fulfill a unique and critical role in ensuring fairness in our markets, compensation to victims, and protection to investors. To carry out this role, regula tors must have access to the tools and remedies necessary to punish wrongdoers, deter future violative conduct, and recover funds for defrauded investors. Disgorgement is one of those essential tools.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws",
		"context": "1376, 1864–65 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(c) & 78aa(b)). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied2019 WL 5686461. In contrast, for private rights, in Section 929Y, 124 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "913 F.3d 1204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court Erroneously Adopted The Broadest Possible Reading Of CERCLA's Savings Clauses",
		"context": "Epic Systems 2018 WL 2292444. A court, after all , \"construe[s] statutes, not isolated provisions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is important, therefore, that a court \"read [a statute 's] words in their context and with a view to their pla ce in the overall statutory scheme.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court Erroneously Adopted The Broadest Possible Reading Of CERCLA's Savings Clauses",
		"context": "As seen above, in Section I, reading a savings clause out of conte xt can wreak havoc on the operation of the rest of the statute. Second, the court ignored \"the commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs th e general.\" RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in which a general permission o r prohibition is contradicted by a specific prohibiti on or permission.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "The fact of the matter is that the slightly different formulations of the test for waiver have existed for decades and proven workable, without generating any anomalous results. Indeed, numerous Circuit Courts have observed that \"[a]n inquiry into whether an arbitration right has been waived is factually specific and not susceptible to bright line rules.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; St. Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 969 F.2d at 590 (\"That principle is implicit in our repeated emphasis that waiver depends on all the circumstances in a particular case rather than on any rigid rules…\"); 603 F.3d 766.",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 F.3d 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "4 F.3d 176; St. Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 969 F.2d at 590 (\"That principle is implicit in our repeated emphasis that waiver depends on all the circumstances in a particular case rather than on any rigid rules…\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given this reality as to how federal and state courts look at waiver, the distinction between whether prejudice is considered a mandatory, separate component of the analysis, or just something to be considered in the mix, is simply not material to the outcomes of individual cases or to the development of the law in this area. 17 As further proof of this point, Circuit Courts on either side of the issue have been able to rely on decisions from Circuit Courts on the other side in evaluating prejudice and waiver.",
		"citation_value_orig": "603 F.3d 766",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": ", St. Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. , 969 F.2d at 591 (relying on Fourth Circuit decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir.1980) in concluding that plaintiff was prejudiced by defendant's litigation activity); Hill, 603 F.3d at 773 (relying on First, Fourth, Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits); 521 F.3d 421. The fact that different Circuits on either side of the supposed \"divide\" on this issue rely upon decisions from both sides in support of their assessment of waiver demonstrates that the vaunted distinction touted by Petitioner is of no practical significance. Lastly, this issue is stale as any slight difference in approaches to waiver among the Circuits has existed for decades and has proven workable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.2d 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "i, 3, 9. This is clearly not the case. The test for waiver relied upon by the Court below was originally set forth by the Eighth Circuit as early as 1991 in Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Seventh Circuit adopted its current approach only a year later in 1992. St. Mary's Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "924 F.2d 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "for Cancer Rsch. , 821 F.2d at 774. The remaining Circuit Courts' positions have also been set for at least twenty years.6 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]526 F.2d 777781 F.2d 494289 F.3d 434791 F.2d 691; S & H Contractors, 906 F.2d 1507 (\"A party has waived its right 19 Similarly, the Petition's reliance on this Court granting certiorari on this issue over ten years ago in Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A . is not evidence of the certworthiness of this issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "807 F.2d 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "for Cancer Rsch. , 821 F.2d at 774. The remaining Circuit Courts' positions have also been set for at least twenty years.6 6 807 F.2d 16526 F.2d 777[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]289 F.3d 434791 F.2d 691; S & H Contractors, 906 F.2d 1507 (\"A party has waived its right 19 Similarly, the Petition's reliance on this Court granting certiorari on this issue over ten years ago in Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A . is not evidence of the certworthiness of this issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.2d 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "for Cancer Rsch. , 821 F.2d at 774. The remaining Circuit Courts' positions have also been set for at least twenty years.6 6 807 F.2d 16526 F.2d 777781 F.2d 494[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]791 F.2d 691; S & H Contractors, 906 F.2d 1507 (\"A party has waived its right 19 Similarly, the Petition's reliance on this Court granting certiorari on this issue over ten years ago in Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A . is not evidence of the certworthiness of this issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 F.3d 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "for Cancer Rsch. , 821 F.2d at 774. The remaining Circuit Courts' positions have also been set for at least twenty years.6 6 807 F.2d 16526 F.2d 777781 F.2d 494289 F.3d 434[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; S & H Contractors, 906 F.2d 1507 (\"A party has waived its right 19 Similarly, the Petition's reliance on this Court granting certiorari on this issue over ten years ago in Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A . is not evidence of the certworthiness of this issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.2d 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
		"context": "for Cancer Rsch. , 821 F.2d at 774. The remaining Circuit Courts' positions have also been set for at least twenty years.6 6 807 F.2d 16526 F.2d 777781 F.2d 494289 F.3d 434791 F.2d 691; S & H Contractors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"A party has waived its right 19 Similarly, the Petition's reliance on this Court granting certiorari on this issue over ten years ago in Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A . is not evidence of the certworthiness of this issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "906 F.2d 1507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Act 900 does not refer to ERISA plans",
		"context": "That is not how this Court has understood those cases. In District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade , the District required employers to provide workers' compensation benefits that were \"meas- ured by reference to\" the specific benefits provided by employee-benefit plans, which were overwhelmingly ERISA plans. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that metric, Dillingham understood Greater Washington as a case where \"the existence of ERISA plans\"—not just any plans—\"[wa]s essential to the law's operation.\" Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Act 900 does not refer to ERISA plans",
		"context": "Given that metric, Dillingham understood Greater Washington as a case where \"the existence of ERISA plans\"—not just any plans—\"[wa]s essential to the law's operation.\" Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325. Likewise, in FMC [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a State forbade benefit plans, including ERISA plans, from reducing their benefits on account of a tort recovery. Id. at 55.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Collectivist Wealth Hypothesis Fails . 9",
		"context": "at 5. This Court has repudiated, however, the notion that the judiciaryshould \"impose a particular economic philosophy upon the Constitution.\" College Savings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The collectivist recharacterization of the ownership of property, moreover, is a theory thatwould be difficult to cabin. A given salary will be theproduct of an endless set of factors and agents: localinfrastructure, consumer appetites, advertising budgets, the size and skill le vel of the local population, the cost of outsourcing, etc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Collectivist Wealth Hypothesis Fails . 9",
		"context": "A given salary will be theproduct of an endless set of factors and agents: localinfrastructure, consumer appetites, advertising budgets, the size and skill le vel of the local population, the cost of outsourcing, etc. ad infinitum . Given \"the interconnectedness of economic activity,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 6This, of course, is not always true for any individual worker. The higher cost of unionized sta ff may induce the employer to lay off employees; for those workers, the union will have reduced theirsalary to zero. Ditto for all of the employees of a business thatcloses or relocates in response to the higher cost of union employees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Collectivist Wealth Hypothesis Fails . 9",
		"context": "at 19. How this helps Prof. Sachs is hard to see; when this Court addressed the issue, it reached the opposite result. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court squarely held that the interest income generated by client accounts commandeered under a state IOLTA program was the private property of the account owner for purposes ofthe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Whilethis Court subsequently held that the \"justcompensation\" due for any such taking was zero, 538 U.S. 216, that holding only addressed the remedy,not the nature of the property at issue. 7 In sum, Prof. Sachs has offered no persuasive reasoning for departing from the obvious – that money 7Nor did this Court address a First Amendment claim in either Phillips or Brown .",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Collectivist Wealth Hypothesis Fails . 9",
		"context": "How this helps Prof. Sachs is hard to see; when this Court addressed the issue, it reached the opposite result. In 524 U.S. 156, this Court squarely held that the interest income generated by client accounts commandeered under a state IOLTA program was the private property of the account owner for purposes ofthe Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Whilethis Court subsequently held that the \"justcompensation\" due for any such taking was zero, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that holding only addressed the remedy,not the nature of the property at issue. 7 In sum, Prof. Sachs has offered no persuasive reasoning for departing from the obvious – that money 7Nor did this Court address a First Amendment claim in either Phillips or Brown . 12 taken from an employee's wages is money taken from that employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The SEC Administrative Law Judges Are Not Officers of the United States",
		"context": "Because the SEC has re-tained final decisionmaking power for itself, its administrative law judges remain non-officer em-ployees. As the Court below explained, \"[o]ver time Con- gress expanded the responsibilities of the [Securi-ties and Exchange] Commission, and by 1960 it was administering six statutes[.]\" Raymond J. Lucia [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1961, \"the President sent Congress a proposal to al-low the Commission to delegate some of its respon-sibilities to divisions and individuals within the Commission\" and \"[i]n response, Congress enacted 'An Act to Authorize the Securities and Exchange Commission to Delegate Certain Functions.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "832 F.3d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that dis- posing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that in-terest.\" In other words, to intervene as of right \"(1) the ap- plication to intervene must be timely; (2) the applicant must demonstrate a legally protected interest in the action; (3) the action must th reaten to impair that in- terest; and (4) no party to the action can be an ade- quate representative of th e applicant's interests.\" 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, however, the Court need not determine whether the States' motion to intervene was timely. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 F.3d 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit tailored the scope of the injunctions to the plaintiffs actually before it. Pet. 1 See106 Va. L. Rev. 271[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, even if the preliminary injunction in this case had applied nationwi de, Petitioners' interests would still not be impaired by the decision in this case. The challenged decision here is an affirmance of a pre- liminary injunction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "Petitioners do not cite a single case where a court considered an appeal from a preliminary injunction af- ter another court ordered final relief—like vacatur of a rule—that rendered the preliminary injunction super- fluous. Nor could they, given that \"[a]n appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction becomes moot when, because of the defendant's compliance or some other change in circumstances, nothing remains to be enjoined through a permanent injunction.\" People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also , e.g., Univ. of 451 U.S. 390485 F. Supp. 3d 1. More fundamentally, however, regardless of whether the Illinois vacatur and subsequent regulatory action 17 technically render this preliminary injunction appeal moot,2 these facts make it impossible for Petitioners to establish that \"this action may as a practical matter impair or impede\" their interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "Nor could they, given that \"[a]n appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction becomes moot when, because of the defendant's compliance or some other change in circumstances, nothing remains to be enjoined through a permanent injunction.\" People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 396 F.3d 416; see also , e.g., Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]485 F. Supp. 3d 1. More fundamentally, however, regardless of whether the Illinois vacatur and subsequent regulatory action 17 technically render this preliminary injunction appeal moot,2 these facts make it impossible for Petitioners to establish that \"this action may as a practical matter impair or impede\" their interests. Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "87-89. 3 Notably, Petitioners would be foreclosed from filing a Peti- tion for Certiorari regarding th e December 2020 decision since the \"mandatory and jurisdictional\" deadline to file has passed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 case, but that motion was denied. Cook 2021 WL 3633917.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "32), the fact that something may happen in the future that could cause a party's interests to be im- paired is not an adequate basis for intervention as of right. See, e.g. , Standard Heating and Air Condition- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]749 F.2d 968. And \"[i]ntervention cannot be used as a means to inject collateral issues into an existing action.\" 198 F.3d 360.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "32), the fact that something may happen in the future that could cause a party's interests to be im- paired is not an adequate basis for intervention as of right. See, e.g. , Standard Heating and Air Condition- ing 137 F.3d 567[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"[i]ntervention cannot be used as a means to inject collateral issues into an existing action.\" 198 F.3d 360.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.2d 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": ", Standard Heating and Air Condition- ing 137 F.3d 567749 F.2d 968. And \"[i]ntervention cannot be used as a means to inject collateral issues into an existing action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, the possibility that circumstances may change in the future based on the actions of different courts addressing a different motion brought by a group of States in a differe nt case does not establish 19 that Petitioners have interests that are currently be- ing, or at risk of being, impaired in the Ninth Circuit .4 Notably, Petitioners' discussion of the Illinois va- catur makes clear that at lea st part of their rationale for seeking intervention here is to generate jurispru- dence from this Court now that would influence ongo-ing and future proceedings in the Seventh Circuit. Indeed, they frankly acknowledge this intent, stating: \"If this Court concludes that the Petitioners should have been granted intervention here, the Seventh Cir- cuit has no justifiable reason for denying intervention there.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 F.3d 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "But a generalized interest in the favora-ble development of caselaw—whether on the merits of the Public Charge Rule, th e standard for appellate in- tervention, or otherwise—is insufficient to support in- tervention. \"Mere interest in the establishment of a legal precedent is not sufficient\" to give a party the right to intervene \"to appeal a decision which all other parties have decided not to appeal.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g., Alaska Excursion Cruises, 603 F. Supp. 541. 4 And even if circumstances do change in the Illinois case, Petitioners' interests still would not be impaired by the geograph-ically limited preliminary injunctions at issue here. 20 In short, under the current circumstances, Peti- tioners' alleged economic interests are simply not impaired by a decision upholding a preliminary in- junction that (1) does not apply in their states and (2) has been superseded by a final judgment of vacatur in another case, along with subsequent executive ac- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 F.2d 509",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "But a generalized interest in the favora-ble development of caselaw—whether on the merits of the Public Charge Rule, th e standard for appellate in- tervention, or otherwise—is insufficient to support in- tervention. \"Mere interest in the establishment of a legal precedent is not sufficient\" to give a party the right to intervene \"to appeal a decision which all other parties have decided not to appeal.\" 559 F.2d 509; see also, e.g., Alaska Excursion Cruises, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 And even if circumstances do change in the Illinois case, Petitioners' interests still would not be impaired by the geograph-ically limited preliminary injunctions at issue here. 20 In short, under the current circumstances, Peti- tioners' alleged economic interests are simply not impaired by a decision upholding a preliminary in- junction that (1) does not apply in their states and (2) has been superseded by a final judgment of vacatur in another case, along with subsequent executive ac- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "603 F. Supp. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fifth Circuit failed to look at the controlling statute in interpreting the regulation",
		"context": "\"Agency regulations must be consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes and policies embedded in the 7 Congressional statute which authorized them.\" Id. University of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[F]inally, 'a regulation must be interpreted in such a way as to not conflict with the objective of its organic statute.\" Canyon Food Co., 849 F.3d 1279, conflicts with the underlying statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "82 F.3d 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fifth Circuit failed to look at the controlling statute in interpreting the regulation",
		"context": "Canyon Food Co., 849 F.3d 1279, conflicts with the underlying statute. Accordingly, if the Fifth Circuit's interpretation is valid, the proper remedy would be to set the regulation aside as it invalidates the exempt status of employees who qualify as exempt under the statute. See Cheshire [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, there is no need to invalidate the regulation. The Fifth Circuit was presented with a perfectly valid and reasonable interpretation of the regulation that does not conflict with the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "689 F.2d 1112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. California Virtually Never Uses Schedule Bs To Investigate Wrongdoing",
		"context": "ER1014 -15; SER1132 -36. A party cannot use privilege as a shield to prevent discovery and then rely on the withheld information as a sword to prove a defense. Chevron [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. United States v. Rylander , 460 U .S. 752, 758 (1983) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "974 F.2d 1156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "23- 24. But the Federal Circuit cogently rejected Minerva's analogy to Lear more than 30 years ago. The Federal Circuit first considered assignor estop - pel in Diamond Scientific [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lear had repudiated licensee es- toppel almost two decades prior, and the assignor i n Di- amond Scientific argued that Lear demolished the foun- dation of assignor estoppel. But after carefully a nalyzing Lear and this Court's other assignor estoppel prece- dents, the Federal Circuit concluded that \"the auto matic application to assignment cases of the rationale un derly- ing Lear and licensees\" would be inappropriate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.2d 1220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "On occasion, infringing assignors have pressed the court to reconsider Diamond Scientific , but each time, the court has refused. See, e.g. , Mentor Graphics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mentor Graphics 870 F.3d 1298. The distinction the Federal Circuit has long drawn between licensee estoppel and assignor estoppel is sound. See infra Part II.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "851 F.3d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "On occasion, infringing assignors have pressed the court to reconsider Diamond Scientific , but each time, the court has refused. See, e.g. , Mentor Graphics 851 F.3d 1275; Mentor Graphics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The distinction the Federal Circuit has long drawn between licensee estoppel and assignor estoppel is sound. See infra Part II.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "870 F.3d 1298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "See infra Part II.A. But regardless, Minerva's disagreement with the Federal Circuit's decades-old 3 See, e.g. , MAG Aerospace Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pandrol USA, 424 F.3d 1161; Mentor Graphics 150 F.3d 1374; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573; Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d 789. 15 reasoning does not create a split of authority, nor \"the patent equivalent\" thereof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.3d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "See infra Part II.A. But regardless, Minerva's disagreement with the Federal Circuit's decades-old 3 See, e.g. , MAG Aerospace Indus., 816 F.3d 1374; Pandrol USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mentor Graphics 150 F.3d 1374; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573; Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d 789. 15 reasoning does not create a split of authority, nor \"the patent equivalent\" thereof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.3d 1161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "See infra Part II.A. But regardless, Minerva's disagreement with the Federal Circuit's decades-old 3 See, e.g. , MAG Aerospace Indus., 816 F.3d 1374; Pandrol USA, 424 F.3d 1161; Mentor Graphics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573; Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d 789. 15 reasoning does not create a split of authority, nor \"the patent equivalent\" thereof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "See infra Part II.A. But regardless, Minerva's disagreement with the Federal Circuit's decades-old 3 See, e.g. , MAG Aerospace Indus., 816 F.3d 1374; Pandrol USA, 424 F.3d 1161; Mentor Graphics 150 F.3d 1374; Carroll Touch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d 789. 15 reasoning does not create a split of authority, nor \"the patent equivalent\" thereof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "15 F.3d 1573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear",
		"context": "See infra Part II.A. But regardless, Minerva's disagreement with the Federal Circuit's decades-old 3 See, e.g. , MAG Aerospace Indus., 816 F.3d 1374; Pandrol USA, 424 F.3d 1161; Mentor Graphics 150 F.3d 1374; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573; Shamrock Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 reasoning does not create a split of authority, nor \"the patent equivalent\" thereof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.2d 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "26-27, 34. To the contrary, in its openi ng statement at trial, SFFA claimed to \"support[] diversity on campus\" and pro-claimed that \"[d]iversity and its benefits are not on trial here.\" CAJA 453:14-16; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Throughout the trial, SFFA also failed to rebut the extensive record evidence regarding the educational benefits of College students also support student-body diversity and val- ue the learning opportunities it provides. See Carey et al., It's col- lege admissions season, and students are looking for diverse cam- puses, Wash. Post (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "Moreover, this is not the right case to \"reconsider some of the Court's most significant equal-protection precedents\" because SFFA brought only statutory claims under Title VI, so the Court would have to con- front whether any revision of its jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause could be imported into that statute consistent with Congress's intent when it enacted Title VI. U.S. Br. 21; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"it would be anomalous to grant review to recon- sider Grutter \" in this case because SFFA's \"most heavily pressed claim\"— i.e., that Harvard allegedly discriminates against Asian-American applicants—\"does not implicate Grutter's holding.\" Indeed, alt- hough SFFA argues (Reply 9) that Grutter should be overruled because it has negatively affected Asian Americans (an incorrect argument on its own, see supra pp. 6-7), that conflates the two questions on which SFFA seeks certiorari, making SFFA's arguments for overruling these longstanding precedents dependent on 10 its counterfactual assertions about intentional discrimi- nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "6-7), that conflates the two questions on which SFFA seeks certiorari, making SFFA's arguments for overruling these longstanding precedents dependent on 10 its counterfactual assertions about intentional discrimi- nation. This case is also a poor vehicle for reviewing either question presented because, as the government notes (at 20), this Court would need to resolve \"[s]ubstantial questions\" about SFFA's standing before reaching the merits, none of which woul d independently warrant re- view. Unlike Bakke , Grutter, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Fisher, which were brought by individ- ual university applicants, this suit was brought by an organization that purports to maintain associational standing. Although the district court found SFFA had standing based on some SFFA members' experience with Harvard's admissions program, the government correctly notes (at 20) the \"gap in the record\" concern- ing whether any of SFFA's members currently has a live interest in admission. See also Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "Id. at 21 (quot- ing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); cf. 570 U.S. 693. Yet SFFA's efforts are directed by individuals with no personal stake in the outcome.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "at 21 (quot- ing International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of 477 U.S. 274); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet SFFA's efforts are directed by individuals with no personal stake in the outcome. The record reveals no meaningful role 11 played by any of SFFA's purported members, much less those with \"standing to sue in their own right,\" 432 U.S. 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "570 U.S. 693. Yet SFFA's efforts are directed by individuals with no personal stake in the outcome. The record reveals no meaningful role 11 played by any of SFFA's purported members, much less those with \"standing to sue in their own right,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. SFFA's members lack power, for example, to choose the organization's offic-ers or vote on its priorities, and the sole member- selected director can always be outvoted by the four leadership-elected directors. CAJA 338-344.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
		"context": "10), it re- ceived just $730 in dues in 2015 and 2016—less than .04% of its total revenues. See CAJA 356; CAJA 379. Those facts distinguish this ca se from the sole decision of this Court that SFFA cites (Reply 4)— Parents In- volved in Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—in which the Court decided a challenge to use of race in school assignment plans brought by a membership organization. 4",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts",
		"context": "Dist. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Barnes , this Court explained that punitive damages are \"not normally available for contract actions\" and are \"of indeterminate magnitude.\" Barnes , 536 U.S. at 188.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts",
		"context": "(empha sis in original) ). This Court's reluctance to imply a punitive damages remedy into the statute was consistent with its shift away from implying private rights of action to enforce statutes in the first instance. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 damages are not recoverable. Emotional distress damages, like punitive damages , are unliquidated, subjective, unlimit ed and unpredictable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts",
		"context": "Thus, e motional distress damages, like punitive damages, are entirely different than typical pecuniary damages for which a contracting party would be on clear notice it was exposing itself by entering into the contract. Finally, the statement in Barnes that \"[ p]unitive damages are not compensatory, and are therefore not embraced within the rule described in Bell,\" indicated only that th is Court's decision did not upset the rule that \"courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done,\" which means \"the recipient compensates \" the injured party. Barnes , 536 U.S. at 189 (emphasis in original) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It did not mean that all funding recipients are on notice that they may be subject to liability for any form o f compensatory damages even if they otherwise present the same concerns as punitive damages. For these reasons, the issue presented by this case is far more complex and difficult than the United States and Petitioner would have it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2.4 Circuit Court tests that have followed Steele to require a substantial impact on U.S. commerce should be preserved, but the impact should be within the focus of the Lanham Act",
		"context": "Other circuits have required only \"some\" impact on foreign commerce. See, e.g. , Wells Fargo & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], followed in Am. Rice, 710 F.2d 408. The result in American Rice was extreme and represents an outlier7 among cases considering the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.2d 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Contrary to Iskanian, the FAA makes no distinction between the arbitration of ordinary commercial disputes and disputes between the government and private individuals",
		"context": "Congress expresses it s purpose by words. It is for us to ascertain—neither to add nor to subtract,neither to delete nor to distort.\" 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]here is no warrant for seeking refined arguments to show that the statute does notmean what it says.\" 280 U.S. 396.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Contrary to Iskanian, the FAA makes no distinction between the arbitration of ordinary commercial disputes and disputes between the government and private individuals",
		"context": "62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of 340 U.S. 593. \"[T]here is no warrant for seeking refined arguments to show that the statute does notmean what it says.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": ". Direct appellate review is the primary method of challenging a criminal conviction. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \" 'When the process of direct review ... comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.' \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U. S. 619",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "'When the process of direct review ... comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.' \" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Once all avenues of relief on direct review have been exhausted, a prisoner may continue to challenge his or her conviction via habeas corpus. A prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of state court may seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal court only on the ground that he or she \"is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U. S. 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "593 U. S. None. The statute \"places a new con- 11 straint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits by a state court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 538 U. S. 202. As a general rule, a federal habeas court is prohibited from granting relief \"with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court ... unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea- sonable application of, clearly established Federal law\" as determined by this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U. S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "593 U. S. None. The statute \"places a new con- 11 straint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits by a state court.\" 529 U. S. 362; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a general rule, a federal habeas court is prohibited from granting relief \"with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court ... unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea- sonable application of, clearly established Federal law\" as determined by this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U. S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). AEDPA imposes a partial, not complete, \"bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The exception that makes the bar less than complete, though, \"is difficult to meet ... because it was meant to be.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U. S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "Ibid. \"AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.\" Burt v. Titlow , 571 U. S., at 19; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Prior to AEDPA, federal habeas courts owed no deference to state court determinations of federal law and could grant a state prisoner's habeas petition if the federal habeas \"court were to conclude in its independ- ent judgment that the ... state court had erred on a question of constitutional law....\" Williams , 529 U. S., at 402 (opinion of O'Connor, J. ); see also Dodson, Habeas Review of Perfunctory State Court Decisions on the Merits, 29 Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U. S. 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "507 U. S., at 633.4 This Court held that the Chapman standard (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) that is applicable to cases on direct review is not the standard to be applied on federal habeas review. On de novo review, federal courts were permitted to give no deference to the state court's harmlessness determination and to decide from scratch whether the claimed error \" 'had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' \" Id., at 637 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"Under this stan- dard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of the constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.' \" Brecht , 507 U. S., at 637; see also 525 U. S. 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U. S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "\" Id., at 637 (quoting 328 U. S. 750). \"Under this stan- dard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of the constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.' \" Brecht , 507 U. S., at 637; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress enacted AEDPA three years after Brecht was decided. However, Brecht remains good law and was not \"overruled\" by AEDPA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U. S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "Congress enacted AEDPA three years after Brecht was decided. However, Brecht remains good law and was not \"overruled\" by AEDPA. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 576 U. S. 257. The question that has confused federal habeas courts is how to apply these two stan- dards when addressing harmless error. Is a state court's \"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt\" determination entitled to AEDPA deference?",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U. S. 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "13 tions depend largely on how the habeas case arrives at the federal court from the state court. The holdings, if not the dicta, of this Court's precedents guide the answers to all three questions. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that when a state court deter- mines that a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard, \"habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-error review in an 'objectively unrea- sonable' manner.\" This standard requires the habeas petitioner to \"show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibil- ity for fairminded disagreement.\" 562 U. S. 86; see also 565 U. S. 23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U. S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "In 540 U. S. 12, this Court held that when a state court deter- mines that a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard, \"habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-error review in an 'objectively unrea- sonable' manner.\" This standard requires the habeas petitioner to \"show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibil- ity for fairminded disagreement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 565 U. S. 23. Esparza thus establishes that when a state court determines that a constitutional error is harmless under Chapman, AEDPA provides a threshold determi- nation to be applied by federal courts considering a collateral attack on that judgment. In making that determination, the federal habeas court is \"limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudi- cated the claim on the merits.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U. S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "In 540 U. S. 12, this Court held that when a state court deter- mines that a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard, \"habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-error review in an 'objectively unrea- sonable' manner.\" This standard requires the habeas petitioner to \"show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibil- ity for fairminded disagreement.\" 562 U. S. 86; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Esparza thus establishes that when a state court determines that a constitutional error is harmless under Chapman, AEDPA provides a threshold determi- nation to be applied by federal courts considering a collateral attack on that judgment. In making that determination, the federal habeas court is \"limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudi- cated the claim on the merits.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U. S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "Esparza thus establishes that when a state court determines that a constitutional error is harmless under Chapman, AEDPA provides a threshold determi- nation to be applied by federal courts considering a collateral attack on that judgment. In making that determination, the federal habeas court is \"limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudi- cated the claim on the merits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because Esparza found that the habeas petitioner did not prove that the state court's harmlessness determination satisfied the strict mandate of § 2254(d)(1), this Court held that habeas relief was not warranted and did not address Brecht . Esparza , 540 U. S., at 18-19.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U. S. 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Collateral review and harmless error",
		"context": "The AEDPA standard properly applied in that case to the state court's decision that there was no constitutional error. The question of how to apply the two standards when the state court has considered the Chapman issue on the merits was not before the Court, and the Court did not fully \"canvas the consider- ations,\" rendering the comment dictum. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5 Esparza held that Chapman holdings of harmless error are subject to the AEDPA standard. Fry held that a petitioner cannot obtain relief on a habeas corpus claim unless he clears the Brecht hurdle, even if the 5. \"Is the Court having once written dicta calling a tomato a vegetable bound to deny that it is a fruit forever after?\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U. S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Circuit Court's Opinion Is Consistent with Central Bank and Janus",
		"context": "2 As discussed in Part II below, Petitioner was also a \"maker\" under Janus . 15 But Central Bank and Janus are not so feeble. The Circuit Court's opinion, together with other decisions such as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], more than adequately explain why holding Petitioner liable on a scheme liability theory is completely consistent with Central Bank , Janus and the Court's other precedents. Central Bank stands for the proposition that private litigants cannot bring aiding and abetting claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Nationwide injunctions violate the doctrine of separation of powers",
		"context": ". In 2018, Justice Thomas issued a masterful concurrence casting severe doubt on the constitutionality of nationwide injunctions and urging the Court to consider the issue. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the nationwide injunction in this case was inappropriate and suggests that he is willing to discuss the constitutionality of nationwide injunctions altogether. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 32-35, Trump v. Pennsylvania (No. 19-454).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "v. Burwell , No. 16 -cv-150 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 29, 2016) ................................ ................ 18 Allina Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ ... 18 American Hosp. 834 F.2d 1037 ................................ ................................ ... 11 Clarian Health West, 878 F.3d 346 ................................ ................................ ... 13 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.3d 1102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "16 -cv-150 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 29, 2016) ................................ ................ 18 Allina Health 746 F.3d 1102 ................................ ................................ ... 18 American Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ ... 11 Clarian Health West, 878 F.3d 346 ................................ ................................ ... 13 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied,498 U.S. 817 ................................ ................................ ...................... 7 416 U.S. 267 ................................ ................................ .. 15, 16, 17, 18 135 S. Ct. 1199 ......................... 17 514 U.S. 87 ................................ ................................ ........ 13, 18, 19 II Statutes, regulations, and rule: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.2d 1037",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "16 -cv-150 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 29, 2016) ................................ ................ 18 Allina Health 746 F.3d 1102 ................................ ................................ ... 18 American Hosp. 834 F.2d 1037 ................................ ................................ ... 11 Clarian Health West, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ ... 13 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied,498 U.S. 817 ................................ ................................ ...................... 7 416 U.S. 267 ................................ ................................ .. 15, 16, 17, 18 135 S. Ct. 1199 ......................... 17 514 U.S. 87 ................................ ................................ ........ 13, 18, 19 II Statutes, regulations, and rule: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.3d 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "834 F.2d 1037 ................................ ................................ ... 11 Clarian Health West, 878 F.3d 346 ................................ ................................ ... 13 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied,498 U.S. 817 ................................ ................................ ...................... 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ .. 15, 16, 17, 18 135 S. Ct. 1199 ......................... 17 514 U.S. 87 ................................ ................................ ........ 13, 18, 19 II Statutes, regulations, and rule: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. ............. 4 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "834 F.2d 1037 ................................ ................................ ... 11 Clarian Health West, 878 F.3d 346 ................................ ................................ ... 13 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied,498 U.S. 817 ................................ ................................ ...................... 7 416 U.S. 267 ................................ ................................ .. 15, 16, 17, 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................... 17 514 U.S. 87 ................................ ................................ ........ 13, 18, 19 II Statutes, regulations, and rule: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. ............. 4 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "834 F.2d 1037 ................................ ................................ ... 11 Clarian Health West, 878 F.3d 346 ................................ ................................ ... 13 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied,498 U.S. 817 ................................ ................................ ...................... 7 416 U.S. 267 ................................ ................................ .. 15, 16, 17, 18 135 S. Ct. 1199 ......................... 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ ........ 13, 18, 19 II Statutes, regulations, and rule: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. ............. 4 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
		"context": "551 et seq. , that Section 1395hh(a)(2) was enacted to mak e applicable to the Medicare program , the agency may adopt interpreta- tions of the Medicare Act without p romulgating them through notice -and-comment rulemaking , and may later change its interpretation without undertaking notice - and-comment rulemaking. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . B. As the government 's opening brief explains , the calculation of respondents' FY2012 Medicare fractions did not change a \"substantive legal standard \"—and thus did not need to be promulgated using the notice - and-comment procedures in Section 1395hh —for sev- eral reasons, including: (1) the calculation of the frac- tions is based on a nonbinding interpretation of the Medicare Act that is at most an interpretive rule to which the notice -and-comment procedures of Section 1395hh do not apply , Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Amicus's Test Conflicts With The Constitution",
		"context": "Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 1, at 1- 2 (1890); see also James L. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies 581 (3d ed. 1896) (similar). Further, examples of officials who could not bind others but were held by this Court to be Officers are legion, including \"thousands of clerks\" in various departments, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1879 ), responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" Hennen , 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 259. See also Jennifer Mascott, Who Are 'Officers of the United States'?",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Amicus's Test Conflicts With The Constitution",
		"context": "Id. at 665; accord Free En- ter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, the only officials to pass Amicus 's pro- posed test would be principal Officers . Accepting that test thus would rewrite our Constitution, transform- ing an essential distinction between types of Officers into one between Officers and employees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 F.3d 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Amicus's Test Conflicts With The Constitution",
		"context": "Moreover, Amicus 's proposed requirement that Officers have authority to bind others in their own name cannot be reconciled wi th the nature of dele- gated authority. Because all executive power is vested in the President , delegated authority is exercised not in the name of a subordinate Officer, but on behalf of the President (or the United States). For example, United States A ttorneys —who are Officers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —exercise exec- utive power not in their own name, but on behalf of the United States. A ppellate judges similarly speak for the court of appeals , not themselves, and issue ma- jority opinions in the court's name. Amicus 's second proposed requirement, therefore, could be interpreted to read out all Officers from the Constitution's execu- tive structure , since only the President actually acts in his own name .",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "2010) (public school lunches); Grand Union Co. v. United States , 696 F .2d 888 (11th Cir. 1983) (food stamps); U.S. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 19 experimental fail ures of sanguine inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armories.\" U.S. ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2015 WL 1446547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "It is common, even typical, for those assisting the government in implementing its programs to be subject to detailed statutory , regulatory , and contractual obligations. As courts have recognized, those legal regimes are at minimum \"complex\" (Federal Family Education Loan Program), 4 if not \"complex [and] poorly- worded\" (Small 4 U.S. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Many federal regulatory regimes are so reticulated and challenging that courts and scholars routinely describe them as \"byzantine[] and all -encompassing\" (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937),6 \"intricate\" and \"almost unintelligible\" (the Social Security Act),7 and \"onerous and impenetrable\" and \"byzantine to the point of incomprehensibility\" (govern - ment procurement rules).8 That brings us to the Medicare and Medicaid programs at issue here, which this Court has described as involving \"a massive, complex program,\" \"embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes and thousands of pages of often interrelated regulations,\" 9 and which seven federal courts of appeals 5 H.B. Mac, 36 Fed. Cl. 793153 F.3d 1338.",
		"citation_value_orig": "639 F.3d 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "639 F.3d 791. Many federal regulatory regimes are so reticulated and challenging that courts and scholars routinely describe them as \"byzantine[] and all -encompassing\" (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937),6 \"intricate\" and \"almost unintelligible\" (the Social Security Act),7 and \"onerous and impenetrable\" and \"byzantine to the point of incomprehensibility\" (govern - ment procurement rules).8 That brings us to the Medicare and Medicaid programs at issue here, which this Court has described as involving \"a massive, complex program,\" \"embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes and thousands of pages of often interrelated regulations,\" 9 and which seven federal courts of appeals 5 H.B. Mac, 36 Fed. Cl. 793[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orang e 912 F. Supp. 1325.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 F.3d 1338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "Mac, 36 Fed. Cl. 793153 F.3d 1338. 6 U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orang e [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 453 U.S. 34; David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers , 123 Yale L.J. 616, 672 n.180 (2013) (referencing \"byzantine\" two -thousand -page Federal Acquisition Regulati ons governing federal government procurement).",
		"citation_value_orig": "912 F. Supp. 1325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "6 U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orang e 912 F. Supp. 1325. 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers , 123 Yale L.J. 616, 672 n.180 (2013) (referencing \"byzantine\" two -thousand -page Federal Acquisition Regulati ons governing federal government procurement). 9 529 U.S. 1; see also Wisc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "7 453 U.S. 34; David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers , 123 Yale L.J. 616, 672 n.180 (2013) (referencing \"byzantine\" two -thousand -page Federal Acquisition Regulati ons governing federal government procurement). 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Wisc. Dep't of Health & Fam. 534 U.S. 473 (Medicaid is an \"intricate statutory and administrative 21 have deemed to be \" among the most completely impen - etrable texts within human experience.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "18-19, supra, would instead be used to pursue treble damages based on unsettled and disputed questions involving statutory , regulatory , or contractual minutiae. But cf. Escobar , 579 regime[]\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]742 F.3d 1239; 715 F.3d 1146; Abraham Lincoln Mem. 698 F.3d 536 ; Personal Care Prods., Inc 635 F.3d 155; Cooper Univ. Hosp 636 F.3d 44 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "18-19, supra, would instead be used to pursue treble damages based on unsettled and disputed questions involving statutory , regulatory , or contractual minutiae. But cf. Escobar , 579 regime[]\"); 529 U.S. 667[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 715 F.3d 1146; Abraham Lincoln Mem. 698 F.3d 536 ; Personal Care Prods., Inc 635 F.3d 155; Cooper Univ. Hosp 636 F.3d 44 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "742 F.3d 1239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "18-19, supra, would instead be used to pursue treble damages based on unsettled and disputed questions involving statutory , regulatory , or contractual minutiae. But cf. Escobar , 579 regime[]\"); 529 U.S. 667742 F.3d 1239; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Abraham Lincoln Mem. 698 F.3d 536 ; Personal Care Prods., Inc 635 F.3d 155; Cooper Univ. Hosp 636 F.3d 44 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "715 F.3d 1146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "But cf. Escobar , 579 regime[]\"); 529 U.S. 667742 F.3d 1239; 715 F.3d 1146; Abraham Lincoln Mem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Personal Care Prods., Inc 635 F.3d 155; Cooper Univ. Hosp 636 F.3d 44 . 22 U.S. at 196 (\"[T]he False Claims Act is not a means of imposing treble damages and other penalties for insignificant regulatory or contractual violations.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "698 F.3d 536",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "But cf. Escobar , 579 regime[]\"); 529 U.S. 667742 F.3d 1239; 715 F.3d 1146; Abraham Lincoln Mem. 698 F.3d 536 ; Personal Care Prods., Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cooper Univ. Hosp 636 F.3d 44 . 22 U.S. at 196 (\"[T]he False Claims Act is not a means of imposing treble damages and other penalties for insignificant regulatory or contractual violations.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "635 F.3d 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "Escobar , 579 regime[]\"); 529 U.S. 667742 F.3d 1239; 715 F.3d 1146; Abraham Lincoln Mem. 698 F.3d 536 ; Personal Care Prods., Inc 635 F.3d 155; Cooper Univ. Hosp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 22 U.S. at 196 (\"[T]he False Claims Act is not a means of imposing treble damages and other penalties for insignificant regulatory or contractual violations.\"). Examples include: • Whether a roofing subcontractor knowingly \"violated the Davis -Bacon Act by deducting Trust contributions from the paychecks of employees whose rights to fringe benefits had not yet vested ,\" but the agency manual addressed only insurance plans, not trust contributions .11 • Whether brazed sensor joints met requirements for diametrical clearance, masking, and sto p-off and flux removal .",
		"citation_value_orig": "636 F.3d 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability",
		"context": "Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union 828 F.3d 587. 12 U.S. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 2009 WL 579380. 23 • Whether highway inspectors met minimum requirements under \"ambiguous\" and \"incon - sistent sets of qualifications\" set forth in a number of contract attachments.14 In each case , courts ruled for the defendants on motions to dismiss or at summary judgment because their positions were objectively reasonable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "812 F.3d 556",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Invalidation of a Generally Applicable Program Reflects No Religious Hostility",
		"context": "It will not satisfy groups whose religious beliefs preclude them from participating in a government-sponsored program, and who may well feel ignored as government funds primarily support the education of children in the doctrines of the dominant religions. And it does little to ameliorate the entanglement problems or the related problems of social division[.] [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Breyer did not persuade the majority that the Establishment Clause required invalidating programs like Montana's, but his views were not rooted in bigotry. Montana's adoption of that position as a matter of state constitutional law— in a State where religious education is the only private school choice for many students—likewise cannot be attributed to religious hostility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Invalidation of a Generally Applicable Program Reflects No Religious Hostility",
		"context": "Rather, the Montana Supreme Court's decision was narrow. The court recognized that a \"tax exemption in many cases is economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It therefore concluded that the tax credit was the economic equivalent of a direct subsidy of religious school tuition, and hence an \"indirect payment\" to religious schools under state law. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Texas has standing to vindicate the financial costs it suffers to enforce an unconstitutional law",
		"context": "The United States counters (at 49 n.6) that Texas can meet Congress's con-dition on spending by describ ing its noncompliance with federal law. Such a remarkable interpretation of a spend- ing condition, introduced for th e first time in litigation, is entitled to little if any deference. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if true , however, Texas still has standing because it must maintain records of its compliance with the race- based preferences to describe that noncompliance. 81 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Texas has standing to vindicate the financial costs it suffers to enforce an unconstitutional law",
		"context": "Palmore , 466 U.S. at 433. This satisfies the three -part test for third -party standing —namely: (1) a close relationship to the third party, (2) some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its own interests, and (3) a concrete injury. Pow- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, a pplying the Powers factors to Geor- gia's prohibition on discriminatory jury strikes by crimi-nal defendants , the Court noted that defense counsel's actions were attributable to the State, which may not \"deny persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\" 505 U.S. 42 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Texas has standing to vindicate the financial costs it suffers to enforce an unconstitutional law",
		"context": "Pow- 499 U.S. 400 . For example, a pplying the Powers factors to Geor- gia's prohibition on discriminatory jury strikes by crimi-nal defendants , the Court noted that defense counsel's actions were attributable to the State, which may not \"deny persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The nature of the violation hindered the dismissed juror from asserting his own rig hts, which injured the State by \"plac[ing] the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Texas has standing to vindicate the financial costs it suffers to enforce an unconstitutional law",
		"context": "Indeed, as the party whose \"judicial process is under- mined,\" this Court held that Georgia was \"the logical and proper party to assert the invasion of the consti tutional rights of the excluded jurors in a criminal trial.\" Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same factors that allowed Georgia to challenge racially biased jury selection exist here: actors whose be-havior is attributable to the State are required to apply ICWA. McCollum , 505 U.S. at 55- 56.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress Has The Power To Modify Or Displace The State Secrets Privilege",
		"context": "Congress can by statute modify or displace the state secrets privilege. \"Congress, of course, has ple- nary authority over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Federal Rule of Evi- dence 501 provides \"[t]he co mmon law . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Delays in Obtaining Justice Cause Significant Harm to Victims of Violent Crime",
		"context": "6 Even though no Eddings error actually occurred. 7 \"This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, pro- duce a second trial no more reliab le as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (com- mon features of the criminal justice system, such as delay, can exacerbate the impact of the initial crime, leading to a secondary victimization); Dean G. Kilpat- rick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Vic- tims: Epidemiology and Outcomes , 16 J. Traum. Stress 119 (2003) (review of epid emiological estimates of criminal victimization derived largely from nationally based studies in the United States, documenting men-tal health outcomes of violence with a focus on PTSD, but also including depress ion, substance abuse, and panic); Patricia A. Resick, The Psychological Impact of Rape , 8 J. Interpersonal Violence 223, 225 (1993) (re- view of the literature on the psychological impact of rape on adult female victims, discussing, among other problems, fear and anxiety, PTSD, depression, poor self-esteem, social adjustme nt issues, and sexual dys- functions). Victims of all types of violent crime can experience PTSD or various symptom clusters, but homicide sur-vivors are twice as likely to meet the criteria for PTSD and report more symptoms of PTSD than victims of other types of trauma.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "Pac. Bell Tel. 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has long sought to structure its antitrust jurisprudence to \"provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial sys- tem.\" Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. 36.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "3 555 U.S. 438. It has long sought to structure its antitrust jurisprudence to \"provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial sys- tem.\" Cont'l T. V., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it ha s consciously made efforts to develop antitrust rules that promote \"business certainty and litigation efficiency.\" 457 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. 36. And it ha s consciously made efforts to develop antitrust rules that promote \"business certainty and litigation efficiency.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this respect, the Court agrees with Professo r Areeda that \"[n]o court should impose a duty that it cannot explain or ade-quately and reasonably supervise.\" Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.540 U.S. 398.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "457 U.S. 332. In this respect, the Court agrees with Professo r Areeda that \"[n]o court should impose a duty that it cannot explain or ade-quately and reasonably supervise.\" Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Providing meaningful guidance to the business com- munity has been a particular emphasis of this Court's an- titrust jurisprudence. The Court has recognized the in- sufficiency of an antitrust regime that leaves \"business- men with little to aid them in predicting in any par- ticular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "Providing meaningful guidance to the business com- munity has been a particular emphasis of this Court's an- titrust jurisprudence. The Court has recognized the in- sufficiency of an antitrust regime that leaves \"business- men with little to aid them in predicting in any par- ticular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has thus sought to \"establish the litigation structure to ensure\" that anti-trust law \"operates to eliminate anticompetitive re- straints from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses.\" Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "405 U.S. 596. It has thus sought to \"establish the litigation structure to ensure\" that anti-trust law \"operates to eliminate anticompetitive re- straints from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses.\" Leegin Creative Leather Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The impetus for this policy is not to benefit any indi- vidual business, but rather to foster the procompetitive conduct that drives a health y economy. This Court has observed that vague or overbroad antitrust rules \"are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "Matsushita Elec. Indus. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, courts \"must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discourag- ing legitimate price competition\" or other procompetitive conduct. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
		"context": "In other words, courts \"must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discourag- ing legitimate price competition\" or other procompetitive conduct. Ibid. (quoting Barry Wright [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.2d 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "Nothing about criminal convictions should categorically insulate the CAT analysis from judicial review for factual errors. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to noncitizens ordered removed \"by rea son of having committed a criminal offense\" covered by one of several statutory cross references, including grounds relating to crimes involving \"moral turpitude.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moral turpitude is a common law te rm not defined by statute. See 341 U.S. 223.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 F.3d 1115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "See 517 F.3d 1115. Moral turpitude is a common law te rm not defined by statute. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Early case law applied the term to \"crimes . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "See2 I. & N. Dec. 134. But more recent cases interpret th e term broadly, finding that \"neither the seriousness of the offense nor the severity of the sentence imposed is determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude.\" Matter of Serna , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, low -level offenses have been found turpitudinous. See,20 I. & N. Dec. 436394 F. App'x 517710 F.3d 734.",
		"citation_value_orig": "20 I. & N. Dec. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "Matter of Serna , 20 I. & N. Dec. 579. Thus, low -level offenses have been found turpitudinous. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]394 F. App'x 517710 F.3d 734. The first renders noncitizens inadmissible for a conviction for \"any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.\" And Section 1227(a)(2)(B) makes a noncitizen \"de portable\" based on any controlled substance violation \"other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "20 I. & N. Dec. 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "Matter of Serna , 20 I. & N. Dec. 579. Thus, low -level offenses have been found turpitudinous. See,20 I. & N. Dec. 436[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]710 F.3d 734. The first renders noncitizens inadmissible for a conviction for \"any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.\" And Section 1227(a)(2)(B) makes a noncitizen \"de portable\" based on any controlled substance violation \"other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 F. App'x 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "Matter of Serna , 20 I. & N. Dec. 579. Thus, low -level offenses have been found turpitudinous. See,20 I. & N. Dec. 436394 F. App'x 517[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The first renders noncitizens inadmissible for a conviction for \"any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.\" And Section 1227(a)(2)(B) makes a noncitizen \"de portable\" based on any controlled substance violation \"other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "710 F.3d 734",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "The first renders noncitizens inadmissible for a conviction for \"any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.\" And Section 1227(a)(2)(B) makes a noncitizen \"de portable\" based on any controlled substance violation \"other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.\" See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moral turpitude and non -violent drug of fenses are two of the most commonly proffered removal charges. Available data suggest that the vast majority of immigration charges that could trigger the Section 1252(a)(2)(C) fall into one of these categories.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1980",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "3 See TRAC, New Deportation Proceedings Filed in Immigration Court , https://bit.ly/2RICLwT. 16 For example, Stephen Bosede was convicted of two drug possession offenses that rendere d him removable despite his 26 years of residence in the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Due to his HIV status, he feared removal to Nigeria because Nigerian law mandates imprisonment of people convicted of drug offense s abroad, and he would likely die due to lack of access to appropriate medicine during imprisonment. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 F.3d 946",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "Id. at 223. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a CAT claim based on a conviction for illegal possession and fraudulent use of credit cards. And in 764 F.3d 1282 , the co urt refused to 17 exercise its jurisdiction based on a conviction for simple battery. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 F.3d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct",
		"context": "at 223. In 270 F.3d 274, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a CAT claim based on a conviction for illegal possession and fraudulent use of credit cards. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the co urt refused to 17 exercise its jurisdiction based on a conviction for simple battery. Id. at 1289 -90.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 1282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "at 215 (citation omitted). At the same time, they leave Con- gress broad discretion to \"encourage certain activities 2 These are the relevant inquiries under the Free Speech Clause. Other constitutional provisions afford additional protection against, for example, refusing registration on the basis of a suspect classifi- cation, such as race or national origin, see Regan , 461 U.S. at 546 - 547, or on the basis of the mark owner's religiou s identity or beliefs, see Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 it believes to be in the public interest.\" Rust , 500 U.S. at 193.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "Given the pervasive presence of trademarks in public view, Congress has a legitimate interest in encouraging the use of trademarks that are appropriate for all audi- ences, including children. See McGinley , 660 F.2d at 486 (observing that a trademark \"may be used in a prominent location for public viewing by persons of all ages\"); Snow 2362 n.117 (\"Anywhere a child might per- ceive a commercial product, a child can perceive a scan- dalous mark.\"). Just as Congress may reasonably seek to limit the exposure of children to sexually explicit or profane material over the airwaves or in public librar- ies, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pacifica , 438 U.S. at 748 -750, it may reasonably decline to promote the commercial use of marks that contain similar material. Although refusing to register vulgar marks does not impose any legal constraint on use of such marks in commerce, it creates a practical disincen- tive to their use by rendering certain government ben- efits unavailable . b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "The refusal to register scandalous marks is also reasonably related to the government's legitimate in- 34 terest in the orderly flow of commerce. The \"predomi- nant function\" of a trademark is to identify and distin- guish the source of goods or services in commerce. Wal- Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By \"quickly and easily\" performing that \"source - identifying\" function, the most effective trademarks \" 'reduce the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.' \" Qualitex 514 U.S. 159.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "Wal- Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205. By \"quickly and easily\" performing that \"source - identifying\" function, the most effective trademarks \" 'reduce the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.' \" Qualitex [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For much of the populace, seeing a scandalous mark in the mar- ketplace thus is disruptive. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "A trade- mark is inherently commercial in nature, since its \"pre- dominant function\" is to identify a mark owner's com- pany as the source of goods in commerce. Wal-Mart Stores , 529 U.S. at 212; see Mishawaka Rubber & Woo len Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even its \"subsidiary functions\" —to \"invoke p ositive con- notations in the consumer's mind,\" and to \"attract an otherwise indifferent consumer's attention on a crowded store shelf,\" Wal-Mart Stores , 529 U.S. at 212 —serve a commercial aim: \"to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears,\" Mishawaka Rubber , 316 U.S. at 205; s ee San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 . 37 The benefits of trademark registration are likewise commercial .",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "Wal-Mart Stores , 529 U.S. at 212; see Mishawaka Rubber & Woo len Mfg. 316 U.S. 203. Even its \"subsidiary functions\" —to \"invoke p ositive con- notations in the consumer's mind,\" and to \"attract an otherwise indifferent consumer's attention on a crowded store shelf,\" Wal-Mart Stores , 529 U.S. at 212 —serve a commercial aim: \"to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears,\" Mishawaka Rubber , 316 U.S. at 205; s ee San Francisco Arts & Athletics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 37 The benefits of trademark registration are likewise commercial . A trademark \"does not confer a right to prohibit the use of [a] word or words\" in all circum- stances, but \"onl y gives the right to prohibit the use of [them] so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "37 The benefits of trademark registration are likewise commercial . A trademark \"does not confer a right to prohibit the use of [a] word or words\" in all circum- stances, but \"onl y gives the right to prohibit the use of [them] so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his.\" Prestonettes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Federal registration gives mark owners certain ad vantages in obtaining redress against infringers and other unau- thorized users of the mark. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
		"context": "In cases in- volving actual restrictions on commercial speech, this Court has recognized \"the commonsense distinction be- tween speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to govern- ment regulation , and other varieties of speech.\" Cen- tral Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The First Amend- ment scrutiny that applies to restrictions on commercial speech therefore reflects this Court's recognition of the greater flexibility that federal and state legislatures have to regulate in the commercial sphere. In assessing the constitutionality of Congress's refusal to confer on scandalous marks the benefit s of federal registration, the Court should likewise give weight to the inherently commercial character of trademark protection, and to 38 the government's broad er authority to encourage cer- tain activities by commercial entities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "114–15. The benefits at issue in both the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit cases were likewise subject to durational clauses with language materially identical to the language here. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The lower court also deemed it significant that the plan at issue here \"carved out certain benefits\" that \"ceased at a time different than other provisions of the CBA.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "B. Likewise for the conflict within the Sixth Circuit. The decisions in this case and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (6th Cir. ), reh'g denied872 F.3d 388, on the one hand, and in 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "854 F.3d 862",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "Likewise for the conflict within the Sixth Circuit. The decisions in this case and 854 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. ), reh'g denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], on the one hand, and in 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied137 S. Ct. 375; 855 F.3d 695 (6th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 F.3d 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "Likewise for the conflict within the Sixth Circuit. The decisions in this case and 854 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. ), reh'g denied872 F.3d 388, on the one hand, and in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (6th Cir. ), cert. denied137 S. Ct. 375; 855 F.3d 695 (6th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "813 F.3d 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "), reh'g denied872 F.3d 388, on the one hand, and in 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied137 S. Ct. 375; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (6th Cir. ), cert. denied2017 WL 4168076; and more recently 875 F.3d 321, on the other, are in irreconcilable conflict on the law.2 As amicus Whirlpool Corp. points out, Whirlpool Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.3d 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "denied137 S. Ct. 375; 855 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied2017 WL 4168076; and more recently [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], on the other, are in irreconcilable conflict on the law.2 As amicus Whirlpool Corp. points out, Whirlpool Br. at 16, \"the rule of law applied in Gallo and Cole does not assign any weight to the 'factual differences'\" deemed determinative in this case. Indeed, in Gallo, Cole, and Watkins ,3 the general durational clauses in the CBAs were materially indistinguishable from the clause here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.3d 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "See Gallo , 813 F.3d at 271 (\"The 2005 CBA, for example, says that 'Hospitalization, Surgical and Medical Benefits for terminated employees, including lay-off, will continue in effect for the duration of the month for which premiums have been paid. '\"); Cole, 855 F.3d at 700 (\"the plaintiffs point out that the CBAs 'set specific durational limits on continued healthcare for employees on layoff and leave—up to 24 months—but set no duration limits on retiree healthcare. '\"); Watkins , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"that the agreement contemplates early benefits termination for active employees but not retirees does not make it ambiguous . \"). These other panels of the Sixth Circuit rejected the very argument accepted by the lower court here, which deemed these specific durational 8 clauses evidence of an ambiguity in the general durational clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.3d 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "Gallo and Watkins specifically rejected the argument that tying of eligibility for retiree healthcare to eligibility for a pension suggested vesting. See Gallo , 813 F.3d at 272 (\"the CBAs simply state that those who are eligible for pensions are also eligible for health benefits. \"); Watkins , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"that the agreement tied eligibility for healthcare coverage to pension eligibility does not , for this particular contract, raise an ambiguity about the duration of the healthcare benefits \") (emphasis added). The Retirees' fallback suggestion that this Court should deny the petition to give the Sixth Circuit 9 more time to work out its differences is unpersuasive. Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.3d 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "at 26–27. First, the Sixth Circuit declined three times to resolve this conflict and appears to lack a cogent majority to do so. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, in view of the severe consequences detailed by amici to both businesses and retirees from the continued uncertainty, \"[t]he value of additional intra-circuit debate seems … far outweighed by the benefits that flow to litigants and the public from the resolution of legal questions.\" U.S. Bancorp Mortg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 F.3d 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "Moreover, in view of the severe consequences detailed by amici to both businesses and retirees from the continued uncertainty, \"[t]he value of additional intra-circuit debate seems … far outweighed by the benefits that flow to litigants and the public from the resolution of legal questions.\" U.S. Bancorp Mortg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Chamber Br. at 7–10 (consequences of uncertainty to employers and employees). In short, the Retirees' assertion that the Third Circuit's decision in Grove and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Barton are distinguishable on their facts is inaccurate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "UAW v. 4 As amicus ERIC forcefully argues, Br. at 21–22, this case may be a candidate for summary reversal with instructions to enter judgment for petitioner CNH. See Amgen, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That \"mess\" calls for this Court's prompt resolution.5 5 Plaintiffs seek to prove vesting with extrinsic evidence from the record in 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, aff'd,435 F.3d 571. See Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 758",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "at 21–22, this case may be a candidate for summary reversal with instructions to enter judgment for petitioner CNH. See Amgen, 136 S. Ct. 758. That \"mess\" calls for this Court's prompt resolution.5 5 Plaintiffs seek to prove vesting with extrinsic evidence from the record in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,435 F.3d 571. See Opp. at 1–3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 F. Supp. 2d 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "at 21–22, this case may be a candidate for summary reversal with instructions to enter judgment for petitioner CNH. See Amgen, 136 S. Ct. 758. That \"mess\" calls for this Court's prompt resolution.5 5 Plaintiffs seek to prove vesting with extrinsic evidence from the record in 318 F. Supp. 2d 455, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Opp. at 1–3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 F.3d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
		"context": "Unlike the pre-1994 agreements, the 1995 and 1998 agreements \"reset\" the benefits for all post-1994 retirees , explicitly extending and modifying those benefits. Pet. at 3, 17; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"No amount of parol evidence regarding prior agreements, including promises made to workers who retired in the 1970s and '80s, is probative of the meaning of a set of distinct promises made by a new corporate parent for the first time in 1995, and then in altered form in 1998.\"). If, contrary to Tackett , extrinsic evidence were relevant, the most compelling evidence is that the parties in fact renegotiated the benefits for all post-1994 retirees in both the 1995 and 1998 collective bargaining cycles. See also Reese I , 574 F.3d at 323 (quoting Summary Plan Description allowing CNH to \"amend[] or terminat[e]\" the plans).",
		"citation_value_orig": "574 F.3d 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable",
		"context": "Restatement ( Third) of Property: Servitudes , In- troduction (2000). C ourts have recognized that \"it is increasingly difficult and correspondingly irrelevant to attempt to pigeonhole\" nonpossessory interests \"as 'leases,' 'easements,' 'licenses,' 'profits,' or some other obscure interest in land devise d by the common law [.]\" Golden West Baseball [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Restatement \"[a]ttempt[s] to simplify this doctrinal thicket,\" Gam- 44 Cal. App. 5th 424, by \"elim inat[ing] needless distinctions, ar- chaic terminology, and obsolete requirements ,\" Re- statement (Third), supra, Introduction. Petitioners' proposal would effectively constitu- tionalize this murky and evolving body of state law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 Cal. App. 4th 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable",
		"context": "42 -46, the Takings Clause analysis wo uld vary depending on whether the access could be analogized to an easement under a particular State's laws. See Preseault , 494 U.S. at 8 (noting that \"applicable state law\" regarding ease- ments \"var[ies]\"); compare, e.g., R.I. Mobile Sportfish- ermen , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] what qualifies as an easement under state law. 34 And e ven if petitioners' approach were workable , it would be ill- suited to identifying per se takings . Whether a particular regulation is analogous to an easement under state law will often bear no relation- ship to the \"severity of the burden that government imposes u pon private property rights,\" or to whether the government's action is \"functionally equivalent\" to a direct physical appropriation or ouster.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 A.3d 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable",
		"context": "See Pet. Br. 23; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners' approach offe rs no apparent mechanism for differentiating between narrow access rights and unduly burdensome ones. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 P.2d 1062",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable",
		"context": "In other respects, however, it lacks the hall- marks of an easement. An easement in gross under California la w is an interest in real property that gen- erally may be assigned or transferred. See City of An- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But no union or organizer could as- 35 sign or transfer the access right conferred by the reg- ulation. The burden of an easement in gross is appur- tenant to \"the real property of another .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "82 Cal. App. 3d 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable",
		"context": "But no union or organizer could as- 35 sign or transfer the access right conferred by the reg- ulation. The burden of an easement in gross is appur- tenant to \"the real property of another .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Restate- ment (Third), supra, § 1.2(3). The access regulation, in contrast, does not burden any parti cular parcel of property; it applies to any property that is used for ag- ricultural employment at a given time. An easement may also be recorded with a county to provide public notice .",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 Cal. App. 2d 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable",
		"context": "5th at 429. While most licenses are revocable by the property owner at will, California also recognizes irrevocable li- censes. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 36 at 36. And governments occasionally authoriz e com- pulsory licenses to enter property even over a property owner's objection.20 To be sure, \" the distinction between a license and an easement is often subtle and difficult to discern. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 Cal. App. 4th 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Structure And Purpose Of The CWA Support Respondents' Reading",
		"context": "Food Mktg. Inst. , 139 S. Ct. at 2364; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The difference between textualist inter pretation and so-called purposive interpreta tion is not that the former never considers purpose. It almost always does. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Structure And Purpose Of The CWA Support Respondents' Reading",
		"context": "As Justice Scalia once wrote for a unanimous Court in a situa tion in which there was far more reason to doubt Congress's intentions than there is in this case, \"the fact that a statute can be ' applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demon - strate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.'\" Pa. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Drawing on Carey, Farrar, and Stachura, the majority holds that nominal damages preclude mootness to protect absolute rights, thereby benefiting individual plaintiffs and society-at-large.",
		"context": "35 F. App'x 386. Yet many of these circuits do not explain how this rule follows from Carey 's discussion of nominal damages, leading Judge Smith on the Third Circuit to wonder whether \"[i]t is just possible that 'the nominal damages solution to mootness' is nothing more than a self- perpetuating myth.\" Freedom from Religion Foundation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The few that do analyze the issue rely primarily on two statements in Carey . First, Carey recognized that \"[c]ommon-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "832 F.3d 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Drawing on Carey, Farrar, and Stachura, the majority holds that nominal damages preclude mootness to protect absolute rights, thereby benefiting individual plaintiffs and society-at-large.",
		"context": "435 U.S. at 266. Nominal damages do not \" 'measure' the constitutional injury\" or assign an \"abstract value\" to 7 constitutional rights; rather, nominal damages preserve cases alleging a violation of such rights, benefitting both the plaintiff (by allowing her to vindicate her rights) and society as a whole: \"Thus, while the monetary value of a nominal damage award must, by definition, be negligible, its value can be of great significance to the litigant and to society.\" Amato, 170 F.3d at 317; see also City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] establishes that the government violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights, which, as Farrar explained, changes the legal relationship of the parties ( ex post ), while at the same time (2) discouraging governmental actors from adopting such unconstitutional policies in the future ( ex ante ). As the Second Circuit explained, \"[a] judgment against a municipality not only holds that entity responsible for its actions and inactions, but also can encourage the municipality to reform the patterns and practices that led to constitutional violations, as well as alert the municipality and its citizenry to the issue.\" Amato , 170 F.3d at 317-18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Drawing on Carey, Farrar, and Stachura, the majority holds that nominal damages preclude mootness to protect absolute rights, thereby benefiting individual plaintiffs and society-at-large.",
		"context": "Amato , 170 F.3d at 317-18. And this is true for breaches of procedural due process (as in Carey) as well as for violations of substantive constitutional rights. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 The Fifth Circuit finds additional support for the majority rule in Arizonans for Official 520 U.S. 43, the only Supreme Court case directly considering the intersection of nominal damages and mootness. See Ward , 35 F. App'x at 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "748 F.2d 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Drawing on Carey, Farrar, and Stachura, the majority holds that nominal damages preclude mootness to protect absolute rights, thereby benefiting individual plaintiffs and society-at-large.",
		"context": "And this is true for breaches of procedural due process (as in Carey) as well as for violations of substantive constitutional rights. See 748 F.2d 783. 8 The Fifth Circuit finds additional support for the majority rule in Arizonans for Official [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the only Supreme Court case directly considering the intersection of nominal damages and mootness. See Ward , 35 F. App'x at 1. According to the Fifth Circuit, Arizonans establishes that a nominal damages claim generally precludes mootness.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Petition Raises Extremely Important Issues of Presidential Immunity Which Repeatedly Have Warranted Review in This Court",
		"context": "When Presidential immunity is at issue, nothing lessthan the President's ability to effectively perform hisofficial duties is at stake. This Court has repeatedlyrecognized the importance of certiorari to review issuesof Presidential immunity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 457 U.S. 731; 418 U.S. 683.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Petition Raises Extremely Important Issues of Presidential Immunity Which Repeatedly Have Warranted Review in This Court",
		"context": "When Presidential immunity is at issue, nothing lessthan the President's ability to effectively perform hisofficial duties is at stake. This Court has repeatedlyrecognized the importance of certiorari to review issuesof Presidential immunity. 520 U.S. 681; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 418 U.S. 683.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Petition Raises Extremely Important Issues of Presidential Immunity Which Repeatedly Have Warranted Review in This Court",
		"context": "When Presidential immunity is at issue, nothing lessthan the President's ability to effectively perform hisofficial duties is at stake. This Court has repeatedlyrecognized the importance of certiorari to review issuesof Presidential immunity. 520 U.S. 681; 457 U.S. 731; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "1. Until 2003, this Court consistently held that \"[r]acial disc rimination [is ] invidious in all contexts.\" Ed- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For decades, the Court stressed that racial pref- erences are \"by their very nature odious to a free peo-ple.\" 528 U.S. 495.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "Ed- 500 U.S. 614. For decades, the Court stressed that racial pref- erences are \"by their very nature odious to a free peo-ple.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are \"contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.\" 347 U.S. 497.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "528 U.S. 495. They are \"contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This suspicion did not \"depen[d] on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.\" Gratz , 539 U.S. at 270.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "This suspicion did not \"depen[d] on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.\" Gratz , 539 U.S. at 270. Though the Fourteenth Amend- ment was indisputably passed to ensure full legal 5 equality for African -Americans in the wake of the Civil War, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it is well established th at \"any person , of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any classification sub- jecting that person to unequal treatment.\" Gratz , 539 U.S. at 270. And the analysis did not depend on whether propo- nents considered the discrimination \"benign. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "And the analysis did not depend on whether propo- nents considered the discrimination \"benign. \" Indeed, \"'benign' carries with it no independent meaning, but re- flects only acceptance of the current generation 's conclu- sion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on par-ticular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable.\" Metro Broad ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Parents Involved , 551 U.S. at 742. Race therefore \"seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment.\" Croson , 488 U.S. at 505.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "Croson , 488 U.S. at 505. In- stead, \"[p]urchased at the price of immeasurable human suffering, \" the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI \" re- flect [] our Nation 's understanding that such classifica- tions ultimately have a destructive impact on the individ-ual and our society.\" Adarand Constructors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he existence of preferences creates a \"stigma\" towards t he preferred class , which \"unfairly marks those . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "at 353. And until 2003, all distinctions based on race were subjected to the \"most rigid scrutiny.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 2. Even now, outside the university -admissions context, \"[i]t is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual rac ial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "See Croson , 488 U.S. at 500. Protecting the best interest of a child is insuffi cient . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even remedying de facto discrimination will not do , absent past de jure segregation . 517 U.S. 899.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "at 754. Specifically, t his Court held that the governmental entity who sought to use a racial distinc- tion must show that \" the means chose n to accomplish the State's asserted purpose [is] specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish [the specified] purpose.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To be narrowly tailored , \"the classification at issue must 'fit' with greate r precision than any alternative means.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
		"context": "To be narrowly tailored , \"the classification at issue must 'fit' with greate r precision than any alternative means.\" Id. at 280 n.6; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That is, t he Constitution \"forbid s the use even of narrowly drawn racial classifications except as a last 7 resort.\" Croson, 488 U.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Corpus Linguistics Is No Substitute for Traditional Tools of Constitutional Analysis, Especially in a Case Involving Fundamental Rights",
		"context": ". The Constitution, by its nature, describes \"only its great outlines\" and designates \"its important objects\" while leaving \"the minor ingredients which compose those objects [to] be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The text alone (let alone snippets of that text) will not always reveal those \"minor ingredi-ents.\" History and tradition must fill the gap — especially so for the Bill of Rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 Wheat. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Corpus Linguistics Is No Substitute for Traditional Tools of Constitutional Analysis, Especially in a Case Involving Fundamental Rights",
		"context": "51 Id. 21 without knowing that \"[t]he Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a response to the reviled 'general warrants' and 'writs of assistance' of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rum-mage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, the rights described in the Second Amend- ment cannot be understood without understanding past abuses—be it the confiscation of weapons by Charles II and James II from English Protestants or by George III in the Revolutionary-era colonies. 52 Nor can the Second Amendment be fully under- stood without accounting for the tradition of arms bearing in early America.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Corpus Linguistics Is No Substitute for Traditional Tools of Constitutional Analysis, Especially in a Case Involving Fundamental Rights",
		"context": "McIn- tyre, 514 U.S. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 139 S. Ct. 675. Likewise, \"[r]acks and thumbscrews, well-known instruments for inflicting pain, were not in use because they were regarded as cruel punish-ments,\" McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting)—a historical marker that necessarily in-forms how the Eighth Amendment's contemporaneous prohibition on \"cruel and unusual punishments\" was understood. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 Here too, as Heller already instructed, under- standing the Second Amendment requires consideration of the historical evidence of the people's right to keep and bear arms. And the Second Amend- ment certainly should not be circumscribed without reconciling that history and tradition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even If The Statute Requires A Temporal Lengthening Of An Earlier Exemption, It Does Not Require Continuity",
		"context": "§44506(c)(2)(B) (author- izing agency to \" extend [appointment] authority for one or more successive one- year periods\"); 50 U.S.C. §3172 (authorizing the President \"to extend the period of a stay … for successive periods of not more than 120 days each\"); id. §3024(n)(4)(E)(ii) (providing that au- thorization \"may be extended … for successive periods of not more than 3 years\"); see also Geo -Energy Part- ners- 1983 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If \"extension\" by itself en- tailed continuity, the limiting words \"successive\" and \"consecutive\" in such statutes would be surplusage. Thus, in multiple other statutes, Congress has both used the term \"extension\" to ref er to the non -continu- ous lengthening of a preexisting benefit that had lapsed and expressly specified when an \"extension\" must be \"successive\" or \"consecutive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 F. Supp. 2d 1210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even If The Statute Requires A Temporal Lengthening Of An Earlier Exemption, It Does Not Require Continuity",
		"context": "29–30, for example, to say that a person who had pre- viously received pandemic -relat ed unemployment ben- efits that expired in July applied for an \"extension\" of those benefits after Congress extended them in De- cember. Nor does this usage rely on a \"definition of a word that is absent from many dictionaries and is deemed obsolete in others. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After all, respond- ents' definition does not appear in any dictionary, and Congress used the term in this sense in two separate statutes a few months ago. Whether Congress used the term the same way here thus depends not on hypothet- icals about parking sessions or hotel rooms , EPA Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even If The Statute Requires A Temporal Lengthening Of An Earlier Exemption, It Does Not Require Continuity",
		"context": "Whether Congress used the term the same way here thus depends not on hypothet- icals about parking sessions or hotel rooms , EPA Br. 35, but on \"statutory context.\" Mohama [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 5 Third, respondents again invoke the presumption of consistent usage, contending that because extensions under subparagraph (A)(ii)(II) were temporally contin- uous with the original exemption, any extension under subparagraph (B) must be temporally continuous. EPA Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. federal regulatory agencies",
		"context": "Partisan-balancing requirements are among the core \"structural characteristics\" that are \"common to almost all federal regulatory agencies.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Anti-Injunction Act bars petitioner's suit",
		"context": "7421(a). The Declaratory Judgment Act's tax exception , 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), which \"is at least as broad as the Anti -Injunction Act ,\" Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reinforces that bar. With exceptions that are inapplicable here, those 12 provisions channel disputes over taxes to post -payment proceedings —the approach American law has followed since the Founding. Petitioner's suit falls squarely within the Anti - Injunction Act 's bar .",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "The Court has made it clear that this clause is only a delegation of authority to adopt procedural regula-tions for congressional elections; it does not permit states to favor or to disadvantage particular candi- dates. U.S. Term Limits, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States are not permitted to dictate electoral outcomes based on candidates' political positions because such action would constitute an illegitimate purpose and would be inconsistent with the constitutional norm against government action in support of partisan advantage. See 531 U.S. 510; Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833–34 (\"[T]he Framers under- stood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779. States are not permitted to dictate electoral outcomes based on candidates' political positions because such action would constitute an illegitimate purpose and would be inconsistent with the constitutional norm against government action in support of partisan advantage. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833–34 (\"[T]he Framers under- stood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.\"). In Cook v. Gralike , the Court overturned a Missouri constitutional amendment requiring each candidate's position on congressional term limits to be printed on the ballot because the amendment had the purpose of favoring certain candidates over others. 531 U.S. at 524.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "The Court found that the law violated the Elections Clause because it sought to \"dictate electoral outcomes\" based on candidates' positions. Id. at 524– 27; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, courts have emphasized the illegitimacy of government election administration with a partisan purpose in striking down voter identification laws and 19 early voting restrictions on nonracial bias grounds. In Obama for America v. Husted , the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court's injunction of an Ohio law limiting early voting because the law discriminated between classes of voters in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Atlantic Richfield's CERCLA Cleanup Obligations Directly Conflict with Its Alleged State-Law Duty",
		"context": "This Court's recent impossibility-preemption cases establish that if defendants need a federal agency's ap- proval and assistance to comp ly with a state-law obliga- tion, then federal law preempts that state obligation. De- fendants cannot serve two conflicting masters, and when federal law leaves no room fo r a defendant to unilaterally fulfill state-law duties, federal law prevails. In the first of these decisions, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a brand-name drug manufacturer argued that its inability under federal law to change its drug la- beling without FDA's approval left the manufacturer powerless to fulfill its state- law duty to strengthen the warning on the drug's label. Id. at 559-60, 568.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Atlantic Richfield's CERCLA Cleanup Obligations Directly Conflict with Its Alleged State-Law Duty",
		"context": "at 571. So that state- law duty was not preempted. PLIVA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], then held that a generic drug manufacturer could not simulta- neously satisfy its federal-law obligations regarding drug labeling and its state-law obligation to change an allegedly inadequate warning label. Unlike brand-name counter-parts, federal law prohibits generic manufacturers from altering FDA-approved warning labels, which generics copy from the brand. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Atlantic Richfield's CERCLA Cleanup Obligations Directly Conflict with Its Alleged State-Law Duty",
		"context": ". are premised on the existence of a legal duty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Bartlett , 570 U.S. at 482 n.1. Under Montana law, anyone who causes an injury to land that \"is used for a purpose personal to the owner, \" like a residence, may face unique remedial obligations. Sunburst Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Atlantic Richfield's CERCLA Cleanup Obligations Directly Conflict with Its Alleged State-Law Duty",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If that damage is reversible, Montana law requires the responsible party to restore the property to \"the condition [it] would have been [in] absent [the] con- tamination.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 P.3d 1079",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE RIGOR THAT CLOSELY DRAWN SCRUTINY REQUIRES",
		"context": ". . to government regulation of nonspeech activities,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both strict and closely drawn scrutiny can only be justified by a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, and both turn on the fact-inten sive issue of whether a re- striction \"fits\" the asserted risk. McCutcheon , 572 U.S. at 199 (\"regardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley 's 'closely drawn' test, we must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective and the 5 means selected to achieve that objective\") (citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE RIGOR THAT CLOSELY DRAWN SCRUTINY REQUIRES",
		"context": "McCutcheon , 572 U.S. at 199 (\"regardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley 's 'closely drawn' test, we must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective and the 5 means selected to achieve that objective\") (citations omitted). By contrast, a court need not even look to the evidentiary record for rational basis review. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The inquiry by the District Court—\"whether expe- rience under the present law confirms a serious threat of abuse,\" J.S. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE RIGOR THAT CLOSELY DRAWN SCRUTINY REQUIRES",
		"context": "App. 7a. As in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], any governmental interest in \"leveling the playing field\" between wealth- ier candidates who can more easily lend to their 6 campaigns and their less wealthy opponents did not justify the Loan Repayment Limit. This Court has \"soundly rejected a cap on a candidate's expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech.\" 554 U.S. 724; see also Ariz. Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE RIGOR THAT CLOSELY DRAWN SCRUTINY REQUIRES",
		"context": "As in 554 U.S. 724, any governmental interest in \"leveling the playing field\" between wealth- ier candidates who can more easily lend to their 6 campaigns and their less wealthy opponents did not justify the Loan Repayment Limit. This Court has \"soundly rejected a cap on a candidate's expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club 564 U.S. 721.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE RIGOR THAT CLOSELY DRAWN SCRUTINY REQUIRES",
		"context": "This Court has \"soundly rejected a cap on a candidate's expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech.\" 554 U.S. 724; see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The BIA lacks the expertise relevant here — legal interpretation",
		"context": "According ly, to decide whether deference is appropriate, courts must consider how a n agency goes about making its decision. The \"deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.\" Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the BIA's decision \"is not thoroughly reasoned\" it is not entitled to any weight. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The BIA lacks the expertise relevant here — legal interpretation",
		"context": "Indeed, the BIA has, to put it lightly, been subject to stinging criticism for the shoddy quality of its analysis. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The BIA's consistently deficient analysis is the predictable result of an organization overwhelmed by a staggering caseload, which is \"further exacerbated by the fact that immigration judges and BIA members face pressure to meet quotas and follow guidelines set by the attorney general.\" Wadhia & Walker, 70 Duke L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Student Loan Borrowers are contractually bound to repay their loans—in full—by the terms of their Master Promissory Notes and the Code of Federal Regulations",
		"context": "Accordingly, any loan forgiveness supposedly granted under the Loan Forgiveness Program will not change Ms. Latta's payment obligations and will not be enforceable as against the government . Moreover, b orrowers can not utilize the doctrine of equitable estoppel to avo id future repayment (and penalties, fines, increased interest, and collection costs) because equitable estoppel generally cannot be asserted against the government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[T]he United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit.\" Utah Power & Light 243 U.S. 389 ; see also Royal Indem.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Student Loan Borrowers are contractually bound to repay their loans—in full—by the terms of their Master Promissory Notes and the Code of Federal Regulations",
		"context": "467 U.S. 51 . \"[T]he United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit.\" Utah Power & Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Royal Indem. 313 U.S. 289 . \"Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous regard for the requirements of law,\" and \"those who deal with the Government are expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "243 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text Of Section 1117(a) Incorporates Traditional Limits On Equitable Relief",
		"context": ". The Lanham Act \"largely codified\" \"[t]raditional trademark infringement law,\" which is \"part of the broader law of unfair competition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Traditional trademark law limited the circumstances in which a court could grant one equitable remedy for trademark infringement: an award of an infring- er's profits. Before ordering this relief, courts re- quired evidence that the defendant's infringement was willful.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Statute's Use of \"System\" in Section 7411 Demonstrates That EPA's BSER Determination Is Not Limited to Measures \"at and to\" an Individual Plant",
		"context": "After considering those systems that have been adequately demonstrated for the source category, EPA determines the best of those systems. The statute does not define the term \"system,\" so it is interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the EPA has previously concluded, the or- dinary meaning of \"system\" is \"a set of things or parts forming a complex whole; a set of principles or proce- dures according to which something is done; an organized scheme or method; and a group of interact- ing, interrelated, or interdependent elements.\" JA273, JA542-43 & n.314 (citing, inter alia , Oxford Diction- ary of English (3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The AIA contains clear and convincing indications that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the PTAB's determination, as part of its institution decision, that section 315(b)'s time bar did not apply",
		"context": ". Generally, there is a \"s trong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bu t \"[t]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that—a presumption.\" 467 U.S. 340.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The AIA contains clear and convincing indications that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the PTAB's determination, as part of its institution decision, that section 315(b)'s time bar did not apply",
		"context": "476 U.S. 667. Bu t \"[t]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that—a presumption.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he presumption favoring judicial review [is] overcome\" when Congress's \"intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernable in the statutory scheme.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court might, for many reasons, dismiss a complaint for \"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\" On one end of the spectrum, a complaint can fail to state a claim simply because it is not well-pled. It could lack \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], potentially immediately curable. Or the complaint could be temporarily hobbled by other shortcomings that are potentially remediable, such as a failure to exhaust administrative or state- law remedies. Traditionally, the courts will dismiss a complaint that does not meet these technical standards without prejudice, to permit the plaintiff another chance to get it right, and often they will set a date for when any amended pleading must be filed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "Or the complaint could be temporarily hobbled by other shortcomings that are potentially remediable, such as a failure to exhaust administrative or state- law remedies. Traditionally, the courts will dismiss a complaint that does not meet these technical standards without prejudice, to permit the plaintiff another chance to get it right, and often they will set a date for when any amended pleading must be filed. See, 4 e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts\") (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other end of the spectrum, a complaint might fail to state a claim because its allegations, \"however true,\" do not \"raise a claim of entitlement to relief.\" Bell Atl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "On the other end of the spectrum, a complaint might fail to state a claim because its allegations, \"however true,\" do not \"raise a claim of entitlement to relief.\" Bell Atl. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This \"basic deficiency,\" see id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), is not merely a matter of defective pleading, but instead goes directly to the merits of a plaintiff's claim (or the lack thereof).",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "\"). Indeed, the standard for dismissing a complaint with prejudice is high, precisely \"because it operates as a rejection of the plaintiff's claims on the merits and [ultimately] precludes further litigation of them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted\"). See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F.3d 790",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "at 15. It is therefore presumed that Congress adopted the \"cluster of ideas\" attached to that language as well as the \"meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Pet. Br. at 17 (citing 566 U.S. 284).",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "498 U.S. 19; see also Pet. Br. at 17 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This includes the distinction between a dismissal with prejudice and a dismissal without prejudice, see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": ". dismiss[ing] a case under Rule 12(b)(6) without stating whether it is with or without prejudice operates as a dismissal with prejudice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] suggests that Congress intended to depart from that well-established understanding of a commonly used legal phrase when it called upon courts to impose a strike for an action that 'was dismissed on the ground[] that it . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "703 F.3d 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "2. In light of what Congress was trying to achieve through the PLRA, it makes sense that Congress knowingly employed the term of art imbedded in § 1915(g)'s phrasing. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The goal of the PLRA was not to deter frivolous prisoner cases at all costs, but to curb frivolous prisoner cases while also guaranteeing that prisoners could still bring meritorious claims. As this Court has recognized, Congress sought to ensure \"that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "The goal of the PLRA was not to deter frivolous prisoner cases at all costs, but to curb frivolous prisoner cases while also guaranteeing that prisoners could still bring meritorious claims. As this Court has recognized, Congress sought to ensure \"that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 141 Cong. Rec. S14627 (daily ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "Br. at 41-43. And deterring frivolous prisoner suits by taking a \"meat- axe approach,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], conflicts with our nation's long history of keeping the courtroom doors open to prisoners with meritorious claims. As this Court has held time and again, \"[o]ur legal system . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": ". remains committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of 7 illegal conduct by their custodians are fairly handled according to law.\" Jones, 549 U.S. at 203; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Counting only with-prejudice dismissals as strikes would also align with other important judicial doctrines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "Petitioner's case further demonstrates why it would be fundamentally unfair to count without- prejudice dismissals as strikes. A dismissal is labeled a \"strike\" only retroactively. In this case, when the district court considered whether Petitioner had struck out, it examined whether two prior dismissals based on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], both of which were entered expressly without prejudice, also counted as strikes. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal",
		"context": "Petitioner was unable to rely on the face of those two decisions dismissing claims without prejudice and trust that he could re-file without collateral consequences. \"[P]risoners, who typically act pro se, are entitled to take dismissals 'at face value' and 'should not be required to speculate on the grounds the judge could or even 9 should have based the dismissal on.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Copyright is protected under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the CRCA is enforceable under that Amendment",
		"context": "Pursuant to Section 5 of the Amendment when considered in conjunction with Section 1 (\"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, …\"), Congress create s legislation to ensure due process is followed if property is to be taken from its lawful owner. This Court has noted that Due Process under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 22 requires just compensation to be ma de to the owner of the private property taken for public us e under the authority of the State. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The CRCA is Congress's attempt to corral the states and create an incentive not to infringe by abrogating state sovereign immunity for copyright suits. The late Justice Stevens correctly noted that the CRCA may be considered an example of valid sovereign immunity abrogation, where infringement by states was an ongoing a nd pervasive problem: To the extent that a majority of this Court finds this factor dispositive, there is hope that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 may be considered \"appropriate\" § 5 legislation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Wi-Fi One Causes The Waste Congress Designed IPR To Avoid",
		"context": "at 6–9 (PTAB Feb. 8, 2016).5 After the PTAB's Institution Decision, the parties sub- mitted additional extensive briefing. Shenzhen Liown Elecs. 2017 WL 500153, vacated by Lim- inara Worldwide, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The case in dicates that the parties hired three experts to opine on the patent claims at is- sue. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 1303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Wi-Fi One Causes The Waste Congress Designed IPR To Avoid",
		"context": "When the PTAB issued the Final Written Decision in Shenzhen , the PTAB's Institution Decision determi- nation that the petition for IPR was timely was not ap- pealable. But while the Shenzhen patent owner's appeal was pending, the Federal Circuit decided both Wi-Fi One and Click-to-Call , which paved the way for the Federal Circuit to summarily vacate the Final Written Decision. Luminara Worldwide, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, like Supe- rior and Dex Media, the IPR petitioner in Shenzhen wasted significant recourse s obtaining a Final Written 5 Slip opinions can be found at the PTAB's website, https:// ptab.uspto.gov//login, by searching for the patent number with-out commas or spaces (the patent number at issue in Schenzhen is 8,070,319). 17 Decision on the merits of its petition only to have that decision undone by an appellate challenge to the Insti- tution Decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 1303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Federal Circuit's enablement precedent is consistent with the text of the Patent Act and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "The Federal Circuit's enablement jurisprudence, and its \"undue experimentation\" test in particular, are fully supported by the text of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) and this Court's decisions. Indeed, petitioners and many of their amici endorse In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which, building on insights from earlier de- cisions of this Court and the courts of appeals, adopted that test and set out factors for applying it. Petitioners describe Wands as a \"now-seminal\" de- cision, and they concede that the specification must be \"sufficiently robust to permit skilled artisans to prac- tice claims as needed, without resort to undue experi- mentation.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "858 F.2d 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations",
		"context": "By contrast, the application approach avoids this abject unfairness by allowing copyright holders to file suit within the 30 statute of limitations while Copyright Office review is ongoing. This issue is even more significant in courts that calculate the limitations pe riod from the time infringement begins ( i.e., using the \"injury rule\"), rather than the time the author discovers it ( i.e., the \"discovery rule\"). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such circumstances, time is truly of the essence, as an author must find and craft claims against the infringer, and potentially also seek and obtain the Copyright Office's decision on whether to issue a certificate of registration, all within the three -year limitations period. Without justification, the certificate approach maximizes the hardship these authors must endure and might forever foreclose a copyright holder from bringing suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Court's decision in United States v. Beggerly confirms the jurisdictional treatment in North Dakota and Mottaz",
		"context": "Contrary to petitioners' suggestion (Br. 39 -42), th is Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is fully consistent with the Court's earlier de- terminations in North Dakota and Mottaz that the 12 - year bar is jurisdictional. In Beggerly, the United States had previously brought a quiet- title action against the respondents concerning certain property . 524 U.S. at 39.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. History shows the States have no sovereign immunity in matters of war",
		"context": "(quoting Declaration of Independence ¶ 4)). But by ratifying the Articles , the States agreed the national government would control matters related to war , thereby relinquishing whatever sovereignty they may have had in that area . See U nited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if the States retained any residual sovereignty over war -related matters, they relinquished that sovereignty by ratifying the Constitution. As explained in the preceding part , the text and structure of the Constitution establish that the federal government has sole sov ereignty over military matters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The history of federal agencies' participation in the patent system confirms that a federal agency is a \"person\" who may petition for post-issuance review",
		"context": "The federal government has similar ly participated as a user of patent ed inventions . In 1881, this Court de- scrib ed it as \"the general practice\" that , \"when inven- tions have been made which are desirable for govern- ment use, either for the government to purchase them from the inventors, and use them as secrets of the proper department; or, if a patent is granted, to pay the patentee a fair compensation fo r their use.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (188 2). The Court ex- plained that, w hen the federal government \"grants let- ters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, [it] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented inv ention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensa- tion, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The history of federal agencies' participation in the patent system confirms that a federal agency is a \"person\" who may petition for post-issuance review",
		"context": "at 357 -358. Initially, although the fed eral government was sub- ject to the patent laws' substantive prohibition on unau- thorized use of patented inventions, no statute provided any means \"of obtaining compensation from the United States for the use of an invention, where such use [w]as not by the consent of the patentee .\" Campbell , 104 U.S. at 358; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to provide a remedy for a patent owner who alleged \"that rights secured to him by a pa- tent had been invaded for the benefit of the United States by one of its officers, that is, that such officer had infringed a patent.\" 224 U.S. 290. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The history of federal agencies' participation in the patent system confirms that a federal agency is a \"person\" who may petition for post-issuance review",
		"context": "Initially, although the fed eral government was sub- ject to the patent laws' substantive prohibition on unau- thorized use of patented inventions, no statute provided any means \"of obtaining compensation from the United States for the use of an invention, where such use [w]as not by the consent of the patentee .\" Campbell , 104 U.S. at 358; see 155 U.S. 163 to provide a remedy for a patent owner who alleged \"that rights secured to him by a pa- tent had been invaded for the benefit of the United States by one of its officers, that is, that such officer had infringed a patent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Federal agencies have also repeatedly invoked the various administrative mechanisms for revisiting the validity of issued patents .",
		"citation_value_orig": "224 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The respondents' vehicle arguments are based on a clear misrepresentation of the record below",
		"context": "But that is no reason to deny certiorari. To begin , there is value in answering \"the question whether the officers' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment,\" regardless of whether -8- they will receive immunity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An answer from this Court will be \"beneficial in developing constitutional precedent\" and restore uniformity to the law. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The respondents' vehicle arguments are based on a clear misrepresentation of the record below",
		"context": "But the answer matters even for this case. The Eighth Circuit granted summary judgment to all respondents, including the City of St. Louis, based on its holding that there was no constitutional violation. Because cities \"do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a finding of qualified immunity for the officers would not affect the claims against the City. Moreover, when the conduct here occurred, in 2015, \"the law was clearly established that applying pressure to [a person's] back, once he [has been] handcuffed and his legs restrained, [is] constitutionally unreasonable due to the significant risk of positional asphyxiation.\" Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1155.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' construction of Section 841(a) is textually foreclosed and unnecessary",
		"context": "As explained above , see pp. 24-25 , supra , however, that antigrammatical argument is directly re- futed by Yermian , which found that similarly struc- tured \"statutory language was unambiguous \" in its ex- clusively forward -looking application of a textual mens rea. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1985 ). The mens rea for any preceding requirements was in- stead determined by other principles, see ibid. , with the jurisdictional nature of the preceding requirement in Yerm ian suggesting that no mens rea was necessarily required, see 139 S. Ct. 2191.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' construction of Section 841(a) is textually foreclosed and unnecessary",
		"context": "471 U.S. 419 (1985 ). The mens rea for any preceding requirements was in- stead determined by other principles, see ibid. , with the jurisdictional nature of the preceding requirement in Yerm ian suggesting that no mens rea was necessarily required, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, unless petitioners ' proposed standard would actually amount to strict willfulness —in the sense of a \"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty,\" Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (citation omitted) — it is not clear that it would make a difference in many (or any) cases. A defendant generally has a culpable mental state when he \" 'know [s] the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense, ' even if he does not know that those facts give rise to a crime .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' construction of Section 841(a) is textually foreclosed and unnecessary",
		"context": "575 U.S. 723 , in writing a prescription . A physician who opts to indulge in med- ical solipsism, rather than respecting the profession, can be deemed to have such knowledge. See Global - Tech Appliances, Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (recognizing the \"well established\" principle un- der which \"defendants cannot escape the reach \" of a \"criminal statute[] requi r[ing] proof that a defendant acted knowingly\" simply \" by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances\" ). In effect, the objective aspect of the inquiry simply looks to the broader picture of a physician's decisions , including the point (or points) in time at which he came to the view that he could ignore or disregard the terms of his DEA registration. It thereby ensures that the doctor did not actually rely on the registration , which is limited to the usual course of medical p ractice, but in- stead elected to rely on an outsized view of his own abil-ity to define the boundaries of his federally granted au- thority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' construction of Section 841(a) is textually foreclosed and unnecessary",
		"context": "17 -23; Kahn Br. 19 -21), that standard comports with t he mens rea presumption applicable to the construction of crim- inal statutes , which \"requires a court to read into a stat- ute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent conduct.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because the statute does not criminal- ize mistakes —even unreasonable ones —by a doctor who objectively tries to rel y on his DEA registration, it does not operate as a trap for the unwary. In contrast, a doctor who obtains a DEA regi stration, makes no rea- sonable effort to respect professional norms , and thereby elevates his own notions of medical practice to the point where other doctors would not describe them as such , does not have an innocent mind .",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Genus Claims Promote, Rather Than Stifle, Innovation",
		"context": "No one defends the Federal Circuit's reach-the-full scope test for enablement of genus claims as consistent with the patent \"bargain.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sanofi-Regeneron and amici decry the idea of genus claims with functional elements. E.g., Resp.Br.44-48; Eli.Lilly.Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Genus Claims Promote, Rather Than Stifle, Innovation",
		"context": "Resp.Br.45-46; see U.S. Br.11, 32. That do ctrine does not apply where \"even one limitation of a claim is not present in the accused [product].\" Lockheed Martin [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts thus have refused to apply \"the equivalence argu- ment\" because it \"would read the amino acid sequence limitation out of \" the claim and \"effectively expand\" the claim's scope to encompass any \"antibody that has the [claimed] effect.\" Teva Pharms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "324 F.3d 1308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Genus Claims Promote, Rather Than Stifle, Innovation",
		"context": "Speculative concerns about hypothetical antibodies in the \"far corners of the claimed landscape,\" Pet.App.65a, 23 cannot meet the clear-and-conv incing standard required for invalidity. And this Court's precedent provides the answer to any such concerns: If some \"different\" antibody in a remote corner \"has so fa r changed the principle of the\" patent claim that it no longer \"represent[s]\" the invention in Amgen's patents, the antibody can be deemed outside the claims' scope (even if it \"literally\" falls within the class). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The answ er is not to rewrite the longstanding enablement stan dard and the patent bargain itself. B. Sanofi-Regeneron errs in urging that many \"im- portant medical treatments wi ll never reach the market.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "170 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Genus Claims Promote, Rather Than Stifle, Innovation",
		"context": "Br.38; Mossoff, supra . If someone did invent a particular species more efficacious and beneficial to the public—Sanofi-Regeneron has identified none—courts would have ample discretion to ensure it is not kept off the market through an injunction. See eBay [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (20 06). And Congress has created processes for allo wing generics and biosimi- lars at low costs. See 21 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Genus Claims Promote, Rather Than Stifle, Innovation",
		"context": "Not so. Th is is nothing like Samuel Morse's effort to claim \" 'the use of electro-magne-tism, however developed , for making or printing intelli- gible characters at any distances.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 24 see Mossoff, supra . Amgen's claims cover only antibodies that block the interaction between PCSK9 and LDL receptors by binding PCSK9's sweet spot . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.",
		"context": "1. The fact that the stop-time rule involves only a threshold question of eligibility for a discretion ary form o f relief, not entit lement to rel ief, strong ly sup- ports a strict interpret ation of the s tatutory text and history. See Moncri [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cancellation for nonpermanent re sidents, like Mr. Niz-Chav ez, is particularly limited. A nonpermanent resident m ust not only have a \"spouse, p arent, or child\" who i s a U.S. citizen or law ful perm anent resi- dent, but also sh ow that h is deporta tion would cau se \"exceptional and extremely unus ual h ardship\" to that f amily mem ber.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.",
		"context": "§§ 1101(a)(43 ), 1182(a)(3) , 1227(a)(4) . And, as w ith a nonperma- nent -resident applicant, the se criteria only establish eligibility for discretionar y relief—an applicant still must show that the e quities favor al lowing her to remain in the country. Se e Matter of Sotelo -Sotelo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (BIA 20 01). Given these restri ctions, the only people for who m the stop-time question i n this case will ma tter will be the most deserving immigrants —nonpermanent re s- 46 idents w ith ex tended residence in the United States, good moral c harac ter, little or no crimin al history, and close U.S. f amily membe rs who would suf fer \"ex- cepti onal and extremely unusual har dship\" if the ap- plicant wer e removed; or permane nt residents wit h extende d U.S. residence, limi ted cri minal h istory, and a strong equit able case for rem aining in the count ry. And entitle ment to rel ief is still a matter of discretion —discretion that is its elf li mited by t he annual c ap on the num ber of i mmigrants who can receive cance llation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 I. & N. Dec. 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.",
		"context": "2. The \"longstan ding principle of const ruing any linger ing ambig uities in deportation statutes in fa vor of the alien\" also weighs strong ly aga inst the B IA's interpretation. IN [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That \"accepted princi ple[] of statut ory con- struction\" rests on the Court 's longstanding recogni- tion that \"d eportatio n is a drasti c measu re and at times the equiva lent of banishment o r exile.\" Cost el- lo v. INS, 376 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.",
		"context": "Id. ; cf. also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court can apply this interpretive canon at Chevron 's first st ep. Courts must a pply \"normal tools of statut ory interpretation\" before deeming a statute \"ambiguous\" for Che vron purposes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.",
		"context": "To the extent any sl ight ambi guities \"linger[] ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], two inter- pretive prin ciples re solve them . See Esquivel- Quintana v. Sessions , 137 S. C t. 156 2, 1569, 1572 (2017) (\"normal tools of statutory in terpretation\" ap- ply at Ch evron 's first step ); Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FAA Motions Are Adjuncts to the Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "Health 993 F.3d 720 . The FAA operates as an inte- grated whole during the entire lifecycle of the underlying controversy , authorizing recourse to the courts \"to take actions necessary to ensure that the parties' underlying controversy is successfully resolved through arbitratio n.\" Id. ; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The FAA throughout refers to the parties' underlying \"controversy\" as the common thread. Start with § 2, the FAA 's \"centerpiece\" provision guaranteeing equal treat- ment and enforceability of arbitral agreements .",
		"citation_value_orig": "909 F.3d 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FAA Motions Are Adjuncts to the Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "The FAA throughout refers to the parties' underlying \"controversy\" as the common thread. Start with § 2, the FAA 's \"centerpiece\" provision guaranteeing equal treat- ment and enforceability of arbitral agreements . Mitsub ishi Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 2 provides that a \"written provision in … a contract … to settle by arbitra- tion a controversy \" or an agreement \"to submit to arbitra- tion an existing controversy … shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.\" 9 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FAA Motions Are Adjuncts to the Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "§ 3. A federal court with jurisdiction over the law- suit, i.e., the underlying dispute, thus also has jurisdiction 18 over the request to stay that lawsuit pending arbitration . See Moses H. Cone Mem' l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 4 authoriz es parties to petition to compel ar- bitration in whatever court would have had jurisdiction over \" the controversy between the parties ,\" i.e., the par- ties' underlying substantive dispute. 9 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FAA Motions Are Adjuncts to the Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "Id. Again, the petition and the case are inextri- cably entangled. See Rush Prudential HMO, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Me. Cmty . Health , 993 F.3d at 725 (Watford, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FAA Motions Are Adjuncts to the Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "The motions themselves do not confer federal jurisdiction; the underlying controversy performs that function . In other words, \"the arbitration agreement limits the remedies a federal court may employ but does not affect the court's jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the FAA throughout presupposes that motions will be brought in federal court, by repeatedly referring to \"United States district court [s]\" as places to file these mo- tions . 9 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "832 F.3d 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. APJs Have More Power Than Article III Judges",
		"context": "While somewhat confounding the analysis, it highlights another PTAB peculiarity – parties are forced to appear before \"inferior\" officers who are the final word of the Executive against their will. - 13 - majority holds that the entirety of these judicial proceedings can be ignored and superseded by an executive agency's later ruling. Fresenius USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Inferior\" officers who are the final word of the Executive should not be able to overturn the decisions of principal officers. This makes a mockery of our Constitution and system of governmen t, eroding the public trust.",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.3d 1330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis Mirrored Other Circuits and Properly Held Ms. Saxon's Class Exempt from the FAA",
		"context": "Saxon , 993 F.3d at 503. In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit relied on prior 20 Southwest heavily relies upon Eastus v. ISS Facility Ser- vices and Hill v. Rent-A-Center ; however, these opinions relied solely on prior circuit precedent. See 960 F.3d 207 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 circuit precedent to support its conclusion. See 970 F.3d 798.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 F.3d 1286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis Mirrored Other Circuits and Properly Held Ms. Saxon's Class Exempt from the FAA",
		"context": "Wallace , 970 F.3d at 801. The court noted the im- portance of the workers being \"active[ly] engag[ed] in the enterprise of moving goods,\" explaining how \"a class of workers must themselves be 'engaged in the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.' \" Wallace , 970 F.3d at 802 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is beyond dispute that Ms. Saxon and her class are engaged in the channels of foreign and interstate commerce. In practical terms, without Ms. Saxon's class, the cargo never boards the plane, never enters interstate commerce, and never arrives at its destination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 F.3d 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The text and context of the judgment bar, and this Court's decision in Simmons, foreclose Bivens claims after a plaintiff's unsuccessful FTCA claims.",
		"context": "4 In addition, the district court's judgment in this case was the kind of judgment that Congress intended to be preclusive. This Court has observed that, when Con- gress adopted the judgment bar, it drew in a rough way on concepts of com mon -law claim preclusion, and expanded them . See Simmons , 136 S. Ct. at 1849 n.5; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whereas claim preclusion traditionally is limited to suc- cessive actions involv ing \"the same parties,\" Lucky Brand Dungarees, 140 S. Ct. 1589, the judgment bar relaxes that mutuality requirement and extend s the preclusive force of a n FTCA judgment to bar any claims against individual employees, even though the employees were 4 The FTCA as originally enacted expressly incorporated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See § 411, 60 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The text and context of the judgment bar, and this Court's decision in Simmons, foreclose Bivens claims after a plaintiff's unsuccessful FTCA claims.",
		"context": "This Court has observed that, when Con- gress adopted the judgment bar, it drew in a rough way on concepts of com mon -law claim preclusion, and expanded them . See Simmons , 136 S. Ct. at 1849 n.5; see also 546 U.S. 345. Whereas claim preclusion traditionally is limited to suc- cessive actions involv ing \"the same parties,\" Lucky Brand Dungarees, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the judgment bar relaxes that mutuality requirement and extend s the preclusive force of a n FTCA judgment to bar any claims against individual employees, even though the employees were 4 The FTCA as originally enacted expressly incorporated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See § 411, 60 Stat. 844.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The text and context of the judgment bar, and this Court's decision in Simmons, foreclose Bivens claims after a plaintiff's unsuccessful FTCA claims.",
		"context": "23 not parties to the plaintiff 's FTCA action against the United States. Both at the time Congress enacted the FTCA and now, c ommon -law claim preclusion applies where a court enters \"a judgment upon the merits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 18A Charles Alan Wright , et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4427 (3d ed. 2017 ) (res judicata applies where a judgment is \"valid, final, and on the merits\"). Thus, t he text and context of Section 2676 indicate that the judgment bar generally applies where a district court enters a final judgment in an FTCA action that would preclude further litigation against the United States —such as the district court's judgment here re- solving the merits of respondent's FTCA claims .",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "Grutter grants universities a limited measure of deference in defining their educational missions—in particular, in determin-ing whether the educational benefits that flow from di- versity are important to their missions. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208. This limited de ference is appropriate be- cause whether the benefits th at flow from diversity are integral to a particular university's mission is, \"in sub-stantial measure, an academic judgment,\" id., implicat- ing academic freedom and First Amendment values and properly made by university faculty rather than federal judges, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-329; see Bakke , 438 U.S. at 312 (the \"'essential freedoms' of a university\" include deciding \"'who may be admitted to study'\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To ensure that race is used no more than necessary to further that compelling interest, however, the Court requires a searching inquiry into \"whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve [a] university's permissible goals.\" Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "Pet.App.266. Second, SFFA contends that Grutter's recognition of a compelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity was anomalous in light of other interests the Court previously rejected. Pet.23 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 476 U.S. 267, and 29 U.S. 899). Grutter cited each of those cases, 539 U.S. at 333, 339-342, and the Court understood perfect- ly well that \"all racial classifications\" are subject to strict scrutiny, id. at 326.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "Pet.App.266. Second, SFFA contends that Grutter's recognition of a compelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity was anomalous in light of other interests the Court previously rejected. Pet.23 (citing 466 U.S. 429, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 29 U.S. 899). Grutter cited each of those cases, 539 U.S. at 333, 339-342, and the Court understood perfect- ly well that \"all racial classifications\" are subject to strict scrutiny, id. at 326.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "But the Court also recog- nized that its precedents do not forbid all consideration of race in all circumstances, as SFFA suggests here; instead, those cases require strict scrutiny, which \"is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'\" Id. at 326 (quot- ing Adarand Constructors, Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Nothing in those cases co nflicts with this Court's recognition that a university may consider race in a lim-ited fashion in pursuit of the compelling educational benefits of diversity. Shaw nowhere endorsed SFFA's argument that the Constitution requires absolute colorblindness; to the contrary, it observed that \"under certain circumstances, drawing racial distinctions is permissible where a govern mental body is pursuing a 'compelling state interest.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "And Grutter recognizes that universities can help break down racial stereotypes and challenge modes of thinking by emphasizing both inter- and intra-racial diversity—because students from any given racial background may have very different expe- riences or perspectives than a stereotype would sug-gest. 539 U.S. at 330, 333. Fourth , SFFA contends (Pet.22-23) that Grutter is inconsistent with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Brown, this Court recognized the educational and societal im portance of bringing togeth- er students of different races, and it invalidated racial classifications that excluded students from educational opportunities solely on account of their race. 347 U.S. at 493-494.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "Admissions programs, like Harvard's, that expand rather than constrict educa- tional opportunities do nothing of the sort. 2. SFFA argues that Parents Involved in Com- munity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 572 U.S. 291, have eroded Grutter's foundations. Pet.26. Nei- ther insinuated that Grutter was wrongly decided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "Admissions programs, like Harvard's, that expand rather than constrict educa- tional opportunities do nothing of the sort. 2. SFFA argues that Parents Involved in Com- munity 551 U.S. 701, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], have eroded Grutter's foundations. Pet.26. Nei- ther insinuated that Grutter was wrongly decided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "What is more, it is SFFA's proposition—that uni- versities must shut their eyes and stop their ears to consideration of applicants' racial or ethnic back- grounds—that would profoundly depreciate applicants' status as individuals. Forcing universities to ignore in- formation applicants view as important to their identi- ties, experiences, perspectives, and interests is funda-mentally inconsistent with treating them as multifacet- ed individuals. It would also disregard applicants' free- dom to \"define and express their identity,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and inhibit universi- ties' ability to cultivate the kinds of environments in which the richest exchange of ideas can flourish, see 385 U.S. 589; Sweezy , 354 U.S. at 250.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless",
		"context": "What is more, it is SFFA's proposition—that uni- versities must shut their eyes and stop their ears to consideration of applicants' racial or ethnic back- grounds—that would profoundly depreciate applicants' status as individuals. Forcing universities to ignore in- formation applicants view as important to their identi- ties, experiences, perspectives, and interests is funda-mentally inconsistent with treating them as multifacet- ed individuals. It would also disregard applicants' free- dom to \"define and express their identity,\" 576 U.S. 644, and inhibit universi- ties' ability to cultivate the kinds of environments in which the richest exchange of ideas can flourish, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sweezy , 354 U.S. at 250.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Administrative agencies, including FDA, oversee highly technical regulatory frameworks, including the one governing medical devices",
		"context": "337(a) by expressly precluding private liti- gation to enforce the FDCA. It would likewise interfere with the need, recognized by this Court in Buckman , for FDA to make the sensitive policy choices regarding en- forcement of the complicated statutory schemes it over- sees. Buckman [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court's decisions support the same",
		"context": "In three late -nineteenth -century cases, the Court construed federal tax statutes enacted during the Civil War to protect delinquent taxpayers, and specifi- cally to protect them from the uncompensated sale of more l and than necessary to satisfy a tax debt. The last of those decisions expressly stated that the government would violate the Fifth Amendment if it retained the ex- cess value from a tax sale . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's more recent decision in 352 U.S. 103, is not to the contrary: The law sustained there did not ex- tinguish the taxpayer 's ability to obtain such proceeds. E. Petitioner has therefore plausibly alleged that respondents ' actions constituted a taking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court's decisions support the same",
		"context": "The last of those decisions expressly stated that the government would violate the Fifth Amendment if it retained the ex- cess value from a tax sale . 110 U.S. 146. This Court's more recent decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is not to the contrary: The law sustained there did not ex- tinguish the taxpayer 's ability to obtain such proceeds. E. Petitioner has therefore plausibly alleged that respondents ' actions constituted a taking. On remand, petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that just compensation is due and the amount of such compensa- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Rules Enabling Act Mandates That Timely Individual Claims Cannot Be Deemed Untimely Because They Are Asserted As A Class Action",
		"context": "28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). As th e Court recognized in Tyson Foods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Rules Enabling Act dictates th at the validity of a claim or defense cannot turn on whether a claim is asserted individually or as a class action. In Tyson Foods , employees brought a class action, claiming that the employer had denied all employees at a plant required overti me compensation for time spent donning and doffing protective equipment. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1036",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Rules Enabling Act Mandates That Timely Individual Claims Cannot Be Deemed Untimely Because They Are Asserted As A Class Action",
		"context": "Under longstanding Supreme Court prece- dent, representative proof was an acceptable method for an individual employee to prove damages when the employer had violated its statutor y duty to keep records. See id. at 1047 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The employer nonetheless argued that \"representative evidence\" could not be used to prove damages in a class action. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Rules Enabling Act Mandates That Timely Individual Claims Cannot Be Deemed Untimely Because They Are Asserted As A Class Action",
		"context": "Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that the separation of powers allows for tolling of subsequent individual actions, but not for subsequent class actions. American Pipe 's separation- of-powers analysis also is consistent with more recent cases explaining that Congress legislates against the backdrop of a \"presumption\" that its statutes are subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "See Louisiana Pub. Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress has specifically enumerated the remedies available to the SEC in civil actions: civil monetary penalties, injunc- tions, and \"appropriate or necessary\" equitable relief. 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "4 Since the landmark case Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. , a number of federal courts have concluded that dis- gorgement is an ancillary equitable remedy, and may be requested as \"appropriate or necessary\" equitable relief under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5). See Texas Gulf Sul- phur Co. , 446 F.2d at 1307-08 ( finding multiple com- mon law examples of courts providing ancillary equitable relief absent from the statutory language) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] op- erates as a penalty for stat ute of limitations purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 and (2) that it serves a punitive purpose, rather than a strictly remedial one. See Kokesh , 137 S. Ct. at 1643-45.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 F.3d 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "Id., n.3. 5 Courts of equity may not enforce punitive civil penalties. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hecht 321 U.S. 321. As Petitioner appropriately describes, disgorgement is not \"sup- ported by any express or imp lied authority of the fed- eral courts to grant equitable relief.\" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Liu v. SEC , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "Id., n.3. 5 Courts of equity may not enforce punitive civil penalties. See 481 U.S. 412; Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Petitioner appropriately describes, disgorgement is not \"sup- ported by any express or imp lied authority of the fed- eral courts to grant equitable relief.\" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Liu v. SEC , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "Mut. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.\" Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. 77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "473 U.S. 134. \"The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.\" Northwest Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a comprehensive leg- islative scheme already exists for enforcement of the federal securities laws. See Brief of Petitioner at 16, 6 Liu v. SEC , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES",
		"context": "18-1501 (2019); Kokesh , 137 S. Ct. at 1640 & n.1 (detailing the SEC's \"full panoply of en- forcement tools\"). Neither th e SEC nor the courts may read into the statute a penalty that is not provided by the plain language. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply",
		"context": "Courts applying the merger doctrine to computer code have held that \"w hen specific [parts of the code], even though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by another will not amount to infringement. \" Computer Associates Intern. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the \"unique arrangement of compute r program expression . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court's longstanding section 2 precedent does not violate the Equal Protection Clause",
		"context": "The most it can show is that it would have to be aware of race to remedy HB1's racial vote dilution. But \"awareness\" of race in redistricting does not equate to \"rac[ial] predomina[nce].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because Alabama offers no evidence that the remedy for a §2 violation would necessitate racial predominance, the decisions below present no equal-protection concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "See Part I.A, supra. But the phrase does not stand alone, and statutory language \"must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it.\" Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is best read to imposes a strike for dismissals based on the failure 21 to state a claim only if those dismissals were ren- dered with prejudice. The two other grounds for dismissal listed in sec- tion 1915(g)—for actions that are \"frivolous\" or \"ma- licious\"—apply to actions that cannot succeed. By contrast, the PLRA identifies other grounds for dis- missal that do not imply any view of the action's merit—and, conspicuously, those grounds are omit- ted from section 1915(g).",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "The legal meaning of the terms in the first two dis- missal categories should inform this Court's inter- pretation of the third. \"[U]nder the familiar inter- pretive canon noscitur a sociis , 'a word is known by the company it keeps.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This canon \"is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unin- tended breadth to the Acts of Congress.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "As used in section 1915, the term \"frivolous\" means \"lack[ing] an arguable basis either in law or in fact.\" Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A claim \"lacks an arguable basis in law or fact\" if \"it relies on an indis- 22 putably meritless legal theory,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or ad- vances factual allegations that are \"fanciful,\" \"fan- tastic,\" and \"delusional,\" Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. \"Malicious,\" in turn, refers to an action or appeal that is \"plainly abusive of the judicial process.\" Cris- 655 F.2d 1305.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 F.3d 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "A claim \"lacks an arguable basis in law or fact\" if \"it relies on an indis- 22 putably meritless legal theory,\" 257 F.3d 470, or ad- vances factual allegations that are \"fanciful,\" \"fan- tastic,\" and \"delusional,\" Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. \"Malicious,\" in turn, refers to an action or appeal that is \"plainly abusive of the judicial process.\" Cris- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This encompasses actions that waste judicial re- sources because they \"merely repeat[] pending or previously litigated claims,\" 530 F. App'x 118, as well as actions that are abusive because they were \"filed with the inten- tion or desire to harm another,\" 492 F.3d 440. These two terms—\"frivolous\" and \"malicious\"— cover different types of abusive suits, but they share a common core: they refer to actions that cannot suc- ceed and should not return to court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "655 F.2d 1305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "\"Malicious,\" in turn, refers to an action or appeal that is \"plainly abusive of the judicial process.\" Cris- 655 F.2d 1305. This encompasses actions that waste judicial re- sources because they \"merely repeat[] pending or previously litigated claims,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as well as actions that are abusive because they were \"filed with the inten- tion or desire to harm another,\" 492 F.3d 440. These two terms—\"frivolous\" and \"malicious\"— cover different types of abusive suits, but they share a common core: they refer to actions that cannot suc- ceed and should not return to court. That key area of overlap should also \"cabin the contextual meaning\" of section 1915(g)'s third category of dismissals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 F. App'x 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "\"Malicious,\" in turn, refers to an action or appeal that is \"plainly abusive of the judicial process.\" Cris- 655 F.2d 1305. This encompasses actions that waste judicial re- sources because they \"merely repeat[] pending or previously litigated claims,\" 530 F. App'x 118, as well as actions that are abusive because they were \"filed with the inten- tion or desire to harm another,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These two terms—\"frivolous\" and \"malicious\"— cover different types of abusive suits, but they share a common core: they refer to actions that cannot suc- ceed and should not return to court. That key area of overlap should also \"cabin the contextual meaning\" of section 1915(g)'s third category of dismissals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 F.3d 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "These two terms—\"frivolous\" and \"malicious\"— cover different types of abusive suits, but they share a common core: they refer to actions that cannot suc- ceed and should not return to court. That key area of overlap should also \"cabin the contextual meaning\" of section 1915(g)'s third category of dismissals. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As discussed, pp. 15-17, supra, a dismissal for failure to state a claim with prejudice likewise re- flects a judgment by the court that the plaintiff can- not assert a plausible legal basis for relief, and it precludes the plaintiff from refiling the complaint.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "(\"Section 1915(g)'s mandate that prisoners may not qualify for IFP status if their suits have thrice been dismissed on the ground that they were 'frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim' was intended to apply to nonmeritorious suits dismissed with preju- dice.\"). By contrast, if section 1915(g)'s third category were interpreted to include \"without-prejudice\" dis- missals, it would create a clear \"inconsisten[cy] with its accompanying words\" in that provision. Gus- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A prisoner's pro se action could be dismissed \"without prejudice for failure to state a claim\" even if it was \"potentially meritorious\" merely because it was \"in- artfully pleaded,\" McLean, 566 F.3d at 397, or had \"a temporary, curable, procedural flaw,\" Snider, 199 F.3d at 111. Regardless of the precise reason for the dismissal, the \"without prejudice\" designation means that the order does not represent a judgment about whether the action can \"ultimately .",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "The PLRA's surrounding text is instructive not only for the other types of dismissals that section 1915(g) includes, but for what it leaves out. Cf. La- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 24 does not impose strikes on other types of dismissals that are not merits adjudications. One striking example is dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. This omission from sec- tion 1915(g) is especially notable because other PLRA sections invite dismissal on grounds that in- clude a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "This omission from sec- tion 1915(g) is especially notable because other PLRA sections invite dismissal on grounds that in- clude a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. Rus- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, the PLRA includes three sections that specify bases for sua sponte dismissal, each of which covers claims that (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim, or (2) \"seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.\" See 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "\"); 5B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Pro- cedure § 1350 n.7, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (collecting decisions that dismiss claims barred by sovereign immunity for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)). As a result, \"claims barred by sover- eign immunity can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2373, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019) (\"[D]ismissals that do not reach the merits because of a lack of jurisdiction, . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "88 F.3d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "(emphasis added)). In addition to sovereign immunity, other poten- tial grounds for dismissing prisoner claims left out of section 1915(g) also share this feature: they do not \"express any view on the merits\" of the action. Daker, 820 F.3d at 1284 (holding that dismissals for want of prosecution and lack of jurisdiction, respec- tively, did not count as strikes); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Tafari, 473 F.3d at 442 (holding that an appeal dismissed as prema- ture did not count as a strike because the dismissal \"had nothing to do with the merits\"). Interpreting section 1915(g) to impose strikes for actions dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim would thus create a strange discrepan- cy: it would mean that, although Congress carefully excluded from section 1915(g) all other types of dis- missals that are \"made without regard to the merits of the claim,\" Butler, 492 F.3d at 444, it adopted an exception for actions dismissed for failure to state a claim—even though without-prejudice dismissals on this ground likewise do not represent \"an adjudica- tion upon the merits,\" Cooter & Gell , 496 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted), or convey a view about the action's ultimately likelihood of success. There is no basis to \"attribute[] to Congress\" such an \"odd intent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 F.3d 1048",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)",
		"context": "Interpreting section 1915(g) to impose strikes for actions dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim would thus create a strange discrepan- cy: it would mean that, although Congress carefully excluded from section 1915(g) all other types of dis- missals that are \"made without regard to the merits of the claim,\" Butler, 492 F.3d at 444, it adopted an exception for actions dismissed for failure to state a claim—even though without-prejudice dismissals on this ground likewise do not represent \"an adjudica- tion upon the merits,\" Cooter & Gell , 496 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted), or convey a view about the action's ultimately likelihood of success. There is no basis to \"attribute[] to Congress\" such an \"odd intent.\" Cass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. C. The PLRA's Legislative History Further Confirms That Without- Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g). The available legislative history for the PLRA7 of- fers further support for interpreting section 1915(g) 7 The legislative record for the PLRA is \"relatively sparse\" be- cause the Act \"was attached as a rider to an omnibus appropri- ations bill.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": "Chaidez , 568 U.S. at 347. Like the common law's \"reasonable person\" standard, this concept fac- tors \" objectiv[ity]\" into the equation —such that \"the mere existence of conflicting authority does not nec- essarily mean a rule is new.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]he presence of actual disagreement among jurists and even among Mem- bers of this Court does not conclusively es tablish a rule's novelty.\"). This makes sense in light of Teague 's approach to retroactivity, which seeks \"to validate reasonable in- terpretations of existing precedents.\" Stringer , 503 U.S. at 237; see also 521 U.S. 151.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": "505 U.S. 277 (\"[T]he presence of actual disagreement among jurists and even among Mem- bers of this Court does not conclusively es tablish a rule's novelty.\"). This makes sense in light of Teague 's approach to retroactivity, which seeks \"to validate reasonable in- terpretations of existing precedents.\" Stringer , 503 U.S. at 237; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The concept of a hypothetical, reason- able jurist therefore aids in \"distinguish[ing] those develop ments in this Court's jurisprudence that state judges should have anticipated from those they could not have been expected to foresee.\" Beard , 542 U.S. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": "Apodaca does not make Ramos 's outcome a \"new\" rule under Teague 's objective framework. As explained in a companion decision to Apodaca, a ma- jority of th e Court agreed that \"the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict in federal criminal jury trials .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a majority fur- ther agreed that \" the Sixth Amendment is to be en- forced against the States according to the same 19 standards that protect that right against federal en- croachment. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": ". may be under- standably p uzzled why convictions by 11 -1 and 10-2 jury votes are affirmed\"); id. at 400 (Marshall, J., dis- senting) (the question in Apodaca was \" too frighten- ingly simple to bear much discussion \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even Justice Powell recognized his dual -track incorporation argument came \"late in the day.\" Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": "As a result, neither the plur ality opinion in Apo- daca nor Justice Powell's separate concurrence can be read objecti vely to \" repudiate this Court's repeated pre-existing teachings on the Si xth and Fourteenth Amendments.\" Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. To be sure, in the wake of Apodaca, Louisiana and Oregon both \"chose to continue allowing non- unanimous verdicts.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": "Id. at 1399 (opinion of Gorsuch, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ.). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case involving a New Jersey defendant convicted of unlawful posses- sion of a firearm, this Court described the jury trial right as one of \"surpassing importance.\" Id. at 476.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes",
		"context": "Id. at 477 (quot- ing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769) ). Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case involving a Wash- ington guilty plea for kidnapping, this Court again explained that \"[t] he Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The time has come for this Court to end overt government hostility to religion.",
		"context": "James Madison, long recognized by this Court as \"'the leading architect of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment,'\" believed that \"[b]efore any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe.\" James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance § 1 (1785), reprinted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, \"every 5 man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society\" must \"do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "As this Court has repeatedly recognized, rights to be free from public and private interference in the relationships between parents and children are among the most cherished rights under the law. Troxel , 530 U.S. at 65 (describing the \"interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children\" as \"perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 The government therefore may not intentionally intrude on rights to family integrity without a particularized court finding of unfitness on the part of each parent. See 434 U.S. 246; Stanley , 405 U.S. at 658.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "\"); 431 U.S. 494. 21 The government therefore may not intentionally intrude on rights to family integrity without a particularized court finding of unfitness on the part of each parent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Stanley , 405 U.S. at 658. Circuit Courts have found children hold a parallel right to family integrity based in part on this Court's decisions. 566 F.2d 817 (quoting 431 U.S. 816).",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "See 434 U.S. 246; Stanley , 405 U.S. at 658. Circuit Courts have found children hold a parallel right to family integrity based in part on this Court's decisions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting 431 U.S. 816). These legal rights evolved as protections in child welfare cases where government authority has the tremendous power to remove a child from his or her home, place him or her in state custody, and invol- untarily terminate his or her legal relationships with family. Santosky , 455 U.S. at 759.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.2d 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "See 434 U.S. 246; Stanley , 405 U.S. at 658. Circuit Courts have found children hold a parallel right to family integrity based in part on this Court's decisions. 566 F.2d 817 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). These legal rights evolved as protections in child welfare cases where government authority has the tremendous power to remove a child from his or her home, place him or her in state custody, and invol- untarily terminate his or her legal relationships with family. Santosky , 455 U.S. at 759.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "28 Whereas removal is unfortunately necessary in extreme cases, keeping families together is a shared goal of edented expansion of this cont ractual arrangement and would interfere with existing federal and state child welfare law. The majority of circuit courts that have directly addressed the question of whether unrelated foster parents have rights to children because they are being fostered have answered in the negative or expressed hesitance to recognize such rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 993 F.2d 369600 F.2d 693. 28 Statistically, Indian children continue to be overly represented in child welfare proceedings. The National Institutes of Health recently found that termination of parental rights proceedings are still nearly three times as likely to occur for Indian children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "778 F.2d 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "28 Whereas removal is unfortunately necessary in extreme cases, keeping families together is a shared goal of edented expansion of this cont ractual arrangement and would interfere with existing federal and state child welfare law. The majority of circuit courts that have directly addressed the question of whether unrelated foster parents have rights to children because they are being fostered have answered in the negative or expressed hesitance to recognize such rights. 778 F.2d 1386; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]600 F.2d 693. 28 Statistically, Indian children continue to be overly represented in child welfare proceedings. The National Institutes of Health recently found that termination of parental rights proceedings are still nearly three times as likely to occur for Indian children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "993 F.2d 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
		"context": "28 Whereas removal is unfortunately necessary in extreme cases, keeping families together is a shared goal of edented expansion of this cont ractual arrangement and would interfere with existing federal and state child welfare law. The majority of circuit courts that have directly addressed the question of whether unrelated foster parents have rights to children because they are being fostered have answered in the negative or expressed hesitance to recognize such rights. 778 F.2d 1386; 993 F.2d 369[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 Statistically, Indian children continue to be overly represented in child welfare proceedings. The National Institutes of Health recently found that termination of parental rights proceedings are still nearly three times as likely to occur for Indian children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 F.2d 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented lacks sufficient importance to merit review by this Court",
		"context": "And in most courts the clock be-gins to run only based upon discovery of infringement . 1 1 See 6 William F. Patry, Patry on C opyright § 20:19 (2017) (\"The overwhelming majority of courts use discovery accrual in copyright cases. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Although [this Court] has not passed on the ques- tion, nine Courts of Appeals have adopted [this] 'discovery rule,' which starts the limitations period when 'the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the i njury that forms the basis for the claim.'\" (quoting William A. Graham 568 F.3d 425 )); see also Pet. 5 n.5 (noting that \"[t]he courts of appeal s have uniformly\" adopted the discovery rule).",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented lacks sufficient importance to merit review by this Court",
		"context": "1 1 See 6 William F. Patry, Patry on C opyright § 20:19 (2017) (\"The overwhelming majority of courts use discovery accrual in copyright cases. \"); 134 S. Ct. 1962 (\"Although [this Court] has not passed on the ques- tion, nine Courts of Appeals have adopted [this] 'discovery rule,' which starts the limitations period when 'the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the i njury that forms the basis for the claim.'\" (quoting William A. Graham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] )); see also Pet. 5 n.5 (noting that \"[t]he courts of appeal s have uniformly\" adopted the discovery rule). 236733.2 7 Even if a claimant delays seeking registration beyond that point, she typically stands to lose not her entire rem- edy, but rather some measure of damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 F.3d 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented lacks sufficient importance to merit review by this Court",
		"context": "That is be- cause \"the separate -accrual rule attends the copyright statute of limitations. Under that rule, when a defendant commits successive violations, the statute of limitations runs separately from each violation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nor will a plaintiff lose her claim in a case invo lving ongoing (rather than separate) violations that began more than three years previously. \"Where a plaintiff challenges an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations pe- riod, the complaint is timely when it is filed within the lim- itations period, measured from the last asserted occur-rence of that practice.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented lacks sufficient importance to merit review by this Court",
		"context": "Nor will a plaintiff lose her claim in a case invo lving ongoing (rather than separate) violations that began more than three years previously. \"Where a plaintiff challenges an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations pe- riod, the complaint is timely when it is filed within the lim- itations period, measured from the last asserted occur-rence of that practice.\" Petrella , 134 S. Ct. at 1969 n.6 (quoting Havens Realty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, a plaintiff's damages window may shift to a less -lucrative time frame pending registration of her copyright. But it is unlikely to be eliminated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely",
		"context": ". In the 225 years since the Eleventh Amendment was enacted in 1795, this Court has recognized only two clauses of the Constitution that authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity: the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Katz , 546 U.S. at 359; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 5 meets the Court's abrogation standard because it empowers Congress to invade state sovereignty in \"express terms.\" Fitzpatrick , 427 U.S. at 453.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely",
		"context": "at 362. For this reason, this Court has long held that bankruptcy discharges of debts owed to state creditors do not implicate state sovereign immunity. Tenn. Student Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New 288 U.S. 329. Second, the Framers explicitly designed the Bankruptcy Clause to intrude on state sovereign immunity. Founding-era history shows that the Framers' \"primary motivation\" for adopting the clause was to forbid States from imprisoning debtors for debts that had been discharged by another State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely",
		"context": "at 362. For this reason, this Court has long held that bankruptcy discharges of debts owed to state creditors do not implicate state sovereign immunity. Tenn. Student Assistance 541 U.S. 440; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the Framers explicitly designed the Bankruptcy Clause to intrude on state sovereign immunity. Founding-era history shows that the Framers' \"primary motivation\" for adopting the clause was to forbid States from imprisoning debtors for debts that had been discharged by another State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 U.S. 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Supremacy Issues",
		"context": "The Constitution expressly stated few executive prerogatives, abolished others or blended them by involving the us Senate and/or US House in the checking process or by allowing executive action to be overruled. The court in which the State crime is prosecuted must manage the case with due respect to the office and the circumstances using its inherent docket control power. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court must assess, inter alia, the charge (e.g., misdemeanor, felony, malum prohibitum, traffic offense, parking ticket, littering) against the possible punishment (e.g., penalty, fine, injunction, imprisonment). Management requires awareness that Presidential functions may be affected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Bucklew's request was disproportional to the needs of the case because existing evidence refuted Bucklew's claim",
		"context": "P. 26(b)(1) . It would have served only to delay proceedings and harass members of the execution team . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bucklew be latedly 54 suggests that it would be appropriate to proceed by interrogatory or remote deposition to protect the identities of M2 and M3 . Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 1089",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Irrespective of the General Counsel's complaint, respondent's conduct was arguably protected",
		"context": "Far from being \"plainly contrary\" to the text of the NLRA, respondent's position is supported by the statutory language, which protects \"concerted stoppages of work.\" As the Board and federal courts have made clear, workers do not forfeit the Act's protections simply by stopping work at a time when the loss of perishable products is foreseeable. See,285 N.L.R.B. 497[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . B. Petitioner contends that even if the conduct at issue here was arguably protected, its claims fall within an exception to Garmon for state torts \"so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.\" 359 U.S. at 244.",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F.2d 689",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Irrespective of the General Counsel's complaint, respondent's conduct was arguably protected",
		"context": "The local feeling exception applies only to conduct that is arguably prohibited under Section 8 of the Act, not conduct that is arguably protected under Section 7. In arguably prohibited cases, there is \"no risk that permitting the state cause of action to proceed would result in state regulation of conduct that Congress intended to protect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the conduct challenged in state court is 14 arguably protected , by contrast, there is always such a risk.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The facts found by the district court established a prima facie case even under the court of appeals' market definition",
		"context": "195a. That distortion of competitive pricing, the \"central nervous system of the economy, \" Socony -Vacuum Oil , 310 U.S. at 226 n.59 , would be a matter of serious antitrust con- cern even if the networks competed for cardholders by expend ing all of their merchant fees on more generous cardholder rewards. This Court made a version of the same point in Cat- alano, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, a group of wholesalers had agreed among themselves to demand immediate payment from retailers , eliminating the practice of affording \"short- term trade credit\" on negotiated terms. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The facts found by the district court established a prima facie case even under the court of appeals' market definition",
		"context": "at 649. Although Catalano was a per se case, it illustrates that a restraint that extinguishes price competition can be anticompetitive even if \" the agreement relates only to one component of an overall price. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 . \"By effectively suppressing com- petition on merchant pricing,\" Amex's anti -steering rules \"shift the bulk of interbrand competition in the credit and charge card industry to the cardholder side of the platform.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "802 F.3d 1049",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Requiring Petitioners to Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation Is Inconsistent with Rule 24's Text and Precedent",
		"context": "Indeed, the argument for presuming adequacy of representation in Trbovich was stronger than it is here, for the Secretary of Labor brought an enforcement action under a statutory regime that gave him \"exclusive\" authority to sue . 404 U.S. at 531. This Court's other significant treatment of Rule 24(a)(2)'s adequacy element was in Cascade Nat ural Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an antitrust lawsuit brought by the Department of Justice. Cascade was a distributor of natural gas supplied by the target of the government's antitrust action, and this Court held that Cascad e was entitled to intervene as of right on the government's side after antitrust regulators attempted to settle the case for insufficient consideration. Without applying any presumption that the Department of Justice adequately represented Cascade's intere sts, the Court said that Cascade could intervene because the existing parties had \"fallen far short of representing [Cascade's] interests.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Requiring Petitioners to Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation Is Inconsistent with Rule 24's Text and Precedent",
		"context": ". for the effective settlement at one time of all disputes of which parts are already before the court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 Rule 24 was revised in 1966 to make intervention even more freely availa ble, and in overhauling the Rule's adequacy provision the Advisory Committee said that would -be intervenors need only show a \"fair probability\" of inadequate representation. FED.",
		"citation_value_orig": "144 F.2d 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Requiring Petitioners to Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation Is Inconsistent with Rule 24's Text and Precedent",
		"context": "To further guide judicial application of the Rule's adequacy element, the Advisory Committee of 1966 also favorably cited several cases in which lower courts correctly analyzed adequacy of representation under the prior version of the Rule. One of those cases is particularly relevant here. In Atlantic Refining [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the court held that a group of petroleum refiners was entitled to intervene as of right in support of the Secretary of the Interior's defense of a regulation concerning crude oil import quotas. Although the refiners did not seek \"a decree in anywise different from that sought by the Secretary,\" id. at 392, the court held that they were not adequately represented by the Secretary because they wished to defend the regulation on \"additional and broader grounds,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 F.2d 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Wyoming's Admission to the Union Did Not Abrogate the Crow Tribe's Treaty Right",
		"context": "On the contrary, the Court explained, those two interests are entirely \"reconcilable\": States may regulate treaty-protected hunters, but only when doing so is necessary as a \"conservation\" measure. Id. at 204-05 (citing Fishing 29 Vessel and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court next rejected Race Horse 's additional rationale that the \"temporary and precarious\" hunting right was \"not intended to survive statehood.\" The Court held that \"the 'temporary and precarious' language in Race Horse is too broad to be useful in distinguishing rights that survive statehood from those that do not.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Wyoming's Admission to the Union Did Not Abrogate the Crow Tribe's Treaty Right",
		"context": "Courts and commentators have overwhelmingly agreed with this assessment. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (deeming Race Horse \"now discredited\"); Hon. William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 524 (6th ed. 2014) (observing that Mille Lacs \"squarely rejects\" Race Horse); Erik B. Bluemel, Accommodating Native American Cultural Activities on Federal Public Lands , 41 Idaho L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "978 P.2d 1070",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Employees should never have to choose between the dignity of work and the dignity of religious liberty.",
		"context": "granted2022 U.S. LEXIS 840 (granting certiorari as to the question \"[w]hether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment\"). 9 See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied, Arlene's Flowers, 141 S. Ct. 2884. 16 in accordance with his convictions and the dignity of his work, the injury proliferates.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 P.3d 1203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Employees should never have to choose between the dignity of work and the dignity of religious liberty.",
		"context": "563 N.Y.S.2d 17 orders and demands. \"[T]he loss of work experience, training, the continued denial of the ability to earn a living and support a family,\" as well as \"the simple loss of human dignity which results from deprivation of employment because of discrimination\" all justify the workplace protections that many people take for granted. See I. M. A. G. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, many state workers'-rights provisions and civil-rights acts spotlight the importance of employment that fosters dignity and diminishes the worry of discrimination, particularly on the basis of religious adherence. 10 10 See, e.g., Louisiana Commission on Human Rights , LA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 F. Supp. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based",
		"context": "for Petitioners at 9 –10, 13 –14, 32 –34, 36.) This Court long has recognized that such statutory \"exemption [s] from a [] … regulation of speech may represent a governmental 'attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people. '\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act 's legislative history confirms tha t that is the case here. The bill 's author, in explaining the \"purpose of this bill,\" called the very existence of pro- life pregnancy centers \"unfortunate,\" in part because they \"aim to discourage and prevent women from seeking abortions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based",
		"context": "The absence of any discussion in the Act 's legislative history of a woman 's right to choose to bear a child underscores that the Act was calculated to increase access to abortion by burdening the very speakers who believe that abortion, though legal, is not a morally legitimate choice. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State 's animus towards pregnancy centers ' pro-life message is further underscored by the fate of a bill introduced shortly after the Act passed. Some California legislators, evidently believing turnabout to be fair play, introduced a reciprocal bill (AB 2775) that would have required \"facilities that offer abortion services\" to disseminate to clients an onsite notice stating: If you are considering continuing your pregnancy, nonprofit pregnancy centers can provide services at no cost to you, that may include consultation, pregnancy testing, ultrasound services, support groups, parenting programs, material assistance, and sexually transmitted disease or sexually transmitted infection (STD/STI) testing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 703",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based",
		"context": "This Court's \"precedents … apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations,\" like the Act, that \"suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is because such regulations \"pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based",
		"context": "This is because such regulations \"pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.\" Id. at 641; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because that is 19 Available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB2775. 31 the case here, the Act constitutes viewpoint discrimination and is subject to strict scrutiny.20 B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The States have surrendered their sovereignty through several constitutional provisions",
		"context": "art. III, § 2, abroga tes state sovereign immunity . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hyatt , 139 S. Ct. at 1495. Although the provision does not expressly authorize the United States to sue States, this Court reasoned that the broad extension of federal judicial power to all suits in which the United States is a party meant that relinquishment of state sovereign immunity was \"inherent in the constitutional plan.\" Hyatt , 139 S. Ct. at 1495 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The States have surrendered their sovereignty through several constitutional provisions",
		"context": "See id. This Court reasoned that recognizing federal jurisdiction over these matters provided a \"substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between sovereigns\" that would have otherwise been necessary, and pr otected each State 11 from \"a possible resort to force.\" North [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The agreement was \"essential to the peace of the Union.\" Hyatt , 139 S. Ct. at 1 495 (quoting Principality of 292 U.S. 313 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 U.S. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The States have surrendered their sovereignty through several constitutional provisions",
		"context": "North 263 U.S. 365. The agreement was \"essential to the peace of the Union.\" Hyatt , 139 S. Ct. at 1 495 (quoting Principality of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This Court relied on a similar analysis to conclude that the Bankruptcy Clause in Article I abrogates state sovereign immunity. Cent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "292 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The States have surrendered their sovereignty through several constitutional provisions",
		"context": "Cent. Va. Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court based its conclusion not only on the text of Article I, which authorizes Congress to establish \"uniform\" bankruptcy laws, U.S. CONST . art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": ". Although this Court has found the Clean Water Act does not extend federal authority to its consti- tutional limits ( see Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), the Agencies exceed even th ose further bounds of the Constitution. Indeed, several courts have recognized as such and the Agencies ignored their direction. This 13 Court should grant cert to clarify the CWA and Commerce Clause limits on Agency authority and to reestablish the primacy of the Constitution over Agency action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "And certainly such a water would not qualify as having a \"substantial economic effect on interstate commerce\" as required to remain within the bounds of the Commerce Clause. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 Indeed, courts have already spoken on this issue and have vacated these provisions. In United States v. Wilson , the Fourth Circuit explained that the \"regu- lation purports to extend the coverage of the Clean Water Act to a variety of waters that are intrastate, nonnavigable, or both, solely on the basis that the use, degradation, or destruction of such waters could affect interstate commerce.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "14 Indeed, courts have already spoken on this issue and have vacated these provisions. In United States v. Wilson , the Fourth Circuit explained that the \"regu- lation purports to extend the coverage of the Clean Water Act to a variety of waters that are intrastate, nonnavigable, or both, solely on the basis that the use, degradation, or destruction of such waters could affect interstate commerce.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the regulation does not require \"that the regulated activity have a substantial effect on inter- state commerce,\" it poses \"serious constitutional diffi- culties\" and appears \"to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "The District Court for the District of Columbia was similarly troubled by the \"could affect interstate commerce language\" and vacated a comparable WOTUS definition. Am. Petroleum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court ordered EPA to return to its 1973 regulation, the last effective regulation before the invalidated 2002 15 regulation. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 F. Supp. 2d 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "merely restore the previous regulatory definition of 'navigable waters' pending further proceedings.\"). This is because, generally, \"[t]he effect of invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. EPA complied but did not make comparable adjustments to other CWA regulations. The Agencies do not have this option of continuing to apply rules courts have invalidated, particularly rules invalidated on constitutional grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F.3d 999",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "EPA complied but did not make comparable adjustments to other CWA regulations. The Agencies do not have this option of continuing to apply rules courts have invalidated, particularly rules invalidated on constitutional grounds. 5 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Agencies then expand on this unlawful base by claiming jurisdiction ov er all tributaries of these waters, however small and insignificant. See 40 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "\"There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce.\" A.L.A. Schechter Poultry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is what the Agencies have long done in their interpretation of WOTUS. By extending federal jurisdiction over an unending sequence of ever-more-attenuated connections to navi- gable waters, the Agencies have \"asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit—whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or ephemeral—through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermit-tently flow.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": ". Although this Court has found the Clean Water Act does not extend federal authority to its constitu- tional limits ( see Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Agencies exceed even those further bounds of the Constitution. Indeed, several courts have recognized as such and the Agencies have ignored their direction. This Court should reject the Agencies' disre- gard of judicial directives and reestablish the constitu-tional limits on Agency authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "SWANCC , 531 U.S. at 168, n. 3. As this Court long ago established, the third ave- nue for regulation under the Commerce Clause is only available to regulate \"commercial activity\" with a \"sub-stantial\" and \"economic\" effect on interstate commerce. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 567 U.S. 519. See also 529 U.S. 598.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "As this Court long ago established, the third ave- nue for regulation under the Commerce Clause is only available to regulate \"commercial activity\" with a \"sub-stantial\" and \"economic\" effect on interstate commerce. 514 U.S. 549 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 529 U.S. 598. However, the CWA and the WOTUS regulations seek to regulate water, not activity, whether economic or not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "514 U.S. 549 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 567 U.S. 519. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, the CWA and the WOTUS regulations seek to regulate water, not activity, whether economic or not. In the context of CWA regulation, this Court has reasoned, \"[W]e would have to evaluate the precise ob-ject or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially af- fects interstate commerce.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "Indeed, courts have already spoken on this issue and have vacated these provisions. In United States v. Wilson , the Fourth Circuit found the \"regulation pur- ports to extend the coverage of the Clean Water Act to a variety of waters that are intrastate, nonnavigable, or both, solely on the basis that the use, degradation, or destruction of such waters could affect interstate commerce.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the regulation does not require \"that the regulated ac- tivity have a substantial effect on interstate com- merce,\" it poses \"serious constitutional difficulties\" and appears \"to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "The District of Columbia District Court was simi- larly troubled by the \"could affect interstate commerce language\" and vacated a comparable WOTUS defini- tion. Am. Petroleum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court ordered EPA to re- turn to its 1973 regulation, the last effective regulation before the invalidated 2002 regulation. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 F. Supp. 2d 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "merely restore the previous regu- latory definition of 'navigable waters' pending further proceedings.\"). This is becaus e \"[t]he effect of invalidat- ing an agency rule is to rein state the rule previously in force.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. EPA complied but did not make comparable ad-justments to other CWA regulations. The Agencies do not have this option of continuing to apply judicially invalidated rules, particularly rules invalidated on constitutional grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F.3d 999",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "EPA complied but did not make comparable ad-justments to other CWA regulations. The Agencies do not have this option of continuing to apply judicially invalidated rules, particularly rules invalidated on constitutional grounds. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, this has historically been the Agencies' response to contrary judicial opinions. See Rapanos , 15 547 U.S. at 726 (\"Following our decision in SWANCC , the Corps did not significantly revise its theory of fed- eral jurisdiction under § 1344(a).\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": "\"There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce.\" A.L.A. Schechter Poultry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 16 (Cardozo, J., concurring). That is what the Agencies have long done in their interpretation of WOTUS. By extending federal jurisdiction over an unending se- quence of ever-more-attenuated connections to naviga-ble waters, the Agencies have \"asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit—whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or ephemeral—through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermit- tently flow.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "As ex- plained above, however, the RRTA 's basic definition of \"compensation ,\" read in light of the accompanying ex- clusions for particular types of stock optio ns and various in-kind benefits, is most naturally understoo d to encom- pass stock . At the very least, t he statutory definition does not foreclose the Departmen t of Treasury's approach . Petitioners also suggest that a regulation aligning the basic definitions of RRTA \"compensation \" and FICA \"wages \"—subject to the distinct (though overlap- ping) express exclusions in the two statutes —would be unreasonable under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], be- cause it effectively \"excis e[s]\" \"the word 'money' from the statute.\" Pets. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "But while this Court has reasoned that Congress 's decision to \"inclu de[] par- ticular language in one section of a statute but omit[] it in another\" triggers a \"presum[ption] that Congress in- tended a difference in meaning ,\" Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers , No. 16 -1276 (Feb. 21, 2018), slip op. 10 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) , this Court has consistently treated that principle as one limited to different words in provisions of the same statute or statutes that were derived from one another. See, e.g. , Department of Homeland 135 S. Ct. 913464 U.S. 23, or \"cognate[s]\" derived from the same statutory provi- sion, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 254 (2012) (discussing 553 U.S. 272 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "10 (quoting 134 S. Ct. 2384) , this Court has consistently treated that principle as one limited to different words in provisions of the same statute or statutes that were derived from one another. See, e.g. , Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]464 U.S. 23, or \"cognate[s]\" derived from the same statutory provi- sion, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 254 (2012) (discussing 553 U.S. 272 ). Moreover, even in the context of a single statute, this Court has never treated the principle that the different words should be assigned different meaning as one that can displace the best interpretation of statutory lan- guage derived from the text itself, or from history or context. On the contrary, this Court has cautioned that 50 \"there is no 'canon of interpretation that forbids inter- preting different words used in different parts of the same statute to mean roughly the same thing.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "10 (quoting 134 S. Ct. 2384) , this Court has consistently treated that principle as one limited to different words in provisions of the same statute or statutes that were derived from one another. See, e.g. , Department of Homeland 135 S. Ct. 913464 U.S. 23, or \"cognate[s]\" derived from the same statutory provi- sion, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 254 (2012) (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Moreover, even in the context of a single statute, this Court has never treated the principle that the different words should be assigned different meaning as one that can displace the best interpretation of statutory lan- guage derived from the text itself, or from history or context. On the contrary, this Court has cautioned that 50 \"there is no 'canon of interpretation that forbids inter- preting different words used in different parts of the same statute to mean roughly the same thing.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "\" Jen- nings v. Rodriguez , No. 15 -1204 (Feb. 27, 2018), slip op. 19 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see 533 U.S. 656. And it has described the principle that \"use of 'certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another' can indicate that 'different meanings were intended ' \" as \"no more than a rule of thumb.\" Auburn Reg'l Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "\" Jen- nings v. Rodriguez , No. 15 -1204 (Feb. 27, 2018), slip op. 19 (quoting 568 U.S. 519); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it has described the principle that \"use of 'certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another' can indicate that 'different meanings were intended ' \" as \"no more than a rule of thumb.\" Auburn Reg'l Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "But reasoning from failed legis- lation is generally inappropriate, because many explanations can ex-plain Congress's failure to enact a particular measure, including the possibility that Congress thought existing law already embodied the principle in the proposed new law. See, e.g. , Star Athletica , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp 496 U.S. 633 ) (brackets in original). 51 ted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Star Athletica , 137 S. Ct. 1002 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ) (brackets in original). 51 ted). By exempt ing railroad workers from FICA taxa- tion, Section 312 1(b)(9) ensur es that compensation of railroad employees is not taxed under both the RRTA and the FICA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT \"SUBSTANTIALLY\" IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.",
		"context": "In Bird , the statute retroactively changed a trust instrument after the testator's death . 974 N.E.2d at 32-33. In Estate of Gab , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the statutory- share statute interfered with an agreement between the spouses . The court did not allow one spo use to defeat the statutory-share statute via a unilateral purchase of a non-probate asset. 12 obliged to give the money to the policyholder's selected beneficiary, which the policyholder may change at will.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 N.W.2d 924",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT \"SUBSTANTIALLY\" IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.",
		"context": "46-47, 49. But Respondent overlooks that even before the revocation-on-divorce statute was enacted, divorce decrees could alter beneficiary designations, even without notice to the insurer, so long as they did so expressly. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Minnesota's statute merely determines which divorce decrees will revoke beneficiary designations. Respondent's argument has a more fundamental flaw.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 N.W.2d 777",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner cannot square his implicit-bracket reading with congressional design and common sense",
		"context": "43 -46) that the results produced by the implicit -bracket reading would not be so absurd as to justify invoking the \"absurdity doctrine \" is beside the point. A court would need to resort to the absurdity doctrine only to \"override the literal terms of a statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner suggests (Br. 43) that a court would need to do so here , on the theory that the distributive interpr e- 37 tation would override the plain meaning of Section 3553(f )(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Sex\" does not mean \"sexual orientation\"",
		"context": "2000e -2(a)(2), does not encompass discrimination based on sexual orientation for the sim- ple reason that \"sex\" does not mean \"sexual orienta- tion.\" Because Title VII does not define the term \"sex,\" the term should \"be interpreted as taking [its] ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contempor aneous dictionaries defined \"sex\" as \"refer[ring ] to [the] physiological dis- tinction[]\" between \" male and female, \" Webster's New International Dictionary 2296 (2d ed. 195 7), or as \"[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the charac- ter of being male or female,\" Black's Law Dictionary 1541 ( 4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Sex\" does not mean \"sexual orientation\"",
		"context": "195 7), or as \"[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the charac- ter of being male or female,\" Black's Law Dictionary 1541 ( 4th ed. 195 1). See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Neither Zarda nor Bostock ha s identified any contemporaneous dic- tionary or legal reference defining \"sex\" as including or referring to sexual orientation. Even judges who have concluded that Title VII pro- hibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation acknowledge that in 1964 \"sex\" did not refer to \"sexual orientation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "853 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Sex\" does not mean \"sexual orientation\"",
		"context": "104 -105 & n.21 (Lynch, J., dissenting). The absence of \"sexual orientation\" from Title VII's list of protected traits thus demon- strates that the statute doe s not prohibit discrimination on that basis. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (5th Cir. 2019 ) (Ho, J., concurring) (\"If Congress had meant to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi- nation, surely the most straightforward way to do so would have been to say so —to add 'sexual orientation' to the list of classifications protected under Title VII.\"). To be sure, \"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evi l to cover reasonably comparable evils.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Sex\" does not mean \"sexual orientation\"",
		"context": "2019 ) (Ho, J., concurring) (\"If Congress had meant to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi- nation, surely the most straightforward way to do so would have been to say so —to add 'sexual orientation' to the list of classifications protected under Title VII.\"). To be sure, \"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evi l to cover reasonably comparable evils.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that unremarkable observation is not a license to rewrite or expand a statute to cover things that are not encompassed by the statutory text. In On- cale, for example, the Court concluded that under the plain text of Title VII, a male employer can be found to have sexually harass ed a male employee \"because of \" 16 the latter's \"sex\" if the employer would not harass sim- ilarly situated women, even though such harassment was not the \"principal evil\" Congress sought to elimi- nate .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with the President's authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)",
		"context": "Order 12, 206, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,101 (1980) (ex- panding directive to encompass all Ira nian nationals); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,459 U.S. 872.",
		"citation_value_orig": "679 F.2d 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with the President's authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)",
		"context": "This Court should hesitate to throw that historical prac- tice to the wind based on a novel and atextual interpre- tation of Section 1152(a)(1). c. The court of appeals' interpretation also would in- vite rather than avoid grave constitutional questions . See Edward J. DeBartolo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Construing Section 1152(a)(1)(A) to prevent the President from suspend ing entry based in part on nationality would undermine the Pres ident's Article II authority as Commander -in-Chief and his power over foreign affairs because it would mean that, by statute, the President could not suspend entry of aliens from a specified coun- try even if he were aware of a particular threat from an unidentified national of that country, or the United States were on the brink of war with it. The court of appeals declined to decide whether a President could suspend entry based on nationality \"un-der special circumstances and for a limited time.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with the President's authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)",
		"context": "The absence of any such textual exception is strong evidence that Congress did not mean Section 1152(a)(1)(A) to intrude on the President's authority to suspend entry based on the Nation's security and 55 foreign -policy interests. Nor is the judiciary well suited to determine what constitutes \"spec ial circumstances\" in matters of national security. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] provides no standards that would enable the judiciary to assess whether the situation in North Korea justifies entry re- strictions but the terrorist threats in Chad, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, for example, do not. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) can and should be construed to avoid asking the judiciary to second -guess those inherently Executive determinations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment protects parents and children",
		"context": "Despite its protective func tion, some officials seek to neutralize the Fourth Amendment's application to child-welfare investigations—stressing the important need to protect children. And a few courts have in- dulged that view. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in their zeal to save children from supposed parental wrongs, officials can harm 15 those they seek to protect. Such investigations often uncover no evidence of wrongdoing, yet they decimate family privacy and can ruin childhoods—or worse.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 S.W.2d 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": ". \"Adherence to precedent is 'a foundation stone of the rule of law.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such fidelity \"'pro- motes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'\" 135 S. Ct. 2401.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2400. Such fidelity \"'pro- motes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Stare decisis thus functions as \"a basic self- governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discre- tion.'\" 491 U.S. 164.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. 2401. Stare decisis thus functions as \"a basic self- governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discre- tion.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The doctrine not 22 only constrains this Court but also \"discourag[es] ad- venturous second-guessing by widely dispersed sub- altern judges.\" Bryan A. Garner, Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett M. Kavanaugh, et al., The Law of Judicial Prec-edent 30 (2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "After sufficient percolation, this Court's typical prac-tice is to select a single test case among many to re- solve the legality of a given type of law or governmen- tal practice. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (lo- cal laws permitting strip searches in jails); 564 U.S. 786 adequately to further a valid state interest, that decision casts a pall over the con- stitutionality of all equivalent laws. The Montana sequel to Citizens 558 U.S. 310—Ameri- can Tradition Partnership, 567 U.S. 516—is exemplary. In Citizens United , the Court held that a federal law restricting independent corporate political expenditures violated the First Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 1510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "After sufficient percolation, this Court's typical prac-tice is to select a single test case among many to re- solve the legality of a given type of law or governmen- tal practice. See, e.g. , 132 S. Ct. 1510 (lo- cal laws permitting strip searches in jails); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] adequately to further a valid state interest, that decision casts a pall over the con- stitutionality of all equivalent laws. The Montana sequel to Citizens 558 U.S. 310—Ameri- can Tradition Partnership, 567 U.S. 516—is exemplary. In Citizens United , the Court held that a federal law restricting independent corporate political expenditures violated the First Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 132 S. Ct. 1510 (lo- cal laws permitting strip searches in jails); 564 U.S. 786 adequately to further a valid state interest, that decision casts a pall over the con- stitutionality of all equivalent laws. The Montana sequel to Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—Ameri- can Tradition Partnership, 567 U.S. 516—is exemplary. In Citizens United , the Court held that a federal law restricting independent corporate political expenditures violated the First Amendment. The Court based its decision on broadly applicable facts, including the value of political speech in a democracy and the ill fit between the gov- ernment's asserted rationales and the restrictions imposed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 132 S. Ct. 1510 (lo- cal laws permitting strip searches in jails); 564 U.S. 786 adequately to further a valid state interest, that decision casts a pall over the con- stitutionality of all equivalent laws. The Montana sequel to Citizens 558 U.S. 310—Ameri- can Tradition Partnership, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—is exemplary. In Citizens United , the Court held that a federal law restricting independent corporate political expenditures violated the First Amendment. The Court based its decision on broadly applicable facts, including the value of political speech in a democracy and the ill fit between the gov- ernment's asserted rationales and the restrictions imposed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "Two years later, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a state law that likewise prohibited 23 independent corporate expenditures on behalf of po- litical candidates. Declaring that \" Citizens United was a case decided upon its facts,\" the Montana Su- preme Court upheld Montana's law based on purport- edly \"critical\" local distinctions, including Montana's special history of corrupti on and the slight \"regula- tory burden\" it imposed. W. Tradition P'ship, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court summarily reversed in a single paragraph, declaring that Montana's arguments \"fail[ed] to meaningfully distinguish\" Citizens United . Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 P.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "Tradition P'ship , 567 U.S. at 516-17. Another illustration ceme nts the point. In Press- Enterprise [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court struck down a California law allow-ing magistrates to close preliminary criminal hear- ings, holding that these hearings were \"sufficiently like a trial\" that the First Amendment required pub- lic access. Seven years later, the Puerto Rico Su- preme Court considered a rule likewise allowing closed preliminary hearings—a rule \"similar in form and function\" to (and indeed, based on) the California law the Court invalidated in Press-Enterprise . See El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbe an Int'l News 508 U.S. 147.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute",
		"context": "In Press- Enterprise 478 U.S. 1, the Court struck down a California law allow-ing magistrates to close preliminary criminal hear- ings, holding that these hearings were \"sufficiently like a trial\" that the First Amendment required pub- lic access. Seven years later, the Puerto Rico Su- preme Court considered a rule likewise allowing closed preliminary hearings—a rule \"similar in form and function\" to (and indeed, based on) the California law the Court invalidated in Press-Enterprise . See El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbe an Int'l News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court upheld the Puerto Rico rule, stressing the \"unique history and traditions of the Commonwealth\" and Puerto Rico's \"small size and dense population.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Functional Claims Like Amgen's Impede Innovation — and The Federal Circuit's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Standard Is an Essential Counterweight to Prevent Overclaiming.",
		"context": "Consol. Elec. Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Halliburton Oil , 329 U.S. at 12 (\"[M]any other devices beyond our present infor- mation or indeed our imagination [may] perform that function and yet fit these claims. And unless fright- ened from the course of experimentation by broad functional claims like these, inventive genius may 6 evolve many more devices to accomplish the same pur- pose. \").2 In the many decades since Incandescent Lamp and Halliburton Oil, the tendency of functional claim- ing to dominate future invention in the same space has continued unabated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Functional Claims Like Amgen's Impede Innovation — and The Federal Circuit's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Standard Is an Essential Counterweight to Prevent Overclaiming.",
		"context": "\").2 In the many decades since Incandescent Lamp and Halliburton Oil, the tendency of functional claim- ing to dominate future invention in the same space has continued unabated. Both the Federal Circuit and commentators have warned against their wholesale encroachment on prospective innovative endeavors— by \"preempt[ing] the future before it has arrived.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law's Func- tionality Malfunction and the Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents , 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1419 (2013) (\"[P]atent protection provides suffi- cient incentives for innovation when it does not en- compass entire markets . Functional claims that reach toward markets are unlikely to strike this bal- ance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "984 F.2d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Functional Claims Like Amgen's Impede Innovation — and The Federal Circuit's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Standard Is an Essential Counterweight to Prevent Overclaiming.",
		"context": "8 by forcing \"inventors to affirmatively build their in- ventions to provide those examples\" that support the breadth of their genus. Lemley 2016, at 1192-93. The Federal Circuit, and district courts, fre- quently use the Wands factors (see In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])4 as a framework for deter- mining whether a person skilled in the art would be enabled, without the need to engage in undue experi- mentation, to practice the full scope of a patent claim. E.g., ALZA 603 F.3d 935. The Wands factors, the Federal Circuit's applica- tion of them over the last thirty-five years (including in the decision below), and the requirement that a pa- tent specification enable the full scope of a claim are not recent developments in U.S. patent law, created out of whole cloth by the Federal Circuit—they reach back nearly 250 years, through this Court's earliest enablement decisions and to the first U.S. patent stat- ute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "858 F.2d 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Functional Claims Like Amgen's Impede Innovation — and The Federal Circuit's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Standard Is an Essential Counterweight to Prevent Overclaiming.",
		"context": "Lemley 2016, at 1192-93. The Federal Circuit, and district courts, fre- quently use the Wands factors (see In re858 F.2d 731)4 as a framework for deter- mining whether a person skilled in the art would be enabled, without the need to engage in undue experi- mentation, to practice the full scope of a patent claim. E.g., ALZA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Wands factors, the Federal Circuit's applica- tion of them over the last thirty-five years (including in the decision below), and the requirement that a pa- tent specification enable the full scope of a claim are not recent developments in U.S. patent law, created out of whole cloth by the Federal Circuit—they reach back nearly 250 years, through this Court's earliest enablement decisions and to the first U.S. patent stat- ute. The Federal Circuit's analysis and holding here are wholly consistent with this Court's enablement ju- risprudence, as we next discuss.",
		"citation_value_orig": "603 F.3d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court should once again ensure that government officials do not have discretion to limit speech.",
		"context": "This Court \"consistently condemn[s]\" laws that \"vest in an administrative offi cial discretion\" to restrict speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With vague criteria, officials \"may de-cide who may speak and who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker.\" City of 486 U.S. 750.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court should once again ensure that government officials do not have discretion to limit speech.",
		"context": "394 U.S. 147. With vague criteria, officials \"may de-cide who may speak and who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Speech restrictions must contain \"nar- row, objective, and definite standards to guide\" offi- cials, Shuttlesworth , 394 U.S. at 150–51, and must not involve the \"appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion.\" Forsyth Cnty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CREATED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT DECISION IN MCDONOUGH WILL CAUSE TREMENDOUS HARM TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS",
		"context": ". For fifteen years , for claims of fabrication of evidence, courts have followed the decision in Heck v. Humphrey , which stated that a plaintiff in a §1983 claim may not bring such a claim until his criminal trial has terminated in his favor. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Notably, five circuits have held that the statute of limitations for a §1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence follows this rule and only begins to run after the termination of criminal proceedings in the defendant's favor. See 803 F.3d 382 ; Floyd v. Attorney General, 722 F. App' x 112, 114 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CREATED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT DECISION IN MCDONOUGH WILL CAUSE TREMENDOUS HARM TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "See512 U.S. 477 . Notably, five circuits have held that the statute of limitations for a §1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence follows this rule and only begins to run after the termination of criminal proceedings in the defendant's favor. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Floyd v. Attorney General, 722 F. App' x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam); 352 F.3d 939. Additionally, th e Seventh Circuit has held that upon the violation of a criminal de fendant's constitutional rights the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the constitutional violation ends.",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 F.3d 382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CREATED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT DECISION IN MCDONOUGH WILL CAUSE TREMENDOUS HARM TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "Notably, five circuits have held that the statute of limitations for a §1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence follows this rule and only begins to run after the termination of criminal proceedings in the defendant's favor. See 803 F.3d 382 ; Floyd v. Attorney General, 722 F. App' x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Additionally, th e Seventh Circuit has held that upon the violation of a criminal de fendant's constitutional rights the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the constitutional violation ends. See 903 F.3d 667.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 F.3d 939",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CREATED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT DECISION IN MCDONOUGH WILL CAUSE TREMENDOUS HARM TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "2018) (per curiam); 352 F.3d 939. Additionally, th e Seventh Circuit has held that upon the violation of a criminal de fendant's constitutional rights the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the constitutional violation ends. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Second Circuit, however, in its recent McDonough decision, held that the statute of limitations in fabrication of evidence claims begins to accrue when the defendant \"should have known\" 5 about the evidence being used against him. See 898 F.3d 259 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CREATED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT DECISION IN MCDONOUGH WILL CAUSE TREMENDOUS HARM TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "While the court asserted that the harm is more analogous to th at which occurs when the tort of false arrest takes place, rather than when there is malicious prosecution , see id. at 267, this misunderstands the violation at issue here. Given the Second Circuit's admission that it goes against the majority of other circuits in this decision, see id., the norm amon g circuit courts t o apply the law uniformly, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the harm th is rule creates for criminal defendants, the Court should grant certiorari to rever se McDonough in favor of the correct bright line \"favorable termination \" accrual rule followed by the majority of circuits and mandated by Heck .",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.2d 1368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "Due process is not measured by judges' subjective notions of fairness, in the manner of the maligned \"Chancellor's foot.\" Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The right question is \"what the Constitution as originally understood requires.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "The anchor of due process, this Court has made clear, is history. The Founders who sought to ensure that govern- ment would render \"due\" process naturally looked to the p rocedures that were already familiar to them – to \"those settled usages and modes of proceeding ex-isting in the common and statute law.\" Murray's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In this case, the question is whether Pennsylvania's consent -to-jurisdiction stat- ute comp orts with the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment. The answer, this Court has stated, is that this basis for general jurisdiction \"must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage\" at the time the Fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "In this case, the question is whether Pennsylvania's consent -to-jurisdiction stat- ute comp orts with the Due Process Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment. The answer, this Court has stated, is that this basis for general jurisdiction \"must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage\" at the time the Fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has not \"displaced the procedure of the ages.\" 291 U.S. 97 , and does not require the states to dispense with \"an ancient and familiar method of procedure.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "110 U.S. 516 . The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has not \"displaced the procedure of the ages.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and does not require the states to dispense with \"an ancient and familiar method of procedure.\" Corn Exch. 280 U.S. 218 , determined that the traditional procedure giving broad discretion in awarding punitive damages to properly instructed ju- ries does not offend procedural due process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "291 U.S. 97 , and does not require the states to dispense with \"an ancient and familiar method of procedure.\" Corn Exch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , determined that the traditional procedure giving broad discretion in awarding punitive damages to properly instructed ju- ries does not offend procedural due process. \"[T]he common -law method for assessing punitive damages 7 was well established before the F ourteenth Amend- ment was enacted. Nothing in that Amendment's text or history indicates an intention on the part of its drafters to overturn the prevailing method.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "Id. at 28 (Scalia, J., concurring). 2 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court had \"no doubt\" that the phrase due process of law includes \"legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence.\" Id. at 733 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "Auto. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts\" s ince the late eighteenth century. Honda Mo- tor 512 U.S. 415 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "538 U.S. 408 . \"Judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts\" s ince the late eighteenth century. Honda Mo- tor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 8 that dates back to the adoption of the Four- teenth Amendment and is still generally ob- served unquestionably meets that standard. 495 U.S. 604.3 Justice Scalia therefore concluded that \"ju- risdiction based on physical presence alone consti-tutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due pro-cess standard of 'traditional notions of fair play an d substantial justice.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.",
		"context": "Honda Mo- tor 512 U.S. 415 . 8 that dates back to the adoption of the Four- teenth Amendment and is still generally ob- served unquestionably meets that standard. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 Justice Scalia therefore concluded that \"ju- risdiction based on physical presence alone consti-tutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due pro-cess standard of 'traditional notions of fair play an d substantial justice.'\" Id. at 619.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The States Have —and Require— Broad Authority to Regulate Healthcare Insurance",
		"context": "\"Indeed,\" this Court has explained, when federal law enters \"fields of traditional state 5 regulation,\" courts work \"on the 'assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be su- perseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'\" Id. at 655 (quot- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Claims of ERISA preemption often implicate two core—and increasingly overlapping—areas of \"tradi- tional state regulation\": local healthcare and the busi- ness of insurance. Nothing in ERISA's text or history signals a \"clear and manifest purpose\" to disrupt the States' general control over those areas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "We \"begin[] with the language of the statute itself.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Bankruptcy Code provides that \"a [bank- ruptcy] petition … operates as a stay\" of \"any act to ob- tain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exerci se control over property of the estate.\" 11 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "Pet. App. 8a-9a; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court looked to a dictionary definition of 18 \"control\"—\"to exercise restraining or directing influ- ence over\" or \"to have power over\"—and reasoned that \"[h]olding onto an asset [and] refusing to return it\" fit within the definition. Thompson , 566 F.3d at 702.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "Those words are key in determining the scope of the automatic stay. And because the Bankruptcy Code does not define \"stay\" or \"act,\" they have their ordi- nary meaning. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In both legal parlance and ordinary English, \"stay\" means the \"halting\" or \"bringing to a stop\" of a pro- ceeding or activity. See In re941 F.3d 115; Black's Law Dictionary 1709 (11th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "95-595, at 340 (the automatic stay \"stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions\"). The word \"stay\" is most commonly used in the law to mean a court's temporary suspension of proceedings or of the effectiveness of an order or judgment under 19 review. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The automatic stay is different only in that it stays parties as well as courts from acting, and thus functions as a prohibitory injunction. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "Simply put, \"[p]rohibitory in- junctions maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case; mandatory injunctions alter it.\" North Am. Soccer League, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g. , 516 U.S. 479 (construing federal environmental statute to authorize issuance of either a \"mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup … of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party from further violating [the statute]\" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Ex parte209 U.S. 123; Marlyn Nutraceu- ticals, 571 F.3d 873.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "North Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d 32; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (construing federal environmental statute to authorize issuance of either a \"mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup … of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party from further violating [the statute]\" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Ex parte209 U.S. 123; Marlyn Nutraceu- ticals, 571 F.3d 873. 20 \"'Act', in turn, commonly means to 'take action' or 'do something.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "Soccer League, 883 F.3d 32; see also, e.g. , 516 U.S. 479 (construing federal environmental statute to authorize issuance of either a \"mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup … of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party from further violating [the statute]\" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Marlyn Nutraceu- ticals, 571 F.3d 873. 20 \"'Act', in turn, commonly means to 'take action' or 'do something.'\" In re849 F.3d 943.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "Soccer League, 883 F.3d 32; see also, e.g. , 516 U.S. 479 (construing federal environmental statute to authorize issuance of either a \"mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup … of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party from further violating [the statute]\" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)); Ex parte209 U.S. 123; Marlyn Nutraceu- ticals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 \"'Act', in turn, commonly means to 'take action' or 'do something.'\" In re849 F.3d 943.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 F.3d 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "§ 6972(a)(1)(B)); Ex parte209 U.S. 123; Marlyn Nutraceu- ticals, 571 F.3d 873. 20 \"'Act', in turn, commonly means to 'take action' or 'do something.'\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Id. ; Denby-Peterson , 941 F.3d at 125.",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 943",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "\"[T]he distinc tion between doing some- thing and doing nothing [was] not … lost\" on Con- gress—a body of \"'practical statesmen,' not metaphysi-cal philosophers\"—when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code. National Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] operates as a \"stay\" of an \"act.\" And, again, a \"stay\" \"prevent[s]\" a future act that would \"alter [] the status quo.\" Nken , 556 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
		"context": "It stops a creditor from taking a \"post- petition affirmative act\" that would improve the posi-tion the creditor held on the petition date, Denby- Peterson , 941 F.3d at 125-126, such as an act \"to repos- 21 sess or liquidate collateral\" or \"to terminate a lease,\" Ritzen , Slip Op. at 10. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Seventh Circuit's and the Debtors' contrary reading—under which the automatic stay requires a creditor to take an act that worsens the position it had on the peti tion date—contravenes the plain text of the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.2d 1467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. QUILL'S BRIGHT-LINE TEST HAS CONTINUING VITALITY IN TODAY'S INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SALES AND USE TAX ENVIRONMENT",
		"context": "South Dakota is simply arguing what its one- state-up neighbor argued back in the 1990s. 11 See New \"Cookie\" Nexus Regulation Effective October 1 , Reed Smith Client Alerts (Sep. 15, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/ perspectives/2017/09/ma-to-move-f orward-with-new-cookie-nexus- regulation-effective-october-1; Alex Ebert, Ohio \"Cookie Nexus\" for Online Sales Tax Likely to Crumble , BNA News (July 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ohio -cookie-nexus-n730144 61659/. 11 The North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the \"burgeoning technological advances of the 1970s and 1980s [that] created revolutionary communications abilities and marketing methods which were undreamed of in 1967[,] \" \"increased efficiency of toll- free telephone lines, fax orders, an d direct computer ordering[,]\" and \"advances in the parcel delivery industry\" to justify its 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]504 U.S. 298. Just as toll-free telephones then were not a salve to sales tax complexity, iPads and augmented reality devices today are not a salve to sales tax complexity. While remote retail has gr own substantially since the internet's infancy in the early 1990s, it still remains a small share of the total retail sales picture in America.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 N.W.2d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. QUILL'S BRIGHT-LINE TEST HAS CONTINUING VITALITY IN TODAY'S INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SALES AND USE TAX ENVIRONMENT",
		"context": "South Dakota is simply arguing what its one- state-up neighbor argued back in the 1990s. 11 See New \"Cookie\" Nexus Regulation Effective October 1 , Reed Smith Client Alerts (Sep. 15, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/ perspectives/2017/09/ma-to-move-f orward-with-new-cookie-nexus- regulation-effective-october-1; Alex Ebert, Ohio \"Cookie Nexus\" for Online Sales Tax Likely to Crumble , BNA News (July 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ohio -cookie-nexus-n730144 61659/. 11 The North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the \"burgeoning technological advances of the 1970s and 1980s [that] created revolutionary communications abilities and marketing methods which were undreamed of in 1967[,] \" \"increased efficiency of toll- free telephone lines, fax orders, an d direct computer ordering[,]\" and \"advances in the parcel delivery industry\" to justify its 15 470 N.W.2d 203[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as toll-free telephones then were not a salve to sales tax complexity, iPads and augmented reality devices today are not a salve to sales tax complexity. While remote retail has gr own substantially since the internet's infancy in the early 1990s, it still remains a small share of the total retail sales picture in America.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "Despite that, some courts have extended Williamson County 's second prong to equal- protection or due-process claims. See, e.g. , Rosedale Missionary Baptist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 383 F.3d 569; Country View Estates @ Ridge 452 F. Supp. 2d 142. Indeed, a panel of the Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to announce (when affirming the dis- missal of a procedural-due-pro cess claim) that \"[l]abels do not matter. A person contending that state or local regulation of the use of land has gone overboard must repair to state court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "Despite that, some courts have extended Williamson County 's second prong to equal- protection or due-process claims. See, e.g. , Rosedale Missionary Baptist 641 F.3d 86; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Country View Estates @ Ridge 452 F. Supp. 2d 142. Indeed, a panel of the Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to announce (when affirming the dis- missal of a procedural-due-pro cess claim) that \"[l]abels do not matter. A person contending that state or local regulation of the use of land has gone overboard must repair to state court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.3d 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "Despite that, some courts have extended Williamson County 's second prong to equal- protection or due-process claims. See, e.g. , Rosedale Missionary Baptist 641 F.3d 86; 383 F.3d 569; Country View Estates @ Ridge [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, a panel of the Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to announce (when affirming the dis- missal of a procedural-due-pro cess claim) that \"[l]abels do not matter. A person contending that state or local regulation of the use of land has gone overboard must repair to state court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 F. Supp. 2d 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "Indeed, a panel of the Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to announce (when affirming the dis- missal of a procedural-due-pro cess claim) that \"[l]abels do not matter. A person contending that state or local regulation of the use of land has gone overboard must repair to state court.\" River Park, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should take the opportunity to make it clear that Williamson County 's second prong applies only to takings claims. As many U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized, there is no reason to require the sec- ond prong of Williamson County in non-takings claims, because those constitutional rights have no counter- part to the \"without just compensation\" language of the Takings Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 F.3d 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "As many U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized, there is no reason to require the sec- ond prong of Williamson County in non-takings claims, because those constitutional rights have no counter- part to the \"without just compensation\" language of the Takings Clause. See, e.g. , John [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 112 F.3d 313; Strick- 74 F.3d 260; 6 F.3d 970; Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d 84, cert. denied507 U.S. 987; Sinaloa 17 Lake Owners 882 F.2d 1398, cert. denied494 U.S. 1016, overruled on other grounds by 75 F.3d 1311.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "As many U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized, there is no reason to require the sec- ond prong of Williamson County in non-takings claims, because those constitutional rights have no counter- part to the \"without just compensation\" language of the Takings Clause. See, e.g. , John 214 F.3d 573; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Strick- 74 F.3d 260; 6 F.3d 970; Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d 84, cert. denied507 U.S. 987; Sinaloa 17 Lake Owners 882 F.2d 1398, cert. denied494 U.S. 1016, overruled on other grounds by 75 F.3d 1311.",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 F.3d 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "As many U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized, there is no reason to require the sec- ond prong of Williamson County in non-takings claims, because those constitutional rights have no counter- part to the \"without just compensation\" language of the Takings Clause. See, e.g. , John 214 F.3d 573; 112 F.3d 313; Strick- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 6 F.3d 970; Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d 84, cert. denied507 U.S. 987; Sinaloa 17 Lake Owners 882 F.2d 1398, cert. denied494 U.S. 1016, overruled on other grounds by 75 F.3d 1311.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 F.3d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "As many U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized, there is no reason to require the sec- ond prong of Williamson County in non-takings claims, because those constitutional rights have no counter- part to the \"without just compensation\" language of the Takings Clause. See, e.g. , John 214 F.3d 573; 112 F.3d 313; Strick- 74 F.3d 260; 6 F.3d 970; Southview Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied507 U.S. 987; Sinaloa 17 Lake Owners 882 F.2d 1398, cert. denied494 U.S. 1016, overruled on other grounds by 75 F.3d 1311.",
		"citation_value_orig": "980 F.2d 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": "See, e.g. , John 214 F.3d 573; 112 F.3d 313; Strick- 74 F.3d 260; 6 F.3d 970; Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d 84, cert. denied507 U.S. 987; Sinaloa 17 Lake Owners [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied494 U.S. 1016, overruled on other grounds by 75 F.3d 1311. ---------------------------------  ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "882 F.2d 1398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
		"context": ", John 214 F.3d 573; 112 F.3d 313; Strick- 74 F.3d 260; 6 F.3d 970; Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d 84, cert. denied507 U.S. 987; Sinaloa 17 Lake Owners 882 F.2d 1398, cert. denied494 U.S. 1016, overruled on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ---------------------------------  ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F.3d 1311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "Br. 28- 31) on Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho , in which this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred an a c- tion against Idaho officials seeking \"the functional equivalent\" of quieting title to the submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, no t- withstanding the State of Idaho's claim to those lands. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lake Coeur d'Alene, of course, is located within the State of Idaho, a fact that this Court emphasized when it explained that the requested relief \"would diminis h, even extinguish, the State's co n- trol over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "VI, cl. 2, it is not surprising that the United States may assert so v- ereign immunity in cases involving land in which it claims an interest, even if those cases are brought by States . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 313 U.S. 274; 305 U.S. 382 . Those cases do not suggest that the United States would be immune from suit in the courts of another country in which it owned land. To the contrary, the consistent p o- sition of the United States has been that it would not be immune in those circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "VI, cl. 2, it is not surprising that the United States may assert so v- ereign immunity in cases involving land in which it claims an interest, even if those cases are brought by States . See, e.g., 461 U.S. 273; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 305 U.S. 382 . Those cases do not suggest that the United States would be immune from suit in the courts of another country in which it owned land. To the contrary, the consistent p o- sition of the United States has been that it would not be immune in those circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "VI, cl. 2, it is not surprising that the United States may assert so v- ereign immunity in cases involving land in which it claims an interest, even if those cases are brought by States . See, e.g., 461 U.S. 273; 313 U.S. 274; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those cases do not suggest that the United States would be immune from suit in the courts of another country in which it owned land. To the contrary, the consistent p o- sition of the United States has been that it would not be immune in those circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 34- 35; s ee, e.g., Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]290 U.S. 18503 U.S. 3074 U.S. 152 . None of those personal -property cases is relevant here. Because of a territorial sovereign's \" primeval i n- terest in resolving all disputes o ver use or right to use of real property within its own do main, \" the law has distin- guished between cases involving real property and cases involving personal property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 851",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 34- 35; s ee, e.g., Republic of 553 U.S. 851[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]503 U.S. 3074 U.S. 152 . None of those personal -property cases is relevant here. Because of a territorial sovereign's \" primeval i n- terest in resolving all disputes o ver use or right to use of real property within its own do main, \" the law has distin- guished between cases involving real property and cases involving personal property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 34- 35; s ee, e.g., Republic of 553 U.S. 851290 U.S. 18[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]74 U.S. 152 . None of those personal -property cases is relevant here. Because of a territorial sovereign's \" primeval i n- terest in resolving all disputes o ver use or right to use of real property within its own do main, \" the law has distin- guished between cases involving real property and cases involving personal property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 34- 35; s ee, e.g., Republic of 553 U.S. 851290 U.S. 18503 U.S. 30[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . None of those personal -property cases is relevant here. Because of a territorial sovereign's \" primeval i n- terest in resolving all disputes o ver use or right to use of real property within its own do main, \" the law has distin- guished between cases involving real property and cases involving personal property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 U.S. 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The common law of trusts has long permitted beneficiaries to sue for restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief absent individualized monetary loss 236733.2 iv",
		"context": "As discussed, the 100% equities st rategy violated the most el- ementary investment principles. See supra at 10-11; 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(B), (C); Tibble , 135 S. Ct. at 1828-1829; see also, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 228 (1959); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. The common law of trusts shows that petitioners have Article III standing to sue to force a fiduciary \"to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from\" the breaches of those du ties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 A.2d 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The common law of trusts has long permitted beneficiaries to sue for restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief absent individualized monetary loss 236733.2 iv",
		"context": "This Court, too, has repeatedly approved the \"no fur- ther inquiry\" rule and recognized its pedigree. In Ma- gruder v. Drury , for example, the Court refused to allow 236733.2 37 a fiduciary to take a profit ev en though \"the estate was not a loser in the transaction\" and \"the commission was no more than the services were reasonably worth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, \"[i]t is the relation of the trustee to the estate which prevents his dealing in such way as to make a personal profit for himself.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The common law of trusts has long permitted beneficiaries to sue for restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief absent individualized monetary loss 236733.2 iv",
		"context": "Ibid. Financial loss to the beneficiary is strictly irreleva nt to the claim's fitness for judicial resolution.10 The justification for this rule is straightforward and consistent with ERISA's goals. It is a prophylactic meas-ure to protect the trust and beneficiaries by deterring trustees from falling prey to any temptation of self-inter- 10 See also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jackson, 254 U.S. at 588-589 (holding that a fiduciary is liable for prof- its from a transaction \"in which his personal interests were, or might be, antagonistic to those of his trust,\" \"although the estate may not have been injured thereby\"); Scanlan , 669 F.3d at 845-847 (conclud- ing under common-law trust principles that a beneficiary has Article III standing to sue a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty even without harm to her monetary interest in the trust). 236733.2 38 est. The rule \"provide[s] agai nst any possible selfish in- terest exercising an influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is owing in a fiduciary capacity.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The common law of trusts has long permitted beneficiaries to sue for restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief absent individualized monetary loss 236733.2 iv",
		"context": "1995), supra , § 861 (\"if the trustee has commit ted a breach of trust, or threatens to do so, or is ot herwise an unsafe administra- tor, the court may remove him\"); Story, supra , § 1287 (eq- uity courts \"will remove th e old trustees, and substitute new ones\" if the trustees committed \"any misapplication of trust property and any gros s negligence or wilful de- parture from their duty in the management of it\"). As the Court has explained, \"the authorities are ample to justify the decree of removal\" based on \"neglect of duty and mismanagement of the trust property.\" Cavender , 114 U.S. at 472; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 251 N.W. 555 (explaining th at at common law \"a trus- tee could be removed and a ne w trustee substituted\" when the trustee \"dealt with the trus t fund for his own personal profit and advancement,\" \"comm itted a breach of trust,\" \"neglected to use due care,\" \"or showed a lack of fidelity to the interests of the tr ust\") (citations omitted); 145 S.E. 588. Again, no financial loss to the beneficiary is required. For instance, in one notable case, the trustees may have acted \"honestly\" in withdrawing money from the trust as an advance on an expected salary raise, and they even re-turned the money when the raise did not occur.",
		"citation_value_orig": "167 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The common law of trusts has long permitted beneficiaries to sue for restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief absent individualized monetary loss 236733.2 iv",
		"context": "Again, no financial loss to the beneficiary is required. For instance, in one notable case, the trustees may have acted \"honestly\" in withdrawing money from the trust as an advance on an expected salary raise, and they even re-turned the money when the raise did not occur. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nonetheless, removal was proper because the trustees' \"private interests con- flict[ed] with their trust duties.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "64 P.2d 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's approach effectively penalizes the Catholic Church for exercising its theological belief in active lay participation",
		"context": "The decisions below require a religious employee to have some level of \"credentials, training, or ministerial background\" for the ministerial exception to apply. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That approach would hinder the Church's ability to exercise its sincere theological belief in the importance of lay ministry. In Biel, for example, the court of appeals acknowledged the significant religious functions that Kristen Biel performed as a Catholic school teacher.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's approach effectively penalizes the Catholic Church for exercising its theological belief in active lay participation",
		"context": "But this delegation of religious functions to the laity is a core Catholic belief, part and parcel of the doctrine of Church unity. The Ninth Circuit's rationale thus \"effectively penalizes\" the Catholic Church's \"free exercise of [its] constitutional liberties.\" Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the Ninth Circuit's framework indirectly coerces the Church to alter its religious belief and practice. Conditioning the ministerial exception's availability on formal markers of religious leadership improperly pressures the Church, and other groups with similar beliefs, to limit reliance on the laity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's approach effectively penalizes the Catholic Church for exercising its theological belief in active lay participation",
		"context": "First Amendment doctrines, however, should not influence a church to \"conform its beliefs and practices regarding 'ministers' to the prevailing secular understanding.\" Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (\"[U]ncertainty about whether its ministerial designation will be rejected, and a corresponding fear of liability, may cause a religious group to conform its beliefs and practices regarding 'ministers' to the prevailing secular understanding. \"); see also Corp. of Presiding Bishops of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fratello , 863 F.3d at 207 (explaining that a form-over-function approach to the 14 ministerial exception incentivizes religious organizations to bar laity from substantial roles). Even requiring something less than ordination—such as formal religious training, credentials, or titles—would deter laypeople from participating and force the Church to alter its beliefs and practices. At bottom, the court of appeals' approach improperly pressures the Church to either cease assigning important religious functions to its lay members or to expand its concept of ordination, a topic on which the Church has equally well-developed and sincerely held beliefs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens",
		"context": "at 13-16. \"Operation Streamline is a program established by the United States Department of Justice that requires criminal prosecution and imprisonment of all individuals unlawfully crossing the border.\" united [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The program has \"eliminated the discretion traditionally reserved by United States Attorney's offices, resulting in a burgeoning number of federal criminal prosecutions in all districts bordering Mexico.\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "730 F.3d 1133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The least-acts-criminalized presumption governs all aspects of the categorical approach and leaves no work for a burden of proof to do.",
		"context": "Much is common ground here. The government does not dispute three key premises of our argument: First, courts analyzing a potential predicate of- fense under the categorical approach must presume that the \"conviction 'r ested upon nothing more than the least of the acts' criminalized ,\" because that is all the \"conviction necessarily involved .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The least-acts-criminalized presumption governs all aspects of the categorical approach and leaves no work for a burden of proof to do.",
		"context": "As we demonstrated (Br. 2 7-29), the least-acts-criminalized presumption governs every aspect of the analysis , in- cluding the \"which prong \" question under the modi- fied categorical approach . That is just how this Court applied the presumption in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —the case that defined the pre- sumption in the first place . Johnson required the Court to consider whether a state battery conviction corresponded to a \"violent felony\" under the A rmed Career Criminal A ct. Id. at 137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The least-acts-criminalized presumption governs all aspects of the categorical approach and leaves no work for a burden of proof to do.",
		"context": "The state statute was divisible into three different battery crimes. Id. at 136-37; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But \"nothing in the record of Johnson's … battery conviction\" clarified which statutory prong he was convicted of. Johnson, 559 U.S. at 136- 37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The least-acts-criminalized presumption governs all aspects of the categorical approach and leaves no work for a burden of proof to do.",
		"context": "But identifying one specific statutory prong is not a neces-sary \"antecedent\" step, as the government says (Br. 34-35). 7 As a result, where a conviction record leaves am- biguous \"what crime, with wh at elements\" gave rise to a particular conviction under a statute, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the cate- gorical inquiry does not grind to a halt. Instead, John-son and Moncrieffe prescribe a default rule: Presume the least, because the most minor prong of the statute is all that that conviction \"necessarily\" establishes. Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190- 91.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The least-acts-criminalized presumption governs all aspects of the categorical approach and leaves no work for a burden of proof to do.",
		"context": "23-24, 26. 3. The government suggests that Moncrieffe, along with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], instead support its view . It notes that those decisions did not rely on the least-acts-criminalized presumption to resolve uncertainty as to \"what crime\" was at issue; instead they \"invoked that presumption to determine the legal scope and significance … of past convictions for crimes that had already been identified.\" Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1980",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "51, at 261-262 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). The Ap- pointments Clause is \"among the significant struc- tural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.\" Ed- mond v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see501 U.S. 868. It serves this role in two ways. First , the Clause \"prevents congressional en- croachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches\" by \"vesting the President with the exclu- sive power to select the principal (noninferior) offic- ers of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "51, at 261-262 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). The Ap- pointments Clause is \"among the significant struc- tural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.\" Ed- mond v.United States , 520 U.S. 651; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It serves this role in two ways. First , the Clause \"prevents congressional en- croachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches\" by \"vesting the President with the exclu- sive power to select the principal (noninferior) offic- ers of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Weiss v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ryder v.United States , 515 U.S. 177. Third, by limiting the power of appointment to the President and, in the case of inferior officers, to the heads of departments and the courts, the Ap- pointments Clause ensures that those wielding the appointment power are \"accountable to political force and the will of the people.\" Freytag , 501 U.S. at 878, 884.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Weiss v.United States , 510 U.S. 163; Ryder v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, by limiting the power of appointment to the President and, in the case of inferior officers, to the heads of departments and the courts, the Ap- pointments Clause ensures that those wielding the appointment power are \"accountable to political force and the will of the people.\" Freytag , 501 U.S. at 878, 884.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Freytag , 501 U.S. at 884. Consistent with this history, the Court has held that \"any appointee exercising significant authority 15 pursuant to the laws of the United States\" is an \"Of- ficer of the United States\" who must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. Buckley v.Valeo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666].",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 760",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "Buckley v.Valeo 424 U.S. 1; see also id.at 132 (\"Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause.\" (emphasis added)); Freytag ,501 U.S. at 881. The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority",
		"context": "The class of officials covered by the Clause is \"unusually broad,\" including: (1) A district court clerk, [ Ex parte38 U.S. 230]; (2) \"thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior and the othe[r]\" departments, [ Unit- ed States v.Germaine , 99 U.S. 508], who are responsible for \"the records, books, and papers appertaining to the office,\" [Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259]; (3) a clerk to \"the assistant treasurer\" stationed \"at Boston,\" [United States v.Hartwell , 73 U.S. 385]; (4 & 5) an \"assistant-surgeon\" and a \"cadet-engineer\" appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, [ United States v.Moore , 95 U.S. 760; United States v.Perkins , 116 U.S. 483]; (6) election monitors, [Ex parte100 U.S. 371]; (7) United States attorneys, [ 272 U.S. 52]; (8) federal marshals, [ Siebold , 100 U.S. at 397; Morrison v.Olson , 487 U.S. 654]; (9) military judges, [ Weiss , 510 U.S. at 170]; (10) judges in Article I courts, [ Freytag , 501 U.S. at 892]; and (11) the general counsel for the Department of Transportation, [ Edmond , 520 U.S. at 666]. 16 Free Enter. Fund v.Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Particularly relevant to determining the status of SEC ALJs is this Court's holding in Freytag that special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court are \"inferi- or officers\" based on the \"significance of the duties and discretion that [they] possess.\" 501 U.S. at 881.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved",
		"context": "Under the U.S. securities law regime, issuers are required to disclose to potential investors information that is \"material.\" This Co urt first defined materiality in TSC Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], holding that \"[a]n omit ted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.\" See also Basic 485 U.S. 224. The concept of the \"reasonable investor\", while ob- jective, necessarily changes and develops over time as investors place importance on different facets of a company's operations, results and conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved",
		"context": "Under the U.S. securities law regime, issuers are required to disclose to potential investors information that is \"material.\" This Co urt first defined materiality in TSC Indus., 426 U.S. 438, holding that \"[a]n omit ted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.\" See also Basic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The concept of the \"reasonable investor\", while ob- jective, necessarily changes and develops over time as investors place importance on different facets of a company's operations, results and conduct. As one com- mentator observed, The changing attributes of a reasonable in- vestor usher in an expanded view of the type and content of disclosures that such investors deem material to their decisions to invest in, engage with, or divest from particular compa- nies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "8 But \"principles of equity\" is an odd clarion call for abso- lute, inflexible requirements. Equity's distinguishing fea-ture is \"[f]lexibility rather than rigidity.\" Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is thus irrelevant that \"equity and clear rules\" can co-exist. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Br. 33-34. Park 'N Fly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rejected reading the phrase \"principles of equity\" in section 1116(a) in a way that would have superseded the text. Id. at 202-03.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Footnote 7 says: \"[W]e need not address in this case whether traditional equita ble defenses such as estoppel or laches are available in an action to enforce an incontestable mark.\" 469 U.S. at 203 n.7. 10 Ct. 651, 657 (2016) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (199 3)). And the Court has rejected a reading of \"appropriate equita ble relief\" that would \"de- prive of all meaning\" the remedial distinctions that Con- gress expressly drew in ERISA. Mertens , 508 U.S at 258.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Fos- sil ignores this authority. Moreover, the presumption that Congress incorpo- rates common-law terms \"has little pull\" when a statute does not map precisely on to the common law. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just so here. Sections 1125(a), 1114, and 1125(d) do not map neatly onto the common law; indeed, section 1125(d) has no common-law analogue whatso ever.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Unlike the prop- erty rationale animating technical-trademark law, unfair competition was based on tort principles. Melville Madi- son Bigelow, Law of Torts § 7 (1907); P.E. Sharpless , 213 F. at 426; Elgin Nat'l Watch [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 1905 Trademark Act . This Act carried forward the common law's protection of technical trademarks and allowed awards of infringers' profits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "179 U.S. 665",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "The Lanham Act . The 1946 Lanham Act further in- corporated elements of the common law of trademark and unfair competition. Two Pesos, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] created a statutory cause of action that incorporated some, but not all, elements of unfair-competition law. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. 633 F.2d 746; see Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue , 32 N.Y.U.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "30-38. a. This Court's cases did no t apply an absolute willful- ness prerequisite. In Champion Spark Plug [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court treated the infringer's culpability as one of the \"var ious circumstances\" \"relevant to\" a profits award under the 1905 Act. Id. at 130, 132.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "331 U.S. at 131- 32. Words like \"relevant\" and \"various circumstances\" connote a holistic inquiry. In Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court analyzed 13 the method of determining an infringer's profits although the infringer had not \"wilfully palmed off\" the infringing goods. Id. at 209 (Black, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Id. at 206-07 (major ity opinion). In describing that standard, the Mishawaka Court cited this Court's earlier decision in Hamilton-Brown Shoe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which explained that, in cases involving technical trademarks, \"[t]he infringer is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains to the true owner, upon a principle anal- ogous to that which charges a trustee with the profits ac- quired by wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust [i.e., beneficiary].\" Id. at 259.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "36, 37, 39. 2 Addressing Mishawaka , Fossil (at 39-40) responds that the Court granted revi ew only to explicate \" how to calculate an accounting, not to decide whether accounting was warranted on the facts.\" But, this Court presumably 2 Fossil vaguely asserts (at 42 n.12) th at \"[a]fter this Court declared trademark law to be 'a part of the broader law of unfair competition' [in Hanover Star Milling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]], courts increasingly applied the willfulness requirement from tradi- tional trademark law.\" But \"increasingly\" suggests that some courts were not applying any requirement before then. And as the above discussion shows, the 1942 Mishawaka decision cites technical-trade- mark precedent, where many courts did not require proof of willful- ness.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 U.S. 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Mishawaka , 316 U.S. at 208; see also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. 67 F. Supp. 1000 that no pre-Lanham Act case awarded profits in the absence of willfulness, as does 49 F. 447. Fossil (at 32-33) invokes [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a common-law techni cal-trademark case, for the idea that \"[e]arly American courts 'constantly refused' 'an account of gains and profits' for 'want of fraudulent in- tent.'\" But that passage describes the approach of Eng-lish courts to infrin gers' mental state. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Common-law trademark cases rejected a willfulness re- quirement. Br. 37-39 (citing Oakes , 49 F. at 453; Stone- 33 Md. 252; Lawrence- Williams [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Fossil (at 34) dismisses Oakes as an \"outlier.\" But, contrary to Fossil's claim (at 38), Stone- braker makes the same point with palpable clarity: an in- fringer \"will be restrained by injunction, and that even where it does not appear there was any fraudulent intent in their use.",
		"citation_value_orig": "52 F.2d 774",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "52 F.2d at 778. Fossil (at 38-39) dis- misses that rejection as dicta and cites another Sixth Cir-cuit common-law case that denied profits absent \"actual wrongful intent\" and \"substantial damage\" to the mark holder, without articulating a categorical prohibition. Hemmeter Cigar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Sixth Circuit articulated yet an-other standard in Mishawaka, stating (in the decision va- cated by this Court) that pr ofits were not allowed absent \"wrongful use of a trade-mark or trade-name,\" but that in technical-trademark cases \"the fraudulent intent is pre- sumed.\" 119 F.2d 316.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 F.2d 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "Hemmeter Cigar 118 F.2d 64. The Sixth Circuit articulated yet an-other standard in Mishawaka, stating (in the decision va- cated by this Court) that pr ofits were not allowed absent \"wrongful use of a trade-mark or trade-name,\" but that in technical-trademark cases \"the fraudulent intent is pre- sumed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 These com- peting statements from the same court confirm the lack of settled uniformity. Other cases explained that an accounting for profits would follow from a finding of infringement or an injunc-tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "119 F.2d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Montanile , 136 S. Ct. at 659, 661. Fred Fisher Music [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is not to the contrary. There, no treatise supported the losing party's view. In sum, Romag has identified at least eight cases and the venerable Pomeroy's treatise articulating rules con- trary to Fossil's proposed rule .",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "But those cases are just as consistent with the notion that an in-fringer's mental state is a relevant consideration, not an absolute prerequisite. As best we can tell, of Foss il's more than fifty cases, only eight are decisions of Am erican courts that clearly articulate an absolute bar on profits without a showing of a culpable mental state. See Horlick's Malted Milk 51 F.2d 357; Dr. A. Reed Cushion Shoe 158 F. 552162 F. 887; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 130 P.2d 220; Liberty Oil 258 N.W. 241; 186 A.D. 701; Reading Stove Works, Orr, Painter & 87 N.E. 751; 77 N.E. 774. None arose under the 1905 Act, and a majority a ppear to involve unfair-com- petition claims. Significan tly, three acknowledged \"con- flict in the decisions\" about th e role of mental state in the profits analysis, disproving a uniform, settled rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "76 A.2d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
		"context": "But those cases are just as consistent with the notion that an in-fringer's mental state is a relevant consideration, not an absolute prerequisite. As best we can tell, of Foss il's more than fifty cases, only eight are decisions of Am erican courts that clearly articulate an absolute bar on profits without a showing of a culpable mental state. See Horlick's Malted Milk 51 F.2d 357; Dr. A. Reed Cushion Shoe 158 F. 552162 F. 887; 76 A.2d 277; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Liberty Oil 258 N.W. 241; 186 A.D. 701; Reading Stove Works, Orr, Painter & 87 N.E. 751; 77 N.E. 774. None arose under the 1905 Act, and a majority a ppear to involve unfair-com- petition claims. Significan tly, three acknowledged \"con- flict in the decisions\" about th e role of mental state in the profits analysis, disproving a uniform, settled rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 P.2d 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The state must guard the rights of all citizens, including those who do not share the values of current legislative majorities.",
		"context": ". it can stifle the ideas we love.\" Gay Alliance of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First Amendment freedoms \"must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.\" Communist 367 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 F.2d 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The state must guard the rights of all citizens, including those who do not share the values of current legislative majorities.",
		"context": "Gay Alliance of 544 F.2d 162. First Amendment freedoms \"must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.\" Communist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Proponents of LGBT rights have accomplished dramatic social and political transformation in just a few years by exercising their rights to free speech, press, association, and the political process generally. Their \"progress depended on the First Amendment's protection of expressive conduct that was once far less popular than it is today, from marching in pride parades to flying rainbow flags.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The state must guard the rights of all citizens, including those who do not share the values of current legislative majorities.",
		"context": "One group's aggressive assertion of rights can erode protection for others. Although LGBT citizens \"cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth\" (Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S. Ct. at 1727), people of faith \"are members of the community too.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The irony and implications have been recognized in prior cases. In Masterpiece Cakeshop , Colorado law \"afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages the storekeeper considered offensive,\" e.g., a Denver bakery that refused a Christian customer's request to create two bible-shaped cakes inscribed with messages about the sinfulness of homosexuality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred",
		"context": "In a quiet title case, the party bringing the action would typically be acting in a purely private capacity, as the Lundgrens are doing here. By contrast, when a utility brin gs a condemnation action, it is only because the sovereign (typically, a State) has delegated that power to the utility as a means of advancing the public interest. E.g., Albert Hanson Lumber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in a quiet title case, such as the one here, the interests of a tribal sovereign are positioned against purely private interests. But, in a condemnation case, the interests of the tribal sovereign would be positioned against the interests of the state sovereign.",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred",
		"context": "See, e.g., The Federalist No. 81, at 548 (Alexander Hamilton) (\"It is inherent in the nature of sove reignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.\") (emphasis added); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 Indeed, the United States seems to agree – at least, implicitly – that this is not the case to decide the fate of condemnation actions brought against land in which an Indian tribe holds an interest. In filing an amicus brief in support of th e Tribe, the United States felt compelled to reframe and narrow the question presented.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred",
		"context": "V. This is so whether the landowner comes to court or not. And, on the other side of the ledger, the benefits from the condemnation will flow to the public at large, including the tribe and its individual members. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding that individual Indians \"benefit as 11 As reframed by the United States, the question presented reads: \"Whether the sovereign immunity of a federally recognized Indian tribe bars an action against the Tribe to quiet title to property purchased by the Tribe outside of its reservation, where the Tribe has not waived its immunity and Congress has not unequivocally abrogated th e Tribe's immunity.\" U.S. Br. at i (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "691 F.2d 926",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred",
		"context": "non-Indian property owners\"). Finally , as this Court held in Carmack , the jurisdiction of a court to hear a condemnation action does not turn upon the owner's participation in the case. 329 U.S. at 235 n.2 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re234 F. 443). Thus, the inability to join an Indian tribe as a party, due to the tribe's assertion of sovereign immuni ty, should not preclude the condemnation action from moving forward. In sum, whatever the Court may decide about quiet title actions where a tribe abstains from participating (and, again, PNM believes such actions should be allowed to proceed), there is a clear basis for allowing condemnation ac tions to proceed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Census and Reapportionment Acts implement the constitutional mandate",
		"context": "[by the] decennial census\" and an apportionment of Representatives calculated based on that full count. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (emphasis 17 added); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the district court held, these statutes \"took their current form in 1929, after a decade-long stalemate over the method for calculating the reapportionment following the 1920 census.\" Appellants' Jur.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Census and Reapportionment Acts implement the constitutional mandate",
		"context": "Every census has, accordingly, included undocumented immigrants in the apportionment count. Fed'n of Am. Immigration Reform (F [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] on congressional the requirements eliminated by the 1995 Act. That is because Section 2a(a) requires a \"statement\" of apportionment figures calculated based on the decennial census and not a \"regular periodic report.\" Moreover, the purpose of the Act was to eliminate needless paperwork that Congress would discard, not to repeal the mechanism through which Congress implements the constitutionally mandated reapportionment of Representatives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 F. Supp. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Deference To The Political Branches Would Require Application Of The FSIA",
		"context": "1. Since the Tate Letter's issuance in 1952, the \"official policy\" of the Executive Branch has been the \"restrictive theory\" of sovereign immunity. See Al- fred Dunhill of London, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress codified that restrictive theory in the FSIA, which is now the political branches' authoritative statement of the scope of foreign sovereigns' immun- ity from suit. And because a court applying 1945 41 immunity law must \"defer\" to that political branch determination, 1945 law would direct the court to the FSIA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Deference To The Political Branches Would Require Application Of The FSIA",
		"context": "Nor is Hoffman the only pre-1945 example of the State Department declining to request immun-ity on behalf of a foreign government. See, e.g. , Compania Espanola de Nave gacion Maritima, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 31 F.2d 199; The Pesaro , 277 F. at 479 n.3; 24 N.E.2d 81. And where the State De- partment did not suggest immunity, courts denied it. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Deference To The Political Branches Would Require Application Of The FSIA",
		"context": "Nor is Hoffman the only pre-1945 example of the State Department declining to request immun-ity on behalf of a foreign government. See, e.g. , Compania Espanola de Nave gacion Maritima, 303 U.S. 68; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; The Pesaro , 277 F. at 479 n.3; 24 N.E.2d 81. And where the State De- partment did not suggest immunity, courts denied it. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 F.2d 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Assignor Estoppel Should Remain a Defense in Appropriate Circumstances",
		"context": "See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has always analogized patents with deeds for land. \"A patent for an invention is as much property as a 4 patent for land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Assignor Estoppel Should Remain a Defense in Appropriate Circumstances",
		"context": "The right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.\" Consol. Fruit-Jar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Westinghouse decision upholding assignor estoppel was premised on circuit court cases dating back to 1880. 3 F. 898.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Assignor Estoppel Should Remain a Defense in Appropriate Circumstances",
		"context": "Westinghouse , 266 U.S. at 353. This Court has since reiterated that assignor estoppel applies only to invalidity challenges, and does not preclude the assignor from raising other defenses or contesting infringement. Scott Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If Any Interpretive Canon Applies Here, It Is the Federalism Canon, Not Chevron Deference",
		"context": "NPS made the same plea for Chevron deference the last time the case was before this Court, see Resp. Br. at 44-46, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 14-1209), but this Court declined. NPS's argument should fare no better this time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If Any Interpretive Canon Applies Here, It Is the Federalism Canon, Not Chevron Deference",
		"context": "See supra n.6. 22 constitutional a nd f ederalism q uestions.\" Solid Waste [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 515 U.S. 900. If there is to be any thumb on the scale in the interpretation of ANILCA, it should weigh in the State's favor under the clear statement rule. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If Any Interpretive Canon Applies Here, It Is the Federalism Canon, Not Chevron Deference",
		"context": "See supra n.6. 22 constitutional a nd f ederalism q uestions.\" Solid Waste 531 U.S. 159; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If there is to be any thumb on the scale in the interpretation of ANILCA, it should weigh in the State's favor under the clear statement rule. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If Any Interpretive Canon Applies Here, It Is the Federalism Canon, Not Chevron Deference",
		"context": "See Pet. Br. 31-34; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alaska's navigable rivers are indispensable to the economic, social, and cultural life of its citizens. See Alaska Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If Any Interpretive Canon Applies Here, It Is the Federalism Canon, Not Chevron Deference",
		"context": "\"[A]n a gency l iterally ha s n o p ower t o a ct … u nless a nd until C ongress c onfers p ower o n i t.\" Louisiana Pub. Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Colorado Law Does Not Violate the CRSCC's First Amendment Rights.",
		"context": "in Support of Reversal 28 . The First Amendment , however, does not absolutely entitle a party to have its nominee appear on the ballot be-cause , among other things, that party's \"particular candidate might be ineligible for office.\" T [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Hassan, 495 F. App'x at 948 (\"[A] state's legit- imate interest in protecting the integrity and practical functioning of the political process permits it to ex-clude from the ballot candidates who are constitution- ally prohibited from assuming office . \"). 41 When deciding whether a state's election regula- tion violates a political party's First Amendment asso- ciational rights, this Court \"weigh[s] the 'character and magnitude' of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State con-tends justify that burden, and consider[s] the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden neces- sary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Colorado Law Does Not Violate the CRSCC's First Amendment Rights.",
		"context": "\"). 41 When deciding whether a state's election regula- tion violates a political party's First Amendment asso- ciational rights, this Court \"weigh[s] the 'character and magnitude' of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State con-tends justify that burden, and consider[s] the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden neces- sary.\" Timmons at 358 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Regulations that impose \"severe burdens\" on associational rights must be \"nar- rowly tailored and advance a compelling state inter-est.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Respondents Disregard Forty Years Of Reliance Interests",
		"context": "Id. at 2126- 27. The Ninth Circuit's an omalous decision—the first 22 to hold that service advisors are not exempt under §213(b)(10)(A)—quite obviously implicates those same \"serious reliance interests\" and this Court's repeated concern with imposing massive retroactive liability on long-settled industry practices, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Pet.Br.51-53. Without even attempting to grapple with the Court's language from Encino I or its precedents disfavoring exactly this so rt of claim, Respondents suggest that discarding over forty years of precedent and practice \"will not unsettle expectations or disrupt the dealership industry,\" because dealerships can invoke 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Java Standard Library is copyrightable",
		"context": "117 . Copyright law protects the non -literal elements of a literary work , such as the plot of a novel. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Th at principle applies to com- puter program s because the Copyright Act makes them 15 eligible for copyright protection on the same terms as other literary works. Copyright protection t hus ex- tends both to the text of a computer program and to the \"non -literal components of [the] program, including [its] structure, sequence and organization\" (SSO).",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Java Standard Library is copyrightable",
		"context": "Th at principle applies to com- puter program s because the Copyright Act makes them 15 eligible for copyright protection on the same terms as other literary works. Copyright protection t hus ex- tends both to the text of a computer program and to the \"non -literal components of [the] program, including [its] structure, sequence and organization\" (SSO). Johnson Controls, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; s ee Computer Assoc s. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. , 982 F.2 d 693, 702 -710 ( 2d Cir. 1992); Whelan Assoc s., 797 F.2d 1222, cert. denied,479 U.S. 1031.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 1173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Java Standard Library is copyrightable",
		"context": "Copyright protection t hus ex- tends both to the text of a computer program and to the \"non -literal components of [the] program, including [its] structure, sequence and organization\" (SSO). Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 1173; s ee Computer Assoc s. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. , 982 F.2 d 693, 702 -710 ( 2d Cir. 1992); Whelan Assoc s., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,479 U.S. 1031. To receiv e copyright protection , any particular com- puter code must meet the basic requirements of copy- right law, including originality, see 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "797 F.2d 1222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Java Standard Library is copyrightable",
		"context": "102(a). With respect to originality, \"[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious ' it might be.\" Feist Publ'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in respondent's Java Sta ndard Library. The de- claring code specifies certain parameters for each method , including the class and package to which the method belongs. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "20 S. Ct. 1721 . The Court's \"duty [is] to re- spect not only what Congress wrote but, as importantly, what it didn 't write. \" Virginia Uranium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rein- forces that conclusion. The NGA provides the sole mechanism through which the federal government de-termines whether and where pipelines and other facili- ties needed for interstate transportation of natural gas will be built . As respondents acknowledge (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "3. The lack of any State -owned -property exception to Section 717f(h) is confirmed by the existence of such exceptions in other statutes delegating the federal right of eminent domain . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Most promi- nent ly, Section 21 of the FPA similarly authorizes pri- vate entities that have obtained license s from FERC to acquire by eminent domain the property rights \"neces- sary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any dam, reservoir, [or] diversion structure.\" 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "App. 28 n.20) the relevance of the 1992 FPA amendment on the ground that, unlike the 1947 amend ment adding Section 717f(h) to the NGA, the FPA amendment was enacted during a seven -year period from 1989 to 1996 in which this Court's precedent held that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the FPA a nd NGA dele- gate federal eminent -domain authority; they do not pur- port to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Moreover, the court of appeals' reasoning cannot explain Con- gress's decision in 1992 to leave the NGA's broad dele-gation of eminent -domain authority intact while amend- ing the clos ely related FPA provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "T hat concern was misplaced. 1. a. As this Court's precedents establish , the \"States entered t he federal syste m with their sovereignty in- tact,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A]s the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, \" States \"retain today\" the same immunity from suit they \"enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution .\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "Ibid. Accordingly, a State is generally not \"subject to suit in federal court unless it has con-sented to suit, either expressly or in the ' plan of the con- vention. ' \" Blatchf [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Giving effect to the plain terms of Section 71 7f(h) , however, would not subject States to any suit to which they did not consent \"in the 'plan of the convention. ' \" Blatchford , 501 U.S. at 779.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "\" Blatchford , 501 U.S. at 779. To the contrary , \"[t]he right of eminent domain was one of those means well known when the Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands for public uses.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, t he power \"is essential to a so vereign government.\" 329 U.S. 230.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "91 U.S. 367. Indeed, t he power \"is essential to a so vereign government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court thus recognized long ago that the federal government's eminent -domain authority \"can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manne r in which it must be exercised.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "And \"[t]he fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the United States.\" Oklahoma ex rel. 26 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The only question, then, is whether the federal eminent - domain power inherent in the plan of the Convention in- cludes the ability to authorize private entities to exer- cise it . History answers that question with a yes .",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "1667 Va. Mill Act, Act IV, re- printed in 2 William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large 260-261 (1823) . Similar statutes were enacted be- fore independence and in the early years of the Repub- lic in at least 1 8 other States . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 545 U.S. 469. Moreover, \"in most, if not all, of the colonies, \" other statutes authorized the exercise of eminent domain by private entities for the construction of public and private roadways. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.22 ( 3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "113 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "1667 Va. Mill Act, Act IV, re- printed in 2 William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large 260-261 (1823) . Similar statutes were enacted be- fore independence and in the early years of the Repub- lic in at least 1 8 other States . See 113 U.S. 9 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, \"in most, if not all, of the colonies, \" other statutes authorized the exercise of eminent domain by private entities for the construction of public and private roadways. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.22 ( 3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "753, Tit. V, § 509, 60 Stat. 849 (authorizing corporations to con- demn property for building bridges between two or more States); see p p. 20-22, supra (collecting additional examples) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . c. For the nearly 150 years since Kohl , no one ap- pears to have seriously questioned that the federal gov- ernment's eminent -domain authority include s the au- thority to condemn property owned by a State. See12 Op. Att'y Gen. 173; see Act of July 24, 1935, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 U.S. 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "The Court should not do so here. The government generally \"may take property pur- suant to its power of eminent domain, either by entering into physical possession of the property without a court order, or by instituting condemnation proceedings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Kohl , the Court held that a statutory grant of authority to obtain land by condemnation implied \"the power to obtain [the land] by any means that were comp etent to adjudge a condemnation.\" 91 U.S. at 375.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "91 U.S. at 375. Respondent's novel assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity from a condemnation action brought to effec- tuate a valid delegation of the right of eminent domain does not require a different approach. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is instructive . There, the State of Georgia contested the City of Cha ttanooga 's effort to condemn property that Georgia owned and used to operat e a railroad within Tennessee. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property",
		"context": "Acknowledging that history does not imply that other sovereign power s operate in the same way . To the contrary, this Court has long recognized that, as a general mat ter, only an \"Officer of the United States\" can \"exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the law s of the United States ,\" with the federal direc- tion and supervision such status constitutionally re- quires . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1976) (per c u- riam) ; see Departmen t of 575 U.S. 43. The va- lidity of a ny delegation to a private party of such sover- eign authority —and any right to sue a sovereign State under such a delegation —would have to be justified on its own terms, and would find no support in the particu- lar history of eminent domain. c. Finally, the court of appeals expressed (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cy Pres Settlements Should Be Subject To Strict Standards",
		"context": "Where absent class members can be identified, the simplest solution to the problem of undistributed settlement funds —the one adopted by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits —is to make additional distributions to identified class members, unless the court determines that their claims have been fully satisfied. \"Because t he settlement funds are the property of the class, a cy pres distribution to a third party of unclaimed settlement funds is permissible 'only when it is not feasible to make further distributions to class members.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where class members have already been identified and fully compensated, there is no need to divert settlement funds to third parties; the court should order the funds returned to the defendant. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.3d 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cy Pres Settlements Should Be Subject To Strict Standards",
		"context": ". is to return any excess funds to the defendant. \"); see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If cy pres distributions are war ranted, courts must carefully scrutinize conflicts of interest and \"next best use.\" In limited circumstances, cy pres distributions may be warranted, but only when it is not \"logistically feasible and economically viable\" to make further distributions bec ause the amounts to be distributed are too small.",
		"citation_value_orig": "775 F.3d 1060",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cy Pres Settlements Should Be Subject To Strict Standards",
		"context": "Id . Cy pres distributions should be made \"for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives underlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and the interests of those similarly situa ted.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the court must be especially vigilant to surface conflicts of interest that might raise a reasonable inference that third parties have been selected for improper reasons. Cy pres distributions should not be considered in determining fee awards .",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 F.3d 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cy Pres Settlements Should Be Subject To Strict Standards",
		"context": "Beisner , supra, at 13. But a distribution of settlement funds to third p arties is not a result \"actually achieved\" for class members. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no justification for awarding fees to class counsel on the basis of cy pres distributions that achieve no more than an indirect benefit for the class members whose claims, in the aggregate, created the settlement fund in the first place. As a result, disregarding cy pres distributions when considering fee awards is the only way to align class counsel's financial incent ives with its duty of loyalty to the absent class.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 F.3d 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The decisions to shackle Respondents are entirely separate from the merits",
		"context": "because reve rsal after final judgment would be assured.\" Pet'r Br. 23 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This is incorrect. The cases discussed in Flanagan on which the Government relies involved violations of the right to counsel (e.g., the right to self-representation, the right to appointed counsel, the right to unconflicted counsel) reviewed as structural errors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Every court of appeals to consider the question has en-dorsed this view. See ibid. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 780 F.3d 731; 192 F.3d 826. After all, \"when Congress uses the same language in two stat- utes having similar purposes, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Every court of appeals to consider the question has en-dorsed this view. See ibid. ; 839 F.3d 286; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 192 F.3d 826. After all, \"when Congress uses the same language in two stat- utes having similar purposes, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "780 F.3d 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Every court of appeals to consider the question has en-dorsed this view. See ibid. ; 839 F.3d 286; 780 F.3d 731; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After all, \"when Congress uses the same language in two stat- utes having similar purposes, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "192 F.3d 826",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "§ 2000bb et seq. ). 10 son, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, be- cause Section 1983 allows for monetary damages in in- dividual capacity claims, the appropriate construction is that RFRA does as well. This reading harmonizes the two statutes, thereby completing the full suite of civil rights remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "The textual similarities be- tween RFRA and Section 1983 therefore support Re- spondents' case. The statutory history of Section 1983 also informs the meaning of \"appropriate relief\" in this context. Prior to Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], superseded by statute , Religious Freedom Res- toration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, plaintiffs could bring free exercise claims against state officials in their individual capacities. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 850 F.2d 917. These claims proceeded under Section 1983, on the ground that free exercise violations are \"depriva- tion[s]\" of a right \"secured by the Constitution.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.2d 697",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, plaintiffs could bring free exercise claims against state officials in their individual capacities. See, e.g., 852 F.2d 697; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These claims proceeded under Section 1983, on the ground that free exercise violations are \"depriva- tion[s]\" of a right \"secured by the Constitution.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F.2d 917",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1993). And although this Court held in City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], superseded by statute , Religious Land Use and Institu- tionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "D. The decision below neither extends nor implicates Bivens . Amicus agrees that it is a \"significant step under separation-of-powers principles\" for a court \"to create and enforce a cause of action for damages.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2017). This case, how- ever, concerns only interpreting a statutory cause of action, not creating a new one. RFRA already contains \"an express private right of action with an express pro- vision for 'appropriate relief. '\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "This Court has traditionally applied two canons of construction to parse statutor y causes of action. First, it has required a clear statement of congressional in- tent before initially recognizing a cause of action. See Gonzaga [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Can- 441 U.S. 677. Second, once this Court has recognized a cause of action, it has 3 In 2000, Congress amended RFRA to codify City of Boerne by restricting the statute to federal officials, but made no adjust- ments to RFRA's remedial reach. Religious Land Use and Insti-tutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "This Court has traditionally applied two canons of construction to parse statutor y causes of action. First, it has required a clear statement of congressional in- tent before initially recognizing a cause of action. See Gonzaga 536 U.S. 273; Can- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, once this Court has recognized a cause of action, it has 3 In 2000, Congress amended RFRA to codify City of Boerne by restricting the statute to federal officials, but made no adjust- ments to RFRA's remedial reach. Religious Land Use and Insti-tutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "at 1857, estimate the deterrence value of its choices, Corr. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and engage the \"policy considerations\" that permeate pre- existing and \"elaborate remedial system[s],\" 462 U.S. 367. There are good rea- sons for Article III courts to tread lightly in that area. By contrast, in this case, Amicus simply asks that the Court interpret RFRA in a manner that is consistent with its plain and unambiguous meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "at 1857, estimate the deterrence value of its choices, Corr. Servs. 534 U.S. 61, and engage the \"policy considerations\" that permeate pre- existing and \"elaborate remedial system[s],\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There are good rea- sons for Article III courts to tread lightly in that area. By contrast, in this case, Amicus simply asks that the Court interpret RFRA in a manner that is consistent with its plain and unambiguous meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "In the prison context, for example, the government can moot claims through (1) transferring inmates and (2) providing eleventh hour relief after the culmination of a lengthy litigation process. 1. Because the Federal Bureau of Prisons can trans- fer an inmate to another district \"at any time for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it has an unfettered ability to moot free exercise claims 15 for injunctive relief. The availability of monetary dam- ages would ensure that meritorious RFRA claims re- main justiciable. As a practical matter, transfers have the immediate effect of mooting inmates' cl aims for injunctive relief, rendering their claims non-justiciable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.2d 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Inmates in this position cannot avail themselves of the traditional ex-ceptions to this Court's mootness doctrine, including the argument that a violation is \"capable of repetition yet evading review.\" Rather, their claim is moot once the inmate has become subject to a new set of regula- tions and decisionmakers in the new facility. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 780 F.2d 1334; 745 F.2d 1360; 53 F. App'x 503; 3 F. App'x 745. One consequence of this ar rangement is to prevent courts from addressing important free exercise ques- tions. For instance, the scope of the right to congrega- tional prayer in prisons is one such important question that can remain unanswered in the absence of mone- tary relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 F.3d 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Inmates in this position cannot avail themselves of the traditional ex-ceptions to this Court's mootness doctrine, including the argument that a violation is \"capable of repetition yet evading review.\" Rather, their claim is moot once the inmate has become subject to a new set of regula- tions and decisionmakers in the new facility. See, e.g., 551 F.3d 825; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 745 F.2d 1360; 53 F. App'x 503; 3 F. App'x 745. One consequence of this ar rangement is to prevent courts from addressing important free exercise ques- tions. For instance, the scope of the right to congrega- tional prayer in prisons is one such important question that can remain unanswered in the absence of mone- tary relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "780 F.2d 1334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Inmates in this position cannot avail themselves of the traditional ex-ceptions to this Court's mootness doctrine, including the argument that a violation is \"capable of repetition yet evading review.\" Rather, their claim is moot once the inmate has become subject to a new set of regula- tions and decisionmakers in the new facility. See, e.g., 551 F.3d 825; 780 F.2d 1334; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 53 F. App'x 503; 3 F. App'x 745. One consequence of this ar rangement is to prevent courts from addressing important free exercise ques- tions. For instance, the scope of the right to congrega- tional prayer in prisons is one such important question that can remain unanswered in the absence of mone- tary relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "745 F.2d 1360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Inmates in this position cannot avail themselves of the traditional ex-ceptions to this Court's mootness doctrine, including the argument that a violation is \"capable of repetition yet evading review.\" Rather, their claim is moot once the inmate has become subject to a new set of regula- tions and decisionmakers in the new facility. See, e.g., 551 F.3d 825; 780 F.2d 1334; 745 F.2d 1360; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 3 F. App'x 745. One consequence of this ar rangement is to prevent courts from addressing important free exercise ques- tions. For instance, the scope of the right to congrega- tional prayer in prisons is one such important question that can remain unanswered in the absence of mone- tary relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "53 F. App'x 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "For exampl e, the Federal Bureau of Prisons can selectively moot prisoners' free exercise claims by providing eleventh-hour relief after the cul- mination of a lengthy litigat ion process. Ordinarily, a defendant's \"voluntary cessation\" of challenged con-duct does not render a case moot unless it is \"abso- lutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government, however, often receives a presumption that it will \"act in good faith\" so that the burden is shifted to the plain- tiff to show that \"there is a reasonable expectation\" that the unlawful government conduct will recur. 666 F.3d 856.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "City of 455 U.S. 283. The government, however, often receives a presumption that it will \"act in good faith\" so that the burden is shifted to the plain- tiff to show that \"there is a reasonable expectation\" that the unlawful government conduct will recur. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This allows last-minute policy changes to render meritorious claims moot, depriving lower courts, government officials, and free exercise plaintiffs of much-needed decisions. See Joseph C. Da-vis & Nicholas R. Reaves, The Point Isn't Moot: How Lower Courts Have Blessed Government Abuse of the Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine , 129 Yale L.J.F.",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F.3d 856",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "See Joseph C. Da-vis & Nicholas R. Reaves, The Point Isn't Moot: How Lower Courts Have Blessed Government Abuse of the Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine , 129 Yale L.J.F. 325 (2019). For example, in Guzzi v. Thompson , state prison of- ficials denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The prison began providing the plaintiff kosher food only after the dis- trict court ruled in favor of the state and the inmate appealed to the First Circuit. 2008 WL 2059321.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 F. Supp. 2d 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Interpreting RFRA to prohibit monetary relief en- sures that some meritorious cl aims will fall flat at the courthouse doors. Yet this Court has noted the \"essen-tiality of the survival of civ il rights claims for complete vindication of constitutional rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has further recog- nized that \"[w]hen government officials abuse their of- fices, action[s] for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.\" 483 U.S. 635.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "446 U.S. 14. This Court has further recog- nized that \"[w]hen government officials abuse their of- fices, action[s] for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Indeed, money damages under RFRA are necessary to fully vindicate free exercise violations. For instance, in In re Navy Chaplaincy , a group of chaplains alleged that Navy officials discriminated against certain \"non-liturgical\" Protestant chapla ins on the basis of their religion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "19 Indeed, money damages under RFRA are necessary to fully vindicate free exercise violations. For instance, in In re Navy Chaplaincy , a group of chaplains alleged that Navy officials discriminated against certain \"non-liturgical\" Protestant chapla ins on the basis of their religion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They alleged that the Navy's \"Thirds Po licy,\" which limited the number of chaplains based on religious categories, in- creased their workloads. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 F.R.D. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Finally, monetary relief prevents the arbitrary dif- ferential treatment of state and federal inmates with regard to their free exercise claims. Consider Arroyo Lopez v. Nuttall , in which a state corrections officer shoved a Muslim inmate without provocation while the inmate was praying at night, even though such prayers were allowed under the prison's policies. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The prisoner brought a Section 1983 action, and the district court awarded monetary damages against th e corrections officers for acting \"recklessly and with callous indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 F. Supp. 2d 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "And, at least in a New York federal prison, a prisoner could not proceed alternat ively under Section 1983, RLUIPA, or the First Amendment. See, e.g., 789 F.3d 218, rev'd in part and vacated in part on oth er grounds sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ensuring the equal treatment of state and federal pris-oners requires allowing federal prisoners to pursue damages claims under RFRA. 21 Similar to Arroyo Lopez , the district court in Fegans v. Norris awarded an inmate monetary damages when Arkansas state prison offici als denied him kosher food for two years, even though a previous court decision had already established a right to a kosher diet in prison.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "21 Similar to Arroyo Lopez , the district court in Fegans v. Norris awarded an inmate monetary damages when Arkansas state prison offici als denied him kosher food for two years, even though a previous court decision had already established a right to a kosher diet in prison. No. 4:03-CV-00172, 2006 WL 6936834, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Later, the prison changed its policy and began accom- modating kosher diets. Under the Government's in- terpretation of RFRA, if the inmate had been in federal rather than state prison, a damages remedy would have been unavailable, and a claim for injunctive relief most likely would have been dismissed as moot after the policy change, resulting in no relief at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 F.3d 897",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "This Court has long extolled the dual function of Sec- tion 1983. For instance, the Court in Wyatt v. Cole noted that the \"purpose of [Section 1983] is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deter- rence fails.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. , the Court recog- nized that the \"deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983.\" 453 U.S. 247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "504 U.S. 158. Similarly, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. , the Court recog- nized that the \"deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 436 U.S. 584. For the same reasons, monetary relief is an appropriate and necessary remedial option under RFRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Similarly, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. , the Court recog- nized that the \"deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983.\" 453 U.S. 247. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For the same reasons, monetary relief is an appropriate and necessary remedial option under RFRA. Monetary relief also would provide a deterrent against gross mistreatment of religious minorities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "Monetary relief also would provide a deterrent against gross mistreatment of religious minorities. In 2006, federal agents raided a Native American cere- mony, seizing nearly fifty ea gle feathers that were be- ing used in religious worship. McAllen Grace Brethren [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pas- tor Robert Soto, a Lipan Apache religious leader, was threatened with criminal fines and imprisonment for possession of these feathers in supposed violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Because Soto's tribe was state-recognized but not federally-rec-ognized, he was not able to receive his property back until 2015, after a decade of litigation resulted in a set- tlement with the Department of the Interior.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "In 1994, foreign nationals and refugees who sought political asylum in the United States were detained at an INS facility op-erated by private contractor s. These foreign nationals alleged that private contractor guards physically abused detainees and perpetrated numerous free exer-cise violations. Guards confiscated religious texts, dis- carded bibles, denied requests for food othe r than pork, and prohibited religious prayer for extended periods. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These guards \"were federal actors because they were 24 employees of a corporation performing governmental functions pursuant to a co ntract with the INS under which the INS monitored the performance of the cor- poration and its employees.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 F. Supp. 2d 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "D. The government overstates the potential impacts of allowing damages. Allowing monetary relief in RFRA suits will not in- terfere with the ordinary operations of the federal gov- ernment because the doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes the \"need to shie ld officials from harass- ment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Conseque ntly, the only officials who would face individual-c apacity suits under RFRA are those who act in such a manner that violates \"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.\" 457 U.S. 800.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "555 U.S. 223. Conseque ntly, the only officials who would face individual-c apacity suits under RFRA are those who act in such a manner that violates \"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., 777 F.3d 1198; 904 F. Supp. 161; 897 F. Supp. 215; 876 F. Supp. 756, aff'd,68 F.3d 463; 851 F. Supp. 377.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 904 F. Supp. 161; 897 F. Supp. 215; 876 F. Supp. 756, aff'd,68 F.3d 463; 851 F. Supp. 377. Contrary to the Government's prognostications, there is thus little chance that the possibility of dam-ages will have \"systemic implications\" for the creation of policy. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 1198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., 777 F.3d 1198; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 897 F. Supp. 215; 876 F. Supp. 756, aff'd,68 F.3d 463; 851 F. Supp. 377. Contrary to the Government's prognostications, there is thus little chance that the possibility of dam-ages will have \"systemic implications\" for the creation of policy. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F. Supp. 161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., 777 F.3d 1198; 904 F. Supp. 161; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 876 F. Supp. 756, aff'd,68 F.3d 463; 851 F. Supp. 377. Contrary to the Government's prognostications, there is thus little chance that the possibility of dam-ages will have \"systemic implications\" for the creation of policy. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "897 F. Supp. 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., 777 F.3d 1198; 904 F. Supp. 161; 897 F. Supp. 215; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,68 F.3d 463; 851 F. Supp. 377. Contrary to the Government's prognostications, there is thus little chance that the possibility of dam-ages will have \"systemic implications\" for the creation of policy. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "876 F. Supp. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., 777 F.3d 1198; 904 F. Supp. 161; 897 F. Supp. 215; 876 F. Supp. 756, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 851 F. Supp. 377. Contrary to the Government's prognostications, there is thus little chance that the possibility of dam-ages will have \"systemic implications\" for the creation of policy. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 F.3d 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "457 U.S. 800. Lower courts have a long history of applying quali- fied immunity in RFRA cases when officials perform their duties in a manner not contrary to clearly estab- lished law. See, e.g., 777 F.3d 1198; 904 F. Supp. 161; 897 F. Supp. 215; 876 F. Supp. 756, aff'd,68 F.3d 463; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contrary to the Government's prognostications, there is thus little chance that the possibility of dam-ages will have \"systemic implications\" for the creation of policy. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "851 F. Supp. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
		"context": "at 31. At the same time, quali- fied immunity ensures that requests for monetary re-lief provide a deterrent effe ct where it matters most: when government officials have \"fair notice\" that their conduct violates \"clearly established\" free exercise rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government encourages this Court to \"treat[] the immunity question separately from the remedies question.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT REDEFINE THE TERM \"POLITICAL\" NOW",
		"context": "at I-1 (emphasis added). This is more than enough to confirm the term \"political\" in Section 211B.11(1) includes all political expression. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. A-6 (Eighth Circuit: \"all political 4 material is banned\") , and those constructions are entitled to deference. 472 U.S. 491.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT REDEFINE THE TERM \"POLITICAL\" NOW",
		"context": "413 U.S. 601; id. A-6 (Eighth Circuit: \"all political 4 material is banned\") , and those constructions are entitled to deference. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given the statutory text, the Government's policies and enforcement practices,1 and the lower courts' decisions, the term \"political\" in Section 211B.11(1) cannot be construed to cover only an amorphous subset of speech related to \"governmental affairs\" at issue in an election. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT REDEFINE THE TERM \"POLITICAL\" NOW",
		"context": "Its attempt to do so now is telling and futile. Stevens , 559 U.S. at 480 (The G overnment's claim that a law will be enforced \"more restrictively than its language [allows] is pertinent only as an implicit acknowledgment of the potential constitutional problems with a more natural reading.\" ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally , upon examination, the Government's attempt to limit the term \"political\" to \"governmental\" concerns generally at issue in an election is not much of a change at all. The definition is so vague that it allows and invites unpredictable and broad enforcement —including to all things \"political .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT REDEFINE THE TERM \"POLITICAL\" NOW",
		"context": "App. B-25. 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The meaninglessness of the Government's shift is further confirmed by the fact that the Government fails to argue that any of the examples of \"political\" messages in the Policy or in MVA 's brief would not qualify as political material under its new \"governmental issues facing voters on election day\" definition. Pet itioners' Brief on the Merits at 24-28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. No State Interest Is Sufficient to Compel an Individual to Publish the Sentiments of Another Private Party",
		"context": "In Barnette , this Court did not look for a compel- ling interest . Instead, the Court inquire d as to whether there was \"clear and present danger\" that would justify the compelled flag salute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , likew ise declined to announce a standard by which the government could compel a newspaper to publish something it did not wish to publish. Instead, the Court merely noted that \"[i]t has yet to be demonstrated how governmen- tal regulation\" of this type \"can be e xercised con- sistent with the First Amendment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. No State Interest Is Sufficient to Compel an Individual to Publish the Sentiments of Another Private Party",
		"context": "Instead, the Court merely noted that \"[i]t has yet to be demonstrated how governmen- tal regulation\" of this type \"can be e xercised con- sistent with the First Amendment.\" Id. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court noted that freedom from compelled speech and free- dom from censorship, at the very least, receive equiv- alent protection under the First Amendmen t. Id. at 797. The Court then went on to apply strict scrutiny since the regulation at issue was content -based.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. No State Interest Is Sufficient to Compel an Individual to Publish the Sentiments of Another Private Party",
		"context": "When it came to proposing a standard of r eview, the Court simply noted \"[w]e perceive no reason to engraft an exception to this set- tled rule.\" Id. The Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , did suggest something approaching a \"compel- ling interest\" test for compelled speech . Yet, the Court imposed a strict rule that a state's interest to dissem- inate an ideology \"cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the c ourier for such a message.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.",
		"context": "The first decision where the EEOC did not find an undue hardship involved a Seventh -day Adventist mechanic. EEOC Dec. No. 70 -110, 1969 WL 2908 ( Aug. 3 In contrast to \"a robust regulatory backdrop ,\" McDonough , 142 S. Ct. at 1959, from \"a long line of [agency] decisions,\" Hardi- son, 432 U.S. at 85, the federal case law interpreting Title VII prior to the 1972 amendment is sparse and not \" well-settled ,\" see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , making it un- likely to be the source of legal soil Congress transplanted into Ti- tle VII according to the legal meaning canon. See Phillips at 43. The legislative history supports this conclusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.",
		"context": "The Com- mission labeled such an argument \"invalid because while a rule may apply equally to all employees, it may well have unequal impact on them.\" Id . (citing Sher- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 300 F. Supp. 709 ). Ac- cord 575 U.S. 768 . Finally, the Commission noted that the employer had failed to state \"whether another employee could be trained to substitute for the [religious employee] during Sabbath days, or whether already qualified personnel have been invited to work a double shift.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.",
		"context": "The Com- mission labeled such an argument \"invalid because while a rule may apply equally to all employees, it may well have unequal impact on them.\" Id . (citing Sher- 374 U.S. 398 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Ac- cord 575 U.S. 768 . Finally, the Commission noted that the employer had failed to state \"whether another employee could be trained to substitute for the [religious employee] during Sabbath days, or whether already qualified personnel have been invited to work a double shift.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "300 F. Supp. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT A PROPER VEHICLE FOR REVIEW",
		"context": "Contrary to Petitioners' representation s, Arizona is not speaking with one voice . A rizona law indicates that \"'the Attorney General is not the proper person to decide the course of action which should be pursued by another public officer .\" Yes on Prop [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 As a result, the Attorney General cannot appeal a case against the wishes of the ex ecutive officer it represents. Santa Rita Mining Co. , 111 Ariz. at 371.",
		"citation_value_orig": "160 P.3d 1216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT A PROPER VEHICLE FOR REVIEW",
		"context": "Secretary Hobbs is the chief elections officer of Arizona and, in this context has the power to determine whether the Ninth Circuit's decision on Arizona's election laws ⸺particularly its OOP Policy ⸺should be appealed. She has stated unequivocally that she will not pursue the appeal of 5 This Court looks to state law when determining who can represent the State in federal court. See Va. House of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. - 41 - Ninth Circuit's decision on Arizona's OOP Policy . Any grant of certiorari, therefore, will necessarily re sult in this Court wading deep into the middle of a state power struggle rooted in Arizona state law .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Roe's Extension Of Procreative Liberty From Contraception To Elective Abortion Lacks Any Basis In Reasoned Judgment",
		"context": ". Under the \"reasoned judgment\" approach, analysis of whether the right to an elective abortion is fundamental begins with the familiar principle that \"the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That principle initially led the Court to recognize the right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U.S. 479, and to extend that right to unmarried persons, 405 U.S. 438. The Court in Roe expanded procreative liberty from the right to prevent pregnancy by contraception to the right to terminate it by abortion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Roe's Extension Of Procreative Liberty From Contraception To Elective Abortion Lacks Any Basis In Reasoned Judgment",
		"context": "Under the \"reasoned judgment\" approach, analysis of whether the right to an elective abortion is fundamental begins with the familiar principle that \"the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.\" 431 U.S. 678. That principle initially led the Court to recognize the right of married couples to use contraception, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and to extend that right to unmarried persons, 405 U.S. 438. The Court in Roe expanded procreative liberty from the right to prevent pregnancy by contraception to the right to terminate it by abortion. 17 Obergefell is instructive on how Roe 's expansion of procreative liberty should be evaluated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Roe's Extension Of Procreative Liberty From Contraception To Elective Abortion Lacks Any Basis In Reasoned Judgment",
		"context": "Under the \"reasoned judgment\" approach, analysis of whether the right to an elective abortion is fundamental begins with the familiar principle that \"the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.\" 431 U.S. 678. That principle initially led the Court to recognize the right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U.S. 479, and to extend that right to unmarried persons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court in Roe expanded procreative liberty from the right to prevent pregnancy by contraception to the right to terminate it by abortion. 17 Obergefell is instructive on how Roe 's expansion of procreative liberty should be evaluated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Roe's Extension Of Procreative Liberty From Contraception To Elective Abortion Lacks Any Basis In Reasoned Judgment",
		"context": "Difficult as it can be for courts to determine whether a state interest is compelling, it is far more difficult for the judiciary to balance the woman's liberty interest in an elective abortion against the State's interest in the life of her fetus. Indeed, speaking of these same interests in the context of Casey 's \"undue burden\" test for abortion regulations, Chief Justice Roberts has observed that \"[t]here is no plausible sense in which anyone, let alone this Court, could objectively assign weight to such imponderable values and no meaningful way to compare them if there were.\" June Medical Services L. L. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Casey 's approach \"would require [the Court] to act as legislators, not judges.\" Id.7 Notably, Obergefell did not adopt Casey 's interest- balancing framework.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the rule of reason to the NCAA promotes the policies underlying the Sherman Act",
		"context": "The jud icial creation of ad-hoc, industry -specific, \"bright-line rules\" would serve to complicate, not simplify, antitrust jurisprudence with- out the flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances. Contra NCAA Br. 20 (citing Race Tires Am., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Conf. Br. 28 (citing same).",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity",
		"context": "55 (2007)); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp. , 814 F .3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., dissenting) (reviewing legislative history of AIA), overruled on other grounds by Aqua Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To avoid this outcome, estoppel —specifically, estoppel of a \"person\" —has been an important component of patent invalidity proceedings for more than a decade prior to the AIA, as seen in the 1999 enactment of the inter partes reexamination 12 procedure.6 Inter partes reexamination was created nearly 20 years ago as an avenue for \"[a]ny person\" to challenge patent validity . 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 F.3d 1290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity",
		"context": "Although these exemplary patent reform bills were not enacted, they reflect long -standing legislati ve interests in preventing repetitive identical attacks on patent validity. This observation is significant for a statutory interpretation analysis, such as in the case at bar, because \"the initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted.\" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lawmakers first recognized the importance of str ong estoppel protections in enacting inter partes reexamination. These subsequent proposed acts demonstrate estoppel's continuing importa nce as a tool regularly used by Congress to achieve its policy goals in crafting patent review proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW — PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "at 713. Every time a court recognizes a new international law norm under the ATS, it expands the original jurisdictional mandate. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, this Court has cautioned that ATS claims must be \"subject to vigilant doorkeeping.\" Sosa , 542 U.S. at 729.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW — PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "Liability for corporate conduct is \"a substantive principle that must be supported by a universal and obligatory norm if it is to be implemented under the ATS,\" Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1402—specifically, \"whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued.\" Sosa , 542 U.S. at 732 & n.20; see id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring); Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1400; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That international law focuses on the nature of the entity being held answerable is evidenced by the historical development of international law itself: Before Nuremberg, it was not typical for individuals to be tried for violations of international law committed by their states. But at no point were companies arraigned for crimes at Nuremberg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "654 F.3d 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW — PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "That international law focuses on the nature of the entity being held answerable is evidenced by the historical development of international law itself: Before Nuremberg, it was not typical for individuals to be tried for violations of international law committed by their states. But at no point were companies arraigned for crimes at Nuremberg. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,569 U.S. 108; Brief Amicus Curiae of Nuremburg Historians and International Lawyers in Support of Neither Party at 7-13, Kiobel , 569 U.S. 108. The artificial nature of the corporate person also highlights why this is an issue of substantive conduct—what specific conduct, as taken by whom, is required to support a claim—and not \"a remedial consideration.\" Compare Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1402 (Kennedy, J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "621 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW — PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "That international law focuses on the nature of the entity being held answerable is evidenced by the historical development of international law itself: Before Nuremberg, it was not typical for individuals to be tried for violations of international law committed by their states. But at no point were companies arraigned for crimes at Nuremberg. See 621 F.3d 111, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Brief Amicus Curiae of Nuremburg Historians and International Lawyers in Support of Neither Party at 7-13, Kiobel , 569 U.S. 108. The artificial nature of the corporate person also highlights why this is an issue of substantive conduct—what specific conduct, as taken by whom, is required to support a claim—and not \"a remedial consideration.\" Compare Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1402 (Kennedy, J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW — PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "That international law focuses on the nature of the entity being held answerable is evidenced by the historical development of international law itself: Before Nuremberg, it was not typical for individuals to be tried for violations of international law committed by their states. But at no point were companies arraigned for crimes at Nuremberg. See 621 F.3d 111, aff'd,569 U.S. 108; Brief Amicus Curiae of Nuremburg Historians and International Lawyers in Support of Neither Party at 7-13, Kiobel , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The artificial nature of the corporate person also highlights why this is an issue of substantive conduct—what specific conduct, as taken by whom, is required to support a claim—and not \"a remedial consideration.\" Compare Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1402 (Kennedy, J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW — PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "Compare, e.g. , Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd. , 504 F.3d at 254, 275-77 & n.12 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (\"purpose\"), with Doe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A survey of major jurisdictions confirms that the conduct required to support accessorial liability is highly varied and unsettled, including as applied to corporate conduct. 9 \u0003 \u0003Nations Diverge Widely on Their Recognition of Corporate Liability and the Circumstances Under Which It Will Arise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 F.3d 932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "In any event, the interpretive default is the opposite of what Petitioner suggests. Absent a contrary indication, a limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff has \"a complete and present cause of action.\" Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only exception is for statutes governing fraud or areas of law that otherwise \"cry out\" for a discovery rule. See TRW , 534 U.S. at 28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 96",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "30 In TRW , the Ninth Circuit had presumed \"that all federal statutes of limitations, regardless of context, incorporate a general discovery rule 'unless Congress has expressly legislated otherwise.'\" Id. at 27 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court declined to decide whether \"such a presumption exists,\" id., because, even if it did, \"the text and structure\" of the FCRA's statute of limitations \"evince[d] Congress' intent to preclude judicial implication of a discovery rule,\" id. at 28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "225 F.3d 1063",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "This Court said so in Bay Area Laundry. And, in TRW 's wake, this Court has dispelled any doubt by restating the Bay Area Laundry rule at least five separate times. See Graham, 545 U.S. at 418 (quoting Bay Area Laundry 's formulation of the \"standard rule\"); Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388 (same); Gabelli , 568 U.S. at 448 (same); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which recognized that \"[a]ll statutes of limit ation begin to run when the right of action is complete.\" Id. at 589; see also Gabelli , 568 U.S. at 448 (explaining that the \"standard rule\" \"has govern ed since the 1830s\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "While some courts of appeals may have applied the opposite presumption for a brief period before TRW , that \"bad wine of recent vintage\" has since been replaced by the traditional varietal. Id. at 37; see, e.g., Pet.App.5 (quoting the \"standard rule\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. This Court has deviated from the Bay Area Laundry presumption only when it comes to fraud statutes and those that ot herwise \"govern an area of the law that cries out for application of the discovery rule.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 590",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "Aside from fraud, this Court has recognized only \"two contexts\" that \"cr[y] out\" fo r a discovery rule: \"latent disease and medical malpractice.\" Id. at 27 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 337 U.S. 163). Debt collection—which is no better a candidate for this characterization than was credit reporting in TRW , see 534 U.S. at 28—should not be the third. Unlike classic fraud, latent disease, and medical malpractice, \"the conduct proscribed by the FDCPA will usually be obvious to its victims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "Aside from fraud, this Court has recognized only \"two contexts\" that \"cr[y] out\" fo r a discovery rule: \"latent disease and medical malpractice.\" Id. at 27 (citing 444 U.S. 111, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Debt collection—which is no better a candidate for this characterization than was credit reporting in TRW , see 534 U.S. at 28—should not be the third. Unlike classic fraud, latent disease, and medical malpractice, \"the conduct proscribed by the FDCPA will usually be obvious to its victims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule",
		"context": "15–16 (describing cases \"appl[ying] equitable tolling because the defe ndants had concealed plaintiffs' cause of action, and plaintiffs had not failed to act diligently\"). Indeed, this Court has made clear that, in the fraud context more broadly, equitable toll ing applies so long as \"the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part.\" Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "In the federal system established by the Constitu- tion, states have \" broad authority to enact legislation for the public good —what [this Court has] often called a 'police power. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Nat'l Fed 'n of Indep. 567 U.S. 519. The 6 police power \"embraces regulations designed to pro- mote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public mora ls or the public safety.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "In the federal system established by the Constitu- tion, states have \" broad authority to enact legislation for the public good —what [this Court has] often called a 'police power. '\" 572 U.S. 844 ; see also Nat'l Fed 'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 6 police power \"embraces regulations designed to pro- mote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public mora ls or the public safety.\" 204 U.S. 311; see 336 U.S. 77 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "567 U.S. 519. The 6 police power \"embraces regulations designed to pro- mote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public mora ls or the public safety.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 336 U.S. 77 . It is \"an exercise of the [state's] sovereign right.\" Allied Structural Steel 438 U.S. 234 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "567 U.S. 519. The 6 police power \"embraces regulations designed to pro- mote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public mora ls or the public safety.\" 204 U.S. 311; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is \"an exercise of the [state's] sovereign right.\" Allied Structural Steel 438 U.S. 234 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "204 U.S. 311; see 336 U.S. 77 . It is \"an exercise of the [state's] sovereign right.\" Allied Structural Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By contrast, t he Con stitution grants Congress only enumerated power s, including the power \"[t]o regu- late Commerce … among the several States.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "3. When Congress exercises that power \"by enacting legislation, the legislation con- trols\" in the face of contrary state police -power regu- lations. South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Absent such legislation , the general rule is that federal law does not supersede \"the historic po- lice powers of the States ,\" given the \"respect\" owed them \"as independent sovereigns in our federal sys- tem.\" 555 U.S. 555.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "South 138 S. Ct. 2080. Absent such legislation , the general rule is that federal law does not supersede \"the historic po- lice powers of the States ,\" given the \"respect\" owed them \"as independent sovereigns in our federal sys- tem.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that circum- stance, the so -called dormant Commerce Clause \"pre- vents the States from adopting protectionist measures and thus preserve s a national market for goods and services .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "at 2459. As the name implies, t he dormant Commerce Clause operates in the absence of \"congressional action ,\" leaving it \"'to the courts to for- mulate the rules ' to preserve 'the free flow of inter- state commerce ,'\" Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089 –90 (quoting S. Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), and freeing Congress from the 7 need to \"pass a law striking down every protectionist measure that a State … chose to enact,\" Tenn. Wine & Spiri ts Retailers Ass'n , 139 S. Ct. at 2461 n.4. This Court has fashioned two general rules for scrutinizing state laws that are alleged to impede in- terstate commerce. First, state laws that discriminate against interstate commerce —that is, \"impose com- mercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of State ,\" C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 ( 1994) —\"face a virtually per se rule of inva- lidity.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "325 U.S. 761 ), and freeing Congress from the 7 need to \"pass a law striking down every protectionist measure that a State … chose to enact,\" Tenn. Wine & Spiri ts Retailers Ass'n , 139 S. Ct. at 2461 n.4. This Court has fashioned two general rules for scrutinizing state laws that are alleged to impede in- terstate commerce. First, state laws that discriminate against interstate commerce —that is, \"impose com- mercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of State ,\" C & A Carbone, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1994) —\"face a virtually per se rule of inva- lidity.\" Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the dormant Commerce Clause, a state can advance its interests only through nondiscriminatory means, unless \"the State [can] demonstra te both that the [discriminatory] statute serves a legitimate local purpose and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscrim i- natory means.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the dormant Commerce Clause, a state can advance its interests only through nondiscriminatory means, unless \"the State [can] demonstra te both that the [discriminatory] statute serves a legitimate local purpose and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscrim i- natory means.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second, if a state law does not discriminate against interstate commerce —that is, if it \"regulates even - handedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest\" —it will be upheld despite its \"incidental\" effect on inter-state commerce \" unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta- tive local benefits. \" Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; see Wayfair , 138 S. Ct. at 2091.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; see Wayfair , 138 S. Ct. at 2091. In comparison to the virtually per se bar on discriminatory state laws, the Pike balancing test represents a \"much more flexible approach. \" Phil- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Dep't of Rev. of 553 U.S. 328. 8 These principles, however, do not grant a general license to review the wisdom of state police- power reg- ulations, including those that affect commercial trans- actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "In comparison to the virtually per se bar on discriminatory state laws, the Pike balancing test represents a \"much more flexible approach. \" Phil- 437 U.S. 617 ; see also Dep't of Rev. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 These principles, however, do not grant a general license to review the wisdom of state police- power reg- ulations, including those that affect commercial trans- actions. States have long used their poli ce powers to enact consumer -protection laws that address \"whether the manufacture of particular articles of traffic, or the sale of such articles, will injuriously af- fect the public,\" 135 U.S. 100.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "of 553 U.S. 328. 8 These principles, however, do not grant a general license to review the wisdom of state police- power reg- ulations, including those that affect commercial trans- actions. States have long used their poli ce powers to enact consumer -protection laws that address \"whether the manufacture of particular articles of traffic, or the sale of such articles, will injuriously af- fect the public,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the state alone is \"the judge of the ne-cessity or expediency of the means adopted.\" New York ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "Rather, the state alone is \"the judge of the ne-cessity or expediency of the means adopted.\" New York ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When regulating intrastate commerce, states are entitled to the same respect that Congress receives when it regu- lates interstate c ommerce. See Okla homa ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "When regulating intrastate commerce, states are entitled to the same respect that Congress receives when it regu- lates interstate c ommerce. See Okla homa ex rel. Phil- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]286 U.S. 374 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.",
		"context": "When regulating intrastate commerce, states are entitled to the same respect that Congress receives when it regu- lates interstate c ommerce. See Okla homa ex rel. Phil- 313 U.S. 508[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Is Integral To Balancing Copyright's Competing Values",
		"context": "In many ca ses, a transformative work will not be fair use based on considerations properly raised under the other factors. See, e.g. , Fox News Network, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that only makes it more important that first factor is properly trained on promoting the breathing space essential for \"creative 'progress,'\" rather than being subsumed into a factor four inquiry. Google , 141 S. Ct. at 1203.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Is Integral To Balancing Copyright's Competing Values",
		"context": "And it may well cause cognizable market harm to the original. See, e.g. , Disney Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 5 Goldsmith is thus wrong to suggest (at 22) that \"AWF's test would devastate derivative-w ork\" rights. Run-of-the-mill derivative works, like book-to-movie adaptations, are changes in f o r m t h a t d o n o t c h a n g e t h e c o r e m e a n i n g o r m e s s a g e o f t h e underlying work. 22 861 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.3d 848",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Is Integral To Balancing Copyright's Competing Values",
		"context": "Finally, Goldsmith posits (at 43-45) that a meaning-or-message test would let people identically reproduce prior works, and then baselessly claim they have some new meaning. But a judge or jury would see through such gamesmanship, at a variety of stages of litigation. That the defendant lithographer in Burrow-Giles Lithographic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"did not even try to raise fair use,\" Goldsmith Br. 45, only highlights that in the real world, manufactured efforts to claim new meaning or message have often been, and will continue to be, futile. The government similarly suggests that the meaning-or-message test would permit a work that simply \"over[lays] new lyrics onto a pre-existing musical composition.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "111 U.S. 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Is Integral To Balancing Copyright's Competing Values",
		"context": "So a song that simply copied a musical composition without alteration would plainly infringe the musical work copyright, regardless of the new lyrics. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A similar answer addresses the government's hypothetical book on politics from 1970 to 2000 that \"incorporat[es]\" wholesale a book covering 1970 to 1990. OSG Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 1150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Text Of Title V Makes Clear That It Was Intended To Assist Governmental Entities, Rather Than For-Profit Corporations",
		"context": "§ 5131(a) (emphasis added). \"This Court does not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same or related statutes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it is undisput- ed that ANCs are not federally recognized and do not appear on the annual list published pursuant to the List Act. Accordingly, ANCs are not Indian Tribes under ISDA, and therefore also do not qualify as Indian Tribes for purposes of the CARES Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": ". There is little stacked on the other side of the scales. To begin, the fleeing suspect has diminished interests because a \"proper arrest\" has \"been set in motion in a public place,\" Santana , 427 U.S. at 42–43, 18 and hot pursuit into the home to complete it works lit- tle \"additional intrusion,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See 451 U.S. 204. The fleeing suspect's interests are further weak- ened by his conduct, his ex pectations, and the scope of the resulting intrusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": "There is little stacked on the other side of the scales. To begin, the fleeing suspect has diminished interests because a \"proper arrest\" has \"been set in motion in a public place,\" Santana , 427 U.S. at 42–43, 18 and hot pursuit into the home to complete it works lit- tle \"additional intrusion,\" 568 U.S. 186. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fleeing suspect's interests are further weak- ened by his conduct, his ex pectations, and the scope of the resulting intrusion. Start with his conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": "Start with his conduct. If a suspect chooses to wrongf ully enter someone else's home, he has no privacy interests in that space at all. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And if he chooses to enter his own home, he invites the pur- suing officer to follow him in, abandoning any reason- able expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amend-ment would otherwise provide. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": "And if he chooses to enter his own home, he invites the pur- suing officer to follow him in, abandoning any reason- able expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amend-ment would otherwise provide. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A fleeing suspect \"intentionally place[s] himself and the public in danger,\" Scott , 550 U.S. at 384, and \"[i]t would be perverse if the more wanton behavior were rewarded\" with greater constitutional protections, Mitchell , 139 S. Ct. at 2537. Next, consider the fleeing suspect's expectations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "887 N.W.2d 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": "Be- cause he has \"knowingly expose[d]\" his house to police, their entry hot on his heels should come as no sur- prise. Santana , 427 U.S. at 42; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jewett, 31 N.E.3d at 1089; infra pp. 31–33. Finally, consider the minimal scope of the intru- sion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 S.E.2d 796",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": "Finally, consider the minimal scope of the intru- sion. Hot pursuit justifies en try \"not [for] a full search of the premises,\" but only to inspect \"those spaces where a person may be found,\" and for \"no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the prem- ises.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 556 U.S. 332. With weighty government interests on one side, and minimal privacy interests on the other, the hot pursuit rule simply reflects \"common sense,\" as the Supreme Court of Canada put it. Macooh , 2 S.C.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests",
		"context": "Finally, consider the minimal scope of the intru- sion. Hot pursuit justifies en try \"not [for] a full search of the premises,\" but only to inspect \"those spaces where a person may be found,\" and for \"no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the prem- ises.\" 494 U.S. 325; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With weighty government interests on one side, and minimal privacy interests on the other, the hot pursuit rule simply reflects \"common sense,\" as the Supreme Court of Canada put it. Macooh , 2 S.C.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation",
		"context": "Proposition 12 squarely violates the standard pro- hibiting extraterritorial regulation set forth in this Court's decisions in Baldwin , Healy and Carbone . Spe- cifically, Proposition 12 transgresses the bright-line rule that \"States … may not attach restrictions to ex- ports or imports in order to control commerce in other States.\" Carbone , 511 U.S. at 393 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 To paraphrase Yogi Berra, this case is Baldwin all over again. Just as it was undisputed in Baldwin that \"New York ha[d] no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there,\" 294 U.S. at 521, there is no question here that California lacks power to regulate how farm animals are housed outside California's bor- ders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation",
		"context": "California could not, for example, decree that farmers throughout the country must comply with Proposition 12's confinement requirements and send its law en-forcement officers to arrest farmers who do not comply. See supra , Part I.A. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The question, then, is whether California can evade this restriction on its auth ority by using the presence of imported meats in the State as a jurisdictional hook to regulate animal-housing conditions on out-of-state farms. Baldwin makes clear the answer is \"no\"—a State may not \"regulat[e] by indirection\" out-of-state conduct that it lacks power to regulate directly by con- ditioning the importation of wholesome foods on com-pliance with the State's regulations regarding the terms of out-of-state commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation",
		"context": "Likewise, allowing California to leverage its authority over in-state sales to regulate out-of-state animal-housing conditions would extend California's police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds. California also cannot circumvent the limits on its regulatory jurisdiction by reframing its interest as avoiding contributing to out-of-state practices to which it objects. See Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (justifying an import ban as a way for California to 6 The town's restriction in Carbone could be characterized as a restriction on the import of waste- processing servic es, as well as a restriction on the export of unprocessed waste. See 511 U.S. at 391–92. But the distinction is immaterial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 937",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation",
		"context": ", 793 F.3d at 1175 (expressing concern about \"problems of overin- clusion\" if the extraterritoriality doctrine required courts to \"strike down state health and safety regula-tions that require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels\"). When a State regulates the properties of goods sold in-s tate or their packaging to prevent in-state harms resulting from the goods' in- state use, the State acts within its jurisdictional au- thority. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such cases, both the harms the State seeks to prevent and their immediate causes oc- cur within the State's territory and hence within its regulatory jurisdiction. Any required changes to man- ufacturers' out-of-state production processes are not ends in themselves; they are incidental to the State's effort to prevent in-state harms resulting from the use of products in the State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation",
		"context": "In response, respondents neither submitted contrary evidence nor attempted to defend Proposition 12 as a food-safety measure. 21 animals and carcasses in order to prevent the ship- ment of impure, unwholesome, and unfit meat and meat-food products.\" Nat'l Meat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no basis to believe that out-of-state farmers' compliance with Proposition 12 would have any effect on the health and safety of California consumers. Regardless, any such relation \"is too remote and indirect to justify obstruc- tions to the normal flow of commerce in its movement between states.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation",
		"context": "With-out the sales ban, out-of-state producers in States that do not impose the same requirements would have a cost advantage over in-state producers. The sales ban eliminates that competitive advantage and thus has a protectionist effect. See W. Lynn Creamery , 512 U.S. at 194–96 (invalidating law that \"enable[d] higher cost Massachusetts dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in other States\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (invalidating law that had a \"leveling effect\" by 8 Proposition 12's sales ban is modeled on a provision the Cali- fornia legislature added to Proposition 2, the 2008 ballot initia- tive that first imposed the requir ement that pregnant pigs, veal calves, and egg-laying hens not be confined in a way that prevents them from \"[l]ying down, standing up, and fully extending [their] limbs\" or \"[t]urning around freely.\" Cal. Prop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent's position is foreclosed by a line of cases—largely from the nineteenth century, an era of peak Contracts Clause enforcement—holding that a paperwork burden is not an \"impairment,\" even if it affects pre-existing contracts. For instance, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the statute at issue construed a bondholder's failure to object to a debt settlement as consent. This Court upheld the statute, pointing out that if the bondholder \"does not wish to abandon his old rights and accept the new, all he has to do is to say so in writing to the president of the company.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent makes no such argument here, and offers no other basis for distinguishing Gilfillan . Likewise, this Court has approved retroactive requirements to record deeds, Jackson ex dem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; record mortgages, 108 U.S. 514; 260 U.S. 677; record judgments, 102 U.S. 203; notify landowners of tax sales, 80 U.S. 68; and file stateme nts of claim for mineral interests, Texaco, 454 U.S. 516. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent makes no such argument here, and offers no other basis for distinguishing Gilfillan . Likewise, this Court has approved retroactive requirements to record deeds, Jackson ex dem. 28 U.S. 280; record mortgages, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 260 U.S. 677; record judgments, 102 U.S. 203; notify landowners of tax sales, 80 U.S. 68; and file stateme nts of claim for mineral interests, Texaco, 454 U.S. 516. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "108 U.S. 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent makes no such argument here, and offers no other basis for distinguishing Gilfillan . Likewise, this Court has approved retroactive requirements to record deeds, Jackson ex dem. 28 U.S. 280; record mortgages, 108 U.S. 514; 260 U.S. 677; record judgments, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; notify landowners of tax sales, 80 U.S. 68; and file stateme nts of claim for mineral interests, Texaco, 454 U.S. 516. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "102 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent makes no such argument here, and offers no other basis for distinguishing Gilfillan . Likewise, this Court has approved retroactive requirements to record deeds, Jackson ex dem. 28 U.S. 280; record mortgages, 108 U.S. 514; 260 U.S. 677; record judgments, 102 U.S. 203; notify landowners of tax sales, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and file stateme nts of claim for mineral interests, Texaco, 454 U.S. 516. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent makes no such argument here, and offers no other basis for distinguishing Gilfillan . Likewise, this Court has approved retroactive requirements to record deeds, Jackson ex dem. 28 U.S. 280; record mortgages, 108 U.S. 514; 260 U.S. 677; record judgments, 102 U.S. 203; notify landowners of tax sales, 80 U.S. 68; and file stateme nts of claim for mineral interests, Texaco, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Respondent appears to suggest that if a contract is signed in a heavily regulated area where legislation affecting existing contracts is foreseeable, such legislation satisfies the Contracts Clause. This Court's cases endorse that approach. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pet. Br. 22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "The two cases Respondent emphasizes are dramatically different from this one. In both, state legislatures issued bonds to fund Reconstruction, and then passed statutes in an effort to avoid paying bondholders back. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Missouri enacted a statute directing the issuance of bonds, alongside a provision requiring county courts to increase taxes to meet bond obligations. Id. at 290.",
		"citation_value_orig": "122 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Id. at 298. Similarly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was part of a line of cases involving the Virginia 16 legislature's efforts to avoid paying back bondholders. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Contract Clause: A Constitutional History 181-84 (2016). The bonds at issue included \"coupons\" that could be used to pay state taxes which \"constituted a major part of the value of the bonds.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "But in assessing whether there is a substantial impairment, this Court has looked to the paperwork obligation, not the consequence of failing to abid e by it. In the above-cited cases, the failure to abide by recordation or notice obligations completely extinguished all interest in the contract, yet this Court upheld those statutes by holding that the recordation and notice obligations themselves were not impairments. This case thus is distinguishable from Allied Structural Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], on which Respondent 17 relies (Resp. Br. 34); in that case, the obligor could not restore its pre-existing pension obligations by filing paperwork.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "Br. 35-36) is unhelpful. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a federal statute specifically governing the disposition of insurance benefits upon death preempted state community-property law which disposed of the benefits differently. In 569 U.S. 483, the Court held that a federal statute that \"described the precise conditions under which a divorce decree could displace an employee's named beneficiary\" preempted a state statute revoking beneficiary designations under different circumstances. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.",
		"context": "35-36) is unhelpful. In 338 U.S. 655, the Court held that a federal statute specifically governing the disposition of insurance benefits upon death preempted state community-property law which disposed of the benefits differently. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a federal statute that \"described the precise conditions under which a divorce decree could displace an employee's named beneficiary\" preempted a state statute revoking beneficiary designations under different circumstances. Id. at 495-97 & n.5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Subsequent legal developments support overruling Apodaca",
		"context": ". Since Apodaca , the Court has reaffirmed that the Bill of Rights applies with equal force to the state and federal governments, and that the right's place in 11 our nation's history, not its function in modern society, governs its scope. McDonald , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's post- Apodaca precedent has continued to reject the application of a \"watered down\" version of the Bill of Rights to the states. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Subsequent legal developments support overruling Apodaca",
		"context": "at 766 n. 14. More recently, in Timbs v. Indiana , the Court incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the states and held that \"if a Bill of Rights protection is incorpor ated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Once again, the Court recognized that Apodaca is the Court's \"sole exception\" to this rule. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Subsequent legal developments support overruling Apodaca",
		"context": "The Court may properly overrule a decision when it is a \"mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.\" Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Apodaca is such a decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 271(f)(2) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality",
		"context": "That injury is domes- tic, and the corresponding aw ard of a reasonable royalty compensating for that injury is likewise domestic. Cf. Carnegie Mellon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] can obtain in junctive relief, the primary remedy at issue in Deepsouth . In this case , petitioner ob- tained injunctive relief in a ddition to damages. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "807 F.3d 1283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's reading of the Agreement is inconsistent with established principles of agency law and contract interpretation",
		"context": "The Agreement's characterization of UWBI as an \"agent\" and \"intermediary\" would be strong evidence that the consolidated -filing group's members did not intend to confer any such ownership interest upon UWBI , even if a court concluded that some Colorado- law prerequisite to the formation of an actual agency relationship had not been satis fied. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that, although a statutory provision declar- ing Amtrak not to be a government agency was not dis- positive for constitutional purposes, the provision was \"assuredly disp ositive of Amtrak's status as a Govern- ment entity for purposes of matters that are within Con-gress's control —for example, whether it is subject to statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Government entities\"). The inference that the contrac t- ing parties did not intend UWBI to obtain equitable title is especially sound because the Agreement here was drafted against the backdrop of the IRS's consolidated -filing rules and the financial regulators' guidance, both of which use the term \"agent\" to describe an entity that receives and disburses refunds without acquiring ownership of the money. Use of the term \"agent\" in the UWBI group's tax allocation Agree- ment thus was the most straightforward way of disa- vowing any intent to produce the result that petitioner advocates.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Are Significant Judicial Restraints on a Severance Remedy",
		"context": "There is a fine line between severing a statutory provision in the name of judicial restraint and a court breaking its constitutional bounds by severing a provision that was key to how a legislative scheme functioned. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts must, therefore, employ severance cautiously and modestly to avoid overstepping into the legislative realm. Otherwise, a court might \"rewrite a statute and give it an effect altogether different\" from what Congress intended.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Are Significant Judicial Restraints on a Severance Remedy",
		"context": "Courts must, therefore, employ severance cautiously and modestly to avoid overstepping into the legislative realm. Otherwise, a court might \"rewrite a statute and give it an effect altogether different\" from what Congress intended. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Despite the danger that severance might be unlawful, it is easy to understand why judges might prefer severing a small portion of a statute rather than ruling that an entire system of laws is unconstitutional and in need of a legislative rewrite. Congress passes laws that are often large, complex, and far-reaching.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Are Significant Judicial Restraints on a Severance Remedy",
		"context": "These limitations on the judiciary's remedial authority and competency are especially pronounced when a system of laws is unconstitutional based on the interaction of several distinct parts, each of which is equally vital to the functioning of the whole. Courts cannot \"foresee which of many different possible ways the legislature might respond to the constitutional objections.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such instances, it is misguided for courts to think that simply severing the \"narrowest\" portion of a statute is the preferred way to remedy a constitutional violation. But see Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Are Significant Judicial Restraints on a Severance Remedy",
		"context": "26a (Federal Circuit severed Title 5's removal restrictions as applied to APJs, declaring this the \"narrowest\" remedy). This Court has instructed that severance is appropriate only when a court can \"retain those portions of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of 'functioning independently,' and (3) consistent with Congress' basic objective in enacting the statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unless these criteria are satisfied, a court should not sever a provision—even if reliance interests may dictate that Congress would prefer a mutilated statutory scheme to no scheme at all. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Are Significant Judicial Restraints on a Severance Remedy",
		"context": "Courts should be cautious, therefore, in creating a false choice between no statute at all and one that Congress never would have passed. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Otherwise, the court risks perverting the incentives that drive the Legislative Branch. Messy policy compromises are the role of Congress.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. ARBITRATION IS A COST-EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION",
		"context": "97 -542, p. 13 (1982). This Court has echoed the sentiments of Congress in recognizing the value of arbitration in several of its decisions. See Stolt -Nielsen S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 107 10 (2001)( \"there are real benefits to arbitration in the employment context, including avoidance of litigation costs. \") With respect to the total length of time to complete the process, the value of arbitration has been clearly demonstrated. In the context of claims arising from employment disputes, an average arbitration moves through final hearing more than a year faster than a case litigated in court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Shareholder voting rights are not generally useful for directing or influencing specific corporate actions",
		"context": "ECON. 610, 621 (2013) (Table 4). 45 Jana Master Fund, Lt [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 46 Gantchev, supra note 44, at 610. 47 Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Consid- erations in Proxy Contests: The Primary Means of Effecting Fun- damental Corporate Change in t he 1990s , 13 Geo.",
		"citation_value_orig": "954 A.2d 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court correctly interpreted and applied Section 2",
		"context": "52 U.S.C. 10301(b). Th is Court properly interpreted that text in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and the dis- trict court correctly applied that longstanding interpre- tation here .",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Reconsideration Order Rests on an Unreasoned Reinterpretation of the Same Facts, Not a Transparent and Reasoned Policy Choice",
		"context": "1. Respondents agree that courts should defer to \"implementation of the public-interest standard, when based on a rational weighing of competing policies.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. From long before the Third Circuit spilled its first drop of ink in the Prometheus cases through today, the Commission's reasoned judgment has been that ownership diversity serves the public interest. It does so in its own right, and because of its \"potential to strengthen competition and [viewpoint] diversity\" through greater participation by small businesses, \"including those owned by minorities and women.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Reconsideration Order Rests on an Unreasoned Reinterpretation of the Same Facts, Not a Transparent and Reasoned Policy Choice",
		"context": "10 Rather than transparently declaring ownership diversity less important than other goals, the Commission altered its rules on the (irrational) finding that ownership diversity would not be harmed, based on an \"analysis\" that failed several tests of reasonableness and \"rest[ed] upon a factual premise … unsupported by substantial evidence.\" Ctr. for Auto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Before this Court, the Government seeks to distance itself from a central element of the decision on review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "956 F.2d 309",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Reconsideration Order Rests on an Unreasoned Reinterpretation of the Same Facts, Not a Transparent and Reasoned Policy Choice",
		"context": "See WNCN , 450 U.S. at 595-96 (Commission's position \"r eflect[ed] a reasonable accommodation\" of two competing policy goals where it had \"assessed the benefits and the harm likely to flow\" from a proposed course of action); NCCB, 436 U.S. at 805-08 (deferring to a \"rational prediction\"). And if, because of faulty and incomplete data, \"uncertainty is so profound that it precludes [the agency] from making a reasoned judgment … [the agency] must say so.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In retaining the rules, the 2016 Commission did acknowledge data problems that precluded it from relying on the data to justify relaxing the rules. E.g., JA176.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Reconsideration Order Rests on an Unreasoned Reinterpretation of the Same Facts, Not a Transparent and Reasoned Policy Choice",
		"context": "Precisely because the \"public interest\" standard is a \"supple instrument for the exercise of discretion,\" WNCN , 450 U.S. at 593, administrative accountability demands transparency when an agency redefines the contours of that standard. 36 Agencies may receive deference when they have \"political accountability.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But there can be no accountability—to the public or to the courts—if agencies obfuscate what they are doing. Dep't of 139 S. Ct. 2551.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Reconsideration Order Rests on an Unreasoned Reinterpretation of the Same Facts, Not a Transparent and Reasoned Policy Choice",
		"context": "See 139 S. Ct. 2400. But there can be no accountability—to the public or to the courts—if agencies obfuscate what they are doing. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Deferring to unspo ken policy choices hidden behind patently irrational reasoning \"would defeat the purpose of the enterprise.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Modifying Quill and Allowing States to Apply the Decision Retroactively Would Undermine the Intended Operation of Sales and Use Taxes",
		"context": "Codified Laws § 10- 45-22. This Court has thus examined the nature of taxes and their operation in prior cases rath er than relying upon formalistic classifications. See, e.g., Trinova [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 If retailers lack substantia l nexus with a state and do not collect the tax from consumers, consumers gen- erally have an obligation to remit the corresponding use tax to the state. In practice, not all consumers remit their use tax obligat ions, and states lack an efficient mechanism to meas ure or track consumers' use tax liabilities – hence the genesis of this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Smith should be revisited and replaced",
		"context": "at 143, 148-50; Meese Br.31 -32; Bruderhof Br.8-22. This is why the Court \"cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right.\" Cit- izens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Philadelphia repeats Smith 's speculation that the compellin g interest test courts \"anarchy .\" Phila.Br .50- 51.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Smith should be revisited and replaced",
		"context": "Whatever Smith 's intentions, that surely was not one of them. A Free Exercise Clause permitting that result can hardly be said to \"lie [] at the heart of our plural- istic society.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Smith should be overruled and re- placed with a standard that relies on the text, history and tradition of the Free Exercise Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In re Huh Persuasively Explains Why Imputed Liability for Fraud Should Not Bar Discharge Absent Proof of the Debtor's Personal Culpability",
		"context": "Corp. Code § 16306(a). But as discussed in Sullivan and Peklar , liability under state law is not necessarily determinative of dischargeability under fed eral law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re Huh , 506 B.R. at 272. The Ninth Circuit BAP decision in Huh, squarely addressed the question presented and concluded that under this Court's decisions in Neal , Geiger , and Bullock as well as the court of appeals' decisions in Walker and Sherman , fraudulent intent of the debtor's agent cannot be imputed to the debt or- principal for purposes of precluding discharge under 10 Peklar 's reasoning illustrates that state law principles of agency establishing liability are not coextensive with the elements of actual fraud for purposes of precluding discharge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Structure Of The FTC Act Demonstrates That Congress Knew How To Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "That argu- ment is as odd as it sounds. It defies the standard principle that where \"Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally pre- sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purpose- ly in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]508 U.S. 248 27 (explaining that a \"carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly\" (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)). Meghrig exemplifies this principle. There, the Court examined a statutory scheme where Congress authorized the federal courts to \"restrain\" environ- mental violations in one statute, while permitting the recovery of \"all costs\" in a separate statute that also addressed environmental harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Structure Of The FTC Act Demonstrates That Congress Knew How To Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "That argu- ment is as odd as it sounds. It defies the standard principle that where \"Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally pre- sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purpose- ly in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" 464 U.S. 16[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 27 (explaining that a \"carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly\" (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)). Meghrig exemplifies this principle. There, the Court examined a statutory scheme where Congress authorized the federal courts to \"restrain\" environ- mental violations in one statute, while permitting the recovery of \"all costs\" in a separate statute that also addressed environmental harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Structure Of The FTC Act Demonstrates That Congress Knew How To Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "§ 502(a), while separately awarding \"damages and profits,\" id. § 504. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In trademark suits, 29 courts may grant both \"injunctions,\" 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a), and the recovery of profits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Structure Of The FTC Act Demonstrates That Congress Knew How To Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "In employ- ment cases, courts may \"enjoin\" unlawful employ- ment practices and order \"any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.\" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(g)(1); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In cases involving military service members, courts have \"full equity powers, including temporary or permanent injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and contempt orders\" to enforce employment protections. 38 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Structure Of The FTC Act Demonstrates That Congress Knew How To Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "& Pac. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Courts historically treated jury instructions as sufficient to address the potential prejudice of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession",
		"context": "This Court has previously \"turn [ed] to the historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to under- stand its meaning. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Undertaking that inquiry here reveals a longstanding practice under which a nontestifying co- defendant's confession was admissible in a joint trial so long as the jury was properly instructed not to consid- er it against the noncon fessing defendant. As one authoritative treatise explained shortly after the Founding: The confession of a prisoner is not to be taken in parts, but the whole together[.]",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Courts historically treated jury instructions as sufficient to address the potential prejudice of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession",
		"context": "As one authoritative treatise explained shortly after the Founding: The confession of a prisoner is not to be taken in parts, but the whole together[.] [A]lthough it 17 may happen that some part of it concerns other prisoners who are tried on the same indictment all that can be done is to direct the jury not to take into their consideration such parts as affect the other prisoners. S. M. Phillip ps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 83 (1816) (Phillip ps); cf., e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 533 -534 (185 2) (relying on Phillip ps trea- tise) . Other contemporary authorities were in accord. See 1 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evi- dence § 218, at 253 -254 (1842) (\"[I]f the confession im- plicates other persons by name, yet it must be proved as it was made, not omitting the names; but the Judge will instruct the jury, that it is not evidence against any but the prisoner who made it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "53 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Courts historically treated jury instructions as sufficient to address the potential prejudice of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession",
		"context": "While it was suggested that a written confession \"might perhaps\" be redacted to remove material relat- ing to co-defendants , if such material were severable and could \"be omitted without affecting in any degree the prisoner's narra tive against himself,\" Phillip ps 83, Wigmore observed that the \"favored\" practice in the United States was in fact to admit the whole state- ment —including the co-defendants' names —with a limiting instruction. 3 John Henry Wigmore, A Trea- 18 tise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2100 n.5, at 2841 (1904) (Wigmore).1 This Court's 19th -century cases reflect that prac- tice. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that, \"as the declarations of [ a co - defendant] were not, in any view of the case, compe- tent evidence against\" the defendant, the trial court \"should have excluded them as evidence ag ainst\" the defendant but \"admitted them against\" the declarant. Id. at 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "156 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Courts historically treated jury instructions as sufficient to address the potential prejudice of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession",
		"context": "Id. at 58. And i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that three defendants were 1 The English courts debated the issue during this period, with many likewise ruling that a defendant's confession should be pro- vided without omitting a co-defendant 's name . See David Power & Henry Roscoe, Roscoe's Digest of the Law of Evidence in Crimi- nal Cases 52-53 (4th ed. 1857 ) (Roscoe) ; see , e.g., R v. Walkley , (1833) 172 Eng.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Courts historically treated jury instructions as sufficient to address the potential prejudice of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession",
		"context": "at 672. The practices of state courts likewise bear out Wigmore's observation . Before the Confrontation Clause was held to apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], virtually every state constitution contained a provision substantially equivalent to it . See 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, at 155 - 158 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "at i. Had respondents instead changed their pol- icies before being sued, and had petitioners so ught only nominal damages from the outset, the question presented would sound in standing. See Friends of the Earth, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In either case, how- ever, the fundamental question is the same: Does a claim for nominal damages for a past violation of a per- son's constitutional rights , by itself, present a justicia- ble \"Cas[e]\" or \"Controvers[y]\" within the meaning of Article III?2 U.S. Const. art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "This Court has given content to Article III's \"Cas [e]\" or \"Controvers[y]\" requirement by looking to the typ es of cases and controversies that were \"tradi- tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial pro- cess\" at common law. Vt. Agency of Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Historically, the direct invasion of a private right —like the right to freedom of speech —would have been actionable in tort without any ad ditional proof of loss or harm. See, e.g., Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (20 16) (Thomas, J., concurring) ; F. An- drew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights , 93 Cornell L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "529 U.S. 765. Historically, the direct invasion of a private right —like the right to freedom of speech —would have been actionable in tort without any ad ditional proof of loss or harm. See, e.g., Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (20 16) (Thomas, J., concurring) ; F. An- drew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights , 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 279 –86 (2008). As Justice Thomas's Spokeo concurrence elaborated, \"[m]any traditional remedies for private -rights causes of action —such a s for trespass, infringement of intel- lectual property, and unjust enrichment —are not con- tingent on a plaintiff' s allegation of damages beyond the violatio n of his private legal right.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "Indeed, Congress itself observ ed this dis- tinction in Section 1983, which does not create a cause of action for every constitutional violation , but only for \"the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni- ties secured by the Constitution and laws.\" 42 U.S .C. § 1983; see, e.g., Gonz aga [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In creating this cause of action , Congress incorporated common -law tort princ iples —including the venerable principle that the violation of a private right is, by itself, an actionable injury sufficient to sup- port a claim . See, e.g., 435 U.S. 247; City of 526 U.S. 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "§ 1983; see, e.g., Gonz aga 536 U.S. 273. In creating this cause of action , Congress incorporated common -law tort princ iples —including the venerable principle that the violation of a private right is, by itself, an actionable injury sufficient to sup- port a claim . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; City of 526 U.S. 687. 2. To the extent this Court's Article II I precedent is read to require not just the violation of a private right, but also \" de facto \" harm , it is inconsistent with the his- torical precedent recounted above.3 Regardless, t he deprivation of petitioners' First Amendment rights was an \"injury -in-fact\" under this Court's precedent .",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "§ 1983; see, e.g., Gonz aga 536 U.S. 273. In creating this cause of action , Congress incorporated common -law tort princ iples —including the venerable principle that the violation of a private right is, by itself, an actionable injury sufficient to sup- port a claim . See, e.g., 435 U.S. 247; City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. To the extent this Court's Article II I precedent is read to require not just the violation of a private right, but also \" de facto \" harm , it is inconsistent with the his- torical precedent recounted above.3 Regardless, t he deprivation of petitioners' First Amendment rights was an \"injury -in-fact\" under this Court's precedent .",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "2. To the extent this Court's Article II I precedent is read to require not just the violation of a private right, but also \" de facto \" harm , it is inconsistent with the his- torical precedent recounted above.3 Regardless, t he deprivation of petitioners' First Amendment rights was an \"injury -in-fact\" under this Court's precedent . 3 One commentator has argued that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 528 U.S. 18 , require d a showing of factual harm over and above a violation of a private constitutional right. See Hessick, supra , at 310 –17. But that is debatable; both decisions can just as plausibly be read as resting on the conclusion that the rights at issue had not been violated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "2. To the extent this Court's Article II I precedent is read to require not just the violation of a private right, but also \" de facto \" harm , it is inconsistent with the his- torical precedent recounted above.3 Regardless, t he deprivation of petitioners' First Amendment rights was an \"injury -in-fact\" under this Court's precedent . 3 One commentator has argued that 518 U.S. 343, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , require d a showing of factual harm over and above a violation of a private constitutional right. See Hessick, supra , at 310 –17. But that is debatable; both decisions can just as plausibly be read as resting on the conclusion that the rights at issue had not been violated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "The injury must also be \"particularized\" and \"actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). There can be no dispute that the latter two requirements are met here—petitioners suffered a particularized depriva- tion of their own right s to free speech , and the depr i- vation has actually and already occurred. The violations of petitioners' First Amendment rights also inflicted \"concret e\" injury .",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "When Uzuegbunam was told he must stop speaking about his religion, this was, for all intents and purposes, a re- striction of his bodily liberty —a prohibition on the use of his vocal cords, mouth, and tongue. It was in that respect akin to the tort of false imprisonment or to a Fourth Amendment seizure (whereby a person may be physically immobilized without actual physical con- tact, let alone physical damage). E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bradford was injured too when he self -censored to avoid punishment. Just as a person is injured when he is prevented from going where he wants to go, he is injured when he is prevented from speaking words he wants to speak —regardless of whether the restriction of his liberty causes any further harm .",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "Although such harms may be intangi- ble, they are no less real and no less concrete than tan- gible harms. Indeed, this Court expressly recognized in Spokeo that \"intangible harm\" may nevertheless be \"concrete,\" and specifically identified \"free speech\" as a right whose deprivation would inflict such a cogniza- ble injury. See Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Pleas- ant Grove [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).4 Other violations of an individual's constitutional rights also inflict real and concrete, even if in tangible, harms. For example, with racial discrimination , the \"discrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic notions' or by stigmatizing members of the 4 The idea that the deprivation of the right to speak is somehow insufficiently harmful runs contrary not only to this Court's standing jurisprudence but also to other related doctrines. For in- stance, the mere credible threat of enforcing an unconstitutional speech restriction is enough to give a plaintiff the right —pre-en- forcement —to challenge that restriction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "For example, with racial discrimination , the \"discrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic notions' or by stigmatizing members of the 4 The idea that the deprivation of the right to speak is somehow insufficiently harmful runs contrary not only to this Court's standing jurisprudence but also to other related doctrines. For in- stance, the mere credible threat of enforcing an unconstitutional speech restriction is enough to give a plaintiff the right —pre-en- forcement —to challenge that restriction. See Susan B. Anthony [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the threat- ened loss of a right to speak constitutes \"irreparable harm\" suffi- cient, by itself, to warrant injunctive relief. See 427 U.S. 347.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "See Susan B. Anthony 134 S. Ct. 2334. And the threat- ened loss of a right to speak constitutes \"irreparable harm\" suffi- cient, by itself, to warrant injunctive relief. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 disfavored gr oup as 'innately inferior' . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": ". can cause se- rious non -economic injuries. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, a person who is detained based on unlawful racial pro- filing suffers a real, concrete injury —even if the deten- tion is brief and cause s no compensable harm. And an applicant who is denied admission to a public univer- sity based on his race suffers a real, concrete injury — even if the applicant would have attended a different university in any event.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
		"context": "Thus, a person who is detained based on unlawful racial pro- filing suffers a real, concrete injury —even if the deten- tion is brief and cause s no compensable harm. And an applicant who is denied admission to a public univer- sity based on his race suffers a real, concrete injury — even if the applicant would have attended a different university in any event. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, there may be cases where the viol ation of a constitutional right does not necessarily inflict a sep- arate factual harm —as where one i s denied procedural due process but the additional process w ould have made no difference to the ultimate outcome. See Carey , 435 U.S. at 266–67.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Kansas's approach reflects its broad discretion to delineate the circumstances in which mental illness excuses criminal conduct",
		"context": "1. A State's \"insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has always been \"the province of the States\" to set the standards for \"assess[ing] the moral accountability of an indi vidual for his antisocial deeds. \" 392 U.S. 514.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Kansas's approach reflects its broad discretion to delineate the circumstances in which mental illness excuses criminal conduct",
		"context": "548 U.S. 735. It has always been \"the province of the States\" to set the standards for \"assess[ing] the moral accountability of an indi vidual for his antisocial deeds. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a plurality of this Court explained in Powell , \"[t]he doctrines of actus reus , mens rea , [and] insanity, \" along with \"mistake, justification, and duress ,\" have \"historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philo-sophical, and medi cal views of the nature of man.\" 392 U.S. at 536.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Kansas's approach reflects its broad discretion to delineate the circumstances in which mental illness excuses criminal conduct",
		"context": "See Clark , 548 U.S. at 755 n.24 ( assessment of cog- nitive incapacity is an \"easier enquiry\" for \"th e fact- finder to conduct\" than the \"harder and broader en- quiry whether the defendant knew his actions were wrong\") . As this Court has observed, \"psychiatrists dis- agree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental 13 illness\" and \"on the appropriate diagno sis to be at- tached to given behavior and symptoms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 463 U.S. 354. Because even \"experts disagree about both the meaning of the terms used to discuss the defendant's mental state and the effect of particular mental states on ac- tions,\" a jury might have difficulty applying such con- cepts . Insanity Defense Hearings 29 (testimony of At- torney General Smith).",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Kansas's approach reflects its broad discretion to delineate the circumstances in which mental illness excuses criminal conduct",
		"context": "See Clark , 548 U.S. at 755 n.24 ( assessment of cog- nitive incapacity is an \"easier enquiry\" for \"th e fact- finder to conduct\" than the \"harder and broader en- quiry whether the defendant knew his actions were wrong\") . As this Court has observed, \"psychiatrists dis- agree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental 13 illness\" and \"on the appropriate diagno sis to be at- tached to given behavior and symptoms.\" 470 U.S. 68 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because even \"experts disagree about both the meaning of the terms used to discuss the defendant's mental state and the effect of particular mental states on ac- tions,\" a jury might have difficulty applying such con- cepts . Insanity Defense Hearings 29 (testimony of At- torney General Smith).",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 354",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. North Carolina has limited the scope of its attorney general's representations",
		"context": "III, § 7(1), (2). The North Carolina Supreme Court has con- strued \"prescribed by law\" to mean that the attorney general's \"duties are left to the discretion of the Gen- eral Assembly\" and are set forth in statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 359 S.E.2d 472. The North Carolina General Assembly has pro- vided in statute that the atto rney general is to appear for the state in any court in which the state may be a party and to represent all state departments, agencies, and commissions, N.C. G EN. STAT.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 S.E.2d 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. North Carolina has limited the scope of its attorney general's representations",
		"context": "III, § 7(1), (2). The North Carolina Supreme Court has con- strued \"prescribed by law\" to mean that the attorney general's \"duties are left to the discretion of the Gen- eral Assembly\" and are set forth in statute. 540 S.E.2d 313; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The North Carolina General Assembly has pro- vided in statute that the atto rney general is to appear for the state in any court in which the state may be a party and to represent all state departments, agencies, and commissions, N.C. G EN. STAT.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 S.E.2d 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Court should not hollow Section 1030 by excising core unlawful conduct like petitioner's",
		"context": "i. Historically, prosecutions against defendants who \"exceed[] authorized access\" have focused on the core conduct that Congress intended Section 1030 to cover. See, e.g., 807 F.3d 508[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]568 U.S. 1163 only three actual prose- cutions, none more recent than 2012, to support his claim that the government's interpretation of \"exceeds authorized access\" would invite prosecutions of \"indi- viduals who allegedly violated companies' terms of ser- vice agreements.\" But even those three cases do not establish that the government co uld or would success- fully prosecute such conduct as an \"exceeds authorized access\" offense. In one, the government filed a super- seding indictment that dropped the \"exceeds authorized acces s\" charges .",
		"citation_value_orig": "597 F.3d 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Court should not hollow Section 1030 by excising core unlawful conduct like petitioner's",
		"context": "And peti- tioner's one example of a civil suit involving improper Internet access at work was dismissed because the em- ployer did not allege \"t hat t he [employee] accessed any of the [employer's] information (as distinguished from her personal email and facebook pages, to which she was entitled after business hours ).\" 2011 WL 1742028. Although this Court \"cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Govern ment will use it responsibly,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], based on unfounded conjecture about the in- ception or outcome of hypothetical litigation . To date, only three courts of appeals h ave adopted petitioner's atextual i nterpretation of \"exceeds authorized access\"— all relatively recently —yet petitioner and his amic i have not identified even a single decision that has entered or affirmed a criminal or civil judgment under Section 1030 based on the kind of innocuous and routine com- puter use described in their hypotheticals . The evi- dence thus undermines petitioner's assertion that af-firming his conviction will lead to a deluge of criminal prosecutions or civil suits involving such conduct .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Court should not hollow Section 1030 by excising core unlawful conduct like petitioner's",
		"context": "16) that becaus e Congress enacted the defi- nition of \"exc eeds authorized access\" before the advent of Internet search engines and websites, this C ourt should narrow the statute to prompt a congressional ex-amination of whether Section 1030 requires further \"re- calibration\" in light of technological and societal changes. But it is not the proper role of the judiciary to disregard plain meaning in order to ask Congress if it really meant what it said. See Connecticut Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is it the Court's role \"to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we think Congress real ly intended.\" Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Court should not hollow Section 1030 by excising core unlawful conduct like petitioner's",
		"context": "See Connecticut Nat'l 503 U.S. 249. Nor is it the Court's role \"to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we think Congress real ly intended.\" Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Judicial interven- tion aimed at getting Congress's attention is not appropriate —or necessary here . See S. 1196, 113th Cong., 1st Sess.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception",
		"context": "Incorporation eliminated the separate - sovereigns exception's doctrinal justification. The Court has repeatedly held in nearly identical contexts that incorporation justifies overruling precedents premised on a provision's inapplicability to the states. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court overruled the so- called \"silver platter\" doctrine, which had allowed federal prosecutors to u se evidence unlawfully obtained by state officers. And in 378 U.S. 52, the Court overruled its prior holding that one sovereign could, in convicting a defendant, rely on testimony unlawfully compelled by another. Both decisions reflect the unassailable principle that, following incorporation, the Court should not adhere to precedent allowing coordinate governments to accomplish together what neither could do alone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception",
		"context": "The Court has repeatedly held in nearly identical contexts that incorporation justifies overruling precedents premised on a provision's inapplicability to the states. In 364 U.S. 206, the Court overruled the so- called \"silver platter\" doctrine, which had allowed federal prosecutors to u se evidence unlawfully obtained by state officers. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court overruled its prior holding that one sovereign could, in convicting a defendant, rely on testimony unlawfully compelled by another. Both decisions reflect the unassailable principle that, following incorporation, the Court should not adhere to precedent allowing coordinate governments to accomplish together what neither could do alone. That principle applies with equal force here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Governmental examination of a speaker's motivations or beliefs has no place in the application of content-neutral restrictions on speech",
		"context": "The constitutional infirmity of Petitioner's conten- tion is all the more troubling given that it would require this subjective examination of the speaker's motivations and beliefs for the express purpose of enabling the government to treat some viewpoints more favorably than others. \"There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.\" Police Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Viewpoint discrimina tion inherently entails the government reaching a very visible hand into the free market of ideas, a proposition that \"plainly offend[s]\" the First Amendment. First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Governmental examination of a speaker's motivations or beliefs has no place in the application of content-neutral restrictions on speech",
		"context": "Police Dep't of 408 U.S. 92. Viewpoint discrimina tion inherently entails the government reaching a very visible hand into the free market of ideas, a proposition that \"plainly offend[s]\" the First Amendment. First Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
		"context": "A defendant cannot be liable based on awareness of generalized in-formation divorced from the alleged substantial aid. Allegations of that sort woul d suggest negligence or at most recklessness, which encompasses \"action entailing 'an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.'\" Safeco Insur- ance Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Halberstam confirms this straightforward reading. Halberstam's third element aligns with the statutory text, thereby reinforcing the construction just ex- plained.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
		"context": "The Eighth Circuit held that a defendant's business conduct at issue was \"not so atypical as to make [it] suspect\" and found the requisite knowledge lacking. Id. at 462- 463; see also Investors Research [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited in Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477. 41 Moreover, courts have demanded heightened scien- ter to establish culpability where the alleged assistance is a failure to act .12 The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that \"liability for non-feasance was slow to re-ceive any recognition in th e law\" and \"is still largely confined to[] situations in which there was some special relation between the parties.\" Restatement (Second) of Torts §314 cmt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.2d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
		"context": "c. In Woodward , the court noted that, absent a special obligation to prevent harm (a duty that is not alleged in the present case), a failure to act can support civil aiding-and-abetti ng liability \"only if scien- ter of the high 'conscious intent' variety can be proved.\" 522 F.2d at 97. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], also cited in Hal- berstam , 705 F.2d at 485, the Third Circuit noted that courts have generally declined to extend secondary lia- bility \"where the secondary defendant's conduct is nothing more than inaction\"; inaction \"may provide a predicate for liability [only] where the plaintiff demon- strates that the aider-abettor consciously intended to assist in the perpetration of a wrongful act.\" Id. at 800.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.2d 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
		"context": "at 800. Other courts have observed the same. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]705 F.2d 485 speaks of knowledge, they illustrate the rule that the \"scienter requirement [for aiding-and- abetting liability] scales upward when activity is more remote,\" such that the remote party must \"know when and to what degree he is furthering\" the primary wrong. Woodward , 522 F.2d at 95. Thus, the scienter standard must \"scale up\" for a defendant accused of merely failing to prevent misuse of its widely available, ordinary services, to require an especially robust show- ing that the defendant knew its assistance was substan-tial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 F.2d 1304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
		"context": "Here, that at least requires plausible allegations that Defendants knew ISIS was operating specific accounts that sub- stantially assisted the Reina attack and also knew that not blocking those accounts would substantially assist such an attack. 13 13 A similar knowledge requirement has been applied in trademark and copyright contributory liability cases that involve, as in this case, providers of widely available services or products that are merely aware of general wrongful uses of those services or products. In Tiffany (NJ) [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Second Circuit explained that, barring in-tentional inducement, contributory trademark infringement re-quires \"a service provider\" to have \"more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods.\" Id. at 107.",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 F.3d 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
		"context": "Rather, \"[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will in- fringe in the future is necessary.\" Id. (emphasis added); see also Sony Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting in di cta that the standa rd for contribu- 43",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. NO CONCEIVABLE INTEREST SUPPORTS A BAN ON ALL \"POLITICAL\" APPAREL",
		"context": "in part). 9 If it becomes necessary to weigh and potentially apply a more formulaic approach, MVA contends that Section 211B.11(1) is subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of forum analysis, because the statute is a content-based restriction on political speech. Burson , 504 U.S. at 207; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 330. The statute would be unconstitutional under this test for the reasons outlined in the following sections, namely, because the ban on political apparel is not sufficiently tailored to the Government's objectives. 31",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Abood Fails to Account for the Fact that Labor Unions Are Inherently and Pervasively Political Organizations",
		"context": "\"58 Under Abood , non-members are compelled to sub- sidize and associate themselves with all of these ac- tivities. \"Making a contribution, like joining a politi- cal party, serves to affiliate a person with a candi- date.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So, too, with a union. The difference is that campaign contributions are not compulsory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Google Was a Complex and Unique Case That Does Not Support Petitioner's Proposed Test",
		"context": "§106(2), at a time when the pendulum has begun swinging back toward a more reasoned analytical process. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other amici have provided more detailed analysis on this point that need not be repeated. In the nearly three decades since its formulation, the Campbell transformative use test has been applied in varying ways among the lower federal courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The requirement of proportionality in punishment is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law",
		"context": "Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 , at 92 (1981) [hereinafter \"Schwoerer, Declaration \"]. The principle of proportionality was prominently associated with Magna Carta, the \"foundation of our English law heritage.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Magna Carta guaranteed that '[a] Free-man shall not be amerced for a small faul t, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof,'\" 139 S. Ct. 682 (\"[T]he punishment should correspond with the fault, so that the will may re- ceive a punishment in contrast with that for love o f which it sinned. \"); V Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The requirement of proportionality in punishment is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law",
		"context": "The principle of proportionality was prominently associated with Magna Carta, the \"foundation of our English law heritage.\" 386 U.S. 213. \"Magna Carta guaranteed that '[a] Free-man shall not be amerced for a small faul t, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof,'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]he punishment should correspond with the fault, so that the will may re- ceive a punishment in contrast with that for love o f which it sinned. \"); V Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics ch. 3 (Roger Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The requirement of proportionality in punishment is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law",
		"context": "Id . at 1016. 10 Amercements—\"the most common criminal sanction in 13th century England,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—\"were payments to the Crown … required of individuals who were 'in th e King's mercy,' because of some act offensive to the Crown.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 688 n.2. 10 In this way, Magna Carta's prohibition of exces- sive amercements came to embody a broader funda- mental principle in English law—that the govern- mental power to punish should be limited by cus- tomary retributive notions of proportionality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Alabama has numerous remedial options. 21",
		"context": "See, e.g. , MSA181. This is because these policies can be manipulated \"to give an electoral advantage\" at the cost of other neutral factors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and can be used improperly to worsen , instead of reliev e, racial vote dilution. See LULAC , 548 U.S. at 441. Thus, incumbency protection and core retention must give ground to the more important obligation to remedy Section 2 vote dilution, which Alabama's criteria list itself recognizes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Alabama has numerous remedial options. 21",
		"context": "at 23; to draw lines in a manner compliant with the Equal Protection Clause, Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472; and t o remedy an established Section 2 violation, see Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 581-82 (approving district with 36.2% Black voting- age population that \"offers to any candidate, without regard to race, the opportunity to seek and be elected to office\"). This is in part because adding voters to 33 potential remedial crossover districts is not done \"on the basis of race,\" Miller, 515 U.S. at 911, but for the \"legitimate political explanation\" that including other socially and politically cohesive voters would avoid the dilution of the minority voters already in the core of the district. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in remedying Section 2 dilution with crossover districts, \"legislatures [are given] a choice that can lead to less racial isolation, not more.\" Bartlett, 556 U.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Associational standing allows an organization to establish standing based on a member's injury.",
		"context": "; see also United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under current law, for a membership association to have this \"assoc iational standing, \" under which standing rests solely on injuries to members, three 12 conditions must be met. United Food , 517 U.S. at 553.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Associational standing allows an organization to establish standing based on a member's injury.",
		"context": "First, one of the association's members must have suffered a cognizable injury that would support \"standing\" for that member \"to sue in their own right.\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Second, the intere sts that the organization \"seeks to protect [must be] germane to the organization's purpose.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lozman's practical criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong",
		"context": "But this Court has already identified the appropriate antidote to such laws: the vagueness doctrine. This doctrine already prohibits laws that are so standardless that they enco urage \"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the doc-trine applies with added rigor to laws that have the \"potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amend- ment liberties. \" 461 U.S. 352.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lozman's practical criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong",
		"context": "405 U.S. 156. And the doc-trine applies with added rigor to laws that have the \"potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amend- ment liberties. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Vagueness doctrine targets the problems raised by unduly expansive criminal laws; by con-trast, retaliatory -arrest doctrine sweeps far more broadly than the problem Lozman wants it to solve, since it would allow a plaintiff to bring a retaliatory - arrest claim regardless of the breadth or specificity of the offense justifying the arrest. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lozman's practical criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong",
		"context": "Those that most trouble amici all involve arrests unsupported by probable cause; they thus reinforce that it is only those arrests, rather than arrests backed by probable cause, that raise any serious risk to freedom of speech. Thus, one amicus discuss es Sheriff Joe Arpaio' s practice of arresting journalists without probable cause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Another discusses cases where the p lain- tiffs allegedly did nothing more than question a neighbor 's arrest, Brief of MacArthur Justice Center 8, or peacefully protest in a public forum, id . at 4— again, cases where there is no probable cause for any crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "693 F.3d 896",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lozman's practical criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong",
		"context": "at 4— again, cases where there is no probable cause for any crime. Yet another amicus discusses a case where the court held that the police lacked probable cause to arrest if, as the plaintiff alleged, he was doing nothing more than standing near a political sign. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Next, a wide range of the examples come from opinions that rule on dispositive motions and that therefore assume the truth of the plaintiffs ' version of the story. See, e.g., 2017 WL 2483813; Fer- 2017 WL 2799698; 2016 WL 4939371; 2015 WL 710427; Morse , 2014 WL 572352.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 F. Supp. 2d 1063",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lozman's practical criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong",
		"context": "Brief of MacArthur Justice Center 13–14. In another, officers arrested man who entered a government trailer at the site of a bridge collapse, \"became confrontational a nd argumenta- tive,\" and \"was repeatedly asked to leave. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plaintiff there claimed that police ar- rested him only because he had given tele vised in- terviews discussing the cause of the bridge collapse, but it is hard to believe the police would have other-wise overlooked a \" confrontational and argumenta- tive\" trespasser at a disaster site. The weakness of the amici 's examples is strong ev- idence that retaliatory arrests are not nearly as se- rious a problem as they suggest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 1070",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Bureau Is Not Accountable To The People's Elected Representatives",
		"context": ". \"Our Constitution was adopted to enable the peo- ple to govern themselves, through their elected lead- ers.\" Free Enterprise [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It embodies \"that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.\" The Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Bureau Is Not Accountable To The People's Elected Representatives",
		"context": "The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison) (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 18th_century/fed39.asp; see also, e.g. , Providence [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, all \"legislative Powers\" of the fed- eral government are \"vested in a Congress of the United States,\" consisting of the people's elected Rep- resentatives and Senators. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "29 U.S. 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "First, where the regulated activity \"was a merely peripheral con-cern of the Labor Managemen t Relations Act.\" Id. at 243-44 (citing International Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Thus, the boundaries of what is arguably preempted were tightened. Second, 9 \"where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "Second, 9 \"where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.\" Garmon , 359 U.S. at 244, (citing United Auto. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 355 U.S. 131; United Auto. 351 U.S. 266. On its face, Justice Frankfurter's phrase suggests that, unlike the states' new labor policies, the states' criminal laws and com-mon law tort system would not be displaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 634",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "Second, 9 \"where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.\" Garmon , 359 U.S. at 244, (citing United Auto. 356 U.S. 634; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United Auto. 351 U.S. 266. On its face, Justice Frankfurter's phrase suggests that, unlike the states' new labor policies, the states' criminal laws and com-mon law tort system would not be displaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "Garmon , 359 U.S. at 244, (citing United Auto. 356 U.S. 634; 355 U.S. 131; United Auto. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On its face, Justice Frankfurter's phrase suggests that, unlike the states' new labor policies, the states' criminal laws and com-mon law tort system would not be displaced. It is important to emp hasize at the outset that Garmon 's facts are very different from those in the in- stant case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "It is important to emp hasize at the outset that Garmon 's facts are very different from those in the in- stant case. As seen in the state supreme court's opin- ion, Garmon involved state claims for purely economic damages resulting from peaceful, not violent, picket- ing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Garmons had a lumber and building material business. As a result of peaceful picketing, they incurred expenses from additional man hours and trucking facilities to transfe r goods at other locations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "45 Cal. 2d 657",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "See Pet'r's App. at 21a-23a. Since Garmon , the Supreme Court found in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that \"a State's concern with redressing malicious libel is 'so deeply rooted in local feel ing and responsibility' that it fits within the exception specifically carved out by Garmon .\" Linn , 383 U.S. at 62. A remedy for malicious libel was necessary because the \"Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief to 13 the defamed individual.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
		"context": "89, 95 (1967). And the Court later upheld a state action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This begins to get far afield from the orig inal constraints of the lo- cal interest exception. Even so, the Petitioner's claim for tortious conversion of property meets even the orig- inal standards of the local interest exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "That is itself in- correct. Properly understood, that canon applies only to ambiguous statutes. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fund for Animals, 472 F.3d 872. Because the text of Section 1608(a)(3) is unambiguous, see pp. 18- 24, supra, the canon \"give[s] way\" and has no application here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "124 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "That is itself in- correct. Properly understood, that canon applies only to ambiguous statutes. See, e.g., 124 U.S. 190; Fund for Animals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the text of Section 1608(a)(3) is unambiguous, see pp. 18- 24, supra, the canon \"give[s] way\" and has no application here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 F.3d 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "Cloer , 569 U.S. at 381. If Section 1608(a)(3) were inconsistent with the Convention (and it is not), the later- in-time statute would \"render[] the treaty null.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the FSIA incorporates the requirements of the Vienna Convention because one of its provisions states that it is \"[s]ubject to existi ng international agreements.\" 28 U.S.C. 1604.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "a. The starting point in interpreting the Vienna Con- vention is its text. See Water Splash, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothin g in the Convention's text speaks to the service of pr ocess or otherwise suggests that mailing a service packet to an embassy is prohibited. In full, Article 22, Section 1, of the Vienna Convention reads as follows: \"The premises of the mission shall be inviolable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "See id. at [16]. As a \"[d]ecision[] of the court[] of [an]other Convention signator[y],\" El Al Israel Airlines [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that decision is entitl ed to \"considerable weight,\" Air 470 U.S. 392, only one of which was from a court of last resort, either involved personal service on a mission, see Sebina v. South African High Commission , [2010] 3 BLR 723 IC (Botswana Indus. Ct.); Village Holdings Sdn. Bhd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "See id. at [16]. As a \"[d]ecision[] of the court[] of [an]other Convention signator[y],\" El Al Israel Airlines 525 U.S. 155, that decision is entitl ed to \"considerable weight,\" Air [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], only one of which was from a court of last resort, either involved personal service on a mission, see Sebina v. South African High Commission , [2010] 3 BLR 723 IC (Botswana Indus. Ct.); Village Holdings Sdn. Bhd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "46-47. The positions of that select group of nations are hardly surprising, because each faces the threat of significant litigation in the United States for involvement either in the Holocaust or in more recent acts of terrorism. See, e.g., Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 , MDL No. 03-1570 (S.D.N.Y.). 46 Griffin, Adjective Law and Practic e in Suits Against For- eign Governments , 36 Temp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "As a preliminary matter, it bears remembering that the question presented here ultimately involves the interpretation of a federal statute, the FSIA—a question on which the government is not entitled to deference. This is not a case, like the ca ses cited by petitioner and the government, in which the question presented itself in- volves the interpretation of a treaty. See, e.g., Water Splash , 137 S. Ct. at 1509; Sumitomo Shoji America, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 366 U.S. 187. Nor is this a case involving the 47 interpretation of an implementing statute that incorpo- rates or mirrors the terms of a treaty. See, e.g., 560 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "As a preliminary matter, it bears remembering that the question presented here ultimately involves the interpretation of a federal statute, the FSIA—a question on which the government is not entitled to deference. This is not a case, like the ca ses cited by petitioner and the government, in which the question presented itself in- volves the interpretation of a treaty. See, e.g., Water Splash , 137 S. Ct. at 1509; Sumitomo Shoji America, 457 U.S. 176; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is this a case involving the 47 interpretation of an implementing statute that incorpo- rates or mirrors the terms of a treaty. See, e.g., 560 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "See, e.g., Water Splash , 137 S. Ct. at 1509; Sumitomo Shoji America, 457 U.S. 176; 366 U.S. 187. Nor is this a case involving the 47 interpretation of an implementing statute that incorpo- rates or mirrors the terms of a treaty. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the parties are relying on the Vienna Conven- tion only indirectly, to su pport their competing interpre- tations of the FSIA—a contex t in which this Court has previously refused to a fford deference. See Permanent Mission of India to 551 U.S. 193 ( 2007).",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "See, e.g., 560 U.S. 1. Here, the parties are relying on the Vienna Conven- tion only indirectly, to su pport their competing interpre- tations of the FSIA—a contex t in which this Court has previously refused to a fford deference. See Permanent Mission of India to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2007). That makes good sense, be- cause the ultimate question here is how (if at all) to recon- cile the FSIA with the Vienna Convention. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "That makes good sense, be- cause the ultimate question here is how (if at all) to recon- cile the FSIA with the Vienna Convention. Cf. Epic Sys- tems [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (refusing to defer to an agency interpretation in a case in which the agency \"has sought to interpr et [a] statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute,\" on the ground that \"the reconciliation of distinct statutory regimes is a mat-ter for the courts\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). ii. Even if the government were entitled to deference in this context, it would be unwarranted here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "Even if the government were entitled to deference in this context, it would be unwarranted here. The gov- ernment's interpretation of the Vienna Convention would carry weight only insofar as it furthers the Court's under-standing of the Convention's meaning. See BG Group, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 548 U.S. 557. The gov- ernment's interpretation here does not do so. The government contends that it has \"consistently ad- hered\" to the view that Article 22 precludes the service of process by mail.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "Even if the government were entitled to deference in this context, it would be unwarranted here. The gov- ernment's interpretation of the Vienna Convention would carry weight only insofar as it furthers the Court's under-standing of the Convention's meaning. See BG Group, 572 U.S. 25; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The gov- ernment's interpretation here does not do so. The government contends that it has \"consistently ad- hered\" to the view that Article 22 precludes the service of process by mail.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "Denza 124 (suggesting that, before the 1970s, \"[t]he United States had consistently favoured permitting service by post\"). Gi ven that view, it is hard to credit government's contrary, post hoc view, absent a more compelling explanation for the government's change of heart. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 12 The government also points to a 1964 letter. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "183 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
		"context": "If serv ice of process by mail at the embassy were a violation of Article 22, that approach, which involves a delivery di rectly to the embassy under cover of a diplomatic note, presumably would be too. In light of the inconsistency in the government's posi- tions and the apparent inconsistency with its own regula-tions, the government's current position is entitled to little weight. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that is particul arly true because the govern- ment's current position is based on a systematic misun- derstanding of the drafting history and other sources in- terpreting the Vienna Conv ention. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive",
		"context": "Section 1604 confers sover- eign immunity, whereas sectio n 1605 (in conjunction with section 1330(a)) waives sovereign immunity. Section 1604 should be read broadly, consistent with the statute's broad text and the traditional vi ew that \"foreign states en- joyed absolute immunity from all actions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sec- tion 1605 should be read narrowly, because this Court \"constru[es] waivers of sovere ign immunity,\" like section 1605, \"narrowly in favor of the sovereign.\" 518 U.S. 187; see Schooner Exchange , 11 U.S. at 146.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 816. Sec- tion 1605 should be read narrowly, because this Court \"constru[es] waivers of sovere ign immunity,\" like section 1605, \"narrowly in favor of the sovereign.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Schooner Exchange , 11 U.S. at 146. 41 The government invokes \"[t]he FSIA's background, purpose, and legislative history\" to argue that criminal lit- igation was not the problem Co ngress sought to address. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive",
		"context": "App.24a. In the civil context before the FSIA, courts wou ld defer to the State Depart- ment's determination that a defendant was a foreign sovereign entitled to immunity. E.g., Compania Es- panola de Navegacion Maritim a, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Samantar , 560 U.S. at 311. But if the Executive did not recommend immunity, the court would decide for itself wh ether immunity applied. Sa- mantar , 560 U.S. at 311 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive",
		"context": "Sa- mantar , 560 U.S. at 311 . As the government previously recognized, when it comes to sovereign immunity, \"a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts.\" Al- fred Dunhill of London, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Federal prosecutors cannot unilaterally destroy an im- munity recognized for centur ies the world over.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Disclosure Claims",
		"context": "See, e.g., 143 S.E. 631. And as the use of third -party printing vendors has become prevalent, courts have concluded that merely sharing information with them likewise does not constitute publication. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and thus generally require proof that the document was read, not just processed, see, e.g., Ostro 175 N.E. 505. That proof is absent here. Second, none of Ramirez's authorities involves a context like this, where the internal publication is part of a process to provide a recipient with information to confirm its accuracy or correct it .",
		"citation_value_orig": "639 F.App'x 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Disclosure Claims",
		"context": "Pet.App.13. Publishing that information thus could not constitute defamation for the simple reason that it is true. See Curtis Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And publication of that true information (which anyone could confirm from the publicly available OFAC list or by typing a class member's name on OFAC's website, see Petr .Br.41 n.5) certainly is not the equivalent of labeling them a potential terrorist . Contrary to Ramirez's claim, the jury was never asked to \"determine\" whether \" the message \" \"TransUnion's OFAC flags communi cated\" \"was false .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": ", id. at 2034 (\"[A] State lacks the ability to sue a tribe for illegal gaming when that activity occurs off the reservation. \"); C & L Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Kiowa , 523 U.S. at 754 (recognizing \"ou r cases have sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal activities occurred\" and declining to limit immunity to on - reservation activities); Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. 165, bars immunity here because the Tribe — having acquired this land on the open market —has no \"sovereign interests\" at stake. Resp. 11 –12, 32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "'is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and cons istent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 1 If City of Sherrill had any application to these proceeding s, it would be in the Court's application of laches to long -dormant claims such as the Lundgrens' claim here . 16 contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.\"' Bay Mills , 134 S. Ct. at 2036 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Carving out a new exception here would be particularly problematic because \"stare decisis concerns are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights .\" State Oil 522 U.S. 3 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "Bay Mills , 134 S. Ct. at 2036 (quoting 501 U.S. 808) . Carving out a new exception here would be particularly problematic because \"stare decisis concerns are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights .\" State Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In reliance on this settled law , the Upper Skagi t and other tribes have acquired land in fee outside the borders of their reservations and use that land to provide services and benefits for their members. Creating a new exception to tribal sovereign immunity for immovable property would undermine consi derable investment and development undertaken by Indian tribes and have sweeping effects on tribal lands, resources, and governance across the country.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners Fail to Identify Unregulated \"Analogous\" Conduct.",
		"context": "In Gonzales v. O'Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniõ de Vegetal , this Court found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest when it could not explain why one religious group and not another should receive an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for hallucinogens used during religious ceremonies. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This failure to regulate \"analogous\" conduct was fatal to the government's regulation under RLUIPA. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 631. Maritime law also has a long tradition of \"special solicitude for the welfare of those men who under- took to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The principle arose in an era when courts viewed sailors as \"ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection against [them- selves] as well as others.\" 293 U.S. 35.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "398 U.S. 375. The principle arose in an era when courts viewed sailors as \"ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection against [them- selves] as well as others.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While at sea, these men were at the mercy of the ship and the captain. Given this dispar- ity in power, maritime -law doctrines sometimes make it easier for seamen to recover against their disproportionately powerful employers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "293 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "While at sea, these men were at the mercy of the ship and the captain. Given this dispar- ity in power, maritime -law doctrines sometimes make it easier for seamen to recover against their disproportionately powerful employers. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has never, however, used maritime law's concern with the welfare of seamen to adopt whatev-er rule maximizes their potential for recovery. To the contrary, it expressly stated that courts should not \"expand remedies at w ill simply because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "Miles, 498 U.S. at 36. The Court has often turned to the foregoing prin- ciples in determining the general maritime law. East River, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is illustrative. T here, the Court held that maritime law recognizes the \"economic loss rule,\" under which \"a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products -liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 858",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "And in any event, the just ifications for giving seamen \"spe- cial solicitude\" are outdated and inapplicable to this case. Centuries ago, admiralty courts believed that seamen were \"deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited to or- dinary a dults\" and therefore needed \"the protection of the law in the same sense in which minors and wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and guardians.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Story put it: \"They are gener-ally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. ... Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen ... because they are thoughtless and require indulgence; because they are credulous and complying; and are easily over reached.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "... Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen ... because they are thoughtless and require indulgence; because they are credulous and complying; and are easily over reached.\" 11 F. Cas. 480 It should go without saying that this conception of sailors, especially Navy sailors, is worse than outdat- ed. The disparaging characteriz ations, already criti- cized more than 70 years ago, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], are downright absurd today: The modern reality is that most seamen are no longer \"friendless\"; rather, they have gained strength through collectivity, and they are a well- organized work force with sophisticated 39 leaders who constantly press for better working conditions, pay, and benefits, as well as in- creased job security. Thus, the need for judicial intervention to protec t seamen has been sub- stantially lessened. 342 F.3d 133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "217 F.2d 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "The disparaging characteriz ations, already criti- cized more than 70 years ago, see 217 F.2d 541, are downright absurd today: The modern reality is that most seamen are no longer \"friendless\"; rather, they have gained strength through collectivity, and they are a well- organized work force with sophisticated 39 leaders who constantly press for better working conditions, pay, and benefits, as well as in- creased job security. Thus, the need for judicial intervention to protec t seamen has been sub- stantially lessened. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The other justification for \"special solicitude\" is the notion that seamen are at the mercy of the captain and ship while at sea, and thus require special pro- tection. See 937 F.2d 240.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 F.3d 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "342 F.3d 133. The other justification for \"special solicitude\" is the notion that seamen are at the mercy of the captain and ship while at sea, and thus require special pro- tection. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this justification is per-tinent only when evaluating the scope of a captain's or shipowner's duty to otherwise helpless sailors. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "937 F.2d 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
		"context": "But this justification is per-tinent only when evaluating the scope of a captain's or shipowner's duty to otherwise helpless sailors. See, e.g. , Atlantic Sounding [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has minimal relevance in the products -liability context, where the danger posed bears no relation to the ship's captain or owner. Such cases do not involve the sort of inequality in bargaining power this Court has cited as justification for the special -solicitude rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress Did Not Make Up For Section 11's Strict Standards By Giving It Limited Reach And Random Application",
		"context": "30), Congress imposed a heightened duty of care in the Securities Act because it believed the provisions' strictness was \"just and ne cessary,\" not because it anticipated the provisions would apply infrequently or to a random assortment of case s. House Report at 23. While it may be unfair to hold a company strictly liable for a careless misstatem ent in an earnings call, Congress believed it \"the essence of fairness to insist upon the assumption of responsibility for the making of these statements\" in formal documents \"prepared with care\" after an opportunity to conduct \"due diligence.\" House Report at 10, 23-24; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"If one of two presumably innocent persons must bear a loss,\" Congress concluded, \"it is familiar legal principle that he should bear it who has the opportunity to learn the truth and has allowed untruths to be published and relied upon.\" Senate Report at 5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress Did Not Make Up For Section 11's Strict Standards By Giving It Limited Reach And Random Application",
		"context": "Congress made up for the strict aspects of Section 11 through \"a number of explicit restrictions and qualifications on the right to sue.\" SEC Amicus Br. at 13, In re:2003 WL 24136189; see Huddleston , 459 U.S. at 382-86 & nn.13, 18, 22; Ernst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As noted, Section 11 applies only to discrete formal documents subject to extensive vetting. Congress enacted a short one-year statute of limitations and an absolute three-year statute of repose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allowing Prisoners to Bar Execution Via section 1983 Would Increase Gamesmanship, Not Reduce Confusion",
		"context": "The Bucklew Court specifically recognized that the sub- stantive pleading requirement for a challenge to exe- cution is separate from the procedural vehicle that a prisoner must use. See 139 S. Ct. at 1128. The point is simply that when a prisoner seeks to nullify a state- authorized punishment, it \"intrudes on state sover-eignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nance would add yet another layer of federal litigation (and delay) onto death penalty ca ses, but that would under- mine AEDPA and the countless decisions of this Court rejecting such tactics, including Bucklew . 32 Of course, the Eighth Amendment reigns supreme, Bucklew , 139 S. Ct. at 1128, and no one has suggested otherwise, but see Pet.Br.3, 20, 23, 32, 38.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allowing Prisoners to Bar Execution Via section 1983 Would Increase Gamesmanship, Not Reduce Confusion",
		"context": "See infra Section III. Simply put, for inmates concerned with \"avoiding unnecessary pain,\" it will be easy to craft an appropri- ate complaint or habeas petition. Bucklew , 139 S. Ct. 4[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 at 1129. Where they are more interested in \"delaying .",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allowing Prisoners to Bar Execution Via section 1983 Would Increase Gamesmanship, Not Reduce Confusion",
		"context": "Nance cannot show that this is a \"problem\" at all. His worry reflects no t real policy risks but an unjustifiable \"general distrust\" of the States and state courts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that States have spent centuries trying to humanely carry out executions, Baze , 553 U.S. at 41–42, Nance's little-disguised contempt for States is ill-founded. Nance also overlooks the key point that States de- fine criminal punishments with more specificity only when they have good reason s for doing so, since they risk being unable to implement a sentence at all if some small part of it is de railed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allowing Prisoners to Bar Execution Via section 1983 Would Increase Gamesmanship, Not Reduce Confusion",
		"context": "In any event, Nance's theory would not solve this purported \"problem.\" Even under Nance's theory, States could enact statutes declaring that state sen- tences are dependent on and immediately vacated if 34 the details of a particular method are enjoined. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of course, States do not do that, for the same reason they do not write detailed exe- cution procedures into their statutes; but they could do what Nance decries, even if Nance were to prevail. Nor will there be \"confusion\" about where to file.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG",
		"context": "State court decisions are not insulated from review simply because they apply state court precedents. And the fact that \"[t]his Court … declined to review \" Bethel , Opp. 19, \" imports no expression of opin ion upon the merits of the ca se,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "Flowers , 136 S.Ct. at 2158 (ALITO, J., dissenting ). In fact, the Court reiterated the teachings of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and the three-part process for determining whether a strike is discriminatory . Foster , 136 S.Ct. at 1747 (quoting 552 U.S. 472 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "In fact, the Court reiterated the teachings of 476 U.S. 79 , and the three-part process for determining whether a strike is discriminatory . Foster , 136 S.Ct. at 1747 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The Court's analy sis in Foster was confined to Batson's third step and focused on case- specific evidence, which supported the conclusion that Foster had carried his burden of persuasion by demonstrating the prosecution purposefully discriminated during jury selection. In that case, Timothy Foster confessed to killing a 79-year-old widow in 1986.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "In doing so, the court correctly stated the fact that Foster concerns Batson's third step, which \"'turns on factual determinations, and, \"in the absence of exceptional circumstances,\" we defer to state court factual finding s unless we conclude that they are clearly erroneous.'\" Id. at 1119 (¶ 91) (quoting Foster , 136 U.S. at 1747 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] )). The Mississippi Supreme Court then addressed Petitioner's argument, that it failed to follow Foster's \"totality -of-the-circumstances-approach,\" by omitting the prosecutor's \"well-documented history from its assessment of the credibility of his facially neutral reasons.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "Respondent submits the Mississippi Supreme Court correctly stated and properly applied the well-settled principles of this Court's Batson jurisprudence in deferring to the trial court's factual finding s. Petitioner asks the Court to assume the prosecutor violated Batson in this case because the prosecutor was found by four justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court to have violated Batson in Flowers III. This is inconsistent with this Court's Batson jurisprudence. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . He does not explain how the prosecutor's history of adjudicated Batson violations constitute substantial, case- specific evidence that demonstrates any of the prosecution's strikes against the prospective African- American jurors should not be credited. He makes no mention of the fact that four Mississippi Supreme Court justices, who dissented in Flowers III, found no Batson violation whatsoever.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "He makes no mention of the fact that four Mississippi Supreme Court justices, who dissented in Flowers III, found no Batson violation whatsoever. Nor does he address facts in the record, which significantly undermine, if not wholly discount his Batson claim. See Foster , 136 U.S. at 1748 (stating that \"in considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] a juror who caused the mistrial in Flowers V by tainting the jury with information disclosed during deliberations but was not admitted into evidence or disclosed during voir dire; (4) Petitioner's motion to reshuffle the jury following challeng es for cause;6 (5) Petitioner's decision to be tried in Montg omery County after arguing in Flowers VI and earlier cases that he could not be fairly tried in that county ; and (6) prospective jurors' relationships with defense witnesses. B. The judgm ent below is consistent w ith Miller-El .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 231",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "35 at 1747. Precedent recog nizes the use of a \"shuf fle\" may indicate an attempt to manipulate the racial composition of the venire to be questioned. Miller–El II, 545 U.S. at 245 (quoting Miller [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2003) (Miller-El I)). 21 prior history , but then dismisses that precedent with a remarkable comparison: 'The Court does not have before it [sic] of a similar policy of the district attorney 's office or of a specific prosecutor that was so evident in Miller-El II .'\" (I d. at 18).",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent",
		"context": "The fact that the Sparling manual was available to at least one of the prosecutors at trial made it evidence of pretex t. With respect to Miller-El II , the state supreme court stated that: The evidence of a specific policy of past discrimination in Miller–El II significantly differs from the evidence before the Court.... The Court does not have evide nce before it of a similar policy of the district attorney 's office or of a specific prosecutor that was so evident in Miller–El II. Miller–El II, 545 U.S. at 266, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"If anything more is needed for an undeniable explanation of what was going on, history supplies it. The prosecutors took their cues from a 20-year-old manual of tips on jury selection, as shown by their notes of the race of each potential juror.\"). Flowers VI( B), 240 So.3d at 1124 (¶ 110).",
		"citation_value_orig": "125 S.Ct. 2317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Associational Discrimination",
		"context": "42. This is begging the question, but it also misunderstands the basic fact that associa-tional discrimination is no t unlawful because of who the associated person is, but because of who the em- ployee is in relation to that person. See Newport News , 462 U.S. at 684; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because Title VII requires a classi- fication-based approach focused on the individual, Manhart , 435 U.S. at 708-09, it is no answer to say that there is no associational di scrimination because the as- sociated person is not protected, even if true. A gay male employee who is discriminated against because of his association with another gay male would not be treated the same way but for the fact that the em-ployee is male.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 F.3d 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Associational Discrimination",
		"context": "of United States, pp. 28-29. It argues instead that because sex-based dis-tinctions can pass constitutional muster in certain con- texts, the rationale of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cannot extend to a ssociational discrimination on the basis of sex, Br. of United States, pp. 28-29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Associational Discrimination",
		"context": "Price Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality). The Employers and the Government also never reckon with the fact that an employer's in- sistence on traditional gender roles for anyone imposes \"mutually reinforcing stereotypes\" for men and women that create a \"self-fulling cycle of discrimination\" against them. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Discrimination against an employee for being intimately associated with another person of the same sex only reinforces the discriminatory insistence on traditional sex roles by employers, and thus violates Title VII. 11",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act",
		"context": "The same Congress, in the same statute, could not have meant \"any e quitable relief \" to exclude disgorgement, while simultaneously enacting nume rous other provisions that presuppose the availability of dis- gorgement in judicial actions. To adopt that reading would violate the principle that \" [t]he provisions of [the] text should be interpreted in a way that renders the m compatible, not contradictory .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[R]econciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to 'make sense' in combination,\" is a \"classic judicial task.\" 484 U.S. 439; see Scalia & Garner § 55 , at 327.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act",
		"context": "570 U.S. 48 . \"[R]econciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to 'make sense' in combination,\" is a \"classic judicial task.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Scalia & Garner § 55 , at 327. Over time , Congress has enacted multiple statutes that refer to disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions . The structure of the Reme- dies Act similarly make s sense only if disgorgement is available in such lawsuit s. Interpreting the term \"any equitable relief \" in Section 21(d)(5) to encompass dis- gorgement harmonizes, gives effect to , and makes sense of the other statutory provisions that Congress has en- acted in this field .",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act",
		"context": "A principle of int erpretation known as the \"prior - construction canon\" states that, \"[i]f a statute uses words or phrases that have already received authorita- tive construction by the jurisdiction's court of last re- sort, or even uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency , they are to be un- derstood according to that construction.\" Scalia & Gar- ner § 54 , at 322 (emphasis altered); see, e.g. , Manhattan Properties, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in 2002, the lower federal courts had uniformly treated disgorgement as an appropriate equi table adjunct to an injunction in 24 SEC suits —as had the C ommission , the responsible ad- ministrative agency. To the extent that the status of disgorgement as a form of \"equitable reli ef \" is other- wise uncertain, that back ground understanding should inform the Court's construction of the term as it ap- pears in Section 21(d)(5) . Indeed, the rationale for applying the prior - construction principle is substantially more compelling here than in the typical case .",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act",
		"context": "Indeed, the rationale for applying the prior - construction principle is substantially more compelling here than in the typical case . In construing newly en- acted statutes against the backdrop of prior judicial de- cisions , this Court ordinarily must \" assume that Con- gress is aware of existing law when it passes legisla-tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Scalia & Garner § 54, at 322. Here, by contras t, the relevant text and history prove that Congress was in fact aware of the lower courts' and the agency's position when it enac ted Sec- tion 21(d)(5). See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act",
		"context": "The SEC, however, has relied not on mere congres- sional inaction or failed legislative proposals, but on the \"statutory history\" —that is, \"the record of enacted changes Congress made to the relevant statutory text over time.\" BNSF Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those enacted changes —embodied in bills \"passed by a majority of both houses of Congress and signed by the President,\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 893",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act",
		"context": "But to the extent Section 21(d)(5)'s language (\"any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors\") were otherwise ambiguous —and it is not— the abun- dant contextual evidence that Congress viewed dis-gorgement as an available remedy is highly relevant to the resolution of any such ambigu ity. \"It is, of course, the most rudimentary rule of statutory construction that courts do not interpret statutes in isolation, but in the context of the corpus juris of which they are a part.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] what they de- scribe as \"countervailing evidence suggesting a differ-ent legislative understanding\" —namely, a currently pending legislati ve proposal to amend the securities laws to include a specific authoriz ation for disgorge- ment in SEC civil actions. Unlike the evidence on which the SEC has relied, petitioners' \"countervailing evi- dence\" appears in a single unenacted bill rather than in enacted law. In any event, that bill was introduced after petitioners sought a writ of certiorari in this case, and it passed the House of Representatives after this Court 27 granted that writ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "ress uses terms that have accumu- lated settled meaning under…the common law, a 5 court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dic- tates, that Congress means to incorporate the estab- lished meaning of these terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Statutory terms such as \"employment\" have such a well-established mean- ing, referring to traditional employer–employee rela- tionships. This Court has recognized as much since at least 1915.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "This Court has recognized as much since at least 1915. Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. required the Court to interpret the terms \"employee\" and \"em- ployed\" as used in the Federal Employer's Liability Act, enacted in 1908. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A provision of that statute rendered void contractual provisions releasing a rail carrier from certain liabilities to \"employees\" of the carrier who were \"employed\" by it. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "237 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "at 94. Likewise, in Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., the Court recognized that, between two rail car- riers potentially liable under FELA for the death of a brakeman, liability was properly placed on the one with whom he had \"the conventional relation of em- ployer and employee.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Linstead v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. , the Court again looked to traditional indicia of employment— payment rates, work rules, immediate supervision, control, etc.—to determine which of two carriers was liable for a conductor's death.",
		"citation_value_orig": "252 U.S. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "And in Linstead v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. , the Court again looked to traditional indicia of employment— payment rates, work rules, immediate supervision, control, etc.—to determine which of two carriers was liable for a conductor's death. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]419 U.S. 318. 7 The rule that statutory terms such as \"employ- ment\" refer to traditional employer–employee rela- tionships is not limited to FELA. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid , for example, involved the Copyright Act's \"work for hire\" provision govern- ing \"'work[s] prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 U.S. 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "And in Linstead v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. , the Court again looked to traditional indicia of employment— payment rates, work rules, immediate supervision, control, etc.—to determine which of two carriers was liable for a conductor's death. 276 U.S. 28[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 The rule that statutory terms such as \"employ- ment\" refer to traditional employer–employee rela- tionships is not limited to FELA. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid , for example, involved the Copyright Act's \"work for hire\" provision govern- ing \"'work[s] prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "7 The rule that statutory terms such as \"employ- ment\" refer to traditional employer–employee rela- tionships is not limited to FELA. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid , for example, involved the Copyright Act's \"work for hire\" provision govern- ing \"'work[s] prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under that rule, it explained, terms such as \"employee,\" \"employer,\" and \"employment\" refer to \"the conven- tional relation of employer and employee.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "at 751. Similarly, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden applied what it called the \"well established principle\" that \"the meaning of 'employee' where the statute containing the term does not helpfully define it\" is \"to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, it held, the definition of \"em- ployee\" in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act as \"any individual employed by an employer\" could only be interpreted as referring to the tradi- 8 tional \"master-servant relationship.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "at 323–24; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. 538 U.S. 440. Indeed, the Court remarked that when it had, in two prior cases, relied on statutory context to adopt broader interpretations of terms like \"employee,\" Congress had \"amended the statute so construed to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles were the keys to meaning.\" Darden , 503 U.S. at 324– 25 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 331 U.S. 704); see also H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947) (distinguishing \"employees,\" who \"work for wages or salaries under direct supervision,\" from \"independent contractors,\" who \"undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference between what they pay for good, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result, that is, up- on profits\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer—Employee Relationships",
		"context": "at 323–24; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. 538 U.S. 440. Indeed, the Court remarked that when it had, in two prior cases, relied on statutory context to adopt broader interpretations of terms like \"employee,\" Congress had \"amended the statute so construed to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles were the keys to meaning.\" Darden , 503 U.S. at 324– 25 (citing 322 U.S. 111; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947) (distinguishing \"employees,\" who \"work for wages or salaries under direct supervision,\" from \"independent contractors,\" who \"undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference between what they pay for good, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result, that is, up- on profits\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. BY ADMITTING MCCOY'S GUILT, COUNSEL RENDERED CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL",
		"context": "For the reasons discussed in Part I, the trial court's decision permitting English to admit guilt over McCoy's unambiguous objection violated McCoy's con-stitutional rights without rega rd to English's effective- ness as counsel and entitles McCoy to a new trial. Were the Court to reject that framework, however, and instead analyze counsel's admi ssion of guilt as an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, McCoy would still be entitled to a new trial. English's admission of McCoy's guilt to the jury over McCoy's objection—and his trial conduct in further ance of that admission— constituted ineffective assistance under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 \"The right to the effective assistance of counsel is … the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case 9 As the Louisiana Supreme Co urt acknowledged, McCoy has not raised a claim of ineffective assistance under Strickland in this direct appeal; consistent with Lo uisiana state practice, he has re- served that claim for development in post-conviction proceedings. See JA88 n.32; Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. BY ADMITTING MCCOY'S GUILT, COUNSEL RENDERED CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL",
		"context": "That exception applies in \"ci rcumstances that are so like- ly to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified,\" Cronic , 466 U.S. at 658— e.g., where \"counsel has entirely failed to function as the client's advocate,\" Nixon , 543 U.S. at 189. In such cases, counsel's failure alone \"demon-strate[s] a denial of the 'right to have the effective assis-tance of counsel,'\" and the defendant \"need not demon-strate prejudice in order to obtain relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. English's admission of McCoy 's guilt in the face of McCoy's express directive to the contrary was the par-adigm of a breakdown in the adversarial process under Cronic . English entirely denied McCoy his constitu- tional right to defend against the charges and to hold the prosecution to its burden of proof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Garcetti must not be expanded, especially now when Americans are more stridently policing each other's speech.",
		"context": "for Prosperity 141 S. Ct. 2373 . Any public attention to a person's association with a controversial cause \" be- comes a means of facilitating harassment that imper- missibly chills the exercise of First Amendment rights.\" See D [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Lower c ourts are recogniz ing the threat of cancel cul- ture as well . Judge Brian Martinotti has written that we live in \"a climate marked by the so -called cancel or call-out culture that has resulted in people losing em- ployment, being ejected or driven out of restaurants while eating th eir meals; and where the Internet re- moves any geographic barriers to cyber harassment of others.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Garcetti must not be expanded, especially now when Americans are more stridently policing each other's speech.",
		"context": "One particularly noxious development is the transfor- mation of Pickering's disruption standard into a heck- ler's veto. Pickering recognizes that employees may be disciplined when their speech creates disr uption in the government workplace. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Public employers who receive demands to fire or can- cel an employee are now relying on this negative feed- back as justification for disciplinary action. Public outcry against an employee's personal speech becomes justification for a public employer's retal iation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reject Alabama's novel interpretation of Section 2",
		"context": "20 47-50) that Section 2 plaintiffs submitting illustrative maps to satisfy the first Gingles precondition may not intentionally create majority -minority districts . Those arguments contradict Section 2's text, history , and pur- pose , and they would upend decades of this Court's precedent . Both as an original mat ter and especially given the \"special force \" of stare decisis \"in the area of statutory interpretation ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court should reject Alabama's proposed overhaul of Section 2 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "Grp. Life & Health Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The dryness of these statements should not mask their importance. Disasters are a fact of life.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "Am. States Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That lever- age creates a danger that insurers will draft the policy in confusing ways, to maximize the ca ses where the in- surer collects the premium but escapes the risk. Insurers also enjoy great leverage when called upon to perform their end of the deal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "662 N.E.2d 945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "It can take ad- vantage of the time value of money and try to settle the claim at a discount: in gener al, the most it will ever have to do is pay the claim. Because of these hazards, \"[g]overnment has al- ways had a special relation to insurance.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Contracts of insurance \"have greater public consequence than contracts . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "German All. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In the Court's words, insurance \"has come to be considered a matter of public concern\" and must \"be controlled by the public for the public good. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "233 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "3D § 2:4. Fearing the total deregulation of the insurance market, this Co urt held that \"[i]ssuing a policy of in- surance is not a transaction of commerce,\" effectively leaving all insurance regulation where it was before: 7 with the States . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 1 C OUCH ON INS. 3D § 2:4 & n.2. \"For three -quar- ters of a century\" after Paul , \"state authority over in- surance regulation was unquestioned\" and by the 1940s, \"was fairly comprehensive. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "at 632. Since 1910, insurers have also been excluded from federal bankruptcy. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 11 U.S. C. § 109(b)(2) . In- stead, State receivership laws govern insurer insol- vency . 1 COUCH ON INS.",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "3D § 5:18. Those laws generally preempt federal law because they are enacted \" for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.\" U.S. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress, however, preferred things the way they were. \"In re action to South -Eastern Underwriters , Con- gress moved quickly, enacting the McCarran –Fergu- son Act to restore the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "Congress, however, preferred things the way they were. \"In re action to South -Eastern Underwriters , Con- gress moved quickly, enacting the McCarran –Fergu- son Act to restore the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation. \" Barnett Bank of Mar- ion Cnty., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Little has changed since then. C. In sum, since 1789, insurance has been regulated almost exclusively by the States .",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "Regulators will often inquire about why insurers are changing their forms and decline to approve them unless the insurer pro- vides a satisfactory explanation. These inquiries are of- ten directed to rating issues —if the insurer is provid- ing less coverage, then it must accept less in premium. E.g., Morton [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 9 An insurer's failure to provide \"full disclosure\" to State regulators —even another S tate's regulators — can lead State courts to disregard those provisions in litigation brought by policyholders . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "629 A.2d 831",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system",
		"context": "at 853 ( surveying statements to regulators in Georgia, Kansas, Virginia, and Puerto Rico and considering amicus briefs from Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Indiana on the same issues ). The determination of those issues in one S tate has powerful ramifications in other States . Ala. Plating [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "690 So. 2d 331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE INA PROVIDES BOND HEARINGS FOR PEOPLE DETAINED DURING WITHHOLDING-ONLY PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "Indeed, in nearly all cases, a grant of withholding or CAT relief is a bar on removal as such. For example, in FY 2017, only 1.6 percent of people granted withholding that year were deported to third countries (i.e., 21 of 1,274 cases). American Immigr ation Council & National Immigr ation Justice C enter , The Difference Between Asylum and Withholding of Removal 7 (Oct. 2020) , https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/ research/the_difference_between_asylum_and_withholding_of_r emoval.pdf ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 entire class of cases [would] put government officials —routinely and completely foreseeably —in dereliction of their statutory duties. \" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Allowed Equitable Tolling at the Request of the IRS; What is Sauce for the Goose is Sauce for the Gander",
		"context": "In the case of Young v. United States, supra , t h i s C o u r t , a t t h e u r g i n g o f t h e I R S , h e l d t h a t t h e time deadlines specified in the Bankruptcy Code which govern the priority and dischargeability of -12- claims for taxes, were effectively statutes of limitation that could be equi tably tolled. 535 U.S. at 52. This Court explained that the three-year period at issue in Young is \"a limitations period subject to traditional principles of equitable tolling,\" 535 U.S. at 47, and further explained that it is hornbook law that limitations periods are \"customarily subject to 'equitable tolling'\" unless tolling would be inconsistent with the statutory language, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Id. at 49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Settlement Does Not Allow the Court to Address the Concerns Identified by Chief Justice Roberts",
		"context": ". In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the Cour t's decision to deny the petition for certiorari un der facts and circumstances somewhat similar to the instant matter. Chief Justice Roberts also identified several concerns the Court may want to address when the right vehicle comes b e f o r e i t . T h i s c a s e i s n o t t h a t v e h i c l e .",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "2018) ; United States v. Easton , 71 M .J. 168 (C.A.A.F. 2012) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (acknowledging that Constitutional safeguards can apply differently to members of the military.) The following table details the individual rights guaranteed by the constitution, and demonstrates whether this Court, or military courts , have determined that the right applies to servicemembers. Constitutional Protection Service Member Protection UCMJ Article, Case Law, and Presidentially promulgated rules Free Speech Limited Protection 417 U.S. 733; US v. Rapert , 75 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 M.J. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "2012) ; 70 M.J. 296 (acknowledging that Constitutional safeguards can apply differently to members of the military.) The following table details the individual rights guaranteed by the constitution, and demonstrates whether this Court, or military courts , have determined that the right applies to servicemembers. Constitutional Protection Service Member Protection UCMJ Article, Case Law, and Presidentially promulgated rules Free Speech Limited Protection [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; US v. Rapert , 75 M .J. 164 (C.A.A.F. 2015) Free Exercise Limited Protection 544 U.S. 709; 75 M.J. 407 Free Press Limited Protection Limited by policy Assembly Limited Protection 24 M.J. 80; 56 M.J. 711 pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Constitutional Protection Service Member Protection UCMJ Article, Case Law, and Presidentially promulgated rules Free Speech Limited Protection 417 U.S. 733; US v. Rapert , 75 M .J. 164 (C.A.A.F. 2015) Free Exercise Limited Protection [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 75 M.J. 407 Free Press Limited Protection Limited by policy Assembly Limited Protection 24 M.J. 80; 56 M.J. 711 pet. denied56 M.J. 477 Search and Seizures Limited Protection United States v. Stevenson , 66 M .J. 15 (C.A.A.F.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Constitutional Protection Service Member Protection UCMJ Article, Case Law, and Presidentially promulgated rules Free Speech Limited Protection 417 U.S. 733; US v. Rapert , 75 M .J. 164 (C.A.A.F. 2015) Free Exercise Limited Protection 544 U.S. 709; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Free Press Limited Protection Limited by policy Assembly Limited Protection 24 M.J. 80; 56 M.J. 711 pet. denied56 M.J. 477 Search and Seizures Limited Protection United States v. Stevenson , 66 M .J. 15 (C.A.A.F.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 M.J. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "denied56 M.J. 477 Search and Seizures Limited Protection United States v. Stevenson , 66 M .J. 15 (C.A.A.F. 2008); United States v. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 311–317. 12 Constitutional Protection Service Member Protection UCMJ Article, Case Law, and Presidentially promulgated rules Self- Incrimination and Right to counsel Full or Modified Protection Article 31, UCMJ ; United States v. Vela , 71 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "58 M.J. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "12 Constitutional Protection Service Member Protection UCMJ Article, Case Law, and Presidentially promulgated rules Self- Incrimination and Right to counsel Full or Modified Protection Article 31, UCMJ ; United States v. Vela , 71 M .J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 2012); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; M.R.E. 3 01, 304, & 305. Double Jeopardy Full Protection Article 44, UCMJ ; 336 U.S. 684; United States v. Easton , 71 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 M.J. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "2012); 59 M.J. 60; M.R.E. 3 01, 304, & 305. Double Jeopardy Full Protection Article 44, UCMJ ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United States v. Easton , 71 M .J. 168 (C.A.A.F. 2012).",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "168 (C.A.A.F. 2012). Due Process Full Protection [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Grand Jury Different Protection Article 32, UCMJ (specifically excluded by U.S. CONST ., amend . V) Speedy Trial Full Protection Article 10, UCMJ ; United States v. Thompson , 68 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Impartial Fact Finder Full Protection United States v. Commisso , 76 M .J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2017); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Informed of Charges Full Protection Articles 30 & 35, UCMJ ; United States v. Gaskins , 72 M .J. 225 (C.A.A.F.",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 M.J. 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Informed of Charges Full Protection Articles 30 & 35, UCMJ ; United States v. Gaskins , 72 M .J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2013); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]541 U.S. 36. Public Trial Full Protection 55 M.J. 293; 38 M.J. 126; 4 M.J. 847 ( 1978). Counsel Full Protection Article 27, UCMJ ; United States v. Gooch , 69 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 M.J. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Informed of Charges Full Protection Articles 30 & 35, UCMJ ; United States v. Gaskins , 72 M .J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2013); 70 M.J. 5[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Public Trial Full Protection 55 M.J. 293; 38 M.J. 126; 4 M.J. 847 ( 1978). Counsel Full Protection Article 27, UCMJ ; United States v. Gooch , 69 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "225 (C.A.A.F. 2013); 70 M.J. 5541 U.S. 36. Public Trial Full Protection [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 38 M.J. 126; 4 M.J. 847 ( 1978). Counsel Full Protection Article 27, UCMJ ; United States v. Gooch , 69 M .J. 353 (C.A.A.F.",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 M.J. 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Counsel Full Protection Article 27, UCMJ ; United States v. Gooch , 69 M .J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 2011); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United States v. New , 55 M .J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2001).",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 M.J. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Cruel and Unusual Punishment Full protection (as decided by the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces ) Article 55, UCMJ ; United States v. Pena , 64 M .J. 259 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); United States v. Avila , 53 M .J. 99 (C.A.A.F. 2000); 19 M.J. 744; United States v. Matthews , 16 M .J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "2005). Bail Different Protection Articles 10 and 13, UCMJ ; 1 M.J. 267. https://www.esd.whs.mil/DOPSR/ [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] declined to definitely resolve whether the self -incrimination clause or ri ght to counsel clause of the Fifth Amendment apply to the military justice system. However, Article 31, UCMJ and case law from the military courts clarify that Soldiers possess comparable if not greater protection than the Fifth Amendment provides. Th e right to a public trial may be infringed for good reason such as classified information, youthful witnesses, or to protect a victim witness \"in relating the lurid details\" of a rape case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice",
		"context": "Moses , 4 M.J. at 848 -49. However, certain civilian jurisdictions follow similar rules. See, inter alia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (8th Cir. 196 6), cert denied386 U.S. 964.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 F.2d 888",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. IRCA preempts the field of fraud on the federal employment verification system",
		"context": "Pet. App. 33 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In particular, \"IRCA's 'extensive ' employment verification system 'is critical to the IRCA regime.'\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "25. However, \"[C]ourts cannot avoid their responsibility merely 'be- cause the issues have political implications.' \" Zivo- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], especially when freedom and preventing tyranny is at stake. James Madison, writing in the Federalist No. 47, 11 stated it precisely: \"[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self- appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": ". consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he re- ceives an injury,\" for \"where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. UTIER has been continuously and directly injured by the actions and determinations of the Oversight Board, while holding their office unconstitutional, thus appro- priate remedy is warranted. This Court has not hesitated to grant meaningful relief, even if it could be co nsidered disruptive as rem- edy to violations of the constitutional separation-of- powers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "UTIER has been continuously and directly injured by the actions and determinations of the Oversight Board, while holding their office unconstitutional, thus appro- priate remedy is warranted. This Court has not hesitated to grant meaningful relief, even if it could be co nsidered disruptive as rem- edy to violations of the constitutional separation-of- powers. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2010, in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB , this Court invalidated \"almost 600\" National Labor Relations Board cases decided in violation of the NLRB's statutory quorum requirement, and refused to construe the quorum requirement to permit \" de facto delegation to a two-member group.\" 560 U.S. 674.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "E.g., 462 U.S. 919. In 2010, in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB , this Court invalidated \"almost 600\" National Labor Relations Board cases decided in violation of the NLRB's statutory quorum requirement, and refused to construe the quorum requirement to permit \" de facto delegation to a two-member group.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The relief requested is not a \"special treatment.\" UCC Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 674",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "\"[C]onven-ience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.\" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Freedom is inval-uable. As this Court stated, \"[t]he leading Framers of our Constitution viewed the principle of separation-of-powers as the central guarantee of a just government.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "To be sure, the appropriate relief is to declare null and void ab initio all the actions and determinations of the Board; that includes dismissing the Title III pro-ceedings. Because of its unconstitutional appoint- ments, the Oversight Board lacked authority to even file the Title III proceedings on behalf of the Common- wealth or the instrumentalities. See Ullrich v. Welt (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, an agency \"lacks authority\" when its \"composition vio- lates the Constitution's separation of powers.\" 6 F.3d 821.",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F.3d 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "See Ullrich v. Welt (In re810 F.3d 781. Moreover, an agency \"lacks authority\" when its \"composition vio- lates the Constitution's separation of powers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regarding the remedy, the Opposing Parties aver that if the Court concludes that the de facto officer doc- trine does not extend in th ese circumstances to the as- serted violation of the Appointments Clause, the Court should vacate the court of appeals' judgment with re- spect to the remedy and remand these cases for further proceedings. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 F.3d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "This newly constituted Board would have the au- thority to determine whether it ratifies the previous actions of the unconstitutional Board and the inter- ested parties will have the o pportunity to argue as to the ratification of such actions. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (for a ratification to be effective, \"a properly appointed official\" must have \"the power to conduct an independent evaluation of the merits\" and have actually \"do[ne] so\"); Fed. Election 513 U.S. 88. ---------------------------------  ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
		"context": "See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 (for a ratification to be effective, \"a properly appointed official\" must have \"the power to conduct an independent evaluation of the merits\" and have actually \"do[ne] so\"); Fed. Election [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ---------------------------------  ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Forming the intent to commit a crime while unlawfully remaining inside a building or structure qualifies as ACCA \"burglary\"",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court defined \"burglary\" under the ACCA as \"any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.\" Id. at 599.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Forming the intent to commit a crime while unlawfully remaining inside a building or structure qualifies as ACCA \"burglary\"",
		"context": "2) to limit the phrase \"remaining in\" to \"the initial moment when the privilege to be in lawfully entered premises ceases .\" But that limitati on is at odds with the plain language of Taylor , was effectively un- known to the law at the time of the ACCA's enactment, and would be detrimental to the ACCA's scheme for identify ing potentially violent recidivists . As it did ear- lier this Term in United S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court should reject such a hairsplitting lim- itation on generic burglary —which, if countenanced, would invite even more litigation —and reaffirm that Taylor meant what it said.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. California wage-and-hour law is not \"applicable\" to the OCS within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(a)",
		"context": "The text and structure of OCS LA, its legislative his- tory and purpose , and this Court's precedent all indi- cate that state law is \"applicable\" as federal law on the OCS only \"to fill substantial 'gaps' in the coverage of feder al law.\" Gulf Offshore [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Chevron Oil 404 U.S. 97; 395 U.S. 352 . Where laws of the United States apply of their own force , there is no gap to fill and thus no need to adopt \"state law as sur- rogate federal law.\" Rodrigue , 395 U.S. at 357.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. California wage-and-hour law is not \"applicable\" to the OCS within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(a)",
		"context": "The text and structure of OCS LA, its legislative his- tory and purpose , and this Court's precedent all indi- cate that state law is \"applicable\" as federal law on the OCS only \"to fill substantial 'gaps' in the coverage of feder al law.\" Gulf Offshore 453 U.S. 473; see Chevron Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 395 U.S. 352 . Where laws of the United States apply of their own force , there is no gap to fill and thus no need to adopt \"state law as sur- rogate federal law.\" Rodrigue , 395 U.S. at 357.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. California wage-and-hour law is not \"applicable\" to the OCS within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(a)",
		"context": "The text and structure of OCS LA, its legislative his- tory and purpose , and this Court's precedent all indi- cate that state law is \"applicable\" as federal law on the OCS only \"to fill substantial 'gaps' in the coverage of feder al law.\" Gulf Offshore 453 U.S. 473; see Chevron Oil 404 U.S. 97; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Where laws of the United States apply of their own force , there is no gap to fill and thus no need to adopt \"state law as sur- rogate federal law.\" Rodrigue , 395 U.S. at 357.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. California wage-and-hour law is not \"applicable\" to the OCS within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(a)",
		"context": "That is the case here. The FLSA comprehensively regulates wage -and-hour issues and l eaves \"no gaps\" for state law to fill. Continental Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,397 U.S. 911 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F.2d 1030",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent supports requiring a heightened showing of need before a state grand jury may issue a subpoena for the President's personal records",
		"context": "A series of precedents —Chief Justice Marshall's de- cision s while presiding over the federal criminal trials of Aar on Burr, this Court's decision in United States v. Nixon , supra , and the D.C. Circuit's decision s in In re121 F.3d 729 , and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —provide bench- marks f or determining the appropriate scope of the President's immunity from the state grand -jury sub- poena in this case. Although t hose decisions rejected the proposition that the President enjoye d absolute im- munity from a feder al subpoena for privileged official records , they made clear that such a subpoena must sat- isfy a higher standard than a subpoena to a private individual —a principle that also applies to state crimi- nal process for the President's private records . During two federal criminal trials of Aaron Burr , Chief Justice Marshall issue d subpoenas for the produc- tion of confidential official letters in President Jeffer- son's possession .",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 F.2d 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent supports requiring a heightened showing of need before a state grand jury may issue a subpoena for the President's personal records",
		"context": "Ibid. In the end, Presi- dent Jefferson never fully complied with the subpoenas. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Nixon , a federal prosecutor sought to subpoena President Nixon's White House tapes for use in a crim- inal trial of the President's associates. 418 U.S. at 686- 687 & n.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 F.2d 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Internet Sales Often Involve Foreign Commerce and Many Fall Under the Import-Export Clause",
		"context": ". The sale of goods over the internet was virtually non-existent when this Court decided Quill [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in 1992. The general pub- lic first gained access to the internet in 1991 with the introduction of the World Wide Web. See National Science Foundation, A Brief History of NSF and the In- ternet .",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Internet Sales Often Involve Foreign Commerce and Many Fall Under the Import-Export Clause",
		"context": "Some websites with a U.S. address state in their Terms and Conditions that its products may be shipped to the purchaser directly from other countries. These changes created by internet sales certainly challenge constitutional distinctions within the Com- merce Clause and between the Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause. Under Michelin Tire [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it is possible that the Import-Export Clause would bloc k some, but not all, of the international sales covered by the South Dakota law. Your Amicus respectfully suggests that any recon- sideration of Quill would not be well-informed without considering the Import-Export Clause and the foreign component of the Commerce Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Announce a Clear Test That Will Prevent State Courts from Engaging in Similar Lawmaking in the Future",
		"context": "Second, state courts may intervene in a redistricting process when the state's political branches that are entrus ted with constitutional authority over redistricting have arrived at a \"true deadlock.\" 11 Situations of true deadlock are, by definition, rare, and in any event would present an instance of the state court enforcing provisions of the federal constitution rather than redistricting-related provisions of state law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The power to reapportion congressional seats \"is not a reserved power of the States,\" in which case state courts could exercise uninhibited judicial review of state legislative enactments, \"but rather is delegated by the Constitution\" and therefore subject to federal constitutional constraints. U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Announce a Clear Test That Will Prevent State Courts from Engaging in Similar Lawmaking in the Future",
		"context": "Const., Art. II, § 22(5)(d). 23 Thornton , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id., at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that under the Tenth Amendment, \"[i]t is up to the people of each State to determine which 'reserved' powers their state government may exercise\"). State courts have routinely adjudicated this kind of deadlock litigation without presenting any federalism problems, and nothing articulated herein would require them to stop. 12 This test might appear familiar because it is essentially the one applied by the Supreme Court in Hildebrant , although the Court there did not characterize its informal checklist as a mandatory test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule",
		"context": "Although the Court used \"jurisdictional\" language, Griggs itself made clear that district courts did not lose subject-matter jurisdiction over the entirety of the case, but rather retained authority to address matters not at issue in the appeal. Id. at 59 (describing cases in which the district court retained jurisdiction when there was \"little danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, because \"[t]he purpose of the rule is to keep the district court and the court of appeals out of each other's hair,\" Jones, 768 F.2d at 931, the rule only \"suspends the power of the district court to modify the order subject to appeal, but does not oust district-court jurisdiction to continue with proceedings that do not threaten either the appeal's orderly disposition or its raison d'etre,\" 16A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3949.1 (5th ed. Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule",
		"context": "Apr. 2022 Update). In other words, under Griggs, while the district court \"may not finally adjudicate substantial rights directly involved in the appeal,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it is \"is free to continue to adjudicate matters separate from or collateral to the appeal,\" Allan Ides, The Authority of A Federal District Court to Proceed After A Notice of Appeal Has Been Filed , 143 F.R.D. 307. Thus, as prominent treatises have recognized, the divestiture rule this Court articulated in Griggs \"is not derived from the jurisdictional statutes or from the 10 rules,\" but rather \"is a judge-made doctrine, designed to promote judicial economy and avoid the confusion and inefficiency that might flow from putting the same issue before two courts at the same time.\" 20 Moore, supra, ¶ 303.32[1]; Wright et al., supra, § 3949.1 (\"[T]he rule .",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule",
		"context": "not jurisdictional. Rather, the divestiture rule is rooted in concerns of judicial economy, crafted by courts to avoid the confusion and inefficiency that would inevitably result if two courts at the same time handled the same issues in the same case.\" (quotations omitted)); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These courts make clear that the divestiture principle is a \"judge-made rule\" that aims to \"prevent[] the confusion and inefficiency which would of necessity result were two courts to be considering the same issue or issues simultaneously.\" 758 F.2d 117; see 633 F.3d 1222.",
		"citation_value_orig": "891 F.3d 776",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule",
		"context": "(quotations omitted)); 891 F.3d 776. These courts make clear that the divestiture principle is a \"judge-made rule\" that aims to \"prevent[] the confusion and inefficiency which would of necessity result were two courts to be considering the same issue or issues simultaneously.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 633 F.3d 1222. Thus, the administration of the divestiture rule is \"sensitive\" and \"requires a delicate touch\" that is attuned to the rule's purpose—to 11 prevent the \"risk of an intramural collision.\" 145 F.3d 446.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F.2d 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule",
		"context": "(quotations omitted)); 891 F.3d 776. These courts make clear that the divestiture principle is a \"judge-made rule\" that aims to \"prevent[] the confusion and inefficiency which would of necessity result were two courts to be considering the same issue or issues simultaneously.\" 758 F.2d 117; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the administration of the divestiture rule is \"sensitive\" and \"requires a delicate touch\" that is attuned to the rule's purpose—to 11 prevent the \"risk of an intramural collision.\" 145 F.3d 446.",
		"citation_value_orig": "633 F.3d 1222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule",
		"context": "758 F.2d 117; see 633 F.3d 1222. Thus, the administration of the divestiture rule is \"sensitive\" and \"requires a delicate touch\" that is attuned to the rule's purpose—to 11 prevent the \"risk of an intramural collision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, there is no basis for concluding that districts courts are divested of subject-matter jurisdiction by the filing of an arbitrability appeal. Nor is there any basis for concluding that Congress, in passing Section 16(a), stripped courts of the discretion to determine whether a stay is appropriate, as the next Section discusses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 F.3d 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Precedents, Relied upon by the Federal Circuit Panel, Establish That APJs Are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "ion were inferior officers . This Court's precedent makes clear , and there is no dispute, that PTAB APJs are \"officers\" of the U.S. because they \"exercise[ e] significant authority. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, none of the decisions of this Court relied upon by the Federal Circuit panel in Arthrex I found an administrative judge to be a \"principal\" officer. Rather, each of the cases, in what could be characterized as analogous statutory frameworks, concluded that the official in question was an \"inferior \" officer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Lower Court Misapplied the \"Local Interest\" Exception",
		"context": "Courts, too, have long understood that intentionally destroying property is every bit as actionable regardless of whether it is committed with violence or in any other manner. For example, if a neighbor \"ha[s] provisions in my cellar,\" but \"I consume his provisions, or destroy them in any other manner,\" then \"it is quite immaterial whether I consume them, or destroy them by casting them into 39 the street, or by opening my cellar and causing their destruction by the action of the elements,\" because \"[t]he result to the owner is the same, and my liability to him is the same, in either case.\" 45 Wis. 262; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the \"malicious des truction of property\" by abandoning it and letting it go to waste can even be criminal. E.g., 1998 WL 1990468.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 S.E.2d 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review of an ALJ Decision Deprives SEC Respondents of their Due Process Rights",
		"context": "A court of appeals will review questions of fact decided by the ALJ under a \"substantial evidence\" standard . See Universal 3 Ibid. 22 Camera [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Legal determinations are accorded Chevron deference, which requires the court to defer to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of its own organic statu te. See Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lack of Meaningful Judicial Review of an ALJ Decision Deprives SEC Respondents of their Due Process Rights",
		"context": "22 Camera 340 U.S. 474 . Legal determinations are accorded Chevron deference, which requires the court to defer to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of its own organic statu te. See Chevron, U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A respondent's burden is even greater given the procedural inequities present at the administrative hearing. Because the federal appellate court is not empowered to take testimony, a respondent is limited to the record created before the SEC.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "There is no conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and this Court or any other circuit court of appeals regarding application of this Court's well settled Strickland precedent. As such, this Court should decline to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over this case. See Chevron U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 349 U.S. 70 ; Layne & Bowler 261 U.S. 387 . Moreover, a review of the Eleventh Circuit's detailed opinion accompanying the denial of this claim establishes correct application of this Court's precedent. 16 Of course, Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, mandates that judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance be highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 1140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "There is no conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and this Court or any other circuit court of appeals regarding application of this Court's well settled Strickland precedent. As such, this Court should decline to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over this case. See Chevron U.S.A., 471 U.S. 1140 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Layne & Bowler 261 U.S. 387 . Moreover, a review of the Eleventh Circuit's detailed opinion accompanying the denial of this claim establishes correct application of this Court's precedent. 16 Of course, Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, mandates that judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance be highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "There is no conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and this Court or any other circuit court of appeals regarding application of this Court's well settled Strickland precedent. As such, this Court should decline to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over this case. See Chevron U.S.A., 471 U.S. 1140 ; 349 U.S. 70 ; Layne & Bowler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, a review of the Eleventh Circuit's detailed opinion accompanying the denial of this claim establishes correct application of this Court's precedent. 16 Of course, Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, mandates that judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance be highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "Since Peede's ineffective assista nce of counsel claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, \"he must do more than \" satisfy the Strickland standard. [Peede] must also show that in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim the state court \" applied Strickland to the fac ts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, ineffective assistance claims considered in federal court on habeas review are subject to additional deference. See Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "Consequently, ineffective assistance claims considered in federal court on habeas review are subject to additional deference. See Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U .S. 111, 123 (2009) (noting that a \"doubly deferential judicial review\" applies to a Strickland claim \"evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard\" ) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 5 -6 (2003 ) (per curiam) ). The Eleventh Circuit's detailed and comprehensive opinion is fully in accord with this Court's precedent governing ineffective assistance of counsel . The court applied this Court's settled precedent of Strickland , viewed with the appropriate deference to counsel and respect which the state court ruling was entitled under the AEDPA .",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "The Eleventh Circuit's detailed and comprehensive opinion is fully in accord with this Court's precedent governing ineffective assistance of counsel . The court applied this Court's settled precedent of Strickland , viewed with the appropriate deference to counsel and respect which the state court ruling was entitled under the AEDPA . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (observing that under the AEDPA a petitioner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal c ourt was \"so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 17 existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.\" ). A) Petitioner Failed To Establish Prejudice The Eleventh Circuit held that the district co urt erred in failing to credit the reasonable decision of the Florida Supreme Court below in finding Peede failed to establish prejudice , stating in part : ...The district court should have deferred to the Florida Supreme Court's view of the new mental heal th evidence and expert testimony.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "Our review of the record gives us no basis to disturb that conclusion under AEDPA. At bottom, the Florida post -conviction court made findings, adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, to which we must give deference. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mr. Peede's post -conviction hearing involved dueling state and defense expert w itnesses. The state's experts opined, consistent with Dr. Kirkland's testimony at trial, that despite the new mental health evidence, Mr. Peede knew right from wrong and could control whether he committed murder.",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 F.3d 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "This new mitigation evidence, t herefore, posed a doubled -edge - sword dilemma -the new information could have hurt as much as it helped, not only because the information itself could be damaging, but also because of the risk that the witnesses' testimony would trigger a violent outburst fr om Mr. Peede, as occurred during Bell's hearing tes timony. We have repeatedly ruled that this sort of post - conviction evidence is usually insufficient to warrant habeas relief. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. We come to the same conclusion here. Peed e, 715 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "703 F.3d 1316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "The district court's decision is no more reasonable than that of the state courts below and, in some respects, less so. Accordingly, the district court was properly reversed by the Eleventh Circuit. Peede asserts that this Court's decisions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 130 S. Ct. 447 support granting certiorari in this case . (Petition at 32 -33). H owever, Petitioner's claim of conflict does not survive even a cursory comparison between these cases and t he facts presented here .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "The district court's decision is no more reasonable than that of the state courts below and, in some respects, less so. Accordingly, the district court was properly reversed by the Eleventh Circuit. Peede asserts that this Court's decisions in 545 U.S. 374 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] support granting certiorari in this case . (Petition at 32 -33). H owever, Petitioner's claim of conflict does not survive even a cursory comparison between these cases and t he facts presented here .",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 S. Ct. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "The district court then impermissibly speculated that had Dr. K irkland been supplied with more background material, his opinion would have been changed, altered, or given more weight.10 However, the defense did not call Dr. Kirkland to testify and there is no evidentiary basis for such an assumption. Such speculation a s the district court engage d in here cannot form the basis for habeas relief. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, the district court clearly erred in discounting the negativ e 10 See 576 So. 2d 696. 28 information that was introduced during the post -conviction hearing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "Such speculation a s the district court engage d in here cannot form the basis for habeas relief. See 516 U.S. 1. Finally, the district court clearly erred in discounting the negativ e 10 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 information that was introduced during the post -conviction hearing. The State courts and the Eleventh Circuit properly balanced the evidence developed during the state post -conviction hearing, recognizing that much of the information presented could be v iewed negatively by the jury.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 So. 2d 696",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "(2PCR 15/437). And, the evidence which was presented, the skin condition as a child and the impact of his mother's suicide, as noted by the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court on appeal, was largely offset by negative information about Peede.11 Such negative evidence included Peede's antisocial traits, prior acts of violence, disparaging attitude toward women, explosive temper, and prior physical abuse of Darla. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that \"both the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently 'rejected [the] prejudice argument [ ] where mitigation evidence was a two -edged sword or 11 Peede was approximately 40 at the time of the murder. His mother committed suicide when Peede was an adult and had a family of his own. While the loss of a parent is potentially mitigating, it must be remembered that Peede murdered the mother of two daughters, both of whom testified at trial [Tanya Bullis and Rebecca Keniston].",
		"citation_value_orig": "690 F.3d 1271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "Peede lost his mother in 1977 while Darla's daughters were suffering a more recent and devastating loss due to Peede's homicidal conduct. 29 would have opened the door to damaging evidence. '\") (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Defense counsel's attempt to portray Peede as someone with positive character traits and someone worth saving would be completely undercut by Peede's post -conviction evidence.12 See Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U.S 170, 202 (2011) (noting that in assessing prejudice under Strickland the court must consider whether the new or post -conviction testimony would \"likely have unde rcut the mitigating value of the testimony\" presented in the penalty phase). Peede threatened to kill John Bell when he was called to testify against Peede's wishes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "588 F.3d 1331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
		"context": "( 2PCR 30/150) . 30 The State can hardly think of anything more prejudicial to a capital defendant, whom the jury already learned had murdered two people, than to hear he is contemplating yet another homicide. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2009 ). The district court, rather incredibly, discounted the re asonable interpretation of the state courts' evaluation of Peede's outburst, for its own , that it was \" the result of his delusion that Bell and others, including Petitioner's family members, had slept with Geraldine Peede. \" (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference",
		"context": "1. Chevron applies only where a statute is \"genu- inely ambiguous .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The modest authority Congress gave the agenc y to \"adjust[]\" Subclause (II) price -based rates \"as necessary for purposes of this Paragraph\" cannot be stretched to justify HHS's decision to reduce the price -based rates to a level that, in HHS's judg- ment, approximates what a cost- based rate would be under Subclause (I). That is not an adjustment of a Subclause (II) rate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference",
		"context": "And it cannot be justified as \"nec- essary for purposes of this Paragraph\" because Sub-clause (I)'s cost survey requirement by definition re- flects Congress' judgment about how the purposes of the Paragraph should be accomplished. This is , in short, as clear an example as this Court will ever see merits —it woul d strengthen petitioners' merits argument by re- moving any justification for Chevron deference . 6 of an agency misusing a \"vague ,\" \"ancillary provi- sion[]\" to \"alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And it invites further abuse be- cause \"adjustment\" provisions similar to the one at is- sue here appear throughout the U.S. Code. See Pet.27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference",
		"context": "Opp.22 -23. That contention is remarkable, es- pecially in light of this Court's recent decisions stress-ing that Chevron deference applies —if at all —\"only when th[e] legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has n o single right answer.\" Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415; see also Epic Systems [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348. No wonder so many lower courts have been \"rushing to find statutes am-biguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis.\" 911 F.3d 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference",
		"context": "Opp.22 -23. That contention is remarkable, es- pecially in light of this Court's recent decisions stress-ing that Chevron deference applies —if at all —\"only when th[e] legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has n o single right answer.\" Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415; see also Epic Systems 138 S. Ct. 1612; SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No wonder so many lower courts have been \"rushing to find statutes am-biguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis.\" 911 F.3d 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference",
		"context": "Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415; see also Epic Systems 138 S. Ct. 1612; SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348. No wonder so many lower courts have been \"rushing to find statutes am-biguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is precisely w hat the government urges. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference",
		"context": "b. In a similar vein, the government is quick to dis- miss longstanding limitations on Chevron deference imposed by this Court. Contrary to the government's argument, the decision below conflicts directly with this Court's decis ion in MCI Telecommunications [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The word \"adjust\" in Subclause (II) is naturally understood to confer only the authority to make modest changes , Pet.25 -26, just as the word \"modify\" in the statute at issue in MCI carried a \"con- notation of increment or limitation.\" 512 U.S. at 225.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Risks Associated with Abolishing Assignor Estoppel and Disrupting Stare Decisis are Potentially Far Reaching",
		"context": "The real-world impact of abolishing assignor estoppel and failing to follow this Court's prior precedent could be profound. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For corporate transactions involving patents, a cloud of uncertainty would hang over patent assignments for the current patent term – 20 years. 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Risks Associated with Abolishing Assignor Estoppel and Disrupting Stare Decisis are Potentially Far Reaching",
		"context": "And the number of corporate patent assignments pales in comparison to the number of employment agreements implicated by abolition of the assignor estoppel doctrine. Companies developing patentable technology want certainty that their employees will remain committed to their intellectual property assignments, particularly those executed at the time when assignor estoppel provided added security against surreptitious validity attacks. In Stanford [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that a present assignment of rights precluded a future assignment of the same rights. Following Stanford , employers had to scramble to shore up their employment agreements, and confirm employees were bound by more explicit and immediately effective assignment agreements. Ted Hagelin, The Unintended Consequences of Stanford v. Roche , 39 AIPLA Q.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 776",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attorney General's Unlawful Demand Violates California's Separation of Powers Doctrine",
		"context": "Id.. In some circumstances, a n agency may lawfully deter- mine whether the facts of a case bring it within the ambit of a rule or standard previously established by the Legislature, but it may never formulate legislative policy or make law. See Coastside Fishing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The key consideration is whether the administrator is complying with the \"legislative will[,]\" rather than his or her own. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 Cal. App. 4th 1183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attorney General's Unlawful Demand Violates California's Separation of Powers Doctrine",
		"context": "IV, § 1. In some circumstances, an agency may lawfully determine whether the facts of a case bring it within the ambit of a rule or standard prev iously established by the Legislature, but it may never formulate legislative policy or make law. See Coastside Fishing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The key consideration is wheth er the administrator is complying with the \"legislative will[,]\" rather than his or her own. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 Cal. App. 4th 1183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1182(f) grants the President an interstitial power to exclude harmful aliens and respond to exigencies",
		"context": "Section 1182(f) appears after that list, providing the President the authority to exclude additional \"aliens\" or \"classes of aliens\" when he \"finds\" that their admission \"would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.\" The most plausible reading of Section 1182 as a whole, therefore, is that it sets out the categories of aliens that should be excluded in Section 1182(a), and then provides the President in Section 1182(f) with the residual authority to supplement that list to address categories of harmful aliens that Congress has not considered or to account for an exigency that 19 Congress cannot practicably address. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to \"effortlessly evade\" the statute's \"specifi- cally tailored\" criteria for inadmissibility. EC Term of Years Tr. v.United States , 550 U.S. 429.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.2d 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1182(f) grants the President an interstitial power to exclude harmful aliens and respond to exigencies",
		"context": "See785 F.2d 1043 to \"effortlessly evade\" the statute's \"specifi- cally tailored\" criteria for inadmissibility. EC Term of Years Tr. v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The words that Congress employed in Section 1182(f) confirm that Congress did not intend to give the President the power to exclude any or all aliens whenever he chooses. When Congress enacts a phrase that \"has been given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts or the responsible agency,\" a later statute \"perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1182(f) grants the President an interstitial power to exclude harmful aliens and respond to exigencies",
		"context": "The words that Congress employed in Section 1182(f) confirm that Congress did not intend to give the President the power to exclude any or all aliens whenever he chooses. When Congress enacts a phrase that \"has been given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts or the responsible agency,\" a later statute \"perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.\" Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Kent ,Zemel , andHaig , for instance, the Supreme Court held that a passport statute enacted in 1918, extended in 1941, and made permanent in 1952 implicitly incorporated two longstanding limits evident in the \"administra- tive practice\" followed under the predecessor stat- utes. Kent , 357 U.S. at 128; see Zemel , 381 U.S. at 17-18; Haig , 453 U.S. at 297-298.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1182(f) grants the President an interstitial power to exclude harmful aliens and respond to exigencies",
		"context": "26 & n.8. None of the Act's supporters affirmed these descriptions, and they are not probative. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10President Carter's 1979 Iran order did not suspend entry and was not issued pursuant to Section 1182(f). See infra p. 32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "Elrod , 427 U.S. at 355, 357. Independent and third- party lawyers seeking a Delaware judgeship will \"feel a significant obligation to support political positions\" needed to hold a judicial seat, and \"to refrain from act- ing on the political views they actually hold, in order to progress up the career ladder.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the judiciary should welcome integrity and candor, Delaware law pressures independent and third- party attorneys who seek to become judges to hide their true political alle-giances from the public, or else to \"forgo their calling rather than compromise their commit ment to in- tellectual and political freedom.\" 384 U.S. 11 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "497 U.S. 62. While the judiciary should welcome integrity and candor, Delaware law pressures independent and third- party attorneys who seek to become judges to hide their true political alle-giances from the public, or else to \"forgo their calling rather than compromise their commit ment to in- tellectual and political freedom.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And independents and members of third parties are a large segment of Delaware's population ; of all registered voters in the state in February 2020, 24.84% are unaffiliated or registered as adhering to a third party . 4 The \"'fixed star in our constitutional con- stellation '\" is that \"' no official, high or petty, can pre- scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion ,'\" Elrod , 427 U.S. at 356 (quoting Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "And independents and members of third parties are a large segment of Delaware's population ; of all registered voters in the state in February 2020, 24.84% are unaffiliated or registered as adhering to a third party . 4 The \"'fixed star in our constitutional con- stellation '\" is that \"' no official, high or petty, can pre- scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion ,'\" Elrod , 427 U.S. at 356 (quoting Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https:// elections.delaware.gov/reports/pdfs/ 20200201_ partytotals.pdf . 6 642 (1943) ). The Delaware Constitution's judicial ap- pointments provisions , though, declare the two largest parties to be the only orthodox ones, treat ing a quarter of Delawarean s as so heterodox that they are excluded by law from the three high er courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "Branti , 445 U.S. at 519 ; see also El rod, 427 U.S. at 367 ( plurality opinion) ; Rutan, 497 U.S. at 70. But political loyalty and allegiance are of course the opposite of what we seek in judges. And judges are appointed to \"apply the law fairly and impartially,\" Common Cause [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rather than being executive -branch appointees \"who are ap- pointed to fulfill the political or policy objectives of a governor, \" 986 F.2d 159 . Their belief or lack of belief in some party platform would not \"inter- fere with the discharge of [their] public duties.\" Branti , 445 U.S. at 517 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "800 F.3d 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "Branti , 445 U.S. at 519 ; see also El rod, 427 U.S. at 367 ( plurality opinion) ; Rutan, 497 U.S. at 70. But political loyalty and allegiance are of course the opposite of what we seek in judges. And judges are appointed to \"apply the law fairly and impartially,\" Common Cause 800 F.3d 913 , rather than being executive -branch appointees \"who are ap- pointed to fulfill the political or policy objectives of a governor, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Their belief or lack of belief in some party platform would not \"inter- fere with the discharge of [their] public duties.\" Branti , 445 U.S. at 517 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "986 F.2d 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "8 7 See, e.g. , Sander s County Republican Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 8 Petitioner relies on Gregory v. Ashcroft for the proposition that state laws that establish judicial qualifications require a \"less exacting\" standard. Pet'r Br .",
		"citation_value_orig": "698 F.3d 741",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "And indeed the cases upholding political affilia-tion discrimination in judicial appointments have gen-erally dealt with discretionary decisionmaker judg- ments, no t with categorical statutory or state constitu- tional disqualifications. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2007 WL 4441226327 F. App'x 315 . 807 F. Supp. 385 , did uphold a statute speci- fying that appointments to seats vacated by elected judges must be filled for the remainder of the term with a judge from the same political party —but that statute allowed independents and members of third parties to run for any elected judicial position, and mere ly preserved the voters' party choice in the rela- tively rare cases of judicial vacancies. Religion may be a helpful analogy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.2d 767",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
		"context": "11 A governor in a place and time in which religion is politically salient to voters might likewise consider religion in choosing nominees. But it does not follow that the Delaware Constitu- tion could divide the state Supreme Court seats into, say, three for the largest religion in the state and two for the second largest, and categorically exclude the ir-religious and members of smaller religions from the ju-diciary. The same should appl y to political affiliation; though religion and political affiliation may not be con-stitutionally identical when it comes to government employment, this Court has treated them compara-bly—indeed, the Elrod plurality expressly quoted United Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 10 See Peter Charles Hoffer et al., The Supreme Court: An Es- sential History 343 (2d ed. 2018).",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CWA's provisions concerning disposal of pollutants in wells underscore the Act's application to the Lahaina Facility",
		"context": "§ 1362(14), the word \"well\" appears in a list of items \"from which pollutants are or may be discharged,\" id ., which suggests it should be understood to refe r to (or at least include) disposal or injection wells that discharge pollutants. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] confirms th is understanding. That section, which sets forth requirements applicable to state \"permit program[s] for discharges into navigable waters,\" provides that EPA may not approve a state NPDES program unless the program provides \"ade- quate authority\" \"[t]o issue permits which … control the disposal of pollutants into wells.\" 33 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CWA's provisions concerning disposal of pollutants in wells underscore the Act's application to the Lahaina Facility",
		"context": "Those applicable re- quirements, in turn, apply only to discharges that add pollutants to navigable waters. 11 Thus, section 1342(b) necessarily contemplates regulating dis-charges from wells through groundwater to navigable waters. Reading the Act to exclude such discharges would render the section \"inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s prohibition of unpermit-ted discharges to extend to underground discharges from wells. Oil and gas production frequently involves the injection of some other fluid (often vast quantities –––––––––––––––––––––––– 11 Section 1342(b)(1)(D) does not \"authorize the regulation of all wells used to dispose of pollutants, regardless of absence of any effects on navigable waters.\" Inland Steel 901 F.2d 1419.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CWA's provisions concerning disposal of pollutants in wells underscore the Act's application to the Lahaina Facility",
		"context": "Reading the Act to exclude such discharges would render the section \"inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant,\" 138 S. Ct. 816's prohibition of unpermit-ted discharges to extend to underground discharges from wells. Oil and gas production frequently involves the injection of some other fluid (often vast quantities –––––––––––––––––––––––– 11 Section 1342(b)(1)(D) does not \"authorize the regulation of all wells used to dispose of pollutants, regardless of absence of any effects on navigable waters.\" Inland Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Only disposals that discharge to navigable waters require NPDES permits. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "901 F.2d 1419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CWA's provisions concerning disposal of pollutants in wells underscore the Act's application to the Lahaina Facility",
		"context": "If section 1311(a)'s prohibition of unpermitted dis- charges already excluded discharges from wells that travel through groundwater before reaching naviga- ble waters, this exclusio n would be unnecessary, as passage through the subsurface is the only way such discharges could reach navigable waters. After all, \"[t]here is no reason to create an exception to a prohi- bition unless the prohibition would otherwise forbid what the exception allows.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the restriction of the exclusion to situations in which a state \"determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of … surface water re- sources,\" 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (B), reveals Congress's awareness that subsurface disposal may threaten navigable waters, and its intent to use the CWA's pro-hibition of unpermitted discharges to mitigate that threat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ALJs Have Duties and Powers Similar to Other Positions That the Court Has Held to Be Offices",
		"context": "17 C.F.R. §201.111 . These factors alone are more than enough to render them officers, as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Freytag , the Court determined that STJs are ex- ecutive offic ers because of the ir discretion and power . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ALJs Have Duties and Powers Similar to Other Positions That the Court Has Held to Be Offices",
		"context": "In re2003 WL 21539920 ; In re2014 WL 1247415 (\"The Commission gives considerable weight to the credibility determination of a law judge since it is based on hearing the witnesses' testimony and observing their demeanor. Such deter- minations can be overcome only where the record con- tains substantial evidence for doing so. \"); Universal Camera [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, the opinions ALJs issue are final unless ap- pealed and Freytag emphasized the importance of STJs' power to issue opinions. 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ALJs Have Duties and Powers Similar to Other Positions That the Court Has Held to Be Offices",
		"context": "§ 557(b) ; Frey- tag, 501 U.S. at 882 (noting that the fact that the STJ can \"render the decisions of the Tax Court\" in some cases is enough to be considered an officer ). The ALJs' authority also mirro rs that of court clerks, which, under the Court's determination, ren- dered them officers. See Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This despite the fact that clerks have no power to make final decisions for the court outside of default judgments (which can be rescinded by the court). FRCP 77(2) ; FRCP 55(b)(1) —as can ALJs, 17 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ALJs Have Duties and Powers Similar to Other Positions That the Court Has Held to Be Offices",
		"context": "6 Since these powers make a clerk an \"officer of the United States ,\" they have the sam e effect on ALJs . The panel below ruled that SEC ALJs are not offic- ers because their decisions are not final ( in that they are appealable to the Commission). Raymond J. Lucia Cos., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This argument fails in the face of respondents' actual experience appearing before SEC ALJs. Although ALJs' rulings on questions of law are subject to review, their findings of fact are nearly unassailable and are given great deference by the Commission.",
		"citation_value_orig": "832 F. 3d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ALJs Have Duties and Powers Similar to Other Positions That the Court Has Held to Be Offices",
		"context": "If most respondents never make their case before the Commission and if those who do are almost irretrieva- bly bound by the factual determinati ons of ALJs, it is difficult to see how the existence of such limited review can be controlling. If it is true that \"[w]ise observers have long understood that the appearance of justice is as important as its reality,\" it must also be true that appearance of justice does not trump actual injustice in practice. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "The Fifth Amendment of the United States Con- stitution, made applicable to the states by the Four-teenth Amendment, provides that \"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just com- pensation.\" The plain language of the Takings Clause \"requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public pur- pose.\" Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Property\" is defined broadly as \"[t]hat which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one.\" Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "1909) (footnote omitted). 7 The rights associated with the ownership of prop- erty are often likened to a \"bundle of sticks.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property , 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 1191 n. 146 (1999) (tracing the use of the \"bundle of rights\" theory to the late 1800s); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property , 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 899 (2000) (explaining that property is often conceived to be a \"bundle of rights\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "885, 899 (2000) (explaining that property is often conceived to be a \"bundle of rights\"). Each of the sticks in the bundle is associated with a different right of ownership, and individual sticks in the bundle have been considered \"property\" for pur- poses of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In cases where the government physically ac- quires private property for a public purpose, this Court has recognized such government action to constitute a categorical or per se taking requiring the payment of just compensation without consideration given to other facts. See 505 U.S. 1003; see also , 483 U.S. 825 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "See, e.g., 458 U.S. 419. In cases where the government physically ac- quires private property for a public purpose, this Court has recognized such government action to constitute a categorical or per se taking requiring the payment of just compensation without consideration given to other facts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also , 483 U.S. 825 . The government's physical possession of private property is a per se taking because \" '[s]uch an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests,' depriving 8 the owner of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "See, e.g., 458 U.S. 419. In cases where the government physically ac- quires private property for a public purpose, this Court has recognized such government action to constitute a categorical or per se taking requiring the payment of just compensation without consideration given to other facts. See 505 U.S. 1003; see also , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government's physical possession of private property is a per se taking because \" '[s]uch an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests,' depriving 8 the owner of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "In fact, the Court has recognized a categorical duty to compensate property owners fo r a wide variety of prop- erty and property interests. For example, in Loretto , 458 U.S. at 435, the Court found a per se taking when the government appropriates part of a rooftop to pro- vide cable TV access for apartment tenants. See also , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be 9 property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40524 U.S. 156570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in-volving land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "In fact, the Court has recognized a categorical duty to compensate property owners fo r a wide variety of prop- erty and property interests. For example, in Loretto , 458 U.S. at 435, the Court found a per se taking when the government appropriates part of a rooftop to pro- vide cable TV access for apartment tenants. See also , 328 U.S. 256[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be 9 property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40524 U.S. 156570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in-volving land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "See also , 328 U.S. 256467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be 9 property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]524 U.S. 156570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in-volving land. Id. at 612.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "See also , 328 U.S. 256467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be 9 property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in-volving land. Id. at 612.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "See also , 328 U.S. 256467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be 9 property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40524 U.S. 156[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in-volving land. Id. at 612.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "In Koontz , the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court decision, which concluded that the Nollan/Dolan exaction rule did not apply \"be- cause the subject of the exaction issue was money ra- ther than a more tangible interest in real property.\" Id. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reviewing the Florida court's decision, this Court ex- plained that, \"if we accepted this argument it would be easy for land-use permitting officials to evade the lim- itation of Nollan and Dolan \" by \"simply giv[ing] the owner a choice of either surrendering an easement or making a payment equal to the easement's value.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "at 619. 10 In cases involving the sale of property to satisfy a tax debt, the Court has determined the former owner of the property to be entitled to the surplus proceeds. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court examined a federal law that permit- ted the federal government to sell property to collect delinquent federal tax debts. Although the law did not expressly provide for the former owner to receive the surplus, the Court concluded that the former owner of the proceeds was entitled to receive the surplus pro-ceeds and claims for such proceeds were not barred by the statute of limitations. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "Id. at 221-22. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court, in reviewing the same federal law at issue in Taylor , concluded that a debtor was entitled to the surplus proceeds in the sale of the debtor's property by the federal government to satisfy a tax delinquency. Id. at 149-50.",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
		"context": "Id. at 150. In this case, the Eighth Circuit Court relied on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in re- jecting Tyler's claim that the Takings Clause protects her ownership in the surplus proceeds. Tyler , 26 F.4th at 793-94. However, the takings claim in Nelson was addressed by the Court in dicta after denying the prop- erty owner's principal arguments related to due pro- cess and equal protection claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": "at 52 –53. This is a chief end of the First Amendment. The Framers believed \"public discussion is a political duty,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A mong scholars, \"there is practically uni- versal agreement that a major purpose of th[e] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov- ernmental affa irs, of course including discussions of candidates.\" 514 U.S. 334.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 357",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": "The Framers believed \"public discussion is a political duty,\" 274 U.S. 357. A mong scholars, \"there is practically uni- versal agreement that a major purpose of th[e] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov- ernmental affa irs, of course including discussions of candidates.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, this Court has often held that \"[t]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.'\" Cruz , 142 S. Ct. at 1650 (quoting Monitor Patriot 401 U.S. 265) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": "514 U.S. 334. Accordingly, this Court has often held that \"[t]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.'\" Cruz , 142 S. Ct. at 1650 (quoting Monitor Patriot [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . For candidate s, as for other citizens , the First Amendment embodies \"the fundamental rule . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": ". that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.\" Hurle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The same is true online. 303 Creative 6 U.S. None, all speakers have a First Amendment right \"not to propound a particu- lar point of view,\" Boy Scouts of Am 530 U.S. 640.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": "Hurle 515 U.S. 557 . The same is true online. 303 Creative 6 U.S. None, all speakers have a First Amendment right \"not to propound a particu- lar point of view,\" Boy Scouts of Am [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This freedom permits a speaker to exclude from his or her own expression a political message he or she does not wish to convey. In Hurley , the Court af- firmed a decision by a private entity to remove from its public parade a group of marchers with \"a message it did not like.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": "at 575; see also 303 Creative , 600 U.S. at __ (slip op., at 8) (\"[speakers] ha[ve] a First Amendment right to pre- sent their message undiluted by views they d [o] not share\"); Boy Scouts , 530 U.S. at 656 (\"The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the other.\"). The same principal applies in the electoral con- text. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Sixth Circuit held then -President George H.W. Bush could exclude from his \"pro-Bush rally\" non-disruptive protesters displaying \"buttons and signs for Bill Clinton.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 F.3d 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
		"context": "The D.C. Circuit has denied these minor -party candidates injunctive relief , explaining that \"if th[e] court were to enjoin the [ or- ganizers ] from staging the debates or from choosing debate participants, there would be a substantial ar- gument that the court would itself violate the [ organ- izers '] First Amendment rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is because participation of minor -party candidates would undermine the message that they are not competitive options. In sum, the freedom of speech safeguards a candi- date's ability to advocate \"without legislative limit on 2 Though seldom litigated, candidates frequently remove from their events persons who express a contrary message.",
		"citation_value_orig": "97 F.3d 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together",
		"context": ". .' \" (quoting Dinitz , 424 U.S. at 609); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner attempts to cast his decision as a Hob- son's choice, contending that being forced to choose be- tween severance and a single trial presented him with \"no meaningful choice,\" and that he had no real option but \"to agree to severance.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together",
		"context": "The \"criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimen-sions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token al- ways forbid requiring him to choose.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has consistently re jected the argument that the Constitution precludes evidence of a defendant's prior convictions simply because such evidence is prej- udicial. See, e.g., 385 U.S. 554.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together",
		"context": "536 U.S. 24. The Court has consistently re jected the argument that the Constitution precludes evidence of a defendant's prior convictions simply because such evidence is prej- udicial. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner was simply confronted with one of the \"difficult choices\" that attends tactical litigation decisions in the criminal justice system, 412 U.S. 17—whether to risk multiple trials or have indisputably probative but po-tentially prejudicial evidence admitted during the course of a single trial. Indeed, Petitioner's argument overlooks good rea- sons why a defendant might want a single trial in cases like his.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together",
		"context": "The Court has consistently re jected the argument that the Constitution precludes evidence of a defendant's prior convictions simply because such evidence is prej- udicial. See, e.g., 385 U.S. 554. Petitioner was simply confronted with one of the \"difficult choices\" that attends tactical litigation decisions in the criminal justice system, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—whether to risk multiple trials or have indisputably probative but po-tentially prejudicial evidence admitted during the course of a single trial. Indeed, Petitioner's argument overlooks good rea- sons why a defendant might want a single trial in cases like his. For example, a defendant might opt for a sin-gle trial if he intends to te stify in his own defense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together",
		"context": "Fed. R. Evid. 609(a); Va. S. Ct. R. 2:607(a), 2:609(a); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that circumstance, there is little benefit to be gained from severing the felon-in- possession charge—the first jury will learn that the defendant is a felon either way. Moreover, because Virginia has jury sentencing, a defendant may also prefer to have a single trial to en-sure a single sentencing event.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together",
		"context": "Such a stipulation avoids having the defendant's status discussed at any length during the trial. While the government may not be constitutionally required to enter into a stipulation, it may be reversible error not to stipulate in circum- stances like those presented here where Petitioner's prior felony also involved breaking and entering. See Old [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Old Chief expressly states that \"what counts as the Rule 403 'probative value' of an item of evidence, as distinct from its Rule 401 'relevance,' may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651. This Court has recognized \"the controversial nature\" of the abortion debate, in which millions of Americans be- lieve \"that an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child,\" while other millions \"fear that a law that forbids abortion wou ld condemn many American women to lives that lack dignity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State has taken its own position on that issue by providing state assistance for abortion services, and the Licensed Notice requires pe- titioner s to advertise the State's efforts. Unlike the \"minimal\" interest Zauderer identified in a profes- sional's withholding factual information about his own services, 471 U.S. at 651, petitioners have a very strong 25 interest in refraining from advertising servi ces they deeply oppose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Riley , 487 U.S. at 800 (holding invalid, under strict scru tiny, requirement that professional fundraisers engage in unpopular disclosures in part be-cause \"the disclosure will be the last words spoken as 26 the donor closes the door or hangs up the phone\"). Compelled speech of that kind strikes at the heart of the First A mendment's protections. See Centro [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents have not demonstrated a substantial in- terest sufficient to justify that intrusion on petitioners' rights. They have not articulated, much less substanti- ated, any particularized interest in havin g the infor- mation contained in the Licensed N otice about state - sponsored abortion and other services disseminated by covered licensed clinics themselves , which do not provide those services .",
		"citation_value_orig": "722 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See Riley , 487 U.S. at 800; Evergreen Ass'n , 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 435[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 486 U.S. 466. 29 that the notice applies only to a limited subset of medi- cal providers in the State. As petitioners note (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See Riley , 487 U.S. at 800; Evergreen Ass'n , 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 435514 U.S. 476; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 29 that the notice applies only to a limited subset of medi- cal providers in the State. As petitioners note (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "§§ 1204, 1206(h) (West 2016) . Those exclusions suggest that the Licensed Notice lacks a reasonable fit due to its underinclusiveness. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At a minimum, the exclusions indicate that less- intrusive means may exist that could be equally or more effective. The court of appeals observed that, in the current procedural posture, it was \"unclear whether \" a state - sponsored \" advertising campaign \" would have been \"as effective[],\" and did not resolve that question because under heightened scrutiny California \"need not prove that the Act is the least restrictive means.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "App. 36a & n.9. Any such uncertainty, howe ver, weighs against upholding the law because the State bore the burden of \"affirmatively establish[ing] \" that the Act is appropriately tailored, Fox, 492 U.S. at 480; see Eden- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And although California need not employ the least restric- tive means, it could not simply disregard obvious poten-tial alternatives. See p. 18, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The rule applies absent information to the contrary.",
		"context": "18 1. Both state and federal courts that have considered this question have held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle where the officer knows the registered owner does not have a valid license or is otherwise subject to seizure so long as the officer has no information indicating that the registered owner is not the driver of the vehicle. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chartier , 772 F.3d at 543. That makes sense: an officer cannot reasonably believe that the registered owner is driving when he or she knows the registered owner is a 22-year-old male, but can tell that the driver is an approximately 60-year-old female. See 551 N.W.2d 919; Armfield , 918 N.E.2d at 321 n.7 (agreeing with courts in Maine and Michigan that observing a driver of a different gender would dissipate reasonable suspicion).",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 N.E.2d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The rule applies absent information to the contrary.",
		"context": "See, e.g., 918 N.E.2d 316; Chartier , 772 F.3d at 543. That makes sense: an officer cannot reasonably believe that the registered owner is driving when he or she knows the registered owner is a 22-year-old male, but can tell that the driver is an approximately 60-year-old female. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Armfield , 918 N.E.2d at 321 n.7 (agreeing with courts in Maine and Michigan that observing a driver of a different gender would dissipate reasonable suspicion). This is not to say an officer is obliged to ascertain additional facts before initiating a stop. Reasonable suspicion \"need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 N.W.2d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The rule applies absent information to the contrary.",
		"context": "This is not to say an officer is obliged to ascertain additional facts before initiating a stop. Reasonable suspicion \"need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in any event, requiring law enforcement to do so exceeds what is required to establish reasonable suspicion, see § II, infra , and would, in many instances, be unsafe, impractical, or both. See § III.C., infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Respondents' mootness arguments are unpersuasive",
		"context": "And even after those events occurred, Petitioners' motion to intervene was not moot. A case is not moot if a litigant retain s any \" 'concrete interest, however small, in the outcome[. ]'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Mootness occurs \" only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.\" Knox , 567 U.S. at 307 (cleaned up).",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Withholding potentially valuable economic information does not automatically deprive the victim of property",
		"context": "And absent a scheme to deprive a person of a protected property interest, a federal fraud-scheme charge will not lie. The Court has made clear that a scheme must aim at deprivation of a property interest to state a fraud claim. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a case under the \"analogous\" bank-fraud statute, id. at 467, this Court held that it is not enough for a scheme to deceive a victim; it must also seek to \"deprive [the victim] of something of value,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Withholding potentially valuable economic information does not automatically deprive the victim of property",
		"context": "Coll. Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case illustrates the reach of the government's theory. Without having to prove any intent to harm Fort Schuyler economically— i.e., without showing a scheme to \"wrong[] one in his property rights,\" McNally, 483 U.S. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted)—the government proceeded on the theory that Fort Schuyler was deprived of the ability to fully assess its decision about using its assets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Old Chief does not invite the appellate court to review evidence outside the trial record on prong four",
		"context": ". The government ar gues that rest ricting the record on plain -error review woul d be pa rticularly proble m- atic in Mr. Greer's case because he entered a stipula- tion under Old [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which prevented the government from placing the nature of his prior convi ctions before the jury. Drawing on the invit ed-erro r doctrine, the g overn- ment argues that Mr. Greer has invited this Court to 15 look outside the trial record because he used an Old Chief stipulation and precluded it from presen ting evidence relevant to the knowledge-o f-status inquiry. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Old Chief does not invite the appellate court to review evidence outside the trial record on prong four",
		"context": "Because o f this change in law, Mr. Greer re- ceived no notice of this essent ial element, had no op- portunity to defend against it, and stands convicted of a crime for which the government failed to meet its burden of proof. But relieving t he governmen t of its 6 Furthermore, \"the inv ited-error doctrine does not ap ply where the law changes between trial and appeal.\" Nasir , 982 F.3d at 173 n .35; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a party's reques t \"rel ied on settle d law,\" there is no danger that he is strategically ma- nipulating the district court. Titties , 852 F.3d at 1264 n.5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 1257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Use this Case to Announce a New Test for Reviewing Establishment Clause Claims Based on Legal Coercion",
		"context": "The time has come to return to the original understanding of the First Amendment as a protec- tion for individual freedom of rel igion. The appropriate standard for judging whether a government action interferes with the individual free- dom of religion protected by the Establishment Clau se will focus on preventing governmental interference and coercion. Such a test must proscribe \"ac tual legal coercion,\" Newdow , 524 U.S. at 52 (Thomas, J., con- curring), such as \"coercion of religious orthodoxy...un- der force of law or thre at of penalty, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the 15 power of government is not used coercively to compel adherence to a particular belief or support of a partic- ular church, there is no establishment. At the same time, t he Court's test must continue to prevent government interference in ecclesiastical decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Use this Case to Announce a New Test for Reviewing Establishment Clause Claims Based on Legal Coercion",
		"context": "At the same time, t he Court's test must continue to prevent government interference in ecclesiastical decisions. Government, for examp le, cannot be al - lowed to interfere in the selection of ministers. Ho- sanna -Tabor Evangelical Lutheran [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nor can government dic- tate mode or content of worship and prayer to which individuals and churches must adhe re. See 370 U.S. 421 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Use this Case to Announce a New Test for Reviewing Establishment Clause Claims Based on Legal Coercion",
		"context": "Ho- sanna -Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 565 U.S. 171 . Nor can government dic- tate mode or content of worship and prayer to which individuals and churches must adhe re. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A test focused on legal coercion will not be con- cerned if an individual is \"personally af fronted\" with a statue or war memorial. Town of Greece , 572 U. S. at 589 (plurality opinion), 610 (Thomas, J., concur- ring) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "The case -specific in- quiry described above precludes relief only where a de- fendant cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that, in his particular case, an appeal would have b een heard on the merits. Little reason exists to believe that 24 the inquiry will reach an incorrect or unjust result in a significant number of cases. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A defendant whose appeal waiver is quite narrow — leaving many issues open for appeal —may have little difficulty making the requisite showing. But a defend- ant like petitioner, whose appeal waiver is much broader and would admit of few exceptions, will face a more difficult hurdle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "But petitioner's at- tempt to ground a rule of presumptive prejudice in a criminal defendant's \"protected autonomy right,\" id. at 24 (citation omitted), is mispla ced. The Court has distinguished a defendant 's right to autonomy from the right to effective assistance under Strickland , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the presumption of prejudice in Flores -Ortega that petitioner seeks to extend was not premised on autonomy interests, see 528 U.S. at 483. 26 And by waiving his right to appeal, a defendant has already made a knowing and voluntary choice not to seek further merits consideration of issues w ithin the scope of the waiver . See 546 F.3d 450.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "The Court has distinguished a defendant 's right to autonomy from the right to effective assistance under Strickland , see 138 S. Ct. 1500, and the presumption of prejudice in Flores -Ortega that petitioner seeks to extend was not premised on autonomy interests, see 528 U.S. at 483. 26 And by waiving his right to appeal, a defendant has already made a knowing and voluntary choice not to seek further merits consideration of issues w ithin the scope of the waiver . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner implicitly acknowledges as much, because he does not argue that a defendant has an autonomy interest in bringing claims barred by an appeal waiver. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 F.3d 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "Petitioner implicitly acknowledges as much, because he does not argue that a defendant has an autonomy interest in bringing claims barred by an appeal waiver. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A focus on the defendant's right to autonomy —properly understood to mean his right to appeal claims that he has not already voluntarily renounced —thus supports a case -specific approach that limits relief to such circumstances , not a per se rule that grants relief indiscriminately .4 3. Petitioner also contends (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "29 -30), t he prejudice inquiry would not require the defendant to es- tablish that he would have prevailed on appeal, but only to establish \"a reasonable probability\" that counsel's 4 Petitioner also errs in relying on the obligations of counsel to \"support his client's ap peal to the best of his ability. \" Br. 27 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The right to the Anders procedure depends on having an \"appeal[ ] as of right,\" 386 U.S. at 741, and does not apply to appeals that would be barred by a waiver. See Nunez , 546 F.3d at 455.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "It will have few benefits, but would add significant litigation burdens , reduce the advantages of plea agreements, and potentially harm defendan ts themselves . Even courts of appeals that have adopted peti- tioner's proposed rule hav e recognized that its applica- tion \" will bestow on most defendants nothing more than an opportunity to lose.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is unsurprising. Relieving defendants of the requirement to prove case -specific prejudice eliminates the traditional tool that courts em- ploy to identify situations in which counsel's deficiencies may actually have mattered.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 F.3d 770",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "But that is burdensome in itself . A defendant may be able to initiate protracted litigation solely through allegations in an affid avit, which some courts (over the government's objection) treat as suffi- cient to require an evidentiary hearing —even where the defendant's trial counsel represents that the defendant in fact \"never asked [him] to file a notice of appeal.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Berrio 129 F.3d 1252; Mar- 2012 WL 2061934. An evidentiary hearing, in turn, will usually require testimony from trial counsel and the defendant, who must be trans- ported to the court (which may be in a different district from the one in which he is imprison ed). Indeed, this Court has previously noted that , for some defendants, the \"collateral attack may [itself ] be inspired by a mere desire to be freed temporarily from the confines of the 31 prison.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F. Supp. 2d 344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
		"context": "An evidentiary hearing, in turn, will usually require testimony from trial counsel and the defendant, who must be trans- ported to the court (which may be in a different district from the one in which he is imprison ed). Indeed, this Court has previously noted that , for some defendants, the \"collateral attack may [itself ] be inspired by a mere desire to be freed temporarily from the confines of the 31 prison.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence",
		"context": "Such informal and impulsive musings simply are not trustworthy. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor do these kind s of statements necessarily reflect an official's thinking during the appropriate timeframe. Officials, not candidates, take oaths of office and are surrounded by a vast government apparatus composed of other office holders and experts in their respective fields.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
		"context": "81 In this context, patents are meant to teach. Society grants the powerful patent right in exchange for the inventor's decision to shar e an invention with society. After all, an inventor could choose to keep the inven- tion as a trade secret, gua rding the details and hoping 79 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 383 U.S. 1; 383 U.S. 519; see also Robin Feldman, Intel- lectual Property Wrongs , 18 Stan. J.L. Bus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
		"context": "81 In this context, patents are meant to teach. Society grants the powerful patent right in exchange for the inventor's decision to shar e an invention with society. After all, an inventor could choose to keep the inven- tion as a trade secret, gua rding the details and hoping 79 See 447 U.S. 303; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 383 U.S. 519; see also Robin Feldman, Intel- lectual Property Wrongs , 18 Stan. J.L. Bus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
		"context": "81 In this context, patents are meant to teach. Society grants the powerful patent right in exchange for the inventor's decision to shar e an invention with society. After all, an inventor could choose to keep the inven- tion as a trade secret, gua rding the details and hoping 79 See 447 U.S. 303; 383 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Robin Feldman, Intel- lectual Property Wrongs , 18 Stan. J.L. Bus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
		"context": "There may be some classes or categories for which identifying the structure of the target and a cer-tain number of examples of biologic products that func- tion a certain way in relation to that target may be sufficient. But there may be many others in which the level of information provided , combined with the level of unknowns, means that the inventor stopped short of actually teaching others how to make the invention. Did you really teach us how to practice your invention 82 See Kewanee Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Feldman, Secrets , supra , at 8 n.23 (\"A patent, of course, is no guarantee of a return, and many patentees receive little value either directly from revenue or indirectly by serving to build[ ] a portfolio to defend territory aro und an innovation. Nevertheless, a patent provides an extraordinary opportunity to create value by excluding others.\"). 32 or did you give us the alphabet with assurances that we could compose Shakespeare?",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
		"context": "Nevertheless, a patent provides an extraordinary opportunity to create value by excluding others.\"). 32 or did you give us the alphabet with assurances that we could compose Shakespeare? A classic application of this notion appears in In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which con- cerned a chemical compound used for treating diabe- tes. Though the specification identified a formula that could encompass a half-million compounds, the pa- tentee argued that a skilled chemist could have nar- rowed the choices and found the specific compound claimed. 83 The court disagreed, explaining that the pa- tentee had failed to guide anyone toward the actual compound: It is an old custom in th e woods to mark trails by making blaze marks on the trees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 F.2d 990",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
		"context": "33 mixed around, but I got essentially what America is about. \"85 In short, the experimentation-based enablement standards fully accomplish th e goal of the enablement requirement: to provide assu rance that no patent claim exceeds what was invented and what was taught to the public. See MagSil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[Enablement] prevents both inadequate disclosure of an invention and overbroad claiming that might other- wise attempt to cover more than was actually in- vented. Thus, a patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril of losing any claim that cannot be enabled across its full scope of coverage.\"). In asking this Court to weaken the \"undue ex- perimentation\" standard's power to police overbroad claims, Amgen is requesting that the Court follow the widely discredited \"prospect theory\" of patent law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 1377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The reopening doctrine does not apply when the agency takes action to effectuate a policy change.",
		"context": "Circuit to assess whether a challenge to 19 agency action is timely. See Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The doctrine \"arise[s] in situations where an age ncy conducts a rulemaking or adopts a policy on an issue at one time, and then in a later rule- making restates the policy or otherwise addresses the issue again without altering the original decision.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 F.3d 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The reopening doctrine does not apply when the agency takes action to effectuate a policy change.",
		"context": "If the \"later proceeding explicitly or implicitly s hows that the agency actually reconsidered the rule, the matter has been reopened and the time period for seeking judicial review begins anew. \" Id. (citing Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). By contrast, an agency does not reopen i ts action , and thus does not restart the time for seeking review, \"merely by responding to an unsolicited comment by reaffirming its prior position.\" CTIA -The Wireless 466 F.3d 105.",
		"citation_value_orig": "901 F.2d 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The reopening doctrine does not apply when the agency takes action to effectuate a policy change.",
		"context": "(citing Public 901 F.2d 147). By contrast, an agency does not reopen i ts action , and thus does not restart the time for seeking review, \"merely by responding to an unsolicited comment by reaffirming its prior position.\" CTIA -The Wireless [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals determined th at the reopen- ing doctrine was relevant to the question whether the October Memorandum \"constitute[ s] a new and sepa- rately reviewable 'final agency action. '\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 F.3d 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The reopening doctrine does not apply when the agency takes action to effectuate a policy change.",
		"context": "NARPO , 158 F.3d at 141; see also Public Ci tizen , 901 F.2d at 150 (discussing the \" the problem of whether an agency 's restatement of an existing rule or policy in a rulemaking format makes the rule or policy challenge- able anew \" (emphasis added)). In that situation, the reopening doctrine permits \"a plaintiff to bring an oth- erwise -stale challenge\" if the \"agency has considered substantively changing a rule but ultimately declined to do so.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The doctrine, however, has no role where \"there [is] new agency action substantively changing\" the agency's rule or policy . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "754 F.3d 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The reopening doctrine does not apply when the agency takes action to effectuate a policy change.",
		"context": "The October Memorandum could not \"continu[e]\" the Secretary's earlier decision to termi- nate MPP because that termination was no longer in effect; the district court's vacatur of the June Memo- randum had reinstated MPP. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Only a new final agency action could terminate MPP after the dis- trict court's judgment went into effect. In the se cir- cumstances, where the agency alter s the status quo rather than \"declin[ing] to do so ,\" the reopening doc- trine plays no role.",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.3d 899",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals erred in refusing to apply the judgment bar in this case.",
		"context": "The majority also observed that Section 1346(b)(1) waives the sovereign immunity of the United States on the same terms as the elements of the FTCA cause of ac- tion. Id. at 6a -7a; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The majority then reasoned backward that, when respond- ent failed o n the merits to establish the liability of the United States on his FTCA claims, he must also have failed to satisfy the terms of the FTCA's immunity waiver . And b ecause sovereign immunity is jurisdic- tional, the majority concluded that the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction over respondent's FTCA claims —and furthermore that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction d oes not trigger the judgment bar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The decision below traps the Catholic Church in the polity of the court's creation",
		"context": "at 14. To arrive at this conclusion, it purported to apply 16 \"neutral principles of law,\" see Pet'rs App. at 9 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), arguing that if the Catholic Church wished the courts to re- spect its structure, it should have incorporated its con- stituent entities under Puerto Rico's corporation law, see Pet'rs App. at 13–14. Howe ver, by first misinter- preting the treaty provisions designed to protect Cath-olic churches upon Puerto Ri co's transfer to American possession, then by disrega rding the legal personality of the Catholic defendant that did incorporate civilly, the decision below effectively disqualifies Catholic en- tities from incorporating under civil law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The decision below traps the Catholic Church in the polity of the court's creation",
		"context": "See 1983 Code c.1288. 18 under Spanish rule. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Con- cordat of 1851, that existence was by virtue of canon law, not in spite of it.16 See Concordat of 1851 art. 1.17 However, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court woefully mis- construed the Treaty of Paris and its interpretation in Ponce to accomplish the opposite goal—the elimination of the identity of Catholic churches.18 Moreover, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's hold- ing with respect to Academia del Perpetuo Socorro ef- fectively ensures that the Church cannot repair the damage done to its polity by incorporating its constit-uent entities under civil law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "210 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The decision below traps the Catholic Church in the polity of the court's creation",
		"context": "17 See Treaty of Paris art. III (ceding the Philippines to the United States). Notably, in citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], plaintiff-respondents omitted the portion of the party name indi-cating that the individual parish, not an overarching Catholic en-tity in the Philippines, brought the claim. See Resp. in Opp'n at 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State judges may be sued under Young",
		"context": "Judge Jackson argues (State Br. 25) that subject - ing judges to suit in federal courts would \"upend[] the structure of the judicial sy stem.\" To the contrary, allowing such suits is necessary to preserve the supremacy of federal law, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and it has long been contem - 16 plated by this Court. Young itself involved —and upheld the use of —anti-suit injunctio ns, which affect the operation of the judiciary. 209 U.S. at 132, 149, 159; see also Younger , 401 U.S. at 46.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "As relevant here, t he Elections C lause has two functions. First, the Clause imposes \"the duty \" on States \"to provide for the election of representatives to the Federal Congress .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That requires, among other things, that States define congressional districts corresponding to the number of federal representatives they are apportioned. Second, the Elections Clause specifies that the entity within each State responsible for this important task is \"the Legislature thereof. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "The autho rity to establish federal congressional district s is thus not a typical state legislative power exercised pursuant to a grant of authority under a state constitution. Rather, this Court has recognized that when a state legislature enacts a statute regulat ing the time, place, and manner of an election, it acts by virtue of a n \"exclusive delegation of power under the Elections Clause .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ex parte100 U.S. 371. That delegation is subject to restraint by the Federal Constitution or , as stated in the Elections Clause itself, by an act of Congress that makes or alters an election rule .2 As recently as two years ago this Court confirmed, in the context of the Constitution 's assignment of 2 This Court has identified two federal constitutional restraints on districting authority: \"one -person, one -vote and racial gerrymandering.\" Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2495; see 376 U.S. 1; 509 U.S. 630.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "The autho rity to establish federal congressional district s is thus not a typical state legislative power exercised pursuant to a grant of authority under a state constitution. Rather, this Court has recognized that when a state legislature enacts a statute regulat ing the time, place, and manner of an election, it acts by virtue of a n \"exclusive delegation of power under the Elections Clause .\" 531 U.S. 510; see also Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That delegation is subject to restraint by the Federal Constitution or , as stated in the Elections Clause itself, by an act of Congress that makes or alters an election rule .2 As recently as two years ago this Court confirmed, in the context of the Constitution 's assignment of 2 This Court has identified two federal constitutional restraints on districting authority: \"one -person, one -vote and racial gerrymandering.\" Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2495; see 376 U.S. 1; 509 U.S. 630.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "531 U.S. 510; see also Ex parte100 U.S. 371. That delegation is subject to restraint by the Federal Constitution or , as stated in the Elections Clause itself, by an act of Congress that makes or alters an election rule .2 As recently as two years ago this Court confirmed, in the context of the Constitution 's assignment of 2 This Court has identified two federal constitutional restraints on districting authority: \"one -person, one -vote and racial gerrymandering.\" Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2495; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 509 U.S. 630. Perhaps the most well -known congressional restraints are the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "531 U.S. 510; see also Ex parte100 U.S. 371. That delegation is subject to restraint by the Federal Constitution or , as stated in the Elections Clause itself, by an act of Congress that makes or alters an election rule .2 As recently as two years ago this Court confirmed, in the context of the Constitution 's assignment of 2 This Court has identified two federal constitutional restraints on districting authority: \"one -person, one -vote and racial gerrymandering.\" Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2495; see 376 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Perhaps the most well -known congressional restraints are the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "None of these is at issue in, or would be affected by, this case. 8 authority to state legislatures to appoint presidential electors, that such assignm ent \"convey[s] the broadest power of determination \" to the legislature subject only to another constraint expressed in the Federal Constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court further observed that states cannot impose ot her conditions on the legislature 's appointments that would conflict with the Federal Constitution. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "The reasons the Framers assign ed primary authority for setting the rules governing federal elections to state legislatures are well know n. Foremost, the selection of legislative institutions reflects the Framers ' \"preference for the democratic process \" in regulat ing elections. League of United Latin Am. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the Electio ns Clause and elsewhere, the Framers provided that federal elections would be principally regulated by \"the political branches. \" Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2506; see U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "The Framers made this choice notwithstanding their familiarity with districting problems. During the colonial period, as afterwards, the political gerrymander was \"alive and well. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To take one prominent example, Thomas Jefferson, among others, accused Patrick Henry of attempt ing to gerrymander James Madison out of the First Congress. Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander?",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
		"context": "'retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes' if those 'processes' violate the United States Constitution.\" AIRC , 576 U.S. at 827 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Furthermore, \"[i]t is precisely because politicians are best able to predict the effects of boundary changes that the districts they design usually make some political sense. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": ". Stare decisis is not an \"inexorable command.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], available at https:/ /reason.com/volokh/2018/07/08/the -stare - decisis -court (collecting data showing that the Court regularly overturns precedent, though the Roberts Court has done so at a lower rate than its predecessors). That is particularly true in cases of constitutional interpretation, where the force of stare decisis \"is at its weakest.\" Agostini , 521 U.S. at 235; see also 135 S. Ct. 2401.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "521 U.S. 203, available at https:/ /reason.com/volokh/2018/07/08/the -stare - decisis -court (collecting data showing that the Court regularly overturns precedent, though the Roberts Court has done so at a lower rate than its predecessors). That is particularly true in cases of constitutional interpretation, where the force of stare decisis \"is at its weakest.\" Agostini , 521 U.S. at 235; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case exemplifies nearly all of the traditional justifications for overruling an erroneous precedent. The separate -sovereigns exception developed without any thorough consideration of constitutional text and original meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "The Separate- Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception. It goes without saying that \"[a]n important factor in determining whether a precedent should be overruled is the quality of its reasoning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The separate -sovereigns exception is wrong in precisely the ways this Court has recognized render a precedent less deserving of stare decisis protection. First, this Court has recognized (in the double - jeopardy context, no less) that a precedent is ripe for overruling when it \"contradict[s] an 'unbroken line of decisions,' [and] contain[s] 'less than accurate' historical analysis.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "The separate -sovereigns exception is wrong in precisely the ways this Court has recognized render a precedent less deserving of stare decisis protection. First, this Court has recognized (in the double - jeopardy context, no less) that a precedent is ripe for overruling when it \"contradict[s] an 'unbroken line of decisions,' [and] contain[s] 'less than accurate' historical analysis.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The separate - sovereigns exception certainly fits that bill. The doctrine had its origins in ill -considered dicta, much of it driven by concerns over fugitive slaves .",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U. S. 688",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "Bartkus was five -to-four, and the follow - on decision in Abbate garnered only one additional vote. Justice Black's opinions in those cases (particularly Bartkus ) were ones for the ages, well deserving of a place in the pantheon of dissents that later become law. Finally, incorrect decisions merit reconsideration when \"[t]hey have been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions,\" Payne, 501 U.S. at 829 – 30, or otherwise subjected to \"substantial and continuing\" criticism, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]136 S. Ct. 1863, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas called for \"fresh examination\" of the separate-sovereigns exception \"in an appropriate case.\" Id. at 1877 (Ginsburg , J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "Bartkus was five -to-four, and the follow - on decision in Abbate garnered only one additional vote. Justice Black's opinions in those cases (particularly Bartkus ) were ones for the ages, well deserving of a place in the pantheon of dissents that later become law. Finally, incorrect decisions merit reconsideration when \"[t]hey have been questioned by Members of the Court in later decisions,\" Payne, 501 U.S. at 829 – 30, or otherwise subjected to \"substantial and continuing\" criticism, 539 U.S. 558[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Justices Ginsburg and Thomas called for \"fresh examination\" of the separate-sovereigns exception \"in an appropriate case.\" Id. at 1877 (Ginsburg , J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "at 1877 (Ginsburg , J., dissenting). In so doing, they added their voices to those of Justice Black and the other Bartkus dissenters, as well as to an ever -growing chorus of respected lower -court jurists 1 and legal 1 See, e.g., 66 F.3d 483 of Rights to the states, consequent alterations in the system of dual sovereignty, and the historic idiosyncracies of various of the precedents upon which Bartkus relies may deprive the opinion of much of its force, we do not believe we are the proper forum to overturn a legal directive from the Supreme Court. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 See, e.g., 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.5(a), 851 (4th ed. 2015) (citing various criticisms of the separate -sovereigns exception); Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 Colum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
		"context": "1096 (1959); Grant, Successive Prosecutions, supra ; Grant, The Lanza Rule , supra . 35 engendering \"sustained and widespread debate\" or \"national controvers[y],\" Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the separate - sovereigns exception is as uniformly criticized a rule of constitutional law as any. Even within legal academia —which tends to reward unconventional viewpoints—defenders of the exception are nowhere to be found.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. State Law Has No Bearing on the Adequacy Analysis",
		"context": "(emphasis added). If the drafters of Rule 24 had intended for States to have equivalent authority t o create a right to mandatory intervention, they would have said so expressly. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nor would it be workable to allow all fifty States to predetermine intervention in the federal courts . Could a State pass a law granting the State's environmental agency the right to intervene in any federal case implicating the State's environmental interests?",
		"citation_value_orig": "946 F.2d 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "a. Before Seminole Rock , this Court had deferred on occasion to an agency's interpretation o f its own reg- ulations . See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; AT&T 299 U.S. 232, 241 -242 (1936 ); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. 288 U.S. 294, 324- 325 (1933 ). But \"few cases\" addressed the issue, and this Court did not defer in some instances where a Seminole Rock -type rule would have required doing so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "a. Before Seminole Rock , this Court had deferred on occasion to an agency's interpretation o f its own reg- ulations . See , e.g., 309 U.S. 134; AT&T [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 241 -242 (1936 ); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. 288 U.S. 294, 324- 325 (1933 ). But \"few cases\" addressed the issue, and this Court did not defer in some instances where a Seminole Rock -type rule would have required doing so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "Before Seminole Rock , this Court had deferred on occasion to an agency's interpretation o f its own reg- ulations . See , e.g., 309 U.S. 134; AT&T 299 U.S. 232, 241 -242 (1936 ); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 324- 325 (1933 ). But \"few cases\" addressed the issue, and this Court did not defer in some instances where a Seminole Rock -type rule would have required doing so. Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations , 35 Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "T he Court did not in- voke any of its prior decisions in announcing that an agency's interpretation should be given \"controlling weight\" unless \"plainly erroneous .\" 325 U.S. at 414. For his part, t he Administrat or of the Office of Price Administration (whose regulation was at issue) had ar- gued for deference primarily on the basis of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , decided just one year earlier . There, the Court had deferred to an agency's interpret ation of a statute while emphasiz ing that the agency's interpretation was \" not controlling \" and re- ceived deference because it had the \"power to per- suade.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "N o discussion of the decision appears in the legislative record. And in a criminal case decided a month before the APA's enactment, this Court inter-preted a price- control regulation without relying on Seminole Rock or suggesting that any deference to the Administrator's construc tion was warranted. See M. Kraus & Bros., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, although t he APA's scope -of-review provision —now found in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. 706 — was understood to be a \" restatement \" of existing law , it is not clear that Congress was restating Seminole Rock 18 deference as that doctrine is understood today .",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "At times, th e Court has sug- gested that Seminole Rock deference is based on an agency's superior insight into the intention behind its regulations —as the Administrator himself argued in Seminole Rock , see p p. 16-17, supra . See, e.g. , Mullins Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That intentionalist the- ory may be relevant where an interpretation is issued contemporaneously with the regulation, including, for example, as part of a final rule's published preamble. But beyond that, it is in significant tension with the Court's interpretive approach in other contexts , where the Court's \"inquiry begins with the text\" of a law 19 and \"ends there as well \" when the text is clear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "That intentionalist the- ory may be relevant where an interpretation is issued contemporaneously with the regulation, including, for example, as part of a final rule's published preamble. But beyond that, it is in significant tension with the Court's interpretive approach in other contexts , where the Court's \"inquiry begins with the text\" of a law 19 and \"ends there as well \" when the text is clear. Na- tional Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An intentionalist theory also fails to explain the breadth of Seminole Rock deference as currently ap- plied. This Court has deferr ed to an agency's interpre- tation of a regulation even when the interpretation is rendered decades after a rule is promulgated, and even when the interpretation is inconsistent with the agency's prior views— both circumstances in which def- erence cannot necessarily be ju stified on the basis of the agency's insight into its own intent ion at the time of the underlying rulemaking .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "This Court has deferr ed to an agency's interpre- tation of a regulation even when the interpretation is rendered decades after a rule is promulgated, and even when the interpretation is inconsistent with the agency's prior views— both circumstances in which def- erence cannot necessarily be ju stified on the basis of the agency's insight into its own intent ion at the time of the underlying rulemaking . See, e.g. , Long Island Care at Home , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. This Court has also, at times, sought to ground Seminole Rock in the same kind of theory underlying Chevr on U.S.A. 467 U.S. 837 (1984 ). It is not clear, how- ever, that the Chevron rationale applies to deference to an agency's construction of its own regulations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Long Island Care at Home , 551 U.S. 158. c. This Court has also, at times, sought to ground Seminole Rock in the same kind of theory underlying Chevr on U.S.A. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1984 ). It is not clear, how- ever, that the Chevron rationale applies to deference to an agency's construction of its own regulations. This Court has stated that the Chevron framework rests on a presumption that \"a statute's ambiguity con- stitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "It is not clear, how- ever, that the Chevron rationale applies to deference to an agency's construction of its own regulations. This Court has stated that the Chevron framework rests on a presumption that \"a statute's ambiguity con- stitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 20 National Cable & Telecomms. 545 U.S. 967 to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.' \") (quoting 517 U.S. 735).",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "This Court has stated that the Chevron framework rests on a presumption that \"a statute's ambiguity con- stitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.\" 529 U.S. 120; see 20 National Cable & Telecomms. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.' \") (quoting 517 U.S. 735). As a corollary, when an agency fails to use the procedures Congress intended the agency to use to re-solve a statutory ambiguity, Chevron deference gener- ally does not apply.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 967",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "529 U.S. 120; see 20 National Cable & Telecomms. 545 U.S. 967 to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.' \") (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As a corollary, when an agency fails to use the procedures Congress intended the agency to use to re-solve a statutory ambiguity, Chevron deference gener- ally does not apply. 533 U.S. 218 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "\") (quoting 517 U.S. 735). As a corollary, when an agency fails to use the procedures Congress intended the agency to use to re-solve a statutory ambiguity, Chevron deference gener- ally does not apply. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, w hen a reviewing court defers to an agency's interpretation under Chevron , it can be viewed as hav- ing \"decide[d] [the] relevant question[] of law,\" 5 U.S.C. 706, by determining that the statute delegates discre- tion to the agency to resolve the ambiguity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "Thus, w hen a reviewing court defers to an agency's interpretation under Chevron , it can be viewed as hav- ing \"decide[d] [the] relevant question[] of law,\" 5 U.S.C. 706, by determining that the statute delegates discre- tion to the agency to resolve the ambiguity. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules , 96 Colum. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "The Court sided with the Secretary, reasoning that in aut horizing the Secretary to make rules, Congress intended also to \"delegate[] interpretive lawmaking power to the [Secretary] rather than to [a] reviewing cour t.\" Id. at 153 . The Court explained that \"[b] ecause applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circum-stances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and pol- icymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power au- thoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a compo- nent of the agency's delegated lawmaking power s.\" Martin , 499 U.S. at 151 (citing Ford Motor Credit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . The Court fur- ther explained that the Secretary has \"identifiable struc- tural advantages\" in interpreting the regulations —such as \"historical familiarity\" with the scheme; \"policy mak- ing expertise\" developed over time; and the ability, as a \"single administrative actor,\" to be \"politically 'account- able for the overall implementation' \" of the regulatory program. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear",
		"context": "B ut an ambiguity in a n agency's own regulation is not of Con- gress's making . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Martin did not ground its presumption of congressional intent on statutory ambi- guity, but rather more generally on the Secretary's del- egated rulemaking authority . See 499 U.S. at 151- 153.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Four Circuits have declined to apply Garcetti's exception to public-faculty speech that implicates academic freedom.",
		"context": "Recognizing the incompatibility of Garcetti 's \"offi- cial duties\" rule with the First Amendment's protec- tion of academic freedom, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that Garcetti does not apply to public -faculty speech related to scholarship or teaching . In Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina -Wilmington , the Fourth Circuit held that \"Garcetti would not apply\" because the facts con- cerned \"the academic context of a public university.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Adams , the plain- tiff was a professor who alleged he was retaliat ed against for the views he expressed in his scholarship 8 and teaching. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "640 F.3d 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Four Circuits have declined to apply Garcetti's exception to public-faculty speech that implicates academic freedom.",
		"context": "Id. at 564 . Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that Garcetti did not apply, and it analyzed the plaintiff's speech under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Id. Similarly, in Demers v. Austin , the Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti does not apply to speech related to scholarship or teaching.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Four Circuits have declined to apply Garcetti's exception to public-faculty speech that implicates academic freedom.",
		"context": "Id. Similarly, in Demers v. Austin , the Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti does not apply to speech related to scholarship or teaching. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Demers , the plaintiff was a professor who al- leged retaliation for distributing a \"pamphlet and drafts from an in -progress book.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.3d 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Four Circuits have declined to apply Garcetti's exception to public-faculty speech that implicates academic freedom.",
		"context": "at 412 . The Fifth Circuit followed suit i n Buchanan v. Al- exander , recogniz ing that \"[t]he Supreme Court has established that academic freedom is 'a special con- cern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Buchanan , the plaintiff was a pro- fessor who alleged retal iation after being terminated for using profanity and making jokes while teaching. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "919 F.3d 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "IV 1938) ). Courts 30 of the era accordingly recognized th at the possession of- fenses analogous to those at issue here did not require proof that the defendant knew his own status. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir.) , cert. denied,350 U.S. 845 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "224 F.2d 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "87-342, 75 Stat. 757 . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1968, Congress overhauled the firearms law s. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Act) , Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 F.2d 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "A nd a s before, the criminal - penalty provision did not itself con tain a mens rea re- quirement . Accordingly, nearly every court of appeals to consider the issue determined that no knowledge re- quirement attached to the relevant status elements . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 606 F.2d 871; 588 F.2d 92 . But see 496 F.2d 922. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.2d 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "A nd a s before, the criminal - penalty provision did not itself con tain a mens rea re- quirement . Accordingly, nearly every court of appeals to consider the issue determined that no knowledge re- quirement attached to the relevant status elements . See, e.g., 683 F.2d 224; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 588 F.2d 92 . But see 496 F.2d 922. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "606 F.2d 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "A nd a s before, the criminal - penalty provision did not itself con tain a mens rea re- quirement . Accordingly, nearly every court of appeals to consider the issue determined that no knowledge re- quirement attached to the relevant status elements . See, e.g., 683 F.2d 224; 606 F.2d 871; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But see 496 F.2d 922. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "588 F.2d 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "Accordingly, nearly every court of appeals to consider the issue determined that no knowledge re- quirement attached to the relevant status elements . See, e.g., 683 F.2d 224; 606 F.2d 871; 588 F.2d 92 . But see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. In 1982, a Senate subcommittee concluded that reform of the firearms laws was necessary in order to ensure that enforcement efforts were focused on the \"primary object of limiting access of felons and other high -risk groups to firearms,\" rather than on \"technical malum prohibitum charges, of individuals who lack all criminal intent and knowledge,\" such as \"collectors,\" who had become frequent law -enforcement targets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 F.2d 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "The adoption of the language accordingly reflected Congress's codifica tion of the d ominant interpretation tha t courts had given to the precursor offenses that appeared in the 1938 and 1968 enactments, which did not require knowledge of status or personal circumstances . c. In accord with that legislative design , every court of appeals to consider the issue after the FOPA's enact- ment has determined that the knowledge requirement in Section 924(a)(2) applies only to the defendant's con- duct in violating Section 922(g), not his status . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir.) , cert. denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602267 F.3d 715194 F.3d 900; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "940 F.2d 710",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "The adoption of the language accordingly reflected Congress's codifica tion of the d ominant interpretation tha t courts had given to the precursor offenses that appeared in the 1938 and 1968 enactments, which did not require knowledge of status or personal circumstances . c. In accord with that legislative design , every court of appeals to consider the issue after the FOPA's enact- ment has determined that the knowledge requirement in Section 924(a)(2) applies only to the defendant's con- duct in violating Section 922(g), not his status . See 940 F.2d 710; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (3d Cir.) , cert. denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602267 F.3d 715194 F.3d 900; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "665 F.3d 588",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "See 940 F.2d 710; 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir.) , cert. denied,568 U.S. 941 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]267 F.3d 715194 F.3d 900; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by 524 U.S. 308; 667 F.3d 1136, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 F.3d 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "See 940 F.2d 710; 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir.) , cert. denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]194 F.3d 900; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by 524 U.S. 308; 667 F.3d 1136, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 F.3d 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "See 940 F.2d 710; 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir.) , cert. denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602267 F.3d 715[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by 524 U.S. 308; 667 F.3d 1136, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 F.3d 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "See 940 F.2d 710; 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir.) , cert. denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602267 F.3d 715194 F.3d 900; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by 524 U.S. 308; 667 F.3d 1136, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "105 F.3d 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602267 F.3d 715194 F.3d 900; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 667 F.3d 1136, cert. denied,571 U.S. 830 ; 77 F.3d 350, 352 -354 (10th Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "denied,568 U.S. 941 ; 62 F.3d 602267 F.3d 715194 F.3d 900; 105 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by 524 U.S. 308; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,571 U.S. 830 ; 77 F.3d 350, 352 -354 (10th Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "667 F.3d 1136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "), cert. denied,522 U.S. 871, abrogated on other grounds by 524 U.S. 308; 667 F.3d 1136, cert. denied,571 U.S. 830 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 352 -354 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,518 U.S. 33; 120 F.3d 1226.",
		"citation_value_orig": "77 F.3d 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "denied,571 U.S. 830 ; 77 F.3d 350, 352 -354 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 120 F.3d 1226. Although legislative silence does not invaria- bly signal acquiescence , if Congress thought that courts were cons istently flouting a new mens rea requirement See Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "denied,571 U.S. 830 ; 77 F.3d 350, 352 -354 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,518 U.S. 33; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although legislative silence does not invaria- bly signal acquiescence , if Congress thought that courts were cons istently flouting a new mens rea requirement See Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "120 F.3d 1226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status",
		"context": "920- 921 (Section 922) . 34 that it had intended to add through the FOPA, presum- ably it would have acted to correct that perceived error . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected",
		"context": "§ 1964(c). A court construing an unambig- ious statute should start and end with the statutory language. 143 S. Ct. 543; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 569 U.S. 50. Here, § 1964(c) 's first two words pre- clude Petitioners' textual arguments and demon strate that RICO 's private right of action is not limited to do- mestic plaintiffs. Section 1964(c) permits \" [a]ny person\" to sue if the person is injured in the ir business or property by rea- son of a RICO violation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected",
		"context": "§ 1964(c). A court construing an unambig- ious statute should start and end with the statutory language. 143 S. Ct. 543; 139 S. Ct. 517; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, § 1964(c) 's first two words pre- clude Petitioners' textual arguments and demon strate that RICO 's private right of action is not limited to do- mestic plaintiffs. Section 1964(c) permits \" [a]ny person\" to sue if the person is injured in the ir business or property by rea- son of a RICO violation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected",
		"context": "Neither can be read as excluding for- eign plaintiffs . Although the term \"any\" in § 1964(c) does not re- but the presumption against application to extraterri- torial conduct , Congress' use of the term \"any\" indi- cates an intent that the category of persons who may 12 sue under the statute be read broadly. RJR Nabisco , 579 U.S. at 349 –50; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When Congress intends to exclude categories of plaintiffs from a statute, it generally does so by enumerating specific categories of plaintiffs that fall under the protections of the statute. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected",
		"context": "See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing only U.S. citizens or persons within U.S. jurisdiction may sue); cf. Bread [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is that such person be \"injured in his busi- ness or property by reason of a violation of § 1962.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court in Roe based its viability standard on: (a) lack of scientific consensus on when human life begins, (b) absence of uniform legal protection of fetuses, and (c) maternal burdens of pregnancy",
		"context": "at 161. The Court said it could find no case \"that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment\" 2 and decided 2 While the Roe Court, 410 U.S. at 155, cited Steinberg v. Brown , it failed to acknowledge that that case did recognize that preborn human life was entitled to protection under the Consti-tution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 that \"the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 F. Supp. 741",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. MNN Is Not a State Actor",
		"context": "Indeed, the whole point of the public -forum doctrine is to assess the validity of \"restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property.\" Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no such creature as a privately owned and operated \"public forum.\" That is why it is essential to first decide whether the person running the forum can be treated as the government before deciding whether the forum is a \"public forum.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. In neighboring provisions, Congress used far more express language to limit jurisdiction.",
		"context": "Biden , 142 S. Ct. at 2539- 2540. In other words , \"[i]f Congress had wanted\" to make the Section 1252(d)(1) exhaustion requirement juris- dictional, \"it knew exactly how to do so—it could have simply borrowed from the statute next door.\" SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Con- gress chose not to do so, and this Court \"generally take[s] [such a] choice to be deliberate.\" 142 S. Ct. 1310.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only One Court Of Appeals Has Considered The Questions Presented",
		"context": "3d at 471- 72. In the \"absence of a pronounced conflict among the circuits ,\" the Court \"should not rush to answer a novel question\" that \"could benefit from further attention in the court of appeals.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Awaiting \" diverse opinions\" from the federal appellate 15 courts \"may yield a better informed and more endur- ing final pronouncement\" that avoids unforeseen con-sequences for administrative law, immigration law, and Executive authority beyond the immediate dis- pute. 514 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only One Court Of Appeals Has Considered The Questions Presented",
		"context": "555 U.S. 261. Awaiting \" diverse opinions\" from the federal appellate 15 courts \"may yield a better informed and more endur- ing final pronouncement\" that avoids unforeseen con-sequences for administrative law, immigration law, and Executive authority beyond the immediate dis- pute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The questions presented here should be vetted by the courts of appeals, and they will be soon. If the Court denies certiorari now, it should have ample opportunity to revisit the ques- tion next Term with the benefit of decisions from the Second, Fou rth, and D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only One Court Of Appeals Has Considered The Questions Presented",
		"context": "54a . The Fifth Circuit itself recognized that \"DACA and DAPA are not identical\" and that \"any extrapolation from DACA [to DAPA] must be done carefully.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]136 S. Ct. 2271 . The lower court s here each correctly gave sev- eral reasons why the question s before them were not the same as those before the Fifth Circuit. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.3d 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. States and Local Governments Established Pensions for Their Employees Well Before Public Employees Were Permitted to Collectively Bargain",
		"context": "Similarly, the case law and state constitutional provisions in California, 9 Michigan, and many other states that protect public - employee pensions from being eliminated or reduced have existed for much longer than collective bargaining rights. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This underscores a point entirely ignored by amici: that public pensions are protected against changes because of state law, not because of unions. 2 Unlike state and local pension systems, public - employee collective bargaining righ ts did not become widespread until the 1960s and 1970s.",
		"citation_value_orig": "179 P.2d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. States and Local Governments Established Pensions for Their Employees Well Before Public Employees Were Permitted to Collectively Bargain",
		"context": "California, for example, gave public employees a limited right to meet and confer over employment conditions in 1961, but the law \"placed no obligation on either the employer or employees to attempt to reach an agreement on terms and conditions of employment, i.e., to negotiate in good faith .\" Pac. Legal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Over the next decade, the state took additional steps tow ard permitting limited forms of collective bargaining, including when Governor Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order R -25-71, directing the state and its colleges and universities to bargain with employee unions in good faith. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "624 P.2d 1215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case",
		"context": "E.g. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]521 U.S. 793497 U.S. 261; 433 U.S. 350; 410 U.S. 113. 10 only to treat ailments; it is also to educate patients so they can be proactive in their own healthcare. If physicians must tailor their speech to accommodate a political restriction, patients will know their doctors are no longer candid and the quality ofmedical care will erode, potentially with direconsequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S.Ct. 2566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case",
		"context": "E.g. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 132 S.Ct. 2566[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]497 U.S. 261; 433 U.S. 350; 410 U.S. 113. 10 only to treat ailments; it is also to educate patients so they can be proactive in their own healthcare. If physicians must tailor their speech to accommodate a political restriction, patients will know their doctors are no longer candid and the quality ofmedical care will erode, potentially with direconsequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case",
		"context": "E.g. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 132 S.Ct. 2566521 U.S. 793[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 433 U.S. 350; 410 U.S. 113. 10 only to treat ailments; it is also to educate patients so they can be proactive in their own healthcare. If physicians must tailor their speech to accommodate a political restriction, patients will know their doctors are no longer candid and the quality ofmedical care will erode, potentially with direconsequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case",
		"context": "E.g. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 132 S.Ct. 2566521 U.S. 793497 U.S. 261; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 410 U.S. 113. 10 only to treat ailments; it is also to educate patients so they can be proactive in their own healthcare. If physicians must tailor their speech to accommodate a political restriction, patients will know their doctors are no longer candid and the quality ofmedical care will erode, potentially with direconsequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case",
		"context": "E.g. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 132 S.Ct. 2566521 U.S. 793497 U.S. 261; 433 U.S. 350; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 only to treat ailments; it is also to educate patients so they can be proactive in their own healthcare. If physicians must tailor their speech to accommodate a political restriction, patients will know their doctors are no longer candid and the quality ofmedical care will erode, potentially with direconsequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case",
		"context": "If physicians must tailor their speech to accommodate a political restriction, patients will know their doctors are no longer candid and the quality ofmedical care will erode, potentially with direconsequences. \"[I]n the fields of medicine and publichealth, information can save lives.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, patients might simply forego necessary medical treatment on account of distrust of theirphysician. Doctor visits can be stressful anduncomfortable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court owes substantial deference to the district courts' findings",
		"context": "Gingles , 478 U.S. at 79. It may reverse only if, \"on the entire evidence,\" it \"is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the §2 inquiry is \"peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case\" and \"requires an 'intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms,\" the clearly-erroneous standard \"preserves the benefit of the trial court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of law .\" Gingles , 478 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rogers , 458 U.S. at 621, 622).",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State",
		"context": "The First Amendment's Free Speech clause, applicable to the states via the Fourteen Amendment, only \"prohibits governmental abridgment of speech\"—not \"private abridgment of speech.\" Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, a claim for constitutional deprivation fails unless it can be shown the deprivation was caused by \"state action.\" This state action doctrine \"requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation 'caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State …', and that 'the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State",
		"context": "Mut. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Conduct satisfying the constitutional \"state action\" requirement also satisfies the \"color of state law\" requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and turns on whether the defendant's actions are \"fairly attributable to the State.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State",
		"context": "Lugar , 457 U.S. at 935 n.18. Resolving the state action question focuses on \"whether 'there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as the State itself.'\" Brentwood , 531 U.S. at 295 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). State action can be found where a public official acts in a way that a private citizen would not have been able to act, but not every action performed by a government official is done with \"some right or privilege created [or imposed] by the State.\" Sullivan , 526 U.S. at 50.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State",
		"context": "Sullivan , 526 U.S. at 50. State action, therefore, does not apply when a government 10 actor is in the midst of his personal, private pursuits. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The public employee must be \"acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.\" 487 U.S. 42.",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State",
		"context": "See 325 U.S. 91. The public employee must be \"acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This makes sense given that public employees are also private citizens. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State",
		"context": "5a (\"It stems from our recognition that public officials aren't just public officials—they're individual citizens, too.\"). Public employees are not only permitted to \"speak[] as citizens about matters of public concern,\" but their speech is also integral in \"promoting the public's interest in receiving the well- informed views of government employees engag[ed] in civic discussion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The government's position conflicts with surrounding provisions",
		"context": "Supra, at 22-24. The word \"inadmissible\" also appears in a provision of IIRIRA that applies prior to a removal proceeding: IIRIRA's mandatory-detention provision. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the 50 mandatory-detention provision, \"inadmissible\" is not a reference to the outcome of an already-completed adjudication; it is a reference to the outcome of a future adjudication. But, even in th at context, it is clear that the relevant future adjudication is the one that will actually occur, not a hypothetical adjudication that would occur if the alien exited the country and re-entered.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. None Of The Formal Hosanna-Tabor Factors Is Satisfied Here",
		"context": "at 203 (Alito, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted).13 13 The Government previously agreed that even when a school has a \"pervasive ly religious atmosphere ,\" its lay teachers cannot be considered ministers where \"there is no requirement that its teachers even be members of [its] religious denomina- tion.\" Br. of Appellee at 11, 29 n.17, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Solicitor General now suggests, however, that \"conditioning the ministe- rial requirement on membership\" could in certain situations in-terfere with church autonomy. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.2d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Article III standing requirements still apply.",
		"context": "Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180-181. This Court has often applied this standard to dis- miss cases brought under the Religion Clauses . Thus, in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found ation , Inc., this Court dismissed an Establishment Clause chal- lenge to conferences and other activities carried out as part of the presid ential Faith -Based and Community Initiative s program , because the suit did not fall within the narrow exception to taxpayer standing rec- ognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Simi- larly, in Valley Forge Christian Coll . v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State , this Court held that Americans United and two of its members lacked standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to the transfer of federal property to a reli- gious college.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 587",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Article III standing requirements still apply.",
		"context": "Simi- larly, in Valley Forge Christian Coll . v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State , this Court held that Americans United and two of its members lacked standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to the transfer of federal property to a reli- gious college. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And more re- cently, members of this Court have rightly argued for applying standing doctrine more faithfully in Estab- lishment Clause cases . American 139 S. Ct. 2067.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Article III standing requirements still apply.",
		"context": "The same is true of some cases brought under the Free Ex- ercise Clause. Thus, i n Harris v. McRae , this Court dismissed a free exercis e challenge to abortion funding restrictions on standing grounds , because the plaintiff religious gr oup had failed to show that its members were individually harmed by the restriction. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, Article III standing has long 28 served as a meaningful check on litigation brought un- der the Religion Clauses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Patent Examiners Make Mistakes",
		"context": "23 F. Cas. 1040. Recognizing that, as with any system, the USPTO and its staff are not perfect, Congress designed the PTAB as a quality control to ol because it was \"con- cerned about overpatenting and the diminishment of competition.\" Thryv, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the unfortunate real- ity is that despite the USPTO's best efforts, \"some-times . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Patent Examiners Make Mistakes",
		"context": ". bad patents slip through.\" SAS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The sheer size of the U.S. patent system boggles the mind; as of 2018, there were more than three mil- lion patents in effect. World Intellectual Property Or-ganization, \"World Intellectual Property Indicators 2019—Patents,\" p. 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The possible reaction of Georgia and other states to a ruling in this case does not factor into the double jeopardy analysis.",
		"context": "The State's argument misconceives constitutional law. T he possible adverse reaction the states might have to enforcing constitutional rights is not a valid reason to disregard those rights . This Court recognized that point in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], when it held that that \"constitutional rights . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The possible reaction of Georgia and other states to a ruling in this case does not factor into the double jeopardy analysis.",
		"context": "violence and disorder.\" Id. at 16; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover , the State's warning —that refusing to recognize the repugnancy exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause crafted by the Georgia Supreme Court will result in the widespread adoption of rules refusing to overturn convictions based on repugnancy —is vastly overblown. Refusing to uphold Georgia's post-McElrath repugnancy doctrine will have little effect outside of Georgia beyond confirming that an acquittal is an acquittal and thus bars a second prosecution for the same offense .",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The possible reaction of Georgia and other states to a ruling in this case does not factor into the double jeopardy analysis.",
		"context": "Consequently, as to acquittals, a ruling for McElrath will do nothing more than bring Georgia into line with 21 the law in every other jurisdiction to consider the issue .6 Nor is there any reason to believe that adopting a prohibition on overturning acquittals based on repugnancy will lead to comparable prohibitions on challenging convictions. To be sure, under federal law and the law of some states , inconsistency between verdicts is not a basis for overturning a conviction . See, e.g., Powell , 469 U.S. at 69; 408 P.3d 885; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 448 P.3d 1134 . But, as discussed above, other states — including Georgia before the McElrath decisions — have reached the opposite conclusion and elected to 6 It also bears noting the absurdity of the State's effort to cast itself as the hero and McElrath as the villain of defendants' rights. McElrath seeks to enforce the rights conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause on defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 P.3d 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The possible reaction of Georgia and other states to a ruling in this case does not factor into the double jeopardy analysis.",
		"context": "Consequently, as to acquittals, a ruling for McElrath will do nothing more than bring Georgia into line with 21 the law in every other jurisdiction to consider the issue .6 Nor is there any reason to believe that adopting a prohibition on overturning acquittals based on repugnancy will lead to comparable prohibitions on challenging convictions. To be sure, under federal law and the law of some states , inconsistency between verdicts is not a basis for overturning a conviction . See, e.g., Powell , 469 U.S. at 69; 408 P.3d 885; New 34 P.3d 133; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But, as discussed above, other states — including Georgia before the McElrath decisions — have reached the opposite conclusion and elected to 6 It also bears noting the absurdity of the State's effort to cast itself as the hero and McElrath as the villain of defendants' rights. McElrath seeks to enforce the rights conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause on defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 P.3d 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The possible reaction of Georgia and other states to a ruling in this case does not factor into the double jeopardy analysis.",
		"context": "It would also discourage defendants from challenging convictions as repugnant for fear their acquittals would also be overturned, especially where the acquittal was on the more serious charge. In short, the rule for which Georgia and its amici advocate is anything but pro -defendant. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 afford defendants greater protections than the Constitution requires . The State and its amici give the Georgia Supreme Court too little credit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fifth Circuit properly found that Louisiana's admitting privileges have not caused closures like those identified in Texas by Hellerstedt",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit did nothing improper. Legal questions receive de novo review. Highmark, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An appellate court reviews thedetermination of historic facts with deference,reversing only when the factual findings by the trialcourt are \"clearly erroneous.\" Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fifth Circuit properly found that Louisiana's admitting privileges have not caused closures like those identified in Texas by Hellerstedt",
		"context": "Ass'n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some issues on appeal have both factual and legal aspects, and the Court distinguishes between review ofhistoric facts and review of the legal effect of such facts.These \"mixed questions of fact and law\" involvesituations where the historical facts are admitted orestablished, and the rule of law is undisputed, but thecourt must determine whether the facts satisfy thelegal standard. 15 When the \"issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the standard of review reflects which \"judicial actor isbetter positioned\" to make the decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fifth Circuit properly found that Louisiana's admitting privileges have not caused closures like those identified in Texas by Hellerstedt",
		"context": "Some issues on appeal have both factual and legal aspects, and the Court distinguishes between review ofhistoric facts and review of the legal effect of such facts.These \"mixed questions of fact and law\" involvesituations where the historical facts are admitted orestablished, and the rule of law is undisputed, but thecourt must determine whether the facts satisfy thelegal standard. 15 When the \"issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the standard of review reflects which \"judicial actor isbetter positioned\" to make the decision. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). When the decision requires a court to\"expound on the law, particularly by amplifying orelaborating on a broad legal standard\" such that\"applying the law involves developing auxiliary legalprinciples of use in other cases,\" then review istypically de novo . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fifth Circuit properly found that Louisiana's admitting privileges have not caused closures like those identified in Texas by Hellerstedt",
		"context": "Id.5 The court below did not disagree with the determinations of historic fact by the trial court.Rather, it reached a different conclusion about whetherthese facts demonstrate that the admitting privilegesrequirement is unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuitconcluded that Louisiana's law is intended to \"furtherthe health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion,\"not an \"unnecessary\" restri ction with the \"purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a womanseeking an abortion.\" Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such an assessment is a legalanalysis and reflects appropriate appellate review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Town of Greece did not modify the legal standard for legislative-prayer, let alone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally",
		"context": ". The argument that Town of Greece \"held that a display\" is constitutional if it \"fits within a longstand- ing history or tradition\" (Comm'n Br.20, 31, 44; accord Legion Br.18), is \"interpretive jiggery-pokery,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to local legislative bodies. As Justice Alito sum-marized: \"All that the Court does today is to allow a town to follow a practice that we have previously held 68 is permissible for Congress and state legislatures.\" 572 U.S. at 603 (concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Town of Greece did not modify the legal standard for legislative-prayer, let alone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally",
		"context": "In Marsh , legislative prayer was upheld in a nar- row opinion by Chief Justice Burger. The same term, in another decision written by Justice Burger, the Court applied Lemon to invalidate a \"symbolic benefit\" to re- ligion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thereafter, the Court explained that Marsh is \"not useful\" outside the legislative-prayer context. 482 U.S. 578.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Town of Greece did not modify the legal standard for legislative-prayer, let alone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally",
		"context": "459 U.S. 116. Thereafter, the Court explained that Marsh is \"not useful\" outside the legislative-prayer context. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since then, the Court has consistently and re- peatedly applied Lemon in religious-display cases. See, e.g., McCreary , 545 U.S. at 860 n.10; Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 604 n.53; Lynch , 465 U.S. at 683.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Town of Greece did not modify the legal standard for legislative-prayer, let alone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally",
		"context": "But it did rely on Justice Kennedy's concur- rence in Allegheny , which both condemned a govern- ment-sponsored cross and expressed contentment to \"remain within the Lemon framework.\" 492 U.S. at 661, 655 (concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennedy, who authored Town of Greece , had also joined the ma- jority in Santa Fe , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which invalidated prayer under Lemon 's purpose and effect prongs—a re- sult that he noted in Town of Greece was not impacted by the decision. 572 U.S. at 587. 69",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "13a (quoting 17 U.S.C. §107). Congress directed courts to engage in a \"case -by-case determi- nation\" of fair use, Harper & Row Publ'rs, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], guided by four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the sub- stantiality of copied material; and (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, 17 U.S.C. §107. Google's petition skirts this inquiry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "It cites no case th at has ever held that factor 2 is dispos- itive for software. Courts weigh factor 2 for software the way they do for any other work —on the facts of each case. See Wall Data [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Oracle II , IP Profes- sors Br. 27-2 9. The per se rule Google seeks would vi- tiate the statute's four- factor analysis; ov erride the \"case -by-case nature\" of the fair use analysis, Harper & Row , 471 U.S at 549; and \"effectively negate Con- gress's express declaration —continuing unchanged for some forty years —that software is copyrightable.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 F.3d 769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "24 -28. In assessing \"the purpose and character of the use,\" courts decide whether it is com- mercial and whether it is \"transformative.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Google skips right over the holding that its copying was wholly commercial. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "25a -28a. That weighs heavily against fair use —so heavily that it could have dominated factor 1, even if Android were mo destly transformative. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As to the half that Google does address, it agrees the court stated the right test for transformative use: A use is transform- ative if it \"alter[s] the first [wor k] with new expres- sion, meaning, or message.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "688 F.3d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "Campbell , 510 U.S. at 580. What Google added to adapt Oracle's work from PCs to smartphones is no different from what a producer does to convert a short story into a movie, which this Court has found to be the \"classic … unfair use.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] reject the approach Google advocates. They ask whether the new work \"uses the copyrighted material itself for a purpose, or imbues it with a char- acter, different from that for which it was created.\" TCA Television 839 F.3d 168109 F.3d 1394 ; see generally Oracle II , NYIPLA Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "495 U.S. 207 reject the approach Google advocates. They ask whether the new work \"uses the copyrighted material itself for a purpose, or imbues it with a char- acter, different from that for which it was created.\" TCA Television [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]109 F.3d 1394 ; see generally Oracle II , NYIPLA Br. 6 6 The cases Google cites each found that the material copied changed meaning in the new work. Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "495 U.S. 207 reject the approach Google advocates. They ask whether the new work \"uses the copyrighted material itself for a purpose, or imbues it with a char- acter, different from that for which it was created.\" TCA Television 839 F.3d 168[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see generally Oracle II , NYIPLA Br. 6 6 The cases Google cites each found that the material copied changed meaning in the new work. Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 F.3d 1394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "6 6 The cases Google cites each found that the material copied changed meaning in the new work. Am. Soc'y for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]725 F.3d 1170 (new work changed message 31 Google also complains that \"[t]he Federal Circuit effectively dismissed … concerns regarding lock -in ef- fects and interoperability\" in analyzing transforma- tive use. Pet. 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "896 F.3d 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "6 6 The cases Google cites each found that the material copied changed meaning in the new work. Am. Soc'y for 896 F.3d 437[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (new work changed message 31 Google also complains that \"[t]he Federal Circuit effectively dismissed … concerns regarding lock -in ef- fects and interoperability\" in analyzing transforma- tive use. Pet. 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.3d 1170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "787, 792 (1963). Broad language in Rule 23 has not prevented this Court from pronouncing what the law is without additional congressional guidance. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]521 U.S. 629 that amend- ments to Rule 23 have not curtailed cy pres . But the Rules Committee's forbearance contemplates the Judiciary's continued engagement in expounding Rule 23. It also reflected concern that a procedural rule authorizing any cy pres could violate the Rules Enabling Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "And contrary to resp ondents' assertions, failed legislative proposals are not a basis to assume the Court cannot interpret a legal provision. Cent. Bank of Denver , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance in most circum- stances.\" Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "Bank of Denver , 511 U.S. 164. \"Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance in most circum- stances.\" Star Athletica, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, when confronted with the Sherman Act's similarly broad language, State Oil Co. v. Khan unanimously adopted the rule that made the most economic sense—even though \"Congress ha[d] not reacted legislatively\" to a decades-old precedent getting it wrong. 522 U.S. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002. Thus, when confronted with the Sherman Act's similarly broad language, State Oil Co. v. Khan unanimously adopted the rule that made the most economic sense—even though \"Congress ha[d] not reacted legislatively\" to a decades-old precedent getting it wrong. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 2 What is atextual is Gaos's use of ellipses to extrapolate Amgen to all class-action litigation when Amgen merely rejected an additional inquiry in class certification requirements for the heavily legislated area of securities litigation. Compare Amgen 568 U.S. 455 with Gaos Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "522 U.S. 3. 2 2 What is atextual is Gaos's use of ellipses to extrapolate Amgen to all class-action litigation when Amgen merely rejected an additional inquiry in class certification requirements for the heavily legislated area of securities litigation. Compare Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with Gaos Br. 24. Congress has not legislated extensively in the cy pres arena, and where it has, contrary to Gaos's claims, it expressed disapproval.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "25–26, 28) that Rule 23(e) language provides nothing more than an ad hoc discretionary balancing test. But a \"trial court has wide discretion when, but on ly when, it calls the game by the right rules.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To require simply that settlements be \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" under Rule 23(e) is, without further guidance from this Court, to \"restate th[e] question\"; \"such an empty and amorphous test\" would simply \"leave to each and every trial court not only the implementation, but also the invention, of the applic- able legal standard.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 826",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "24) the proportionality rule is \"not properly before this Court.\" But a petitioner \"generally possesses the ability to frame the question to be decided in any way he chooses, without being limited to the manner in which the question was framed below.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners 3 Gaos accuses (Br. 43) petiti oners of unfair attacks on the Judiciary, but Gaos simply quotes petitioners quoting the Eighth Circuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "4 Gaos incorrectly characterizes (Br. 44) Subway as a reversal of an \"inadequate\" settlement, though Frank, the appellant in that case, made the same proportionality arguments there that petitioners make here. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pet. Br. 16; Opening Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.3d 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"",
		"context": "21–23, 60. \"Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.\" Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Yee , 503 U.S. at 534. The purely legal issue of fees in cy pres settle- ments is \"fairly included\" in the question presented: \"in what circumstances\" is a cy pres settlement appropriate? The petition ex pressly argued this issue regarding the circuit split.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software's Collaborative and Functional Elements Distinguish It from Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection",
		"context": "Although \"[m]ost of the law of copyright devel- oped in the context of literary works such as novels, plays, and films,\" \"[t]he problem presented by computer programs is fundamentally different.\" Lotus Dev. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Software is made differently from, and serves different purposes than, traditional literary works. Unlike a novel, software today is often built collab- oratively, not by an individual, siloed author.",
		"citation_value_orig": "49 F.3d 807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software's Collaborative and Functional Elements Distinguish It from Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection",
		"context": "A programmer's \"program structure and design may be highly creative and idiosyncratic.\" Sega Enters. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as amended (Jan. 6, 1993). But other aspects of software are utilitarian and serve functional purposes, such as \"fa-cilitat[ing] communication between the user and the com- puter.\" Apple Comput., 35 F.3d 1435.",
		"citation_value_orig": "977 F.2d 1510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software's Collaborative and Functional Elements Distinguish It from Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection",
		"context": "977 F.2d 1510, as amended (Jan. 6, 1993). But other aspects of software are utilitarian and serve functional purposes, such as \"fa-cilitat[ing] communication between the user and the com- puter.\" Apple Comput., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Software thus \" 'hover[s] closely to the elusive boundary' \" between idea and ex- pression that marks copyright's bounds. Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d 522.",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.3d 1435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software's Collaborative and Functional Elements Distinguish It from Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection",
		"context": "Apple Comput., 35 F.3d 1435. Software thus \" 'hover[s] closely to the elusive boundary' \" between idea and ex- pression that marks copyright's bounds. Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The software interfaces at issue in this case are one example. While they reflect certain minimal creativity, these interfaces are largely func-tional, allowing a programmer to invoke a function on a device.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 F.3d 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "They note ( Br. 12-13) that, more than a cent ury later, this Court described legislation that Congress enacts pursuant to the Spending Clause as \" much in the nature of a contract .\" Pennhurst State Sch ool & Hosp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And they argue ( Br. 18) that, given the contract analogy used in Pennhurst and later cases, the Court should not have interpreted Section 1983 to encompass actions brought to enforce rights established by the Social Security Act or other 16 Spending Clause legislation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "First, it is anac hronistic. This Court first articulated the analogy between Spending Clause legislation and contracts in the 20th Century. See Pennhurst , 451 U.S. at 17 (citing Steward Machine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 448 U.S. 297). Pe- titioners point to no indication that Congress would have equated Spending Clause laws with ordinary con- tracts when it adopted Section 1983 shortly after the Civil War , or treated rights created by such laws as un- worthy of judicial enforcement .2 Second, the contract -law analogy is just that —an analogy. Whatever conceptual similarities exist be- tween Spending Clause legislation and a contract for some purposes , the Social Security Act is clearly a fed- eral \"law\" that can establish f ederal rights .",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "First, it is anac hronistic. This Court first articulated the analogy between Spending Clause legislation and contracts in the 20th Century. See Pennhurst , 451 U.S. at 17 (citing Steward Machine 301 U.S. 548 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Pe- titioners point to no indication that Congress would have equated Spending Clause laws with ordinary con- tracts when it adopted Section 1983 shortly after the Civil War , or treated rights created by such laws as un- worthy of judicial enforcement .2 Second, the contract -law analogy is just that —an analogy. Whatever conceptual similarities exist be- tween Spending Clause legislation and a contract for some purposes , the Social Security Act is clearly a fed- eral \"law\" that can establish f ederal rights .",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. 1983. For example, while this Court has reserved the question whether a federal contract can itself preempt state law, see Coventry Health Care of Missouri, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court has re- peatedly h eld that Spending Clause legislation preempts conflicting state law, see, e.g., id. at 1194. Similarly, the Court has recognized that such legisla- tion bind s not only the recipients of federal funds but also third parties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "at 1194. Similarly, the Court has recognized that such legisla- tion bind s not only the recipients of federal funds but also third parties. See, e.g., Lawrence [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, to the extent a contract analogy has any force, it is not apparent why the proper reference is to the 2 By contrast, the analogy to contracts can make it appropriate to consider contract -law principles in deciding whet her to recognize an implied cause of action in 20th -Century legislation and what reme- dies are available under such an action . See, e.g., 142 S. Ct. 1562 ; 575 U.S. 320 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "3. In any event, peti tioners have not shown that it was \"well settled at the time of [Section 1983's] enact- ment\" that third -party beneficiaries could not sue on a contract. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners contend (Br. 13) only that their rule was \"generally\" followed in the United States when Con- gress enacted Section 1983.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 464 n.(e) (O. W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 12th ed. 1873).3 And this Court ap- pears to have agreed, stating in 1876 that \"the right of a party to maintain assumpsit on a promise not under seal, made to another for his benefit, although much controverted, is now the prevailing rule in this country.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners' reliance on cases regarding government contracts ( Br. 18-23) also fails.",
		"citation_value_orig": "93 U.S. 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "21 into Section 1983 , especially without some explicit hook in the statutory text . 4. Petitioners likewise have failed to show the sort of heightened \"special justification\" this Court demands before overruling statutory -interpretation precedent s. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For half a century, Congress has legislated against the backdrop of this Court's \"h[o]l d[ing] that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Securi ty Act.\" Edelman , 415 U.S. at 675.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "1396a(a)(10)(A) , and to fur- nish that assistance with reasonable prompt ness to \"all eligible individuals,\" 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8). See, e.g., Ro- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 501 F.3d 348, cert. denied,552 U.S. 1243; S.D. ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.3d 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "1396a(a)(10)(A) , and to fur- nish that assistance with reasonable prompt ness to \"all eligible individuals,\" 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8). See, e.g., Ro- 721 F.3d 373; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,552 U.S. 1243; S.D. ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 F.3d 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "denied,552 U.S. 1243; S.D. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sa- 367 F.3d 180; 308 F.3d 79; 136 F.3d 709. Those private actions play a vital role in ensuring that States comply with the bedrock statutory requirement to pay promptly for medical care for needy persons.5 The fact that courts sometimes disagree about how to interpret particular provisions of Spending Clause legislation (see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 F.3d 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "denied,552 U.S. 1243; S.D. ex rel. 391 F.3d 581; Sa- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 308 F.3d 79; 136 F.3d 709. Those private actions play a vital role in ensuring that States comply with the bedrock statutory requirement to pay promptly for medical care for needy persons.5 The fact that courts sometimes disagree about how to interpret particular provisions of Spending Clause legislation (see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 F.3d 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "denied,552 U.S. 1243; S.D. ex rel. 391 F.3d 581; Sa- 367 F.3d 180; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 136 F.3d 709. Those private actions play a vital role in ensuring that States comply with the bedrock statutory requirement to pay promptly for medical care for needy persons.5 The fact that courts sometimes disagree about how to interpret particular provisions of Spending Clause legislation (see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "308 F.3d 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "denied,552 U.S. 1243; S.D. ex rel. 391 F.3d 581; Sa- 367 F.3d 180; 308 F.3d 79; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those private actions play a vital role in ensuring that States comply with the bedrock statutory requirement to pay promptly for medical care for needy persons.5 The fact that courts sometimes disagree about how to interpret particular provisions of Spending Clause legislation (see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 F.3d 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "Petition- ers have not demonstrated that those disagreements are more widespread with r espect to Spending Clause legislation than they are with respect to other laws. 5 The Medicaid statute's free -choice -of-provider require ment, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23), which \"gives recipients the right to choose among a range of qualified providers, without government interfer- ence,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]536 U.S. 283 . Although there is some disagree- ment in the circuits on that question, the contrary rulings relied in part on the fact that this requirement is a mandatory element of a state plan, see, e.g., 867 F.3d 1034, which does not preclude a Section 1983 action for the rea- sons discussed above, see pp. 10-15, supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "5 The Medicaid statute's free -choice -of-provider require ment, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23), which \"gives recipients the right to choose among a range of qualified providers, without government interfer- ence,\" 447 U.S. 773536 U.S. 283 . Although there is some disagree- ment in the circuits on that question, the contrary rulings relied in part on the fact that this requirement is a mandatory element of a state plan, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which does not preclude a Section 1983 action for the rea- sons discussed above, see pp. 10-15, supra . 23 Petitioners' proposed exclusion of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" covered by Section 1983 , moreover, would introduce substantial administrability problems of its own.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 1034",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
		"context": "Reading Section 1983 to exempt provisions adopted pursuant to the Spending Clause rather than other enumerated powers would therefore often require courts to decide which powers Congress did or could have invoked . That determination could force courts to address otherwise unnecessary constitutional questions about the scope of Congress's enumerated powers . Compare, e.g., National Federation of Independent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , with id. at 661-669 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). Petitioners have assumed (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Speedy Trial Rights",
		"context": "It is similarly restrictive of the prosecution, requiring that serviceme mbers must be brought to trial within 120 days of the initiation of charges, placed under certain restraints or retur ned 23 to active duty. R.C.M. 707(b)(1); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like Article 10, R.C.M. 707 limitations are designed to exceed the existing Sixth Amendment protections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "51 M.J. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT AN UNDERLYING BASIS FOR ITS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE IS ARBITRATION'S SPEED AND EFFICIENCY",
		"context": ". can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration.\" See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Repeatedly, this Court has itself extolled speedier process and lowered costs as benefits of arbitration. See Allied -Bruce Terminix 513 U.S. 265 ; (arbitration \"is usually cheaper and 5 faster than litigation\") ; 552 U.S. 346; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep- cion, 563 U.S. at 345 (\"the informality of arbitral pro- ceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and in-creasing the speed of dispute resolution .\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT AN UNDERLYING BASIS FOR ITS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE IS ARBITRATION'S SPEED AND EFFICIENCY",
		"context": "See, e.g., 346 U.S. 427 . Repeatedly, this Court has itself extolled speedier process and lowered costs as benefits of arbitration. See Allied -Bruce Terminix [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; (arbitration \"is usually cheaper and 5 faster than litigation\") ; 552 U.S. 346; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep- cion, 563 U.S. at 345 (\"the informality of arbitral pro- ceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and in-creasing the speed of dispute resolution .\") (citations omitted). In order to achieve this intended speed and ef- ficiency , this Court has concluded that Congress drafted the FAA procedures with the express goal of moving the parties \"out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT AN UNDERLYING BASIS FOR ITS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE IS ARBITRATION'S SPEED AND EFFICIENCY",
		"context": "See, e.g., 346 U.S. 427 . Repeatedly, this Court has itself extolled speedier process and lowered costs as benefits of arbitration. See Allied -Bruce Terminix 513 U.S. 265 ; (arbitration \"is usually cheaper and 5 faster than litigation\") ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep- cion, 563 U.S. at 345 (\"the informality of arbitral pro- ceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and in-creasing the speed of dispute resolution .\") (citations omitted). In order to achieve this intended speed and ef- ficiency , this Court has concluded that Congress drafted the FAA procedures with the express goal of moving the parties \"out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT AN UNDERLYING BASIS FOR ITS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE IS ARBITRATION'S SPEED AND EFFICIENCY",
		"context": "(citations omitted). In order to achieve this intended speed and ef- ficiency , this Court has concluded that Congress drafted the FAA procedures with the express goal of moving the parties \"out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible .\" Moses H. Cone Memorial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress did this by providing for a stay of litigation to enforce an arbitration agreement , 9 U.S.C. § 3 , and the authority to issue an order to compel arbitration, id., § 4, both of which were de- signed to fulfill Congress's intent that an agreement to arbitrat e would result in an expeditious hearing and timely resolution .",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT AN UNDERLYING BASIS FOR ITS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE IS ARBITRATION'S SPEED AND EFFICIENCY",
		"context": ". makes the process slower [and] more costly\"), and 3) not allow ing a court to weigh in on the arbitrator's decision regarding remedies, Unit- ed Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] In sum, this Court has steadfastly ruled against any procedure that might present an obstacle to achieving the FAA's underlying goals of speed and efficiency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Either of these constitutional bases prohibits the abolition of the affirmative insanity defense",
		"context": "In order to resolve this case, this Court need do no more than hold that the Constitution does not permit a state to abolish the mechanism that permits a de- fendant to show that he is not culpable as a result of his insanity. With blameworthiness as the touch- stone, states retain ample leeway to experime nt with the formulation of the insanity defense that works best for their citizen s and the juries that ultimately must decide whether to hold a defendant accountable for his acts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, states have encountered little difficulty in doing so . The most common formulation has been 37 one that asks if the defendant can \"appreciate .",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Either of these constitutional bases prohibits the abolition of the affirmative insanity defense",
		"context": "And states can and do institute procedural mechanisms to ensure that the individual seeking the defense is qualified to raise it. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States can also allocate burdens as they see fit. Many states put the burden of pr oof on the defend- ant, consistent with the historical and common -sense view that \"most men are sane. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Director Does Not Have Unfettered Discretion to Institute an IPR, Let Alone One that Is Time Barred",
		"context": "§ 315(b) (emphasis added). Where, as here, the statutory language is clear, the Director \"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress\" by denying institution of any time-barred petition. Nat'l Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the Director has no discretion to institute IPR upon a time-barred petition. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Case Law Does Not Bar the Courthouse Doors to Axon's Constitutional Claims",
		"context": ". The panel decision is rooted in a misinterpretation and expansion of Thunder Basin , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Elgin , 567 U.S. 1 .10 Thunder Basin and Elgin were both rooted in implied congressional intent. The principles they announce cannot be transplanted from old soil to new without an assessment of the congressional intent embodied there. And that assessment of the FTC Act confirms Congress did not intend to preclude Axon from raising its claims in federal district court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Case Law Does Not Bar the Courthouse Doors to Axon's Constitutional Claims",
		"context": ". The panel decision is rooted in a misinterpretation and expansion of Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. 200, and Elgin , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .10 Thunder Basin and Elgin were both rooted in implied congressional intent. The principles they announce cannot be transplanted from old soil to new without an assessment of the congressional intent embodied there. And that assessment of the FTC Act confirms Congress did not intend to preclude Axon from raising its claims in federal district court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Case Law Does Not Bar the Courthouse Doors to Axon's Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "\" Elgin , 567 U.S. at 11 –12. By contrast, entities like Axon have no ability to obtain review of their constitutional challenges to the FTC's authority through the FTC Act scheme unless and until the FTC issues a cease -and-desist order against them. Moreov er, the Mine Act involved administrative proceedings before an independent commission (rather than the agency enforcing the Mine Act), see Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 204 ; Sec'y of 991 F.3d 1297 , and th e CSRA involved actions by the government as an employer, rather than a regulator , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 589 F.3d 445. Those are different animals from inhouse enforcement proceedings brought by administrative agencies, particularly when , as here, those enforcement procee dings are interfering with private rights. Thunder Basin itself confirms the panel's decision here was erroneous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Case Law Does Not Bar the Courthouse Doors to Axon's Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "\" Elgin , 567 U.S. at 11 –12. By contrast, entities like Axon have no ability to obtain review of their constitutional challenges to the FTC's authority through the FTC Act scheme unless and until the FTC issues a cease -and-desist order against them. Moreov er, the Mine Act involved administrative proceedings before an independent commission (rather than the agency enforcing the Mine Act), see Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 204 ; Sec'y of 991 F.3d 1297 , and th e CSRA involved actions by the government as an employer, rather than a regulator , see 484 U.S. 439 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those are different animals from inhouse enforcement proceedings brought by administrative agencies, particularly when , as here, those enforcement procee dings are interfering with private rights. Thunder Basin itself confirms the panel's decision here was erroneous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "589 F.3d 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Article 4 provided authority for the Crow Tribe to seek game outside the reservation boundaries only until non-Indians began to occupy the wilderness surrounding the reservation",
		"context": ". Indian treaties are \"construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Treaty language matters, however, and a court cannot disregard \"the obvious, palpable meaning of the words of an Indian treaty\" because \"in the opinion of the court, that meaning may in a particular transaction work what it wo uld regard as injustice to the Indians.\" 179 U.S. 494.",
		"citation_value_orig": "175 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Article 4 provided authority for the Crow Tribe to seek game outside the reservation boundaries only until non-Indians began to occupy the wilderness surrounding the reservation",
		"context": "175 U.S. 1. Treaty language matters, however, and a court cannot disregard \"the obvious, palpable meaning of the words of an Indian treaty\" because \"in the opinion of the court, that meaning may in a particular transaction work what it wo uld regard as injustice to the Indians.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts must follow treaty language \"that, viewed in its historical context and given a fair appraisal, clearly runs counter to the tribe's claims.\" Or.",
		"citation_value_orig": "179 U.S. 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Article 4 provided authority for the Crow Tribe to seek game outside the reservation boundaries only until non-Indians began to occupy the wilderness surrounding the reservation",
		"context": "Courts must follow treaty language \"that, viewed in its historical context and given a fair appraisal, clearly runs counter to the tribe's claims.\" Or. Dep't of Fish and Wildli [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interpretation requires the Court to examine the text, the treaty's historical context, and the understanding of the parties as reflected in the treaty's implementation. Each of these inquiries demonstrates that the Crow Tribe's off-reservation hunting right has expired.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. There is no qualifying national emergency",
		"context": "Indeed, if those types of declarations triggered theHeroes Act, it could be invoked at any time by anyPresident. \"It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.\" Third Nat'l Bank in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26 As the term \"national emergency\" is used within the phrase \"war or othermilitary operation or national emergency,\" it shouldnot be understood as providing blanket cancellationauthority for other types of national emergencies,especially when congressional findings specify theHEROES Act was intended to benefit active dutymilitary personnel. The DOE had \"never before adopted a broad ... regulation of th[at] kind.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Critical-habitat designations have significant financial effects on States and private parties",
		"context": "Andrew J. Turner & Kerry L. McGrath, A Wider View of the Impacts of Critical Habitat Designation A Comment on Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms , 43 ENVTL .L.REP.NEWS &ANALYSIS 10678, 10680 (2013). For example, the Court's first major decision examining that act, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, resulted in the suspension of a dam-building project that was 80 percent complete and for which Congress had spent more than $100 million of taxpayer money. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It was a harbinger of things to come. Critical habitat designations, by their very nature, limit 10 human activity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "The Fourth Amendment provides that \"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized ,\" U.S. Const. amend IV, and it applies to the FTC. Knoll Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has held that the warrant itself —not merely supporting documents —must state with particularity the things to be seized such that the description is available for inspection by the person whose premises is to be searched. 540 U.S. 551.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 F.2d 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "Knoll Assocs., 397 F.2d 530. This Court has held that the warrant itself —not merely supporting documents —must state with particularity the things to be seized such that the description is available for inspection by the person whose premises is to be searched. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any \"warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.\" 468 U.S. 981.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "540 U.S. 551. Any \"warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has never allowed the Fourth Amendment to be nullified or circumvented simply by appointing a receiver to seize the premises before a general search is conducted. The evils of general warrants go to the heart of the Founding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 981",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Police Officer's Discharge of A Firearm Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment Seizure",
		"context": ". In the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio , this Court explained that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer restrains the \"liberty of a citizen\" in one of two ways: either by \"physical force\" or by \"show of authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A seizure by \"physical force\" occurs by the \"laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.\" 499 U.S. 621.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Police Officer's Discharge of A Firearm Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment Seizure",
		"context": "392 U.S. 1. A seizure by \"physical force\" occurs by the \"laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A seizure by \"show of authority,\" by contrast, occurs when, \"in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\" 446 U.S. 544.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Police Officer's Discharge of A Firearm Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment Seizure",
		"context": "499 U.S. 621. A seizure by \"show of authority,\" by contrast, occurs when, \"in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Importantly, the Mendenhall test employs an \"objective standard\" that \"calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police.\" Chestnut , 486 U.S. at 574.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Police Officer's Discharge of A Firearm Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment Seizure",
		"context": "Plainly, then, an officer who unholsters their gun and actually points it at a person signals to any reasonable person that they are not free to turn around and walk away. That is, by definition, a \"show of authority\" that would convey to a reasonable person that they are not \"free to 'disregard the police and go about his business.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 The seizure in this case involves an even greater show of authority. It does not involve an officer simply putting a hand on a gun or pointing it at someone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Police Officer's Discharge of A Firearm Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment Seizure",
		"context": "499 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added). If the slightest application of physical force is enough to effect an arrest, then the use of deadly force must certainly be a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Garner , 471 U.S. at 7 (stating that \"there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, according to th is Court's precedent, which the Tenth Circuit failed to follow, the actual restraint of an individual is not dispositive as to whether a seizure has occurred. In Hodari D. , this Court stated that the \"word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split as to Whether Police Officers May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm",
		"context": "The court of appeals decision does not conflict with the decisions of any other circuit. On the contrary, the cases from other circuits that Kisela puts forth could not be more different than this case—they involve a genuine risk of third-party harm. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited in Pet. 17, does not bear any resemblance to this case. In Untalan , an officer used lethal force against a suspect who was wr estling for control of a butcher knife after lunging at and stabbing an officer with the knife.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 F.3d 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split as to Whether Police Officers May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm",
		"context": "at 313–14. There is no comparison between, on the one hand, wrestling with a police officer for a butcher knife an d, on the other, standing in a yard while holding a ki tchen knife at one's side and engaging in conversation. Similarly, in Larsen's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited in Pet. App. 16, officers used deadly force against a man who raised a knife above his shoulder with the blade pointed outwards.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 F.3d 1255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split as to Whether Police Officers May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm",
		"context": "When officers warned him that they would shoot if he did not drop the knife, he advanced toward the officers. Id. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited in Pet. 17, fits the pattern of Untalan and Larsen's Estate —police shot someone who did not 32 merely hold a weapon, but wielded it in a threatening manner. In Mace, police officers arrived to the scene to find a man with blood y hands smashing windows and brandishing a sword.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.3d 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split as to Whether Police Officers May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm",
		"context": "at 624–25. This is a far cry from holding a kitchen knife in one's yard. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited in Pet. 16, the plaintiff was armed with a gun, not a knife, and he had previously moved the firearm up and down and aimed it at the officers. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "584 F.3d 1304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split as to Whether Police Officers May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm",
		"context": "Unlike Ms. Hughes, he therefore posed \"an immediate threat to [the officers] or to others in the neighborhood.\" Id. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited in Pet. 16, a police officer tried to arrest a man who responded by stealing the officer's police cruiser and driving off. The court found the use of force reasonable based on the unique dangers posed by an erratic person in control of a police car: \"We stress these facts: Long was mentally unstable; and he had taken control of not just any vehicle, but a police cruiser.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 F.3d 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. USERRA provides important reemployment rights and protections from discrimination",
		"context": "USERRA achieves its purposes by providing servicemembers reemployment rights upon their return from service and by protecting them against discrimination based on their service. Its provisions are \"to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need.\" Fishgold , 328 U.S. at 285 (construing USERRA's predecessor statute); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The First Amendment gives governments ample latitude to develop programs involving private speakers",
		"context": "See, e.g., A.N.S.W.E.R. 28 Coal 153 F. Supp. 3d 395 ; see also, e.g. , Community for Creative Non [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition to national celebration events, the Park Service sponsors one -time events in park areas that may involve the active participation of private entities. For example, in July 2019, \"a on ce-in-a-lifetime celebration of the 50th a nniversary of Apollo 11 \" featured images and a movie about the moon landing \"projected on the east face of the Washington Monument.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "908 F.2d 992",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Viking's contention that a \"representative\" action necessarily involves procedures incompatible with ar-bitration is ahistorical. When Congress enacted the FAA, the meaning of \"settle by arbitration a contro- versy\" included representative arbitration conducted on a bilateral basis. Far from being incompatible with the \"form of arbitration envisioned by the FAA,\" Lamps Plus, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"the virtues Congre ss originally saw in ar- bitration,\" Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623, bilateral, 35 representative arbitration of employment disputes was common in 1925 and recognized by several con- temporaneous federal statutes. In the early 1920's, the two most common catego- ries of arbitration were commercial and maritime dis-putes (the principal focus of the FAA), and labor dis-putes arising in unionized industries, which were fre- quently resolved by bilateral arbitrations between un- ions (as representatives of the interests of their mem- bers) and employers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 1407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "577, 46 U.S.C. § 651 (repealed). Circuit City Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. –––––––––––––––––––––––– 10 See briefs of amici curiae AFL-CIO and National Academy of Arbitrators. 36 Notably, Congress used the same words in the Railway Labor Act (RLA) as in the FAA to describe the dispute resolution procedures established by statute: \"arbitration\" of a \"controver sy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "at 1624, bilateral, representa- tive proceedings involving employment controversies were well within its contemporaneous understanding of \"arbitration.\" Construing \"settle by arbitration a controversy\" in section 2 of the FAA to exclude bilat- eral, representative proceedings involving employ- ment disputes would run afoul of the \"fundamental canon of statute construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary mean-ing at the time Congress enacted the statute .\" New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and non-transpor- tation employees within the FAA's scope—even though the statutes were enacted at nearly the same time and used similar language. That result can no more be squared with the poli- cies of the statutes than with their text. Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration. The recognition of those benefits in employment ar bitration continued under the National Labor Relations Act, see Pyett , 556 U.S. at 256-57, and this Court ha s repeatedly endorsed ar- bitration of representative labor claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nolde 430 U.S. 243; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; 363 U.S. 574; 363 U.S. 593; Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. 550. The use of representative arbitration in the unionized workplace, where the stakes may be very high and the complexity of disputes makes expert decisionmakers desirable, also refutes the suggestion that high stakes and substantive complexity (in the absence of procedural requirements incompatible with arbitration) require treating bilateral, repre- sentative workplace actions as outside the realm of ar- bitration as envisioned in 1925. 38",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration. The recognition of those benefits in employment ar bitration continued under the National Labor Relations Act, see Pyett , 556 U.S. at 256-57, and this Court ha s repeatedly endorsed ar- bitration of representative labor claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. 643; Nolde [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; 363 U.S. 574; 363 U.S. 593; Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. 550. The use of representative arbitration in the unionized workplace, where the stakes may be very high and the complexity of disputes makes expert decisionmakers desirable, also refutes the suggestion that high stakes and substantive complexity (in the absence of procedural requirements incompatible with arbitration) require treating bilateral, repre- sentative workplace actions as outside the realm of ar- bitration as envisioned in 1925. 38",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration. The recognition of those benefits in employment ar bitration continued under the National Labor Relations Act, see Pyett , 556 U.S. at 256-57, and this Court ha s repeatedly endorsed ar- bitration of representative labor claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. 643; Nolde 430 U.S. 243; John Wiley & Sons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 363 U.S. 574; 363 U.S. 593; Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. 550. The use of representative arbitration in the unionized workplace, where the stakes may be very high and the complexity of disputes makes expert decisionmakers desirable, also refutes the suggestion that high stakes and substantive complexity (in the absence of procedural requirements incompatible with arbitration) require treating bilateral, repre- sentative workplace actions as outside the realm of ar- bitration as envisioned in 1925. 38",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration. The recognition of those benefits in employment ar bitration continued under the National Labor Relations Act, see Pyett , 556 U.S. at 256-57, and this Court ha s repeatedly endorsed ar- bitration of representative labor claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. 643; Nolde 430 U.S. 243; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 363 U.S. 593; Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. 550. The use of representative arbitration in the unionized workplace, where the stakes may be very high and the complexity of disputes makes expert decisionmakers desirable, also refutes the suggestion that high stakes and substantive complexity (in the absence of procedural requirements incompatible with arbitration) require treating bilateral, repre- sentative workplace actions as outside the realm of ar- bitration as envisioned in 1925. 38",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration. The recognition of those benefits in employment ar bitration continued under the National Labor Relations Act, see Pyett , 556 U.S. at 256-57, and this Court ha s repeatedly endorsed ar- bitration of representative labor claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. 643; Nolde 430 U.S. 243; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; 363 U.S. 574; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Goodall-Sanford, 353 U.S. 550. The use of representative arbitration in the unionized workplace, where the stakes may be very high and the complexity of disputes makes expert decisionmakers desirable, also refutes the suggestion that high stakes and substantive complexity (in the absence of procedural requirements incompatible with arbitration) require treating bilateral, repre- sentative workplace actions as outside the realm of ar- bitration as envisioned in 1925. 38",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding",
		"context": "Congress's de-cided preference for bilateral arbitration between em- ployers and workers' representatives to resolve labor disputes furthers the same interests—speed, infor- mality, and expertise—that are typically invoked as benefits of FAA arbitration. The recognition of those benefits in employment ar bitration continued under the National Labor Relations Act, see Pyett , 556 U.S. at 256-57, and this Court ha s repeatedly endorsed ar- bitration of representative labor claims. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. 643; Nolde 430 U.S. 243; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; 363 U.S. 574; 363 U.S. 593; Goodall-Sanford, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The use of representative arbitration in the unionized workplace, where the stakes may be very high and the complexity of disputes makes expert decisionmakers desirable, also refutes the suggestion that high stakes and substantive complexity (in the absence of procedural requirements incompatible with arbitration) require treating bilateral, repre- sentative workplace actions as outside the realm of ar- bitration as envisioned in 1925. 38",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The history of the statute confirms that \"actual knowledge\" does not encompass constructive knowledge",
		"context": "889 . The latter provision applied without regard to whether the plaintiff had in fact read the publicly filed reports. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In 1987, however, Congress amended the statute to eliminate the 16 constructive knowledge provision and retain only \"ac- tual knowledge\" as the trigger for the three -year limi- tations period. See Pension Protection Act, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.2d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The history of the statute confirms that \"actual knowledge\" does not encompass constructive knowledge",
		"context": "And the 1987 amendments demonstrate that Congress delib- erately eliminated the prior constructive knowledge stan - dard as a basis for triggering the three -year limitations period in Section 1113( 2). \"When Congress amends legis- lation, courts must 'presume it intends the change to have real and substantial effect.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that petition- ers propose would be broader in some respects than the since -removed constructive knowledge standard. The prior version of Section 1113(2) imputed to a plaintiff only knowledge of specific reports filed with the Secre- tary. See Fink , 772 F.2d at 956 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The history of the statute confirms that \"actual knowledge\" does not encompass constructive knowledge",
		"context": "What petitioners effective ly seek then \"is not a construction of [the] statute,\" but rather \"an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted may be included within its scope.\" West Va. Univ. Hosps., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th at request should be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State courts and federal district courts also split on the question",
		"context": "20–21. Other courts reject that interpretation of Nelson . See, e.g., Rafaeli , 505 Mich. at 459– 60; Coleman through [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 2022 WL 2286381, motion to certify appeal denied2022 WL 3133063 . The conflicting understandings of Nelson and resulting contradictory holdings underscore rather than obviate the need for this Court to grant review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 F.Supp.3d 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Assignor Estoppel Is Contrary To Patent Policy",
		"context": ". Congress is \"concerned about overpatenting and its diminishment of competition,\" and structures the patent laws \"to weed out bad patent claims efficiently.\" Thryv, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court could not have been more consistent over the decades in expressing the critical role litigating validity plays in our patent system. See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Assignor Estoppel Is Contrary To Patent Policy",
		"context": "None of Hologic, its amici, or the Government, has reported any reduction in patent licenses after Lear or that assignments slowed during the decades between Lear and Diamond Scientific, when it was widely assumed that assignor estoppel was dead. Even now, assignors are able to raise common invalidity challenges (but not on Section 112 grounds) in inter partes proceedings. Arista Networks, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet Hologic, its amici, and the Government point to no evidence that allowing assignors to raise invalidity challenges is deterring patent assignments. That provides reason to be confident that allowing assignors to raise invalidity challenges in litigation will likewise 17 not impact patent assignments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "908 F.3d 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Assignor Estoppel Is Contrary To Patent Policy",
		"context": "The Government acknowledged in Lear that eliminating patent estoppel doctrines \"would leave unimpaired\" other state law doctrines such as \"equitable estoppel.\" U.S. Br., Lear , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 56), 1968 WL 129415 at 23 n.13; see also SCA Hygiene , 137 S. Ct. at 967 (\"[E]quitable estoppel provides protection against … unscrupulous patentees ….\"). 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "DHS attempts (at 26) to distinguish those precedents because they involved \"habeas review,\" a context in which this Court requires a \"particularly clear state- ment\" for Congress to foreclose review. But th is Court likewise requires a clear statement to foreclose chal- leng es to \"administrative action ,\" including for \"legisla- tion regarding immigration.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Guerrero 140 S. Ct. 1062 . So this is no distinction at all. Petitioners also have ano ther problem: they claim (at 2) that the Final Memorandum is an exercise of authority under 6 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "DHS attempts (at 26) to distinguish those precedents because they involved \"habeas review,\" a context in which this Court requires a \"particularly clear state- ment\" for Congress to foreclose review. But th is Court likewise requires a clear statement to foreclose chal- leng es to \"administrative action ,\" including for \"legisla- tion regarding immigration.\" 558 U.S. 233 ; see also Guerrero [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . So this is no distinction at all. Petitioners also have ano ther problem: they claim (at 2) that the Final Memorandum is an exercise of authority under 6 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1062",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "Kucana , 558 U.S. at 249. History and context also show that section 1231(h) was designed to overturn the Ninth Circuit's interpreta- tion of section 1231's predecessor statute, which that court interpreted as giving removable aliens a judicially enforceable right to speedy removal. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress responded in 1994 by amending the INA through the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 , Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "942 F.2d 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": ". must have been our Ninth Circuit law allowing\" aliens to seek speedy re- moval. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The legislative record also reflects this purpose. See 140 Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 F.3d 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "§ 1252(g) is also mis- placed. The States are not raising claims \"by or on behalf of any alien\" per section 1252(g), and that section provides no \"clear and convincin g evidence of legislative intention to preclude review.\" Ja- pan Whaling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 squared here with the statute's \"mandatory language: 'shall,'\" which imposes \"a n obligation.\" Me.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "Me. Cmty. Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Kingdomware Techs., 579 U.S. 162 . Nor can it be reconciled with Congress deem- ing it \"too risky\" to release aliens that section 1226(c ) co- vers. Nielsen , 139 S. Ct. at 959.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "Petitioners' contrary authority is inapposite. One cited case did not involve e xecutive enforcement discre- tion at all , but a claim that a city ordinance violated due process. See City o f [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners' remaining authorities involved chal-lenges to individual non -enforcement decisions —not regulation s that change an enforcement scheme alto- gether. See Castle Rock , 545 U.S. at 751 (addressing an alleg ed \"fail[ ure] to respond properly\" to violations of a restraining order); Heckler , 470 U.S. at 823 (\"investiga- tory and enforcement actions\" regarding lethal -injection drugs); 525 U.S. 471.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "See City o f 527 U.S. 41. Petitioners' remaining authorities involved chal-lenges to individual non -enforcement decisions —not regulation s that change an enforcement scheme alto- gether. See Castle Rock , 545 U.S. at 751 (addressing an alleg ed \"fail[ ure] to respond properly\" to violations of a restraining order); Heckler , 470 U.S. at 823 (\"investiga- tory and enforcement actions\" regarding lethal -injection drugs); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31 This Court has never held that an agency's generally applicable rules about how or whether it will enforce the law in toto are beyond scrutiny as exercises of putative enforcement discretion. Cf .",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "31 This Court has never held that an agency's generally applicable rules about how or whether it will enforce the law in toto are beyond scrutiny as exercises of putative enforcement discretion. Cf . OSG Bulk [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 96 F.3d 1118 ; Crowley Caribbean 37 F.3d 671 . Rightly so : any such theory of \"enforcement dis- cretion\" would conflict with the Executive's obligation to see the laws faithfully executed . U.S. CONST .",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 F.3d 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "31 This Court has never held that an agency's generally applicable rules about how or whether it will enforce the law in toto are beyond scrutiny as exercises of putative enforcement discretion. Cf . OSG Bulk 132 F.3d 808; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Crowley Caribbean 37 F.3d 671 . Rightly so : any such theory of \"enforcement dis- cretion\" would conflict with the Executive's obligation to see the laws faithfully executed . U.S. CONST .",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 F.3d 1118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "31 This Court has never held that an agency's generally applicable rules about how or whether it will enforce the law in toto are beyond scrutiny as exercises of putative enforcement discretion. Cf . OSG Bulk 132 F.3d 808; 96 F.3d 1118 ; Crowley Caribbean [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Rightly so : any such theory of \"enforcement dis- cretion\" would conflict with the Executive's obligation to see the laws faithfully executed . U.S. CONST .",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 F.3d 671",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "See Nielsen , 139 S. Ct. at 969- 70. Instead, Congress enacted the grace period understand- ing that funding problems alone do not permit the Exec- utive to re -write congressional commands . In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] skeptically. The district court found that \"the Government has not acted in good faith\" regarding its \"insufficient resources and limited detentio n capacity.\" JA.358- 59.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "§ 202(5) 's general grant of authority to establish \"immi- gration enforcement policies and priorities\" overrides section 1226(c). When one statute gives a \"general per- mission\" that is \"contradicted by a specific prohibition\" in anothe r, the \"contradiction\" is \"eliminate[d]\" by con- struing the \"spec ific provision\" as \"an exception to the general one.\" RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whatever general authority DHS possess es is limited by section 1226(c) . b. Petitioners' arguments regarding section 1231 are likewise meritless .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "There is nothing remarkable about Congress using \"detain\" for the same purpose. \"Though one might wish it were otherwise, \" legislators \" more than rarely use the same word to denote different concepts, and of-ten (out of a misplaced pursuit of stylistic elegance) use different words to denote the same concept.\" A. SCALIA & B. GARNER , READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012); see also Ki [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , DHS contend s (at 32) that in all events it may release at least some aliens with removal orders because section 1231(a)(2)'s \"second sentence\" provid es that DHS may \"under no circumstance\" release aliens with a removal order who have committed certain crimes. Ac-cordingly, they say s ection 1231(a)(2)'s first sentence — providing that petitioners \"shall detain the alien\" —must provide discretion to release other types of aliens or the second sentence is superfluous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates",
		"context": "But the second sentence reflects \"belt -and-suspenders caution ,\" which is not atypical. See Atl . Richfield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Territory of 141 S. Ct. 1608. The subset of aliens subject to section 1231(a)(2)'s second sentence include s those convicted of serious crimes and terrorists. It was prudent for Congress to emphasize that no matter what contingencies may arise, t errorists must no t be released.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court Can — and Should — Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
		"context": "Otherwise , CAAF could conclude its precedential opinions with the disposition it tacked onto Dalmazzi,11 and thereby render this Court (and a 11. CAAF has even relied upon its substantive analysis in Dalmazzi in subsequent opinions. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court therefore has jurisdiction in all eight cases.12 B. \"Abuse of Discretion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "76 M.J. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court Can — and Should — Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
		"context": "52 –53. The government waived this ar gument by failing to raise it in opposing certiorari . S. Ct. R. 15.2; see Granite Rock [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . holding in . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court Can — and Should — Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
		"context": ". . Dalmazzi \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the government correctly argues, this Court's appellate jurisdiction does not turn—and never has turned —on whether the \"proceedings in a cause already instituted\" took place before an Article III court . E.g., 155 U.S. 76270 U.S. 568 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "76 M.J. 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court Can — and Should — Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
		"context": "Dalmazzi \"); 76 M.J. 315. As the government correctly argues, this Court's appellate jurisdiction does not turn—and never has turned —on whether the \"proceedings in a cause already instituted\" took place before an Article III court . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]270 U.S. 568 . The amicus could hardly claim that CAAF's proceedings are not \"judicial,\" in contrast to Secretary of State Madison's refusal to deliver William Marbury's commission. CAAF's administrative location and Article I status are therefore immaterial to whether this Court may constitutional ly exercise appellate jurisdiction over it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court Can — and Should — Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
		"context": "Dalmazzi \"); 76 M.J. 315. As the government correctly argues, this Court's appellate jurisdiction does not turn—and never has turned —on whether the \"proceedings in a cause already instituted\" took place before an Article III court . E.g., 155 U.S. 76[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The amicus could hardly claim that CAAF's proceedings are not \"judicial,\" in contrast to Secretary of State Madison's refusal to deliver William Marbury's commission. CAAF's administrative location and Article I status are therefore immaterial to whether this Court may constitutional ly exercise appellate jurisdiction over it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court Can — and Should — Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
		"context": "The Petitioners in Dalmazzi and Cox are not challenging whether CAAF should have exercised its discretion to grant review , but rather its substantive analysis in support of the judgments . As with this Court's review of a state court with discretionary jurisdiction, how CAAF answers a federal question is subject to de novo review, even if CAAF could have declined to answer the question in the first place . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Implicitly conceding that CAAF resolved Dalmazzi on the merits, the government closes by defen ding CAAF's analysis —asserting that the four judges were continuing to act in their c apacity as assigned CMCR judges when they decided the Dalmazzi and Cox Petitioners ' CCA appeals . U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": ". The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 798",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]385 U.S. 511319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]319 U.S. 624. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The quality of a decision's reasoning is a n important factor in determining whether it should be overruled. Ja- nus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (citing Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 363- 64; 539 U.S. 558 ). Hellerstedt misapplied the undue- burden 491 U.S. 1); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200482 U.S. 496456 U.S. 798453 U.S. 420414 U.S. 313402 U.S. 183415 U.S. 651385 U.S. 511[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 standard, contradicted Casey and related cases, and failed to hold the plaintiffs to the correct standard for bringing a facial challenge. That \" exceptionally ill founded\" reasoning, Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178, justifies overruling Hellerstedt .",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Interprets Treaties Consistent with the Shared Expectations of the Parties",
		"context": ". \"A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations.\" Trans World Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The interpretation of a treaty \" begins with its text,\" 560 U.S. 1; see also 572 U.S. 1. Basic norm s of contract interpretatio n provide that \"[a] court must interpret contractual pr ovisions in a way that gives effect to every term of the instrument, and that, if possible, reconciles all of th e provisions when read as a whole.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Interprets Treaties Consistent with the Shared Expectations of the Parties",
		"context": "\"A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations.\" Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243. The interpretation of a treaty \" begins with its text,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 572 U.S. 1. Basic norm s of contract interpretatio n provide that \"[a] court must interpret contractual pr ovisions in a way that gives effect to every term of the instrument, and that, if possible, reconciles all of th e provisions when read as a whole.\" 2009 WL 2096213 (\"the primary concern when interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effec t to the intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in the contract\"; \"[n]o single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument \") (quotation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Interprets Treaties Consistent with the Shared Expectations of the Parties",
		"context": "\"A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations.\" Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243. The interpretation of a treaty \" begins with its text,\" 560 U.S. 1; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Basic norm s of contract interpretatio n provide that \"[a] court must interpret contractual pr ovisions in a way that gives effect to every term of the instrument, and that, if possible, reconciles all of th e provisions when read as a whole.\" 2009 WL 2096213 (\"the primary concern when interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effec t to the intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in the contract\"; \"[n]o single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument \") (quotation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Interprets Treaties Consistent with the Shared Expectations of the Parties",
		"context": "2009 WL 2096213 (\"the primary concern when interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effec t to the intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in the contract\"; \"[n]o single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument \") (quotation omitted). 6 Specific with respect to treaty interpretation , \"'[t]he opinions of our sister signatories are entitled to considerable weight.'\" Abbott , 560 U. S. at 16 (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (internal quotations a nd ellipsis omitted); see also Lozano , 572 U.S. at 12; Air France , 470 U.S. at 399 (1985); El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. 155; cf. Office of the Children's 1 S.C.R. 398; 237 CLR 582, 596 ¶ 36; Punter v. Secretary of Justice , CA 221/05 [2007] 1 NZLR 40, 84 ¶ 171; PAS v. AFS , [2004] IESC 95 (Ir.) ( recognizing same).",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Interprets Treaties Consistent with the Shared Expectations of the Parties",
		"context": "2009 WL 2096213 (\"the primary concern when interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effec t to the intent of the parties as that intent is expressed in the contract\"; \"[n]o single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument \") (quotation omitted). 6 Specific with respect to treaty interpretation , \"'[t]he opinions of our sister signatories are entitled to considerable weight.'\" Abbott , 560 U. S. at 16 (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. 155) (internal quotations a nd ellipsis omitted); see also Lozano , 572 U.S. at 12; Air France , 470 U.S. at 399 (1985); El Al Israel Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Office of the Children's 1 S.C.R. 398; 237 CLR 582, 596 ¶ 36; Punter v. Secretary of Justice , CA 221/05 [2007] 1 NZLR 40, 84 ¶ 171; PAS v. AFS , [2004] IESC 95 (Ir.) ( recognizing same).",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Judicial Review",
		"context": "Reg. 67,960, 68,010 (Nov. 24, 2006)). The govern- ment also ignores petitioners' citation (Pet r.Br.29 -30) to Universal 770 F. Supp. 704, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a D.C. Circuit decision on which the government places heavy reli- ance refutes the government's view, stating that any \"interference with the administration of the Medicare B program that would result from judicial review per- taining to the overall scope of the Secretary's statutory adjustment authority \" woul d be \" sufficiently offset by the likely gains from reducing the risk of systematic misinterpretation .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "978 F.2d 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In five statutes enacted between 1988 and 2010, Congress ratified and built upon the prior judicial consensus that disgorgement is an available remedy in SEC enforcement actions",
		"context": "In more recent years, this Court has moved away from the understanding of courts' remedial authority that prevailed in the 1960s and early 1970s , emphasizing that policy judgments concerning the remedies that should be available for violations of federal laws are en- trusted to Congress rather than to the courts . The Court has ex plained that the \"remedies available are those 'that Congress enacted into law.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To discern the ex- tent of those remedies, a court should \"apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation.\" Lexmark Int'l, 572 U.S. 118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In five statutes enacted between 1988 and 2010, Congress ratified and built upon the prior judicial consensus that disgorgement is an available remedy in SEC enforcement actions",
		"context": "\" 532 U.S. 275 . To discern the ex- tent of those remedies, a court should \"apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation.\" Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A court may not \"apply its independent pol- icy judgment ,\" either to \" recognize a [remedy] that Congress has denied\" or to \"limit a [remedy] that Con- gress has created.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Robust Due Process Requirements This Court Has Articulated In The Specific Judicial Jurisdiction Context Provide An Appropriate Analogy In Assessing A State's Authority To Tax A Nonresident",
		"context": ". This Court has addressed the due process limits on a State's power to tax nonresidents in a signifi- cant number of decisions. E.g., Quill , 504 U.S. at 308-310; National Bellas Hess, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ameri- can Oil 380 U.S. 451; Miller Bros. 347 U.S. 340; 311 U.S. 435. Petitioner and respondent discuss those decisions in detail. But they also reference the Court's rulings addressing due process limits on other exercises of state authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Robust Due Process Requirements This Court Has Articulated In The Specific Judicial Jurisdiction Context Provide An Appropriate Analogy In Assessing A State's Authority To Tax A Nonresident",
		"context": ". This Court has addressed the due process limits on a State's power to tax nonresidents in a signifi- cant number of decisions. E.g., Quill , 504 U.S. at 308-310; National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753; Ameri- can Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Miller Bros. 347 U.S. 340; 311 U.S. 435. Petitioner and respondent discuss those decisions in detail. But they also reference the Court's rulings addressing due process limits on other exercises of state authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Robust Due Process Requirements This Court Has Articulated In The Specific Judicial Jurisdiction Context Provide An Appropriate Analogy In Assessing A State's Authority To Tax A Nonresident",
		"context": ". This Court has addressed the due process limits on a State's power to tax nonresidents in a signifi- cant number of decisions. E.g., Quill , 504 U.S. at 308-310; National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753; Ameri- can Oil 380 U.S. 451; Miller Bros. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 311 U.S. 435. Petitioner and respondent discuss those decisions in detail. But they also reference the Court's rulings addressing due process limits on other exercises of state authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Robust Due Process Requirements This Court Has Articulated In The Specific Judicial Jurisdiction Context Provide An Appropriate Analogy In Assessing A State's Authority To Tax A Nonresident",
		"context": ". This Court has addressed the due process limits on a State's power to tax nonresidents in a signifi- cant number of decisions. E.g., Quill , 504 U.S. at 308-310; National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753; Ameri- can Oil 380 U.S. 451; Miller Bros. 347 U.S. 340; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner and respondent discuss those decisions in detail. But they also reference the Court's rulings addressing due process limits on other exercises of state authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Publishers Rely on Copyright Protection to Foster a Vibrant and Diverse Landscape of Original Expression",
		"context": "Copyright incentivizes creators of all viewpoints, backgrounds, and socio -economic status to create and publish works. This framework is of particular importance to AAP and the publishing industry at large —the original industry of free expression — because it enables publishers to create, market, and distribute a wide array of books, articles, journals, and 2 This Court has also recognized the critical role of the idea - expression distinction in promoting free expression. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Without publishers' distribution of works across a variety of disciplines and perspectives, our culture would not be enriched by a vibrant marketplace of ideas and our public would be less informed. But copyright protection means nothing if the exclusive rights under the law are unenforceable or undermined by exceptions and limitations that swallow their value in the marketplace.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Publishers Rely on Copyright Protection to Foster a Vibrant and Diverse Landscape of Original Expression",
		"context": "art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the follow -on authors are enriched with a body of creative source material, as well as job and commercial opportunities arising from licensing the right to prepare derivative works based on those materials. Sony , 464 U.S. at 43 2 (\"[T]he ultimate aim\" of the incentive to create is \"to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decisions below correctly applied the rule of reason",
		"context": "But their stew of complaints reveals that their disagreement lies with the district court's findings of fact, not with the courts' standards of law. This Court \"do[es] not try the facts of cases de novo.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"For [Petition- ers] to succeed in this Court now, [they] must show that erroneous legal tests were applied to essential findings of fact or that the findings themselves were 'clearly erroneous .'\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U. S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "Nor can it given that the First Amendment protects all 19 forms of expression, not just speech that a court deems \"generic\" or \"lesser\" based on some idiosyncratic measure. Because \"all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid,\" all expression is protected from government speech compulsions and restrictions. Pacific Gas , 475 U.S. at 11 (plurality opinion); Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569 (explaining that \"the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression\"); Joseph Burstyn, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Cressman v. Thompson , \"[t]he concept of pure speech is fairly capacious\" and covers an \"expanding list\" of expression, including \"Arnold Schöenberg's atonal compositions, Lewis Carroll's nonsense verse, and Jackson Pollock's abstract paintings—regardless of their meaning, or lack thereof—[which] are 'unquestionably shielded' as expressions of the creators' perceptions and ideas.\" 798 F.3d 938521 U.S. 844 (explaining how social media \"websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard\" by \"allow[ing] a person with an internet connection to 'become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 20 soapbox.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "Pacific Gas , 475 U.S. at 11 (plurality opinion); Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569 (explaining that \"the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression\"); Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Cressman v. Thompson , \"[t]he concept of pure speech is fairly capacious\" and covers an \"expanding list\" of expression, including \"Arnold Schöenberg's atonal compositions, Lewis Carroll's nonsense verse, and Jackson Pollock's abstract paintings—regardless of their meaning, or lack thereof—[which] are 'unquestionably shielded' as expressions of the creators' perceptions and ideas.\" 798 F.3d 938[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining how social media \"websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard\" by \"allow[ing] a person with an internet connection to 'become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 20 soapbox. '\"); 258 F.3d 1167. When someone asks a website designer to create a custom-designed website for a wedding, the site provides family and friends with important information about the engagement, the wedding registry, and the date, time, and location of the wedding (all of which information falls within the ambit of the First Amendment).",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "As the Tenth Circuit explained in Cressman v. Thompson , \"[t]he concept of pure speech is fairly capacious\" and covers an \"expanding list\" of expression, including \"Arnold Schöenberg's atonal compositions, Lewis Carroll's nonsense verse, and Jackson Pollock's abstract paintings—regardless of their meaning, or lack thereof—[which] are 'unquestionably shielded' as expressions of the creators' perceptions and ideas.\" 798 F.3d 938521 U.S. 844 (explaining how social media \"websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard\" by \"allow[ing] a person with an internet connection to 'become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 20 soapbox. '\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When someone asks a website designer to create a custom-designed website for a wedding, the site provides family and friends with important information about the engagement, the wedding registry, and the date, time, and location of the wedding (all of which information falls within the ambit of the First Amendment). Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (\"Purely factual matter of public interest may claim [First Amendment] protection.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 F.3d 1167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "Additionally, States will be able to dictate the content of expressive works by writers, painters, musicians, and photographers who offer their services to the public. Yet requiring any of these individuals or businesses to convey messages with which they disagree \"invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.\" Barnette 319 U.S. at 642; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, if a for-prof it business (such as 303 Creative) does not want to convey a particular government-mandated message, Colorado cannot cure the First Amendment problem by presenting 24 the business with an unconstitutional alternative: stop offering its creative works to anyone who wants to get married. See 370 P.3d 272, overturned on other grounds by Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (stating that, under CADA, Masterpiece must \"sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples, but only if it wishes to serve heterosexual couples in the same manner\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "Barnette 319 U.S. at 642; 138 S.Ct. 2448. Moreover, if a for-prof it business (such as 303 Creative) does not want to convey a particular government-mandated message, Colorado cannot cure the First Amendment problem by presenting 24 the business with an unconstitutional alternative: stop offering its creative works to anyone who wants to get married. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overturned on other grounds by Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (stating that, under CADA, Masterpiece must \"sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples, but only if it wishes to serve heterosexual couples in the same manner\"). On this view, s ilence is supposed to cure the CADA violation—Appellants can avoid discriminating based on sexual orientation by ceasing to make custom wedding websites for any engaged couple. The problem is that compelled silence also is unconstitutional: \"There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 P.3d 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "Barnette 319 U.S. at 642; 138 S.Ct. 2448. Moreover, if a for-prof it business (such as 303 Creative) does not want to convey a particular government-mandated message, Colorado cannot cure the First Amendment problem by presenting 24 the business with an unconstitutional alternative: stop offering its creative works to anyone who wants to get married. See 370 P.3d 272, overturned on other grounds by Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (stating that, under CADA, Masterpiece must \"sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples, but only if it wishes to serve heterosexual couples in the same manner\"). On this view, s ilence is supposed to cure the CADA violation—Appellants can avoid discriminating based on sexual orientation by ceasing to make custom wedding websites for any engaged couple. The problem is that compelled silence also is unconstitutional: \"There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "515 U.S. at 579. 27 As a result, when applied to a business's expression, CADA favors \"cer tain preferred speakers … taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others.\" Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In so doing, \"the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or cl ass of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "Moreover, the panel's holding jeopardizes Appellants' willingness to make any statements criticizing Obergefell or CADA (through an op-ed or a blog post) because such views might suggest to a reader (or judge) that Appellants would refuse, withhold, or deny service to someone based on their sexual orientation. This, in turn, chills their speech, forcing them to \"steer far wider of the unlawful zone\" to avoid penalties under CADA. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Tornillo , 418 U.S. at 257 (quoting Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 279) (\"Government-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.' \"). The Tenth Circuit's opinion offers no reason for denying First Amendment protection to Appellants, and none of the Court's free speech cases justify this result.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "The Tenth Circuit's opinion offers no reason for denying First Amendment protection to Appellants, and none of the Court's free speech cases justify this result. Rather, these cases compel the opposite conclusion because, as Dale reminds us, the First Amendment protects the \"freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think\" and \"eschew[s] silence coerced by law—the argument of force in 28 worst form.\" Boy Scouts of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. II. Smith's statement regarding her religious views on marriage is not commercial speech and, therefore, cannot be prohibited under Pittsburgh Press as a restriction on commercial advertising that is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.",
		"context": "The Court has not allowed the government to prohibit commercially-tinged speech on matters of public concern. As Hurley explains, while \"the State may at times 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising,'\" it may do so only \"by requiring the dissemination of 'purely factual and uncontroversial information.'\" 515 U.S. at 573 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"[O]utside that context\" of mandating factual disclosures in purely commercial advertising, the government \"may not compel affirmance of a belie f with which the speaker disagrees\" or violate the right of \"a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 626",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "Where … that examination yields a clear answer, judges must stop.\" Food Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 2 begins with an express prohibition: \"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color [or language-minority status].\" 52 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. 576 U.S. 519; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both the court below and the United States agree. JA610; U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "18- 19. Fourth , Section 2 protects \"the right of any citizen of the United States to vote\" and thus its \"focus should be on individuals\" rather than solely on the broader electorate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 512 U.S. 874. Both the court below and the United States agree. JA619-21; U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "18- 19. Fourth , Section 2 protects \"the right of any citizen of the United States to vote\" and thus its \"focus should be on individuals\" rather than solely on the broader electorate. 140 S. Ct. 1731; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both the court below and the United States agree. JA619-21; U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 874",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "That is wrong. It is the \"ancient and simple 'but for' common law causation test,\" not proximate causation, that \"supplies the 'default' or 'background' rule against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated when creating its own new causes of action.\" Comcast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 3 Although ARP Petitioners also advocate for proximate causation, Brnovich Petitioners appear to accept that the statute requires only \"actual causality.\" Brnovich Br. 23 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "Both indicate but-for causation. As an initial matter, \"[a] thing 'results' when it '[a]rise[s] as an effect, issue, or outcome from some action, process, or design.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]571 U.S. 214. Thus, \"'the ordinary meaning of \"result[s in]\" imposes a requirement of actual or but- for causation,' and not proximate causation.\" 816 F.3d 607.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "571 U.S. 204571 U.S. 214. Thus, \"'the ordinary meaning of \"result[s in]\" imposes a requirement of actual or but- for causation,' and not proximate causation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Meanwhile, the phrase \"on account of race\" is synonymous with \"because of race.\" See Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1739.",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.3d 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "20 The text leaves no doubt about either causation element, as Section 2's context and purpose confirm. Nothing in the provision's \"context\" indicates a higher causation standard; but-for causation would not, for instance, \"cannibalize\" other language in the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Quite the opposite. Section 2 requires courts to evaluate a challenged policy in \"the totality of circumstances.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "Imposing a proximate-cause requirement would unduly restrict the scope of this congressionally mandated inquiry. \"It would be unacceptable to adopt a causal standard so strict that it would undermine congressional intent where neither the plain text of the statute nor legal tradition demands such an approach.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second and relatedly, the United States asserts that Section 2 requires plaintiffs to prove that state action caused the racial disparity. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "But a claim that a court may consider only state-sponsored discrimination in its analysis runs headlong into precedent. This Court has long held that \"Section 2 … prohibits any practice or procedure that, ' interact[ing] with social and historical conditions ,' impairs the ability of a protected class to elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, though 21 the challenged practice must be a but-for cause of minority voters' unequal opportunity to participate and elect, Section 2 allows courts to consider private activity and societal and historical discrimination, as well.4 This does not make governments liable for discrimination they did not cause or caused only in the past. See U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "If the challenged policy is a cause of a disparity in opportunity, 4 See, e.g. , League of United Latin Am. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding districting change violated Section 2 because local Hispanics \"were becoming more politically active,\" and \"the 'political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination'\" against \"Latinos in Texas … may well 'hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process'\"); 478 U.S. 30 (holding multimember- districting scheme in violation of Section 2 based on its interaction with \"racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice\"). 22 and if that disparity would not exist but for voters' race, that is the causation Section 2 requires. Third and finally, the United States argues that \"courts considering limitations on one voting method must account for available alternative methods.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "If the challenged policy is a cause of a disparity in opportunity, 4 See, e.g. , League of United Latin Am. 548 U.S. 399 (finding districting change violated Section 2 because local Hispanics \"were becoming more politically active,\" and \"the 'political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination'\" against \"Latinos in Texas … may well 'hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process'\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding multimember- districting scheme in violation of Section 2 based on its interaction with \"racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice\"). 22 and if that disparity would not exist but for voters' race, that is the causation Section 2 requires. Third and finally, the United States argues that \"courts considering limitations on one voting method must account for available alternative methods.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "20-21.5 To be sure, no voting practice exists in isolation. And courts should consider the challenged practice's interaction with other election laws as part of the totality-of-circumstances inquiry—for other laws, while \"neither in themselves improper nor invidious,\" may \"enhance[] the opportunity for racial discrimination\" resulting from the challenged practice. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But just as a plaintiff cannot establish liability merely by pointing to statistical disparities in voting practices, so, too, a defendant cannot escape liability merely by pointing to the availability of alternative voting practices. Minority voters always will have some theoretical other means to vote.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 755",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "21. Section 2 does not mandate \"maximiz[ing]\" minority voters' opportunities. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, when considering the availability of alternative methods, courts must undertake an \"'intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms.\" 478 U.S. 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 997",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "512 U.S. 997. Instead, when considering the availability of alternative methods, courts must undertake an \"'intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And they must bear in mind that deliberate elimination of a voting practice known to be used disproportionately by minority voters creates exactly the \"risk of purposeful discrimination\" that the United States warns against. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "And they must bear in mind that deliberate elimination of a voting practice known to be used disproportionately by minority voters creates exactly the \"risk of purposeful discrimination\" that the United States warns against. U.S. Br. 16 (quoting City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); cf. League of United Latin Am. 548 U.S. 399.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "16 (quoting City of 446 U.S. 156); cf. League of United Latin Am. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. This reading of Section 2 is bolstered \"in light of the purpose underlying\" the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "2. This reading of Section 2 is bolstered \"in light of the purpose underlying\" the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has 6 ARP Petitioners' example illustrates this. They note that, \"[i]f a state sends unsolicited ballot applications to residents of white neighborhoods, … but not to residents of black neighborhoods, that would amount to giving the latter less 'opportunity' to participate.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "But that is of course true even though black voters could vote in other ways. 24 long recognized that \"[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with that tenet, Section 2 \"should be interpreted in a manner that provides 'the broadest possible scope' in combating racial discrimination.\" Chisom , 501 U.S. at 403.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": "Congress passed this sweeping law to address a sweeping problem. For a century after the Fifteenth Amendment formally guaranteed minorities the right to vote, \"[m]anipulative devices and practices were … employed to deny the vote to blacks.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Early attempts to cope with this vile infection resembled battling the Hydra. Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited, others sprang up in its place.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text",
		"context": ", 570 U.S. at 560 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Indeed, when pre-VRA adjudication \"produced favorable results, affected jurisdictions often 'merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees.'\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress devised an intentionally expansive solution. In 1982, it overruled this Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden that Section 2 forbade only intentional discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "§ 2. Congress enacted the statute to thwart the \"great variety\" of \"devices and formulas\" that judges \"hostil[e] towards arbitration\" had used to \"declar[e] arbitration against public policy.\" AT&T Mobility [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it used broad terms (\"evidencing\" a transaction \"involving\" commerce) because it wanted the FAA to extend as far as the federal legislative power under the Commerce Clause can go. Allied -Bruce Terminix 513 U.S. 265.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333. And it used broad terms (\"evidencing\" a transaction \"involving\" commerce) because it wanted the FAA to extend as far as the federal legislative power under the Commerce Clause can go. Allied -Bruce Terminix [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In shor t, Congress wanted the FAA to govern most arbitration clauses. Most, but not all .",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "Section 2 extends the FAA to a contract \"in - volving\" comme rce, while § 1 removes it from a contract of employment signed by certain classes of workers \"engaged in\" foreign or interstate commerce. The \"open -ended\" § 2 is limited by the \"narrower\" 7 § 1. Circuit City Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This manif ests an intent to withdraw only a small sliver of contracts from the FAA's purview. After all, if Congress had wanted the FAA to have a narrow ambit —if it had wanted it to apply, say, only to contracts between merchants —it could have simply said so in the first place.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "It would have made no sense for Congress to craft a narrow statute by the circuitous method of (1) writing a sweeping clause, and then (2) cutting that clause to the bone with another, almost equally sweeping clause. What's more, under the venerable statutory canon noscitur a sociis, \"a word is known by the company it keeps.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1 lists seamen , railroad employees, and others \"engaged in\" foreign or interstate commerce. The section's more general category (\"any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\") is \"controlled and defined\" by the examples that precede it (\"seamen\" and \"railroad employees\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "& Lab. L. 275, 292 (2004) (discussing Act of July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 131, 131- 35); see also Southern S.S. Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Workers at sea have been the beneficiaries of extraordinary legislative solicitu de[.] The statutes of the United States contain elaborate requirements with respect to such matters as their medicines, clothing, heat, hours and watches, wages, and return transportation to this country if destitute abroad.\"). The First Congress a lso regulated the earliest form of maritime alternative -dispute -resolution — better known as mutiny —through its power \"to define and punish Felonies committed on the high Seas.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress understood, above all, that including sea and rail workers in the FAA \"would have created pointless friction\" in \"alrea dy sensitive area[s].\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "192 F.2d 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "And this is es sential ly how m any federal courts have come to understand § 1 . The exemption applies, in these courts' correct view, to workers \"actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also, e.g ., 105 F.3d 1465207 F.2d 450 —it's clear that \"workers engaged in the physical movement of goods\" does not mean workers \"engaged\" in such \"movement\" in some loose chain - of-causation sense. It means, rather, workers \"engaged directly\" ( id. at 452) in such movement — workers whose primary role is , literally , to carry goods across state lines or foreign boundaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 F.3d 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "And this is es sential ly how m any federal courts have come to understand § 1 . The exemption applies, in these courts' correct view, to workers \"actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.\" 87 F.3d 745 ; see also, e.g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]207 F.2d 450 —it's clear that \"workers engaged in the physical movement of goods\" does not mean workers \"engaged\" in such \"movement\" in some loose chain - of-causation sense. It means, rather, workers \"engaged directly\" ( id. at 452) in such movement — workers whose primary role is , literally , to carry goods across state lines or foreign boundaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "105 F.3d 1465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "And this is es sential ly how m any federal courts have come to understand § 1 . The exemption applies, in these courts' correct view, to workers \"actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.\" 87 F.3d 745 ; see also, e.g ., 105 F.3d 1465[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —it's clear that \"workers engaged in the physical movement of goods\" does not mean workers \"engaged\" in such \"movement\" in some loose chain - of-causation sense. It means, rather, workers \"engaged directly\" ( id. at 452) in such movement — workers whose primary role is , literally , to carry goods across state lines or foreign boundaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "207 F.2d 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1",
		"context": "Those are the only kinds of workers who might generate the type of labor issues that would spur Congress to pass \"specific legislation\" (id. at 121), as it did for the seamen and the railroad employees. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reads Circuit City accurately. Hill was an account manager for a furniture rental company. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 F.3d 1286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The state and local plaintiffs lack parens patriae standing against the federal government",
		"context": ". State and local governments cannot assert parens patriae standing against the federal government. Alfred L. Snapp & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Harms to third parties, then, cannot form any part of the state and local plaintiffs ' standing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PAGA is Not a Qui Tam Action",
		"context": "Federal courts are, however, not inaccord on this point. Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with 245 F.3d 315. Even assuming that the FCA and the FAA are inconsistentand that, therefore, FCA claims cannot be arbitrated,this does not mean a state statute like PAGA fallsoutside the FAA. After all, if \"vindication\" of statutoryrights only counts under the FAA for federal, not state,laws, assignment of the state's interest to individualplaintiff's would logically differ from the federalgovernment's assignment of its rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "871 F.3d 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PAGA is Not a Qui Tam Action",
		"context": "Federal courts are, however, not inaccord on this point. Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. 871 F.3d 791 with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even assuming that the FCA and the FAA are inconsistentand that, therefore, FCA claims cannot be arbitrated,this does not mean a state statute like PAGA fallsoutside the FAA. After all, if \"vindication\" of statutoryrights only counts under the FAA for federal, not state,laws, assignment of the state's interest to individualplaintiff's would logically differ from the federalgovernment's assignment of its rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 F.3d 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PAGA is Not a Qui Tam Action",
		"context": "[¶]A complete assignment to thisdegree—an anomaly among modern qui tamstatutes—undermines the notion that the aggrievedemployee is solely stepping into the shoes of the State rather than also vindicating the interests of otheraggrieved employees.\" Id. Third, Iskanian's reference to Equal Opportunity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not help, but goes against its assertion that PAGAclaims are essentially qui tam actions. Iskanian , 59 Cal.4th at 386. Waffle House holds that the EEOC can bring suit under its own na me and is not bound by an arbitration agreement between the employee and 12 66 Cal.5th 924, decided after Magadia and contrary to one of its major holdings, held that even though a plaintiff's \"individual [PAGA] claim may be time barred does not nullify the alleged Labor Codeviolations nor strip [plaintiff] of .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A contract-based approach to Fourth Amendment rights will inordinately prejudice the rights of minorities",
		"context": "\"Reliable transportation is a daily, fundamental need, almost more so in the wake of a disaster. \"9 Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Affirming the Third Circuit's decision in this case would thus mean that anyone who briefly borrows a rental car from the contracting renter in hurricane-ravaged Houston or San Juan must be ready to sacri- fice their Fourth Amendment rights to get where they need to go. That outcome is inconsistent with the vision of the Framers, who rejected \"indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of general warrants.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 F.3d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A contract-based approach to Fourth Amendment rights will inordinately prejudice the rights of minorities",
		"context": "Affirming the Third Circuit's decision in this case would thus mean that anyone who briefly borrows a rental car from the contracting renter in hurricane-ravaged Houston or San Juan must be ready to sacri- fice their Fourth Amendment rights to get where they need to go. That outcome is inconsistent with the vision of the Framers, who rejected \"indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of general warrants.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That outcome is also incon- sistent with the conscience of our free nation—one that is more than prepared to recognize that the borrower of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car even if his or her name is not on the rental car agreement. 8 Alex Davies, [Hurricane] Harvey Wrecks Up to a Million Cars in Car-Dependent Houston, W IRED, Sept. 3, 2017, http:// bit.ly/2iTaCmZ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The FDCPA's legislative history confirms that enforcing a security interest by initiating a non-judicial foreclosure is not debt collection",
		"context": "Petitioner's interpretation would effectively reinstate the rejected language of the earlier Senate bill by treating the enforcement of security in terests as debt collection for all purposes. As this Court has stated, however, \"[f]ew principles of statutory constr uction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub si- lentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier dis- carded in favor of other language.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That principle is \"p articularly appropriate\" here because the FDCPA \"is the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises.\" Community for Creative Non-Vi- 490 U.S. 730.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The FDCPA's legislative history confirms that enforcing a security interest by initiating a non-judicial foreclosure is not debt collection",
		"context": "480 U.S. 421. That principle is \"p articularly appropriate\" here because the FDCPA \"is the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises.\" Community for Creative Non-Vi- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Another portion of the legisl ative history further illus- trates that Congress did no t intend to regulate foreclo- sure. Both the House and Senate Reports asserted that the FDCPA was needed in part because \"there are 13 States, with 40 million citizens , that have no debt collec- tion laws.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": ". This Court has held that a robust warrant require- ment is essential to ensuring the Fourth Amendment's protections. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A robust warrant requirement furthers peoples' security in at least two ways. First, it reduces the risk that interactions between poli ce and citizens will re- sult in injuries or loss of life.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "A robust warrant requirement furthers peoples' security in at least two ways. First, it reduces the risk that interactions between poli ce and citizens will re- sult in injuries or loss of life. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recognized that forcibly entering someone's home can \"provoke violence in sup- posed self-defense by the surprised resident.\" 547 U.S. 586.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "See 392 U.S. 1. This Court has recognized that forcibly entering someone's home can \"provoke violence in sup- posed self-defense by the surprised resident.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One function of the warrant requirement, then, is to \"minimize[ ] the danger of needless intrusions\" into the home. Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "Second, the warrant requirement protects citizens from the threat of arbi- trary searches and seizures. As Justice Jackson recog-nized: \"Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart\" as when \"homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the po- lice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that \"narrow and well-delineated\" exception, 528 U.S. 11. Be- cause the warrant requirement is a bulwark against the threat of arbitrary searches and seizures, the right to be secure means little if that requirement is not jeal- ously guarded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "As Justice Jackson recog-nized: \"Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart\" as when \"homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the po- lice.\" 338 U.S. 160. But that \"narrow and well-delineated\" exception, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Be- cause the warrant requirement is a bulwark against the threat of arbitrary searches and seizures, the right to be secure means little if that requirement is not jeal- ously guarded. Accordingly, this Court has refused to expand exceptions to the warrant requirement that would effectively \"swallow the rule.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "Accordingly, this Court has refused to expand exceptions to the warrant requirement that would effectively \"swallow the rule.\" City of Los 576 U.S. 409. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court upheld the warrantless search of a vehicle towed to a private garage under a new \"community caretak- ing\" exception to the warrant requirement. The defen-dant, a Chicago policeman, crashed his vehicle in a rural area after drinking. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "The Court distinguished such nuisances from vehicles parked ad- jacent to the owner's home or those only \"momentarily unoccupied on a street.\" Id. at 447 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Applying that rationale, the Court has since observed that police may remove and impound vehicles that \"jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.\" South 428 U.S. 364.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions",
		"context": "at 447 (citing 403 U.S. 443). Applying that rationale, the Court has since observed that police may remove and impound vehicles that \"jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.\" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , the Court upheld the subsequent search based on officers' right to remove threats from vehicles in police custody. The Court observed that the officers had exercised \"control\" over the vehicle, which was \"neither in the custody nor on the premises of its owner.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' theory disregards post-founding historical practice",
		"context": "at 1259 (citation and internal quotes omitted). Here, \"our whole experience as a Nation\" refutes Petitioners' extreme and unprecedented view of the Elections Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. From the 1820s onward , new and revised state constitutions continued to require that \"all elections\" be \"by ballot . \" N.Y. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 2316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "278 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": ".......... 22 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 .................................................. 18, 19, 22 546 U.S. 320 .......... 23 City of 507 U.S. 410 .............................................................. 20 City of 512 U.S. 43 .... 9, 10, 17, 18, 20 City of 486 U.S. 750 .................................................... 9, 17, 20 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. : Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................ 3 Williams 135 S. Ct. 1656 .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. : Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "Telecomm s. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727 .................................................... 15 First Nat'l 435 U.S. 765 .............................................................. 20 278 U.S. 515 ........................................................ 21, 22 614 F.3d 380 ................................................. 5 Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173 .............................................................. 20 III Cases —Continued: Page 465 U.S. 728 ............................ 23 139 S. Ct. 2294 ...................................................................................... 6 Minneapolis Star & Tribune 460 U.S. 575 ......................... 20 440 U.S. 268 ................................ ............. 19 135 S. Ct. 2218 ............................ 15 137 S. Ct. 1678 ................................ 6 564 U.S. 552 ................. 20 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 ......... 6 529 U.S. 803 ................................................................ 3 Williams [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................................................... 17 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. : Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "And even if the applica- bility of the exception depend ed on the caller's subjec- tive intent ( e.g., if it encompassed calls concerning debts that the caller believed to be delinquent but in fact were not, or calls that were intended for delinquent debtors but were made to wrong numbers), the exception would still turn on the nature of the economic activity in which the caller was seeking to engage. In any event, the gov- ernment' s interp retation is at least sufficiently reason- able that the Court should adopt it if a different con- struction would raise constitutional doubts . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Respondents contend (Br. 22 -23) that, even under the government's interpretation of the government - debt exception , the TCPA's automated -call restriction is content -based .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "22. The government 's theory here, however, i s not that the TCPA provisions that regulate automated calls to cell phones include non-co nten t-base d as well as content - based element s. Rather, i t is that no part of the rele- vant statutory text— neither the underl ying automated - call restriction , nor the phrase \"made solely to collect a debt ,\" nor the phrase \" owed to or guaranteed by the United States\" —\"focuses only on the content of the speech. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that is solely content -based . 4 c. Respondents' contention (B r. 18) that the TCPA's automated -call regime is viewpoint -based is particu- larly ill -conceived . The government -debt exception does not apply to calls that either oppose the payment of government -backed debts or argue in general terms that persons who owe such debts should satisfy their ob- ligations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "But the words used in a communication to a debtor may serve a similar function under the FDCPA, by provid ing evidence that the com- munication was made \"in connection with the collection of [a] debt.\" 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a); see , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That consideration of content has not led any court to subject the FDCPA to strict scrutiny, let alone to invalidate it as a content -based regulation of speech. Strict scrutiny is unwarranted here as well .2 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "414 F. Supp. 3d 1205. And although speaker -based dis- tinctions warrant strict scrutiny when they \"reflect [] a content preference,\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], respondents cite no decision apply ing that principle to an exclu sion of sovereign ac- tors from a statutory restriction. Cf. 544 U. S. 550 that the FCC has introduced a constitutional infirmity into the statu- tory scheme by promulgat ing several exemptions to the automated -call restriction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "Sys., 512 U.S. 622, respondents cite no decision apply ing that principle to an exclu sion of sovereign ac- tors from a statutory restriction. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the FCC has introduced a constitutional infirmity into the statu- tory scheme by promulgat ing several exemptions to the automated -call restriction . The Commission promulgated those exemptions pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(2)(C), which authorizes it to exempt calls \"that are not charged to the called party , subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights [the TCPA] is intended to protect .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U. S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "at 16a. Because the government -debt exceptio n is not content - based, the court of appeals erred in applying strict, rather than intermediate, scrutiny. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And as our opening brief explains (at 24-33), Congress's decision to except government -debt calls from the underlying TCPA re- striction satisfies intermediate sc rutiny. Unlike most other automated calls, government -debt calls serve a significant federa l interest in protecting the federal fisc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "In any event, the Fourth Circuit's focus on the con- stitutionality of the government -debt exception fol- lowed logically from the court's rationale for finding a First Amendment violation. This Court has identifi ed \"two analytically distinct grounds for challenging the constitutionality\" of a content -based speech regulation under the First Amendment . City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see City of 486 U.S. 750. \"One is that the measure in effect re- stricts too little spee ch because its exemptions discrim- inate on the basis of [content].\" Ladue , 512 U.S. at 50-51.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "In any event, the Fourth Circuit's focus on the con- stitutionality of the government -debt exception fol- lowed logically from the court's rationale for finding a First Amendment violation. This Court has identifi ed \"two analytically distinct grounds for challenging the constitutionality\" of a content -based speech regulation under the First Amendment . City of 512 U.S. 43; see City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"One is that the measure in effect re- stricts too little spee ch because its exemptions discrim- inate on the basis of [content].\" Ladue , 512 U.S. at 50-51.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "IF THIS COURT CONCLU DES THAT THE CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATES THE FIRST A MEND- MENT, SEVERING THE GOVERNMENT -DEBT EXCEP- TION IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY A. Severing The Gover nment -Debt Exception Would Fully Remedy The First Amendment Violation The Court Of Appeals Found 1. When unlawful discrimination is the source of a constitutional violation, \"the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here , equal treatment can be achieved either by severing the government -debt exception or by invali- dating the automated -call restriction . See ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "As in any other case where one aspect of a sta tutory scheme is held to be invalid, the choice between those alterna- tives turns on which remedy Congress would have pre- ferred. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm s. Consor- tium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 708 of the Communications Act of 1934, of which the TCPA is a par t, specifies that when any C om- munications Act provision is \"held invalid,\" \"the remain- der\" of the statute \"shall not be affected.\" 47 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "), how- ever, that \"while that remedy might solve an equal pro- tection problem, it does nothing to address the distinct First Amendment harm inflicted by [an] unjustified speech restriction .\" But a s explained above, the First Amendment protects not only against laws that \" pro- hibit too much protected speech,\" but also against laws that \"in effect restrict[] too little speech because [their] exemptions discriminate on the basis of [content].\" Ladue , 512 U.S. at 50- 51; see Lakewood , 486 U.S. at 762- 763 ( similar ); Williams- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] where a court invokes the latter rationale to find a First Amendment v iolation , severing the exception is the most natural way to remedy the discriminati on. b. For substantially the same reasons, respondents are wrong in arguing (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "But in none of the decisions they cite (Br. 39 -43) did the Court conduct any severability analysis —let alone h old that severing an except ion can never be an appropriate remedy for a First Amendment violation . In Arkansas Writers ' Project, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the only court that conducted a severa- bility analysis was the Arkansas Supreme Court. Id. at 226.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "at 4, 7 , Ragland , supra (No. 85 -1370). This Court agreed, see Ragland , 481 U.S. at 227, relying on its holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that a party has standing to assert an equal -protection claim, regardless of \"how the State\" would ultimately remedy the alleged discrimi nation , id. at 272. Thus, contrary to respondents' contention (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "In e ach of tho se cases , the Court rejected the proffered justification for a speech restriction —the second of the \"two analytically distinct grounds\" discussed above. Ladue , 512 U.S. at 50; see Greater New Orleans Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]507 U.S. 410435 U.S. 765. And in any event, this Court did not address severability in any of those cases . That is un- surprising given that, in all but one, severabili ty was \"a question of state law \" and therefore \"best resolved be- low.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "In e ach of tho se cases , the Court rejected the proffered justification for a speech restriction —the second of the \"two analytically distinct grounds\" discussed above. Ladue , 512 U.S. at 50; see Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]435 U.S. 765. And in any event, this Court did not address severability in any of those cases . That is un- surprising given that, in all but one, severabili ty was \"a question of state law \" and therefore \"best resolved be- low.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "In e ach of tho se cases , the Court rejected the proffered justification for a speech restriction —the second of the \"two analytically distinct grounds\" discussed above. Ladue , 512 U.S. at 50; see Greater New Orleans Broad. 527 U.S. 173507 U.S. 410[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in any event, this Court did not address severability in any of those cases . That is un- surprising given that, in all but one, severabili ty was \"a question of state law \" and therefore \"best resolved be- low.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
		"context": "49) that it \"is all speculation\" whether Congress would prefer that re-gime to one in which automated calls to cell phones are unregulated under t he TCPA . But respondents identify nothing in the text or history of the 2015 amendment sug- gesting that Congress viewed the ability of government - debt collectors to make automated calls to cell phones as a matter of greater policy importance than protectio n of American consumers from a ll other s uch call s. 2. When determining the appropriate remedy for unconstitutional discriminatory treatment , this Court has consider ed \"the intensity of [Congress's] commit- ment\" to the general rule, Morales -Santana , 137 S. Ct. at 1700 (citations omitted), and whether an exception was \"added by way of amendment many years after the original section was enacted ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As our opening brief explains (at 36 -39), those cons iderations favor severing the government -debt exception here. Respondents dis- miss those decisions (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "278 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "\"Content -based regulations 'target speech based on its communicative content.' \" National Inst. of Family & Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, content -neutral laws targeting conduct rather than speech generally pose no First Amendment problem even when they impose \"incidental\" burdens on expression . 547 U.S. 47.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361. In contrast, content -neutral laws targeting conduct rather than speech generally pose no First Amendment problem even when they impose \"incidental\" burdens on expression . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In- stead, the question is whether the challenged law is \" di- rected at the communicative nature of conduct\" or \"at speech itself \"; if not, any burden ordinarily qualifies as incidental. 491 U.S. 397 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "547 U.S. 47. In- stead, the question is whether the challenged law is \" di- rected at the communicative nature of conduct\" or \"at speech itself \"; if not, any burden ordinarily qualifies as incidental. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See, e.g., 472 U.S. 675 . A law satisfies O'Brien if it \"promotes a substantial government interest\" that is unrelated to 11 the suppression of speech and that \"would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "In- stead, the question is whether the challenged law is \" di- rected at the communicative nature of conduct\" or \"at speech itself \"; if not, any burden ordinarily qualifies as incidental. 491 U.S. 397 . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A law satisfies O'Brien if it \"promotes a substantial government interest\" that is unrelated to 11 the suppression of speech and that \"would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 675",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "Under that \"relatively lenient standard,\" Johnson , 491 U.S. at 407, the Court will uphold the law so long as it does not \"burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Public accommodations laws like CADA easily pass muster under that framework .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "Public accommodations laws like CADA easily pass muster under that framework . They impose no more than an incidental burden on speech because they do not \"target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, public accommodations laws target \"the act of discrimi- nating\" by requiring businesses to provide goods and services to members of a protected class on the same terms extend ed to other customers. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "Some restauranteurs or innkeepers may deeply object to the speech associated with welcoming guests of a particular race, religion, or sexual orientation —but such objections are not grounds for a valid First Amendment challenge. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 12 Even when the relevant goods and services consist of speech or expressive conduct, public accommodation s laws readily survive scrutiny under O'Brien . As this Court explained in upholding the application of such a law to require the United States Jaycees to admit women , laws aimed at \"eliminating discrimination \" and assuring \" equal access to publicly available goods and services \" \"plainly\" serve \"compelling state interests of the highest order.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "See Masterpiece , 138 S. Ct. at 1727 -1728. B. This Court Has Invalidated Public Accommodations Laws Only In Unusual Cases Where They Were Applied To Directly Burden Speech By Forcing A Speaker To Convey An Unwanted Ideological Message In Hurley and Boy Scouts of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court held that unusual applica- tions of public accommodations laws imposed direct ra- ther than incidental burdens on First Amendment rights by compell ing private expressive association s to convey unwanted ideological message s. But the Court's rea- soning in those cases reinforce s the general rule that public accommodations laws ordinarily impose only in- cidental burdens . And the Court's subsequent decision in FAIR confirms the narrow scope of the exception rec- ognized in Hurley and Dale. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "Id. at 61. But the Court explained that the Solomon Amend- ment was nothing like the laws at issue in West Virginia State Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 430 U.S. 705, which directly burdened speech by compelling citizens to \"endorse\" a \"Government -mandated pledge or motto.\" FAIR , 547 U.S. at 62. The Solomon Amend- ment did not \" dictate the content of the speech at all \" because a school's speech wa s \"only 'compelled' if, and to the extent, the school provides such speech for other recruiters.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech",
		"context": "Id. at 61. But the Court explained that the Solomon Amend- ment was nothing like the laws at issue in West Virginia State Board of 319 U.S. 624, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which directly burdened speech by compelling citizens to \"endorse\" a \"Government -mandated pledge or motto.\" FAIR , 547 U.S. at 62. The Solomon Amend- ment did not \" dictate the content of the speech at all \" because a school's speech wa s \"only 'compelled' if, and to the extent, the school provides such speech for other recruiters.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court in this case",
		"context": "Such d eference to a lower court's discretionary determination is a \"hall-mark of abuse -of-discretion review. \" Sprint/ United Mgmt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"particularly when the applicable standard of review is deferential,\" an \"appellate court should not presume that a district court intended an incorrect legal result when the [district court's] order is equally sus- ceptible of a correct reading .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lindstrom is limited to strict products liability, and has no bearing on negligent failure to warn claims",
		"context": "T he Third Circuit's test accords with the prevailing law on land. In addition to aligning with general maritime law, the Third Circuit's test accords with \"the law prevailing on the land.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Yamaha , 516 U.S. at 202. 41",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 F.2d 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Trust Is Separate and Distinct from Its Beneficiaries, and Should Be Treated as Such for Purposes of State Income Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income",
		"context": "Id. Beneficiaries are not \"owners\" of trust assets in the common sense of the word. On the contrary, because a trustee is a fiduciary, and fiduciaries and beneficiaries are separate entities, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a trust beneficiary's interest in trust assets is \"non-possessory.\" Bogert on Trusts, § 38. A trustee has legal ownership of trust assets, at least until trust distributions are made.",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 F.2d 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Trust Is Separate and Distinct from Its Beneficiaries, and Should Be Treated as Such for Purposes of State Income Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income",
		"context": "Id. Further demonstrating the dichotomy that exists between trusts and their beneficiaries is the fact that courts typically will not require trustees to exercise their discretion to make trust distributions in a manner that would allow for beneficiaries' creditors and assignees to gain access to trust assets. Lineback by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, courts have explained that, under a \"discretionary trust, the trustee may withhold the trust income and principal altogether from the beneficiary and the beneficiary, as well as the creditors and assignees of the beneficiary, cannot compel the trustee to pay over any part of the trust funds.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 S.E.2d 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The so-called \"general\" or \"generic\" nature of alleged misstatements alone must not be conclusive as to price impact",
		"context": "Price impact and materiality are fundamentally different questions, and Petitioners' proposed approach improperly conflates the two. Although materiality is an objective inquiry, its focus is on how a hypothetical \"reasonable investor\" would view the information in the alleged misstatements. Basic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Price impact is a factual inquiry. Instead of asking how a hypothetical reasonable investor would react to the alleged misstatements, the relevant question to determine price impact is whether individual investors in the market did, in fact, react to the alleged misstatements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Prior Precedents Support Respondents",
		"context": "WCA agrees with Respondents that this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], supports affirmance here. The law at issue in Nelson allowed for the relevant local official to file with the relevant clerk's office a list of parcels with tax liens that had been unpaid for a certain period of time. 352 U.S. at 104 n.1 (discussing s D17—1.0 et seq.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Prior Precedents Support Respondents",
		"context": "Id. This is a holding on which states, including Wisconsin, have relied for decades. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Petitioner attempts to distinguish Nelson by noting that the New York City law in that case \"gave the owners an opportunity to claim the surplus proceeds from a judicial sale of the property.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "207 Wis. 2d 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Prior Precedents Support Respondents",
		"context": "What matters for constitutional purposes is that a former property owner received constitutionally adequate notice and had an opportunity to take action to preserve the alleged property interest. That clearly happened here. Finally, WCA submits there is no merit to Petitioner's claim that this Court's decision in Nelson has been \"disproven\" by this Court's subsequent decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" The Court in Knick was addressing the question of whether a property owner must bring a claim in state court for just compensation under state law before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court—the so-called \"state- litigation requirement.\" This Court had first imposed the \"state-litigation requirement\" in Williamson County Regional Planning 473 U.S. 172.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Prior Precedents Support Respondents",
		"context": "Finally, WCA submits there is no merit to Petitioner's claim that this Court's decision in Nelson has been \"disproven\" by this Court's subsequent decision in 139 S. Ct. 2162.\" The Court in Knick was addressing the question of whether a property owner must bring a claim in state court for just compensation under state law before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court—the so-called \"state- litigation requirement.\" This Court had first imposed the \"state-litigation requirement\" in Williamson County Regional Planning [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Knick this Court overruled Williamson County and held that \"[a] property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his property without paying for it\" and thus may bring a claim in federal court without first pursuing remedies under state law. 139 S. Ct. at 2167-68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "The decision below properly considered binding authority addressing unsanitary cell conditions. The body of relevant law included a case acknowledging a vi- olation for unsanitary cell conditions lasting ten months and another case finding no violation based on such con- ditions lasting three days. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nei- ther case indicates when a temporary housing assign- ment gains sufficient duration that it crosses the line from permissible to unconstitutional. T hat tipping point is ambiguous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.2d 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "See Sheehan , 135 S. Ct. at 1777 (conclud- ing that the three circuit cases the lower court relied on did not clearly require the result it reached ). The state of the law on this point was , at minimum, \"undeveloped .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"the officers in this case cannot have been ' expected to predict the future course of constitutional law ,'\" it would be 30 \"unfair to subject\" them \"to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "Because \"the officers in this case cannot have been ' expected to predict the future course of constitutional law ,'\" it would be 30 \"unfair to subject\" them \"to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy .\" Id. at 617-18 (quoted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); accord 472 U.S. 511. Unable to distinguish Davis , Petitioner suggests that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to consider Davis because it \"cuts against the great weight of precedent\" of other cir- cuits. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "Because \"the officers in this case cannot have been ' expected to predict the future course of constitutional law ,'\" it would be 30 \"unfair to subject\" them \"to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy .\" Id. at 617-18 (quoted in 566 U.S. 658 ); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unable to distinguish Davis , Petitioner suggests that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to consider Davis because it \"cuts against the great weight of precedent\" of other cir- cuits. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "13 n.4. In the Fifth Circuit, \"one panel of [the] court may not overturn another panel 's decision, absent an intervening change in the law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in Hope \"unequivocal[ly]\" declares Davis overruled. Second, only a \"a robust 'consensus of cases of per- suasive authority '\" will do.",
		"citation_value_orig": "823 F.3d 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "al–Kidd , 563 U.S. at 742. And no \"robust consensus \" from other circuits existed ; for ex- ample , cases from at least two circuits involved temporal guidelines similar to those stated in Davis . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]735 F. App'x 559. At best, the cases reflect inconsistency and show \"that the courts are divided\" on the merits question, which \"demonstrates that the law on the point is not well established .\" Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1868.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 F.3d 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "To be eligible for a sentencing reduction under § 3582(c)(2), a defendant must have been \"sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered.\" The key 14 term \"based on\" is not defined, and so carries \"its or- dinary meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The ordinary meaning of \"based on\" is rooted in principles of causation. Those principles , however, may have been given short shrift in the Freeman briefing; the petitioner said little about it, and the government offered only a flawed \"le- gally binding\" test that no Justice endorsed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "See generally Dan B. Dobbs et al., Dobbs' Law of Torts § 186 (2d ed. 2017). T hat's how the Court un- derstood the term in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr , which interpreted provisions of the Fair Credit Re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court ob- served that, \"[ i]n common talk, the phrase 'based on' indicates a but -for causal relationship and thus a nec- essary logical condition.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "Elsewhere the Court has understood \"based on\" to denote necessary element s with a close connection to the result. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson interpreted th e term \"based upon\" in the Foreign Sovereign Immuni- ties Act (FSIA). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Invoking diction- aries that define \"base\" as a \"basis\" or \"foundation,\" the Court explained that a n FSIA claim is \"based on\" those elements that entitle a plaintiff to relief, id. at 356-57—in other words, the \"essentials\" of the suit , OBB Personenverkehr 136 S. Ct. 390.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "507 U.S. 349. Invoking diction- aries that define \"base\" as a \"basis\" or \"foundation,\" the Court explained that a n FSIA claim is \"based on\" those elements that entitle a plaintiff to relief, id. at 356-57—in other words, the \"essentials\" of the suit , OBB Personenverkehr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This language sounds in proximate cause. In the tort context, a cause bearing a \"close connection\" to the result is a \"proximate\" or legal cause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "In the tort context, a cause bearing a \"close connection\" to the result is a \"proximate\" or legal cause. Bank of Am. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . (5th ed. 1979) (\"basis\" is a \"[f]undamental principle\"); American Heritage Dictionary 110 (1969) (\"base\" is \"[t]he fact, observation, or premise from which a measuremen t or reasoning process is begun\"); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 180 (1966 ed.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "Prosser, supra , at 268. \"[A] given proximate cause need not be, and frequently is not, the exclusive proximate cause of harm.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 562 U.S. 411. So long as a cause is not \"too remote, purely contingent, or indirect,\" it is a proximate cause . Staub , 562 U.S. at 419; see Prosser , supra, at 268 (\"If the defendant's conduct was a sub- stantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it fol- lows that he will not be absolved from liability merely because other causes have contributed to the re- sult ….\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "Prosser, supra , at 268. \"[A] given proximate cause need not be, and frequently is not, the exclusive proximate cause of harm.\" 542 U.S. 692; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So long as a cause is not \"too remote, purely contingent, or indirect,\" it is a proximate cause . Staub , 562 U.S. at 419; see Prosser , supra, at 268 (\"If the defendant's conduct was a sub- stantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it fol- lows that he will not be absolved from liability merely because other causes have contributed to the re- sult ….\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation",
		"context": "The ordinary meaning of \"based on\" applies here. \"Courts in applying criminal laws generally must fol- low the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statu- tory language.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A sentence, therefore, is \"based on\" 17 those factors —those \" principle[s] \" or dat[a],\" Black's Law Dictionary (2014), supra , at 180 (base) —that bear a \" reasonably close connection\" to the imposition of the sentence. Prosser, supra, at 300.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 675",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jurisdiction based on property cannot justify the tax because the Trust holds no property in North Carolina",
		"context": "But as with jurisdiction based on effects, the theory of jurisdiction based on property fails to pro-vide jurisdiction on the facts of the case at hand. The Due Process Clause permits both adjudicative and tax jurisdiction over nonresident's property held in the forum state. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Frequently the asset in question is real property, but the reasoning extends to other sorts of property as well. Jurisdiction based on property is depicted in Row B of Table 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "The Board and its amici present the same his- torical arguments that were made in 1977 when the Court decided Nevada v. Hall . This Court has been clear that \"an argument that we got something wrong—even a good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, \"[t]o reverse course, we re- quire as well what we have termed a 'special justifica- tion'—over and above the b elief 'that the precedent was wrongly decided.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-417. authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Additionally, the defendant state may be able to reject the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, or other invalidating grounds such as fraud, as long as those issues were not litigated in the original forum state. See James P. George, En- forcing Judgments Across State an d National Boundaries: Inbound Foreign Judgments and Outbound Texas Judgments , 50 S. Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "Id. at 416. Relying on precedent from the earliest days of American history—Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in The Schooner [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—this Court in Nevada v. Hall concluded that sovereign immunity never was meant to protect a state from suits in another state's court. Nevada v. Hall , 440 U.S. at 416. The Schooner Exchange has been seen as establishing the principle throughout American history that a sovereign is under no legal obligation to grant immunity to other sover- eigns in its own courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "The Schooner Exchange has been seen as establishing the principle throughout American history that a sovereign is under no legal obligation to grant immunity to other sover- eigns in its own courts. Simply put, a state's sovereign immunity in its own courts is a function of its sover- eignty there; but that does not give it sovereign im- munity when it is sued in the courts of another sovereign. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also William Baude, \"Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text,\" 103 Virginia L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (2017) (\"Immunity in one's own courts, the Court wrote, 'has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries,' while immunity in another sovereign's courts was a matter of mutual agreement or comity.\" (quoting Nevada v. Hall , 440 U.S. at 414)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "20 U.S. 283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "146-147. As Justice Thomas stated: \"[I]mmunity does not apply of its own force in the courts of another sovereign.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the crucial fact that the Board points to—\"the absence of an enforcement mechanism\"—also is true if this Court were to overrule Nevada v. Hall . There would be no enforcement mechanism of any kind for those like Gilbert Hyatt who have been injured by another state government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "No state could be required to respect another's sovereign immunity in its courts. \" Brief for Petitioner at 31-32 (emphasis added). The Board's initial conclusion, which it later rightly contradicts, was based on generalizing from two cases from Pennsylvania in the unique context of admiralty law— [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 17 F. Cas. 574, Pa. Adm. 1781 (No. 9,767). See also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti- tioner at 10-11 (relying on these cases as the basis for its analysis).",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "Under the Articles of Confederation, how- ever, there was no limit on the ability of a state to be sued. In Chisholm v. Georgia , Justice Cushing ex- plained that before the ratification of the Constitution, states were subject to suit in the courts of other states. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1793). He observed that \"[e]ach State was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of justice which another State might yield to her, or to her citizens [.]\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "L. Rev. 1, 55 (2002). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Board and its amici offer no evidence that the framers meant to turn this common law immunity against a state being sued in another state into a constitutional rule. As Professors Sachs 42 and Baude point out: \"The Board repeatedly confuses the Founders' choice not to abrogate sovereign immun- ity with a decision to entrench it , transforming the tra- ditional common-law immunities into new rules of constitutional law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "As Professors Sachs 42 and Baude point out: \"The Board repeatedly confuses the Founders' choice not to abrogate sovereign immun- ity with a decision to entrench it , transforming the tra- ditional common-law immunities into new rules of constitutional law.\" Amicus Brief of Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs, at 11. This is why the Board is wrong in its assertion that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is inconsistent with Nevada v. Hall . Brief for Petitioner at 36-37. Alden v. Maine is about the ability of a state to choose to not be sued in its own st ate courts, a choice that this Court said was protected by an immunity that has ex-isted throughout American history.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "But a state also may choose, as Nevada did here and as California did in Nevada v. Hall , to provide a forum for its citizens when they are injured by another state. As this Court recently noted in discussing the Tenth Amendment, \"[t]he Constitution limited but did not abolish the sov- ereign powers of the States, which retained 'a residu-ary and inviolable sovereignty.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An aspect of that sovereignty is be- ing able to determine the jurisdiction of its courts and to choose to allow its courts to hear claims by its citi- zens who have been injured, including by other states. See Nevada v. Hall , 440 U.S. at 426-427.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "Brief for Petitioner at 40-43. But this Court's deci- sions about sovereign immunity in federal courts are about the scope of a consti tutional limit on federal court jurisdiction: the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike the limits the Constitution places on Congress's powers, including its power to ab- rogate state sovereign immunity, the Constitution places no similar limits on the ability of states to create a forum for their citizens wh en they are injured in the state. See Nevada v. Hall , 440 U.S. at 426-427.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "Brief for Petitioner at 14, 41-42. But this Court has long recognized that \"the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is no t coextensive with that of the States.\" Kiowa Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike the Board's character- ization of tribal immunity, this Court said that \"it developed almost by accident.\" Kiowa , Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
		"context": "at 758. Also, the scope of tribal immunity remains uncertain. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court spec ifically declined to consider (and stated that it had never previously addressed) \"whether im-munity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to de al with a tribe, has no alterna- tive way to obtain re lief for off-reservation commercial conduct.\" 47 the framers' intent—and nothing cited by the Board or its amici —supports the conclusion that such a consti- tutional limit exists on state power. In Hyatt II , this Court reiterated that the very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for com- pelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is com-petent to legislate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "It is undisputed that the Fourth Circuit \"exercise [d]…the grave power ofannulling an Act of Congress \"on constitutional grounds. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"obvious importance \"of that decision itself warrants this Court 's immediate review 545 U.S. 1 , irrespective of any circuit split .See Pet. 12 (citing cases) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "It is undisputed that the Fourth Circuit \"exercise [d]…the grave power ofannulling an Act of Congress \"on constitutional grounds. 380 U.S. 63. The \"obvious importance \"of that decision itself warrants this Court 's immediate review [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , irrespective of any circuit split .See Pet. 12 (citing cases) . As the Solicitor General noted in obtaining a grant earlier this Term —without a circuit split —\"any decision invalidating an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds is significant. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "for Cert. 11, 139 S.Ct. 782 (No. 18-302) , available at https://www.justice .gov/sites/default/files/briefs/2018/ 09/10/18 -302_brunetti_pet.pdf (Sept. 7, 2018) (citing cases); see also , e.g.,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Maricopa Cnty ., 135 S.Ct. 428. Moreover ,there is no prospect here offurther percolation among courts of appeals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "11, 139 S.Ct. 782 (No. 18-302) , available at https://www.justice .gov/sites/default/files/briefs/2018/ 09/10/18 -302_brunetti_pet.pdf (Sept. 7, 2018) (citing cases); see also , e.g.,570 U.S. 387; cf. Maricopa Cnty ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover ,there is no prospect here offurther percolation among courts of appeals. As the State observes (BIO 11-12), lower courts have \"uniformly \" refused to enforce the CRCA, and the Solicitor General has \"stopped defending the law. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "Without denying the import ance of the Question Presented, the State cites (BIO 13-15 & n.5) isolated, inapposite cases where this Court denied certiorari ; in only two of those cases (both distinguishable) was this Court asked to review alower court 's invalidation of a federal statute . See Am. Civil Liberties [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied555 U.S. 1137.1 For the past decade, no less than previously, this Court has continued to grant certiorari in cases like this without awaiting any circuit split. See, e.g., Dep 't of Transp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F.3d 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "See, e.g., Dep 't of Transp. v. Ass'n of 1In ACLU , the Court had already granted certiorari and ,on the merits ,enumerated the applicable test to resolve that dispute. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Tennessee Valley Authority ,the EPA did not seek reversal of a fina l judgment but ofa non-final agency order. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "In Tennessee Valley Authority ,the EPA did not seek reversal of a fina l judgment but ofa non-final agency order. See Pet. for Cert., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in University of 517 U.S. 1184 . A GVR \"does 'not amount to a final determination of the merits. '\" Shapiro , supra , at 349(quoting 376 U.S. 776); see also 533 U.S. 656 did not urge review of a lower court 's invalidation of a federal law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 1030",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "for Cert., 541 U.S. 1030 in University of 517 U.S. 1184 . A GVR \"does 'not amount to a final determination of the merits. '\" Shapiro , supra , at 349(quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also 533 U.S. 656 did not urge review of a lower court 's invalidation of a federal law. Pet. for Cert., Intercollegiate Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 776",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "for Cert., 541 U.S. 1030 in University of 517 U.S. 1184 . A GVR \"does 'not amount to a final determination of the merits. '\" Shapiro , supra , at 349(quoting 376 U.S. 776); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] did not urge review of a lower court 's invalidation of a federal law. Pet. for Cert., Intercollegiate Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "Pet. for Cert., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 569 U.S. 1004566 U.S. 968[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]407 F.3d 1139. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "655 F.3d 1077",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
		"context": "Pet. for Cert., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 569 U.S. 1004566 U.S. 968655 F.3d 1077[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 F.3d 1139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here",
		"context": "See, e.g. , U.S.Br.34 n.10. Rightly so : Petitioners filed their motion one day after the Unite d States abruptly changed course, which is plainly timely under United Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nor does any Respondent contest th at no remaining party adequately represent s Petitioners' interests. That too is unsurprising: When Petitioners moved to intervene, the United States had abandoned defense of the Public Charge Rule, leaving no p arty to defend Petitioners' interest s. Thus, Respondents contest only the existence of protectable interests and the potential for impairment 1 No Respondent appears to dispute that although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is binding only on district courts, it properly guides appellate courts in deciding motions to intervene.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE TERRITORY CLAUSE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "26 McDonald v. Chicago , 561 U.S. at 767 (2010). 27 In the cited case the reference is to \"a child\". 18 Sandford , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"28 It is interesting to note that Justice White in his concurring opinion in 182 U.S. 244 stated the following as to the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford , supra: \"Whatever may be the view entertained of the correctness of theopinion of the court in that case, in so far as itinterpreted a particular provision of the Constitutionconcerning slavery and decided that as so construed itwas in force in the territories , this in no way affects the principle which that decision announced, that theapplicable provisions of the Constitution were operative[in the territories]. That doctrine was concurred in bythe dissenting judges.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE TERRITORY CLAUSE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "27 In the cited case the reference is to \"a child\". 18 Sandford , 60 U.S. 393. \"28 It is interesting to note that Justice White in his concurring opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] stated the following as to the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford , supra: \"Whatever may be the view entertained of the correctness of theopinion of the court in that case, in so far as itinterpreted a particular provision of the Constitutionconcerning slavery and decided that as so construed itwas in force in the territories , this in no way affects the principle which that decision announced, that theapplicable provisions of the Constitution were operative[in the territories]. That doctrine was concurred in bythe dissenting judges.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's cases involving different types of errors do not support a holding that a reviewing court may look outside the trial record to assess the effect of a trial error",
		"context": "Br. 10–19 (expl aining that the nature of the error sets the scope of appellate review). For exam-ple, the government cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 542 U.S. 74 ( 2004) , two guilty -plea cas es. But plea-colloquy errors differ fr om trial errors because the inquiry in a plea case focuse s on the voluntari- ness of the plea, not the outcome and fairness of a trial. Thus, the nature of a plea -colloquy error re- quires court s to assess the impact of the error on t he voluntarin ess of a pl ea, not on the jury's verdict.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's cases involving different types of errors do not support a holding that a reviewing court may look outside the trial record to assess the effect of a trial error",
		"context": "Br. 10–19 (expl aining that the nature of the error sets the scope of appellate review). For exam-ple, the government cites 535 U.S. 55 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2004) , two guilty -plea cas es. But plea-colloquy errors differ fr om trial errors because the inquiry in a plea case focuse s on the voluntari- ness of the plea, not the outcome and fairness of a trial. Thus, the nature of a plea -colloquy error re- quires court s to assess the impact of the error on t he voluntarin ess of a pl ea, not on the jury's verdict.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's cases involving different types of errors do not support a holding that a reviewing court may look outside the trial record to assess the effect of a trial error",
		"context": "As explained, in the context of an instruc tional error or insufficient e vidence, pro- ceedings out side the trial record are irrelevant to the jury's verdict. Vonn and Dominguez Benitez , there- fore, support Mr. Greer's position that the nature of the error dictates the scope of an appellate court's r e- view. The gov ernment also misplaces its reliance on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Mechanik , the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) by allowing two law en- forcement agents to testify before a gra nd jury at the same time. This Court co ncluded , based on the jur y's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt , the Rule 6(d) error was harmless.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 66",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's cases involving different types of errors do not support a holding that a reviewing court may look outside the trial record to assess the effect of a trial error",
		"context": "at 70, 72. But unlike in Mechanik , no factfinder has found that Mr. Greer knew his status when he posse ssed the g un. Finally , the government er roneousl y rel ies on Del- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the district court barred defense counsel from ques- tioning the government's witness about an unrelated homicide investigation . The defendant preserved the error by pr offer ing testi mony , which t hen became part of the trial record and which the appellate court properly reviewed in determining the prejudicial ef- fect of the error . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
		"context": "Before the National Parks decision, courts looked to Exemption 4's text and held that the government could withhold commercial documents in response to a FOIA request only where there was an \"express or implied promise by the government that the information will be kept confidential.\" Gen. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is a practical and easy-to-apply rule that has the added benefit of being consistent with how this Court has interpreted other FOIA exemptions. A test based on the express or implied promise of confidentiality is similar to the standard that this Court announced in Landano , 508 U.S. at 172.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 F.2d 878",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
		"context": "Fed. Crop Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Individual officials cannot by practice or pronouncement deem information confidential. Accordingly, there must be a statute or duly-promulgated regulation on point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
		"context": "Alternatively, the USDA initially argued, and the District Court initially held, that the SNAP statute, 7 U.S.C. 2018,5 made the requested documents exempt under FOIA Exemption 3. Argus Leader 900 F. Supp. 2d 997, rev'd and remanded,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that while the SNAP statute made some documents exempt from disclosure, it did not affect the documents Argus Leader was requesting. Th at holding, which was correct, was allegedly the impetus for Congress to deem the documents confidenti al in future cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "740 F.3d 1172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
		"context": "Expanding Exemption 4 to exempt any information a contractor deems confidential exacerbates the injury to FOIA, the public fisc, and all tax payers. Just as this Court has interpreted \"confidential\" in Exemption 7 to apply only when a properly authorized government actor has given an informant assurance of confidentiality, the term \"confidential\" in Exemption 4 only applies when Congress by statute or an agency through regulation has provided an assurance of confidentialit y. The Eighth Circuit's judgment in Argus Leader [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], should be affirmed not because it correctly applied National Parks , but rather because, at the time of the request, neither Congress nor USDA had deemed the information \"confidential.\" 20",
		"citation_value_orig": "889 F.3d 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Compelled Speech and Association",
		"context": "Both stem from the recognition that the constitutional \"right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'\" Wooley , 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also Riley , 487 U.S. at 796 (distinction between compelled speech and com-pelled silence is \"without constitutional significance\"). Moreover, in arguing (at 24) that Illinois has no \"in- terest\" in compelling expression, petitioner confuses the interest with the regulation adopted to further that interest. Whether the government adopts regulations preventing or compelling \"expressive activities,\" id., the government interest is in \"the efficient and effec- tive operation of government.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Compelled Speech and Association",
		"context": "Whether the government adopts regulations preventing or compelling \"expressive activities,\" id., the government interest is in \"the efficient and effec- tive operation of government.\" Guarnieri , 564 U.S. at 389. Petitioner offers no principled reason why that 7 See, e.g., Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]487 U.S. 781 . 29 interest cannot justify requiring payment of fair-share fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Compelled Speech and Association",
		"context": "Whether the government adopts regulations preventing or compelling \"expressive activities,\" id., the government interest is in \"the efficient and effec- tive operation of government.\" Guarnieri , 564 U.S. at 389. Petitioner offers no principled reason why that 7 See, e.g., Citizens 558 U.S. 310[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 29 interest cannot justify requiring payment of fair-share fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is the right vehicle for clarifying the \"true threats\" exception",
		"context": "This case is an excellent vehicle for the Court to consider the scope of the \"true threats\" exc eption and to provide badly needed guidance for the lower courts regarding when government may prosecute people based on the substance of their expression. 4 Likewise, with respect to the amorphous \"fighting words\" exception, see Chaplinsky , 315 U.S. at 572 , the Court lim- ited that exception's scope, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and ultimately reduced it to near non-existence, e.g., R.A.V. , 505 U.S. at 383 –84. 9 First, this case squarely raises the central question dividing state and federal circuit courts, nam ely the nature of the \"true threats\" test and its objective and subjective components.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is the right vehicle for clarifying the \"true threats\" exception",
		"context": ", 505 U.S. at 383 –84. 9 First, this case squarely raises the central question dividing state and federal circuit courts, nam ely the nature of the \"true threats\" test and its objective and subjective components. One aspect of that question is the level of mens rea required to render allegedly threatening speech unprotected, which this Court has flagged as worthy of consideration but not yet ad- dressed by applying First Amendment principles, see Elonis , 135 S. Ct. at 2004 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Another aspect is whether the speech at issue must be objectively th reatening, sub- jectively intended as such, or both. Compare, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is the right vehicle for clarifying the \"true threats\" exception",
		"context": ". for the exchange of views.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And so- cial media sites like Facebook , Twitter, and YouTube are the most important and broadly used channels of online communication and expression today, used to \"debate religion and politics,\" \"look for work,\" and \"pe- tition . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "VI. The States thus cannot \"defeat the legitimate operations\" of the federal government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1819 ). They have \" no powe r\" \"to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control \" the President , Congress, or the Judicial Branch . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "The Court has enforced this principle when faced with overreach from state and local officials. It has not hesitated to step in when necessary to prevent \"the operations of the general government \" from being \"arrested at the will of one of its members .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 879); see id. at 263 ( a state court cannot try a federal officer for charges arising from the execution of his duties ); Tarble , 80 U.S. at 411 -12 (a state court cannot order the release of a resident held in federal custody ); 19 U.S. 598254 U.S. 51. These cases all stand for the same inviolable pro position: \"the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "It has not hesitated to step in when necessary to prevent \"the operations of the general government \" from being \"arrested at the will of one of its members .\" 100 U.S. 257 (1 879); see id. at 263 ( a state court cannot try a federal officer for charges arising from the execution of his duties ); Tarble , 80 U.S. at 411 -12 (a state court cannot order the release of a resident held in federal custody ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]254 U.S. 51. These cases all stand for the same inviolable pro position: \"the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state .\" 319 U.S. 441 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "19 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "It has not hesitated to step in when necessary to prevent \"the operations of the general government \" from being \"arrested at the will of one of its members .\" 100 U.S. 257 (1 879); see id. at 263 ( a state court cannot try a federal officer for charges arising from the execution of his duties ); Tarble , 80 U.S. at 411 -12 (a state court cannot order the release of a resident held in federal custody ); 19 U.S. 598[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These cases all stand for the same inviolable pro position: \"the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state .\" 319 U.S. 441 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "at 263 ( a state court cannot try a federal officer for charges arising from the execution of his duties ); Tarble , 80 U.S. at 411 -12 (a state court cannot order the release of a resident held in federal custody ); 19 U.S. 598254 U.S. 51. These cases all stand for the same inviolable pro position: \"the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As a consequence , the Supremacy Clause —both independent of and in conjunction with Article II — bars states and local ities from criminally prosecuting the sitting President. For most federal officials, the protection the Supremacy Clause affords them from state interference applies only when they undertake official acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "This Court need not \"'exhibit a naiveté from which ordinar y citizens are free.'\" Dept. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Our constitutional system does not —and indeed cannot —abide a rule that would allow the nation's choice for President to be hobbled by the whims of local officials serving l ocal constituencies with local priorities. There is a reason why this case appears to be the first time a state or local prosecutor ha s opened a criminal proceeding about the sitting president , let alone issued a grand -jury subpoena for his personal records .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "There is a reason why this case appears to be the first time a state or local prosecutor ha s opened a criminal proceeding about the sitting president , let alone issued a grand -jury subpoena for his personal records . That the S tates \"avoided use of this highly attractive power\" suggests strongly that \"the power was thought not to exist.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 71 U.S. 475; Free Enter . Fund , 561 U.S. at 505; 505 U.S. 788 President is unpopular will be unleashed to proceed criminally against the Executive . The Court should not allow that to happen.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "There is a reason why this case appears to be the first time a state or local prosecutor ha s opened a criminal proceeding about the sitting president , let alone issued a grand -jury subpoena for his personal records . That the S tates \"avoided use of this highly attractive power\" suggests strongly that \"the power was thought not to exist.\" 521 U.S. 898; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Free Enter . Fund , 561 U.S. at 505; 505 U.S. 788 President is unpopular will be unleashed to proceed criminally against the Executive . The Court should not allow that to happen.",
		"citation_value_orig": "71 U.S. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process",
		"context": "That the S tates \"avoided use of this highly attractive power\" suggests strongly that \"the power was thought not to exist.\" 521 U.S. 898; see 71 U.S. 475; Free Enter . Fund , 561 U.S. at 505; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] President is unpopular will be unleashed to proceed criminally against the Executive . The Court should not allow that to happen.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Commission's Decision Rested on an Arbitrary Assessment of the Past, Not a Reasoned Predictive Judgment",
		"context": "The Government argues that agencies have substantial leeway to reach reasonable judgments and need not produce empirical evid ence if it is difficult to do so. See Br. 22, 36 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the Third Circuit held the agency only to the 44 requirement of a \"reasoned explanation.\" Stilwell , 569 F.3d at 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Commission's Decision Rested on an Arbitrary Assessment of the Past, Not a Reasoned Predictive Judgment",
		"context": "And having chosen to rely on statistics in this way, the Commission did \"not have free rein to use inaccurate data,\" Dist. Hosp. Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] demands, as Industry Petitioners agree (Br. 32)—was the primary basis for any predictive judgment. The Government makes much of the proposition that when the Commission makes judgments \"of a predictive nature,\" \"complet e factual support … is not possible or required.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Commission's Decision Rested on an Arbitrary Assessment of the Past, Not a Reasoned Predictive Judgment",
		"context": "Because the Commission's \"no harm\" projection is predicated on its irrational assessment of past data, it, too, is arbitrary. Especially when predictive judgments underpin drastic course reversals, they \"must be based on some logic and evidence, not sheer speculation.\" Sorenson Commc'ns [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 45 2. In an odd turn, the Government now claims (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Commission's Decision Rested on an Arbitrary Assessment of the Past, Not a Reasoned Predictive Judgment",
		"context": "See CA3JA560; CA3JA568-69. The FCC did not even try, even though it knows (better than anyone else) who owns each station and when it changed hands.13 Uncertainties from flawed data might be excused if the Commission had \"actually adjusted the [data] to account for … objections and demonstrated that the outcome of the final rule would not have changed.\" See Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Failure to even try is no excuse. The Commission acknowledged that Form 323 data inadequacies had long \"impaired the ability of the Commission and interested parties to study and analyze\" the relevant issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.2d 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Commission's Decision Rested on an Arbitrary Assessment of the Past, Not a Reasoned Predictive Judgment",
		"context": "But it is the Commission's burden to determine whether its rules are necessary for the 13 Because there was inadequate notice that the Commission planned to compare the NTIA and Form 323 data, commenters had no opportunity to \"point out where … the agency may be drawing improper conclusions,\" between those two data sets, specifically. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nonetheless, commenters repeatedly held the Free Press studies up to the Commission as a model. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "737 F.2d 1095",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury",
		"context": "Pet.App.2a. Merely declaring invalid the at-will removal bar would not, in itself, redress the injury underlying this lawsuit. Instead, the proper cour se is to provide \"reme- dies…tailored to the injury suffered,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this instance, that requires in validating the civil investi- gative demand. Only that remedy would relieve the Petitioner from being subjec t to an action that was 7 It should not go unnoticed that that precise scenario nearly played out when the Bureau's first appointed director attempted to install a successor opposed by the President at the time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 711",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury",
		"context": "By contrast, a remedy that does no more than declare invalid and sever the removal bar \"affor ds Plaintiff no relief what- soever\" because its complaint is not about future in-jury, but \"a past decision ma de by\" an improperly in- sulated officer. Collins , 938 F.3d at 609–10 (Oldham, J., concurring in part an d dissenting in part); cf. Stef- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "1. In 1945, foreign -state immunity was governed by common -law principles that were suggested in the first instance by the Executive Branch and then adopted by courts. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311-3 12 (citing The Schooner [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . The rules of foreign -state immunity were \"a matter of grace and comity\" among coequal sovereigns, informed by considerations of foreign relations and reciprocity. Verlinden 461 U.S. 480.",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311-3 12 (citing The Schooner 11 U.S. 116) . The rules of foreign -state immunity were \"a matter of grace and comity\" among coequal sovereigns, informed by considerations of foreign relations and reciprocity. Verlinden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the time, the common -law rule was clear: the United States \"generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this country.\" Ibid .",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": ". The classical or virtually abs o- lute theory of sovereign immunity has generally been followed by the courts of the United States. Alfred Dunhill of London, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ac- cordingly, in the yea rs preceding the IOIA's enactment, this Court uniformly declared that \"upon the principle of comity foreign sovereigns and their public property are held not to be amenable to suit in our courts wit h- out their consent.\" E.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "E.g. , Guaranty Tr. Co. of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 Immunity extended to foreign states' commercial activi ties. This Court explained in cases involving state -owned vessel s engaged in commercial activities that \"a vessel of a friendly government in its possessio n and service is a public vessel, even though engaged in the carriage of merchandise for hire, and as such is immune from suit in the courts of admiralty of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "This Court explained in cases involving state -owned vessel s engaged in commercial activities that \"a vessel of a friendly government in its possessio n and service is a public vessel, even though engaged in the carriage of merchandise for hire, and as such is immune from suit in the courts of admiralty of the United States.\" The Navemar, 303 U.S . 68, 74 (1938); accord Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Berizzi Bros. 271 U.S. 562. The same was true in non -admiralty suit s involving commercial contracts. See Kingdom of Rou- 250 F. 341 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "This Court explained in cases involving state -owned vessel s engaged in commercial activities that \"a vessel of a friendly government in its possessio n and service is a public vessel, even though engaged in the carriage of merchandise for hire, and as such is immune from suit in the courts of admiralty of the United States.\" The Navemar, 303 U.S . 68, 74 (1938); accord Ex parte318 U.S. 578; Berizzi Bros. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same was true in non -admiralty suit s involving commercial contracts. See Kingdom of Rou- 250 F. 341 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "See Kingdom of Rou- 250 F. 341 . Foreign -state immunity was characterized as \"vir- tually\" absolute because narrow exceptions existed for suits concerning real property that was not diplomatic or consular property, and for suits concerning vessels owned b ut not possessed by foreign states. Alfred Dunhill , 425 U.S. at 712; Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .6 Apart from these narrow exceptions, foreign states possessed complete immunity. 6 Hoffman explained that when a vessel was owned but not possessed by a foreign state, the Executive and the courts have historically not recognized immunity. 324 U.S. at 36 -37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "324 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "6 Hoffman explained that when a vessel was owned but not possessed by a foreign state, the Executive and the courts have historically not recognized immunity. 324 U.S. at 36 -37. That rule had origins in nineteenth- century admiralty law, The D a- vis, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and reflected concern that im- munity would leave no party responsible for the vessel. The Attualita, 238 F. 909. Moreover, such suits did not involve the \"indignity\" of \"oust[ing] the possession of a foreign state.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "77 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "37- 40), contending that no substantive rule of immunity existed in 1945. This Court's decisions and the Executive's statements refute that assertion. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714 (appending Tate Le t- ter); Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311; Permanent Mission of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; U.S. Br., Guaranty Tr. Co. of New 304 U.S. 11938 WL 63887.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714 (appending Tate Le t- ter); Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311; Permanent Mission of 551 U.S. 193; U.S. Br., Guaranty Tr. Co. of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]1938 WL 63887. 25",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Four of the ten \"may issue\" jurisdictions behave like \"shall issue\" states, so a decision for Petitioners would only affect six states",
		"context": ". Although the concealed carry permit statutes of Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island each expressly contain a \"may issue\" standard, in practice these states issue licenses on a shall-issue basis to regular citizens seeking to carry a firearm for self-defense. Additionally, while D.C.'s permitting statute contains a \"may issue\" standard, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the D.C. Circuit issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of this law on constitutional grounds, which has put D.C. on similar footing as \"shall issue\" states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "Rather, the statute supplies the substantive legal standard . The interpretation simply reflects the understanding on which the agency will base its \"implement[ation]\" of that standard. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It does not establish or change that standard.5 Here, after all, CMS must rely on some interpreta- tion of the Medicare Act in instructing the contractors in making their initial determinations. But such an interpretation —whether reflected in the calculation of Medicare fractions as in this case, or contained in the Provider Reimbursement Manual as in other cases —is not binding in final agency review, or in court, or on the hospital or other healthcare provider.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "But such an interpretation —whether reflected in the calculation of Medicare fractions as in this case, or contained in the Provider Reimbursement Manual as in other cases —is not binding in final agency review, or in court, or on the hospital or other healthcare provider. A nonbinding in- terpretation by definition \"do[es] not h ave the force and effec t of law \" and so cannot establish or change any kind of legal standard. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 This case involves action by CMS that rests on an interpretation of the Medicare Act itself, and this brief accordingly discusses the application of Section 1395hh to interpretation s of the Act. The same analysis would apply, however, to action by CMS interpreting a regulation that was promulgated to imp lement the Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "The same analysis would apply, however, to action by CMS interpreting a regulation that was promulgated to imp lement the Act. 23 The fundamental distinction between establishing or changing a substantive legal standard, on the one hand, and nonbinding statutory interpretation, on the other, tracks the \"central distinction\" in the APA between \" 'substantive ' \" and \" 'interpretive ' \" rules. Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].6 Section 1395hh's notice -and-comment provisions were enacted against the backdrop of dec- ades of APA jurisprudence, and so must be interpreted in that light. Under the APA, only substanti ve rules must go through notice -and-comment rulemaking . Chrysler Corp. , 441 U.S. at 313, 315.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "\" Mortgage Bankers Ass'n , 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Guernsey Mem'l Hosp. , 514 U.S. at 99); 6 This Court has repeatedly found the Attorney General's 1947 Manual interpreting the APA to be a persuasive construction of the APA. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 accord 1947 APA Manual 30 n.3. Unlike \"substantive\" rules, \" 'interpretive rules' do not have the force and effect of law,\" and courts are therefore not required to give them \"the binding effect of law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "1395hh(a)(2) . Subsec- tion (a)(2) thus does not apply to interpretive rules, as three other courts of appeals have correctly held. Baptist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 371 F.3d 625; 149 F.3d 73, cert. denied,526 U.S. 1064. Nor was the court of appeals correct to rely (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 F.3d 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "1395hh(a)(2) . Subsec- tion (a)(2) thus does not apply to interpretive rules, as three other courts of appeals have correctly held. Baptist 458 F.3d 768 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 149 F.3d 73, cert. denied,526 U.S. 1064. Nor was the court of appeals correct to rely (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "1395hh(a)(2) . Subsec- tion (a)(2) thus does not apply to interpretive rules, as three other courts of appeals have correctly held. Baptist 458 F.3d 768 ; 371 F.3d 625; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,526 U.S. 1064. Nor was the court of appeals correct to rely (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 F.3d 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "An express good -cause excep- tion, on the other hand, is necessary because it applies to substantive rules , which are covered by Section 1395hh(a)(2) —just as a good -cause exception is neces- sary for substantive rules under the APA too. Cf. Reyn- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 560 U.S. 438. So the Med- icare Act' s express incorporation of the APA's good - 29 cause exception, but not its interpretive -rule exception, does not imply that interpretive rules are subject to a notice-and-comment requirement . To the contrary, it reaffirms that interpretive rules are excluded from the notice -and-comment provision's scope to begin with.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
		"context": "An express good -cause excep- tion, on the other hand, is necessary because it applies to substantive rules , which are covered by Section 1395hh(a)(2) —just as a good -cause exception is neces- sary for substantive rules under the APA too. Cf. Reyn- 565 U.S. 432; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So the Med- icare Act' s express incorporation of the APA's good - 29 cause exception, but not its interpretive -rule exception, does not imply that interpretive rules are subject to a notice-and-comment requirement . To the contrary, it reaffirms that interpretive rules are excluded from the notice -and-comment provision's scope to begin with.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. New Mexico's tardiness is not excused by equitable tolling",
		"context": "20 -22, New Mexico fails to meet its elements. That doctrine requires the party invoking it to show \"(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.\" Menominee Indian Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. New Mexico does not even argue that it diligent- ly pursued its rights by choosing to disregard the de- cree's deadlines. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. New Mexico's tardiness is not excused by equitable tolling",
		"context": "New Mexico is rep re- sented by sophisticated counsel ; it is capable of reading and understanding the amended decree. Cf. Lawrence [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. New Mexico's choice not to move for a deadline extension was either a mis- guided strategy or a simple mistake . Neither is an ex- traordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 620's purpose is to protect women who have an abortion procedure",
		"context": "This Court's constituti onal analysis considers \"the purpose\" of abortion regulations. Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One legitimate—even compelling— purpose is \"to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Judges May Not Balance a Right that \"Is the Very Product of an Interest Balancing by the People\"",
		"context": "Having settled on intermediate scrutiny, the Second Circuit then stated what it believed was on each sideof the balancing test — the government's lofty andcompelling interest in public safety 12 and crime control — to prevent \"'mayhem in public places'\" ( id. at 96) — versus the individual's narrow interest in self-defense 12 The court embraced the view of the Fourth Circuit that, \"'outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests of ten outweigh individual interests in self-defense.'\" Kachalsky at 94 ( citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). See also Id . at 475 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (\"This is serious business.",
		"citation_value_orig": "638 F.3d 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Judges May Not Balance a Right that \"Is the Very Product of an Interest Balancing by the People\"",
		"context": "To be sure, the Second Circuit is not alone in its misreading of Heller , because the temptation of judges to empower themselves to re-write the Constitution isstrong. In spite of that, some lower courts have adhered to Heller . Perhaps the first lower federal court opinion to faithfully and correctly read Heller on this point was then-Judge Kavanaugh's dissent in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thatapproach, elevating \"text, history, and tradition,\" notinterest balancing, should be applied here, and by allfederal courts reviewing Second Amendmentchallenges. Indeed, New York's licensing scheme for bearing arms infringes on the constitutionally enumeratedright of the People of New York to \"bear arms,\" even ifjudges on the Second Circuit do not agree with theSecond Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.3d 1244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Judges May Not Balance a Right that \"Is the Very Product of an Interest Balancing by the People\"",
		"context": "at 635. Early in this nation's history, Justice Marshall explained \"the framers of the constitutioncontemplated that instrument, as a rule for thegovernment of courts, as well as of the legislature.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If federal judges are allowed to set aside portions of theConstitution with which they disagree, then thecontract with the people is broken. This Court must restore order to the lower federal courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "And it has sowed confusion among the courts of appeals, hindering States' core ability to regulate abortion pro- viders to fur ther important state interests, such as pa- tient health and the protection of unborn life . This Court does not hesitate to overrule recent deci- sions that are demonstrably erroneous. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "See 321 U.S. 649. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "See 321 U.S. 649. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "See 321 U.S. 649. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "See 321 U.S. 649. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "See 321 U.S. 649. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); 555 U.S. 223 (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded",
		"context": "Indeed, the Court has repeatedly dis- carded recent decisions —even in the abortion context — when only a few years' experience confirms their error. See550 U.S. 124530 U.S. 914 after seven years); Casey , 505 U.S. 833 (over- ruling 476 U.S. 747 and City of Akron , 462 U.S. 416).9 The Court does so with such frequency that it is 9 The Court has overruled its own recent decisions in myr iad contexts. E.g., Johnson , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (overruling Sykes , 564 U.S. 1); Citi- zens United , 558 U.S. 310 (overruling in part 540 U.S. 93); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (overruling 21 doubtful whether recent decisions enjoy stare decisis protection at all. Regardless , the Janus factors readily confirm that nothing stands in the way of discarding Hel- lerstedt as an erroneous anomaly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Having Section 1983 Claims Accrue During the Related Criminal Proceeding Will Traduce the Rights of the Accused and Waste Prosecutorial Resources",
		"context": "The filing fee alone is more than a majority of U.S. households have saved in case of emergency. 24 The median cost of the subse- quent civil lawsuit is nearly 40 times this amount.25 By definition, a defendant facing imprisonment due 23 Order of R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM : REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017 (May 2018), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/ publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-being-us-household s-201805.pdf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Having Section 1983 Claims Accrue During the Related Criminal Proceeding Will Traduce the Rights of the Accused and Waste Prosecutorial Resources",
		"context": "The more detail included in a civil filing, the higher chance it survives a motion to dismiss – but also a higher chance those details will be used in the still-ongoing criminal matter. The complications of concurrent proceedings do not solely affect the criminal defendant. Just as that party 26 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated and remanded sub nom. 138 S. Ct. 1945. 12 must file a civil lawsuit wh ile involved in a criminal matter, the government agents whose behavior is the subject of the Section 1983 claim must defend them- selves while continuing their duties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 794",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Having Section 1983 Claims Accrue During the Related Criminal Proceeding Will Traduce the Rights of the Accused and Waste Prosecutorial Resources",
		"context": "The complications of concurrent proceedings do not solely affect the criminal defendant. Just as that party 26 490 U.S. 794, vacated and remanded sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 must file a civil lawsuit wh ile involved in a criminal matter, the government agents whose behavior is the subject of the Section 1983 claim must defend them- selves while continuing their duties. At a minimum, this will require responding to the initial filing, and it may include more intrusive steps such as depositions and discovery about complex issues of subjective intent and objective law, with the result being a trial- within-a-trial concurrent with the criminal pro- ceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The extraterritoriality doctrine safeguards State sovereignty",
		"context": "A State \"is sovereign within its territorial limits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But a State's projection of its laws to control commerce \"occurring wholly outside the boundaries of [the] State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority.\" Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The extraterritoriality doctrine safeguards State sovereignty",
		"context": "Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. As a matter of constitutional design, \"[n]o State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. State action that \"pass[es] beyond\" its territorial limits and \"the rights of [its] own citizens,\" and \"act[s] upon the rights of citizens of other States,\" is \"incompatible with the rights of other States, and with the constitution of the United States.\" 25 U.S. 213.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The extraterritoriality doctrine safeguards State sovereignty",
		"context": "104 U.S. 592. State action that \"pass[es] beyond\" its territorial limits and \"the rights of [its] own citizens,\" and \"act[s] upon the rights of citizens of other States,\" is \"incompatible with the rights of other States, and with the constitution of the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recognizing the inherent right of each State to regulate in-state conduct as the State sees fit, the extraterritoriality doctrine bars the \"projection of one state's regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.\" Healy , 491 U.S. at 337.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Categorical exclusion of religious education providers from generally available tax credit programs violates the U.S. Constitution",
		"context": ". Lower courts are split on the question of whether religious participants can be excluded from generally available public aid programs merely on account of religious identity. There is a disturbing trend of lower courts approving discrimination against religious actors ' participation in government benefit programs, even after this Court's recent decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Montana Supreme Court ruled that exclusion of religious school participation was mandatory and did not violate the U.S. Constitution, even after Trinity Lutheran re-affirmed the Constitution's non- discrimination rules . There, similar to here, the State attempted to categorically exclude a religious institution from a generall y available benefit —purely on the basis of religious identity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner misunderstands how law applies on federal enclaves",
		"context": "Even assum- ing Congress drew on federal-enclave principles in enacting OCSLA, the absence of a uniform enclave doctrine for determining when state law applies means that OCSLA's clear statutory text remains the starting point for interpreting its governing-law provision. Second, the principles of law the Court ha s recognized as consistent across enclaves refute the argument that state law only \"f ills gaps\" on federal enclaves. Rather, when a new fede ral enclave is established, state laws \"existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty,\" id., and \"not inconsistent with federal policy,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], continue in force until altered by Congress, id. ; see also Sadrakula , 309 U.S. at 97-98 (holding existing New York labor law to be \"applicable\" after federal government acquired exclusive federal jurisdiction). When the federal government has exclusive jurisdic- tion over a federal enclave, state law existing at the time of cessation becomes federalized state law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner misunderstands how law applies on federal enclaves",
		"context": "Br. 34 (citing Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court recognized that \"there is a wide difference between a cession of political jurisdiction from one nation to another, and a cession to the United States by a state of legislative power over a particular tract.\" McGlinn , 114 U.S. at 547.",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Executive Vesting Clause Did Not Mean \"Indefeasible\" or Exclusive Removal",
		"context": "It is telling that textualists are adding words to the text, instead of noting their conspicuous absence (expressio unius). The words \"the,\" \"executive power,\" and \"vested\" do not establish exclusivity either.\" Recent scholarship demonstrates that the phrase \"executive power\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution's Executive Vesting Clause, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 1 (2009); Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 4, at 553-56 (2004). 28 encompassed less than many judges have assumed,\" so it is a stretch to suggest it included indefeasible power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Marbury v. Madison prohibits this Court from exercising direct \"appellate jurisdiction\" over executive branch officers",
		"context": "The Court then held that it lacked \"appellate jurisdiction\" to issue the writ, because an \"essential criterion\" of such jurisdiction was \"that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.\" Id. at 175; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A writ of mandamus could be \"directed to courts,\" Chief Justice Marshall reasoned, but \"to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.\" 5 U.S. at 175- 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "19 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": ". This Court has often repeated the claim that Con- gress intended for the courts to defer to the judgment of agencies when interpreting a statute. See Chevron U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This congressional intent is claimed to be found where Congress left a gap in the statutory scheme and gave rule -making authority to the agency. See Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. 158 ; see also 576 U.S. 473 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": "See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837 . This congressional intent is claimed to be found where Congress left a gap in the statutory scheme and gave rule -making authority to the agency. See Long Island Care at Home, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 576 U.S. 473 . The Court has even described this as an \"express delegation of specific in- terpretive authority\" to the agency. 533 U.S. 218 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": "See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837 . This congressional intent is claimed to be found where Congress left a gap in the statutory scheme and gave rule -making authority to the agency. See Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. 158 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court has even described this as an \"express delegation of specific in- terpretive authority\" to the agency. 533 U.S. 218 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": "See Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. 158 ; see also 576 U.S. 473 . The Court has even described this as an \"express delegation of specific in- terpretive authority\" to the agency. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . However, there is no reference to any actual stat- ute or congressional text expressing such an intent. See 517 U.S. 735 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": "533 U.S. 218 . However, there is no reference to any actual stat- ute or congressional text expressing such an intent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Professor Hamburger observed: \"As a re- sult of Chevron 's presumption from ambiguity, the courts have ended up in the peculiar position of basing their deference on statutory authorization while pre- suming such authorization from what the statutes do not say.\" Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias , 84 GEO.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": "& PUB. POL'Y 639 (2017) ; see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Panama Refin. 293 U.S. 388 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies",
		"context": "POL'Y 639 (2017) ; see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 295 U.S. 495 ; Panama Refin. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "293 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Takings From Victims Of A Genocide Are Never \"Domestic Takings\" Because The Victims Of A Genocide Cease To Be Nationals Of The Genocidal State",
		"context": "117 (codifying the customary international law that stateless persons have the same property rights as al- iens under international law). 24 he has under the formalities of domestic law. The Venus , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, it has treated naturalized American citizens who had returned to Britain as British subjects for purposes of the law of prize. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "12 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Takings From Victims Of A Genocide Are Never \"Domestic Takings\" Because The Victims Of A Genocide Cease To Be Nationals Of The Genocidal State",
		"context": "See id. It has likewise treated a British subject as a Confederate national when he had long resided in New Orleans, \"id entified with the people of Louisiana,\" and had aided the Confederate cause. The V[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Thirty Hogsheads of 13 U.S. 191. 2. During the 1930s and 1940s, Germany's internal law stripped many German Jews of their nationality before the Nazis murdered them and expropriated their property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "69 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Takings From Victims Of A Genocide Are Never \"Domestic Takings\" Because The Victims Of A Genocide Cease To Be Nationals Of The Genocidal State",
		"context": "See id. It has likewise treated a British subject as a Confederate national when he had long resided in New Orleans, \"id entified with the people of Louisiana,\" and had aided the Confederate cause. The V69 U.S. 258 ; see also Thirty Hogsheads of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. During the 1930s and 1940s, Germany's internal law stripped many German Jews of their nationality before the Nazis murdered them and expropriated their property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "13 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Takings From Victims Of A Genocide Are Never \"Domestic Takings\" Because The Victims Of A Genocide Cease To Be Nationals Of The Genocidal State",
		"context": "These obscene technicalities of Third Reich law do not control t he jurisdiction of federal courts, even if —as the Solici tor General and petitioner s urge —the expropriation exception is always subject to a domestic takings rule. Cf. JPMorgan Chase [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Needless to say, the Gestapo often took actions in \"crass\" contempt of the terms of written law. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Takings From Victims Of A Genocide Are Never \"Domestic Takings\" Because The Victims Of A Genocide Cease To Be Nationals Of The Genocidal State",
		"context": "at 275 (treating British subject as Confederate national); The Venus , 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 277 -78 (same with naturalized Americans who had returned to Bri tain). During the Holocaust, German Jews became, in substance, stateless, and it is appropriate for federal courts to treat them as such. Indeed, several lower courts have already held the domestic takings exception inapplicable to Holocaust takings on t his ground.22 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Amicus 28 Second, as a matter of domestic procedure and choice of law, courts give effect to the laws of illegitimate and belligerent states only \"to such extent as justice and public policy re quire that effect be given.\" Fred S. James & 239 N.Y. 248 Thus, for example, \"in litigations following our Civil War\" this Court held that Confederate laws were \"nullities\" insofar as \"they worked injustice to citizens of the Union, or were in conflict w ith its public policy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1019",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "Justiciability, of course, is the rule, not the exception, in American constitutional law. Ordinarily, \"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 566 U.S. 189. Nevertheless, Appellants invoke two categories of cases that do constitute unreviewable political questions. The first of these arises when there is \"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "Justiciability, of course, is the rule, not the exception, in American constitutional law. Ordinarily, \"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.\" 5 U.S. 137; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nevertheless, Appellants invoke two categories of cases that do constitute unreviewable political questions. The first of these arises when there is \"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "Nevertheless, Appellants invoke two categories of cases that do constitute unreviewable political questions. The first of these arises when there is \"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To decide if such a commitment exists, the Court must \"first determine what power the Constitution confers\"; only then can it \"determine to what extent, if any, the exercise of that power is subject to judicial review.\" 395 U.S. 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "369 U.S. 186. To decide if such a commitment exists, the Court must \"first determine what power the Constitution confers\"; only then can it \"determine to what extent, if any, the exercise of that power is subject to judicial review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The second type of political question (addressed in the next section) stems from \"a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the case].\" Baker , 369 U.S. at 217.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "38\u0003 \u0003 \u0003same structure as racial vote-dilution challenges, which have been justiciable for almost half a century. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In racial (as in partisan) vote-dilution suits under the Constitution, discriminatory intent is a prerequisite for liability. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 755",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "In racial (as in partisan) vote-dilution suits under the Constitution, discriminatory intent is a prerequisite for liability. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As noted above, racial and partisan vote dilution both function by cracking and packing disfavored voters. See supra pp.30-35.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 613",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "Racial and partisan vote dilution both also depend on voter behavior that is predictable and polarized. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And racial and partisan vote dilution both require analyses of individual distri cts as well as \"whether line-drawing in the challenged area as a whole dilutes [a group's] voting strength.\" LULAC , 548 U.S. at 504 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "3. Strongly supporting justiciability, too, is this Court's general vigilance against electoral regulations that threaten to entrench parties and undermine responsiveness. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court struck down a campaign-finance law \"making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election.\" The Court explained that \"it is a dangerous business for [politicians] to use the election laws to influence the voters' choices.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "at 192; see also, e.g. , Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These cases' lessons apply squarely to partisan gerrymandering. What is gerrymandering if not \"making and implementing judgments about ... the outcome of an election\"?",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
		"context": "Again, the district court here adopted a district-specific test requiring the (1) intentional, (2) effective, and (3) unjustified subordination of the opposing party and entrenchment of the line-drawing party. J.S.App.139- 40\u0003 \u0003 \u000354. This test built on the standard endorsed by the district court in 218 F. Supp. 3d 837[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; League of Women 2018 WL 6257476—is thus now reality. Lower courts have converged on a single partisan vote-dilution test that exposes only egregious gerrymanders to liability and is highly workable to",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1916",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent's insistence on an objective standard does not separate criminal from apparently innocent conduct",
		"context": "Insisting that a defendant take objectively reasonable steps to ascertain an al ready vague standard does not solve the vagueness problem. It exacerbates it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner presents a more elegant solution: Re- quire proof that a defendant knew a prescription was outside the usual course of professional practice and that he intentionally acted without a legitimate medi- cal purpose. This solves the vagueness problem, pro- tects all unwary practitioners, and prevents the chilling effect on medical practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The court of appeals disregarded the established meanings of \"encourage\" and \"induce\"",
		"context": "at 6a-7a (panel opinion). As this Court has recognized, however, the proper a nalysis focuses on how Congress itself used those terms in con- text. See, e.g., Williams , 553 U.S. at 293 -297; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit failed to conduct that analysis here and in its vacated decision in Sineneng -Smith . In- deed, the court did not even acknowledge the estab- lished criminal -law meanings of the terms \"encourage\" and \"induce,\" let alone provide a ny rationale for con- cluding that Congress deviate d from those established meanings in Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
		"context": ". was to limit the government's power to punish,\" with the Excessive Fines Clause forming an integral part of the Amendment's three -part framework by \"limit[ing] the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for some offense.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] James Madison, House of Representatives, (June 8, 1789), available at http://press - pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s50.html . -23- (quoting Browning –Ferris , 492 U.S. at 26 5). It \"would be anomalous indeed\" if other sanctions under the Eight h Amendment were subject to review under federal constitutional principles but excessive fines were not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Private Religious Expression: Remarkably, courts cannot even come to a consensus on whether the Endorsement Test permits student s to distribute candy canes with religious messages attached to them in school . The Fifth Circuit has held that a student may pass out candy canes with religious messages attached at a \"winter break\" party without raising endorsement concerns. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, in Massachusetts, a district court determined that a school wrongly suspended students for giving out candy canes with religious messages between classes. Westfield High Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.3d 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that endorsement concerns justified a New Jer sey elementary school 's decision to b lock a student from distributing candy canes with religious messages attached . Walz ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 F. Supp. 2d 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that endorsement concerns justified a New Jer sey elementary school 's decision to b lock a student from distributing candy canes with religious messages attached . Walz ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly , the Sixth Circuit upheld a school's decision to prohibit a Fifth Grader from \"selling\" candy cane ornaments with religious message s as part of a model business project for class. Curry ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 F.3d 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Similarly , the Sixth Circuit upheld a school's decision to prohibit a Fifth Grader from \"selling\" candy cane ornaments with religious message s as part of a model business project for class. Curry ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 Even a child's home work is not safe from allegations of endorsement. One court held that endorsement concerns justified a New York school 's decision to f old the corners of a kindergarten student's environmental protection poster to hide the picture of Jesus that the child had pasted on it . Peck v. 2 Other examples abound.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 F.3d 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Peck v. 2 Other examples abound. The Fourth Circuit held that school clubs may make Bibles available to interested students, but the Eighth Circuit held that the distribution of Bibles is an endorsement of religion . Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , with 573 F.3d 556. However , a district court in the Sixth Circuit also held that the First Amendment protects a student 's right to proselytize directly by giving his classmates letters inviting them to attend his church's summer camp . J.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 F.3d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Peck v. 2 Other examples abound. The Fourth Circuit held that school clubs may make Bibles available to interested students, but the Eighth Circuit held that the distribution of Bibles is an endorsement of religion . Compare 155 F.3d 274 , with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However , a district court in the Sixth Circuit also held that the First Amendment protects a student 's right to proselytize directly by giving his classmates letters inviting them to attend his church's summer camp . J.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 556",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "J.S. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Baldwinsville Cent. Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F. Supp. 2d 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "22 -CV-1947, 2008 WL 4527598 , vacated as moot by 351 F. App'x 477. Yet , when a Texas school blacked out a contractor's religious message on a fundraising form sent home with students, a federal court found the conduct to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lower courts also are divided on whether a school must censor religious expression in student graduation speeches. Students may include religious language in their commencement speech es in the Eleventh Circuit, 250 F.3d 1330 , but schools in the Ninth Circuit are apparently required to strip religio us language from student speech es, 320 F.3d 979 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "730 F. Supp. 2d 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "730 F. Supp. 2d 636. Lower courts also are divided on whether a school must censor religious expression in student graduation speeches. Students may include religious language in their commencement speech es in the Eleventh Circuit, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but schools in the Ninth Circuit are apparently required to strip religio us language from student speech es, 320 F.3d 979 . One district court held that a school may even deprive a student of her diploma until she publicly apologizes for religious content in a graduation speech . 568 F. Supp. 2d 1237, aff'd,566 F.3d 1219 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "250 F.3d 1330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "730 F. Supp. 2d 636. Lower courts also are divided on whether a school must censor religious expression in student graduation speeches. Students may include religious language in their commencement speech es in the Eleventh Circuit, 250 F.3d 1330 , but schools in the Ninth Circuit are apparently required to strip religio us language from student speech es, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . One district court held that a school may even deprive a student of her diploma until she publicly apologizes for religious content in a graduation speech . 568 F. Supp. 2d 1237, aff'd,566 F.3d 1219 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 F.3d 979",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Students may include religious language in their commencement speech es in the Eleventh Circuit, 250 F.3d 1330 , but schools in the Ninth Circuit are apparently required to strip religio us language from student speech es, 320 F.3d 979 . One district court held that a school may even deprive a student of her diploma until she publicly apologizes for religious content in a graduation speech . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,566 F.3d 1219 . 3 See Peck ex rel. 426 F.3d 617.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 F. Supp. 2d 1237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Students may include religious language in their commencement speech es in the Eleventh Circuit, 250 F.3d 1330 , but schools in the Ninth Circuit are apparently required to strip religio us language from student speech es, 320 F.3d 979 . One district court held that a school may even deprive a student of her diploma until she publicly apologizes for religious content in a graduation speech . 568 F. Supp. 2d 1237, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 3 See Peck ex rel. 426 F.3d 617.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 1219",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "568 F. Supp. 2d 1237, aff'd,566 F.3d 1219 . 3 See Peck ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Courts also are confused about whether private religious conduct and expression on school property is an impermissible endorsement of religion. The Ninth Circuit required a school to allow student religious clubs to meet at school during the lunch hour.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 F.3d 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit required a school to allow student religious clubs to meet at school during the lunch hour. Ceniceros ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Second Circuit held that a school could prohibit the use of school facilities for religious worship (but not religious activities), even when the worship occurred after school. Bronx Household of 650 F.3d 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 F.3d 878",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "106 F.3d 878 . But the Second Circuit held that a school could prohibit the use of school facilities for religious worship (but not religious activities), even when the worship occurred after school. Bronx Household of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Curriculum, calendars, and events: There also is no clear standard governing endorsement in curricula , on school calendars, and as a part of school events . Some federal courts have held that schools that provided disclaimers before teaching evolution , by telling students to form their own opinions , were endorsing religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Curriculum, calendars, and events: There also is no clear standard governing endorsement in curricula , on school calendars, and as a part of school events . Some federal courts have held that schools that provided disclaimers before teaching evolution , by telling students to form their own opinions , were endorsing religion . See Fr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 400 F. Supp. 2d 707. However , other courts have held that schools that require d students to role-play as witches or \"become Muslims\" for an eight -week unit on Islam were not endorsing religion . See 27 F.3d 1373; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27152, aff'd,154 F. App'x 648.",
		"citation_value_orig": "185 F.3d 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Curriculum, calendars, and events: There also is no clear standard governing endorsement in curricula , on school calendars, and as a part of school events . Some federal courts have held that schools that provided disclaimers before teaching evolution , by telling students to form their own opinions , were endorsing religion . See Fr 185 F.3d 337; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However , other courts have held that schools that require d students to role-play as witches or \"become Muslims\" for an eight -week unit on Islam were not endorsing religion . See 27 F.3d 1373; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27152, aff'd,154 F. App'x 648.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 F. Supp. 2d 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "See Fr 185 F.3d 337; 400 F. Supp. 2d 707. However , other courts have held that schools that require d students to role-play as witches or \"become Muslims\" for an eight -week unit on Islam were not endorsing religion . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27152, aff'd,154 F. App'x 648. Similarly, s chool calendar s listing religious holidays may or may not survive the Endorsement Test. In Illinois, a teacher successfully sued her school for listing Good Friday as a school holiday.",
		"citation_value_orig": "27 F.3d 1373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Similarly, s chool calendar s listing religious holidays may or may not survive the Endorsement Test. In Illinois, a teacher successfully sued her school for listing Good Friday as a school holiday. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Kentucky, by contrast, the Sixth Circuit approved schools' closures for Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah , observ ing that this was not done \"to establish the Jewish religion, but rather as a secular recognition of the practicalities \" of school attendance . 173 F.3d 568.",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F. Supp. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "850 F. Supp. 740. In Kentucky, by contrast, the Sixth Circuit approved schools' closures for Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah , observ ing that this was not done \"to establish the Jewish religion, but rather as a secular recognition of the practicalities \" of school attendance . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor ca n courts agree on whether the Endorsement Test prohibits the performance of religious music at school events. The Third Circuit upheld a New Jersey school's policy prohibiting students from performing \"Silent Night\" at the school's concert, which had the effect of barring the school's gospel choir from the recital.",
		"citation_value_orig": "173 F.3d 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Nor ca n courts agree on whether the Endorsement Test prohibits the performance of religious music at school events. The Third Circuit upheld a New Jersey school's policy prohibiting students from performing \"Silent Night\" at the school's concert, which had the effect of barring the school's gospel choir from the recital. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Texas, however, when a student challenged using hymns —\"Go Ye Now in Peace\" and \"The Lord Bless You and Keep You\" —as the school choir's theme songs , the Fifth Circuit declared that prohibiting religious music would exhibit \"hostility, not neutrality , toward religion.\" 70 F.3d 402.",
		"citation_value_orig": "587 F.3d 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "587 F.3d 597. In Texas, however, when a student challenged using hymns —\"Go Ye Now in Peace\" and \"The Lord Bless You and Keep You\" —as the school choir's theme songs , the Fifth Circuit declared that prohibiting religious music would exhibit \"hostility, not neutrality , toward religion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Religious Images on School Property: Lower courts also disagree about the appropriateness of religious images (including student -created images) in public schools. When a Florida school invited students to paint murals on temporary plywood boards that were part of a renovation project , but then required a student to paint over the word \"God\" and \"Jesus\" in her mural , the Eleventh Circuit held that endorsement concerns justified the school's actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 F.3d 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "Religious Images on School Property: Lower courts also disagree about the appropriateness of religious images (including student -created images) in public schools. When a Florida school invited students to paint murals on temporary plywood boards that were part of a renovation project , but then required a student to paint over the word \"God\" and \"Jesus\" in her mural , the Eleventh Circuit held that endorsement concerns justified the school's actions. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Eastern District of Virgini a held that a reasonable observer would not interpret crosses engraved in brick that were part of a \"walkway of fame\" in a \"prominent area . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 F.3d 1208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": ". near the main entrance \" of the school as an endorsement of Christianity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Use of Off -Campus Facilities: Finally, courts have reached conflict ing conclusions about when a school can use off- campus religious facilities for school purposes . For instance, the Seventh Circuit rejected as unconstitutional the vote of Wisconsin high school seniors to hold graduation in a roomy, air -conditioned church rather than their school's cramped gym, reasoning tha t the \"sheer religiosity of the space\" created a likelihood of endorsement .",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 F. Supp. 2d 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "For instance, the Seventh Circuit rejected as unconstitutional the vote of Wisconsin high school seniors to hold graduation in a roomy, air -conditioned church rather than their school's cramped gym, reasoning tha t the \"sheer religiosity of the space\" created a likelihood of endorsement . Doe ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . However , the Sixth Circuit held that the Endorsement Test did not preclude a school district in Tennessee from sending students to a partnered Christian \"alternative school\" that provided a secular education but required students to attend events in the chapel, which contained religious imagery . 788 F.3d 580.",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 840",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion",
		"context": "687 F.3d 840 . However , the Sixth Circuit held that the Endorsement Test did not preclude a school district in Tennessee from sending students to a partnered Christian \"alternative school\" that provided a secular education but required students to attend events in the chapel, which contained religious imagery . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.3d 580",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "That phrase had an established meaning, reported in the Restatement, used in another statute, and reflected in the FSIA's legislative history: takings in violation of the customary international law of expropriation. When a statute uses a term of art, courts assume that \"Congress intended [the term] to have its estab- lished meaning,\" absent a \"contrary indication.\" McDermott Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is so even if, stripped of context, the plain language could be understood differently. See, e.g., 138 S. Ct. 1118; Merck & 559 U.S. 633, 644–45 ( 2010).",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "McDermott Int'l, 498 U.S. 337. That is so even if, stripped of context, the plain language could be understood differently. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Merck & 559 U.S. 633, 644–45 ( 2010). This principle applies not only to the defini tions of terms but also to \"the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor- rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.\" 566 U.S. 284.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "McDermott Int'l, 498 U.S. 337. That is so even if, stripped of context, the plain language could be understood differently. See, e.g., 138 S. Ct. 1118; Merck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 644–45 ( 2010). This principle applies not only to the defini tions of terms but also to \"the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor- rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.\" 566 U.S. 284.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "See, e.g., 138 S. Ct. 1118; Merck & 559 U.S. 633, 644–45 ( 2010). This principle applies not only to the defini tions of terms but also to \"the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor- rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Justice Frankfurter's famous phrase, when Congress \"transplant[s]\" a statutory term from another legal source, the term \"brings the old soil with it,\" namely, the limits and qualifications of that term in the legal 23 sources it was drawn from. 139 S. Ct. 1795.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "566 U.S. 284. In Justice Frankfurter's famous phrase, when Congress \"transplant[s]\" a statutory term from another legal source, the term \"brings the old soil with it,\" namely, the limits and qualifications of that term in the legal 23 sources it was drawn from. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has often app lied this cardinal rule of interpretation to the FSIA, giving its terms their meaning in the customary international law of 1976. For example, in Republic of 504 U.S. 607, this Court recognized that the word \"commercial\" in the FSIA's commercial-activities exception was a term of art and gave it \"the meaning generally attached to that term under the restrictive theory at the time the statute was enacted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 1795. This Court has often app lied this cardinal rule of interpretation to the FSIA, giving its terms their meaning in the customary international law of 1976. For example, in Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court recognized that the word \"commercial\" in the FSIA's commercial-activities exception was a term of art and gave it \"the meaning generally attached to that term under the restrictive theory at the time the statute was enacted.\" And in Per- manent Mission , this Court relied on \"international practice at the time of the FSIA's enactment,\" as estab-lished by the Restatement Second, to determine the scope of the FSIA's immovable-property exception. 551 U.S. at 200.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "It should come as no surprise that Congress in- voked this body of international law when it drafted the expropriation exception. For decades, Communist states had engaged in extensive expropriations of al- iens' property, particularly that of U.S. nationals. The issue reached the Court in Banco Nacional de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which asked this Court to decide competing claims of ownership over U.S. sugar interests that Cuba had nationalized. But the Court declined, holding that the act-of-state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from deciding the validity of the \"public acts [of ] a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": ". in violation of the princi- ples of international law\" meant violations of the customary international law of expropriation, not do- mestic takings. See F. Palicio y Compania, S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress codified that interpretation when it used nearly identical language in the FSIA several years later. See Forest Grove Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 F. Supp. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
		"context": "Congress codified that interpretation when it used nearly identical language in the FSIA several years later. See Forest Grove Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 The FSIA's legislative history notes the connection, directly citing the Second Hickenlooper Amendment in its discussion of the expropriation exception. H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. ERISA's duty of prudence cannot require ESOP fiduciaries to violate the securities laws' disclosure requirements",
		"context": "Section 10(b) of the Ex- change Act and Rule 10b -5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b -5, pro- hibit a corporate insider from \"trad[ing] in the securi-ties of his corporation on the basis of material , nonpub- lic information.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, as the Court observed, ERISA's duty of prudence cannot require an ESOP fi-duciary to \"divest[] the fund's holdings of the em- ployer's stock on the basis of inside infor mation.\" Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. at 428.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 642",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. ERISA's duty of prudence cannot require ESOP fiduciaries to violate the securities laws' disclosure requirements",
		"context": "243.100. If it were made in violation of the ESOP fiduciary's confidentiality obligations to the employer, it would be an unlawful tip of inside infor- mation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Ac- cording ly, any disclosure must be \"effected by a public release designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or group.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The software can accurately determine true donors and non-donors when multiple unknown individuals are present in a mixture",
		"context": "37 36Id. (Table 1 showing that for the 77,967 comparisons to non- donors for DNA mixtures of three individuals or less, 1,853 individuals were not excluded and Table 2 showing that for the 120 comparisons to true donors for the same DNA mixtures, only four individuals were not included). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 C",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Officials' Possibly Mistaken Beliefs About Removability May Present Questions of Administrative Law, Not Constitutional Law, Which Have Not Been Addressed in This Case",
		"context": "A solution to that problem that would regard unconstitutional statutes as valid until a court makes them invalid, while regarding as unlawful official acts taken while the unconstitutional provision was in effect, is inconsistent with basic constitutional p rinciples. Any solution should be sought in principles of administrative law. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court applied administrative law principles to a problem that arose from an agency adjudication that reflected 31 an error concerni ng structural constitutional law. An SEC ALJ had decided Lucia 's case on the assumption that the ALJ had a valid appointment. The Court concluded that Judge Elliot 's appointment was invalid under the Appointments Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "As evidenced by the Court's reliance on a lengthy and unbroken chain of jurisprudence in its opinion in Franklin , the availability of damages as a remedy for violations of federal rights—including against federal officials sued in their individual capacities—is fun- damental to our legal system. See503 U.S. at 66–67; Kendall , 37 U.S. at 575, 603–04, 614–15, 624 (noting that damages were available against a federal offi- cial, the Postmaster General, under statute with ex- plicit private right of action that did not specify available remedies); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 And ever since 1938, when this Court eliminated the distinction between actions at law and in equity, there has been only one pertinent \"form of action, the civil action.\" Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "Thus, in Franklin, when faced with \"the question of what remedies are available under a statute that provides a private right of action,\" the Court con- cluded that it must \"presume the availability of all appropriate remedies\"—including damages—\"unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.\" 503 U.S. at 65–66. This holding reinforced the long- standing principles that \"[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done,\" id.at 66 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and that damages are generally available in civil actions, and are thus necessarily \"appropriate\" relief. See id. (\"From the earliest years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court….\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "(\"From the earliest years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court….\"). Congress enacted RFRA one year after the Court's unanimous decision in Franklin , and must be presumed to have understood that courts would view a statute that says it provides for \"appropriate relief\" 26 to authorize damages absent a limitation in the stat- ute itself or the Constitution. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would be absurd for Congress to have used \"appropriate relief\" in RFRA to sweep more narrowly than the Franklin Court implied one year earlier in the absence of any statutory text providing relief. Petitioners attempt to blunt the powerful force of Franklin 's reaffirmation of \"the traditional presump- tion in favor of all appropriate relief,\" 503 U.S. at 69, by asserting it should be limited to implied causes of action, like Title IX, but not to express causes of ac- tion of the kind at issue in RFRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "\").10 10 That Congress amended Title IX to provide for remedies after this Court had implied a right of action but prior to the decision in Franklin further demonstrates that this Court did not intend to limit its holding to implied rights of action. See Franklin , 503 U.S. at 72 (reading subsequent statute as \"vali- dation\" of right of action previously held to be implied despite 28 Thus, the Franklin Court made clear that it was reaffirming the longstanding principle that Congress should be presumed to mean what it says—a statute providing for appropriate relief without limitation, including against federal officials, should not be judi- cially limited to mean \"all appropriate relief except for money damages.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In- deed, accepting Petitioners' novel limitation on the \"traditional rule\" Franklin represents, 503 U.S. at 73, would undermine the holdings of lower courts that have applied Franklin to express causes of ac- tion across a range of substantive areas. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "In- deed, accepting Petitioners' novel limitation on the \"traditional rule\" Franklin represents, 503 U.S. at 73, would undermine the holdings of lower courts that have applied Franklin to express causes of ac- tion across a range of substantive areas. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that subsequent statute also \"must be read\" as \"implicit acknowledgement that damages are availa- ble\"). 11 Petitioners' argument that \"[u]nder the lowest common- denominator approach, the unavailability of damages against the government and its branches…dictates the unavailability of damages against all defendants under RFRA,\" Pet'rs' Br. 47 (citing 543 U.S. 371), is inappo- site.",
		"citation_value_orig": "662 F.3d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": ", 662 F.3d 1091 (noting that subsequent statute also \"must be read\" as \"implicit acknowledgement that damages are availa- ble\"). 11 Petitioners' argument that \"[u]nder the lowest common- denominator approach, the unavailability of damages against the government and its branches…dictates the unavailability of damages against all defendants under RFRA,\" Pet'rs' Br. 47 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), is inappo- site. In Clark , this Court applied the rule of lenity to reject a construction of federal immigration law that would have given the same statutory language two different meanings when ap- 29 Petitioners assert that Congress has a \"practice of employing express language to authorize personal damages liability against government personnel.\" Pet'rs' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "Moreover, Congress's use of the term \"appropriate\" relief suggests that the relief available against different categories of defendants may vary. See infra Part B.2. Even were that not so, Petitioners' proposed extension of Clark should be rejected because it would sanction precisely the \"havoc\" that Justice Thomas warned of in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"As I explained in Clark , the lowest common denomi- nator principle requires courts to search out a single hypothet- ical constitutionally doubtful case to limit a statute's terms in the wholly different case actually before the court, lest the court fail to adopt a reading of the statute that reflects the lowest common denominator.\"). Petitioners' proposed extension of Clark here would upend this Court's jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in the absence of any constitutional question on the facts of this case. 30 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "Petitioners' argument that RFRA's scope should be limited by the remedial outcomes that would have been available prior to Smith , under this Court's ear- lier First Amendment cases, Pet'rs' Br. 21, 25–26, is in tension with this Court's understanding that RFRA's scope is in fact broader than what this Court had recognized until that point.12See Hobby Lobby , 12 In any event, at the time RFRA was enacted, this Court had not ruled that damages were unavailable as a remedy against individual federal officers for violations of free religious exercise, and damages were assumed to be available by numer- ous courts of appeals. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]702 F.2d 1263640 F.2d 1335. RFRA's legislative history indicates that Congress took this into account when enacting RFRA. Unlike the Senate Committee Report for RFRA, which authorizes relief \"con- sistent with the Supreme Court's…free exercise jurisprudence,\" S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.2d 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "Petitioners' argument that RFRA's scope should be limited by the remedial outcomes that would have been available prior to Smith , under this Court's ear- lier First Amendment cases, Pet'rs' Br. 21, 25–26, is in tension with this Court's understanding that RFRA's scope is in fact broader than what this Court had recognized until that point.12See Hobby Lobby , 12 In any event, at the time RFRA was enacted, this Court had not ruled that damages were unavailable as a remedy against individual federal officers for violations of free religious exercise, and damages were assumed to be available by numer- ous courts of appeals. 790 F.2d 589[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]640 F.2d 1335. RFRA's legislative history indicates that Congress took this into account when enacting RFRA. Unlike the Senate Committee Report for RFRA, which authorizes relief \"con- sistent with the Supreme Court's…free exercise jurisprudence,\" S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.2d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants",
		"context": "Petitioners' argument that RFRA's scope should be limited by the remedial outcomes that would have been available prior to Smith , under this Court's ear- lier First Amendment cases, Pet'rs' Br. 21, 25–26, is in tension with this Court's understanding that RFRA's scope is in fact broader than what this Court had recognized until that point.12See Hobby Lobby , 12 In any event, at the time RFRA was enacted, this Court had not ruled that damages were unavailable as a remedy against individual federal officers for violations of free religious exercise, and damages were assumed to be available by numer- ous courts of appeals. 790 F.2d 589702 F.2d 1263[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. RFRA's legislative history indicates that Congress took this into account when enacting RFRA. Unlike the Senate Committee Report for RFRA, which authorizes relief \"con- sistent with the Supreme Court's…free exercise jurisprudence,\" S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "640 F.2d 1335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Assembly Clause also prevents the state from interfering in Petitioners' decisions regarding whom they empower to carry out their religious missions",
		"context": "769 F. App'x 460. Likewise, in Biel v. St. James School , the teacher taught her stu- dents Catholic doctrine and practice for about two hours each week, included religious symbols in the classroom, took her students to Mass, and joined her 25 students in religious pr ayer. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet in both cases, the court focused on the teacher's titles and lack of substantial religious train- ing, rather than giving due weight to the role of teachers and other employees in shaping, formally and informally, the Catholic school communities' in- ternal beliefs and practices. If religious groups such as Petitioners cannot decide who may embody and carry out the religious purposes of the group (in these cases, teaching and instructing children in accordance with Petitioners' religious principles), the integrity of religious groups to define themselves on their own terms cannot be sustained.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "Nor is the distinction between principal and accomplice liability the only insignificant circumstance the simultaneity rule so exalts. To take but one more example, under the court of appeals' approach, otherwise-irrelevant allegations or admissions regarding offenses' locations can also be the difference between an ordinary offender and an armed career criminal. For instance, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1993), the Eighth Circuit held that a stabbing and a shooting that took place in a single evening nevertheless occurred on different occasions because, twenty-five years earlier, the defendant had admitted in his plea colloquy to the then-immaterial proposition that one occurred inside and the other outside a bar. The location of those offenses would have been irrelevant to the underlying state court proceeding, and thus may well have gone unchallenged if inaccurate, see Descamps , 570 U.S. at 6 As the petitioner correctly no tes, the possibility that he was convicted as an accomplice rather than a principal was actively litigated in both lower courts. See Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 F.3d 1187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "Br. 19-20, even though, as the petitioner explains, state law makes clear that it need not be charged or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Pet'r Br. 42 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The court of appeals then ignored the issue entirely. 22 270-71, but took on life-altering consequence when a federal sentencing court discovered the admission decades later.",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 S.E.2d 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "The casebooks are full of similar examples. See supra at 13-19; Pet'r Br . at 37-43; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Moreover, as the decision below also demonstrates, see Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 F. App'x 632",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "App. 8-9, courts that apply the simultaneity rule routinely resort to an all-the- circumstances analysis when th at rule is not satisfied. For instance, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Eleventh Circuit, ordinarily a simultaneity jurisdiction, conducted its occasions inquiry based on the premise that the defendant had burglarized one home, fled to another home when the police approached, and hid in a closet to escape detection (one occasion). And in 27 F.3d 1126 and 211 F.3d 316, the court of appeals whose decision is cu rrently on review reached divergent results based on the apparent difference between committing two rapes against different victims on different floors of the same house in one day (career criminal) and committing two rapes in a single day against two victims in a car driven from one location to another (not). As the petitioner explains, these highly fact-specific decisions from courts that 23 supposedly apply the simultaneity rule demonstrate that the rule is \"built on sand\" and cannot be consistently applied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "933 F.2d 962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "8-9, courts that apply the simultaneity rule routinely resort to an all-the- circumstances analysis when th at rule is not satisfied. For instance, in 933 F.2d 962, the Eleventh Circuit, ordinarily a simultaneity jurisdiction, conducted its occasions inquiry based on the premise that the defendant had burglarized one home, fled to another home when the police approached, and hid in a closet to escape detection (one occasion). And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 211 F.3d 316, the court of appeals whose decision is cu rrently on review reached divergent results based on the apparent difference between committing two rapes against different victims on different floors of the same house in one day (career criminal) and committing two rapes in a single day against two victims in a car driven from one location to another (not). As the petitioner explains, these highly fact-specific decisions from courts that 23 supposedly apply the simultaneity rule demonstrate that the rule is \"built on sand\" and cannot be consistently applied. Pet' r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "27 F.3d 1126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "8-9, courts that apply the simultaneity rule routinely resort to an all-the- circumstances analysis when th at rule is not satisfied. For instance, in 933 F.2d 962, the Eleventh Circuit, ordinarily a simultaneity jurisdiction, conducted its occasions inquiry based on the premise that the defendant had burglarized one home, fled to another home when the police approached, and hid in a closet to escape detection (one occasion). And in 27 F.3d 1126 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court of appeals whose decision is cu rrently on review reached divergent results based on the apparent difference between committing two rapes against different victims on different floors of the same house in one day (career criminal) and committing two rapes in a single day against two victims in a car driven from one location to another (not). As the petitioner explains, these highly fact-specific decisions from courts that 23 supposedly apply the simultaneity rule demonstrate that the rule is \"built on sand\" and cannot be consistently applied. Pet' r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
		"context": "That is an independent Sixth Amendment violation and still further reason for this Court to intervene. At the very root of the Apprendi line of cases rests the maxim that facts that increase the ma ximum available sentence must not only be found by a jury, but also proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 484-85 (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Jones , 526 U.S. at 240- 43 (same). To the extent the simultaneity rule has been employed in service of the Fifth Circuit's 24 additional violation, that is yet another reason to reject any suggestion that it lessens the Sixth Amendment problems the occasions inquiry begets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE",
		"context": "Part A Fee- For-Service And Part C Managed Care Program s Under Medicare Part A , the Government makes direct payment s to hospitals for inpatient hospital services on a fee-for- service basis . 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d); Cape Cod [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The standard per- patient - discharge rates at which hospitals are paid are predetermined, but subject to further adjustments to account for factors that may cause a hospital to incur greater- than- average costs , such as the treatment of a high number of low -income patients . 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.3d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE",
		"context": "An eligible beneficiary can elect to receive benefits through enrollment in a managed care plan under Part C in lieu of benefits under Part A. Id. § 1395w -21(a)(1), (i)(1); see Northeast Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. II. THE AGENCY 'S NEW STANDARD ON PART -A-ENTITLED DAYS IN THE DSH PAYMENT A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE",
		"context": "Patients are either Part A entitled or not. Accordingly, a given patient can be counted in the numerator of one DSH fraction or the other, but not both. Allina Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To implement the DSH payment adjustment, including the determination of days in the DSH fractions, the agency has repeatedly used notice -and- comment rulemaking . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.3d 1102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE",
		"context": "16,772, 16,777 (May 6, 1986) (explaining the Secretary's intent when regulation adopted to include only \"covered Medicare Part A inpatient days\"). Although the 1986 regulation did not expressly mention Part C patient days (as noted above, Part C came later), it necessarily excluded them as days not covered and paid under Part A . See Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B. DSH Payment Changes Relating To Part C Patients In 2003, the agency published a proposed rule \"to clarify\" that Part C days are excluded from Part -A- entitled days in the DSH fractions because they are not considered covered and paid under Part A . 68 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "718 F.3d 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE",
		"context": "69 Fed. Reg. 48,916, 49,099 (Aug. 11, 2004); see also Allina Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd746 F.3d 1102. Unlike the proposed rule, t he final rule deleted the requirement that days must be \"covered\" by Medicare Part A to be included as Part-A-entitled days. Compare 42 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F. Supp. 2d 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE",
		"context": "69 Fed. Reg. 48,916, 49,099 (Aug. 11, 2004); see also Allina Health 904 F. Supp. 2d 75, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike the proposed rule, t he final rule deleted the requirement that days must be \"covered\" by Medicare Part A to be included as Part-A-entitled days. Compare 42 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.3d 1102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Stay Should Be Imposed Where a District Court Determines That the Parties Privately Agreed to Litigate Via an Unambiguous Forum Selection Clause.",
		"context": "The FAA merely \"places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.\" Rent -A-Center, West, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Prima Paint 388 U.S. 395 . \"And indeed, the text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create 5 The Court once glossed over the word \"evidencing,\" in the process of deciding the meaning of the phrase \"involving commerce.\" See Allied -Bruce Terminix 513 U.S. 265.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Stay Should Be Imposed Where a District Court Determines That the Parties Privately Agreed to Litigate Via an Unambiguous Forum Selection Clause.",
		"context": "The FAA merely \"places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.\" Rent -A-Center, West, 561 U.S. 63 ; see also Prima Paint [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"And indeed, the text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create 5 The Court once glossed over the word \"evidencing,\" in the process of deciding the meaning of the phrase \"involving commerce.\" See Allied -Bruce Terminix 513 U.S. 265.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Stay Should Be Imposed Where a District Court Determines That the Parties Privately Agreed to Litigate Via an Unambiguous Forum Selection Clause.",
		"context": "Rent -A-Center, West, 561 U.S. 63 ; see also Prima Paint 388 U.S. 395 . \"And indeed, the text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create 5 The Court once glossed over the word \"evidencing,\" in the process of deciding the meaning of the phrase \"involving commerce.\" See Allied -Bruce Terminix [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As shown herein, that never -decided assumption is inaccurate. Such passing, unsupported assumpti ons \"are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "§ 107. 6 The preamble of that section also mentions \"news reporting\" as an example of the type of use that could attract a fair use defense, but this Court has made clear that these examples are \"illustrative and not limitative\" and \"provide only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly ha[ve] found to be fair uses.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Second Circuit observed in the Google Books decision, \"[t]hose who report the news undoubtedly create factual works. It cannot seriously be argued that, for that reason, othe rs may freely copy and re- disseminate news reports.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "As the Second Circuit observed in the Google Books decision, \"[t]hose who report the news undoubtedly create factual works. It cannot seriously be argued that, for that reason, othe rs may freely copy and re- disseminate news reports.\" Authors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Factor 1: The Purpose and Character of the Use Non-Transformative Use Fair use emerged from a concern that an overly broad view of copyright may prevent others in society from, for example, criticizing or commenting upon the work of others. Writing in 1841, Justice Story stated that \"no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work , if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "Br. at 37 (citation omitted). 7 Starting with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this and lower courts have placed increasing emphasis on whether a secondary use is transformative. It is no secret, however, that the doctrine of \"transformative use\" has taken on a life of its own. Much like an urban legend that changes upon each retelling, the doctrine has morphed to the point that, as one comment ator laments, it \"has become all things to all people.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "Such a device- or me dia-focused standard that ties transformation to the location in which Oracle's lines of code are running, i.e., laptop v. smartphone, is woefully misplaced. See Infinity Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] republis hing otherwise protected online news content via a smart speaker could cloak a would-be infringer with fair use immunity, assuming other fair use elements balanced in its favor. See id . at 108 n.2 (\"[C]hange of format, though useful, is not technically a tran[s]formation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "Google could have written its own software interface, but did not. Ra ther, it simply avoided the burden in creating its own, by taking Oracle's. Campbell , 510 U.S. at 580; see also Oracle Am., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. granted2019 WL 6042317. It is always cheaper and easier for an infringer to appropriate the property of another than to engage in its own efforts to create a new work or to pay for a license to use the other's work, but that is not an efficiency argument in favor of fair use because it fails to account for the economic disincentive to creation that would ensue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "\"); 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 (\"[J]ust because a given use qualifies as 'trans formative' does not even mean that defendants prevail under the first factor, much less that they prevail altogether on the fair use defense.\"). Use of the copyrighted work in a way that is commercial \"tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.\" Harper & Row, Publrs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Google misconstrues the standard by which a use is deemed \"commercial,\" suggesting that the presence of \"some non-commercial purposes\" for a secondary work supports a legal determination that the nature of the use is not commercial. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "That approach would elevate works with \"aesthetic appeal\" to the highest level of protection, and demote works not issued for their artistic merit to second -class copyright citizenship. See id. at 658 (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is also increasingly perilous as a general proposition of copyright law in the digital age, in which so much of the creativity that drives our economy is embodied in works that wou ld not conventionally be described as 13 \"artistic.\" Computer software can represent remarkable flights of human creativity, as can the synthesis and eloquent ex pression of events and ideas, investigative skill, and intrepid reporting that mark the best news reporting.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 F.2d 487",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "It is also increasingly perilous as a general proposition of copyright law in the digital age, in which so much of the creativity that drives our economy is embodied in works that wou ld not conventionally be described as 13 \"artistic.\" Computer software can represent remarkable flights of human creativity, as can the synthesis and eloquent ex pression of events and ideas, investigative skill, and intrepid reporting that mark the best news reporting. While the distinction between unprotected bare facts and copyrightable expression is not in question, see, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court should not be misled into making overbroad pronouncements regarding the degree of protection available to \"non-artistic\" works. Factor 3: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used Google similarly argues that Factor 3 supports the jury verdict on fair use because \"less than 0.5% of the code\" was used, consisting of \"short and scattered\" excerpts of the copyrighted wo rk. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "This too represents a danger ous distortion of the law. First, Factor 3 requires consideration of the qualitative as well as the quantitative significance of what was taken—a well-settled principle that Google ignores. E.g., Harper & Row, Publrs., 471 U.S. at 566; Los Angeles News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Oracle points out, Google appropriated far more code than was functionally necessitated—suggesting that Google commandeered significant amo unts of content that it valued independently for its competitive purposes. See Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 F.3d 924",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A] [4]. And it \"take[s] account…of harm to the market for derivative works, defined as those markets that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop[.]\" Castle Rock Entm't, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Google would have this Court narrow the scope of the inquiry in a manner that is inconsistent with precedent and contrar y to the intent of the copyright law to protect intellectual property so as to encourage 16 creative expression for the ultimate benefit of the public. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "Google would have this Court narrow the scope of the inquiry in a manner that is inconsistent with precedent and contrar y to the intent of the copyright law to protect intellectual property so as to encourage 16 creative expression for the ultimate benefit of the public. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Google's market-har m conception admits only of harm between companies whose products compete directly with one another. Indeed, Google argues that its use of Java lines of code did not cause cognizable copyright harm \"because Java SE, which was designed for servers and desktop computers, is not suitable for the modern smartphone market.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "As the Second Circuit explained: \"It is indisputable that, as a general matter, a copyright holder is entitled to 17 demand a royalty for licensing others to use its copyrighted work, and that the impact on potential licensing revenues is a proper subject for consideration in assessing the fourth factor[.]\" Am. Geophysical [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a consumer of copyrighted material exploits that material without permission, Factor 4 is triggered even where the use is for a purpose collateral to the main or original purpose of creating the material. That is one of the important lessons of Fox News Network, 883 F.3d 169, where the defendant ingested vast amounts of broadcast news programming and enabled its subscribers to watch, download, and save actual news clips of up to ten minutes duration without license from the source broadcasters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 F.3d 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "Geophysical 60 F.3d 913. When a consumer of copyrighted material exploits that material without permission, Factor 4 is triggered even where the use is for a purpose collateral to the main or original purpose of creating the material. That is one of the important lessons of Fox News Network, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the defendant ingested vast amounts of broadcast news programming and enabled its subscribers to watch, download, and save actual news clips of up to ten minutes duration without license from the source broadcasters. Id. at 175.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors",
		"context": "As one court said in rejecting a fair use defense by a company that engaged in massive unlicensed photocopying of textbooks, creating a new bus iness through the exploitation of copyrighted materials does not in itself justify immunity from infringement: \"defendant has effectively created a new nationwide business allied to the publishing industry by usurping plaintiffs ' copyrights and profits. T his cannot be sustained by this Court as its result is complete frustration of the intent of the copyright law which has been the protection of intellectual property and, more importantly, the encouragement of creative expression.\" Basic Books, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this Court were to adopt Google's narrow conception of market harm, the Alliance members' ability to license their copyrighted material would be threatened in evolving commercial markets , jus t as Oracle's ability to license its software would be curtailed. The instant case is emblematic of how Google has exploited fair use to free ride on others' creative expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F. Supp. 1522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications",
		"context": "Even as the states and Congress moved away from the traditional \"felonious intent,\" they uniformly retained the concept of blameworthiness in doctrines of excuse —defenses like insanity and infancy . The Model Penal Code re- flects this distinction. Although the Code adopted a \"carefu l delineation o f mental states\" that went be- yond the traditional \" evil mind ,\" see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it kept the insanity defense's moral -culpability princip le. Compare Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) , with id. § 4.01(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications",
		"context": ". . of the normal individual to choose between good and evil, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the insanity de- fense's moral -culpability principle r emains a vital protection. Likewise , the existence of \"strict liability . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications",
		"context": "at 9, that is not quite right. Kansas allows evidence of mental disease or defect only \"as it specifically relates to the requisite mens rea of the offense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So, if an offense requires intentional action, a defendant might try to show that he did not know what he was doing. But for an offense requiring only recklessness or negli- gence, mental -state evidence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible .",
		"citation_value_orig": "66 P.3d 840",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications",
		"context": "A nd of course evidence of mental state is irrelevant to strict liability . Kansas thus ex- cludes evidence of insanity in whole categories of criminal cases —a result the state neither acknowl- edges nor defends. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]110 P. 1020. More broadly, Kansas apparently deems itself free to criminally punish any act without regard for blameworthiness. On this view, Kansas could also abolish other ancient common -law defenses like self- defense and infancy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications",
		"context": "Br. 40. If no more is required, the \"basic right [of self -defense], recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is just a matter of legislative grace. Likewise, because infancy historically excused a child who lacked \"sufficient ca- pacity to understand the wrongfulness of his act,\" 14 So. 134 ; Com- 92 Mass. 398 , mak- ing culpability irrelevant to criminality would permit a state to punish a small child like an adult felon. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Mere Risk That A Subpoena Duces Tecum May Interfere With Official Presidential Functions Does Not Afford A President Categorical Immunity",
		"context": "But that is exactly what this Court considered and rejected: an \"unquali- fied Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process.\" Nixon , 418 U.S. at 706; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 portant public interest at stake and had to be evalu- ated \"in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law\" and \"the twofold aim (of criminal justice) … that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 F.2d 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional trademark law required willfulness for an infringer's profits award",
		"context": "This rule crossed the Atlantic. Early American courts \"constantly refused\" \"an account of gains and 33 profits\" for \"want of fraudulent intent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 179 U.S. 42; see also 11 Paige Ch. 292. State and federal courts routinely denied an accounting where there was no bad faith or limited an accounting to a period when a defendant could no longer be deemed to have been acting in good faith. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional trademark law required willfulness for an infringer's profits award",
		"context": "This rule crossed the Atlantic. Early American courts \"constantly refused\" \"an account of gains and 33 profits\" for \"want of fraudulent intent.\" 96 U.S. 245; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 11 Paige Ch. 292. State and federal courts routinely denied an accounting where there was no bad faith or limited an accounting to a period when a defendant could no longer be deemed to have been acting in good faith. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "179 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution's Text and Original Meaning Bar the Re-Delegation of Legislative Power",
		"context": "\"To the Framers, the Separation of Powers and checks and balances were more than just theories. They were practical and real protections for individual liberty in the new Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the opening lines of the Constitution, the American people vested all legislative power in the United States Congress. See U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution's Text and Original Meaning Bar the Re-Delegation of Legislative Power",
		"context": "I, § 1. The people granted the legislative power to Congress exclusively, just as the people granted coordinate powers exclusively to the Executive and J udicial Branches. S ee Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When the Government is called upon to perform a function that requires an 8 exercise of legislative, executive, or ju dicial power, only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution's Text and Original Meaning Bar the Re-Delegation of Legislative Power",
		"context": "405, 411 -12 (2008) . But no one doubted that Congress cannot delegate \"powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At its most concrete, the power to legislate is the power to prescribe \"the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.\" The Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Background Principles Do Not Trump the Text of the Lanham Act",
		"context": "15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). In Park N' Fly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court refused to interpr et section 1116's reference to \"principles of equity\" incons istently with the statute's text. There, the Court reason ed that the Act's text did not allow a defendant to defend \"an action to enjoin the in- fringement of an incontestabl e trade or service mark . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Background Principles Do Not Trump the Text of the Lanham Act",
		"context": "at 203. This Court more generally has held that background legal principles \"can be relevant to the interpretation of 34 an ambiguous text,\" but cannot supplant the unambiguous meaning of a statute. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2012). Resort to background principles is \"a to ol of construction, not an ex- tratextual supplement.\" Hartford Underwriters Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Background Principles Do Not Trump the Text of the Lanham Act",
		"context": "Resort to background principles is \"a to ol of construction, not an ex- tratextual supplement.\" Hartford Underwriters Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These precedents establish that section 1117(a)'s ref- erence to \"principles of eq uity\" cannot supply a willful- ness requirement for profit awards. As discussed, the statutory text and structure make clear that section 1117(a) does not require plaintiffs to prove willfulness to recover profits under any cause of action other than trade- mark dilution under section 1125(c).",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "But administrative -review statutes \"do not restrict judicial review unless the 'statutory scheme' displays a 'fairly discernible' intent to limit jurisdiction, and the claims at issue 'are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure.'\" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] whether the suit is \"wholly collateral to a statute's review provisions\"; and (3) whether the claims fall \"outside the agency's ex- pertise.\" Id. (quoting Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 212- 13).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "Br. 41-42. Take [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a social security case. The Social Security Act auth orizes judicial review of only \"final decision [s] of the Commis- sioner of Social Security made after a hearing.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "Id. at 330 -31. Or take [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the Court held that an adminis trative - review scheme that preconditioned judicial review on vol-untary surrender for deportation did not \"as a practical matter\" afford \"meaningful\" judicial review. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "at 496 -97. By contrast, an administrative scheme precludes im- mediate judicial review only where Congress evinces a clear intent to strip district courts of jurisdiction over the specific claims at issue. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], demonstrates how high that bar is. For- mer federal employees challenged their termination on constitutional grounds , seeking reinstatement and back- pay. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "Forcing parties be- fore the FTC to litigate all the way to a cease -and-desist order just to obtain judicial review of the FTC's unconsti- tutional structure and procedures would produce too little review , too late. Judicial review is, by definition, not \"meaningful\" if it comes only after th e allegedly unconsti- tutional act \"would have already taken place.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Parties incur irreparable harm when an unconstitutionally structured agency subjects them to un- constitutional procedures . No matter the outcome of the particular proceeding, parties have been deprived of their right to have their cases heard by constitutionally ac- countable decision -makers employing constitutionally adequate procedures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "Br. 36-38, 44- 45. The FTC is incorrect that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], treated enduring an unconstitutional process as a non-cognizable harm. Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "at 244 (citation omitted). Being sub- jected to unconstitutional proceedings before an uncons titutionally structured agency is a classic \"'here - and-now' injury\" for courts to adjudicate. Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Further, back -end judicial review is a hollow promise when the price of getting to court is to risk an FTC order imposing a company -destroying penalty. Here, for exam- ple, the FTC demanded that Axon write a \"blank check\" 10 to create a new competitor with all of Axon's intellectual property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "Finally, this Cour t routinely declines to infer that Congress implicitly desig- nated agencies as the threshol d arbiters of challenges they lack the competence or jurisdiction to resolve. E.g., 141 S. Ct. 1352 ; Free Enter. Fund , 561 U.S. at 491; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The point of administrative review is ordinar- ily for the agency to bring its specialized expertise to bear on substantive matters within its bailiwick . See Wein- 422 U.S. 749.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
		"context": "Fund , 561 U.S. at 491; 430 U.S. 99 . The point of administrative review is ordinar- ily for the agency to bring its specialized expertise to bear on substantive matters within its bailiwick . See Wein- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Constitutional challenges to the agency's structure and foundational procedures fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Agencies lack \"competence and expertise\" on structural constitutional law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mississippi Has A Duty To Protect Nascent Human Life.",
		"context": "amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Because the Constitution is a written document, the meaning of the words contained in the Constitution do not change. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting South 199 U.S. 437). Accordingly, this Court has long recognized that interpretation of the Constitution \"must necessarily depend on the words of the Constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mississippi Has A Duty To Protect Nascent Human Life.",
		"context": "amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Because the Constitution is a written document, the meaning of the words contained in the Constitution do not change. 514 U.S. 334 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Accordingly, this Court has long recognized that interpretation of the Constitution \"must necessarily depend on the words of the Constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "199 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mississippi Has A Duty To Protect Nascent Human Life.",
		"context": "in the several states.\" Id. (quoting Rhode [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 16 In 1866 the House and the Senate passed the Fourteenth Amendment and proposed it to the States for ratification. In 1868, the States ratified it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "12 Pet. 657",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mississippi Has A Duty To Protect Nascent Human Life.",
		"context": "The Fourteenth Amendment's Use Of The Term \"Person\" Included The Pre-born. William Blackstone is \"the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.\" Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1411 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Blackstone's preeminence continued through the 19th Century, particularly among lawyers and those who crafted the Fourteenth Amendment. John Finnis, Abortion is Unconstitutional , First Things No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mississippi Has A Duty To Protect Nascent Human Life.",
		"context": "at 549. Furthermore, and following Blackstone's distinction of artificial persons, this Court decided early that the Fourteenth Amendment's use of the term \"person\" included corporations. First Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even though a corporation cannot testify, even though a corporation is not counted in the Census for apportionment purposes, it is still considered a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the pre-born child cannot testify but can inherit property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Distinguish Contractual Waiver from Other Doctrines Requiring Prejudice, but Collapse the Distinction When Agreements to Arbitrate Are at Issue",
		"context": ", 371 N.Y.S.2d 948; Nathan Miller, 39 A.2d 23. 10 E.g., Scheetz , 324 N.W.2d at 305; Lafayette Car Wash , 282 N.E.2d at 839; State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Thomas N. Carlton Estate, 52 So.2d 131; Home Fire Ins. 78 N.W. 936. 11 A small minority of states do require prejudice in other contractual waiver contexts besides arbitration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 N.W.2d 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Distinguish Contractual Waiver from Other Doctrines Requiring Prejudice, but Collapse the Distinction When Agreements to Arbitrate Are at Issue",
		"context": ", 371 N.Y.S.2d 948; Nathan Miller, 39 A.2d 23. 10 E.g., Scheetz , 324 N.W.2d at 305; Lafayette Car Wash , 282 N.E.2d at 839; State ex rel. 109 N.W.2d 596; Thomas N. Carlton Estate, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Home Fire Ins. 78 N.W. 936. 11 A small minority of states do require prejudice in other contractual waiver contexts besides arbitration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "52 So.2d 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Distinguish Contractual Waiver from Other Doctrines Requiring Prejudice, but Collapse the Distinction When Agreements to Arbitrate Are at Issue",
		"context": "78 N.W. 936. 11 A small minority of states do require prejudice in other contractual waiver contexts besides arbitration. E.g., Magic Valley Foods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 372 P.3d 64. Other states consider prejudice as an element of only certain types of waiver. E.g., J.R. Hale Contracting 799 P.2d 581.",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 P.3d 734",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Distinguish Contractual Waiver from Other Doctrines Requiring Prejudice, but Collapse the Distinction When Agreements to Arbitrate Are at Issue",
		"context": "78 N.W. 936. 11 A small minority of states do require prejudice in other contractual waiver contexts besides arbitration. E.g., Magic Valley Foods, 10 P.3d 734; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other states consider prejudice as an element of only certain types of waiver. E.g., J.R. Hale Contracting 799 P.2d 581.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 P.3d 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Distinguish Contractual Waiver from Other Doctrines Requiring Prejudice, but Collapse the Distinction When Agreements to Arbitrate Are at Issue",
		"context": "E.g., Magic Valley Foods, 10 P.3d 734; 372 P.3d 64. Other states consider prejudice as an element of only certain types of waiver. E.g., J.R. Hale Contracting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 party has acted inconsistently with the written terms of a contract or delayed in seeking enforcement of a contractual provision—also often lend themselves to assertion of the closely related defenses of estoppel and/or laches. Courts ruling on two or more of these defenses in the same case often have occasion to compare and contrast them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 P.2d 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Fifth Circuit Had No Warrant To Reject The District Court's Findings",
		"context": ". As this Court repeatedly has emphasized, an \"ap- pellate court cannot substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of th e trial court simply because the reviewing court 'might give the facts another con-struction [or] resolve the ambiguities differently.'\" Inwood Labs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This rule promotes \"the public interest in . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Fifth Circuit Had No Warrant To Reject The District Court's Findings",
		"context": "751, 764-71, 778- 82 (1957). Accordingly, a district court's factual findings must govern on appeal so long as they are \"plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.\" Ander- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All the more so with respect to \"determinations of credi-bility and demeanor,\" which \"lie peculiarly within a trial judge's province.\" 135 S. Ct. 2187.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Fifth Circuit Had No Warrant To Reject The District Court's Findings",
		"context": "Ander- 470 U.S. 564. All the more so with respect to \"determinations of credi-bility and demeanor,\" which \"lie peculiarly within a trial judge's province.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This increase in mandatory delay, how- ever, is not currently being enforced. 32 2726, 2740 (2015); see also supra at 3, 8 (citing sev- eral other courts making or accepting similar find- ings).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The record is fully developed",
		"context": "ed There are no facts that need to be developed by a lower court for this Court to decide whether \"prison inmates have a Firs t Amendment right to include threatening, abusive, and irrelevant language in grievances. \" Petition i. Richey agrees that the relevant test for the Court to apply comes from Turner , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but he argues that this test cannot be applied without additional facts, specifically as to whether his objectionable language actual ly harm ed the prison. BIO 16. This is clearly incorrect under this Court 's precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The record is fully developed",
		"context": "The Turner test asks whether prison rules serve legitimate penological inte rests, not whether a prison had a good reason to apply those rules in a particular circumstance. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Turner itself illustrates this point. The rule at issue there restricted inmate -to-inmate correspondence based on general concerns about the risks posed by such correspondence , and without \"individual review of each piece of mail. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The record is fully developed",
		"context": "BIO 16. But it is Richey 's burden to prove that Washington 's rules fail to serve legitimate interests, not the other way around. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, in assessing whether prison regulations serve legitimate penol ogical interests, this Court has looked to exactly the types of evidence available here: declarations of prison officials, rules in other states, and amicus briefs from other prison administrators. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The record is fully developed",
		"context": "In any event, in assessing whether prison regulations serve legitimate penol ogical interests, this Court has looked to exactly the types of evidence available here: declarations of prison officials, rules in other states, and amicus briefs from other prison administrators. Id. at 134 (citing amicus brief for proposition that \"nume rous other States have implemented similar restrictions \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Turner , 482 U.S. at 91, 93, 93 n. (citing testimony from prison officials, rules of other prison systems, and amicus brief of State of Texas and the United States). 1 See 371 F.3d 917. 5 In short, there is nothing left f or a lower court to decide or investigate to determine whether prison officials may restrict abusive language in prison grievances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The record is fully developed",
		"context": "Id. at 134 (citing amicus brief for proposition that \"nume rous other States have implemented similar restrictions \"); 548 U.S. 521; Turner , 482 U.S. at 91, 93, 93 n. (citing testimony from prison officials, rules of other prison systems, and amicus brief of State of Texas and the United States). 1 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 In short, there is nothing left f or a lower court to decide or investigate to determine whether prison officials may restrict abusive language in prison grievances. This Court can address the question presented on the existing record, just as it was addressed below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 917",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Boston Owns its Flagpoles, and Ownership of the Substitute Flag Does Not Alter the Analysis",
		"context": "The Walker Court viewed Texas's ownership of each specialty plate design as relevant, 576 U.S. at 216 , but did not suggest that ownership was a critical factor, 21 and Summum shows that it is not. Boston's willingness to fly a borrowed flag does not convert the City's expressive act of raising a flag on its own flagpole into private speech. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 F.3d 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "6 1. Aside from impeachment, \"[t]he Constitution is silent with respect to the power of removal from office.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue \"was not discussed in the Constitutional Convention,\" Myers , 272 U.S. at 109-10, and it was the subject of widely varying views in the years following ratification, see, e.g. , 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 1532-37, at 390-95 (1833) (Story).",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "Act of July 13, 1866, ch . 176, § 5 14 Stat. 92; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As explained above, moreover, Congress has been conferring for-cause removal protection on the heads of independent agencies si nce it created the first modern regulatory agency in 1887. See supra p. 14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 401 (brackets and ellipsis omitted). Of course, tradition \"cannot supplant the Constitution.\" Youngstown Sheet & Tube [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But where, as here, neither the constitu-tional text nor any Framing-era understanding provides a clear answer, \"the longstanding 'practice of the government' can inform [the Court's] determination of 'what the law is.' \" 573 U.S. 513.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "Those protections reflect a wise judgment that the Nation's monetary policy should not be driven—or be perceived to be driven—by a President's short-term political interests. Similar logic applies to other financial regulators like the SEC, FTC, and CFPB. And Congress has also deemed for-cause removal protections to be essential for a wide variety of Executive Branch bodies charged with adjudicating individual cases, including the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the Merit Systems Protection Board, see 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "Even if this Court might consider deciding the issue differently were it writ ing on a clean slate, that would not justify overruling decades of precedent. \"Overruling precedent is never a small matter.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before taking that step, this Court \"demands special justification,\" not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided. 139 S. Ct. 1960.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. 2401. Before taking that step, this Court \"demands special justification,\" not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And petitioner's criticisms of Humphrey's Executor do not remotely justify overruling multiple unanimous precedents that have not only proved workable, but have become deeply embedded in the structure of the government. As this Court has emphasized, stare decisis has \"special force when legislators or citizens 'have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
		"context": "And petitioner's criticisms of Humphrey's Executor do not remotely justify overruling multiple unanimous precedents that have not only proved workable, but have become deeply embedded in the structure of the government. As this Court has emphasized, stare decisis has \"special force when legislators or citizens 'have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress has repeatedly relied on Humphrey's Executor in creating independent agencies vested with a wide range of important regulatory, adjudicatory, and enforcement responsibilities. Those agencies were built on the understanding that their powers would be exercised by officials with a measure of independence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. PAGA actions are state law enforcement actions",
		"context": "59 Cal. 4th at 382; see 13 also Vt. Agency of Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .11 Petitioner contends that PAGA actions are not qui tam in nature , asserting that a PAGA plaintiff has \"virtually complete\" and \"unfettered control\" over the action and that \"the state is unable to exercise any control over [a PAGA claim] or direct it in any way.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Gingles Framework Ensures that Race Is Used Appropriately in Redistricting",
		"context": "3.Third, the requirement that the \"white ma- jority[also]vote[]sufficientlyasabloc\"furtherlim- itsSection2liabilitytothosecircumstancesinwhich a minority's\"submergence ina white [majority] dis- trict impedes its ability to elect its chosen repre- sentative.\" Gingles,478U.S.at51; seealso Cousinv. Sundquist, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Crucially, this factor requires a fact-finder to distinguish between \"the mere loss of an occasional election\" and circumstances in which racialpolarizationissoseverethatthewhitemajori- 26 ty's electoral success is nearly inevitable. Gingles, 478U.S.at51.",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 F.3d 818",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Background",
		"context": "und As Chief Justice Roberts observed in his dissent in City of Arlington , the federal bureaucracy now \"wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life.\" City of Arlington, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given this regulatory expansion, over the pas t three decades there has been a concerted effort to force administrative agencies to bring more analytical rigor to their decisionmaking. See e.g., OMB C IRCULAR A - 4 (September 17, 2003); In the Mat- ter of Establishment of the Office of Economics and Analy tics, FCC 18 - 7, O RDER , 33 FCC Rcd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Background",
		"context": "Admin- istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. For nearly forty years, application of the arbitrary and capricious standard has been guided by this Court 's ruling in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associ- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court held, \"an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explana- tion for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view o r the product of agency expertise.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Background",
		"context": "As this Court held, \"an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explana- tion for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view o r the product of agency expertise.\" Id. at 43; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The central question in this case is what are the proper boundaries for how a court should apply that reviewing standard ? \"Too much\" deference by a court 5 permits regulators to run rogue, while \"too strict\" a review improperly substitutes a court's policy judge- ment for that of the expert agency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 760",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Background",
		"context": "The central question in this case is what are the proper boundaries for how a court should apply that reviewing standard ? \"Too much\" deference by a court 5 permits regulators to run rogue, while \"too strict\" a review improperly substitutes a court's policy judge- ment for that of the expert agency. C.f., Chevron, U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless of where this Court may draw the precise line between overly def- erential and undul y strict judicial review of agency actions, the Third Circuit's decision in this case was inappropriate. No one doubts that the Federal Communications Commission's media ownership policies are a vestige of a bygone era when newspapers, radio, and broad- cas t television dominated, if not monopolized, the con- veyance of news and information to Americans and , therefore , the FCC's attempt s to modernize its rules are long overdue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capabil- ity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of feta l life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.\" 3 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (197 3). For a critique of Roe v. Wade, see, e.g., Horan & Thomas, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in History, Law, or Logic (1987), available at https://studylib.net/ doc/8127662/roe-v.-wade--no-justification-in-history--law--or-logic; Schlueter, 40th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade: Reflections Past, Pre- sent, and Future , 40 O HIO NO. U.L.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "R EV. 105 (2013). 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For a critique of the viability rule, see generally Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court , 113 S T. LOUIS U. PUB. L. R EV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "Criticism of the Standard The \"logical and biological justifications\" for the vi- ability standard, however, began to fade a mere decade later when Justice O'Connor opined that under this ra-tionale \"As medical science becomes better able to pro- vide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.\" 6 She contended that the \"state interest in potential hu- man life is likewise extant throughout pregnancy. \"7 She challenged the reasoning in Roe by stating that: The difficulty with this analysis is clear: po- tential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or 4 Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Id. at 460.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "\"11 Justice Scalia opined in Casey that Justice O'Con- nor was correct in her view that the viability standard 8 Id. at 461 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1986 ) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (stating \"State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist 'throughout pregnancy' \"). 10 476 U.S. 747 (19 86) (White, J. dissenting). 11 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "at 461 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 9 476 U.S. 747 (1986 ) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (stating \"State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist 'throughout pregnancy' \"). 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (19 86) (White, J. dissenting). 11 Id. 6 was arbitrary.12 He continued: \"The arbitrariness of the viability line is confirmed by the Court's inability to of- fer any justification for it beyond the conclusory asser- tion that it is only at that point that the unborn child's life \" 'can in reason and all fairness' be thought to over- ride the interests of the mother.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "That makes no more sense than according infants legal protection only after the point when they can feed themselves. 13 This Court in Webster questioned \"why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before via- bility.\" 14 This was a valid question and this Court should provide an adequate constitutional rationale 12 Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 for the viability standard or abandon it.15 The Amicus believes that it should be abandoned due to the varia- ble factors in determining viability and the lack of any articulated justification for it. At the time these opinions were announced, the Justices repeatedly referred to the unborn child as \"po-tential life.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "Task Force Report at 10, available at www.dakota- voice.com/Docs/South%20Dakot a%20Abortion%20Task%20Force %20Report.pdf (stating \"It can no longer be doubted that the un-born child from the moment of conception is a whole separate human being.\") This was the larg est and most extensive govern- ment investigation on abortion since Roe and the Task Force heard testimony from many experts. In Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court up-held the South Dakota law requiring that women be informed that abortion ends the \"life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being,\" and finding that opponents of the definition pro-vided no evidence to the contrary. Id. at 736.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 F.3d 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "9 of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and w hat others call the un- born child is a human life.19 Viability is based on the gestational age of the un- born child.20 There are, however, other factors that af- fect the baby's survival rate such as the sex of the child, birth weight, and maternal exposure to steroids. 21 In addition, the baby's survival rate is affected by any complications from the ea rly birth, oxygen depriva- tion, and whether it was a single prete rm birth or multiple births.22 Even variables such as the quality of healthcare a baby has access to and in what part of the world they are born can factor into viability. 23 Further- more, viability may differ with each pregnancy.24 The viability threshold is also dependent on tech- nology and medical developments which will deter- mine the concept.25 Considering the speed at which 19 Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], available at https://dash.harvard.edu/ bitstream/handle/1/12025606/ SSRN-id1805904.pdf ?sequence=1. 21 Id. 22 Danielsson, What Is Fetal Viability (2021), available at http://www.verywellfamily.com/p remature-birth-and-viability 237152factors-affectin g-fetal-viability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "31 Furthermore, the Court in Danforth recognized that \"it is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specif ic point in the gestation period. 32 In addition, the Court stated that \"The time when viability is achieved may vary with each preg- nancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judg-ment of the responsible attending physician.\" 33 There- fore, a specified number of weeks in pregnancy should 30 Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31 Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court , 113 S T. LOUIS U. P UB. L. R EV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "L. R EV. 15, 41 (1993). 32 Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 Id. 12 not be fixed by statute or th e courts as the point of vi- ability.34 Alternatives to the Viability Standard There are alternative st andards that would be better than viability because they eliminate the vari-ous factors and arbitrariness of the viability standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used",
		"context": "at 65. 35 See Legislative findings for HB 1510 available at https:// legiscan.com/MS/text/HB1510/id/1692666. 36 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 risky and less beneficial, and the child's sentience far more advanced, than the Roe Court knew. \"37 Judge Ho in Jackson concurred in affirming the lower court decision, but he was critical of the district court stating he was \"deeply troubled by how the dis- trict court handled this case\" and the \"alarming lack of disrespect\" it had demonstrated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 F.3d 846",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The American Rule Applies To section 145",
		"context": "There can be no real doubt that this presumption applies to § 145. If § 145 said nothing about \"expenses\" at all, then there would be no dispute that the PTO would have to pay its attorneys' fees based on the American Rule's \"bedrock\" presumption. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The only question here is whether the term \"expenses\" standing on its own is sufficient to displace that presumption (it is not). The mere fact that § 145 states that the PTO may recover \"expenses\" even where it is not the prevailing party does not mean that the American Rule presumption is somehow irrelevant, nor does it mean that this Court's long line of cases holding that departures from the American Rule must be specific and explicit are somehow inapplicable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
		"context": "27-28. While still impermissibly extraterri torial, looking to U.S. \"confu- sion\" has at least some toehol d in statutory text, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A), and would limit the Act to foreign conduct with \"tradema rk-impairing effects upon American commerce,\" Sterling Drug, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, 97% of petitioners' sales never reached the U.S. The Tenth Circuit found no evidence those wholly foreign sales involved a likelihood of U.S. confusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 F.3d 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
		"context": "Pet. App. 33a, 163a-164a, petitioners were not required to make a futile jury-instruction objection, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "726 F.2d 1499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
		"context": "54. Regardless, legal sufficiency is judged under the \"properly formulat-ed\" standard, even if defendants \"failed to object to jury instructions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 Foreign trade shows, Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. OVER-WARNING COULD UNDERMINE CONSUMER SAFETY",
		"context": "\"). As the California Supreme Court said in O'Neil, \"To warn of all potential dangers would warn of nothing.\" 266 P.3d at 1006 (citation omitted); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "887 F. Supp. 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Non-Discretionary Licensing Schemes Would Further Increase the Risk to the Lives of Law Enforcement Personnel",
		"context": "\"(D]ue to their small size, light weight, and concealability, ... [handguns can) be placed in the glove boxes of cars and stowed under car seats in ways that retain their ready accessibility, making them more of a threat for officers conducting traffic stops.\" 51 \"With the flick of a thumb, a shooter can 47 Brief of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Ceasefire NJ, International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Major Cities Chiefs et al. as Amici Curiae at 25, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4s All but one of the law enforcement killings occurred in states with shall -issue or otherwise loosely unrestricted permitting regimes. See Violence Policy Center, Law Enforcement Of$cers Ki11ed by Concealed Carry Killers May 2007 to Present http~/%oncealedcarrykillers.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/04/ccwlawenforcement.pdf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Non-Discretionary Licensing Schemes Would Further Increase the Risk to the Lives of Law Enforcement Personnel",
		"context": "4s All but one of the law enforcement killings occurred in states with shall -issue or otherwise loosely unrestricted permitting regimes. See Violence Policy Center, Law Enforcement Of$cers Ki11ed by Concealed Carry Killers May 2007 to Present http~/%oncealedcarrykillers.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/04/ccwlawenforcement.pdf. 5o Brief of the Legal Community Against Violence, Major Cities Chiefs Association, Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, and San Francisco District Attorney George Gascbn as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 21, Peruta, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 51 Johnson Decl. at 126-27; see also supra Part I.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.3d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious liberty is endangered without the remedy of standalone nominal damages",
		"context": ". A plaintiff who obtains relief in a Religion Clause case vindicates societal interests of the highest order. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Establish- ment Clause uniquely: guards against the \"anguish, hardship and bitter strife,\" that can occur when \"the govern- ment weighs in on one side of religious de-bate.\" And while the \"union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion,\" separating the two pre-serves the legitimacy of each.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious liberty is endangered without the remedy of standalone nominal damages",
		"context": "9 Due to their easily-mootable and non-monetary quality, Religion Clause violations are frequently vin- dicated through nominal damages. And even with nominal damages, the Religion Clauses are underen-forced: \"Suing a State over religion puts nothing in a plaintiff 's pocket and can ta ke a great deal out, and even with volunteer litigat ors to supply time and en- ergy, the risk of social ostracism can be powerfully de- terrent.\" Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If citizens cannot vindicate their Free Exercise and Establishment Clause ri ghts, they will exist in vain. \"The lessons of the First Amendment are as ur- gent in the modern world as in the 18th century when it was written.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious liberty is endangered without the remedy of standalone nominal damages",
		"context": "If citizens cannot vindicate their Free Exercise and Establishment Clause ri ghts, they will exist in vain. \"The lessons of the First Amendment are as ur- gent in the modern world as in the 18th century when it was written.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by government,\" the Court must ask, \"[w]hy would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?\" McCreary , 545 U.S. at 882 (O'Connor, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE IDEA DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION WHEN A NON-IDEA CLAIM SEEKS RELIEF THAT THE IDEA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE",
		"context": "Congress enacted Section 1415( l) to overturn [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and make clear that the IDEA is not the exclusive mechanism for vindicating the rights of children with disabilities. That provision expressly contemplates that such children may invoke other statutes—including the ADA—to secure relief. Section 1415( l) places a single restriction on such non-IDEA litigation: It states that litigants must exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures \"before the filing of a civil action under [the ADA or other specified] laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA].\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 992",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Under 18 U.S.C. 2703, the government may require a U.S. service provider to disclose any electronic communications within its control",
		"context": "Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). The focus turns on the acts that the statutory provision \"seeks to regulate \" and the parties or interests that it \" seeks to protect .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e focus inquiry is provision -specific; the focus of Section 2703 need not be the same as other provisions of the SCA or the ECPA. See RJR Nabisco , 136 S. Ct. at 2103, 2106.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Under 18 U.S.C. 2703, the government may require a U.S. service provider to disclose any electronic communications within its control",
		"context": "The conclusion that a Sec tion 2703 warrant com- pels U.S. provider s to disclose foreign -stored data com- ports with common -law principles that were well estab- lished when Congress enacted the SCA. Courts have long held that \"[t]he test for the production of docu- ments is control, not l ocation.\" Marc Rich & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,463 U.S. 1215.",
		"citation_value_orig": "707 F.2d 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Under 18 U.S.C. 2703, the government may require a U.S. service provider to disclose any electronic communications within its control",
		"context": "Thus, \"[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only do- mestic appl ication.\" Id. at 2100 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court has outlined \"a two -step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "559 U.S. at 687 (footnote omitted). To the contrary, arbitrators must establish that the parties affirmatively \"'agree[] to authorize' class arbitration, not merely that they fail to bar such a proceeding.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Reed v. Florida Metropolitan University , for instance, the Fifth Circuit rejected an arbitrator's conclusion that a broadly worded arbitration clause similar to the one at issue here implicitly authorized class arbitration procedures. 681 F.3d at 641.",
		"citation_value_orig": "681 F.3d 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "The Sixth Circuit came to the same conclusion when it considered a similarly broad agreement, this one 13 containing standard language that the parties would resolve \"any controversy … by binding arbitration,\" and omitting any reference to classwide arbitration. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finding that this standard language merely represented \"'the fact of the parties' agreement to arbitrate,'\" id. at 600 (citation omitted), the court held that Stolt-Nielsen precluded an inference that the parties intended to use classwide procedures: \"The principal reason to conclude that this arbitration clause does not authorize classwide arbitration is that the clause nowhere mentions it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "734 F.3d 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "at 599. In an analogous context, the Fourth Circuit inter- preted the term \"contractual basis\" to mean that an agreement must \"unmistakabl y provide\" evidence that the parties consented on a particular point. Del Webb Cmtys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir. ), cert. denied137 S. Ct. 567.",
		"citation_value_orig": "817 F.3d 867",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "Even prior to Stolt-Nielsen , most courts of appeals held that the FAA precludes the imposition of class- based arbitration or consolid ation of individual arbi- trations where the arbitration agreement itself is silent as to the availability of such procedures. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 14 see also 225 F.3d 366; Del E. Webb 823 F.2d 145, abrogated on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. 539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "246 F.3d 219",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "Even prior to Stolt-Nielsen , most courts of appeals held that the FAA precludes the imposition of class- based arbitration or consolid ation of individual arbi- trations where the arbitration agreement itself is silent as to the availability of such procedures. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. 246 F.3d 219; 14 see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Del E. Webb 823 F.2d 145, abrogated on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. 539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "225 F.3d 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "Even prior to Stolt-Nielsen , most courts of appeals held that the FAA precludes the imposition of class- based arbitration or consolid ation of individual arbi- trations where the arbitration agreement itself is silent as to the availability of such procedures. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. 246 F.3d 219; 14 see also 225 F.3d 366; Del E. Webb [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. 539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "823 F.2d 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. 246 F.3d 219; 14 see also 225 F.3d 366; Del E. Webb 823 F.2d 145, abrogated on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Am. Centennial Ins. 951 F.2d 107; 55 F.3d 269; Dominium Austin Partners, 248 F.3d 720; Weyerhaeuser 743 F.2d 635; 244 F.3d 814.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 55 F.3d 269; Dominium Austin Partners, 248 F.3d 720; Weyerhaeuser 743 F.2d 635; 244 F.3d 814. Some went a step further, expressi ng the logical view that class arbitration categorically is unavailable in the absence of contract language expressly authorizing the procedure. In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. , for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the FAA prohibits a court from ordering classwide arbitration \"absent a provision in the parties' arbitration agreement providing for class treatment of disputes ....\" 55 F.3d at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "951 F.2d 107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins. 951 F.2d 107; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Dominium Austin Partners, 248 F.3d 720; Weyerhaeuser 743 F.2d 635; 244 F.3d 814. Some went a step further, expressi ng the logical view that class arbitration categorically is unavailable in the absence of contract language expressly authorizing the procedure. In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. , for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the FAA prohibits a court from ordering classwide arbitration \"absent a provision in the parties' arbitration agreement providing for class treatment of disputes ....\" 55 F.3d at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 F.3d 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins. 951 F.2d 107; 55 F.3d 269; Dominium Austin Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Weyerhaeuser 743 F.2d 635; 244 F.3d 814. Some went a step further, expressi ng the logical view that class arbitration categorically is unavailable in the absence of contract language expressly authorizing the procedure. In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. , for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the FAA prohibits a court from ordering classwide arbitration \"absent a provision in the parties' arbitration agreement providing for class treatment of disputes ....\" 55 F.3d at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 F.3d 720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins. 951 F.2d 107; 55 F.3d 269; Dominium Austin Partners, 248 F.3d 720; Weyerhaeuser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 244 F.3d 814. Some went a step further, expressi ng the logical view that class arbitration categorically is unavailable in the absence of contract language expressly authorizing the procedure. In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. , for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the FAA prohibits a court from ordering classwide arbitration \"absent a provision in the parties' arbitration agreement providing for class treatment of disputes ....\" 55 F.3d at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F.2d 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration",
		"context": "539 U.S. 444; Am. Centennial Ins. 951 F.2d 107; 55 F.3d 269; Dominium Austin Partners, 248 F.3d 720; Weyerhaeuser 743 F.2d 635; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some went a step further, expressi ng the logical view that class arbitration categorically is unavailable in the absence of contract language expressly authorizing the procedure. In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. , for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the FAA prohibits a court from ordering classwide arbitration \"absent a provision in the parties' arbitration agreement providing for class treatment of disputes ....\" 55 F.3d at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "244 F.3d 814",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CADA's application to Smith fails any level of heightened scrutiny.",
		"context": "As the Tenth Circuit held, since CADA regulates and compels speech based on content and viewpoint, it must satisfy strict scrutiny. Pet.App.24a; Pet.Br.36. Yet Colorado and the United States urge this Court to apply intermediate scrutiny under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], arguing that the State's interest in enforcing CADA is \"unrelated\" to speech suppression. Resp.Br.25–26; U.S.Br.31. But the Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to laws that textually focused on conduct but altered, or were triggered by, content.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CADA's application to Smith fails any level of heightened scrutiny.",
		"context": "Resp.Br.25–26; U.S.Br.31. But the Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to laws that textually focused on conduct but altered, or were triggered by, content. Pet.Br.25 (collecting cases); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]561 U.S. 28. 18 Here, CADA \"directly and immediately\" burdens speech based on its content. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tucker Offers No Rational Explanation Why Congress Would Have Intended Wrongdoers To Keep The Proceeds Of Their Illegal Conduct",
		"context": "Tucker 's desire to cabin the Commission 's enforcement discretion cannot be squared with Congress 's creation of two enfo rcement pathways. When Congress creates two means for an agency to proceed, it conveys the discretion to choose between them. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, when the Commission \"does not desire to further expa nd upon the prohibitions of the Federal Trade Commission Act through the issuance of a cease -and-desist order, \" it may sue in federal court instead. S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Congress Enacts PROMESA, Which Includes Title VI's Consensual Restructuring Process For Puerto Rico Instrumentalities And Their Bondholders",
		"context": "In 2016, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Over- sight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (\"PROMESA\"), 48 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., to address the fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico. Locked out of the Bank- ruptcy Code, see Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , PROMESA created two pathways for Puerto Rico and its entities to restruc- ture their debts. First, the more well- known provi- sion, Title III, creates a bankruptcy analog that allows Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities , under the approval of and represented by the Oversight Board, to restructure their debts pursuant to a com- prehensive restructuring plan, even over the objec- tions of creditors , under the protection of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision . See 48 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THERE IS NOT A MATERIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT SUPPORTS A GRANT OF CERTIORARI.",
		"context": "Petitioner's use of the term \"always\" effectively concedes the point that no circuit court has decided that a denial of stay relief is a non-final, interlocutory order. Instead, as Petitioner correctly articulates and cites, seven circuits – the Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit – are all on the same page: that denials of stay relief are always final and appealable. The Sixth Circuit ruled in the case at bar that denials of stay relief are final and appealable (consistent with the above-referenced circuits), but that there are exceptions if the order does not finally resolve the issues presented in the stay relief motion (consistent with the Third Circuit – see Moxley v. Comer (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and Matter of West Elecs ., 852 F.2d 79). The alleged \"split\" is the result of the immaterial distinction above, and the First Circuit that merely decided finality of a denied stay relief motion depends upon whether the determination was fully developed such that the denial definitely decided the issues between the parties. See 42 F.3d 26; Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re761 F.3d 177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F.2d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THERE IS NOT A MATERIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT SUPPORTS A GRANT OF CERTIORARI.",
		"context": "Petitioner's use of the term \"always\" effectively concedes the point that no circuit court has decided that a denial of stay relief is a non-final, interlocutory order. Instead, as Petitioner correctly articulates and cites, seven circuits – the Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit – are all on the same page: that denials of stay relief are always final and appealable. The Sixth Circuit ruled in the case at bar that denials of stay relief are final and appealable (consistent with the above-referenced circuits), but that there are exceptions if the order does not finally resolve the issues presented in the stay relief motion (consistent with the Third Circuit – see Moxley v. Comer (In re716 F.2d 168 and Matter of West Elecs ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The alleged \"split\" is the result of the immaterial distinction above, and the First Circuit that merely decided finality of a denied stay relief motion depends upon whether the determination was fully developed such that the denial definitely decided the issues between the parties. See 42 F.3d 26; Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re761 F.3d 177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.2d 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THERE IS NOT A MATERIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT SUPPORTS A GRANT OF CERTIORARI.",
		"context": "The Sixth Circuit ruled in the case at bar that denials of stay relief are final and appealable (consistent with the above-referenced circuits), but that there are exceptions if the order does not finally resolve the issues presented in the stay relief motion (consistent with the Third Circuit – see Moxley v. Comer (In re716 F.2d 168 and Matter of West Elecs ., 852 F.2d 79). The alleged \"split\" is the result of the immaterial distinction above, and the First Circuit that merely decided finality of a denied stay relief motion depends upon whether the determination was fully developed such that the denial definitely decided the issues between the parties. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re761 F.3d 177. 8 This is not a true conflict or split; instead, it is a distinction without a material difference. This reality is evidenced by the fact that Petitioner only cited cases in which the alleged circuits in conflict agreed that denials of stay relief in the subject cases were actually final and appealable orders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "42 F.3d 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THERE IS NOT A MATERIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT SUPPORTS A GRANT OF CERTIORARI.",
		"context": "The Sixth Circuit ruled in the case at bar that denials of stay relief are final and appealable (consistent with the above-referenced circuits), but that there are exceptions if the order does not finally resolve the issues presented in the stay relief motion (consistent with the Third Circuit – see Moxley v. Comer (In re716 F.2d 168 and Matter of West Elecs ., 852 F.2d 79). The alleged \"split\" is the result of the immaterial distinction above, and the First Circuit that merely decided finality of a denied stay relief motion depends upon whether the determination was fully developed such that the denial definitely decided the issues between the parties. See 42 F.3d 26; Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 This is not a true conflict or split; instead, it is a distinction without a material difference. This reality is evidenced by the fact that Petitioner only cited cases in which the alleged circuits in conflict agreed that denials of stay relief in the subject cases were actually final and appealable orders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "761 F.3d 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square",
		"context": "Our nation has a \"long tradition of allowing religious adherents to participate on equal terms in neutral government programs.\" Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of V[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even whi le offering sanctuary to a diverse array of religious groups , the United States has from its F ounding embraced a diversity of public religious observance , to promote civic virtue and engender unity and mutual affection. Within that range of public religious expression, 9 government should stand as neutral toward all and partisan of none.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2067 . The Founders encouraged this diversity of religious expression because they \"believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good.\" Lamb 's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because the force of law alone could not promote the virtues necessary to sustain republican government, the Founders relied on religion and moral teaching to form responsible citizens. See Michael W. McConnell, 10 Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion , 44 Wm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square",
		"context": "1890) (noting the importance of \"religious worship and religious institutions\" in \"preserv[ing] the public order\" ). Rather than sowing division, the Founders understood that the public expression of a variety of religious view points would act as a \"unifying mechanism.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Consistent with that neutrality, the religious proclamations of our first Presidents often invoked generalized religious beliefs—of a common bond with the Creator —rather than specific religious dogma. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process",
		"context": "The Copyright Remedy Act has the same fatal flaw. When Congress enacted the Act, it barely even considered whether plaintiffs could use state or other remedies to address copyright infringement by States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 39 The statute itself never mentions alternative remedies. The committee reports, for their part, address only one among many possible remedies: federal injunctions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 F.3d 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process",
		"context": " Third, copyright holders can bring takings claims under the United States Constitution and state constitutions. This Court has applied takings analysis to other forms of intellectual property. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].  Fourth, copyright holders can bring infringement claims under section 1983 against responsible state officials individually. In these lawsuits— subject to qualified-immunity and other personal defenses—copyright holders can seek financial compensation directly from the responsible people.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process",
		"context": " Fourth, copyright holders can bring infringement claims under section 1983 against responsible state officials individually. In these lawsuits— subject to qualified-immunity and other personal defenses—copyright holders can seek financial compensation directly from the responsible people. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Taylor); (\"we have required state institution[s] to obtain an effective waiver of their rights under the Eleventh Amendment before contracting\" to sell them products); id. at 95 (testimony of David Eskra) (same). 41 167 & n.1 (1st Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "871 F.2d 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process",
		"context": "at 95 (testimony of David Eskra) (same). 41 167 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1989) (dismissing copyright claims against State, but allowing claims to proceed against individual state officials); Richard Anderson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Congress did not consider any of these possible remedies. For example, after surveying the legislative record, the Fifth Circuit in Chavez concluded that Congress \"never consider ed\" a number of \"possible remedies in state courts\" when it enacted the Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.2d 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. EPA's New Powers Offend Federalism",
		"context": "The federalism clear-statement canon is an independent reason for the Court to reverse—and Respondents all but ignore it. Just as separation of powers on the federal level \"prevent[s] the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents do not challenge the States' traditional control over electricity management. And they never identify \"exceedingly clear language\" from Congress directing EPA to take it over.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. EPA's New Powers Offend Federalism",
		"context": "Respondents do not challenge the States' traditional control over electricity management. And they never identify \"exceedingly clear language\" from Congress directing EPA to take it over. U.S. Forest [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet they would hand control over to the EPA anyway. See WV.Br.26-31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Under This Current Doctrine, Texas Retains Its Immunity from Petitioner's Suit",
		"context": "The suit is clearly not brought by the United States or another State. See Part I.A, supra . And Petitioner never claims he is suing as any type of delega tee of the United States, let 6 See Bonito Boats, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; The Federalist No. 43 (J. Madison) (\"The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Under This Current Doctrine, Texas Retains Its Immunity from Petitioner's Suit",
		"context": "Seminole , 517 U.S. at 72; see also Part I.E, supra . Sovereignty is a divisible construct, and sovereign regulatory power \"is a distinct attribute of sovereig nty\" that \"is discussed, for example, in a completely separate portion of the Federalist than immunity from suit.\" Katz, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Those categories are: (1) \"where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union\" (Hamilton cites Congress's exclusive power to regulate the District of Columbia as an example); (2) \"whe re it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority\" (he cites imposts and duties as an example); and (3) \"where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradi ctory and repugnant\" (he cited Congress's power to establish a unifo rm rule of naturalization as an example). The Federalist No. 32 (A. Hamilton).",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Under This Current Doctrine, Texas Retains Its Immunity from Petitioner's Suit",
		"context": "491 U.S. at 19–20. 8 As noted 8 Justice Brennan, who authored the Union Gas plurality, had argued in prior separate opinio ns that States lack immunity from suits authorized by any of Congress's Article I powers. See Atascadero State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]415 U.S. 651. 21 above, the Court expressly rejected that view in numerous subsequent decisions. See Part I.E, supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Under This Current Doctrine, Texas Retains Its Immunity from Petitioner's Suit",
		"context": "491 U.S. at 19–20. 8 As noted 8 Justice Brennan, who authored the Union Gas plurality, had argued in prior separate opinio ns that States lack immunity from suits authorized by any of Congress's Article I powers. See Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 above, the Court expressly rejected that view in numerous subsequent decisions. See Part I.E, supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Hardison's underpinnings have not eroded",
		"context": "35) that Hardison 's ap- proa ch \"may have\" been intended to \"avoid a perceived Establishment Clause problem\" that has proven un- founded. Petitioner rightly couches that claim as con- jecture, as Hardison did not invoke principles of consti- tutional avoidance. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] -85. Regard less, it is appropriate to take account of the Establishment Clause backdrop in considering whether a hardship is \"undue.\" This Court has recognized that , to be con- sistent with the Establishment Clause, a law requiring religious accommodations \"must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Hardison's underpinnings have not eroded",
		"context": "Regard less, it is appropriate to take account of the Establishment Clause backdrop in considering whether a hardship is \"undue.\" This Court has recognized that , to be con- sistent with the Establishment Clause, a law requiring religious accommodations \"must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, in Estate of 472 U.S. 703 , this Court invalidated a statute guaranteeing employees the right not to work on their chosen Sabbath because it took \"no account of the con- venience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Hardison's underpinnings have not eroded",
		"context": "This Court has recognized that , to be con- sistent with the Establishment Clause, a law requiring religious accommodations \"must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.\" 544 U.S. 709 . For example, in Estate of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court invalidated a statute guaranteeing employees the right not to work on their chosen Sabbath because it took \"no account of the con- venience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath .\" Id. at 709.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 703",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Rule 32.1(g) is a neutral procedural rule",
		"context": "Cruz's failure to seek review of a perceived error in his case under the procedures established by the Arizona courts does not require the Arizona courts to allow him to bring a collateral claim invoking Lynch despite the claim 's ineligibility for review under Arizona's procedural rules. In fact, states \"have no obligation to provide\" an avenue for collateral proceedi ngs after direct review at all . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Arizona thus could constitutionally do away with its Rule 32 proceedings altogether. 2 Nor does Lynch 's holding that Arizona \"misapplied Simmons \", Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. English practice drew no distinction between statutes that authorized \"full costs\" and those that merely authorized \"costs\"",
		"context": "16-17, supra ; see also Wright & Miller § 2665 (\"At an early date the federal courts departed from the Eng- lish practice of attempting to provide the successful lit- igant with total reimbursement and developed princi- ples limitin g the scope of taxabl e costs.\") ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, to the extent that the 1831 Act's \"full cost s\" pro- vision instructed federal courts to \"apply state law,\" Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. English practice drew no distinction between statutes that authorized \"full costs\" and those that merely authorized \"costs\"",
		"context": "at 123 -124 (Lindley, L.J.) (emphasis added). The italicized sentence is particularly significant be- cause \"Anglo -American copyright legislat ion begins in 1709 with the Statute of 8 Anne,\" Fred Fisher Music [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"the copyright laws en- acted by the original thirteen states prior to 1789 were based largely upon the Statute of Anne,\" id. at 648, as was early federal copyright legislation, id. at 649 -650.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce",
		"context": "\"When determining the focus of a statute,\" this Court \"do[es] not analyze the provision at issue in a vacuum. If the statutory provision at issue works in tandem with other provisions, it must be assessed in concert with those other provisions.\" WesternGeco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the Lanham Act's focus —the \"'the objec[t] of [its] solici - tude, '\" ibid. —is a trademark's \"use in commerce.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce",
		"context": "It follows that \"[u]se of a mark in a foreign country\" is not a violation of U.S. trademark rights. The same term —\"use in com merce\" —should have equivalent scope in both con - texts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In WesternGeco , the Court held that the \"focus\" of the patent- damages statute was the \"act\" of \"infringement\" underlying the plaintiff 's cause of action. 138 S. Ct. at 2137 -2138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce",
		"context": "Examin ing foreign conduct's \"effects\" in this country , ibid., is a way of deciding whether foreign conduct falls within an other - wise extraterritorial statute —not a way of distinguish ing extraterritorial from domestic applica tion. Indeed, the govern ment's test closely resembles the \"effects\" test for extraterritorial applica tion of securities law this Court rejected in Morrison , under which U.S. laws would reach foreign conduct with \" 'a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens. '\" 561 U.S. at 257; see F. Hoffmann-La Roche [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Asking where effects of conduct are felt, rather than where the conduct occurred, overlooks the primary con - cern animating extra territoriality doc trine: the problems that arise \"when U.S. law is applied to conduct in for eign countries.\" RJR, 579 U.S. at 335 (em phasis added); see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce",
		"context": "at 346- 347; Nestlé USA , 141 S. Ct. at 1936- 1937; Kiobel , 569 U.S. at 115, 117, 121, 124. The presump tion against extraterritoriality is rooted in the \"general and almost universal rule\" that \"the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done .\" American Banana [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"focus\" test for domestic applica tion likewise asks where \"conduct\" oc curred. Nestlé USA , 141 S. Ct. at 1936 -1937; see Western Geco , 138 S. Ct. at 2137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The key issue is whether personal accounts are used as tools of governance.",
		"context": "Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. at 419–21. The relevant question is whether the official has chosen to use his or her social media site to conduct government business. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 This Court has addressed various contexts in which officials pursue their official duties and thus are considered to be acting \"under color of state law.\" 457 U.S. 922.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The key issue is whether personal accounts are used as tools of governance.",
		"context": "487 U.S. 42. 19 This Court has addressed various contexts in which officials pursue their official duties and thus are considered to be acting \"under color of state law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a government official uses his social media account to conduct public business, the main issue to consider is whether the actions are \"fairly attributable to the state.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The key issue is whether personal accounts are used as tools of governance.",
		"context": "When a government official uses his social media account to conduct public business, the main issue to consider is whether the actions are \"fairly attributable to the state.\" Id. at 937 ; Brentwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . No single factor is dispositive, id., and courts will examine the \"totality of the circumstances\" to determine if the challenged action bears \"a 'sufficiently close nexus' with the S tate to be 'fairly treated as that of the State itself.'\" 316 F.3d 516 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The key issue is whether personal accounts are used as tools of governance.",
		"context": "at 937 ; Brentwood 531 U.S. 288 . No single factor is dispositive, id., and courts will examine the \"totality of the circumstances\" to determine if the challenged action bears \"a 'sufficiently close nexus' with the S tate to be 'fairly treated as that of the State itself.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under this analysis, an official's conduct is more likely to amount to state action when it \"occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office.\" 54 F.3d 980 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 F.3d 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The key issue is whether personal accounts are used as tools of governance.",
		"context": "316 F.3d 516 . Under this analysis, an official's conduct is more likely to amount to state action when it \"occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The most important question for a government official's social media account is whether it has been used as a \"tool of governance.\" Campbell , 986 F.3d at 825.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 F.3d 980",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should decline to review the question presented in the conditional cross-petition",
		"context": "at 18 -19, t he D.C. Circuit's position on this question does not warrant review be- cause it is consistent with the only other court of ap- peals decision to discuss the question, albeit in dicta. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No other court of appeals has issued an opinion on the question in the interim. Rather, i n asserting that review is proper (19 -520 Pet. 16 -17), respondents cite inapposite cases that were decided before this Court de- nied review in de Csepel .",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 F.3d 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Grant Review to Repudiate Hardison's Non-Textual Interpretation of \"Undue Hardship.\"",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). In Trans World Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court pronounced ipse dixit that undue hardship meant \"anything more than a de minimis cost.\" Id. at 84.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Atlantic Coast Pipeline Will Have a Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities",
		"context": "While this case focuses on whether the United States Forest Service has statutory authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a gas pipeline right-of-way across the Appalachian Trail, there can be no dispute that the construction and operation of the Atlantic Coast Pipelin e will have environmental effects on the communities through which it passes. See Cowpasture River Pres. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"A thorough review of the record leads to the necessary conclusion that the Forest Service abdicated its responsibility to preserve national forest resources. This conclusion is particularly informed by the Forest Service's serious environmental concerns that were suddenly, 5 Citations to \"App. _a\" are to the appendix in No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS FAVOR THE CENSUS BUREAU PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT AND THE PUBLIC WITH INFORMATION — NOT SUPPRESSING INFORMATION",
		"context": "The Enumeration Clause of the Constitution \"vests Congress with virtually unlimited discretion in conducting the decennial actual Enumeration…\". Dep't. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress then \"delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS FAVOR THE CENSUS BUREAU PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT AND THE PUBLIC WITH INFORMATION — NOT SUPPRESSING INFORMATION",
		"context": "The Presidential Memorandum, as this Court has recognized, separates these two distinct steps. See Dep't. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to transmitting his report, the Presidential Memorandum indicates his intent to \"exclud[e] Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census.\" 4 To do this, he orders the Secretary of Commerce to provide the President with the \"information\" necessary to effectuate his policy.5 This Memorandum does not require the Census Bureau to exclude illegal aliens from the tabulation of total population.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS FAVOR THE CENSUS BUREAU PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT AND THE PUBLIC WITH INFORMATION — NOT SUPPRESSING INFORMATION",
		"context": "This census, conducted during the Vietnam War, accounted for the numerous Armed Forces members serving abroad. The Census Bureau used personnel records from the Department of Defense to allocate these persons to their \"home[s] of record.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After realizing that those \"home[s] of record\" in Defense Department records were prone to misuse, the Census Bureau declined to use these records in the 1980 Census. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS FAVOR THE CENSUS BUREAU PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT AND THE PUBLIC WITH INFORMATION — NOT SUPPRESSING INFORMATION",
		"context": "at 795. This Court upheld this practice in part because these employees and Dep't. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 service members likely consider themselves to be \"usual residents\" of the United States, and counting them does not harm the \"goal of equal representation\" but \"actually promotes equality.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Scher and Labron refute Collins's position",
		"context": "for the United States, 1938 WL 63934 (\"[Scher] also contends that the search of the automobile consti- tuted a search of the garage and that, since the garage was within the curtilage of his home, it could not be searched without a warrant. We submit that the con- tentions are without merit.\"). But this Court rejected Scher's construction of Carroll and the idea that the automobile exception does not apply on curtilage: Considering the doctrine of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (see 282 U.S. 694), and the application of this to the facts there disclosed, it seems plain enough that just before he entered the garage the following officers properly could have stopped petitioner's car, made search and put him under arrest. So much was not seriously controverted at the argument. Scher , 305 U.S. at 254-55.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Scher and Labron refute Collins's position",
		"context": "for the United States, 1938 WL 63934 (\"[Scher] also contends that the search of the automobile consti- tuted a search of the garage and that, since the garage was within the curtilage of his home, it could not be searched without a warrant. We submit that the con- tentions are without merit.\"). But this Court rejected Scher's construction of Carroll and the idea that the automobile exception does not apply on curtilage: Considering the doctrine of 267 U.S. 132 (see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and the application of this to the facts there disclosed, it seems plain enough that just before he entered the garage the following officers properly could have stopped petitioner's car, made search and put him under arrest. So much was not seriously controverted at the argument. Scher , 305 U.S. at 254-55.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Scher and Labron refute Collins's position",
		"context": "The Court also applied the exception on private property in Labron , which resolved two cases on the certiorari filings. In one of them, a truck \"parked at the rear of [a] residence\" had been searched \"[w]ithout a warrant or Appellant's consent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev'd sub nom. 37 518 U.S. 938. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con- cluded that probable cause existed to search the truck, it found the search was not justified because of the ab-sence of \"any exigent circumstances which would jus- tify the failure of police to obtain a search warrant prior to searching the vehicle.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "677 A.2d 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Scher and Labron refute Collins's position",
		"context": "In one of them, a truck \"parked at the rear of [a] residence\" had been searched \"[w]ithout a warrant or Appellant's consent.\" 677 A.2d 311, rev'd sub nom. 37 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con- cluded that probable cause existed to search the truck, it found the search was not justified because of the ab-sence of \"any exigent circumstances which would jus- tify the failure of police to obtain a search warrant prior to searching the vehicle.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "at 841 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see id. at 817–18 (majority op.). 3E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Harper v. Lewis , No. 19-CVS-12667, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 122 (N.C. Super.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 S.E.2d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "LEXIS 122 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake Cnty. Oct. 28, 2019); Common 2019 WL 4569584; Pender [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd sub nom. 556 U.S. 1. 29 In Rucho , too, every Justice endorsed that proposition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "649 S.E.2d 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "Ct. Wake Cnty. Oct. 28, 2019); Common 2019 WL 4569584; Pender 649 S.E.2d 364, aff'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 29 In Rucho , too, every Justice endorsed that proposition. The Court emphasized that its nonjusticiability holding did not \"condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "As in Smiley , North Carolina's Free Elections, Equal Protection, Free Speech, and Free Assembly Clauses are \"check[s] in the legislative process.\" 285 U.S. at 367–68; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the legislature has no \"power to enact laws\" governing congressional redistricting \"in any manner 31 other than that in which the Constitution of the state has provided.\" Smiley , 285 U.S. at 368.4 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "Smiley , 285 U.S. at 368.4 3. This Court has also long recognized—in a line of cases Petitioners fail to acknowledge—that if state legislatures fail to act lawfully, \"the judiciary of a State\" has the \"power … to formulate a valid redistricting plan\" and remedy violations of \"State … Constitutions.\" Growe , 507 U.S. at 29, 33 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, when a federal court enjoined state-court proceedings aimed at formulating a valid congressional redistricting plan, this Court vacated that injunction as \"clear error.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "Id. (emphasis in original). 4 Petitioners also cite [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. 31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "32 Myriad other cases testify to this Court's longstanding \"teaching that state courts have a significant role in redistricting,\" including for Congress. Id. at 33; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 285 U.S. 380. In reliance on that settled precedent, state courts have—just in this redistricting cycle—prescribed congressional maps in Minnesota, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "32 Myriad other cases testify to this Court's longstanding \"teaching that state courts have a significant role in redistricting,\" including for Congress. Id. at 33; see 538 U.S. 254; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reliance on that settled precedent, state courts have—just in this redistricting cycle—prescribed congressional maps in Minnesota, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "30. Such negative inferences, however, \"must be applied with great caution, since … so much [depends] on context.\" S CALIA &GARNER , supra , at 107; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And here, context renders inconceivable that negative inference. The Framers understood that legislatures are \"Creatures of the Constitution\"; that they \"owe their existence to the Constitution\"; and that 33 \"all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "And here, context renders inconceivable that negative inference. The Framers understood that legislatures are \"Creatures of the Constitution\"; that they \"owe their existence to the Constitution\"; and that 33 \"all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void.\" Vanhorne's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Framers understood, specifically, that a \"Legislature\" could not \"annul[]\" state constitutional provisions \"ordain[ing]\" that \"all elections … shall be by ballot, free and voluntary.\" Vanhorne's Lessee , 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "3. No one believes this clause confers authority free from the normal constraints of judicial review. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Elections Clause itself is the same. If Petitioners were correct that the Elections Clause makes the state legislature's discretion \"subject to check only by Congress,\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "If Petitioners were correct that the Elections Clause makes the state legislature's discretion \"subject to check only by Congress,\" Pet. 29, it would follow that neither state courts nor federal courts could review congressional redistricting plans for compliance with constitutional constraints. Yet [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that \"nothing in the language of [the Elections Clause] gives support to a construction that would immunize state congressional apportionment laws 34 which debase a citizen's right to vote from the power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction.\" Id. at 6.5 Founding-era understandings also refute Petitioners' position.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review , 70 U. CHI. L.REV. 887, 933–35 (2003); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But despite those well-known limits, there is no \"suggestion\" in the Elections Clause or early historical practice that state laws regulating federal elections were exempt from the ordinary \"conditions which attach to the making of state laws,\" including judicial review. Smiley , 285 U.S. at 365, 5 True, the Constitution in some places gives state legislatures powers or duties outside their ordinary roles in enacting legislation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
		"context": "Such legislative action is entirely different from the requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression no legislative action is authorized or required.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 35 368. Instead, many Founding-era state constitutions imposed both procedural and substantive restrictions on federal elections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Authoritative Guidance Existed to Warn Respondents Away from Their Interpretation.",
		"context": "Petitioners are silent as to how that removal should be interpreted. 21 consensus of cases of persuasive authority,\" to warn officers away from their challenged conduct with a \"high degree of specificity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 563 U.S. 731. This appeal illustrates why a similar rule requiring guidance to be authoritative and binding is needed in the context of the FCA. As discussed in the preceding sections, a voluminous amount of non- binding guidance supported Respondents ' interpretation of \"usual and customary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Authoritative Guidance Existed to Warn Respondents Away from Their Interpretation.",
		"context": "Petitioners are silent as to how that removal should be interpreted. 21 consensus of cases of persuasive authority,\" to warn officers away from their challenged conduct with a \"high degree of specificity.\" 138 S. Ct. 577; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This appeal illustrates why a similar rule requiring guidance to be authoritative and binding is needed in the context of the FCA. As discussed in the preceding sections, a voluminous amount of non- binding guidance supported Respondents ' interpretation of \"usual and customary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Authoritative Guidance Existed to Warn Respondents Away from Their Interpretation.",
		"context": "23 Here, it is undisputed that such specific authoritative guidance did not exist durin g the time that Respondents operated their respective discount club and price -matching programs. Indeed, the first authoritative guidance from an appellate court became final only after Respondents ended their challenged programs. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even as the Garbe court held that discount club programs should be considered in determining a \"usual and customary\" price, the paucity of authority cited in support of that proposition reinforced the lack of binding government guidance. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.3d 632",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TURKIYE DOES NOT PROSECUTE FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS.",
		"context": "2, 59 Stat. 1051, T. S. No. 993 (1945) (specifying that the U.N. organization \"is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of a ll its Members\"); The Schooner [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (observing that the adoption of the restr ictive theory of sovereign immunity internationally \"has not been treated as having any relevance in relation to the [a]bsolute [i]mmunity of the foreign State from criminal proceedings. \"); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 461 cmt. a (1987) (a foreign state \"would not be prosecuted under normal criminal process\"; a state can \"give effect to its law by certain nonjudicial measures\"); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment secures children's interests in joining and forming families for their protection, education, and well-being",
		"context": "Children, no less than the potential fos- ter parents whose interests Respondents assert, share this basic aspect of human nature. The Fourteenth Amendment is not \"for adults alone.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment secures children's interests in joining and forming families for their protection, education, and well-being",
		"context": "Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.\" Planned Parenthood of Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At least intuitively, this Court has understood that familial interests are not re served to adults. It has thus been careful to avoid making precedent that might diminish children's familial rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment secures children's interests in joining and forming families for their protection, education, and well-being",
		"context": "At least intuitively, this Court has understood that familial interests are not re served to adults. It has thus been careful to avoid making precedent that might diminish children's familial rights. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court rejected a claim that children awaiting deportation proceedings should be released from custody to the care of private, tempo- rary guardians. The government's facilities provided basic, but constitutionally adequate care. However, this Court noted that the children's would-be hosts were unwilling to become permanent guardians, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment secures children's interests in joining and forming families for their protection, education, and well-being",
		"context": "Nor are children's familial rights equal to those possessed by adults. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, at least some maturity is required to form the capacity for making coherent, mutually uplifting marital decisions. In this sense, children's familial \"rights\" might be a misnomer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment secures children's interests in joining and forming families for their protection, education, and well-being",
		"context": "Under the Fourteenth Amendment, they have the right to have those interests considered and respected. \"In the construction of the constitution, we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted; to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the remedy.\" Rhode [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The treatment of chil- dren, freed and born to the newly-freed, as well as the freedmen's interests in familial maintenance and for-mation, concerned the Fourteenth Amendment's fram- ers. This concern animated the framers' efforts, and is reflected in their ratified work product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 U.S. 657",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "However, this Court has refused the ap- plication of this doctrine with respect to Appointments Clause challenges. See Ryder , 515 U.S. at 183–84, and with respect to the remedy, \"[n]othing in the Constitu- tion alters the fundamental rule of 'retrospective oper-ation' that has governed '[j]udicial decisions for nearly a thousand years.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"which involved an Appoint- ments Clause challenge to the then recently consti- tuted Federal Election Commission and the Court allowed \" de facto validity\" to the past administrative actions of the Commission. Id. Nonetheless, in Buckley , \"the constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiffs was decided in their favor, and the declaratory and in- junctive relief they sought was awarded to them.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "at 184. Historically, this Court has applied the de facto of- ficer doctrine to limit relief following \"merely tech- nical\" statutory defects in an officer's appointment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Glidden 370 U.S. 530. Also, it has been applied to excuse defects in an officer's ap- pointment that are raised in a \"collateral attack\" on a judgment, such as in a habeas corpus petition. See Ex parte173 U.S. 452.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "at 184. Historically, this Court has applied the de facto of- ficer doctrine to limit relief following \"merely tech- nical\" statutory defects in an officer's appointment. 539 U.S. 69; see Glidden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Also, it has been applied to excuse defects in an officer's ap- pointment that are raised in a \"collateral attack\" on a judgment, such as in a habeas corpus petition. See Ex parte173 U.S. 452.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "539 U.S. 69; see Glidden 370 U.S. 530. Also, it has been applied to excuse defects in an officer's ap- pointment that are raised in a \"collateral attack\" on a judgment, such as in a habeas corpus petition. See Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Ryder , this Court explained that, in these limited circumstances, the doctrine \"protect[s] the public by insuring the or- derly functioning of the government despite technical defects in title to office.\" Ryder , 515 U.S. at 180.",
		"citation_value_orig": "173 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "Ryder , 515 U.S. at 180. How- ever, the Appointments Clause is not a mere technical 8 matter of \"etiquette or protocol.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It \"is among the significant struc- tural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "\"But it is more: 'it preserves another aspect of the Constitution's struc- tural integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointments power.' \" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In Ryder , \"the petitioner challenged the composi- tion of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review while his case was pending before that court on direct re- view.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": ". ]\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The de facto officer doctrine is inapplicable to con- stitutional defects like Appointments Clause violations because those errors are structural, see Freytag v. Com- missioner , 501 U.S. at 878–80, 6 and therefore, subject to automatic reversal. See Neder v. United States , 527 6 Freytag v. Commissioner , 501 U.S. at 880 (1991) (holding that \"[t]he structural principles embodied in the Appointments Clause do not speak only, or even primarily, of Executive prerog-a t i v e s s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e l o c a t e d i n A r t i c l e I I .",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "[...] . T h e structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one of Government but of the entire Republic).\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].7 Thus, when a proceeding is \"tainted with an appointments violation,\" the challenger \"is en- titled\" to an entirely \"new\" proceeding. 138 S. Ct. 2044. Moreover, the de facto officer doctrine should not be invoked on cases that in volve \"basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "T h e structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one of Government but of the entire Republic).\" 9 U.S. 1.7 Thus, when a proceeding is \"tainted with an appointments violation,\" the challenger \"is en- titled\" to an entirely \"new\" proceeding. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the de facto officer doctrine should not be invoked on cases that in volve \"basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants.\" Ryder , 515 U.S. at 182 ( citing Glidden 370 U.S. 530).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 2044. Moreover, the de facto officer doctrine should not be invoked on cases that in volve \"basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants.\" Ryder , 515 U.S. at 182 ( citing Glidden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As a matter of fact, this Court emphasized in Ryder t h a t \" [...] o n e w h o m a k e s a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits [ . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "Id. \"Any other rule would cre- ate a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause 7 See also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 challenges with respect to questionable [ . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The remedy should be retroactive",
		"context": "After Ryder , this Court has not applied or even mentioned the de facto officer doctrine to cases where the plaintiffs have brought Appointments Clause chal- lenges. In those cases, the past actions by the uncon- stitutionally appointed \"Officers of the United States\" have been declared void and null ab initio , and the remedies sought by the aggrieved party, granted. See 573 U.S. 513; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. According to the United States' interpretation of Ryder , and in an attempt to avoid its controlling ruling over this case, it states that Ryder only \"stands for the modest proposition that a court ordinarily should not apply the de facto doctrine to an unconstitutional ap- pointment of a judge or other adjudicator.\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "The Fourth Circuit is not alone in continuing to apply Lemon after Van Orden in deciding cases involving passive displays. See, e.g., Am. Atheists, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]419 F.3d 772 (\"Taking our cuefrom Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court 3 The \"reasonable observer\" standard of the endorsement test—a modification of the purpose and effects prongs of Lemon —was first proposed by Justice O'Connor in 472 U.S. 38. 7 and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Van Orden , we do not apply the Lemon test. \"); Red River 764 F.3d 948.",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "The Fourth Circuit is not alone in continuing to apply Lemon after Van Orden in deciding cases involving passive displays. See, e.g., Am. Atheists, 760 F.3d 227[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Taking our cuefrom Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court 3 The \"reasonable observer\" standard of the endorsement test—a modification of the purpose and effects prongs of Lemon —was first proposed by Justice O'Connor in 472 U.S. 38. 7 and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Van Orden , we do not apply the Lemon test. \"); Red River 764 F.3d 948.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 F.3d 772",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "The Fourth Circuit is not alone in continuing to apply Lemon after Van Orden in deciding cases involving passive displays. See, e.g., Am. Atheists, 760 F.3d 227419 F.3d 772 (\"Taking our cuefrom Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court 3 The \"reasonable observer\" standard of the endorsement test—a modification of the purpose and effects prongs of Lemon —was first proposed by Justice O'Connor in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Van Orden , we do not apply the Lemon test. \"); Red River 764 F.3d 948.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Atheists, 760 F.3d 227419 F.3d 772 (\"Taking our cuefrom Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court 3 The \"reasonable observer\" standard of the endorsement test—a modification of the purpose and effects prongs of Lemon —was first proposed by Justice O'Connor in 472 U.S. 38. 7 and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Van Orden , we do not apply the Lemon test. \"); Red River [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in a case involving a public display of the Bible, the Fifth Circuit focused on both JusticeBreyer's Van Orden concurrence and the \"reasonable observer\" standard—nowhere, as mentioned, found inJustice Breyer's opinion itself. See 461 F.3d 504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 948",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "See 461 F.3d 504. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that while Lemon \"remains the general rule for evaluating whether an Establishment Clause violation exists,\" itdoes \"not use the Lemon test to determine the constitutionality of some longstanding plainly religiousdisplays that convey a hist orical or secular message in a nonreligious context.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But subsequent toCard , in the protracted litigation over the Mount Soledad Cross, the Ninth Circuit used both Lemon and Van Orden to adjudicate the case. 629 F.3d 1099.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 F.3d 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "520 F.3d 1009. But subsequent toCard , in the protracted litigation over the Mount Soledad Cross, the Ninth Circuit used both Lemon and Van Orden to adjudicate the case. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Outside the public display context, and given this Court's movement away from Lemon i n s u c h o t h e r cases, e.g., 544 U.S. 709, the lower courtsare in disarray as to which Establishment Clause testto apply, or whether to apply more than one of them. 4 4 This Court's recent Establishment Clause decision in 138 S. Ct. 2392.",
		"citation_value_orig": "629 F.3d 1099",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "But subsequent toCard , in the protracted litigation over the Mount Soledad Cross, the Ninth Circuit used both Lemon and Van Orden to adjudicate the case. 629 F.3d 1099. Outside the public display context, and given this Court's movement away from Lemon i n s u c h o t h e r cases, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the lower courtsare in disarray as to which Establishment Clause testto apply, or whether to apply more than one of them. 4 4 This Court's recent Establishment Clause decision in 138 S. Ct. 2392. 624 F.3d 157.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "629 F.3d 1099. Outside the public display context, and given this Court's movement away from Lemon i n s u c h o t h e r cases, e.g., 544 U.S. 709, the lower courtsare in disarray as to which Establishment Clause testto apply, or whether to apply more than one of them. 4 4 This Court's recent Establishment Clause decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 624 F.3d 157. Recently, the Sixth Circuit \"weave[d] together three main jurisprudential threads\" for deciding a casearising under the Establishment Clause: \"the Lemon test,\" \"an endorsement analysis,\" and \"a historicalapproach.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Outside the public display context, and given this Court's movement away from Lemon i n s u c h o t h e r cases, e.g., 544 U.S. 709, the lower courtsare in disarray as to which Establishment Clause testto apply, or whether to apply more than one of them. 4 4 This Court's recent Establishment Clause decision in 138 S. Ct. 2392. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recently, the Sixth Circuit \"weave[d] together three main jurisprudential threads\" for deciding a casearising under the Establishment Clause: \"the Lemon test,\" \"an endorsement analysis,\" and \"a historicalapproach.\" 788 F.3d 580.",
		"citation_value_orig": "624 F.3d 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "624 F.3d 157. Recently, the Sixth Circuit \"weave[d] together three main jurisprudential threads\" for deciding a casearising under the Establishment Clause: \"the Lemon test,\" \"an endorsement analysis,\" and \"a historicalapproach.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Earlier this year, the Seventh Circuit noted in a case involving a public school's holiday show that thisCourt \"has employed at least three ways to assesswhether a local governmental body . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.3d 580",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Id. at 1053 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment). In light of the various and motley frameworks used by the lower courts in adjudicating EstablishmentClause challenges, it is little wonder that thejurisprudence in this area has been described as a \"judicial morass,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, given that numerous past and present Justices of this Court have op ined on the lack of clarity, the lower courts can hard ly be blamed for their confusion. See, e.g., Rowan 2018 U.S. LEXIS 4040 (\"This Court's Establishment Clausejurisprudence is in disarray.",
		"citation_value_orig": "574 F.3d 1235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Sometimes our precedentsfocus on whether a 'reasonable observer' would thinkthat a government practice endorses religion; othertimes our precedents focus on whether a governmentpractice is supported by this country's history andtradition. \"); Elmbrook Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]472 U.S. 38444 U.S. 646. 10 In sum, as the district court noted in this very case, \"Establishment Clause jurisprudence is . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Sometimes our precedentsfocus on whether a 'reasonable observer' would thinkthat a government practice endorses religion; othertimes our precedents focus on whether a governmentpractice is supported by this country's history andtradition. \"); Elmbrook Sch. 134 S. Ct. 2283[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]444 U.S. 646. 10 In sum, as the district court noted in this very case, \"Establishment Clause jurisprudence is . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence",
		"context": "Sometimes our precedentsfocus on whether a 'reasonable observer' would thinkthat a government practice endorses religion; othertimes our precedents focus on whether a governmentpractice is supported by this country's history andtradition. \"); Elmbrook Sch. 134 S. Ct. 2283472 U.S. 38[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 In sum, as the district court noted in this very case, \"Establishment Clause jurisprudence is . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "1. The \"underlying idea\" of the Double Jeopardy Clause is that \"the State wi th all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[P]ermitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for 17 the same offense would arm [the] Government with a potent instrument of oppression.\" 430 U.S. 564.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "355 U.S. 184. \"[P]ermitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for 17 the same offense would arm [the] Government with a potent instrument of oppression.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Importantly, the issue preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause \"precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial.\" 557 U.S. 110.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "430 U.S. 564. Importantly, the issue preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause \"precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Issue preclusion secures the finality and sanctity of acquittals, \"[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.\" Martin Linen , 430 U.S. at 571.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "Martin Linen , 430 U.S. at 571. \"[T]he primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to protect the integrity of a final judgment [of acquittal].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Verdicts of acquittal accord- ingly are entitled to \"special weight,\" 457 U.S. 31, and \"p articular significance,\" 449 U.S. 117. Issue preclusion also prevents the unfairness of allowing the prosecution a practice run of trying a defendant more than once.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "\"[T]he primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to protect the integrity of a final judgment [of acquittal].\" 437 U.S. 82. Verdicts of acquittal accord- ingly are entitled to \"special weight,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"p articular significance,\" 449 U.S. 117. Issue preclusion also prevents the unfairness of allowing the prosecution a practice run of trying a defendant more than once. \"[I]f the Government may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of its own.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "\"[T]he primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to protect the integrity of a final judgment [of acquittal].\" 437 U.S. 82. Verdicts of acquittal accord- ingly are entitled to \"special weight,\" 457 U.S. 31, and \"p articular significance,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Issue preclusion also prevents the unfairness of allowing the prosecution a practice run of trying a defendant more than once. \"[I]f the Government may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of its own.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "at 447. The prohibition against affording the government \"the proverbial 'second bite at the apple'\" is \"central to the objective of the [Clause's] prohibition against succes-sive trials.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, Currier's second trial presented all of the problems with sequential prosecutions that the Dou- ble Jeopardy Clause aims to prevent. After two pros- ecution witnesses floundered in the first trial, prosecu-tors returned at the second trial with more polished witnesses whose testimony was sought to prove that Currier was at the scene of the crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
		"context": "To the contrary, the prosecution's theory was that petitioner discarded the safe and guns in a river after removing the cash. Thus, Currier's \"possession\" of the weapons in this case \"d[id] not offend\" a key goal of felon-in-possession laws—to \"keep[] guns out of the hands of convicted felons.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The felon-in-possession charge against Currier was aggressive and tenuous at best. But it allowed the prosecution to try petitioner twice for the same alleged cri minal episode.",
		"citation_value_orig": "233 F.3d 619",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": ". This Court has articulated the extraordinary cir- cumstances that must be demonstrated before this Court will consider overruling a well-established prec- edent. As this Court noted in Harris v. United States , a \"special justification\" is required: 5 Stare decisis is not an \"inexorable command,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even in constitu- tional cases, in which stare decisis concerns are less pronounced, we will not overrule a precedent absent a \"special justification.\" Ari- 467 U.S. 203536 U.S. 545.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "As this Court noted in Harris v. United States , a \"special justification\" is required: 5 Stare decisis is not an \"inexorable command,\" 285 U.S. 393. Even in constitu- tional cases, in which stare decisis concerns are less pronounced, we will not overrule a precedent absent a \"special justification.\" Ari- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]536 U.S. 545. Williamson County was not an aberration. The principles embodied in Williamson County 's second prong were articulated more than a century ago and have been consistently followed by this Court since then.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "As this Court noted in Harris v. United States , a \"special justification\" is required: 5 Stare decisis is not an \"inexorable command,\" 285 U.S. 393. Even in constitu- tional cases, in which stare decisis concerns are less pronounced, we will not overrule a precedent absent a \"special justification.\" Ari- 467 U.S. 203[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Williamson County was not an aberration. The principles embodied in Williamson County 's second prong were articulated more than a century ago and have been consistently followed by this Court since then.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "135 U.S. at 658–59 (emphasis added). This principle was soon applied to local takings. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court continued to articulate these prin- ciples in a variety of differ ent kinds of takings cases. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Joslin Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"It has long be en settled that the tak- ing of property for public us e by a state or one of its municipalities need not be accompanied or preceded by payment, but that the requirement of just compensation is satisfied when the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment, and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge. \"); 285 U.S. 95; 452 U.S. 264. Although the roots of the facial-claim exception to the second prong are not so deep, they extend back at least to this Court's decision in Yee v. City of Escondido , 503 U.S. at 534, in which it held that the plaintiff 's fa- cial takings claim was not subject to the Williamson County requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": ", Joslin Mfg. 262 U.S. 668 (\"It has long be en settled that the tak- ing of property for public us e by a state or one of its municipalities need not be accompanied or preceded by payment, but that the requirement of just compensation is satisfied when the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment, and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 452 U.S. 264. Although the roots of the facial-claim exception to the second prong are not so deep, they extend back at least to this Court's decision in Yee v. City of Escondido , 503 U.S. at 534, in which it held that the plaintiff 's fa- cial takings claim was not subject to the Williamson County requirements. The reasons for overruling one or both of these es- tablished lines of authority are insufficient to satisfy the \"special justification\" standard, particularly as it has been applied by this Court .",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": ", Joslin Mfg. 262 U.S. 668 (\"It has long be en settled that the tak- ing of property for public us e by a state or one of its municipalities need not be accompanied or preceded by payment, but that the requirement of just compensation is satisfied when the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment, and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge. \"); 285 U.S. 95; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the roots of the facial-claim exception to the second prong are not so deep, they extend back at least to this Court's decision in Yee v. City of Escondido , 503 U.S. at 534, in which it held that the plaintiff 's fa- cial takings claim was not subject to the Williamson County requirements. The reasons for overruling one or both of these es- tablished lines of authority are insufficient to satisfy the \"special justification\" standard, particularly as it has been applied by this Court .",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "The reasons for overruling one or both of these es- tablished lines of authority are insufficient to satisfy the \"special justification\" standard, particularly as it has been applied by this Court . There has not been \"a significant change in, or s ubsequent development of, our constitutional law\" that destroys the vitality of the principles upon which Williamson County and San Remo were decided. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the \"prece dents before and after [Williamson County 's or San Remo 's] issue\" do not \"con- tradict [their] central holdin g\" in a way that creates uncertainty and erodes its foundations. See 539 U.S. 558; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "See 521 U.S. 203. Similarly, the \"prece dents before and after [Williamson County 's or San Remo 's] issue\" do not \"con- tradict [their] central holdin g\" in a way that creates uncertainty and erodes its foundations. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. id. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (\"[W]e should be consistent rather than manipulative in invo king the doctrine [of stare decisis ].\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here",
		"context": "The world has not changed so \"as to have robbed\" these rules \"of significant applicat ion or justification.\" Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These rules have not \"proven to be intol-erable simply in defying practical workability.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 854 (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham , 382 U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court lacked Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": ". Under Article III, federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions and instead must focus on cases or controversies presented by affected parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Standing doctrine measures the necessary effect on plaintiffs und er a tripartite test: cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, causation by the challenged conduct, and redressable by a court. 504 U.S. 555.",
		"citation_value_orig": "219 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court lacked Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "219 U.S. 346. Standing doctrine measures the necessary effect on plaintiffs und er a tripartite test: cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, causation by the challenged conduct, and redressable by a court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, \"[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon con tingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. \" 523 U.S. 296.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court lacked Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "504 U.S. 555. Similarly, \"[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon con tingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under both principles, a plaintiff must show that it \"has sustained or is immedia tely in danger of sustaining some direct injury \" from the challenged action, and that injury must be \"both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. \" City of Los 461 U.S. 95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court lacked Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "523 U.S. 296. Under both principles, a plaintiff must show that it \"has sustained or is immedia tely in danger of sustaining some direct injury \" from the challenged action, and that injury must be \"both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. \" City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For three reasons, Plaintiffs cannot meet these threshold tests for bringing suit in federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hosanna-Tabor And Other Supreme Court Decisions Establish That The Assembly Clause, Along With The Religion Clauses, Provides Support For A Robust Ministerial Exception",
		"context": "The Court has long protected this type of reli- gious association in the context of resolving ecclesiastical property disputes. For example, the Court has noted: The right to organize voluntary religious asso- ciations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and 28 for the ecclesiastical government of all the indi- vidual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like- wise, the Court has recognized \"a spirit of freedom for religious organizations\" that includes the \"power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.\" 344 U.S. 94.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hosanna-Tabor And Other Supreme Court Decisions Establish That The Assembly Clause, Along With The Religion Clauses, Provides Support For A Robust Ministerial Exception",
		"context": "80 U.S. 679. Like- wise, the Court has recognized \"a spirit of freedom for religious organizations\" that includes the \"power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court has explained that courts \"have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from member- ship.\" 82 U.S. 131.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Hosanna-Tabor And Other Supreme Court Decisions Establish That The Assembly Clause, Along With The Religion Clauses, Provides Support For A Robust Ministerial Exception",
		"context": "344 U.S. 94. And the Court has explained that courts \"have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from member- ship.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions support protection of a rela- tionship-based right of association for religious organizations rooted in the Assembly Clause. Justice Alito's concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor is also consistent with the conclusion that a reinvigor-ated right of association, grounded in the Assembly Clause, provides support fo r a robust ministerial ex- ception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "82 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf",
		"context": "The decision of a defendant to testify on his own behalf is a right essential to our adversary system. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. 483 U.S. 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf",
		"context": "504 U.S. 127. Indeed, every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here too, however, defense counsel's decision to concede guilt over the defendant's express objection effectively nullifies this right. See, e.g., Bergerud, 223 P.3d at 702; Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843-44; 592 A.2d 1142.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf",
		"context": "Jones, 463 U.S. at 751; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (1992); Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843. To allow counsel to 6 2.Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf The decision of a defendant to testify on his own behalf is a right essential to our adversary system. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. 483 U.S. 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf",
		"context": "504 U.S. 127. Indeed, every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here too, however, defense counsel's decision to concede guilt over the defendant's express objection effectively nullifies this right. See, e.g., Bergerud, 223 P.3d at 702; Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843-44; 592 A.2d 1142.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf",
		"context": "Jones, 463 U.S. at 751; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (1992); Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53; see alsoCooke, 977 A.2d at 843. To allow counsel to 7 contradict the essence of the defendant's decision regarding testimony would make counsel the \"master\" rather than the \"assistant\" and thus strip the defense of the personal character that the Constitution demands. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Bergerud, 223 P.3d at 702.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The ruling below undermines the Declaratory Judgments Act",
		"context": "§ 2201(a). And this Co urt has long held that in certain circumstances parties subject to a law may seek a pre-enforcement declaration of their rights rather than 12 subject themselves to arrest. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the upshot of the Fourth Circuit's opinion is that parties subject to certain laws simply cannot do this. As noted above, this Court has been perfectly clear that a defendant subject to an unconstitutionally underinclusive law can rais e that underinclusiveness as a constitutional defense without regard to severa- bility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law",
		"context": "The first third of the Argument section of Pe- titioners' brief is devoted to pressing an argument—that ERISA fiduciaries who ar e also corporate insiders are not required to use knowledge gained in their cor- porate capacity in making fiduciary decisions—which Petitioners did not raise before the district or appellate court. Typically, this Court \"do[es] not decide questions neither raised nor resolved below.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is this issue \"fairly included\" in the question set forth in the petition for certiorari as Rule 14.1(a) requires. See 503 U.S. 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law",
		"context": "531 U.S. 198. Nor is this issue \"fairly included\" in the question set forth in the petition for certiorari as Rule 14.1(a) requires. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because this is \"a cour t of final review and not of first view[,]\" the entirety of Petitioners' argument set forth at pages 22 through 33 of their brief need not be considered. 137 S. Ct. 788.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law",
		"context": "See 503 U.S. 519. Because this is \"a cour t of final review and not of first view[,]\" the entirety of Petitioners' argument set forth at pages 22 through 33 of their brief need not be considered. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. If the Court does decide to consider Petition- ers' brand-new argument, however, it should swiftly be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law",
		"context": "A fiduciary may be permitted to wear two hats, but she still only has one head. 4. Much of Petitioners' argument seems to rest on a misunderstanding of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Petitioners' Br. 23-25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law",
		"context": "More fun-damentally, Petitioners seem dissatisfied with the case- by-case approach to prudence claims that \"more than good\" entails, even though that approach is perfectly consistent with how prudence claims against other ERISA fiduciaries are evaluated. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]588 F.3d 585. Plaintiffs have brought claims against ESOP fiduciaries based on inside infor- mation for decades, yet Petitioners' apocalyptic sce- nario has never come to pass. Petitioners cannot point to anything unique to this case that, if it is affirmed, will suddenly render courts incapable of avoiding the chaos Petitioners predict.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law",
		"context": "More fun-damentally, Petitioners seem dissatisfied with the case- by-case approach to prudence claims that \"more than good\" entails, even though that approach is perfectly consistent with how prudence claims against other ERISA fiduciaries are evaluated. See, e.g. , 923 F.3d 320[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs have brought claims against ESOP fiduciaries based on inside infor- mation for decades, yet Petitioners' apocalyptic sce- nario has never come to pass. Petitioners cannot point to anything unique to this case that, if it is affirmed, will suddenly render courts incapable of avoiding the chaos Petitioners predict.",
		"citation_value_orig": "588 F.3d 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "That relief —vacatur — erases the rule, restoring the status quo ante.3 2. A long line of this Court's cases has applied the APA to set aside a n agency's rule in its entiret y.4 For 3 See, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]145 F.3d 1399; N.H. Hosp. 887 F.3d 62; Nat'l Black 3 example, in 529 U.S. 120 , the Court affirmed the circuit court's invalidation of the FDA's regulations governing tobacco . See Brown & Williamson Tobacco 153 F.3d 155 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.2d 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "That relief —vacatur — erases the rule, restoring the status quo ante.3 2. A long line of this Court's cases has applied the APA to set aside a n agency's rule in its entiret y.4 For 3 See, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners 809 F.2d 847[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; N.H. Hosp. 887 F.3d 62; Nat'l Black 3 example, in 529 U.S. 120 , the Court affirmed the circuit court's invalidation of the FDA's regulations governing tobacco . See Brown & Williamson Tobacco 153 F.3d 155 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 F.3d 1399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "A long line of this Court's cases has applied the APA to set aside a n agency's rule in its entiret y.4 For 3 See, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners 809 F.2d 847145 F.3d 1399; N.H. Hosp. 887 F.3d 62; Nat'l Black 3 example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court affirmed the circuit court's invalidation of the FDA's regulations governing tobacco . See Brown & Williamson Tobacco 153 F.3d 155 . The Court nowhere limited its grant of relief only to the plaintiffs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "U.S. Tanker Owners 809 F.2d 847145 F.3d 1399; N.H. Hosp. 887 F.3d 62; Nat'l Black 3 example, in 529 U.S. 120 , the Court affirmed the circuit court's invalidation of the FDA's regulations governing tobacco . See Brown & Williamson Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court nowhere limited its grant of relief only to the plaintiffs. Earlier, i n 488 U.S. 204, the Court affirmed the D.C. Cir- cuit's decision invalidating a retroactive rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 F.3d 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "See Brown & Williamson Tobacco 153 F.3d 155 . The Court nowhere limited its grant of relief only to the plaintiffs. Earlier, i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court affirmed the D.C. Cir- cuit's decision invalidating a retroactive rule. The Court did not cab in its grant of relief to the seven hos- pitals that had filed suit. Rather, it directed its hold- ing and remedy to the illegal rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Id. at 216 (\"The 1984 reinstatement of the 1981 cost -limit rule is inva- lid.\"). Earlier still, i n Motor Vehicle M anufacture rs As- sociation of the United States, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the agency had issued an order rescinding its passive - restraint rule, and the Court held that the rescission was unlawful. I t order ed the agen cy to \"either con- sider the matter further or adhere to or amend [the standard at issue] along lines which its analysis sup- ports.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "I t order ed the agen cy to \"either con- sider the matter further or adhere to or amend [the standard at issue] along lines which its analysis sup- ports.\" Id. Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.2d 1016",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "I t order ed the agen cy to \"either con- sider the matter further or adhere to or amend [the standard at issue] along lines which its analysis sup- ports.\" Id. Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "652 F.3d 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Id. Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.3d 755",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Id. Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Id. Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.2d 1220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Id. Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 F.2d 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467. 4 acted only upon automobi le makers , so the plaintiff in- surance company was not even regulated by the rule it was challenging.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.2d 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467. 4 acted only upon automobi le makers , so the plaintiff in- surance company was not even regulated by the rule it was challenging.",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.2d 1163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Plainly the relief the Court ordered had an impact beyond the plaintiff —the regulation directly Media 791 F.2d 1016 ; Prome- theus Radio 652 F.3d 431; N.C. Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467. 4 acted only upon automobi le makers , so the plaintiff in- surance company was not even regulated by the rule it was challenging.",
		"citation_value_orig": "841 F.3d 1141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Growers' Ass'n, 702 F.3d 755; Chamber of Commerce of 885 F.3d 360; Mason Gen. 809 F.2d 1220; H & H Tire 471 F.2d 350; Menorah Med. 768 F.2d 292; 843 F.2d 1163; Zen Magnets, 841 F.3d 1141; Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 acted only upon automobi le makers , so the plaintiff in- surance company was not even regulated by the rule it was challenging. In 440 U.S. 689, examining the FCC's public access cable rules, the Court \"affirm[ed] the lower court's deter mi- nation to set aside the amalgam of rules without inti- mating any view regarding whether a particular ele- ment thereof might appropriately be revitalized in a different context.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 F.3d 1467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Assistance Found., 118 F.3d 1467. 4 acted only upon automobi le makers , so the plaintiff in- surance company was not even regulated by the rule it was challenging. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], examining the FCC's public access cable rules, the Court \"affirm[ed] the lower court's deter mi- nation to set aside the amalgam of rules without inti- mating any view regarding whether a particular ele- ment thereof might appropriately be revitalized in a different context.\" Again the effect of this Court's de- cision was the complete invalidation of th e rules as to all those subject to the m. And in Abbott 387 U.S. 136, the Court ex- plained that a benefit of pre -enforcement review under the APA is that such review may counterintuitively \"speed enforcement\" because if the agency \"loses, it can more quickly revise its regulation.\" What the Court thus contemplated was the complete invalida- tion and consequent revision of a regulation under the APA, rather than relief for a particular plaintiff.5 5 In the early APA case of 351 U.S. 192, this Court reviewed a court of appeals decision that expressly \"struck out\" select \"words\" from the regu- latory order under review, rather than granting relief solely as to the plaintiff.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 689",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "4 acted only upon automobi le makers , so the plaintiff in- surance company was not even regulated by the rule it was challenging. In 440 U.S. 689, examining the FCC's public access cable rules, the Court \"affirm[ed] the lower court's deter mi- nation to set aside the amalgam of rules without inti- mating any view regarding whether a particular ele- ment thereof might appropriately be revitalized in a different context.\" Again the effect of this Court's de- cision was the complete invalidation of th e rules as to all those subject to the m. And in Abbott [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court ex- plained that a benefit of pre -enforcement review under the APA is that such review may counterintuitively \"speed enforcement\" because if the agency \"loses, it can more quickly revise its regulation.\" What the Court thus contemplated was the complete invalida- tion and consequent revision of a regulation under the APA, rather than relief for a particular plaintiff.5 5 In the early APA case of 351 U.S. 192, this Court reviewed a court of appeals decision that expressly \"struck out\" select \"words\" from the regu- latory order under review, rather than granting relief solely as to the plaintiff. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "In 440 U.S. 689, examining the FCC's public access cable rules, the Court \"affirm[ed] the lower court's deter mi- nation to set aside the amalgam of rules without inti- mating any view regarding whether a particular ele- ment thereof might appropriately be revitalized in a different context.\" Again the effect of this Court's de- cision was the complete invalidation of th e rules as to all those subject to the m. And in Abbott 387 U.S. 136, the Court ex- plained that a benefit of pre -enforcement review under the APA is that such review may counterintuitively \"speed enforcement\" because if the agency \"loses, it can more quickly revise its regulation.\" What the Court thus contemplated was the complete invalida- tion and consequent revision of a regulation under the APA, rather than relief for a particular plaintiff.5 5 In the early APA case of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court reviewed a court of appeals decision that expressly \"struck out\" select \"words\" from the regu- latory order under review, rather than granting relief solely as to the plaintiff. Id. at 200.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "While the Court found that the original agency order itself was lawful and therefore undid the court of appeals' edits, the Court d id not question the court 's power to make such edits. Other instances of this Court approving the wholesale setting aside of agency regulations abound. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 3. That unbroken line of precedent was consistent with pre -APA practice developed under statutory schemes that informed the crafting of the APA itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "73 -416, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093 (applying Urgent Deficiencies Act provisions \"relating to the enforcing or setting aside of the orders of the [ICC]\" to \"suits to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the [FCC] under this Act\"). For example, i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , several railroads sued under the Urgent Deficiencies Act to enjoin an ICC or- der requiring steam engine modifications. The three - judge court ordered that the ICC rule be \"v acated, set aside, and annulled \" and its enforcement \"perpetually enjoined, \" Transcript of Record at 223 -24, and this Court affirmed , 293 U.S. at 463 -65. And in CBS v. United States , two networks challenged the FCC's chain -broadcasting regulations .",
		"citation_value_orig": "293 U.S. 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "The three - judge court ordered that the ICC rule be \"v acated, set aside, and annulled \" and its enforcement \"perpetually enjoined, \" Transcript of Record at 223 -24, and this Court affirmed , 293 U.S. at 463 -65. And in CBS v. United States , two networks challenged the FCC's chain -broadcasting regulations . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1942 ); 316 U.S. 407. The three -judge court , while finding it lacked jurisdiction, stayed the regulations' enforce- ment entirel y pending this Court's review . The lower court's stay protected not just the two plaintiff net- works ; the stay also protected the third national net- work, Mutual, which was not a plaintiff , and hundreds of non-party stations that would otherwise have been threatened with losses of licenses under the new 6 rules.6 This Court continued the stay when it reversed and remanded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "The three - judge court ordered that the ICC rule be \"v acated, set aside, and annulled \" and its enforcement \"perpetually enjoined, \" Transcript of Record at 223 -24, and this Court affirmed , 293 U.S. at 463 -65. And in CBS v. United States , two networks challenged the FCC's chain -broadcasting regulations . 316 U.S. 447 (1942 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The three -judge court , while finding it lacked jurisdiction, stayed the regulations' enforce- ment entirel y pending this Court's review . The lower court's stay protected not just the two plaintiff net- works ; the stay also protected the third national net- work, Mutual, which was not a plaintiff , and hundreds of non-party stations that would otherwise have been threatened with losses of licenses under the new 6 rules.6 This Court continued the stay when it reversed and remanded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "The result was that the chain -broadcasting regulations an- nounced in 1941 did not go into effect as to any station or any network, plaintiff or non -plaintiff, until ten days after the Court eventually approved their validity in 1943.7 4. The Court need not look beyond the APA's text and that long line of APA (and pre-APA ) precedents for certainty that the APA 's power to \"set aside\" agency action authorizes the general vacatur of rules. But 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 690 -91, 696 -97 (S.D.N.Y. ), rev'd sub nom. 316 U.S. 407316 U.S. 447; Decree Granting Tempo- rary Restraining Order, Transc ript of Record at 482 , Columbia Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "44 F. Supp. 688",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "But 6 44 F. Supp. 688, 690 -91, 696 -97 (S.D.N.Y. ), rev'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]316 U.S. 447; Decree Granting Tempo- rary Restraining Order, Transc ript of Record at 482 , Columbia Broad. 316 U.S. 407274 U.S. 564, the three - judge district court \"set aside, annulled, and suspended\" the ICC's rule and permanently enjoined the federal de fendants from en- forcing it. Transcript of Record at 75.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "But 6 44 F. Supp. 688, 690 -91, 696 -97 (S.D.N.Y. ), rev'd sub nom. 316 U.S. 407[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Decree Granting Tempo- rary Restraining Order, Transc ript of Record at 482 , Columbia Broad. 316 U.S. 407274 U.S. 564, the three - judge district court \"set aside, annulled, and suspended\" the ICC's rule and permanently enjoined the federal de fendants from en- forcing it. Transcript of Record at 75.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "), rev'd sub nom. 316 U.S. 407316 U.S. 447; Decree Granting Tempo- rary Restraining Order, Transc ript of Record at 482 , Columbia Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]274 U.S. 564, the three - judge district court \"set aside, annulled, and suspended\" the ICC's rule and permanently enjoined the federal de fendants from en- forcing it. Transcript of Record at 75. While the Court reversed on the merits, 274 U.S. at 584, it took no issue with the sweeping scope of the lower court's decree.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "), rev'd sub nom. 316 U.S. 407316 U.S. 447; Decree Granting Tempo- rary Restraining Order, Transc ript of Record at 482 , Columbia Broad. 316 U.S. 407[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the three - judge district court \"set aside, annulled, and suspended\" the ICC's rule and permanently enjoined the federal de fendants from en- forcing it. Transcript of Record at 75. While the Court reversed on the merits, 274 U.S. at 584, it took no issue with the sweeping scope of the lower court's decree.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Transcript of Record at 75. While the Court reversed on the merits, 274 U.S. at 584, it took no issue with the sweeping scope of the lower court's decree. Similarly, in Lukens Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir. 193 9) (per curiam) , the D.C. Circuit granted a universal preliminary injunction that enjoined the government from conditioning its procurement contracts on the payment of specified minimum wages .",
		"citation_value_orig": "107 F.2d 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Circuit granted a universal preliminary injunction that enjoined the government from conditioning its procurement contracts on the payment of specified minimum wages . This Court reversed, but for lack of standing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In dictum, the Court did call into question the wisdom of the breadth of the court of appeals' injunction by sug- gesting that (had there been standing) it should have applied to all bidders in the plaintiffs' specif ic \"locality\" rather than to all localities. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "5. Consistent with that broad intent, Congress has long abided the courts' uniform interpretation of the APA . It has made no changes to the \"set aside\" power as this Court and lower courts for de cades have repeat- edly used that power to strike unlawful rule s. By 1967, Abbott Laboratories had removed any doubt that the APA authorized pre-enforcement facial challenges to regulations, even in the absence of a separate and express statutory authorizat ion of such suits.8 Yet i n 1976 , when Congress enacted amendments to the APA's judicial review provisions, Congress did not re- 8 See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 158. The dissent in Abbott Laboratories confirmed that the majority's decision there \"authorize[d] threshold or pre - enforcement challenge by action for injuncti on and declaratory relief to suspend the operation of the regulations in their entirety and without reference to particular factual situations .\" Toilet Goods Ass'n , 387 U.S. at 175 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "5. Consistent with that broad intent, Congress has long abided the courts' uniform interpretation of the APA . It has made no changes to the \"set aside\" power as this Court and lower courts for de cades have repeat- edly used that power to strike unlawful rule s. By 1967, Abbott Laboratories had removed any doubt that the APA authorized pre-enforcement facial challenges to regulations, even in the absence of a separate and express statutory authorizat ion of such suits.8 Yet i n 1976 , when Congress enacted amendments to the APA's judicial review provisions, Congress did not re- 8 See387 U.S. 136; Toilet Goods Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The dissent in Abbott Laboratories confirmed that the majority's decision there \"authorize[d] threshold or pre - enforcement challenge by action for injuncti on and declaratory relief to suspend the operation of the regulations in their entirety and without reference to particular factual situations .\" Toilet Goods Ass'n , 387 U.S. at 175 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "702, 703). \"Congress' failure to disturb a consistent judicial in- terpretation of a statute may provide some indication that 'Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that [interpretation].'\" Monesse n Sw. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in others areas where the courts have interpreted a statutory command with \"virtual unanimity over more than seven decades\" and Congress has not acted, the Court should not revise its \"longstanding\" view of what Con- gress's statute allows the courts to do \"in the face of such congressional inaction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "10 The APA's author ization of universal preliminary re- lief makes sense given the courts' power to set a rule aside in its entirety at the end of a case. If the review- ing court may universally vacate a rule on the merits, it has to have the interim power to halt the rule fro m going into effect universally pending its merits deci- sion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Otherwise, the power to afford meaningful final relief would be diminished . Once a rule begins to be applied, the \"egg has been scrambled,\" Sugar Cane Growers Coop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation",
		"context": "Otherwise, the power to afford meaningful final relief would be diminished . Once a rule begins to be applied, the \"egg has been scrambled,\" Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , with sometimes irreversible effects. The way that courts are to grant such interim relief is through ordinary injunctions and restraining orders . See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act 107 & n.20 (1947) (citing 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 F.3d 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Court Has Not Required Domestic Conduct When the Focus of the Provision Is Something Other Than Conduct",
		"context": "Nowhere did Morrison articulate a require- ment for conduct in the United States relevant to a domestic transaction in securities, an omission that is all the more striking because relevant domestic conduct had been alleged in that case. Lower courts have read Morrison to reject any additional domestic- conduct requirement. See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. RJR Nabisco similarly imposed no requirement of domestic conduct, despite the decision's reference to \"conduct relevant to the statute's focus\" when describ- ing the presumption's second step. 579 U.S. at 337.",
		"citation_value_orig": "677 F.3d 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Relators' and the Government's Remaining Contrary Arguments Are Meritless",
		"context": "Epistemology tilts decidedl y against re- lators' position. 44 As for legislative history, it is not clear what take- away relators prefer from this exercise in \"looking over [the] c rowd and p icking out [their] friends.\" Exx- on Mob il [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Relators discuss a \"duty to inquire\" (Br. 37-38), but any such \"duty\" was supposed to be \"limited,\" not \"burdensome,\" and \"on ly … 'rea sonable and prudent under the ci rcumstances .'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The pre-Roe American experience with abortion shows that religious liberty conflicts would likely decrease post-Roe/Casey.",
		"context": "Laws 87 5 (all similar). Confronting one of those exceptions in Doe v. Bolton , this Court observed that, under Georgia's abortion statute, \"the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion\" and that \"a phy sician or any other employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the abor tion procedure.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather than being controversial, these provisions were described by the Roe/Doe majority as \"obviously\" placed in the statute \"to afford appropriate protection to the individual and to the denominational hospi tal.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action",
		"context": "Although the court of appeals correctly held that Section 14(e) encompasses ne gligent misrepresenta- 27 tions , respondents' suit still should be dismissed . Un- der this Court's modern private -right -of-action juris- prudence, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , private litigants like respondents may not sue for violation s of Section 14(e) . In Piper , 430 U.S. at 24- 42, this Court hel d that Sec- tion 14(e) does not create an implied private right of ac- tion for unsuccessful tender offerors . The Court de- clined to address whether a private damages rem edy exists for shareholders subject to a tender offer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action",
		"context": "See id. at 42 n.28. Nevertheless, lower courts have long per- mitted private litigants to pursu e claims under Section 14(e) , on the theory that this Court has recognized pri- vate rights of action under Section 10(b), Superinten- dent of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Section 14(a), J. I. Case 377 U.S. 426 . See, e.g., 489 F.2d 579, 595 -596 (5th Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action",
		"context": "at 42 n.28. Nevertheless, lower courts have long per- mitted private litigants to pursu e claims under Section 14(e) , on the theory that this Court has recognized pri- vate rights of action under Section 10(b), Superinten- dent of 404 U.S. 6, and Section 14(a), J. I. Case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See, e.g., 489 F.2d 579, 595 -596 (5th Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action",
		"context": "Nevertheless, lower courts have long per- mitted private litigants to pursu e claims under Section 14(e) , on the theory that this Court has recognized pri- vate rights of action under Section 10(b), Superinten- dent of 404 U.S. 6, and Section 14(a), J. I. Case 377 U.S. 426 . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 595 -596 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied,419 U.S. 873 ; Chris -Craft Indus., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 F.2d 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action",
		"context": "See, e.g., 489 F.2d 579, 595 -596 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied,419 U.S. 873 ; Chris -Craft Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,414 U.S. 910 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 F.2d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action",
		"context": "Br. 31 -42, the determination whether a private right exists is \"predicate to an intelligent resolution of 28 the question \" whether Section 14(e) encompasses negli- gent misrepresentations . Caterpillar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. TRIBAL OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING RIGHTS ARE NOT IMPLIEDLY ABROGATED AND HAVE CONTINUING VIABILITY",
		"context": "However, this Court has also recognized that it bene fits from the considered de- cisions of other interpreters of federal law; and when the federal law in question concerns Indian interests, Indian tribes are among those interpreters. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On the question before this Court, every interpreter except Wyoming has concluded that the off-reservation hunting right described in the 1868 Treaty remains in-tact.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 845",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Small refineries operate with limited access to resources under constrained market conditions, making RFS compliance difficult",
		"context": "There have been no relevant legal or factual changes since EPA's most recent briefing in this case. As a result, EPA's reversal is unreasonable. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] fails to account for serious legitimate reliance interests engendered by the prior policy or (2) rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy.). 5 See U.S. EPA, Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking to Change the RFS Point of Obligation , EPA-420-R-17-008, at 9–10 (Nov. 2017), available at https://nepis.epa.gov/. 7 blended fuel generally cannot be transported via pipeline.6 Instead, blending gasoline and diesel fuel with renew- able fuels (such as ethanol) generally occurs immediately before fuel is distributed fo r consumption, and this can occur at the refinery's loadin g rack (\"upstream blending\") or at distribution terminals, bulk storage facilities, and/or retail gas stations (\"downstream blending\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' Attorney's Fees Proposals Are Not Properly Before the Court",
		"context": "The court of appeals did not pass on petitioners' argument for ex-cluding cy pres payments, presumably because of that waiver. This Court should not entertain arguments not preserved or passed upon below. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying a new rule \"without the benefit of a full record or lower court deter- minations is not a sensible exercise of this Court's discre- tion.\" 494 U.S. 545.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 638",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' Attorney's Fees Proposals Are Not Properly Before the Court",
		"context": "503 U.S. 638. Applying a new rule \"without the benefit of a full record or lower court deter- minations is not a sensible exercise of this Court's discre- tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "The United States has sometimes acted as a wise steward and sometimes used children to target Tribes for destruction. But the choices, for good or ill, have been federal. States, by contrast, began 35 Plaintiffs' position is even more destructive given their argument that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], should be overruled. Entertaining that argument in the Indian-law context would require overruling not just Holland but Kagama , Seber , Lara ,and many others and would disable the United States from fulfilling most treaty obligations to Tribes. Indeed, Plaintiffs' objection to Holland —that international law now \"cover[s] matters traditionally understood as domestic,\" Texas Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "252 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "The Court should leave debates about Holland for the context where they arose. 40 seriously addressing Indian children only reluctantly, at the federal government's behest, in the 1950s. Supra 8- 9; cf.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More: Plaintiffs' attempt to constitutionalize child- welfare matters generally as an exclusive state sphere, Texas Br. 36, is entirely anachronistic.",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "X (emphasis added). Thus, \"[v]irtually by definition\" powers delegated to the United States \"are not powers … 'reserved to the States.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has applied that principle to reject Plaintiffs' position nearly verbatim and repudiate a nontextual exception for laws regulating \"in areas of traditional [state] governmental functions.\" 469 U.S. 528.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "560 U.S. 126. This Court has applied that principle to reject Plaintiffs' position nearly verbatim and repudiate a nontextual exception for laws regulating \"in areas of traditional [state] governmental functions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Quoting Madison, the Court explained that \"[i]nterference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "Id. at 549 (quoting 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791)); see United Haulers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs simply re-excavate nontextual arguments this Court properly buried. When this Court a century 37 John E.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America 9 (2004), https://bit.ly/3Q5Uz08. 42 ago held that Congress may protect Indians outside Indian country \"within a state,\" it emphasized that \"if Congress possesses power\" to act, \"it follows that the state possesses no exclusive control.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Taxation is a \"fundamental\" state power, CSX Transp., 552 U.S. 9, yet Seber held that Congress may exercise its \"plenary\" power to \"with-draw lands from the tax rolls and [to] possibly embarrass the finances of a state,\" 318 U.S. at 718. And this Court has held that Congress may create reservations within States, see 437 U.S. 634, though doing so preempts fundamental state powers, White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136.",
		"citation_value_orig": "232 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "42 ago held that Congress may protect Indians outside Indian country \"within a state,\" it emphasized that \"if Congress possesses power\" to act, \"it follows that the state possesses no exclusive control.\" 232 U.S. 478. Taxation is a \"fundamental\" state power, CSX Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], yet Seber held that Congress may exercise its \"plenary\" power to \"with-draw lands from the tax rolls and [to] possibly embarrass the finances of a state,\" 318 U.S. at 718. And this Court has held that Congress may create reservations within States, see 437 U.S. 634, though doing so preempts fundamental state powers, White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136. Plaintiffs' favorite cases, Sosna and Burrus , recognize only that Congress has no general domestic- relations power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "232 U.S. 478. Taxation is a \"fundamental\" state power, CSX Transp., 552 U.S. 9, yet Seber held that Congress may exercise its \"plenary\" power to \"with-draw lands from the tax rolls and [to] possibly embarrass the finances of a state,\" 318 U.S. at 718. And this Court has held that Congress may create reservations within States, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], though doing so preempts fundamental state powers, White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136. Plaintiffs' favorite cases, Sosna and Burrus , recognize only that Congress has no general domestic- relations power. 419 U.S. 393; Ex parte136 U.S. 586.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 634",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "232 U.S. 478. Taxation is a \"fundamental\" state power, CSX Transp., 552 U.S. 9, yet Seber held that Congress may exercise its \"plenary\" power to \"with-draw lands from the tax rolls and [to] possibly embarrass the finances of a state,\" 318 U.S. at 718. And this Court has held that Congress may create reservations within States, see 437 U.S. 634, though doing so preempts fundamental state powers, White Mountain Apache [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs' favorite cases, Sosna and Burrus , recognize only that Congress has no general domestic- relations power. 419 U.S. 393; Ex parte136 U.S. 586.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "And this Court has held that Congress may create reservations within States, see 437 U.S. 634, though doing so preempts fundamental state powers, White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136. Plaintiffs' favorite cases, Sosna and Burrus , recognize only that Congress has no general domestic- relations power. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ex parte136 U.S. 586. They do not bar Congress from exercising enumerated powers simply because they touch domestic relations. Congress has done so often: In the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Congress exercised its war powers to regulate domestic-relations proceedings concerning servicemembers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "And this Court has held that Congress may create reservations within States, see 437 U.S. 634, though doing so preempts fundamental state powers, White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136. Plaintiffs' favorite cases, Sosna and Burrus , recognize only that Congress has no general domestic- relations power. 419 U.S. 393; Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They do not bar Congress from exercising enumerated powers simply because they touch domestic relations. Congress has done so often: In the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Congress exercised its war powers to regulate domestic-relations proceedings concerning servicemembers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception",
		"context": "§§2931-32, 3938(b). 43 Via the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Congress exercised its war powers to preempt state divorce laws. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §9001 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "But \"Judge Posner's logic\" is irreconcilable with ERISA's plain tex t for the reasons discussed above. Still, the agencies have advanced this interpretation, and lower courts have uncritically accepted it, time and again. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://p erma.cc/G6KK- NF4J (arguing that ministries \"need only attest to their religious beliefs 20 and step aside\") (citations and internal quotation omitted) . In the alternative, the Third Circuit stated that even if a TPA's duty to deliver contraceptives arises only after a ministry invoke s the accommodation, there is no trigger because it is the government, not the employer , that create s the contractual obligation: [T]he regulations specific to . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "778 F.3d 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "Circuits might be defensible if th ose court s had objectively assessed how the regulatory measure work s. But they did not. Judge Posner's opinion in University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius was the first appellate opinion on the accommodation and it became the template for every other circuit that sided with the government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, Notre Dame was the first to accept the government's characterization of the accommodation as an \"opt out ,\" Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 550 at 609. That phrase went 21 judicially viral and was invoked over 200 times by five other circuits.10 The Notre Dame court styled the accommodation as an \"opt out\" because it assumed that Congress had granted the agencies power to \"enlist[], draft[], conscript[] substitute providers\" into providing contraceptive coverage after a ministry invoke s the accommodation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F.3d 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "The Third Circuit's deference to sister circuits contributed to an echo chamber that became ever more confident and disconnecte d from federal law as time went on. Four months after Geneva College, the Fifth Circuit cited the Third Circuit in support of its claim that TPAs are \" already required by law \" to provide contraceptive coverage before ministries either \"complet[e] Form 700 or submit[] a notice to HHS.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The next month, Judge Posner went even further in the Seventh Circuit's Wheaton Colleg e decision, writing: \"What had been Wheaton's plan, so far as 23 emergency contraception was concerned, the Affordable Care Act made the government's plan when Wheaton refused to comply with the Act's provision on contraception coverage.\" 791 F.3d at 800 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 F.3d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "The government's briefing in Zubik also retreated from its claim that Labor has power under ERISA to unilaterally appoint TPAs as plan administrat ors and force them to provide contraceptive services. This claim played a key role in this Court's per curiam decision in Wheaton College, which noted that \"[t]he Government contends that the applicant's [TPA is] required by federal law to provide full contraceptive access regardless whether the applicant completes ESBA Form 700.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Based on that premise, the Court reasoned that the agencies w ould be able to 27 compel Wheaton's TPA to comply with the mandate without requiring Wheaton to give its TPA a form that was \" one of the instrument s under which [its] plan is operated under ERISA se ction 3(16)(A)(i).\" 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "Geneva, 778 F.3d at 437 (quoting Notre Dame , 743 F.3d at 554) . This Court frequently uses the term \"trigger\" to describe actions taken by individuals or organizations that cause a new set of statutory rules or obligations to apply. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]551 U.S. 644 . C. This administration took the previous administration's concessions into account when it decided to create a broader religious employer exemption . The Respondents claim the agencies \"reversed course\" when they issued a Final Rule that expanded the religiou s employer exemption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "Geneva, 778 F.3d at 437 (quoting Notre Dame , 743 F.3d at 554) . This Court frequently uses the term \"trigger\" to describe actions taken by individuals or organizations that cause a new set of statutory rules or obligations to apply. See, e.g., 139 S. Ct. 2369[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . C. This administration took the previous administration's concessions into account when it decided to create a broader religious employer exemption . The Respondents claim the agencies \"reversed course\" when they issued a Final Rule that expanded the religiou s employer exemption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
		"context": "Id. There is no doubt that a ministry forced to choose between violating its conscience and the mandate's crushing fines is suffering an imminent injury. See 33 Hobby Lobby Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd sub nom. 573 U.S. 682 . Therefore, the agencies satisfied the APA's \"good cause\" requirement if they had reason to believe that their accommodation was violating the RFRA rights of self -insured ministries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F.3d 1114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT \"EXPENSES OF THE PROCEEDING\" IS AMBIGUOUS",
		"context": "It would be more candid to concede that the USPTO simply did not consider the term \"expenses \" sufficie ntly explicit to cover attorney's fees . At a minimum, a 174 year track record is evidence that many generations of Patent and Trademark Office administrators have harbored doubts about the meaning and scope of the phrase \"all expenses of the proceeding s.\" These doubts, inferred from the long delay, support the conclusion that the statutes are ambiguous, and therefore inadequate to satisfy the American Rule requirement that the authority to award attorney fees be clearly and explicitly stated. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 480 –81 (19 21) (\"[T]he practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years will not be disturbed except for cogent 22 reasons. \"); Colonial Press Intern., 788 F.3d 1350 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT \"EXPENSES OF THE PROCEEDING\" IS AMBIGUOUS",
		"context": "At a minimum, a 174 year track record is evidence that many generations of Patent and Trademark Office administrators have harbored doubts about the meaning and scope of the phrase \"all expenses of the proceeding s.\" These doubts, inferred from the long delay, support the conclusion that the statutes are ambiguous, and therefore inadequate to satisfy the American Rule requirement that the authority to award attorney fees be clearly and explicitly stated. See 256 U.S. 477, 480 –81 (19 21) (\"[T]he practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years will not be disturbed except for cogent 22 reasons. \"); Colonial Press Intern., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.3d 1350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact",
		"context": "In these circuits, the existence of probable cause is consid ered as one element of the third Mount Healthy factor —not as a separate, dispositive element on its own. In ascertaining whether plaintiff 's constitutionally protected activity (speech) motivated defendant 's adverse action (arrest), the court evaluates wh ether the presence of probable cause was the but -for cause of the arrest, or if in reality, the arrest only occurred to retaliate against speech that is protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir. 201 3). In both Gullick and in Henneberry , the courts employed this framework to conclude the First Amendment retaliation claims should proceed because of the very real possibility that plaintiffs suffered adverse action in truth not because of any offense th ey committed, but because they crossed paths with government officials who opposed their political beliefs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "706 F.3d 1188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact",
		"context": "2d at 1069 ; Henneberry, 2017 WL 1493006. In resolving on the merits of a claim that a government official retaliated against speech opposing him politically, the court must be able to consider whether the government targeted the speech because of its message. See First Nat 'l Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Constitutional-avoidance principles provide no basis to disregard the Anti-Injunction Act's text",
		"context": "It has be en settled for more than a century that post -payment review satisfies due process. See G.M. Leasing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] at 276-286. \"[M]ere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate.\" Phil lips, 283 U.S. at 596 -597.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Constitutional-avoidance principles provide no basis to disregard the Anti-Injunction Act's text",
		"context": "But petitioner need not violate that pro-vision in order to incur a penalty and bring a refund suit. \"Willfulness\" in Section 7203 \"requires the Govern- ment to prove that the law imposed a duty on the de- fendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Although willfulness does not require \"evil intent,\" 429 U.S. 10 , a taxpayer does not \" 'willfully ' \" violate the Code by failing to report information based on a \"good -faith belief \" that the reporting requirement do es not apply if it discloses that belief to the IRS in a timely return . Cheek , 498 U.S. at 202, 206; see 305 U.S. 255 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Constitutional-avoidance principles provide no basis to disregard the Anti-Injunction Act's text",
		"context": "\"Willfulness\" in Section 7203 \"requires the Govern- ment to prove that the law imposed a duty on the de- fendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.\" 498 U.S. 192 . Although willfulness does not require \"evil intent,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , a taxpayer does not \" 'willfully ' \" violate the Code by failing to report information based on a \"good -faith belief \" that the reporting requirement do es not apply if it discloses that belief to the IRS in a timely return . Cheek , 498 U.S. at 202, 206; see 305 U.S. 255 . The Code does not make it a crime to take those steps in order to pursue the avenue of judicial re-view that Congress has established and made exclusive .",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Constitutional-avoidance principles provide no basis to disregard the Anti-Injunction Act's text",
		"context": "498 U.S. 192 . Although willfulness does not require \"evil intent,\" 429 U.S. 10 , a taxpayer does not \" 'willfully ' \" violate the Code by failing to report information based on a \"good -faith belief \" that the reporting requirement do es not apply if it discloses that belief to the IRS in a timely return . Cheek , 498 U.S. at 202, 206; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Code does not make it a crime to take those steps in order to pursue the avenue of judicial re-view that Congress has established and made exclusive . A taxpayer who believes that it is not legally required to report specific information , but knows that the IRS has taken a different view, may file a return stating that it is omitting the information on that basis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Constitutional-avoidance principles provide no basis to disregard the Anti-Injunction Act's text",
		"context": "A taxpayer who believes that it is not legally required to report specific information , but knows that the IRS has taken a different view, may file a return stating that it is omitting the information on that basis. Cf . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, if petitioner follows that course, it \"take [s] the risk of being wrong\" and incurring a pen- alty that it might have avoided if it had received an ad- vance judicial ruling that Notice 2016 -66 is valid . Cheek , 47 498 U.S. at 206.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN HABEAS, IT IS NOT SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE.",
		"context": "37–47. In Panetti v. Quarterman , this Court explained that \"[t]he phrase 'second or successive' is not self-defining\" and does not \"refer[] to all § 2254 applications filed second or successively in time, even when the later filing addresses a state-court judgment already challenged in a prior § 2254 application.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, to determine whether a subsequent habeas petition is second or successive, this Court assesses first whether the claim would have constituted an abuse of the writ under the common law pre-AEDPA, and second whether allowing the petition is consistent with AEDPA's purposes. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 930",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN HABEAS, IT IS NOT SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE.",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 41 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Respondents contend that AEDPA codified a pre- AEDPA common-law rule that any later-in-time petition was \"second or successive.\" Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN HABEAS, IT IS NOT SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE.",
		"context": "This Court's cases reject that position—because no such rule existed. As the Court explained in Magwood v. Patterson , \"pre-AEDPA cases cannot affirmatively define the phrase 'second or successive' as it appears in AEDPA\"; in fact, \"Congress did not even apply the phrase 'second or successive' to applications filed by state prisoners until it enacted AEDPA.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Id. \"In light of this complex history of the phrase 'second or successive,'\" the Court \"rel[ies] 20 upon the current text to determine when the phrase applies, rather than pre-AEDPA precedents or superseded statutory formulations.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN HABEAS, IT IS NOT SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE.",
		"context": "at 8–9. That petition, filed in 2013, necessarily did not raise the as-applied allegations that Nance learned of in 2019, and yet the district court still held that it was premature. 9 Respondents suggest [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] held all previously unripe claims are \"second or successive\" when brought in subsequent habeas petitions. Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Founding-Era Practice And The Convention Debates Refute Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": ". Founding-era state practice and the debates at the Constitutional Convention confirm the Framers' un- derstanding that state constitutions would constrain state legislatures' regulation of congressional elec- tions—evidence that merits great weight when as- sessing the Constitution's meaning. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; NLRB v.Noel Canning , 573 U.S. 513; District of 554 U.S. 570. 29 1. The Articles of Confederation provided that dele- gates to the Confederation Congress \"shall be annu- ally appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Founding-Era Practice And The Convention Debates Refute Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": ". Founding-era state practice and the debates at the Constitutional Convention confirm the Framers' un- derstanding that state constitutions would constrain state legislatures' regulation of congressional elec- tions—evidence that merits great weight when as- sessing the Constitution's meaning. See 17 U.S. 316; NLRB v.Noel Canning , 573 U.S. 513; District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 29 1. The Articles of Confederation provided that dele- gates to the Confederation Congress \"shall be annu- ally appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Founding-Era Practice And The Convention Debates Refute Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "Had the Fram- ers contemplated eliminating constraints on state leg- islatures that are so fundamental to the constitutional structure and that existed under the Articles of Con- federation, someone would have said something. 31 Their silence \"is most instructive.\" Alden v.Maine , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Early state practice confirms that the founding generation did not share Petitioners' interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Founding-Era Practice And The Convention Debates Refute Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "If the Elections Clause prohibited States from im- posing constitutional constraints on state legislatures' regulation of congressional elections, then a superma- jority of the early state constitutions contained provi- sions that were unconstitutional. The States' \"regular course of practice\" should \"settle the meaning of\" the Elections Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting Letter to S. Roane (Sept. 2, 12 Act of Feb. 11, 1799, § 1, 1799 Ga. Acts 91, 91; Act of Dec. 21, 1799, ch. LXXV, §§ 3, 14, 1800 Ky. Acts 154, 155-56, 168-69. 13See Hayward H. Smith, Revisiting the History of the Independ- ent State Legislature Doctrine , 53 S T.MARY'S L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Founding-Era Practice And The Convention Debates Refute Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "IV, § 30. 38 original meaning. Cf.Bostock v.Clayton County , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] a proposed 1821 amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution that would have required the creation of districts for con- gressional elections. But Justice Story's constitu- tional objection turned on his belief that the amend- ment would require the Legislature \"to surrender all discretion\" over redistricting. J OURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES , CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 60 (1821) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": ". Congress adopted the requirement, embodied in section 411(a), that authors of U.S. works register those works before filing infringement actions, not to benefit defendants ( i.e., potential infringers), but instead to serve \"broader public and governmental interests[.]\" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, at 11, Reed Elsevier, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is to incentivize depositing copies of works for the collection of the Library of Congress. B RUCE KELLER & JEFFREY CUNARD , C OPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER 'S GUIDE § 5:3 (Keith Voelker, 2d ed. 2017) (citing legislative history).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": "20 These deposits not only enable the Library to serve as the nation's leading archive of published works, but also provide valuable evidence in litigation. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]895 F.3d 1106; Data Gen. 36 F.3d 1147, abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 (concluding that a reconstruction, created without direct access to the original, \"cannot constitute a 'copy' sufficient to satisfy the deposit copy requirement\", and \"[s]ubmissi on of a reconstruction with a copyright registration application results in an incomplete application\"); 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, affirmed297 F. App'x 976. This purpose is fully vindicated by the Application Rule. So long as plaintiffs continue to file registration applications prior to filing lawsuits, as they must under the Application Rule, the Library will continue to receive depo sits for its collections and litigants and courts will continue to have access to deposit copies during litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 1150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": "20 These deposits not only enable the Library to serve as the nation's leading archive of published works, but also provide valuable evidence in litigation. See, e.g. , 885 F.3d 1150895 F.3d 1106; Data Gen. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 (concluding that a reconstruction, created without direct access to the original, \"cannot constitute a 'copy' sufficient to satisfy the deposit copy requirement\", and \"[s]ubmissi on of a reconstruction with a copyright registration application results in an incomplete application\"); 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, affirmed297 F. App'x 976. This purpose is fully vindicated by the Application Rule. So long as plaintiffs continue to file registration applications prior to filing lawsuits, as they must under the Application Rule, the Library will continue to receive depo sits for its collections and litigants and courts will continue to have access to deposit copies during litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 F.3d 1147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": "20 These deposits not only enable the Library to serve as the nation's leading archive of published works, but also provide valuable evidence in litigation. See, e.g. , 885 F.3d 1150895 F.3d 1106; Data Gen. 36 F.3d 1147, abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (concluding that a reconstruction, created without direct access to the original, \"cannot constitute a 'copy' sufficient to satisfy the deposit copy requirement\", and \"[s]ubmissi on of a reconstruction with a copyright registration application results in an incomplete application\"); 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, affirmed297 F. App'x 976. This purpose is fully vindicated by the Application Rule. So long as plaintiffs continue to file registration applications prior to filing lawsuits, as they must under the Application Rule, the Library will continue to receive depo sits for its collections and litigants and courts will continue to have access to deposit copies during litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": "20 These deposits not only enable the Library to serve as the nation's leading archive of published works, but also provide valuable evidence in litigation. See, e.g. , 885 F.3d 1150895 F.3d 1106; Data Gen. 36 F.3d 1147, abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 (concluding that a reconstruction, created without direct access to the original, \"cannot constitute a 'copy' sufficient to satisfy the deposit copy requirement\", and \"[s]ubmissi on of a reconstruction with a copyright registration application results in an incomplete application\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], affirmed297 F. App'x 976. This purpose is fully vindicated by the Application Rule. So long as plaintiffs continue to file registration applications prior to filing lawsuits, as they must under the Application Rule, the Library will continue to receive depo sits for its collections and litigants and courts will continue to have access to deposit copies during litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 F. Supp. 2d 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": "20 These deposits not only enable the Library to serve as the nation's leading archive of published works, but also provide valuable evidence in litigation. See, e.g. , 885 F.3d 1150895 F.3d 1106; Data Gen. 36 F.3d 1147, abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 (concluding that a reconstruction, created without direct access to the original, \"cannot constitute a 'copy' sufficient to satisfy the deposit copy requirement\", and \"[s]ubmissi on of a reconstruction with a copyright registration application results in an incomplete application\"); 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, affirmed[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This purpose is fully vindicated by the Application Rule. So long as plaintiffs continue to file registration applications prior to filing lawsuits, as they must under the Application Rule, the Library will continue to receive depo sits for its collections and litigants and courts will continue to have access to deposit copies during litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 F. App'x 976",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
		"context": "Supporters of the Certificate Rule maintain that Sections 507(b) and 411(a), considered together, \"reflect a statutory plan to encourage registration.\" See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, other provisions in the copyright law, including increased available remedies and prima facie evidence for timely certificates, are more effective incentives to register early. E.g., 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 1338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Text, History, And Tradition Confirm That The Second Amendment Guarantees A Right To Carry Handguns Outside The Home For Self-Defense",
		"context": "19. I t prohibits people from carrying handguns for self -defense anywhere unless and until they can persuade an \"official, high or petty ,\" W. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that they have a non-speculative nee d that distinguishes them from the bulk of \"the people\" textually guaranteed the same right. Petr.Br.14 -18. While the state claims that petitioners may carry their handguns for \"self -defense in 'back country' areas,\" Resp.Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Text, History, And Tradition Confirm That The Second Amendment Guarantees A Right To Carry Handguns Outside The Home For Self-Defense",
		"context": "S ee, e.g. , Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U .S. 370, 3 79-82 (1996) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After all, it wa s those Reports— cursory or otherwise—not any additional detail or obscure source s unearthed centuries later, that informed the original public meaning of the Second Amendment on state court system) and sought and was denied a right to carry for self -defense more broadly. J.A.114.",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 U.S. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Text, History, And Tradition Confirm That The Second Amendment Guarantees A Right To Carry Handguns Outside The Home For Self-Defense",
		"context": "Moreover, the state continues to ignore the authority that cuts against it . Patrick Henry went 11 armed in town on his way to court in early America , John Adams defended the right to go armed in Boston , and Thomas Jefferson requested that arms be brought to him in the District. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By the state's lights, all of these founding fathers were scofflaws. Straying even further afield, the state invokes rules about when firearms could be used for self- defense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "187 F.Supp.3d 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Text, History, And Tradition Confirm That The Second Amendment Guarantees A Right To Carry Handguns Outside The Home For Self-Defense",
		"context": "20-25 (collecting laws). The se laws thus reinforced the understanding that th e people had a baseline right to carry arms, and that only abuse of that right could justify its 12 restriction . Pet r.Br.32; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The state claims that a surety could be demanded of anyone who sought to carry a firearm in a public place because \"background law provided that merely carrying firearms in populous areas breached the peace. \" Resp.Br.27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE SSA'S INTERPRETATION DOES NOT WARRANT DEFERENCE",
		"context": "ce applied under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ARGUMENT I. THE UNIFORMED-SERVICES EXCEPTION APPLIES TO DUAL-STATUS TECHNICIANS.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Who Purchase Directly From An Antitrust Violator Can Seek Damages From That Violator",
		"context": "1. The rule of Illinois Brick traces back to Hanover Shoe, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, in a suit by a shoe manufacturer (Hanover) against an allegedly monopolistic lessor of shoe manufacturing equipment (United), the Court held that United could not defend the claim by assert- ing a \"passing-on defense\" – that is, by contending that Hanover was undamaged (or less da maged) because it recovered any unlawful overcharge by pass- ing that charge on to its own customers. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Who Purchase Directly From An Antitrust Violator Can Seek Damages From That Violator",
		"context": "The Hanover Shoe Court gave three reasons for permitting Hanover to recover the entire overcharge on its direct purchases from the antitrust violator. One reason sounded in precedent, and two in policy. The precedential reason was that, dating back at least to Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"[a] person whose property is diminish ed by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property\" within the meaning of the antitrust laws. Id. at 396, quoted 20 in Hanover Shoe , 392 U.S. at 490.",
		"citation_value_orig": "203 U.S. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Who Purchase Directly From An Antitrust Violator Can Seek Damages From That Violator",
		"context": "at 490 n.8 (\"'The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.'\") (quoting Southern Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The policy reasons given for rejecting United's passing-on defense in Hanover Shoe included a problem of trial proof and a proble m of incentives. The trial-proof problem was that, because of the \"wide range of factors [that] influence a company's pricing policies,\" the \"task\" of proving that the plaintiff had passed on a specific, quantifiable part of the defendant's overcharge would, the Court believed, \"normally prove insurmountable.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Who Purchase Directly From An Antitrust Violator Can Seek Damages From That Violator",
		"context": "at 745-47. 3. This Court returned to the Illinois Brick rule in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an action by the State of Kansas alleging that suppliers of natural gas had conspired to fix the price of their product. Th e suppliers had sold the gas to utility companies, which in turn sold it to consumers 23 (represented by Kansas as parens patriae ). The suppliers contended that th e consumers (like Illinois in Illinois Brick ) were only indirect purchasers of natural gas and that the action for the entire over- charge belonged exclusively to the utilities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "While injunctions can prohibit particular acts or practice s, they can also mandate specific actions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A leading legal scholar on remedies has written, \"The injunction is a 9 personal command to the defendant to act or to avoid acting in a certain way.\" Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies: Damages – Equity – Restitution 2 (1973) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "588 (1785) . 3 Plaintiffs bringing suits for breach of contractual and regulatory duties can, under particular circumstance s, obtain specific performance of the breaching party's obligations . See L Series, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 10 obtained —specific performance—functions as mandatory, permanent injunctive relief\"). The mandatory injunction is an established remedy in American judicial tribunals .",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 S.W.3d 864",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "In an 1892 decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated, \"It is now settled that injunctions are not only, as is usually the case, preventive or prohibitory, but also mandatory, commanding positive, affirmative action to be taken or done by the defendant, as mandamus does at law.\" City of 16 S.E. 514 . See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Expansive mandatory injunctions played a central role in the federal attack on Jim Crow in the South and racial segregation across the nation. See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Civ il Rights Injunction (1978) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Civ il Rights Injunction (1978) . For instance, in following up on its landmark 1954 case invalidating racial discrimination in public educati on, the Supreme Court directed district courts to \"enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In antitrust law, p rivate litigants can obtain mandatory injunctions to cure the effects of the defendant's exclusionary or other unfair competitive conduct. Under the Clayton Act, \"any person, fir m, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, .",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "§ 26. In private antitrust suits, injunctive relief under the Clayton Act includes prohibitory and mandatory orders . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the American Stores Court held that Section 16, authorizing injunctive relief , permits the court- ordered sale or transfer of business assets. The Court wrote that the divestiture of business property \"is a form of 'injunctive relief' within the meaning of § 16 of the Clayton Act.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "In int erpreting and applying the Clayton Act , the federal courts have crafted a wide range of mandatory orders . For example, t he Supreme Court ordered the New York Stock Exchange to reconnect the wire service of a broker whose membership it had improperly termin ated. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In a case involving exclusionary patent licensing practices , the Court directed the liable parties to withdraw from patent pools. Zenith Radio 395 U.S. 100 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "373 U.S. 341 . In a case involving exclusionary patent licensing practices , the Court directed the liable parties to withdraw from patent pools. Zenith Radio [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The lower courts have crafted a variety of mandatory i njunctions in private antitrust litigation. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "See, e.g. , New York ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Mandatory injunctions include orders to turn over improperly acquired property. As the Supreme Court wrote, \"[n]othing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an injunction than the recovery of that which has been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the necessity f or injunctive relief.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "787 F.3d 638",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "Federal and state courts have customarily issued injunctions ordering the defendant to return property to its rightful owner or transfer it to the government. In an 1893 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction ordering a sheriff to return property to a court receiver. Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . State courts in the nineteenth ce ntury ordered defendants to return or give up property they had wrongly obtained. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
		"context": "So, it will be granted to restrain the transfer of diamond s or other valuables, where the rightful owner may be in danger of losing them.\"). In an 1824 ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction directing a state government to return funds that it had unlawfully taken from the Bank of the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Osborn decision was by no means exceptional. Other courts similarly issued and affirmed injunctions directing the return of funds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The 1946 amendments ensured that Rule 60(b)(1) would reach mistakes made by courts",
		"context": "36) reveal a pre -1946 \"split over whether opposing or third -party mistakes qualify as 'mistake[s]' \" under Rule 60(b). But petitioner iden- tifies no evidence that the Committee was focused on that asserted conflict, and neither of the decisions that he cites expressly held that an opposing or third -party mistake was grounds for relief under the pre -1946 ver- sion of Rule 60(b). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And in any event, the text and history of the 1946 amendment make clear that it was not limited to that scenario, but instead permitted relief based on anyone 's mistake. At bottom, the Rule is directed at \"material\" mistakes, Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "47 F. Supp. 1004",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. Other Provisions of the FAA Confirm that There Is No textual Basis for a Prejudice Requirement",
		"context": "\"If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue[.]\"). These repeated pairings make clear that \"default in proceeding,\" \"failure to comply\" with the arbitration agreement, and \"failure, neglect, or refusal to perform\" the arbitration agreement all mean the same thing under § 4. In accordance with the presumption that \"when Congress uses a term in multiple places within a single statute, the term bears a consistent meaning throughout[,]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the term \"default in proceeding with such arbitration\" in § 3 should be understood to mean \"failure, neglect or refusal to proceed with the arbitration.\" 16 Thus, Congress gave courts applying § 3 of the FAA a straightfo rward question to answer, divorced from any considerations of prejudice or detrimental reliance: Has the applicant for the § 3 16 Of course, in § 4 the \"party al leged to be in default\" is not the same party bringing the motion to compel, whereas in § 3 the default inquiry is being asked about \"the applicant for the stay.\" But, as this Court has observed, \"it is inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to differ depending upon\" whether a stay under § 3 or specific performance under § 4 is being sought.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act \"Modified\" section 841(b)(1)(C)",
		"context": "2019) (\"to make somewhat different; to make small changes to (something) by way of improvement, 17 suitability, or effectiveness\"); see also 982 F.3d 463. Congress used the term \"modify\" in section 404(a) of the First Step Act, and there is no reason to infer that it meant some- thing different. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The history of § 404 of the First Step Act reinforces this point. The earliest versions of what would become § 404 all used the word \"modify\" instead of \"amend\" in the relevant passage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "(emphasis added). Because of that rule, \"trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that 22 country's statutory scheme.\" Person's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T rademark protection in one country thus does not confer the right to control the mark 's use in other countries . Instead, trade- mark protection within a given country must come from — and be enforced under —the laws of that country alone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "900 F.2d 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "1. This Court recognized that principle long ago, re - fusing to apply for eign trademark law to U.S. conduct . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a French law seizing the Carthusian monks' \"Char - treuse\" trademarks \"cannot be conceived to have any extra -territorial effect to detach the trade- marks in this country from the products of the monks.\" Id. at 596 (em - phasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 U.S. 580",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "Id. at 596 (em - phasis added). The Court cemented that rule in A. Bourjois & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], often considered the definitive adop tion of the territoriality principle. 5 Mc Carthy §29:1 n.4. In Katzel , the plaintiff had obtained U.S. trademarks for \"Java\" and \"Bourjois\" face powder from a French compa ny, which retained equiva lent French trademarks.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 689",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "Conversely, this Court has held that U.S. trademark rights do not extend to foreign coun tries. In Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. , the plaintiff was a cigar -maker in the Philippines (then a U.S. territory) ; however, the U.S. govern ment seized its business and trademarks in the 23 Philippines and sold them to the defendant. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1927 ). The plaintiff later successfully sued the defen - dant for trademark infrin gement in Hong Kong. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "273 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "Ibid. U.S. courts have ac knowledged th e territori ality principle ever since—that \"trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.\" Fuji Photo Film [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 5 See Societe Des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d 633406 F.3d 577. 24 The c ourts below effectively read the Lanham Act to overturn that longstanding principle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "754 F.2d 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "U.S. courts have ac knowledged th e territori ality principle ever since—that \"trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.\" Fuji Photo Film 754 F.2d 591. 5 5 See Societe Des Produits Nestle, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]406 F.3d 577. 24 The c ourts below effectively read the Lanham Act to overturn that longstanding principle. If Congress had meant to overturn the rule that U.S. trademarks are territorial and do not confer \"the exclusive right to use the trade -marks in\" other countries , Ingenoh l, 273 U.S. at 544, there would be some indication in the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "U.S. courts have ac knowledged th e territori ality principle ever since—that \"trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.\" Fuji Photo Film 754 F.2d 591. 5 5 See Societe Des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d 633[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 The c ourts below effectively read the Lanham Act to overturn that longstanding principle. If Congress had meant to overturn the rule that U.S. trademarks are territorial and do not confer \"the exclusive right to use the trade -marks in\" other countries , Ingenoh l, 273 U.S. at 544, there would be some indication in the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 F.3d 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "Brad ley 520-525, 536 -545. U.S. patent laws \"do not, and were not intended to, oper - ate beyond the limits of the United States. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Microsoft 550 U.S. 437. \"[C]opyright protec tions\" likewise \" 'do not have any ex- traterritorial operation .'\" Im pres sion Prod ucts, 137 S. Ct. 1523.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "Brad ley 520-525, 536 -545. U.S. patent laws \"do not, and were not intended to, oper - ate beyond the limits of the United States. \" 60 U.S. 183; see Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[C]opyright protec tions\" likewise \" 'do not have any ex- traterritorial operation .'\" Im pres sion Prod ucts, 137 S. Ct. 1523.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "60 U.S. 183; see Microsoft 550 U.S. 437. \"[C]opyright protec tions\" likewise \" 'do not have any ex- traterritorial operation .'\" Im pres sion Prod ucts, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Trademarks, this Court has recognized, should have no broader territorial scope. Katzel , 260 U.S. at 692 (analo - gizing trademarks' territori al scope to patents').",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "art. I, §8, cl. 8; Trade-Mark Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would be upside- down for trademarks to have broader territori al scope than patents or copyrights . Bradley 539, 570-572.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
		"context": "133 U.S. 697; see 5 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §17.05[A] (2022). It is precisely because the U.S. \" patent system makes no claim to extra terri torial effect\" that the United States can \"correspond ingly reject the claims of others to such con trol over our markets.\" Deepsouth Packing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The same is true here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits judicial review of a \"final order of removal.\"",
		"context": "B. In resolving this question of statutory construc- tion, there is a \"strong presumption that Congress in-tends judicial review of administrative action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While Sec- tion 1252(a)(2)(C) reflects an intent to strip jurisdiction as to some aspects of immigration proceedings, this weighty presumption caution s against reading it be- yond the clear bounds of the statutory text. That pre-sumption is especially appropriate here, where an er- roneous agency denial means that the United States sends an individual to a country where he or she is likely to be tortured.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "First , and of note, the State fa ils to identify a single case in which an attorney made the purposeful, high- risk decision to not bring a claim in state court, gam- bling that the lawyer for the client in the federal habeas proceeding would be able to get the claim before the federal court through the Martinez gateway. Instead, the State's position depends on a partial dissent from the Ninth Circuit, see Br. 37 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and a training document created by a single attorney in 2008, before Martinez was even de- cided, which in no way advi ses attorneys to withhold a claim in state court until federal habeas proceedings, see id. By contrast, the ABA Guidelines, which are \"a feature at every defense-training seminar,\" advise re-peatedly and emphatically that claims should be raised and evidence presented at the earliest possible oppor- tunity. 14 The ABA—which represents lawyers with experience in federal habeas proceedings and capital punishment litigation—is not aware of evidence that this type of unethical attorney misconduct arises either.",
		"citation_value_orig": "740 F.3d 1302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "at 1030. 17 applicable rules of professional conduct provides the appropriate remedy for any unethical acts by the law- yer. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The disci pline system in the U.S. is professionalized and well-equipped to handle such mat-ters if and when they arise. The ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement describe the sanctions available for attorney misconduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "Second, the notion that this Court would interpret a statute based on an unfounded, far-reaching, and il-logical assumption about how bad actors might behave is foreign to our legal system. All lawyers, as officers of the court, are presumed to act ethically, including de- fense counsel and prosecutors. See Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[Attorneys] are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair pri-vate character … . In this court the fact of the admis- sion of such officers in the highest court of the States to which they respectively belong, for three years preced- ing their application, in regarded as sufficient evidence 22 ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R. 10 (2020). 18 of the possession of the requi site legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair.",
		"citation_value_orig": "71 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "In this court the fact of the admis- sion of such officers in the highest court of the States to which they respectively belong, for three years preced- ing their application, in regarded as sufficient evidence 22 ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R. 10 (2020). 18 of the possession of the requi site legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with this presum ption of good faith and faithful execution of a lawyer's duties, the Court should not interpret a statute to resolve hypothetical concerns such as those posited here by the State. It would be particularly ironic to do so here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. Martinez only applies to \"the default of a single claim—ineffective assistance of trial counsel—in a single context.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 In short, \"the Martinez test is not a simple one. \"23 To access relief under Martinez , a petitioner must es- tablish four elements concerning his or her defaulted claim: (1) the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is \"substantial\"24; (2) the state post-conviction counsel was ineffective or there was no post-conviction counsel; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the \"initial\" review proceeding in respect to the ineffec- tive assistance of trial counsel claim; and (4) state law requires that the claim be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2058",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "466 U.S. at 687- 696. Strickland 's demanding standard is notoriously difficult to win. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (describing Strickland as \"a formidable obstacle to defendants alleging that they were deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel\"). 25 King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 Yale L.J. 2428, 2432-2433 (2013).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "\"29 Finally , even if, as the State incorrectly suggests, the decision to withhold a claim in state court to raise it for the first time in federal habeas could be considered strategic, such a decision would not qualify as ineffec- tive assistance of counsel under Strickland's first prong (deficient performance) and thus would not amount to cause to excuse the default. In federal habeas proceed- ings, courts will not entertain claims that were proce-durally defaulted, but procedural defaults can be ex- cused by a showing of \"cause and prejudice.\" Wain- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The cause and prejudice necessary to overcome a procedural default is satisfied by ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "information regarding the consequences and risks the proposed treatment would have for the child. Id. (\"encompassed within the independent duty flowing between the doctor and infant in utero is the obligation of the physician to obtain informed consent from the parent\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 372 N.J.Super. 368; 87 N.C.App. 88. Other cases have recognized this two-patient concept in other malpractice contexts. See, e.g., 2 Cal.4th 1064; Ob-Gyn Associates of 259 Ga. 663.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 F.3d 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "information regarding the consequences and risks the proposed treatment would have for the child. Id. (\"encompassed within the independent duty flowing between the doctor and infant in utero is the obligation of the physician to obtain informed consent from the parent\"); see also 284 F.3d 293; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 87 N.C.App. 88. Other cases have recognized this two-patient concept in other malpractice contexts. See, e.g., 2 Cal.4th 1064; Ob-Gyn Associates of 259 Ga. 663.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 N.J.Super. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "information regarding the consequences and risks the proposed treatment would have for the child. Id. (\"encompassed within the independent duty flowing between the doctor and infant in utero is the obligation of the physician to obtain informed consent from the parent\"); see also 284 F.3d 293; 372 N.J.Super. 368; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other cases have recognized this two-patient concept in other malpractice contexts. See, e.g., 2 Cal.4th 1064; Ob-Gyn Associates of 259 Ga. 663.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 N.C.App. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "(\"encompassed within the independent duty flowing between the doctor and infant in utero is the obligation of the physician to obtain informed consent from the parent\"); see also 284 F.3d 293; 372 N.J.Super. 368; 87 N.C.App. 88. Other cases have recognized this two-patient concept in other malpractice contexts. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ob-Gyn Associates of 259 Ga. 663. See, also, In re387 N.W.2d 42. 18 In the context of adoption, every effort is made to protect the mother's constitutional liberty interest in maintaining her relationship with her child – termination of the mother's rights is treated as the last option, and every effort is made to insure that the mother has every opportunity to avoid waiving her constitutional right to keep her child.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 Cal.4th 1064",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "(\"encompassed within the independent duty flowing between the doctor and infant in utero is the obligation of the physician to obtain informed consent from the parent\"); see also 284 F.3d 293; 372 N.J.Super. 368; 87 N.C.App. 88. Other cases have recognized this two-patient concept in other malpractice contexts. See, e.g., 2 Cal.4th 1064; Ob-Gyn Associates of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, also, In re387 N.W.2d 42. 18 In the context of adoption, every effort is made to protect the mother's constitutional liberty interest in maintaining her relationship with her child – termination of the mother's rights is treated as the last option, and every effort is made to insure that the mother has every opportunity to avoid waiving her constitutional right to keep her child.",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 Ga. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "Other cases have recognized this two-patient concept in other malpractice contexts. See, e.g., 2 Cal.4th 1064; Ob-Gyn Associates of 259 Ga. 663. See, also, In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 In the context of adoption, every effort is made to protect the mother's constitutional liberty interest in maintaining her relationship with her child – termination of the mother's rights is treated as the last option, and every effort is made to insure that the mother has every opportunity to avoid waiving her constitutional right to keep her child. For instance, under South Dakota's adoption laws, the petition which represents the waiver by a mother of her rights cannot be filed, at the earliest, until five days after the birth of her child.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 N.W.2d 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "25-5A-9. That court must determine that the consent is knowing, informed and voluntary. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the Matter of J.M.J. 368 N.W. 2d 602 the S.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 N.W.2d 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "See,294 N.W.2d 423. In the Matter of J.M.J. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the S.D. Supreme Court ruled that a judgment terminating a mother's rights should be vacated, even if the trial court found that her decision was informed and voluntary, if the record does not support the court's finding. The law even allows the mother under certain circumstances to withdraw her consent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 N.W. 2d 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child",
		"context": "Supreme Court ruled that a judgment terminating a mother's rights should be vacated, even if the trial court found that her decision was informed and voluntary, if the record does not support the court's finding. The law even allows the mother under certain circumstances to withdraw her consent. In Matter of Everett , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in the adoption context a mother must be fully counseled about how she can keep her child, cannot give up her rights until after the birth of her child, and her rights cannot be terminated except by a court order entered by a judge following a hearing in which the court concludes, upon an adequate record, that the mother's waiver of her rights was informed, knowing and voluntary. California has similar protections for women in the adoption context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 N.W.2d 810",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS FORMULATION OF \"EXACTING SCRUTINY\" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND UNDULY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT",
		"context": ". The First Amendmentdoes not protect the government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In securing expressive activities from governmental interference,the First Amendment's protections hence \"do[] notleave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige \" and are not limited \"only to categories of speech that survive an adhoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.\"559 U.S. 460. In other words, a citizen need not justify his expressiveor associational activities to the government (or, forthat matter, to the courts); rather, the governmentmust prove that regulatory encumbrances on suchactivities are no greater than necessary to advance acompelling public interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS FORMULATION OF \"EXACTING SCRUTINY\" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND UNDULY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT",
		"context": "The First Amendmentdoes not protect the government.\" 572 U.S. 185. In securing expressive activities from governmental interference,the First Amendment's protections hence \"do[] notleave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige \" and are not limited \"only to categories of speech that survive an adhoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.\"[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, a citizen need not justify his expressiveor associational activities to the government (or, forthat matter, to the courts); rather, the governmentmust prove that regulatory encumbrances on suchactivities are no greater than necessary to advance acompelling public interest. The second is a recognition that the compelled disclosure of associational information can be just aspernicious to First Amendment freedoms as directprohibitions on protected speech or conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS FORMULATION OF \"EXACTING SCRUTINY\" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND UNDULY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT",
		"context": "In other words, a citizen need not justify his expressiveor associational activities to the government (or, forthat matter, to the courts); rather, the governmentmust prove that regulatory encumbrances on suchactivities are no greater than necessary to advance acompelling public interest. The second is a recognition that the compelled disclosure of associational information can be just aspernicious to First Amendment freedoms as directprohibitions on protected speech or conduct. See NAACP , 357 U.S. at 462 (acknowledging that \"[i]nvioability of privacy in group association may inmany circumstances be indispensable to preservationof freedom of association\"); 5 U.S. 60[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The confluence of these two principles has impelled this Court to affirm that governmentally imposedburdens on the right of association may be sustainedonly by means \"closely drawn to avoid unnecessaryabridgement of associational freedoms.\" In re436 U.S. 412.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS FORMULATION OF \"EXACTING SCRUTINY\" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND UNDULY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT",
		"context": "See NAACP , 357 U.S. at 462 (acknowledging that \"[i]nvioability of privacy in group association may inmany circumstances be indispensable to preservationof freedom of association\"); 5 U.S. 60333 F.3d 168. The confluence of these two principles has impelled this Court to affirm that governmentally imposedburdens on the right of association may be sustainedonly by means \"closely drawn to avoid unnecessaryabridgement of associational freedoms.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contrary to these settled precepts, the Ninth Circuit brushed aside sworn testimony from multiplewitnesses attesting that the Petitioner has lost—andwill continue to lose—financial support as a directconsequence of California's regulatory mandate thatthe Petitioner disclose to the state's Attorney General the identities of its major donors. See Americans for Prosperity 903 F.3d 1000.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS FORMULATION OF \"EXACTING SCRUTINY\" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND UNDULY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT",
		"context": "In re436 U.S. 412. Contrary to these settled precepts, the Ninth Circuit brushed aside sworn testimony from multiplewitnesses attesting that the Petitioner has lost—andwill continue to lose—financial support as a directconsequence of California's regulatory mandate thatthe Petitioner disclose to the state's Attorney General the identities of its major donors. See Americans for Prosperity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that \" some individuals who have or would support the plaintiffs may be deterred 6 from contributing\" did not, according to the court, establish the requisite substantial burden on FirstAmendment rights. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 1000",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Does Not Contain A But-For Causation Requirement",
		"context": "While \"based on\" may connote but-for causation in some circumstances, the meaning of that phrase ultimately turns on the context in which it is used and its position within the provision as a whole. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, \"based on\" modifies only the word \"discrimination.\" In cont ext, the function of the phrase is to identify the type of discrimination prohibited by the provision— i.e., discrimination based on age.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Does Not Contain A But-For Causation Requirement",
		"context": "of Tex. Southwest Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That argument likewise misses the mark. Congress is free to deviate from any \"default rule[]\" by including \"an indication to the contrary in the statute.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. South Dakota's economic nexus thresholds are not sufficient to prevent the imposition of undue burdens on multistate and international sellers of property and services",
		"context": "Forty -five S tates, the District of Columbia, and thousands of municipalities, counties, and specia l taxing districts impose sales and use taxes. In Quill , this Court determined that the threat of complying with 6,000 taxing jurisdictions imposed a burden on interstate commerce. Quill [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since Quill , the number of 7 jurisdictions has increased to nearly 10,000.2 Contrary to South Dakota's suggestion, complying with the requirements of each one of these jurisdictions is not a s simple as plugging an address into a piece of software. That might identify a tax rate, but it will not help a retailer deal with the wide variation in taxability, interpretation, and administration that exists among taxing jurisdictions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. South Dakota's economic nexus thresholds are not sufficient to prevent the imposition of undue burdens on multistate and international sellers of property and services",
		"context": "13 average sale is $10 has nexus with South Dakota with sales of only $2,000 .) But unless this Court is willing to set a bright -line standard that definitively protects sma ll businesses, the elimination of Quill 's physical -presence standard will create a race to the bottom. Given the opportunity, the States will turn \"substantial nexus\" under Complete Auto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1977 ), into nothing more than constitutional due process, under which any directed commercial activity (maybe even one sale over the internet) provides a State the power to tax. Use tax collection in all 10,000 -plus jurisdictions could become the de facto rule . That is a rule that small - and medium -sized online retailers cannot bear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Courts Applying Common Law Consistently Limited Employers' Obligations to Employees, Excluding Independent Contractors",
		"context": "Common law prior to the FAA's enactment con- sistently regarded \"independent contractors\" and \"employees\" as mutually exclusive categories. \"[T]he distinction between employees and independent con- tractors has deep roots in our legal tradition.\" O'Hare Truck Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Pittsburgh Valve Foundry & Const. 32 F.2d 436. The issue often arose because the common law cabined respondeat superior liability for negligence torts to a principal's employees, excluding independent contractors and their employees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 712",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FOR STAY RELIEF IS IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE",
		"context": "The text of the Judicial Code supports the conclu- sion that orders conclusively resolving motions for re-lief from the automatic stay are immediately appealable as of right. And this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is in accord. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. These state prosecutions conflict with comprehensive federal law",
		"context": "Ibid. Likewise, the Court held preempted efforts by a State to bar from state business repeat violators of the National Labor Relations Act. Wisconsin Dep't of In- dus., Labor & Human [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"'[C]onflict is imminent,'\" Gould held, whenever \"'two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity'\" that is carefully regulated by the federal government, even when a State seeks to pro-vide \"judicial remedies for conduct prohibited\" by fed- eral law. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. These state prosecutions conflict with comprehensive federal law",
		"context": "In any event, \"[p]re- emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.\" Gei- er, 529 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.\"). Additionally, \"the Court has never before required a specific, formal agency statement identifying conflict in order to conclude that such a conflict in fact exists\" ( Geier , 529 U.S. at 884), and it has previously found federal preemption even when the United States argued against it (see 136 S. Ct. 936139 S. Ct. 1919. That is, \"States may not legis late with the purpose and effect of regulating a fede rally preempted field,\" never mind that the regulations may facially steer clear of the federally occupied area.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. These state prosecutions conflict with comprehensive federal law",
		"context": "Gei- er, 529 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added). See also 555 U.S. 555 (\"[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.\"). Additionally, \"the Court has never before required a specific, formal agency statement identifying conflict in order to conclude that such a conflict in fact exists\" ( Geier , 529 U.S. at 884), and it has previously found federal preemption even when the United States argued against it (see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]139 S. Ct. 1919. That is, \"States may not legis late with the purpose and effect of regulating a fede rally preempted field,\" never mind that the regulations may facially steer clear of the federally occupied area. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Are Meritless",
		"context": "Thus, in Koenig , which Petitioners do not cite, this Court affirmed a state- court decision invalidating a legislatively enacted con- gressional plan because it violated \"the requirements 52 of the Constitution of the state in relation to the en- actment of laws.\" 285 U.S. at 379. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], after a state court de- clared that State's congressional plan violated malap- portionment provisions in the state constitution, this Court held that federal courts were required to \"defer\" to the state court's remedial determinations. Id. at 29, 33-34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Are Meritless",
		"context": "ALFRED B.STREET ,THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 300 (1859). In Smiley , Minne- sota's Governor vetoed the legislature's congressional plan on substantive grounds—concluding that the dis- tricts were malapportioned. Transcript of Record at 6-7, Smiley , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 617). Petitioners never explain how the Elections Clause could permit state 53 governors to proscribe legislation on substantive con- stitutional grounds but prohibit state courts from do- ing the same thing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Are Meritless",
		"context": "at 407. This Court for centuries has reviewed legislation under provisions Petitioners would contend are open-ended, including the Due Pro- cess Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the First Amendment. Just as this Court engages in a permissible judicial function when it enforces these broad guarantees, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], state courts similarly engage in a permissible judicial func- tion when they enforce comparable state-law guaran- tees. See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 1868.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Are Meritless",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. at 2493-94. Of course, \"the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts.\" ASARCO [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id. (emphasizing that \"state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law\"). And far from suggesting that the Elections Clause restricts state-court judicial review, Rucho endorsed theprop- osition that \"state statutes and state constitutions can provide standards and guidance for state courts to ap- ply\" to constrain partisan gerrymandering of congres- sional districts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Are Meritless",
		"context": "Petitioners cite no precedent for an arrangement requiring state courts to hear challenges to state legislation under federal law but prohibiting them from doing the same under the State's own law. Cf. Printz v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is entirely implausible to as- cribe to the Framers a system so at odds with basic federalism principles.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because IGRA is inconsistent with the Restoration Act, the Restoration Act controls",
		"context": "(2018) (statement of Darryl Lacounte, Acting Director, Bureau of Indian Af-fairs). \"Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] by pointing to the so- called Indian canon of construction. That canon, how- ever, applies only to ambiguous statutes. Chickasaw Na- 534 U.S. 84; accord 420 U.S. 425 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because IGRA is inconsistent with the Restoration Act, the Restoration Act controls",
		"context": "417 U.S. 535 by pointing to the so- called Indian canon of construction. That canon, how- ever, applies only to ambiguous statutes. Chickasaw Na- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 420 U.S. 425 . By contrast, the rule that the specific governs the general is used to determine whether the statute is ambiguous . See 529 U.S. 120.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because IGRA is inconsistent with the Restoration Act, the Restoration Act controls",
		"context": "417 U.S. 535 by pointing to the so- called Indian canon of construction. That canon, how- ever, applies only to ambiguous statutes. Chickasaw Na- 534 U.S. 84; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By contrast, the rule that the specific governs the general is used to determine whether the statute is ambiguous . See 529 U.S. 120.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because IGRA is inconsistent with the Restoration Act, the Restoration Act controls",
		"context": "Chickasaw Na- 534 U.S. 84; accord 420 U.S. 425 . By contrast, the rule that the specific governs the general is used to determine whether the statute is ambiguous . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After applying that canon, the Fifth Cir- cuit concluded that the Restoration Act c ontained no \"ambigui ties [to be] resolved in favor of the Indians ,\" 139 S. Ct. 1686. T he so-called Indian canon affords the Pueblo nothing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because IGRA is inconsistent with the Restoration Act, the Restoration Act controls",
		"context": "By contrast, the rule that the specific governs the general is used to determine whether the statute is ambiguous . See 529 U.S. 120. After applying that canon, the Fifth Cir- cuit concluded that the Restoration Act c ontained no \"ambigui ties [to be] resolved in favor of the Indians ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he so-called Indian canon affords the Pueblo nothing. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fractured and divergent lower-court decisions under section 1324a(b)(5) demonstrate the need for this Court to clarify its preemption standards",
		"context": "17 -28, 29- 38, 38-47. By contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court decided a similar case with four judges rejecting express preemption but finding field and conflict preemption – with two of those four judges specially concurring on additional issues of field preempt ion and the exclusively federal discretion for prosecuting immigration -related matters – and three judges dissenting. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit rejected a facial challenge by treating the issue here as one o f field and 7 conflict preemption, including the presumption against preemption. Puente 821 F.3d 1098.",
		"citation_value_orig": "896 N.W.2d 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fractured and divergent lower-court decisions under section 1324a(b)(5) demonstrate the need for this Court to clarify its preemption standards",
		"context": "896 N.W.2d 737. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit rejected a facial challenge by treating the issue here as one o f field and 7 conflict preemption, including the presumption against preemption. Puente [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, the decisions are deeply fractured, with no other court agreeing with the Kansas Supreme Court about §1324a(b)(5) 's present ing express -preemption issues . Amicus EFELDF respectfully that the fractured nature of the decisions on these issues results in large part from the need for greater clarity from this Court on issues of both preemption generally and immi gra- tion preemption specifically.",
		"citation_value_orig": "821 F.3d 1098",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA",
		"context": ". The APA does not provide a private right of action here, or otherwise confer jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C.§ 701(a)(2); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] makes it clear that review is not to be had in those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn sothat a court would have no meaningful standardagainst which to judge the agency's exercise ofdiscretion. In such a case, the statute (law) can be 10 taken to have committed the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely.\") (internal citations andquotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA",
		"context": "(internal citations andquotation marks omitted). Here, § 1182(f) gives thepresident the widest discretion to suspend the entry ofclasses of aliens \"in the national interest.\" Haitian Refugee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, the Proclamation is unreviewable under the APA because it is th e action of the president. 511 U.S. 462 (holding that decisions of the president's subordinates aboutmilitary base closings were not reviewable under theAPA because the statute in that case conferreddecision-making authority on the president, and,because the president is no t an agency, the APA does not apply to actions of the president) (citing 505 U.S. 788).",
		"citation_value_orig": "953 F.2d 1498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA",
		"context": "Haitian Refugee 953 F.2d 1498. Furthermore, the Proclamation is unreviewable under the APA because it is th e action of the president. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that decisions of the president's subordinates aboutmilitary base closings were not reviewable under theAPA because the statute in that case conferreddecision-making authority on the president, and,because the president is no t an agency, the APA does not apply to actions of the president) (citing 505 U.S. 788). See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 477 (\"Where a statute . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA",
		"context": "Haitian Refugee 953 F.2d 1498. Furthermore, the Proclamation is unreviewable under the APA because it is th e action of the president. 511 U.S. 462 (holding that decisions of the president's subordinates aboutmilitary base closings were not reviewable under theAPA because the statute in that case conferreddecision-making authority on the president, and,because the president is no t an agency, the APA does not apply to actions of the president) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 477 (\"Where a statute . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA",
		"context": "L. Rev. 2245, 2351 (2001). 12 Detroit Int'l Bridge [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also, e.g., Tulare 185 F. Supp. 2d 18 (citing Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470) (other internal citations omitted). Indeed, a court considering a challenge to a precursor of the instant Proclamation under the APAcorrectly concluded that the APA did not apply becausethe order in that case was the action of the president: [T]he Presidency is not an \"agency\" as defined inthe APA, § 701(b)(1), and thus actions by thePresident are not subject to the APA….",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 F. Supp. 3d 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA",
		"context": "2245, 2351 (2001). 12 Detroit Int'l Bridge 189 F. Supp. 3d 85. See also, e.g., Tulare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citing Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470) (other internal citations omitted). Indeed, a court considering a challenge to a precursor of the instant Proclamation under the APAcorrectly concluded that the APA did not apply becausethe order in that case was the action of the president: [T]he Presidency is not an \"agency\" as defined inthe APA, § 701(b)(1), and thus actions by thePresident are not subject to the APA…. Here,Congress has granted the President authority tosuspend entry for any class of aliens if suchentry would be \"detrimental to the interests ofthe United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "185 F. Supp. 2d 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overruling Seminole Rock deference would upset significant private reliance interests",
		"context": "The prospect of unsettling decision s based on Semi- nole Rock deference would loom particularly large in statutory regimes with private enforcement mecha- nisms. Many applications of Seminole Rock occur in that context, whe re private litigants have an incentive to stretch the boundaries of a regulation, and the agency's interpretation benefits a regulated party. See, 38 e.g., PLIVA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]519 U.S. 455. I n PLIVA , for example , this Court deferred to the understanding of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that its reg- ulations require the manufacturer of a generic drug to label the drug with the same information approved by the agency for the equivalent brand -name drug, see 564 U.S. at 613 -614— thus foreclosing a plaintiff 's failure -to- warn suit based on alleged deficiencies in the generic drug's label. Private parties have no doubt made invest- ment (property) and pricing (contract) decisions in rea- sonable reliance on that understanding of the regula-tory scheme , which exem pts generic manufacturers from certain tort liability to which brand -name manu- facture rs are subject.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overruling Seminole Rock deference would upset significant private reliance interests",
		"context": "Consequently , narrowing Seminole Rock defer- ence would not present the same degree of reliance con- cerns as overruling it altogether, and would be con- 39 sistent with the path this Court has charted in other ar- eas where it has narrowed but not overruled a prece- dent in light of experience. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": ". \"A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To ensure that federal regulations comply with this fundamental principle, the APA generally requires agencies to engage in notice -and-comment rulemaking before issuing substantive, binding regu-lations. See 5 U.S .C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "\"). Notice -and-comment rulemaking is grounded in \"notions of fairness\" be-cause it promotes \"informed administrative deci-sionmaking\" by allowing an agency to enact regulations \"only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Notice -and-comment rulemaking provides busi- nesses with an important opportunity to help shape the adm inistrative decisions that govern their indus- tries. E very decision that a business makes —from hiring employees and opening new facilities to mar- keting and selling its products —requires an assess- ment of the legal implications of th at decision .",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "Seminole Rock and Auer undermine the important role played by notice-and -comment rulemaking. As the Court has explained, Auer deference encourages agencies to \"promulgate vague and open -ended regu- lations that they can later inter pret as they see fit, thereby 'frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The business community is harmed by this ap- proach to rulemaking. When agencies promulg ate vague regulations that they can interpret later in a myriad of ways, companies have difficulty predicting what conduct is required or prohibited .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "When agencies promulg ate vague regulations that they can interpret later in a myriad of ways, companies have difficulty predicting what conduct is required or prohibited . Under Auer , it is not enough for a regulated entity to hire \" an army of perfumed lawyers and lobbyists\" to d etermine the fairest reading of vague regulations or to seek guid- ance from the agency . Gutierrez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Even if the [regulated party] somehow manage[s] to make it through this far unscathed, [it] must always remain alert to the possibility that the agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees any-time based merely on the shift of political winds and still prevail.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 1142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "But track ing an agency's interpretations of vague regula- tions is considerably more challenging because those interpretations could appear almost anywhere . For example, i n Auer , the Court deferred to an agency in- terpretation advanced for the first time in an amicus brief. 519 U.S. at 461; see also Chase Bank USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court also has deferred to one agency's interpretation of another agency's regulation. See 501 U.S. 680 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "519 U.S. at 461; see also Chase Bank USA, 562 U.S. 195. The Court also has deferred to one agency's interpretation of another agency's regulation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Auer doctrine has created a world in which businesses must scour court dockets, amicus briefs, agency websites, letters sent to other companies, and other agencies' policies to fully understand the regulatory regime in which they operate. In Christopher, the Court too k an important step to limit Seminole Rock and Auer by refusing to defer to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous regula- tions that \"impose [d] potentially massive liability … for conduct that occurred well before that interpreta-tion was announced.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "Even after Christopher, courts continue to defer to agency interpretations that upset the rea- sonable expectations of regulated parties. For exam- ple, the Seventh Circuit recently deferred to a novel agency interpretation that made a loan guaranty agency liable for breach of contract. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id. at 663 (Flaum, J., con- curring in part and concurring in the judgment ) (con- firming that outcome depended on application of 8 Auer ). The agency announced its interpretation for the first time in an amicus brief , and the court applied Auer deference even though the agency 's interpreta- tion was \" at odds with the regulatory scheme [and] de- fie[d] ordinary English. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "at 663 (Flaum, J., con- curring in part and concurring in the judgment ) (con- firming that outcome depended on application of 8 Auer ). The agency announced its interpretation for the first time in an amicus brief , and the court applied Auer deference even though the agency 's interpreta- tion was \" at odds with the regulatory scheme [and] de- fie[d] ordinary English. \" United Student Aid Funds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Federal Circuit recently deferred to the Army's mid -gam e rule change in a contractual dispute despite the \"textually dubious\" nature of the Army's interpretation. Garco Constr., Inc. , 138 S. Ct. at 1053 (Thomas, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FTC's disproportionate scrutiny deters pro-competitive hospital mergers",
		"context": "That the FTC targets hospital mergers does not mean that its enforcement actions are justified. For instance, from 1994 to 1999, the FTC lost four consec- utive hospital merger cases in the federal courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 946 F. Supp. 1285, aff'd,121 F.3d 708; 911 F. Supp. 1213, aff'd,69 F.3d 260; 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,593 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd,38 F.3d 1184. Even when such wrongful enforcement ac- tions are defeated, however, they take a toll—both in terms of the costs of defense and in terms of deterring pro-competitive mergers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "186 F.3d 1045",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FTC's disproportionate scrutiny deters pro-competitive hospital mergers",
		"context": "That the FTC targets hospital mergers does not mean that its enforcement actions are justified. For instance, from 1994 to 1999, the FTC lost four consec- utive hospital merger cases in the federal courts. See 186 F.3d 1045; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,121 F.3d 708; 911 F. Supp. 1213, aff'd,69 F.3d 260; 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,593 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd,38 F.3d 1184. Even when such wrongful enforcement ac- tions are defeated, however, they take a toll—both in terms of the costs of defense and in terms of deterring pro-competitive mergers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "946 F. Supp. 1285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FTC's disproportionate scrutiny deters pro-competitive hospital mergers",
		"context": "That the FTC targets hospital mergers does not mean that its enforcement actions are justified. For instance, from 1994 to 1999, the FTC lost four consec- utive hospital merger cases in the federal courts. See 186 F.3d 1045; 946 F. Supp. 1285, aff'd,121 F.3d 708; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,69 F.3d 260; 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,593 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd,38 F.3d 1184. Even when such wrongful enforcement ac- tions are defeated, however, they take a toll—both in terms of the costs of defense and in terms of deterring pro-competitive mergers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F. Supp. 1213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FTC's disproportionate scrutiny deters pro-competitive hospital mergers",
		"context": "That the FTC targets hospital mergers does not mean that its enforcement actions are justified. For instance, from 1994 to 1999, the FTC lost four consec- utive hospital merger cases in the federal courts. See 186 F.3d 1045; 946 F. Supp. 1285, aff'd,121 F.3d 708; 911 F. Supp. 1213, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,593 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd,38 F.3d 1184. Even when such wrongful enforcement ac- tions are defeated, however, they take a toll—both in terms of the costs of defense and in terms of deterring pro-competitive mergers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "69 F.3d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FTC's disproportionate scrutiny deters pro-competitive hospital mergers",
		"context": "For instance, from 1994 to 1999, the FTC lost four consec- utive hospital merger cases in the federal courts. See 186 F.3d 1045; 946 F. Supp. 1285, aff'd,121 F.3d 708; 911 F. Supp. 1213, aff'd,69 F.3d 260; 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,593 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even when such wrongful enforcement ac- tions are defeated, however, they take a toll—both in terms of the costs of defense and in terms of deterring pro-competitive mergers. Unfortunately, the very hospitals that are most likely to need to consolidate are most unlikely to have the resources to sustain a prolonged struggle with the FTC.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 F.3d 1184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Grounding claims' prerequisites in the common law produces a stable, neutral rule of law",
		"context": "45, 55 (2018). In line with this history, the Court \"did not recognize an immuni ty under § 1983 for good- faith official conduct\" during the first century of the statute's existence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the Court initially pur- ported to root this immunity in the common law, the Court later replaced that historical reasoning with a judge-made rule, which has transformed the qualified- immunity doctrine. See 457 U.S. 800137 S. Ct. 1843.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1862",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Grounding claims' prerequisites in the common law produces a stable, neutral rule of law",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 1862. Although the Court initially pur- ported to root this immunity in the common law, the Court later replaced that historical reasoning with a judge-made rule, which has transformed the qualified- immunity doctrine. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]137 S. Ct. 1843. In the 40 years since the Court abandoned common-law principles in 11 Contrasting with this treatmen t of qualified immunity, the Court has maintained a common-la w inquiry for judicial, legisla- tive, and state sovere ign immunities. See 491 U.S. 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Grounding claims' prerequisites in the common law produces a stable, neutral rule of law",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 1862. Although the Court initially pur- ported to root this immunity in the common law, the Court later replaced that historical reasoning with a judge-made rule, which has transformed the qualified- immunity doctrine. See 457 U.S. 800[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the 40 years since the Court abandoned common-law principles in 11 Contrasting with this treatmen t of qualified immunity, the Court has maintained a common-la w inquiry for judicial, legisla- tive, and state sovere ign immunities. See 491 U.S. 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Grounding claims' prerequisites in the common law produces a stable, neutral rule of law",
		"context": "See 457 U.S. 800137 S. Ct. 1843. In the 40 years since the Court abandoned common-law principles in 11 Contrasting with this treatmen t of qualified immunity, the Court has maintained a common-la w inquiry for judicial, legisla- tive, and state sovere ign immunities. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Harlow , qualified immunity has generated confusion and disagreement within the federal judiciary.12 Qualified immunity's retreat from the statute's text and history is a cautionary tale not to similarly abandon the common-law inquiry here—a case about the prerequisites of a Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983. See Wyatt , 504 U.S. at 171 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that Har- low's departure from history should not be extended to other contexts).",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups",
		"context": "Supra , part I. Furthermore, \"both [the Federal Circuit] and the Supreme Court have rec- ognized that there is a significant public policy interest in removing invalid patents from the public arena.\" SmithKline Beecham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the ability to challenge the validity of a patent is a vital safeguard provided to defendants in infringement suits. For startups, the harm caused by invalid patents is particularly acute, and the ability to challenge low- quality patents is especially important.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 F.3d 1331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups",
		"context": "27, 2015), https://www.arlnow.com/2015/03/27/arlington-startup-founder-testifies-before-congress/ (referring to \"college students develop-ing a product in a startup incubator who were threatened with a lawsuit\" and \"folded their compan y because they couldn't even pay the licensing fee\" requested to avoid the lawsuit); Startups Need Comprehensive Patent Reform Now , Engine 7-14, available at http://static1.squarespace.com/ static/571681753c 44d835a440c8b5/ 57323e0ad9fd5607a3d9f66b/57323e14d9fd5607a3d9faec/14629 10484459/Startup-Patent-Tro ll-Stories1.d.pdf?format=original (summarizing experience of several startups). 10 in assignor estoppel cases. See, e.g., Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Perfor- mance Plastics Corp., HCM [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hexcel 716 F. Supp. 974960 F.2d 155; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573. Assignor estoppel's far-reaching effects are espe- cially damaging to startups due to the disparity between resources available to startups and those available to well-established competitors. Because startups have limited resources, plaintiffs can use the fact of a patent lawsuit for other, potentially anticompetitive, pur- poses, well beyond the scope of reasonable intellectual property enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 F. Supp. 2d 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups",
		"context": "27, 2015), https://www.arlnow.com/2015/03/27/arlington-startup-founder-testifies-before-congress/ (referring to \"college students develop-ing a product in a startup incubator who were threatened with a lawsuit\" and \"folded their compan y because they couldn't even pay the licensing fee\" requested to avoid the lawsuit); Startups Need Comprehensive Patent Reform Now , Engine 7-14, available at http://static1.squarespace.com/ static/571681753c 44d835a440c8b5/ 57323e0ad9fd5607a3d9f66b/57323e14d9fd5607a3d9faec/14629 10484459/Startup-Patent-Tro ll-Stories1.d.pdf?format=original (summarizing experience of several startups). 10 in assignor estoppel cases. See, e.g., Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Perfor- mance Plastics Corp., HCM 351 F. Supp. 2d 290; Hexcel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]960 F.2d 155; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573. Assignor estoppel's far-reaching effects are espe- cially damaging to startups due to the disparity between resources available to startups and those available to well-established competitors. Because startups have limited resources, plaintiffs can use the fact of a patent lawsuit for other, potentially anticompetitive, pur- poses, well beyond the scope of reasonable intellectual property enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F. Supp. 974",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups",
		"context": "27, 2015), https://www.arlnow.com/2015/03/27/arlington-startup-founder-testifies-before-congress/ (referring to \"college students develop-ing a product in a startup incubator who were threatened with a lawsuit\" and \"folded their compan y because they couldn't even pay the licensing fee\" requested to avoid the lawsuit); Startups Need Comprehensive Patent Reform Now , Engine 7-14, available at http://static1.squarespace.com/ static/571681753c 44d835a440c8b5/ 57323e0ad9fd5607a3d9f66b/57323e14d9fd5607a3d9faec/14629 10484459/Startup-Patent-Tro ll-Stories1.d.pdf?format=original (summarizing experience of several startups). 10 in assignor estoppel cases. See, e.g., Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Perfor- mance Plastics Corp., HCM 351 F. Supp. 2d 290; Hexcel 716 F. Supp. 974[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d 1573. Assignor estoppel's far-reaching effects are espe- cially damaging to startups due to the disparity between resources available to startups and those available to well-established competitors. Because startups have limited resources, plaintiffs can use the fact of a patent lawsuit for other, potentially anticompetitive, pur- poses, well beyond the scope of reasonable intellectual property enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "960 F.2d 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups",
		"context": "27, 2015), https://www.arlnow.com/2015/03/27/arlington-startup-founder-testifies-before-congress/ (referring to \"college students develop-ing a product in a startup incubator who were threatened with a lawsuit\" and \"folded their compan y because they couldn't even pay the licensing fee\" requested to avoid the lawsuit); Startups Need Comprehensive Patent Reform Now , Engine 7-14, available at http://static1.squarespace.com/ static/571681753c 44d835a440c8b5/ 57323e0ad9fd5607a3d9f66b/57323e14d9fd5607a3d9faec/14629 10484459/Startup-Patent-Tro ll-Stories1.d.pdf?format=original (summarizing experience of several startups). 10 in assignor estoppel cases. See, e.g., Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Perfor- mance Plastics Corp., HCM 351 F. Supp. 2d 290; Hexcel 716 F. Supp. 974960 F.2d 155; Carroll Touch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Assignor estoppel's far-reaching effects are espe- cially damaging to startups due to the disparity between resources available to startups and those available to well-established competitors. Because startups have limited resources, plaintiffs can use the fact of a patent lawsuit for other, potentially anticompetitive, pur- poses, well beyond the scope of reasonable intellectual property enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "15 F.3d 1573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups",
		"context": "543 (2014) (describing how \"incumbents [are] able to exploit de- fects in the patent system in order to prevent disrup-tive technologies from competing with their outmoded products and services\"). As this Court has recognized, even if a \"patent is ultimately held invalid, patent holders may be able to use it to threaten litigation and bully competitors, especially those that cannot bear the cost of litigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Assignor estoppel increases costs and risks that startups face in litigation, because it removes the op- tion of a validity defense. In the types of meritless cases startups often face, that too often forces compa-nies to pursue alternative, costly defenses or pay dam- ages, settlements, or license fees over invalid patents that should not have issued.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Role of Statutory Exceptions",
		"context": "It needed to put an exception because courts had, 24 for 83 years (since Alkan , supra ), held the AIA to bar such suits. Had Congress disapproved of Alkan , it would not have waited 83 years, nor would it have added the phrase \"by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was as- sessed\" to ensure courts did not overread the exception. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress did not mod- ify the AIA to express disapproval; it did so to coordi- nate with the new remedy it had created. Congress does not create an AIA exception for every remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Role of Statutory Exceptions",
		"context": "However, Congress did not prohibit continued collection and did not create a statutory exception to the AIA. Taxpayers can seek to enjoin the Service's act of reporting them but cannot do more. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 5 Chapter 68B penalties are some times substitutes for taxes otherwise evaded. E.g., 436 U.S. 238.",
		"citation_value_orig": "154 T.C. No. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Role of Statutory Exceptions",
		"context": "See 154 T.C. No. 13. 5 5 Chapter 68B penalties are some times substitutes for taxes otherwise evaded. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, Congress added §6720A to counter ev asion of a diesel fuel excise tax by persons disregarding relevant EPA regulation. H. Rept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Massachusetts",
		"context": "See LTC Restrictions and Definitions , dCJIs, https://www.boston.gov/sites/ default/files/embed/f/firearms-license-restrictions.pdf (providing examples of various Massachusetts firearm license restriction). 21 Boston police have an unofficial practice to place restrictions on all first-time concealed carry permits. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"McDonough agreed that his decision to restrict Phipps's license to target and hunting was his 'normal course of procedure when processing licenses to carry,' specifically, to restrict all first-time applicants' licenses to target and hunting except for police officers or attorneys, who, once approved as suitable, were issued unrestricted licenses.\"). Therefore, although the state is only slightly below the national average with 7.32% of adult citizens possessing a concealed carry permit, that does not reflect the reality that only a highly qualified right to bear arms exists in some Massachusetts localities like Boston. See 2020 Report , at 21.",
		"citation_value_orig": "119 N.E.3d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. It is necessary to consider whether administrative patent judges are directed and supervised when exercising authority Congress granted to the Board, irrespective of the Director's ability to oversee them when they are acting under his authority",
		"context": "Notably, this grant of authority is not to the Office generally, or to the Director, instead, it is specifically to \"[t]he Patent Trial and Appeal Board,\" 35 U.S.C. § 6(b), and thus \"the Board's authority … rests on an independent grant.\" Animal Legal Defense [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B. However, not all tasks performed by the Board, and the administrative patent judges on the Board, are performed under authority granted by Congress to the Board.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.2d 920",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. It is necessary to consider whether administrative patent judges are directed and supervised when exercising authority Congress granted to the Board, irrespective of the Director's ability to oversee them when they are acting under his authority",
		"context": "4 Other constraints may still op erate to limit the Director's oversight ability even when the Board is acting under the Director's authority. For example, the Director appears to have bound himself to the requirement that \"[i]nter partes review shall not be instituted for a ground of unpatentability unless the Board decides that…\" 37 CFR § 42.108; see also 37 CFR § 42.208 (\"Post-grant review shall not be instituted for a ground of unpatentability unless the Board decides that…\"). - 11 - These effects in turn matter because, analogously to this Court's reasoning in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], if administrative patent judges are principal officers for purposes of duties under 35 U.S.C. § 6, they are principal officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause regardless of the Director's ability to oversee their performance of other duties the Director has delegated to them. In Freytag , this Court confronted an Appointments Clause challenge for special trial judges assignable by the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court to various proceedings under 26 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "\"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g. , Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 353. In this case, Plaintiffs seek to hold Tidwell and Walls liable for in- tentional religious discrimination and seek compensato- ry and punitive damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "39a. \"[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one- sided determination of facts decisive of rights.\" Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]501 U.S. 1. The courts of appeals have likewise adhered to \"the firmly held main rule th at a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte , in cam- era submissions.\" 785 F.2d 1043.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 341 U.S. 123501 U.S. 1. The courts of appeals have likewise adhered to \"the firmly held main rule th at a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte , in cam- era submissions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 4 See also, e.g. , 634 F.3d 1274 (consideration of ex parte communications material to either the merits of underlying charge or the penalty to 24 Although the court of appeals below has acknowl- edged these due process concerns in other contexts, see Ludwig , 681 F.3d at 1052, it dismissed Tidwell and Walls's due process argument—declining even to find a serious constitutional question warranting application of the avoidance canon—on the ground that \"courts have upheld the constitutionality of FISA's in camera and ex parte procedures with regard to criminal de- fendants.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.2d 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "785 F.2d 1043. 4 4 See also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (consideration of ex parte communications material to either the merits of underlying charge or the penalty to 24 Although the court of appeals below has acknowl- edged these due process concerns in other contexts, see Ludwig , 681 F.3d at 1052, it dismissed Tidwell and Walls's due process argument—declining even to find a serious constitutional question warranting application of the avoidance canon—on the ground that \"courts have upheld the constitutionality of FISA's in camera and ex parte procedures with regard to criminal de- fendants.\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 1274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "66a n.31 (\"Individual defendants in a civil suit are not enti- tled to more stringent protection than criminal defend- ants.\"). The decisions on which the court relied, how- ever, held only that FISA's in camera, ex parte proce- dures may be used to determine admissibility of evi- dence without violating due process. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]692 F.2d 14199 F.3d 105670 F.3d 1045; In re654 F.2d 1107. They did not hold—and had no occasion to hold—that in camera, ex parte procedures may be used to determine ultimate issues of liability. In each case, the criminal defendant had the opportunity to review evidence relevant to the determination of guilt and to participate fully in the defe nse on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.3d 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "66a n.31 (\"Individual defendants in a civil suit are not enti- tled to more stringent protection than criminal defend- ants.\"). The decisions on which the court relied, how- ever, held only that FISA's in camera, ex parte proce- dures may be used to determine admissibility of evi- dence without violating due process. See 630 F.3d 102[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]99 F.3d 105670 F.3d 1045; In re654 F.2d 1107. They did not hold—and had no occasion to hold—that in camera, ex parte procedures may be used to determine ultimate issues of liability. In each case, the criminal defendant had the opportunity to review evidence relevant to the determination of guilt and to participate fully in the defe nse on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.2d 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "66a n.31 (\"Individual defendants in a civil suit are not enti- tled to more stringent protection than criminal defend- ants.\"). The decisions on which the court relied, how- ever, held only that FISA's in camera, ex parte proce- dures may be used to determine admissibility of evi- dence without violating due process. See 630 F.3d 102692 F.2d 141[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]70 F.3d 1045; In re654 F.2d 1107. They did not hold—and had no occasion to hold—that in camera, ex parte procedures may be used to determine ultimate issues of liability. In each case, the criminal defendant had the opportunity to review evidence relevant to the determination of guilt and to participate fully in the defe nse on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 F.3d 1056",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "66a n.31 (\"Individual defendants in a civil suit are not enti- tled to more stringent protection than criminal defend- ants.\"). The decisions on which the court relied, how- ever, held only that FISA's in camera, ex parte proce- dures may be used to determine admissibility of evi- dence without violating due process. See 630 F.3d 102692 F.2d 14199 F.3d 1056[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re654 F.2d 1107. They did not hold—and had no occasion to hold—that in camera, ex parte procedures may be used to determine ultimate issues of liability. In each case, the criminal defendant had the opportunity to review evidence relevant to the determination of guilt and to participate fully in the defe nse on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 F.3d 1045",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "66a n.31 (\"Individual defendants in a civil suit are not enti- tled to more stringent protection than criminal defend- ants.\"). The decisions on which the court relied, how- ever, held only that FISA's in camera, ex parte proce- dures may be used to determine admissibility of evi- dence without violating due process. See 630 F.3d 102692 F.2d 14199 F.3d 105670 F.3d 1045; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They did not hold—and had no occasion to hold—that in camera, ex parte procedures may be used to determine ultimate issues of liability. In each case, the criminal defendant had the opportunity to review evidence relevant to the determination of guilt and to participate fully in the defe nse on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "654 F.2d 1107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause",
		"context": "These cases do not support the procedure outlined by the court of appeals here, and they do not obviate the seri-ous due process question implic ated by the court' hold- ing. One court has suggested there may be \"extraordi- nary circumstances\" in which in camera, ex parte pro-cedures may be used to \"decide the merits of a dis-pute.\" Abourezk , 785 F.2d at 1061 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir. 1 984)). At issue there, however, was simply the court's use of in camera, ex parte procedures to evaluate whether the state-secrets privilege had been properly invoked—which in turn confirmed that the assertion of the privilege required dismissal because the privileged material would have established a valid defense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.2d 815",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause",
		"context": ". The First Amendment \"subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target the religious for special dis- abilities.\" Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quot- ing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . A law enacted with \" hostil- ity\" that is \"inconsistent with the First Amendment 's guarantee \" of neutrality toward religion \" must be in- validated .\" Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause",
		"context": "Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quot- ing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520) . A law enacted with \" hostil- ity\" that is \"inconsistent with the First Amendment 's guarantee \" of neutrality toward religion \" must be in- validated .\" Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Blaine Amendments have \"a discriminatory pur- pose\" that targets \"some or all religious beliefs .\" Trin- ity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2021 (quoting Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 532) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause",
		"context": "Ibid. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (\"Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include ' the historical background of the decision under challenge [and] the specific series of events leading to the enact- ment or official policy in question .'\" (citation omitted)); Village of Arlington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has also used this approach in applying the Equal Protection Clause. In Hunter v. Underwood , the Court considered an Alabama state constitutional provision that applied to all persons convicted of cer- tain petty crimi nal offenses, regardless of race.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause",
		"context": "The Court has also used this approach in applying the Equal Protection Clause. In Hunter v. Underwood , the Court considered an Alabama state constitutional provision that applied to all persons convicted of cer- tain petty crimi nal offenses, regardless of race. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But despite its facial neutrality, there was overwhelming historical evidence that the constitutional provision was intended to disenfran-chise African -Americans. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
		"context": "2008 WL 298001. Because the court will in most cases eventua lly issue a judgment on the FTCA claim , the Bivens claim , regardless o f the order in whic h the courts add ress it, is doomed from the start . Thus, in Estate of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court of appeals —before the FTCA claims were resolved — instructed the district court to di smiss the Bivens claim . There , the district court had entered judgment for the plaintiff on both the Bivens claim (following a jury verdict in favor of the plain tiff) and the FTCA claim . The Tenth C ircuit remand ed the case to the district court fo r further considera tion of the FTCA 12 claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 F.3d 840",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
		"context": "Instead, under these ca ses, a plain tiff who rel ies on the FTCA 's preservation of Bivens claims against employ ees, 5 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2), and seeks to pursue an FTCA claim in the alte rnative to her Bivens claim in the most efficient manner —by asserting the claims in the same acti on—will have doomed her Bivens claim , regardless of its merits or those of her F TCA claim. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example , the district court erroneously dismissed the plaintiff 's Bivens claim based on the statute of limit ations and later entered judgment in favor of the United States on the FTCA clai m. On appeal, the court first consider ed the FTCA c laim, upheld the ruling, and on that basis applied the judgment bar to the Bivens claim , \"[e]ven though t he district co urt [had] incorrectly dismissed Harris's Bivens claims .\" Id. at 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 F.3d 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
		"context": "at 333. 13 Such outcomes contradict Congress 's \"crystal clear \" intention that FTCA and Bivens exist \"as parallel, complementary causes of action .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 980); see Unit ed Sta 499 U.S. 160 (\"Section 5 declares that the FTCA is not the exclusive remedy for torts committed by Government employees in the scope of their employment when an injured plaintiff brings … a Bivens action , seeking damages f or a constitutional violation by a Government employee [.]\" (footnote omitted) ); see also 559 U.S. 799.2 Indeed, under the government 's view , when the claims are brought in the s ame case, neither the timin g nor outcome of a decision on the Bivens claim matters. In many cases, a s soon a s an FTCA claim is pleaded, dismissal of the Bivens claim becomes inevitable .",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
		"context": "at 333. 13 Such outcomes contradict Congress 's \"crystal clear \" intention that FTCA and Bivens exist \"as parallel, complementary causes of action .\" 446 U.S. 14 (1 980); see Unit ed Sta [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Section 5 declares that the FTCA is not the exclusive remedy for torts committed by Government employees in the scope of their employment when an injured plaintiff brings … a Bivens action , seeking damages f or a constitutional violation by a Government employee [.]\" (footnote omitted) ); see also 559 U.S. 799.2 Indeed, under the government 's view , when the claims are brought in the s ame case, neither the timin g nor outcome of a decision on the Bivens claim matters. In many cases, a s soon a s an FTCA claim is pleaded, dismissal of the Bivens claim becomes inevitable .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
		"context": "13 Such outcomes contradict Congress 's \"crystal clear \" intention that FTCA and Bivens exist \"as parallel, complementary causes of action .\" 446 U.S. 14 (1 980); see Unit ed Sta 499 U.S. 160 (\"Section 5 declares that the FTCA is not the exclusive remedy for torts committed by Government employees in the scope of their employment when an injured plaintiff brings … a Bivens action , seeking damages f or a constitutional violation by a Government employee [.]\" (footnote omitted) ); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 Indeed, under the government 's view , when the claims are brought in the s ame case, neither the timin g nor outcome of a decision on the Bivens claim matters. In many cases, a s soon a s an FTCA claim is pleaded, dismissal of the Bivens claim becomes inevitable . For example , in Mann ing, the plaintiff had be en erroneously co nvicted of kidnap ping and m urder, based in part upon materi al evidenc e fabric ated b y federal agents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
		"context": "Carlson , 446 U.S. at 20 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93 -588, p.3 (1973) , empha sis added in Carlson ). 14 encourag ed to pursue their claims co ncurrently in the same actio n, instead of in separate a ction s,\" Hoosie r Bancor p of I ndiana, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 18 5 (7th Cir. 199 6), Manning brought the two cla ims together in one complaint . The claims were tried tog ether —the Bivens claim to a jury and the FTCA claim to t he judge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "90 F.3d 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "Justice Alito observed in the first iteration of this matter, \"The reach of the Clean Water Act is notoriously unclear. Any piece of land that is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being classified by EPA employees as wetlands covered by the Act.\" 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Four years earlier, Justice Scalia noted, \"The Corps' enforcement practices vary somewhat from district to district bec ause 'the definitions used to make jurisdictional determinations' are deliberately left 'vague.' GAO Report 26.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "Vague regulations—particularly vague criminal regulations3—violate constitutional due process rights and cannot stand. \" 'A statut e which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of du e process of law.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A regulatory stand ard must be vacated if it \"fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.\" 553 U.S. 285, 3 For merely negligent CWA violations, the landowner is subject to fines of up to $37,500 per day of noncompliance and imprisonment for up to a year.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 2307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "\" 132 S. Ct. 2307. A regulatory stand ard must be vacated if it \"fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 3 For merely negligent CWA violations, the landowner is subject to fines of up to $37,500 per day of noncompliance and imprisonment for up to a year. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), adjusted per 40 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), adjusted per 40 C.F.R. § 19.4; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: [T]he Clean Water Act imposes criminal liability, as well as steep civil fines, on a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial activities. In this litigation, for example, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil fines. 9 304 (2008).",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "This effort costs thousands of dollars and at least several months. See U.S. DOT, FHWA, Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letter on Jurisdictional Determinations (May 6, 2009), 4 See Summit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 748. 12 https://www.environment.fhwa. dot.gov/legislation/other_ legislation/natural/laws_usacememo.aspx (\"While the RGL states that the Corps is committed to finalizing both preliminary and approved JDs within 60 days of submittal, factors such as Corps work load and complexity of the aquatic resource delineation may delay a decision from the Corps.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "690 F.3d 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "Justice Alito observed in the first iteration of this matter, \"The reach of the Clean Water Act is notori- ously unclear. Any piece of land that is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being classified by EPA em- ployees as wetlands covered by the Act.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Four years earlier, Justice Scalia noted, \"The Corps' en- forcement practices vary somewhat from district to district because 'the definitions used to make jurisdic-tional determinations' are deliberately left 'vague.' GAO Report 26.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "Vague regulations—particularly vague criminal regulations 2—violate constitutional due process rights and cannot stand. \" 'A statut e which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to it s application, violates the first essential of due process of law.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A regulatory standard must be vacated if it \"fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 2 For merely negligent CWA violations, the landowner is subject to fines of up to $37,500 per day of noncompliance and imprisonment for up to a year. See 33 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 2307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), ad- justed per 40 C.F.R. § 19.4; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The current regulato ry regime fails on both counts. To understand the current definition of WOTUS, a landowner must wade through 1980s-era regulations this Court found impossibly vague in 2006 and 2012, several enigmatic Supreme Court decisions, EPA guid- ance documents purporting to explain those decisions, and numerous circuit and district court attempts at further interpretation, and then guess how a local en- forcement agent might apply all that law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
		"context": "See id. , p. 10. Though the landowner's inability to perceive the federal jurisdic-tion over her property is completely understandable, she would face crippling fines for failure to secure a 3 See Summit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 748. 9 federal permit, plus the loss of use of her property, without recompense. To avoid such risk, a landowner might engage the services of a costly enviro nmental professional, obtain a scientific opinion on whether her land is subject to federal jurisdiction, and coordinate with the Agencies to confirm their agreement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "690 F.3d 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Eliminating Burglary's Contemporaneous Intent Requirement Would Violate The Principles Of Due Process And Separation Of Powers Underlying The Rule Of Lenity",
		"context": "Br. 15-28, it \"could not properly be expanded as the Gov- ernment suggests … [because] this being a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed, and any ambi- guity must be resolved i n favor of lenity .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos applies retroactively to a relatively small number of cases, and fewer still will require retrials",
		"context": "A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial right —i.e., by pleading guilty or opting for a bench trial—has no viable claim under Ramos , significantly reduc ing Ramo s's practical reach. And \"the vast ma- jority of criminal convictions result from [guilty ] pleas. \" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 138 S. Ct. 798 .13 And the frequency of jury trials is not much higher in Or- egon. In 2018, only 673 of 29,208 felony cases —or 2.3% —terminated by jury trial.14 But even those low rates over-represent Ramos 's reach because they in- clude trials that ended in acquittals and mistrials. In any event, not all eligible habeas petitioners would be able to obtain federal relief under Ramos .",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos applies retroactively to a relatively small number of cases, and fewer still will require retrials",
		"context": "A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial right —i.e., by pleading guilty or opting for a bench trial—has no viable claim under Ramos , significantly reduc ing Ramo s's practical reach. And \"the vast ma- jority of criminal convictions result from [guilty ] pleas. \" See 441 U.S. 780 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .13 And the frequency of jury trials is not much higher in Or- egon. In 2018, only 673 of 29,208 felony cases —or 2.3% —terminated by jury trial.14 But even those low rates over-represent Ramos 's reach because they in- clude trials that ended in acquittals and mistrials. In any event, not all eligible habeas petitioners would be able to obtain federal relief under Ramos .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 798",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos applies retroactively to a relatively small number of cases, and fewer still will require retrials",
		"context": "And i n some circuits, that deadline is not tolled while the court of appeals con- siders whether a peti tioner should be granted leave to proceed und er 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreo- ver, even habeas relief does not necessitate retrial. Both the prosecution and the defense would have substantial incent ives to reach a plea deal , especially where a defendant may have already served signifi- 13 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 F.3d 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos applies retroactively to a relatively small number of cases, and fewer still will require retrials",
		"context": "Judicial Dep't, C ases Tried Analysis – Manner of Dispo- sition , at 1 (2018), https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/ Documents/20 18CasesTriedAnalysis -MannerofDisposition.pdf. 37 cant time in prison .15 In the end, the resulting num- ber of actual retrials in Louisiana and Oregon will burden their judicial systems far less than the burden associated with other rules or provisions this Court has applied retroactively in federal court. See John- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. DHS's Custody Reviews Do Not Comport with Due Process Requirements",
		"context": "Id. at 46 -47. 15 Dep't of Homeland Sec ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 634 F.3d 1081 ; 285 F. Supp. 3d 997 , rev'd on other grounds , 912 F.3d 869, cert. denied2020 WL 3578681 (noting, in class action challenging prolonged detention, the \"strong evidence\" that custody reviews for class members \"were not undertaken in a good faith effort to detain only those who were flight and safety risks\" and that \"[v]irtually every detainee who had a . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 F.3d 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. DHS's Custody Reviews Do Not Comport with Due Process Requirements",
		"context": "Id. at 46 -47. 15 Dep't of Homeland Sec ., 535 F.3d 942; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 285 F. Supp. 3d 997 , rev'd on other grounds , 912 F.3d 869, cert. denied2020 WL 3578681 (noting, in class action challenging prolonged detention, the \"strong evidence\" that custody reviews for class members \"were not undertaken in a good faith effort to detain only those who were flight and safety risks\" and that \"[v]irtually every detainee who had a . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 1081",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. DHS's Custody Reviews Do Not Comport with Due Process Requirements",
		"context": "Id. at 46 -47. 15 Dep't of Homeland Sec ., 535 F.3d 942; 634 F.3d 1081 ; 285 F. Supp. 3d 997 , rev'd on other grounds , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied2020 WL 3578681 (noting, in class action challenging prolonged detention, the \"strong evidence\" that custody reviews for class members \"were not undertaken in a good faith effort to detain only those who were flight and safety risks\" and that \"[v]irtually every detainee who had a . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "912 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. DHS's Custody Reviews Do Not Comport with Due Process Requirements",
		"context": "Corr . Instit . at [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Lower courts have held that the regulations raise serious due process concerns \"because they do not provide for an in -person hearing, they place the burden on the alien rather than the government and they do not provide for a decision by a neutral ar biter such as an immigration judge.\" Diouf , 634 F.3d at 1091 ; see also Guerrero 905 F.3d 208 (finding serious constitutional concerns because the custody 17 reviews are done by \"DHS employees who are not ostensibly neutral decision makers such as immigration judges\" and \"place the burden on the alien, rather than the Government, to prove that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the society,\" and because there is no appeal) (emphasis omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. DHS's Custody Reviews Do Not Comport with Due Process Requirements",
		"context": "at 472 U.S. 445 ). Lower courts have held that the regulations raise serious due process concerns \"because they do not provide for an in -person hearing, they place the burden on the alien rather than the government and they do not provide for a decision by a neutral ar biter such as an immigration judge.\" Diouf , 634 F.3d at 1091 ; see also Guerrero [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding serious constitutional concerns because the custody 17 reviews are done by \"DHS employees who are not ostensibly neutral decision makers such as immigration judges\" and \"place the burden on the alien, rather than the Government, to prove that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the society,\" and because there is no appeal) (emphasis omitted) . The process the government has made available under Section 1231 affords none of the procedural protections necessary for such a severe deprivation of physical liberty. The process available under Section 1226 provides a hearing before an independent adjudicator, and the opportunity to present witnesses and challenge the government's evidence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally",
		"context": ". property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A mere \"negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person's property\" does not violate the Constitution. Florida Prepaid , 527 U.S. at 645.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally",
		"context": "Under these principles, copyright infringement, standing alone, does not violate due process. After all, \"[i]ntention to infringe\" is not an element of infringement. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 3 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 9.5 (2019) (collecting cases that apply this principle). Instead \"copyright infringement is a strict 34 liability offense, in which a violation does not require a culpable state of mind.\" 922 F.3d 255; Patry § 9.5 (same).",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally",
		"context": "283 U.S. 191; see 3 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 9.5 (2019) (collecting cases that apply this principle). Instead \"copyright infringement is a strict 34 liability offense, in which a violation does not require a culpable state of mind.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Patry § 9.5 (same). Under the Copyright Act, an infringer's state of mind is relevant only to damages. 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "922 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "1. This Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to protect children from harm—as a general matter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But \"[h]ad the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed [the child] from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incar-ceration or institutionalization to give rise to an 28 affirmative duty to protect.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "\"[W]hen the state places a child in state-regulated foster care, the state has entered into a special relationship with that child which im- poses upon it certain affirmative duties\" enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. [T]he analogy between foster children on the one hand and prisoners and institutionalized persons on the other is incomplete . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 F.3d 798",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "989 F.2d 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "597 F.3d 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "907 F.3d 237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "902 F.2d 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "906 F.3d 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.3d 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.3d 1233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "[but] any distinctions between children placed in foster care and [prisoners and the institution- alized mentally ill] are matters of degree ra- ther than of kind. Id. (citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 F.3d 1227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "(citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd126 F.3d 372, one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\" Id. at 677.",
		"citation_value_orig": "929 F. Supp. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "(citing 989 F.2d 289; 597 F.3d 163; 907 F.3d 237; Meador v. Cabinet for Human Re-902 F.2d 474; 906 F.3d 540; 630 F.3d 833; 878 F.3d 1233; 551 F.3d 1227. Those affirmative duties include respecting chil- dren's attachment relationships. Because custodial children \"have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their emotional well-being,\" Marisol A. by 929 F. Supp. 662, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], one court rec- ognized a due process claim for \"failure to provide rea- sonable services and placements that protect custodial plaintiffs' right of association with their biological fam-ily members.\" Id. at 677.",
		"citation_value_orig": "126 F.3d 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "Another held that children stated a claim against officials who \"pursued policies which caused them injuries by impairing their rela-tionships with their siblings . The fact that the plain- tiffs' injuries are psychological rather than physical is of no moment.\" Aristotle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]],\" which held that states must assist institutionalized individuals in pursuing their liberty interests, \"requires the state to protect foster children in it s custody . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F. Supp. 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": ". [from] the psy- chological and emotional harms that repeated disrup- tion of attachment relationships causes.\" Jackson & Fasig at 12 (citing LaShawn [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev'd on other grounds sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. 990 F.2d 1319; 715 F. Supp. 1387; Doe ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "762 F. Supp. 959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "Jackson & Fasig at 12 (citing LaShawn 762 F. Supp. 959, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 715 F. Supp. 1387; Doe ex rel. 670 F. Supp. 1145; 81 P.3d 851). In sum, psychological, emotional, and developmen- tal concerns inform an affirmative duty to respect chil- dren's existing familial rela tions and avoid disruption of constructive foster placements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "990 F.2d 1319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "Jackson & Fasig at 12 (citing LaShawn 762 F. Supp. 959, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. 990 F.2d 1319; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Doe ex rel. 670 F. Supp. 1145; 81 P.3d 851). In sum, psychological, emotional, and developmen- tal concerns inform an affirmative duty to respect chil- dren's existing familial rela tions and avoid disruption of constructive foster placements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "715 F. Supp. 1387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "LaShawn A. ex rel. 990 F.2d 1319; 715 F. Supp. 1387; Doe ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 81 P.3d 851). In sum, psychological, emotional, and developmen- tal concerns inform an affirmative duty to respect chil- dren's existing familial rela tions and avoid disruption of constructive foster placements. Logic thus dictates that \"laws that unreasonably prevent a parentless child from attaining a perm anent family relationship implicate constitutional concerns, both by prolonging the child's confinement in state custody, and by expos- ing the child to serious harm from the repeated detach- ments that typify foster care throughout the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F. Supp. 1145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "LaShawn A. ex rel. 990 F.2d 1319; 715 F. Supp. 1387; Doe ex rel. 670 F. Supp. 1145; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In sum, psychological, emotional, and developmen- tal concerns inform an affirmative duty to respect chil- dren's existing familial rela tions and avoid disruption of constructive foster placements. Logic thus dictates that \"laws that unreasonably prevent a parentless child from attaining a perm anent family relationship implicate constitutional concerns, both by prolonging the child's confinement in state custody, and by expos- ing the child to serious harm from the repeated detach- ments that typify foster care throughout the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "81 P.3d 851",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "2. \"The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific 31 rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to de- fine and express their identity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e rights and interests inherent in the parent-child relationship easily fit within this concept of liberty. \"[C]hoices concerning .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "Obergefell , 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (citation omitted). \"The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The personal affili- ations that exemplify these considerations . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "at 619. \"[A] parent's desire for and right to the compan- ionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an important interest that undeniably war- rants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But \"to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such inti- mate relationships, so, too, do children have these in-terests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.\" 530 U.S. 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "452 U.S. 18. But \"to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such inti- mate relationships, so, too, do children have these in-terests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As with marriage, the rights and interests attendant to a par- ent-child relationship are shar ed by both parties to the union. Because the parental relationship is so valuable, precedent extolls the right to form it—the right to de- cide \"whether to bear or beget a child.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "As with marriage, the rights and interests attendant to a par- ent-child relationship are shar ed by both parties to the union. Because the parental relationship is so valuable, precedent extolls the right to form it—the right to de- cide \"whether to bear or beget a child.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], falling within the constitutionally-pro- tected \"dignity and personality and natural powers\" of human beings, id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring). Procreation is not the only way to form familial bonds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "\"Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious rea- soning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty towards children.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Parentless children, unlike adults, have no mari- tal or procreative path to family formation; for them, adoption is the only means by which they might form essential familial bonds. And blood relations do not ex- clusively define parental bonds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
		"context": "And blood relations do not ex- clusively define parental bonds. \"[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach- ments that derive from the intimacy of daily associa-tion, and from the role it plays in promoting a way of life through the instruction of children.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34 It would be incongruent and irrational to hold that while adults are protected in forming families via mar- riage and procreation, children whose interests in be- ing parented are far more critical to their \"individual dignity and autonomy, [and] personal identity and be- liefs,\" Obergefell , 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (c itations omitted), have no constitutional interest in being adopted. They do.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plain text of the uniformed services exception establishes that it does not apply to work performed in the dual status technician role",
		"context": "That conclusion is reinforced by the broader stat- utory framework governing a dual status technician's work. This Court has long recognized that National 24 Guard memb ers \"must keep three hats in their closets —a civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an army hat — only one of which is worn at any particular time.\" Per- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A n individual who is a dual status technician wea rs his state militia hat when he performs Title 32 weekend drills and annual training; for that service he receives military pay and benefits , which all agree trigger the uniformed ser- vices exception. He wears his army hat when called to federal active du ty status under Title 10; for that ser- vice he also receives military pay and benefits , which all agree trigger the uniformed services exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Arizona Supreme Court's State-Law Determination That Post-Conditional-Writ Independent Review Is Not Part Of Direct Review Ends The Retroactivity Analysis",
		"context": "E.g., Styers III, 254 P.3d at 1134. The Court cannot upend the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusions, whic h are dispositive as to retroactivity. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. In light of that history, it is appropriate to overrule PruneYard here",
		"context": "In light of that history, it is appropriate to overrule PruneYard now. Stare decisis \"is at its weakest\" when this Cour t interprets the Constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e Court 's \"cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision. Five of these are most important here: the quality of [ Prune Yard ]'s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and reliance on the decision.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Permitting a PTO Determination That a Patent Is Invalid to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Allows a Patent Troll to Continue to Use the Patent in Frivolous Lawsuits to Extort Tribute from the Public, Contrary to the Strong Federal Policy Favoring Free Competition in Ideas Which Do Not Merit Patent Protection",
		"context": ". This Court has recognized \"the strong federal pol- icy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.\" Lear, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing Sears, Roebuck & 376 U.S. 225, and Compco 376 U.S. 234. This Court has said that it is \"important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Permitting a PTO Determination That a Patent Is Invalid to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Allows a Patent Troll to Continue to Use the Patent in Frivolous Lawsuits to Extort Tribute from the Public, Contrary to the Strong Federal Policy Favoring Free Competition in Ideas Which Do Not Merit Patent Protection",
		"context": ". This Court has recognized \"the strong federal pol- icy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.\" Lear, 395 U.S. 653, citing Sears, Roebuck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Compco 376 U.S. 234. This Court has said that it is \"important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Permitting a PTO Determination That a Patent Is Invalid to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Allows a Patent Troll to Continue to Use the Patent in Frivolous Lawsuits to Extort Tribute from the Public, Contrary to the Strong Federal Policy Favoring Free Competition in Ideas Which Do Not Merit Patent Protection",
		"context": ". This Court has recognized \"the strong federal pol- icy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.\" Lear, 395 U.S. 653, citing Sears, Roebuck & 376 U.S. 225, and Compco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has said that it is \"important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Permitting a PTO Determination That a Patent Is Invalid to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Allows a Patent Troll to Continue to Use the Patent in Frivolous Lawsuits to Extort Tribute from the Public, Contrary to the Strong Federal Policy Favoring Free Competition in Ideas Which Do Not Merit Patent Protection",
		"context": "Appellate review of a PTAB institution decision opens the door to allowing invalid patents – deter- mined to be invalid by the same government agency that issued the patent in the first place – to be subse- quently enforced against the public solely because of an error in the institution decision, (an error having nothing to do with the merits concerning the validity of the patent). Surely Congress did not intend for a pa- tent challenger to spend the time and money required to eliminate an invalid patent repressing free 7 In the antitrust context, this Court has observed that the high cost of litigation \"will push cost-conscious defendants to set- tle even anemic cases.\" Bell Atlantic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 competition, for which the public would otherwise be required to pay tribute, only to find that it was all for naught because of an error in the institution decision. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2131.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Permitting a PTO Determination That a Patent Is Invalid to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Allows a Patent Troll to Continue to Use the Patent in Frivolous Lawsuits to Extort Tribute from the Public, Contrary to the Strong Federal Policy Favoring Free Competition in Ideas Which Do Not Merit Patent Protection",
		"context": "Bell Atlantic 550 U.S. 544. 23 competition, for which the public would otherwise be required to pay tribute, only to find that it was all for naught because of an error in the institution decision. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any relief in this case should be narrowed to the plaintiff States",
		"context": "Any actual harm to Pennsylvania and New Jersey from the appli- cation of the rules to out -of-state entities is thus so spec- ulative and attenuated that it is o utweighed by the gov- ernment's interest in protecting rights of conscience. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. In affirming the nationwide injunction, the court of appeals also stated that \"Congress determined that rule-vacatur was not unnecessarily burdensome on agen- cies when it provided vacatur as a standard remedy for APA violations.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any relief in this case should be narrowed to the plaintiff States",
		"context": "43 - 45, supra . Congress enacted the APA against a back- ground rule that stat utory remedies should be con- strued in accordance with \"traditions of equity prac- tice.\" Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While Congress \"may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion,\" this Court will \"not lightly assume that Congress has intended to de- part from established [equity] principles.\" 456 U.S. 305.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any relief in this case should be narrowed to the plaintiff States",
		"context": "Hecht 321 U.S. 321. While Congress \"may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion,\" this Court will \"not lightly assume that Congress has intended to de- part from established [equity] principles.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in the APA's text or history —or this Court's cases construing it —suggests that Congress took the dramatic step of sub silentio authorizing nationwide re- lief. Instead, Section 703 of the APA provides that re- view may be sought in cases like this through any of the traditionally available forms of relief, such as \"actions 50 for declaratory judgments\" or \"writs of injunc- tion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any relief in this case should be narrowed to the plaintiff States",
		"context": "And Section 702(1) provides that nothing in the APA's authorization of judicial review \"affects the power or duty of the court to deny relief on any other equitable ground.\" 5 U.S.C. 702(1); se e Abbott [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Particularly given that backdrop, the court of appeals erred in holding that the APA authorizes this nationwide injunction. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners' State-Law Arguments Underscore Why the Petition Should Be Denied",
		"context": "For two reasons, these arguments underscore why certiorari is unwarranted. First, state-law arguments are outside this Court's domain. \"[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"interpret[] their state constitutions\" \"free and unfettered by\" this Court, 559 U.S. 50 North Carolina nondelegation doctrine. Second, to the extent these state-law arguments are predicates to Petitioners' federal claims, that is all the more reason to deny. Petitioners never raised these issues before the state courts, which thus have never decided—for example—whether N.C.G.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners' State-Law Arguments Underscore Why the Petition Should Be Denied",
		"context": "For two reasons, these arguments underscore why certiorari is unwarranted. First, state-law arguments are outside this Court's domain. \"[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law,\" 421 U.S. 684, and \"interpret[] their state constitutions\" \"free and unfettered by\" this Court, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] North Carolina nondelegation doctrine. Second, to the extent these state-law arguments are predicates to Petitioners' federal claims, that is all the more reason to deny. Petitioners never raised these issues before the state courts, which thus have never decided—for example—whether N.C.G.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The 1973 Leasing Act Amendments",
		"context": "on Interior and Insular Affairs , 91st Cong. 64 (1969) (Park Service Director: \"miscellaneous areas\" outside the \"definition of the system in 1953\" are \"now included in the system\" by the 1970 amendment). 16 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 Under those exceptions, no agency has any authority to permit pipelines through three catego ries of protected federal \"lands\": those \"in the National Park System,\" those \"held in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe,\" and those \"on the Outer Continental Shelf.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The 1973 Leasing Act Amendments",
		"context": "18 Congress knew the significance of excluding \"lands in the National Park System,\" as it had defined that phrase and expanded the System three years earlier in the Authorities Act. See Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and the Leasing Act leave no doubt. \"[A]ny area of land and water administered by\" the Park Service is in the Park System. The Appalachian Trail is one such area – as Congress knew when it excluded all federal land \"in the National Park System\" from the Leasing Act in 1973.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": ". The question of whether the ATS applies to corporations has twice been before this Court: first, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and more recently in 138 S. Ct. 1386. On both occasions, this Court declined to create a categorical rule barring all forms of corporate liability. See Kiobel , 569 U.S. at 114; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": ". The question of whether the ATS applies to corporations has twice been before this Court: first, in 569 U.S. 108 and more recently in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On both occasions, this Court declined to create a categorical rule barring all forms of corporate liability. See Kiobel , 569 U.S. at 114; Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "However, this Court explicitly did not reach the issue of domestic corporate liability in Jesner and did not decide whether the law of nations provides corporate liability at least in some contexts such as international norms prohib iting child slave labor. In Jesner, this Court relied on Sosa v. Alvarez - Machain 's two -step framework for evaluating ATS claims, which considers the following: (1) whether the alleged violation is \"of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory\" and (2) whether allowing the case to proceed under the ATS is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, or instead whether caution requires the political branches to grant specific authority before corporate liability can be imposed. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 139 9 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The plurality and concurring opinions focused on the foreign relations and separation of powers concerns counselling against judicial discretion. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "at 1403. Critically, the claims in Jesner were based on allegations that a Jordanian bank, through transactions at its New York branch, served as the \"paymaster\" for Hamas. Brief for Petitioners at 3 –6, Jesner, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 16– 499), 2017 WL 2687507. These allegations had significant implications for foreign governments and international relations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406. Arab Bank had also provided financial services to an organization connected to the Saudi Arabian government. Br ief for Petitioners at 9, Jesner, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 16 –499), 2017 WL 2687507. This Court declined to extend corporate liability to foreign corporations, noting the policy implications.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "The Framers were concerned with tensions in international relations derived from the new government's inability to prosecute such violati ons. Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). A particular concern was violations of international law committed by American citizens – at the passage of the ATS \"[i]f a nation failed to redress injuries by its citizens upon the citizens of another nation\" it would be perceived as \"just cause for reprisals or war.\" Anthony J. Bellia Jr & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. Chi.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "Indeed, remanding this case for amendment is consistent with Jesner's view of ATS liability. Moreover , the Executive Branch in Kiobel and Jesner expressly supported the availability of 23 corporate liability under the ATS because of the well - established existence of corporate liability in the common law. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 16 -499) (hereafter \" Jesner Amicus Brief\"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel 569 U.S. 108. In both Kiobel and Jesn er, the United States' amicus briefs emphasize that while causes of action brought under the ATS are premised on international law, they are ultimately questions of federal common law and that corporate liability is a well -established basic background prin ciple of federal common law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "Moreover , the Executive Branch in Kiobel and Jesner expressly supported the availability of 23 corporate liability under the ATS because of the well - established existence of corporate liability in the common law. See138 S. Ct. 1386 (No. 16 -499) (hereafter \" Jesner Amicus Brief\"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In both Kiobel and Jesn er, the United States' amicus briefs emphasize that while causes of action brought under the ATS are premised on international law, they are ultimately questions of federal common law and that corporate liability is a well -established basic background prin ciple of federal common law. See Jesner Amicus Brief at 9; Kiobel Amicus Brief at 7, 14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions",
		"context": "See Jesner Amicus Brief at 9; Kiobel Amicus Brief at 7, 14. \"It has long been 'unquestionable' under domestic law that corporations are 'deemed persons' for 'civil purposes' and can be held civilly liable.\" Jesner Amicus Brief at 10 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The United States' briefs recognize that the ability to violate international law norms is not limited to natural persons —corporations are capable of violating these norms as well. Kiobel Amicus Brief at 7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Under this Court's decisions, remuneration \"paid to an employee for services rendered to one or more employers\" includes remuneration for time not spent in active service",
		"context": "a. In Social Security [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], t his Court constru ed statutory language ma- terially indistinguishable from the RRTA language 17 here. Nierotko present ed the question whether the So- cial Security Act 's definition of \"wages \" as remunera- tion for \"any service . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Under this Court's decisions, remuneration \"paid to an employee for services rendered to one or more employers\" includes remuneration for time not spent in active service",
		"context": "Id. at 370 -371. b. Four years ago, t he Court unanimously reaf- firmed th is interpretation in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e Court there considered whether severance payments were subject to FICA tax as payments for \"any service, of whatever nature, performed . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Threatens Religious Freedom",
		"context": "Since Hosanna-Tabor , lower courts other than the Ninth Circuit have applied the ministerial exception using such a functional anal ysis. For example, the Sev- enth Circuit recently applied the ministerial exception to a teacher of Hebrew and Jewish studies at a Jewish day school because \"the importance of [the teacher's] role as a 'teacher of [] faith'\" outweighed considerations relevant to her formal title. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied Hosanna- Tabor to hold that \"the ministerial exception applies to 9 the school's employment decision regardless whether a religious teacher is called a minister or holds any title of clergy.\" Temple Emanuel of 975 N.E.2d 433.",
		"citation_value_orig": "882 F.3d 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Threatens Religious Freedom",
		"context": "See, e.g., 863 F.3d 190700 F.3d 169426 S.W.3d 597 approach in the decisions below: it treated the Re-spondents' lack of a \"minis ter\" title as effectively dis- positive. For instance, in the Biel case, Ms. Biel's posi- tion required her to teach religion classes four days a week using a textbook on the Catholic faith assigned by the school. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. She was also required to attend pray- ers and Mass, to work within Church \"doctrines, laws, and norms,\" and to be evaluated on the religious as- pects of her role. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Threatens Religious Freedom",
		"context": "Id. As the judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in Biel noted, the panel's holding \"poses grave consequences for religious minorities … whose practic-es don't perfectly resemble the Lutheran tradition at issue in Hosanna-Tabor .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the panel came dangerously close to adopting a bright-line title- based ministerial exception, to the potential detriment of \"a substantial plurality of religious adherents\" in the circuit. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 1238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Third Circuit's conclusions that section 3 does not protect a compelling state interest and that judges are not policymakers are unfounded and should be rejected",
		"context": "Judges also significantly impact public policy through the promulgation of rules and guidelines. Nearly 200 years ago, Chief j ustice m arshall observed that Congress may \"confer[] on the judicial department\" the power to \"make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same description.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Over a century later, the Court accordingly upheld the constitutionality of the r ules e nabling a ct of 1934, which authorized the federal judiciary to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. , 312 U. s. 1, 10 (1941).",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Third Circuit's conclusions that section 3 does not protect a compelling state interest and that judges are not policymakers are unfounded and should be rejected",
		"context": "has been substantially incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).\"). The Court has similarly upheld \"Congress' decision to require at least three federal judges to serve on the [United s tates s entencing] Commission and to require those judges to share their authority with nonjudges.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The purposes of the Commission are to \"establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system\" and to \"develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.\" 28 U. s.C. § 991(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Third Circuit's conclusions that section 3 does not protect a compelling state interest and that judges are not policymakers are unfounded and should be rejected",
		"context": "§§ 620, 621, 623(a)(1) (directing the Federal Judicial Center and directing its Board to establish policies and develop programs, among other things). a nd, though not legislators, judges may and do consider issues of public policy to determine what the law is, particularly when deciding questions of constitutional or common law. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers , 461 U.S. 757. Delawareans made a \"considered judgment[]\" in an \"area central to their own governance—how to select those who 'sit as their judges.'\" See 575 U.S. 433.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 836",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Third Circuit's conclusions that section 3 does not protect a compelling state interest and that judges are not policymakers are unfounded and should be rejected",
		"context": "§§ 620, 621, 623(a)(1) (directing the Federal Judicial Center and directing its Board to establish policies and develop programs, among other things). a nd, though not legislators, judges may and do consider issues of public policy to determine what the law is, particularly when deciding questions of constitutional or common law. See, e.g., 497 U.S. 836; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Delawareans made a \"considered judgment[]\" in an \"area central to their own governance—how to select those who 'sit as their judges.'\" See 575 U.S. 433.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 757",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": ", 925 F.3d at 249–50. Under the Sixth Circuit's decision, Petitioner \"only has two options: (1) acquiesce to a potentially unlawful reporting requirement that will 3 Cf. Foodservice & Lodging [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 cost it significant money an d reputational harm, or (2) flout the requirement, i.e., 'break the law,' to the tune of $50,000 in penalties for each transaction it fails to report.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.2d 842",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Thus, it would insulate a wide swath of IRS rules from judicial review by forcing taxpayers to risk criminal liability to have their day in court. This is precisely a \"situation in which compliance is sufficiently onerous and coercive penalties sufficiently potent that a constitutionally intolerable choice might be presented.\" Thunder Basin Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], (19 94). To impose on a party \"the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of 4 Section 7203 states: \"Any person required . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": ". is, in effect, to cl ose up all approaches to the courts.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The constitutional defect in Young was that the dilemma of either obeying the law and thereby for-going any possibility of judicial review , or risking 'enormous' and 'severe' penalties, effectively cut off all access to the courts.\" Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 221 (Scalia, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Instead, the IRS's so-called alternative remedy is one that would only permit judicial access to fanatical gamblers willing to bet their liberty and risk prison to challenge the agency. 5 This renders the \"fai r price of adventure\" intolerably high. See Ford Motor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To challenge Notice 2016-66, a taxpayer would have to first pay up to $50,000 for each failed disclosure. 9 In effect, under these circumstances, \"operation of the [AIA] would mean that the aggrieved party has no access to judicial review[.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F. Supp. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "9 In effect, under these circumstances, \"operation of the [AIA] would mean that the aggrieved party has no access to judicial review[.]\" Nat'l Rest. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, like Ex parte Young , \"the practical effect of coercive penalties for noncompliance [is] to foreclose all access to the courts.\" Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 218.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 F. Supp. 993",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "The right to judicial review \"is merely nominal an d illusory if the party to be affected can appeal to the courts only at the risk of having to pay penalties so great that it is better to yield to orders of uncertain legality rather than to ask for the protection of the law.\" Wadley S. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in Ex Parte Young , \"these criminal sanctions make the reporting requirement in this case (and many others) 11 unreviewable.\" CIC Servs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": ", 936 F.3d at 505 (Thapar, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). That violates due process. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"It is a denial of due process of law if . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Life & Cas. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Due process requires that \"[b]efore the Government can impose severe civil and criminal penalties; the defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'\" 336 F.3d 1236.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "291 U.S. 566. Due process requires that \"[b]efore the Government can impose severe civil and criminal penalties; the defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the very least, the panel majority opinion operates to deprive Petitioner of a hearing at a meaningful time — that is, before exposure to civil penalties and criminal liability. As this Court made clear, \"one has a due process right to contest the validity of a legislative or administrative order affecting his affairs without necessarily having to face ruinous penalties if the suit 12 is lost.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 F.3d 1236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "At the very least, the panel majority opinion operates to deprive Petitioner of a hearing at a meaningful time — that is, before exposure to civil penalties and criminal liability. As this Court made clear, \"one has a due process right to contest the validity of a legislative or administrative order affecting his affairs without necessarily having to face ruinous penalties if the suit 12 is lost.\" Brown & Williamson Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Yet the IRS seems to think people should bet their liberty\" for a chance at judicial review of IRS reporting requirements. CIC Servs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 F.2d 1115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Okla. Operating Co. , 252 U.S. at 336–37. \"[T]he Due Proc ess Clause requires an exception to the [AIA] when the tax is so high as to render the purported tax not just a disincentive or civil penalty, but a criminal prohibition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Outside of the AIA context, this Court has repeatedly held a party \"need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final 7 The IRS has not foreclosed the possibility of criminally prosecuting violations of Notice 2016-66's reporting requirements. See CIC Servs ., 925 F.3d at 263 n.5 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting) (citing Gov't's Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "661 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "at 58). 13 agency action where such proceedings carry the risk of serious criminal and civil penalties.\" U.S. Army Corps of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So too here. To be sure, \"[t]he IRS envisions a world in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of its taxing authority.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "So too here. To be sure, \"[t]he IRS envisions a world in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of its taxing authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But as Judge Sutton explained: I doubt that the words of the [AIA] . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "It is also unconstitutional. The IRS cannot effectively insulate its rules enforced by civil and criminal penalties from judicial review through the simple expedient of labeling those penalties a \"tax\" subject to the AIA. See Regal Drug [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The mere use of the word 'tax' in an act primarily designed to de fine and suppress crime is not enough to show that wi thin the true intendment of the term a tax was laid. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Before collection of taxes levied by statutes enacted in plain pursuance of the taxing power can be enforced, the taxpayer must be given fair opportunity for hearing—this is essential to due process of law.\" Lipke , 259 U.S. at 561–62. Finally, application of the AIA here would also fail the now-familiar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake.\" 137 S. Ct. 1249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Finally, application of the AIA here would also fail the now-familiar 424 U.S. 31. \"Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All three considerations weigh against the IRS. First , the private interest at stake is Petitioner's interest in judicial review of an IRS notice without the deterrent effect of facing imprisonment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "3a –4a. Under the Sixth Circuit's decision, Petitioner \"only has two 3 Cf. Food service & Lodging [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] acquiesce to a potentially unlawful reporting requirement that will cost it significant money and reputational harm, or (2) flout the requirement, i.e., 'break the law,' to the tune of $50,000 in penalties for each transaction it fails to report.\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.2d 842",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "§ 7203. 8 choice might be presented.\" Thunder Basin Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To impose on a party \"the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a question . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": ". is, in effect, to close up all ap proaches to the courts.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The constitutional defect in Young was that the dilemma of either obeying the law and thereby for -going any possibility of judicial review, or risking 'enormous' and 'severe' penalties, effectively cut off all access to the courts.\" Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 221 (Scalia, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "To challenge Notice 2016 -66, a taxpay er would risk up to $50,000 for each failed disclosure. 9 intolerably high. See Ford Motor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, like Ex parte Young , \"the practical effect of coercive penalties for noncompliance [is] to foreclose all access to the courts.\" Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 218.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F. Supp. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "The right to judicial review \"is merely nominal and illusory if the party to be affected can appeal to the courts only at the risk of having to pay penalties so great that it is better to yield to orders of uncertain legality rather than to ask for the pro tection of the law.\" Wadley S. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in Ex Parte Young , \"these criminal sanctions make the reporting 11 requirement in this case (and many others) unreviewable.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "62a (Thapar, J., dissenting from denial o f rehearing en banc). That violates due process. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It is a denial of due process of law if . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Life & Cas. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Due process requires that \"[b ]efore the Government can impose severe civil and criminal penalties; the defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'\" 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "291 U.S. 566. Due process requires that \"[b ]efore the Government can impose severe civil and criminal penalties; the defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (11th Cir. 2003 ) (quoting 380 U.S. 545). At the very least , the Sixth Circuit has deprive d Petitioner of a hearing at a meaningful time —that is, before exposure to civil penalties and criminal liability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 F.3d 1236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Due process requires that \"[b ]efore the Government can impose severe civil and criminal penalties; the defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'\" 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003 ) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). At the very least , the Sixth Circuit has deprive d Petitioner of a hearing at a meaningful time —that is, before exposure to civil penalties and criminal liability. As this Court made clear, \"one h as a due process right to contest the validity of a legislative or administrative order affecting his affairs without 12 necessarily having to face ruinous penalties if the suit is lost.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "At the very least , the Sixth Circuit has deprive d Petitioner of a hearing at a meaningful time —that is, before exposure to civil penalties and criminal liability. As this Court made clear, \"one h as a due process right to contest the validity of a legislative or administrative order affecting his affairs without 12 necessarily having to face ruinous penalties if the suit is lost.\" Brown & Williamson Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For as Chief Justice Marshall observed : It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty it is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals; a ministerial offi cer might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 F.2d 1115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "leaving to [the citizen] no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust. But this anomaly does not exist ; this imputation cannot be cast on the le gislature of the United States . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Yet the IRS seems to think people should bet their liberty\" for a chance at judicial review of IRS reporting requirements. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 U.S. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Okla. Operating Co. , 252 U.S. at 336 –37. \"[T]he Due Process Clause requires an exception to the [AIA] when the tax is so high as to render the purported tax not just a disincentive or civil penalty, but a criminal prohibition.\" Seven [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Outside of the AIA context, t his Court has repeatedly held a part y \"need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final agency action where such proceedings carry the risk of serious criminal and civil penalties.\" U.S. Army Corps of 136 S. Ct. 1807.",
		"citation_value_orig": "661 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Seven 661 F.3d 1. Outside of the AIA context, t his Court has repeatedly held a part y \"need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final agency action where such proceedings carry the risk of serious criminal and civil penalties.\" U.S. Army Corps of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has long made clear, one need not \"first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled t o challenge\" the validity of a government mandate. 415 U.S. 452 (1974 ); see 387 U.S. 167.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "U.S. Army Corps of 136 S. Ct. 1807. As this Court has long made clear, one need not \"first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled t o challenge\" the validity of a government mandate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1974 ); see 387 U.S. 167. 14 regulations by defending agai nst government criminal, seizure, or injunctive suits against them \" is not \"a satisfactory alternative to \" pre-enforcement judicial review ). So too here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "U.S. Army Corps of 136 S. Ct. 1807. As this Court has long made clear, one need not \"first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled t o challenge\" the validity of a government mandate. 415 U.S. 452 (1974 ); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 regulations by defending agai nst government criminal, seizure, or injunctive suits against them \" is not \"a satisfactory alternative to \" pre-enforcement judicial review ). So too here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "So too here. To be sure, \"[t]he IRS envisions a world in which no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of its taxing authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But as Judge Sutton explained: I doubt that the words of the [AIA] . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "It is also unconstitutional. The IRS cannot effectively insulate its rules enforced by civil and criminal penalties from judicial review through the simple expedient of labeling those penalties a \"tax\" subject to t he AIA. See Regal Drug 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The mere use of the word 'tax' in an act primarily designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that within the true intendment of the term a tax was laid. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Before collection of taxes levied by statutes enacted in plain pu rsuance of the taxing power can be enforced, the taxpayer must be given fair opportunity for hearing —this is essential to due process of law.\" Lipke , 259 U.S. at 561 –62. Finally, application of the AIA here would also fail the now -familiar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake.\" 137 S. Ct. 1249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
		"context": "Finally, application of the AIA here would also fail the now -familiar 424 U.S. 319. \"Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All three considerations weigh against the IRS. First , the private interest at stake is Petitioner's interest in judicial review of an IRS notice without the deterrent effect of facing imprison ment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Distorts the Lanham Act",
		"context": "It cites (Resp. Br. 29) cases involving shipping containers \"phys- ically present\" in California, Japan Line, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Congress's \"plenary power\" over D.C., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. 427, and state dental regulation, N.C. State Bd. of Dental 574 U.S. 494. International would graft post- Wickard conceptions of the interstate commerce power onto the foreign commerce power—essentially allowing Co ngress to regulate as free- ly in Athens, Greece, as it can in Athens, Georgia.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Distorts the Lanham Act",
		"context": "It cites (Resp. Br. 29) cases involving shipping containers \"phys- ically present\" in California, Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434, Congress's \"plenary power\" over D.C., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and state dental regulation, N.C. State Bd. of Dental 574 U.S. 494. International would graft post- Wickard conceptions of the interstate commerce power onto the foreign commerce power—essentially allowing Co ngress to regulate as free- ly in Athens, Greece, as it can in Athens, Georgia.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 U.S. 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International Distorts the Lanham Act",
		"context": "of Dental 574 U.S. 494. International would graft post- Wickard conceptions of the interstate commerce power onto the foreign commerce power—essentially allowing Co ngress to regulate as free- ly in Athens, Greece, as it can in Athens, Georgia. Even if 22 one could argue that the Constitution extends so far, but see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there is no reason to construe the Lanham Act—and other stat-utes invoking Congress's full commerce power—to raise such grave constitutional concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Compactness\" Inquiry Should Incorporate The Notion That A District Is A Recognizable Representational Unit Of Geography",
		"context": "56 , at 261 (James Madison) (Hallowell ed., 1842). Further support for the historical understanding of the term \"district\" is found in the debates on the Ap-portionment Act of 1842, \"which required single - member districts for the first time\" for congressional districts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That debate further indicates that Con-gress used the term to refer to a recognizable local representational unit of geography that respects po-litical subdivisions. Senator Graham commented \" we find in every great nation with any extension of coun- try…that the representative assemblies of the people have been chosen by counties, parishes, departments, and districts, by whatever named called.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Compactness\" Inquiry Should Incorporate The Notion That A District Is A Recognizable Representational Unit Of Geography",
		"context": "22 ient for voters, and make it far more difficult for can- didates and members to become familiar with the is-sues that matter to their constituents. Thus, require-ments that preserve political subdivisions serve inde-pendent values, including facilitation of political or-ganization, electoral campaigning, and constituent representation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congressional representatives are elected to \"rep- resent people\" and \"not trees or acres,\" Reynolds , 377 U.S. at 562, but people participate in our political pro-cess through group action. Legislators repre sent not only individuals, but also the interests of organized and unorganized associations of individuals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Petitioners' decision to terminate the Migrant Protection Protocols was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act",
		"context": "§ 706(2). There are recent examples of the prior Admin- istration's attempts to modify or end existing programs that violated the APA and are relevant to the Petition- ers' decision to end the MPP. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See GianCarlo Canaparo, Administrative Inertia After Regents and Department of Commerce , 6 Admin. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Petitioners' decision to terminate the Migrant Protection Protocols was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act",
		"context": "The Court found that rescission of the program required analysis of the two aspects of the program separately. Regents , 140 S. Ct. at 1912-13 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Furthermore, \"when an agency rescinds a prior policy its reasoned analysis must consider the 'alternative[s]' that are 'within the ambit of the exist-ing [policy].' \" Regents , 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Petitioners' decision to terminate the Migrant Protection Protocols was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act",
		"context": "355a. There is little more than a series of conclusory statements in the document to show that DHS's decision was \"based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.\" Regents , 140 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting Citizens to Pr eserve Overton Park, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Peti- tioners failed to meet the Regents \"alternatives\" re- quirement. Regents also required consideration of reliance interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement",
		"context": "What that looks like depend s on which \"caretakin g\" functions officials are performing . For safety hazards , such as leaky plumbing in a neighboring townhouse , cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an administrative warrant should suffice , cf. Clifford , 464 U.S. at 294 (plurality op.) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 N.W.2d 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Has Already Provided the Basis for Overruling Abood",
		"context": "Br. 10), as opposed to statutory interpr e- tation where the force of stare decisis is stronger. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if the Court were to consider the 14 Abood rule while fully deferential to stare decisis , the compelling justification to overrule Abood lies in this Court's recent criticism of the case. Now that the issue is squarely before the Court, Abood must fall.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Has Already Provided the Basis for Overruling Abood",
		"context": "at 313. The Court indicated that its analysis in Abood and Chi. Teachers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was lacking, because it had \"assumed without any focused analysis that the dicta from Street had authorized the opt -out requirement as a constitutio n- al matter.\" Knox , 567 U.S. at 313. The Court also remarked that \"[a] union's collection of fees from nonmembers is authorized by an act of legislative grace one that we have termed 'unusual' and 'extraord inary.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Has Already Provided the Basis for Overruling Abood",
		"context": "Knox , 567 U.S. at 313 ( citation omitted). Indeed the Court stated: \"Our cases have tolerated a substantial impinge ment on First Amendment rights by allowing unions to impose an opt-out requirement at all.\" Knox , 567 U.S. at 31 7; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly in Harris , the Court reiterated that \"[Knox ] pointed out that Abood is 'something of an anomaly.'\" Harris , 134 S. Ct. at 2627.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Quasi-Contract Claims Likewise Support Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring). The cases are legion. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 341 U.S. 267; Gen. Motors , 461 U.S. at 654; 254 U.S. 586. Where the plaintiff 's rights are violated, unjust enrichment entitles him to sue to recover the wrongdoer's gains. He may do so even if he \"has not suffered a corresponding 22 loss\"—or indeed \"any loss\" at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Quasi-Contract Claims Likewise Support Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring). The cases are legion. See, e.g., 501 U.S. 115; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gen. Motors , 461 U.S. at 654; 254 U.S. 586. Where the plaintiff 's rights are violated, unjust enrichment entitles him to sue to recover the wrongdoer's gains. He may do so even if he \"has not suffered a corresponding 22 loss\"—or indeed \"any loss\" at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Quasi-Contract Claims Likewise Support Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring). The cases are legion. See, e.g., 501 U.S. 115; 341 U.S. 267; Gen. Motors , 461 U.S. at 654; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where the plaintiff 's rights are violated, unjust enrichment entitles him to sue to recover the wrongdoer's gains. He may do so even if he \"has not suffered a corresponding 22 loss\"—or indeed \"any loss\" at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The court of appeals erred in declining to apply the Lanham Act's likelihood-of-confusion standard to petitioner's trademark-infringement claims",
		"context": "The court of appeals erred in requiring petitioner to satisfy a special threshold test, derived from the Second Circuit's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1989 ), before petitioner could invoke the Lanham Act's ordinary likelihood -of-confusion standard for proving infringement of the concededly valid trademarks and trade dress that it has long used to sell Jack Daniel's Old No. 7 Tennessee whiskey. The Ninth Circuit effec- tively held that , so long as respondent's use of peti- tioner's marks and tr ade dress is \"artistically relevant\" to the message the Bad Spaniels toy seeks to convey and respondent does not \"explicitly mislead []\" consumers about the source of the toy , respondent cannot be held liable for infringement under the Act , regardless of the likelihood that consumers will wrongly believe that pe- titioner is the source of respondent's products .",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Founding-era history",
		"context": "See also id. at 133 (\"In the colonies as in England the scope of privilege was ever growing wider 22 through the addition of punishable offenses. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those slights came to include various forms of general speech, from seditious libel to mere \"insults\" against assembly members. Clarke, supra , at 133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Founding-era history",
		"context": "b. Among the most notorious examples of abusive use of the contempt doctrine was the case of John Wilkes, who in 1762 \"published an attack on a recent [English] peace treaty with France, calling it a product of bribery and condemning the Crown's ministers as 'the tools of despotism and corruption.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Incensed by Wilkes's criticisms, Parliament accused him of the contempt of \"seditious libel\" and stripped him of his seat in the body for punishment. Ibid .",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Founding-era history",
		"context": "at 531 n.60 (cleaned up) (quoting 22 Parliamentary History of England 100-101 (1781)). Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to the Wilkes affair as evidence of a settled American tradition of pun- ishing elected officials for their speech thus gets matters exactly backwards. See also Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY OF section 924(e) REQUIRE COURTS TO APPLY AN OFFENSE-MATCHING CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO DETERMINE WHETHER A STATE OFFENSE QUALIFIES AS A \"SERIOUS DRUG OFFENSE\" UNDER ACCA",
		"context": "§ 924(c) and the Immi- gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). E.g., Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2323; Esquivel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990. 9 ACCA's serious drug offenses provision compels the same approach as a matter of text, statutory struc- ture, and legislative history. There is no logical rea- son to apply the categorical approach in all other as- pects of ACCA and to extend it to other sentence- enhancement statut es, but to set it aside for purposes of serious drug offenses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act's other conservation tools have no bearing on the Service's duty to designate critical habitat",
		"context": "In fact , the des- ignation of critical habitat supports voluntary conserva- tion by educating state and local governments, landown- ers, and the public about areas of importance to endan- gered species. See, e.g. , Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of the Act permits the Service to \"authorize the release of any population of an endangered species or a threatened species outside the current range of such species \" in order to \"further the conservation of such species,\" 16 U.S.C. 1539( j)(2)(A ), and provides that the land onto which that \"experimental population \" is released generally \"shall not be des ignated\" as \"critical habitat,\" 16 U.S.C. 1539( j)(2)(C)(ii).",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 F.3d 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Committee's arguments for why certiorari should be denied are unpersuasive",
		"context": "16-17 (collecting cases). The Committee's cases are not in that class. The Committee offers no explanation for why review would be appropriate in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 520 U.S. 681 , yet not here. The Committee mentions, in passing, that this is not an executive -privilege dispute and that the President filed this case on his own behalf. BIO 1, 10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Committee's arguments for why certiorari should be denied are unpersuasive",
		"context": "16-17 (collecting cases). The Committee's cases are not in that class. The Committee offers no explanation for why review would be appropriate in 418 U.S. 683, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , yet not here. The Committee mentions, in passing, that this is not an executive -privilege dispute and that the President filed this case on his own behalf. BIO 1, 10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ms. Clarkston does not \"enforce\" the Heartbeat Law",
		"context": "This Court has been \"unwilling to as- sume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appel- late courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per- sonal liberties and to uphold federal law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, Petitioners are not prejudiced by the lack of a federal pre -enforcement challenge because they cannot meet standing requirements, as they are fully entitled to assert their constitutional defenses in state court actions brought under the Heart beat Law . See Mendez , 530 F.2d at 460–61 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the lower court's dismissal for lack of justiciability against any state defendant, including judge and clerk, \"improperly forces her to initiate stat e proceedings to vindicate her federal claim, and prevents her from seeking federal re- lief except in the Supreme Court\" because \"we perceive no injustice therein.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ms. Clarkston does not \"enforce\" the Heartbeat Law",
		"context": "Further, t he Heartbeat Law supplies Petitioners with an affirmative defen se based on the Supreme Court's undue -burden standard, which applies in abor- tion cases anyway. See Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners may thus ar- gue in state court, if they are sued, that the law imposes 32 an undue burden —just as they do here —and avoid lia- bility. In addition, if they are sued, Petitioners may as- sert an affirm ative claim in state court that the law vio- lates their constitutional rights .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ms. Clarkston does not \"enforce\" the Heartbeat Law",
		"context": "ROA.73, 74. In what other capacity could a judge grant legal \"remedies\" in case s brought be- fore her? See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1991 ) (\"Whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a func tion normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.\" ) Further, Petitioners ' logic would even allow the Justices and clerks of this Court to be named as defendants and enjoined if it adjudicates a case involving a challenge d law. That result must be rejected: \"Plaintiffs' position is antithetical to federalism, violates 33 the Eleventh Amendment and Ex parte Young , and ig- nores state sepa ration of powers.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Second Circuit Flouted Campbell",
		"context": "1. This Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. makes clear that the linchpin of the \"transformativeness\" inquiry under the first fair use factor is whether the new work \"adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, there is no dispute th at the Prince Series does communicate a different meaning and message than Goldsmith's original. As Goldsmith explained, her photograph conveys the message that Prince himself was \"a really vulnerable human being\" with \"immense fears.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "Since the Wilburn Boat decision issued in 1955—nearly 70 years ago—this Court has never created any uniform federal rules to govern on the subject of maritime insurance. A number of lower court decisions and commen- tators have understood Wilburn Boat to provide that if there is no preexisting federal admiralty rule to apply—which, again, precisely describes this case— then state law applies without any need to consider whether some uniform federal admiralty rule should be adopted. See Elevating Boats, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Big Lift Shipping Co. (N.A.) 594 F. Supp. 701; see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §19.6, at 429 (6th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.2d 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "See Elevating Boats, 766 F.2d 195; Big Lift Shipping Co. (N.A.) [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §19.6, at 429 (6th ed. 2018) (hereinafter Schoenbaum Treatise) (\"There is a presumption against creating a federal admiralty rule in such a case and in favor of the application of state law. \"); Thomas R. Beer, Established Federal Admiralty Rules in Marine Insurance Contracts & the Wilburn Boat Case, 1 U.S.F.",
		"citation_value_orig": "594 F. Supp. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "1248, 1260 n.96 (1997)). Federal courts sitting in admiralty have applied the Restatement to decide which state's law to apply in maritime insurance disputes governed by state law under Wilburn Boat . See Durham Auctions , 585 F.3d at 242; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; American Home Assur. 153 F.3d 616; State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d 409; 444 F. Supp. 569. 3 3 In admiralty cases not involving maritime insurance, federal appellate courts also routinely apply the Restatement to resolve choice-of-law issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "Federal courts sitting in admiralty have applied the Restatement to decide which state's law to apply in maritime insurance disputes governed by state law under Wilburn Boat . See Durham Auctions , 585 F.3d at 242; 392 F.3d 1; American Home Assur. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d 409; 444 F. Supp. 569. 3 3 In admiralty cases not involving maritime insurance, federal appellate courts also routinely apply the Restatement to resolve choice-of-law issues. See 575 F.3d 1151; Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V 40 Under the Restatement approach, the Third Circuit properly remanded this case for the district court to determine whether Pennsylvania's public policy sufficed to overcome the insurance contract's New York choice-of-law provision with respect to Raiders' extracontractual counterclaims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 F.3d 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "Federal courts sitting in admiralty have applied the Restatement to decide which state's law to apply in maritime insurance disputes governed by state law under Wilburn Boat . See Durham Auctions , 585 F.3d at 242; 392 F.3d 1; American Home Assur. 153 F.3d 616; State Trading Corp. of India, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 444 F. Supp. 569. 3 3 In admiralty cases not involving maritime insurance, federal appellate courts also routinely apply the Restatement to resolve choice-of-law issues. See 575 F.3d 1151; Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V 40 Under the Restatement approach, the Third Circuit properly remanded this case for the district court to determine whether Pennsylvania's public policy sufficed to overcome the insurance contract's New York choice-of-law provision with respect to Raiders' extracontractual counterclaims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "921 F.2d 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "Federal courts sitting in admiralty have applied the Restatement to decide which state's law to apply in maritime insurance disputes governed by state law under Wilburn Boat . See Durham Auctions , 585 F.3d at 242; 392 F.3d 1; American Home Assur. 153 F.3d 616; State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d 409; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 3 In admiralty cases not involving maritime insurance, federal appellate courts also routinely apply the Restatement to resolve choice-of-law issues. See 575 F.3d 1151; Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V 40 Under the Restatement approach, the Third Circuit properly remanded this case for the district court to determine whether Pennsylvania's public policy sufficed to overcome the insurance contract's New York choice-of-law provision with respect to Raiders' extracontractual counterclaims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 F. Supp. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
		"context": "153 F.3d 616; State Trading Corp. of India, 921 F.2d 409; 444 F. Supp. 569. 3 3 In admiralty cases not involving maritime insurance, federal appellate courts also routinely apply the Restatement to resolve choice-of-law issues. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V 40 Under the Restatement approach, the Third Circuit properly remanded this case for the district court to determine whether Pennsylvania's public policy sufficed to overcome the insurance contract's New York choice-of-law provision with respect to Raiders' extracontractual counterclaims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 1151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "84a (ci-tation omitted). \"[I]f a word is obviously transpla nted from another legal source,\" it g enerally \" brings the old soil with it .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statutory phrase was taken ver- batim from the Fourteenth Amendment 's Apportion- ment Clause , see U.S. Const. Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "Although the general inclu- sion of aliens was contemplated, see p. 34, supra ; Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling), the subset of illegal aliens came into meaningful existence only after the first federal immi-gration re strictions were enacted in 1875, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nevertheless , it was well known at the time that the term \"inhabitants\" could require that an alie n have the sovereign's permission to remain within the country. Notably, Emmerich de Vattel —the \"founding era's foremost expert on the law of nations,\" Franchise Tax 139 S. Ct. 1485 , and \" [t]he in- ternational jurist most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution ,\" United States Steel 434 U.S. 452 — defined \"inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens,\" as \"strangers, who are permitted to settle and stay in the 36 country .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "359 (1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling), the subset of illegal aliens came into meaningful existence only after the first federal immi-gration re strictions were enacted in 1875, 408 U.S. 753. Nevertheless , it was well known at the time that the term \"inhabitants\" could require that an alie n have the sovereign's permission to remain within the country. Notably, Emmerich de Vattel —the \"founding era's foremost expert on the law of nations,\" Franchise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and \" [t]he in- ternational jurist most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution ,\" United States Steel 434 U.S. 452 — defined \"inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens,\" as \"strangers, who are permitted to settle and stay in the 36 country .\" 1 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 213, at 92 (1760). Unsurprisingly, prominent figures from th e period such as Marshall and Story relied on Vattel's definition of \"inhabitants\" in various contexts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "359 (1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling), the subset of illegal aliens came into meaningful existence only after the first federal immi-gration re strictions were enacted in 1875, 408 U.S. 753. Nevertheless , it was well known at the time that the term \"inhabitants\" could require that an alie n have the sovereign's permission to remain within the country. Notably, Emmerich de Vattel —the \"founding era's foremost expert on the law of nations,\" Franchise Tax 139 S. Ct. 1485 , and \" [t]he in- ternational jurist most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution ,\" United States Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] — defined \"inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens,\" as \"strangers, who are permitted to settle and stay in the 36 country .\" 1 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 213, at 92 (1760). Unsurprisingly, prominent figures from th e period such as Marshall and Story relied on Vattel's definition of \"inhabitants\" in various contexts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "42 , at 286. After Congress enacted federal immigr ation re- strictions, this Court's precedents continued to reflect a similar understanding. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for instance, this Court held that an alien who had been denied admission but paroled into the country, where she lived for the next ten years, had not been \"dwelling in the United States\" or \"resid[ing] perma-nently\" in the country for purposes of certain statutes, including the latest version of a naturalization law da- ting from 1790. Id. at 230; see Act of Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "at 231. Or, as this Court more recently put it 37 in the context of due process, aliens \" detained shortly after unlawful entry\" or who \"arrive at port s of entry — even those paroled [ into] the country for year s pending removal —are 'treated' 'as if stopped at the bor- der.' \" Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's understanding that such aliens are not \"dwelling ,\" \"resid [ing] permanently,\" or otherwise \"in\" the United States supports deeming them not to be \"in- habitants\" of this country . Founding -era dictionaries defined \"inhabitant\" as one who \"dwells or resides per- manently in a place .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "Under our system of government, \"sover eignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the right to choose freely their representa- tives to the National Government.\" U.S. Term Limits, 39 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he appor- tionment of representatives is the method by which \"the people\" have chose n to distribute their power among themselves . And there is no evident reason why illegal aliens, who by definition have already flouted \"the sov- ereign['s] prerogative\" to \"exclude\" them, Thuraissi- giam , 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (citation omitted), must be able to leverage that defiance into a distorti on of the people's allocat ion of their sovereign power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "As this Court has explained, those aliens \" who are excluded cannot assert the rights in general obtaining in a land to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise ,\" and cannot \"be- come one of the people to whom these things are se- cured by our Cons titution by an attempt to enter for- bidden by law .\" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Neither all such aliens nor the States in which they are found may demand dif- ferent treatment when it comes to the allocation of the people's political power. Accordingly, the requirement to include each State's \"inhabitants\" in the apportion- ment base, whether constitutional or statutory, does not eliminate the President's discretion concerning the ex- clusion of illegal aliens.",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "84a n.16. To the contrary, a facial challenge contending that a regulation \"exceeds\" the statutory \"authority\" of even a subordinate executive official must \" 'establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the regulation would be valid .' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court provided no justification for its upside -down suggestion that a facial challenge co ntend- ing that the President exceeded his statutory authority should be held to a less demanding standard. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "Franklin , 505 U.S. at 804. In concluding otherwise, the district court overlooked that this Court has long distinguished between the \"illegal entrant\" and the lawful resident on the basis of \"the character of the relationship between 44 the alien and this country.\" M [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court gave no reason why all aliens living in the United States —a \"heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide -ranging variety of ties to this country ,\" id. at 78 -79— should be treated as a ho- mogenous bloc for purposes of inclusion in the appor- tionment base.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base",
		"context": "at 44,680); see pp. 38 -39, supra. The court cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that \"Congress adopted a different theory of Government, in which the House of Representatives represents the whole population, not a subset of the population.\" J.S. 45 App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Informational Injury",
		"context": "In Pub. Citizen , 491 U.S. at 449, a case similar to Akins , this Court stated: \"Our decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act have never suggested that those requesting information under it need show more than that they sought and were denied specific agency records.\" See also Nat'l Archives & Records [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Circuit Courts which ruled against standing premise much of their opinions on language from TransUnion , in which this Court stated: For its part, the United States as amicus curiae, but not the plaintiffs, separately asserts that the plaintiffs suffered a concrete \"informational injury\" under several of this Court's precedents. [Citations to Akins and Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Informational Injury",
		"context": "In addition, those cases involved denial of information subject to public-disclosure or sunshine laws that entitle all members of the public to certain information. This case does not involve such a public-disclosure law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 964 F. 3d 990. Moreover, the plaintiffs have identified no \"downstream consequences\" from failing to receive the required information. Trichell , 964 F. 3d, at 1004.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F. 3d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Informational Injury",
		"context": "3602, 32; Arpan , 29 F.4th at 1275-76 (Jordan. J., Concurring). See also Rodriguez de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].12 Naranda goes further and sees no conflict between TransUnion and Havens Realty . Naranda , 2023 U.S. App. Lexis 3602, 32 (\"we are satisfied that TransUnion most assuredly did not overrule Havens Realty Realty , 12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's convictions should stand in any event",
		"context": "Even if this Court were to extend Bruton and hold that the admission of Stillwell's modified confession 44 violated petitioner's confrontation right, petitioner would still not be entitled to relief because any viola- tion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrington v. California , 395 U.S . 250, 252 -254 (1969) (applying prejudice standard in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to uphold verdict notwith- standing Bruton error ). Although the Court may leave th e prejudice inquiry for the court of appeals to conduct in the first instanc e, this Court \"plainly ha[s] the authority\" to assess harm- lessness itself. 461 U.S. 499.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's convictions should stand in any event",
		"context": "250, 252 -254 (1969) (applying prejudice standard in 386 U.S. 18, to uphold verdict notwith- standing Bruton error ). Although the Court may leave th e prejudice inquiry for the court of appeals to conduct in the first instanc e, this Court \"plainly ha[s] the authority\" to assess harm- lessness itself. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has exercised that authority in the Bruton context before. See Harrington , 395 U.S. at 254; 411 U.S. 223; 405 U.S. 427.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's convictions should stand in any event",
		"context": "461 U.S. 499. The Court has exercised that authority in the Bruton context before. See Harrington , 395 U.S. at 254; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 405 U.S. 427. And given that petitioner points the Court to- ward the other evidence in his case as a reason for ex- panding Bruton , the Court would be well -positioned to conduct the h armlessness inquiry if it were to adopt his proposal. With or without any violation of the district court's instruction to consider Stillwell's statement only against Stillwell, the trial evidence definitively estab- lished petitioner's guilt , and the outcom e would have been the same .",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's convictions should stand in any event",
		"context": "461 U.S. 499. The Court has exercised that authority in the Bruton context before. See Harrington , 395 U.S. at 254; 411 U.S. 223; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And given that petitioner points the Court to- ward the other evidence in his case as a reason for ex- panding Bruton , the Court would be well -positioned to conduct the h armlessness inquiry if it were to adopt his proposal. With or without any violation of the district court's instruction to consider Stillwell's statement only against Stillwell, the trial evidence definitively estab- lished petitioner's guilt , and the outcom e would have been the same .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
		"context": "a. \"It is not required that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved\" for a defend- ant to receive a fair trial. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, the Sixth Amendment requires an \"impartial jury.\" And \"juror impartiality does not require ignorance .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
		"context": "Skilling , 561 U.S. at 381. For well over a century, the Court has recognized that \"every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelli- gent people in the vicinity,\" such that \"scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Irvin , 366 U.S. at 721 (similar). The \"widespread and diverse methods of communication\" that make that so, Irvin , 366 U.S. at 722, have multiplied immeasurably in recent years, increasing the potential depth and breadth of media coverage in a high -profile case. In li ght of those realities, to \"hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, [ is] sufficient to\" disqualify a juror would \"establish an impossible stand-ard.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "98 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
		"context": "at 386- 387. Indeed, the \"function\" of the trial judge in conducting voir dire \"is not unlike that of jurors later on in the trial\"; \"[b]oth must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evi- dence and of responses to questions.\" Rosales [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The trial judge therefore has broad latitude in \"de- terminations of juror impartiality and of the measures necessary to ensure that impartiality.\" Skilling , 561 U.S. at 387.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
		"context": "at 386. This Court has instead \"stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and in other areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. This Court has required a particular line of in- quiry only in very limited contexts. For example, the Court has required trial courts to cover the subject of racial or ethnic prejudice, which can raise \"unique his-torical, constitutional, a nd institutional concerns\" in certain cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
		"context": "c. This Court has required a particular line of in- quiry only in very limited contexts. For example, the Court has required trial courts to cover the subject of racial or ethnic prejudice, which can raise \"unique his-torical, constitutional, a nd institutional concerns\" in certain cases. Pena [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Mu'Min , 500 U.S. at 422- 424 (re- viewing constitutional and supervisory -rule prece- dents). And even then, \"the trial judge retains discre- tion as to the form and number of questions on the sub- ject.\" 476 U.S. 28; see Mu'Min , 500 U.S. at 424 (emphasizing that both state and federal trial judges have \"great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire \"); Rosales - Lopez , 451 U.S. at 195 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (relying, in controlling opinion, on \"the trial court's discretion\" in determining whether to ask voir dire questions regarding racial and ethnic prejudice).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 855",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
		"context": "Pena 137 S. Ct. 855; see Mu'Min , 500 U.S. at 422- 424 (re- viewing constitutional and supervisory -rule prece- dents). And even then, \"the trial judge retains discre- tion as to the form and number of questions on the sub- ject.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Mu'Min , 500 U.S. at 424 (emphasizing that both state and federal trial judges have \"great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire \"); Rosales - Lopez , 451 U.S. at 195 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (relying, in controlling opinion, on \"the trial court's discretion\" in determining whether to ask voir dire questions regarding racial and ethnic prejudice). The Court has, in particular, made clear that a dis- trict court can select an \"impartial jury\" in a heavily publicized case even without questioning prospective jurors \"about the specific contents of the news reports to which they ha[ve] been exposed.\" Mu'Min , 500 U.S. at 417.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Adjudicators of Public Franchise Rights",
		"context": "I have read this Court's decision in Oil States Energy Services, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and I understand that the Court considers patents to be public franchise rights granted by the g overnment. Under that view, perhaps it does not matter who handles disputes over patent 9 Josh Malone, Assessing PTAB Invalidity Rates , US Inventor (20 20), https://usinventor.org/assessing -ptab-invalidity -rates (last visited Dec. 27, 2020). 10 Chrimar Systems, 785 Fed. Appx. 854; XY, 890 F.3d 1282; ePlus, 789 F.3d 1349.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Adjudicators of Public Franchise Rights",
		"context": "I have read this Court's decision in Oil States Energy Services, 138 S. Ct. 1365, and I understand that the Court considers patents to be public franchise rights granted by the g overnment. Under that view, perhaps it does not matter who handles disputes over patent 9 Josh Malone, Assessing PTAB Invalidity Rates , US Inventor (20 20), https://usinventor.org/assessing -ptab-invalidity -rates (last visited Dec. 27, 2020). 10 Chrimar Systems, 785 Fed. Appx. 854; XY, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; ePlus, 789 F.3d 1349. - 7 - validity. As fellow inventor and entrepreneur Tom Pierson muses in the documentary INVALIDATED, \"a much better process would be, as soon as a patent is issued, somebody at the Patent Office flips a coin: heads, the patent is good; tails, it 's no good.",
		"citation_value_orig": "890 F.3d 1282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Adjudicators of Public Franchise Rights",
		"context": "I have read this Court's decision in Oil States Energy Services, 138 S. Ct. 1365, and I understand that the Court considers patents to be public franchise rights granted by the g overnment. Under that view, perhaps it does not matter who handles disputes over patent 9 Josh Malone, Assessing PTAB Invalidity Rates , US Inventor (20 20), https://usinventor.org/assessing -ptab-invalidity -rates (last visited Dec. 27, 2020). 10 Chrimar Systems, 785 Fed. Appx. 854; XY, 890 F.3d 1282; ePlus, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. - 7 - validity. As fellow inventor and entrepreneur Tom Pierson muses in the documentary INVALIDATED, \"a much better process would be, as soon as a patent is issued, somebody at the Patent Office flips a coin: heads, the patent is good; tails, it 's no good.",
		"citation_value_orig": "789 F.3d 1349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The CFTC Secures Legal Damages in the Name of Equity",
		"context": "§ 13a-1. But the CFTC still relies on Porter and Mitchell to expand the \"ancillary relief\" it may garner to attain its monetary demands and relies on SEC cases to fill in the gaps. Commodity Futures Trading [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Commodity Futures Trading 591 F.2d 1211. It seems that congressionally enumerated powers to seek relief are never enough when Porter/Mitchell and a bevy of SEC precedent can be relied on to expand the agency's scope.",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F.2d 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The CFTC Secures Legal Damages in the Name of Equity",
		"context": "§ 13a-1. But the CFTC still relies on Porter and Mitchell to expand the \"ancillary relief\" it may garner to attain its monetary demands and relies on SEC cases to fill in the gaps. Commodity Futures Trading 680 F.2d 573; Commodity Futures Trading [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It seems that congressionally enumerated powers to seek relief are never enough when Porter/Mitchell and a bevy of SEC precedent can be relied on to expand the agency's scope.",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 F.2d 1211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application",
		"context": "Even if the court of appeals grants authori zation, t he district court may consider the prisoner's claims on the merits only if it determine s that the prisoner actually \"satisfies the requirements o f\" sec- tion 2244(b). 28 U.S.C . § 2244(b)(4) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The au thorization requirement is not a mere \"manda- tory claim -processing rule.\" See 138 S. Ct. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application",
		"context": "§ 2244(b)(4) ; see 533 U.S. 656. The au thorization requirement is not a mere \"manda- tory claim -processing rule.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is a juris- dictional prerequisite—j ust like a certificate of appeala- bility . See Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 142.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "Pet. App. 13a–14a; contra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit's radical reading of the Hobbs Act finds no support in its text. The Act, rather, speaks only to jurisdiction over a sp ecific type of proceeding: one for direct review of agen cy action, in which the pe- titioner seeks declaratory or injunctive relief against the government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "Some of the courts that have reached the same basic conclusion as the Fourth Circuit have sought to justify a broader preclusive sweep by relying in isolation on the phrase \"determine the validity of\" in § 2342. They have reasoned that a court decides the \"validity\" of an agency interpretation anytime it considers whether the agency's interpretation is consistent with the gov-erning statute. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; CE Design, 606 F.3d 443. This in- terpretation, however, fails to consider the statutory context in which the phrase \"determine the validity of\" sits. In particular, it ignores the \"commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis ,\" which \"counsels that a [term] is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated,\" 566 U.S. 624, 634–35 ( 2012), and which \"is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress,\" 136 S. Ct. 2355.",
		"citation_value_orig": "715 F.3d 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "Some of the courts that have reached the same basic conclusion as the Fourth Circuit have sought to justify a broader preclusive sweep by relying in isolation on the phrase \"determine the validity of\" in § 2342. They have reasoned that a court decides the \"validity\" of an agency interpretation anytime it considers whether the agency's interpretation is consistent with the gov-erning statute. E.g., 715 F.3d 680; CE Design, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This in- terpretation, however, fails to consider the statutory context in which the phrase \"determine the validity of\" sits. In particular, it ignores the \"commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis ,\" which \"counsels that a [term] is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated,\" 566 U.S. 624, 634–35 ( 2012), and which \"is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress,\" 136 S. Ct. 2355.",
		"citation_value_orig": "606 F.3d 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "E.g., 715 F.3d 680; CE Design, 606 F.3d 443. This in- terpretation, however, fails to consider the statutory context in which the phrase \"determine the validity of\" sits. In particular, it ignores the \"commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis ,\" which \"counsels that a [term] is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 634–35 ( 2012), and which \"is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress,\" 136 S. Ct. 2355. Here, the terms that surround the phrase \"determine the validity of\"— enjoin, vacate, and set aside—all plainly refer to forms of relief. See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "E.g., 715 F.3d 680; CE Design, 606 F.3d 443. This in- terpretation, however, fails to consider the statutory context in which the phrase \"determine the validity of\" sits. In particular, it ignores the \"commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis ,\" which \"counsels that a [term] is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated,\" 566 U.S. 624, 634–35 ( 2012), and which \"is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the terms that surround the phrase \"determine the validity of\"— enjoin, vacate, and set aside—all plainly refer to forms of relief. See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "For ex-ample, this Court explained that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, permits \"an insur- ance company [to] bring a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of insurance policies.\" Calde- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, just five years before the Hobbs Act's enactment, in Rail- way Mail Ass'n v. Corsi , the Court noted that the ap- pellant had initiated the litigation by \"fil[ing] suit\" against a state agency \"in a state court for a declara- tory judgment to determine the validity of [a state stat- ute], and related provisions, and for an injunction re-326 U.S. 88. Thus, in context, the natu ral reading of § 2342's \"ex- clusive jurisdiction\" phrase is that it concerns \"exclu- sive jurisdiction\" over a grant of injunctive or declara-tory relief against the govern ment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "§ 2201, permits \"an insur- ance company [to] bring a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of insurance policies.\" Calde- 523 U.S. 740. Likewise, just five years before the Hobbs Act's enactment, in Rail- way Mail Ass'n v. Corsi , the Court noted that the ap- pellant had initiated the litigation by \"fil[ing] suit\" against a state agency \"in a state court for a declara- tory judgment to determine the validity of [a state stat- ute], and related provisions, and for an injunction re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in context, the natu ral reading of § 2342's \"ex- clusive jurisdiction\" phrase is that it concerns \"exclu- sive jurisdiction\" over a grant of injunctive or declara-tory relief against the govern ment. Therefore, when no such relief is sought—as in a private TCPA class action suit for monetary damages—the Hobbs Act has no bearing on the power of the district court to decide the case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "22 A holistic look at the Hobbs Act's text and structure confirms this reading. \"It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,\" and \"cannot be con- strued in a vacuum.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. I ndep. I ns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "Ag ent s of Am. , I nc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fo urth Circuit, however, fo- cused narrowly on the \"exclusive jurisdiction\" phrase in § 2342, and failed to ask what clues about its mean- ing should be drawn from neighboring provisions. Perhaps the single most telling clue comes from § 2349, entitled \"Jurisdictio n of the proceeding.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action",
		"context": "§ 2349(a) (emphasis added). This provision resolves any doubts about the meaning of the phrase \"determine the validity of.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In tying the \"determine the validity\" phrase to a \"judgment,\" § 2349 makes clear that the phrase refers to a remedy that the courts of appeals may enter as part of the judgment. 23 Other provisions of the Hobbs Act point in the same direction by defining the rules and procedures for ac- tions to obtain such judgments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "That holding runs contrary to this Court's precedent. In South Dakota v. Opperman , the Court drew a \"distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court stated th e \"reason for this well- settled distinction is twofold.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "\"First, the inher- ent mobility of automobiles\" presents an \"exigency.\" Ibid. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Second, \"less rigorous warrant require- ments govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that related to one' s home or office.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "Put another way, the Court's automobile exception cases at least implicitly reco gnize that whatever \"exi- gency\" a parked (or, in this case, parked and covered) automobile's inherent mobility presents, it is not the type of \"emergency\" that by itself justifies a warrant- less search per se . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In- stead, the automobile exception springs from the com- 10 bination of that lesser form of exigency with the own- er's reduced expectation of privacy. Where, as here, the circumstances did not present a true, bona fide \"emergency,\" the question thus becomes whether the police's search implicated on ly a diminished expectation of privacy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "Where, as here, the circumstances did not present a true, bona fide \"emergency,\" the question thus becomes whether the police's search implicated on ly a diminished expectation of privacy. The Court has explained that a person has a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle that is stationed on a public roadway or \"in a place not regu- larly used for residential purposes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has never held, nor even suggested, that a person also has such a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile parked within the curtilage of the home that the police would be entitled to invade the curtilage without a warrant in order to gain acce ss to the automobile. To the contrary, privacy intere sts are at their zenith where the home, including its curtilage, is concerned.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "For Fourth Amendment purposes, people enjoy the same protections from physical intrusions onto the curti- lage—which \"enjoys protection as part of the home it- self,\" Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6—whether their curtilage is comprised of a small parking patio or a large garage. As the Court has put it, \"the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Discriminating between invasions on the curtilage would almost cer- tainly result in wealthy persons enjoying more robust Fourth Amendment protections than those of more modest means. Indeed such a rule would have a dis- proportionate impact on clients of NACDL's members.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 798",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "Any rule that tried to make such distinctions like those between a parking patio, carport, or an enclosed garage would un- 13 doubtedly run counter to this Court's longstanding principles. \"We have, after all, lived our whole national history with an understanding of 'the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle to the point that the poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the police trespassed on the curtilage of petitioner's home in order to look underneath a motorcycle cover that was covering some type of motorcycle. For Fourth Amendment purposes, this is indistinguishable from the facts in Florida v. Jardines , where the officer was able to \"gather[] information\" only by first \"physically entering and occupying\" the curtilage of the home without being \"explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.\" 569 U. S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
		"context": "\" 547 U.S. 103, the police trespassed on the curtilage of petitioner's home in order to look underneath a motorcycle cover that was covering some type of motorcycle. For Fourth Amendment purposes, this is indistinguishable from the facts in Florida v. Jardines , where the officer was able to \"gather[] information\" only by first \"physically entering and occupying\" the curtilage of the home without being \"explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Jardines holds, this is precisely what the Fourth Amendment prohibits. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U. S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Individual Rights in Property Are at the Core of Individual Liberty Protected by the Constitution",
		"context": "Noah Webster, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCI- PLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 58-61 (Oct. 10, 1787) . Individual rights in the ownership of private prop- erty are the \"essence of constitutional liberty.\" John- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In a word, they are \"fundamental.\" In re136 U.S. 436 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Individual Rights in Property Are at the Core of Individual Liberty Protected by the Constitution",
		"context": "John- 333 U.S. 10 . In a word, they are \"fundamental.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Justice Washington noted that rights that are \"fundamental\" are those that belong \"to the citizens of all free governments.\" 6 F. Cas. 546 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 U.S. 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "cem.va.gov/hmm/emblems.asp (last visited July 20, 2018). 12 little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. \"); Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Doe ex rel. 687 F.3d 840. As these well -founded criticisms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "12 little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. \"); Van 545 U.S. 677; Doe ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As these well -founded criticisms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test. Indeed, this Court has not applied the Lemon factors to the merits of an Establishment Clause claim since 2005.",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 840",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "As these well -founded criticisms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test. Indeed, this Court has not applied the Lemon factors to the merits of an Establishment Clause claim since 2005. See Town of Greece v. Galloway , 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (declining to apply Lemon and instead stating \"the Establishment Clause must be interp reted by reference to historical practices and under -standings\") (emphasis added; quotation omitted); Hosanna -Tabor , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (ignoring Lemon ); 536 U.S. 639. The gradual abandonment of Lemon rests on good reason, namely that the test, however well - intentioned, is an utter departure from the historic understanding and interpretation of the Establish - ment Clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman , the Court self - 13 consciously abandoned traditional historical interpretation , complaining that it could \"only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extra - ordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "As these well -founded criticisms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test. Indeed, this Court has not applied the Lemon factors to the merits of an Establishment Clause claim since 2005. See Town of Greece v. Galloway , 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (declining to apply Lemon and instead stating \"the Establishment Clause must be interp reted by reference to historical practices and under -standings\") (emphasis added; quotation omitted); Hosanna -Tabor , 565 U.S. 171 (ignoring Lemon ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The gradual abandonment of Lemon rests on good reason, namely that the test, however well - intentioned, is an utter departure from the historic understanding and interpretation of the Establish - ment Clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman , the Court self - 13 consciously abandoned traditional historical interpretation , complaining that it could \"only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extra - ordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "cem.va.gov/hmm/emblems.asp (last visited December 21 , 2018). 12 little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. \"); Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Doe ex rel. 687 F.3d 840. As these well -founded criticis ms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "12 little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. \"); Van 545 U.S. 677; Doe ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As these well -founded criticis ms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test. Indeed, this Court has not applied the Lemon factors to the merits of an Establishment Clause claim since 2005.",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 840",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "As these well -founded criticis ms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test. Indeed, this Court has not applied the Lemon factors to the merits of an Establishment Clause claim since 2005. See Town of Greece v. Galloway , 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (declining to ap ply Lemon and instead stating \"the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and under -standings\") (emphasis added; quotation omitted); Hosanna -Tabor , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (ignoring Lemon ); 536 U.S. 639. The gradual abandonment of Lemon rests on good reason, namely that the test, however well - intentioned, is an utter departure from the historic understanding and interpretation of the Establish - ment Clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman , the Court self - 13 consciously abandoned traditional historical interpretation , complaining that it could \"only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extra - ordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "As these well -founded criticis ms mounted, this Court has slowly retreated from reliance on the Lemon test. Indeed, this Court has not applied the Lemon factors to the merits of an Establishment Clause claim since 2005. See Town of Greece v. Galloway , 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (declining to ap ply Lemon and instead stating \"the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and under -standings\") (emphasis added; quotation omitted); Hosanna -Tabor , 565 U.S. 171 (ignoring Lemon ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The gradual abandonment of Lemon rests on good reason, namely that the test, however well - intentioned, is an utter departure from the historic understanding and interpretation of the Establish - ment Clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman , the Court self - 13 consciously abandoned traditional historical interpretation , complaining that it could \"only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extra - ordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Constitution's Structure Confirms That The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Within The Federal Government And Not To Territorial Officers",
		"context": "Could this position be contested, the constitution of the United States declares that 'co ngress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.' Accordingly , we find c ongress possessing and exercising the absolute and undisputed power of govern ing and legislating for the territory of Orleans. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The leading early commentators on t he Constitution are in accord. In addition to Justice Story, quoted supra at 7, Chancellor Kent observed: \"It would seem from these various congressional regulations of the territories belonging to the United States, that congress have supreme power in the government of them, depending on the exerci se of their sound discretion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE INTERNET SALES TAX DEBATE IS AN ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO MILLIONS OF AMERICANS AND SMALL BUSINESSES",
		"context": "Such merchants are, according to Quill , properly \"free from state imposed duties to collect sales and use taxes.\" 5 If this Court were to overrule Quill , tens of thousands of small businesses and tens of millions of customers who rely upon their staying in business will be adversely affected. 4 National Bellas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Quill, 504 U.S. at 315. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "24 have explored them and urged the Court to revisit that decision. E.g., Small , 141 S. Ct. at 1228 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Alito, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (\" Hardison 's de minimis cost test does not appear in the statute. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hardison 's faults are so blatant and severe that Sixth Circuit Judge Thapar, joined by Judge Kethledge declared the decision guilty of \"rewrit[ing] a statute.\" Small , 952 F.3d at 829 (Thapar, J., joined by Kethledge, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "Title VII's \"undue hardship\" text shows that religious accommodations present \"'a field of degrees, not a matter for extremes' or 'absolutes.'\" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Yet Hardison 's de minimis cost test is an \"absolute\" that \"'effectively nullif[ies]' the accommodation requirement,\" and for no good reason. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 F.3d 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "Small , 141 S. Ct. at 1228 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). If the Cour t may overrule a precedent that is \"poorly reasoned,\" it may certainly revisit Hardison , which is not reasoned at all. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The litigants in Hardison never even proposed a de minimis cost standard. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "at 89–91 & n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But that concer n is no longer valid. When Hardison was decided, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], ruled the day. And the second prong of the Lemon test asked whether a law's \"principal or primary effect … ad vances [ ]or inhibits religion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "Title VII poses no plausi ble Establishment Clause concerns. Its undue-hardshi p standard guarantees that courts apply the statut e in a \"balanced way\" in which religious accommodations do not always \"override other significant interests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"[r]eligious accommodations … need not come packaged with benefits to secular\" concerns. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "Accord Op.Br.33–34. Last, this Court has \"never applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling [its] earlier 28 decisions determining the meaning of statutes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Op.Br.31. Hardison 's de minimis cost standard is a \"judge-made rule\" with no basis in Title VII's language and ex perience has confirmed its many \"shortcomings.\" 555 U.S. 223.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "436 U.S. 658; accord Op.Br.31. Hardison 's de minimis cost standard is a \"judge-made rule\" with no basis in Title VII's language and ex perience has confirmed its many \"shortcomings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should not \"place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of [its] own error.\" 328 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should overrule Hardison — stare decisis is no impediment.",
		"context": "555 U.S. 223. This Court should not \"place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of [its] own error.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accord Op.Br.30–31. What's more, reliance interests are of no major concern.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Eighth Circuit decision here directly conflicts with the Sixth Circuit",
		"context": "The County 's argument is unavailing. 3 It is true that the \"Constitution protects rather than creates property interests,\" which are \"determined by reference to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , in direct conflict with the Eighth Circuit in this case, \"the Takings Clause would be a dead letter if a state could simply exclude from its definition of property any interest that the state wished to take.\" Hall held that taking absolute title to a home worth more than the debt giving rise to the forfeiture effected a taking of the equity , also known as equitable title . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Eighth Circuit decision here directly conflicts with the Sixth Circuit",
		"context": "The Sixth Circuit also properly acknowledged this Court's precedent that whether a taking occurred could not be \"answered solely\" by a state statute . Id. at 189 –90 (citing Phillips , 524 U.S. at 164, 167, and Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . This Court should grant the Petition to resolve a direct conflict between the Eighth Circuit and Sixth Circuit involving laws that deprive thousands of home owner s of their equity each yea r. 5",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Reexamine its Decision to Defer to the Agencies' Interpretation of the Clean Water Act.",
		"context": "In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., this Court deferred to the Army Corps of Engi- neers \"interpretation\" of the Clean Water Act to allow the Corps to include \"wetlands\" adjacent to a naviga- ble water as part of the navigable water of the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That decision to de- fer to the Executive on an issue of statutory interpre- tation was based on the doctrine of Chevron deference. Members of this Court have identified th e constitu- tionally dubious nature of this doctrine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The American Rule grew out of judicial reluctance to chill good-faith litigation without direction from Congress",
		"context": "Fundamentally, judges believed the English Rule was inconsistent with American principles and institutions. As already mentioned , this Court touched off the discussion in 1796 when it rejected a prevailing party's argument that attorneys' fees \"might fairly be included under the idea of damages.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After noting that \"[t]he general practice of the United States is in opposition to it,\" the Court recognized that reversing the traditional approach would be up to Congress, not the Court. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The American Rule grew out of judicial reluctance to chill good-faith litigation without direction from Congress",
		"context": "Id. This Court continued to uphold the American Rule for the same reasons , concluding that \"o ne should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit .\" Fleischmann Distilling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Without the American Rule, the Court explained, \" the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Over time, the undue-burden standard has proven to be nothing more than a vehicle for judges to make policy judgments",
		"context": "By forcing judges to make such value judgments , the undue -burden standard not only frustrates the judicial function but undermines the rule of law. The rule of law rests on \"the perception —and reality —that [judges] exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases according to the Constitution and law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet t he undue -burden standard \"perver[ ts]\" this logic. Jackson Women's Health 760 F.3d 448.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Over time, the undue-burden standard has proven to be nothing more than a vehicle for judges to make policy judgments",
		"context": "576 U.S. 644. Yet t he undue -burden standard \"perver[ ts]\" this logic. Jackson Women's Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, it invites judges to \"make policy decisions about which abortion restrictions are 'undue,' and then escape any jurisprudential ramifications of those decisions by taking refuge in the purportedly distinct factual context of that particular application.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under The Interpretive Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, The Section 213(b)(10)(A) Exemption Is Limited To Three Positions, Salesman, Partsman And Mechanic, And Two Duties, Selling Automobiles Or Servicing Automobiles, But Does Not Include Either \"Service Advisor\" Or The Duty Of \"Selling Servicing\"",
		"context": "The statutory construction rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides that the express mention of one thing of a type may excludes others of that type. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has cautioned, however, that the expression-exclusion rule will not apply where indications are that passage of statutory language was likely not meant to signal exclusion of others of the type. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under The Interpretive Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, The Section 213(b)(10)(A) Exemption Is Limited To Three Positions, Salesman, Partsman And Mechanic, And Two Duties, Selling Automobiles Or Servicing Automobiles, But Does Not Include Either \"Service Advisor\" Or The Duty Of \"Selling Servicing\"",
		"context": "Id. Similarly, the rule will not be applied to an enumerated series characterized as illustrative, rather than exclusive. Chevron [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is further inapplicable if the enumerated series does not support, by a telling absence, an inference that the thing omitted was intentionally left out. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under The Interpretive Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, The Section 213(b)(10)(A) Exemption Is Limited To Three Positions, Salesman, Partsman And Mechanic, And Two Duties, Selling Automobiles Or Servicing Automobiles, But Does Not Include Either \"Service Advisor\" Or The Duty Of \"Selling Servicing\"",
		"context": "at 81. As we have held repeatedly, the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are 10 members of an \"associated group or series,\" justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 213(b)(10)(A) identifies three positions within a car dealership: salesman, partsman, or mechanic. The Section identifies two functions or duties: selling or servicing automobiles.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under The Interpretive Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, The Section 213(b)(10)(A) Exemption Is Limited To Three Positions, Salesman, Partsman And Mechanic, And Two Duties, Selling Automobiles Or Servicing Automobiles, But Does Not Include Either \"Service Advisor\" Or The Duty Of \"Selling Servicing\"",
		"context": "Moreover, Congress's backtracking on the Act's total exclusion of dealership employees in 1961 lends additional credence to the view that its decision- making regarding the particulars of the 1966 amendment was deliberate. As the court of appeals noted in its first decision, the 1961 amendment exempted from the Act all employees of car, truck or farm implement dealerships. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 In the next few years, several bills regarding dealership employees were considered, including one that would have exempted only salesmen and mechanics. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "780 F.3d 1267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A rigid property-based rule would risk categorically foreclosing application of the public forum doctrine to expressive spaces online",
		"context": ". would have pernicious effects in the modern age.\" Denver Area , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Adopting a property-based rule would have broad implications for speech offline as well. Elected officials frequently hold open town halls in a wide array of privately owned physical spaces—including non-profit community centers, retirement homes, places of worship, coffeeshops, and restaurants—without first acquiring an interest in the property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Can and Should Apply the Ordinary Meanings of \"Domestic\" and \"Government\"",
		"context": "Both before and after Yates , this Court has often looked to the ordinary meanings – as reflected 19 In a footnote, the Band suggests that its construction is supported by the \"Indian canons of construction,\" which favor construing statutes \"'liberally in favor of the Indians.'\" Br. 39 n.3 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Those canons apply only to \"ambiguous provisions,\" Blackfeet Tribe , 471 U.S. at 766; here, \"[t]he language of the stat- ute is too strong to bend as the [Band] would wish,\" Chickasaw 534 U.S. 84. 39 by dictionary definitions – of the component words of a statutory phrase.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Can and Should Apply the Ordinary Meanings of \"Domestic\" and \"Government\"",
		"context": "Br. 39 n.3 (quoting 471 U.S. 759). Those canons apply only to \"ambiguous provisions,\" Blackfeet Tribe , 471 U.S. at 766; here, \"[t]he language of the stat- ute is too strong to bend as the [Band] would wish,\" Chickasaw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 39 by dictionary definitions – of the component words of a statutory phrase. See, e.g., Intel Corp. Inv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Can and Should Apply the Ordinary Meanings of \"Domestic\" and \"Government\"",
		"context": "39 by dictionary definitions – of the component words of a statutory phrase. See, e.g., Intel Corp. Inv. Pol'y [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If anything, Yates teaches that the bar for depar- tures from ordinary meaning is high. Yates held that a fish was not a \"tangible object\" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of his First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise his Religion",
		"context": "of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"the neutrality principle, synthesized from the Free speech, Free e xercise and e stablishment c lauses of the First Amendment, respects the 'crucial distinction between government speech endorsing religion, which the e stablishment c lause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free s peech and Free exercise c lauses protect.'\" Nichol, 268 F .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of his First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise his Religion",
		"context": "Nichol, 268 F . S u p p . 2d a t 549 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In other words, the government can no more demonstrate hostility toward religion than it can sponsor religion: neutrality is the key. Mergens , 496 U.S. at 248.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of his First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise his Religion",
		"context": "Mergens , 496 U.S. at 248. It is this government neutrality toward religion that \"is the hallmark of the Religion clauses.\" ACLU of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. the c ircuit c ourt's opinion, however, stomps on this principle of neutrality and entirely erases the fine line between endorsement of and hostility toward religion, in favor of a categorical prohibition on all demonstrative religious expression, no matter how personal or fleeting, 7 by a coach when at work and in front of others. This prohibition violates the First Amendment rights of observant coaches, like Kennedy, and cannot be reconciled with this c ourt's precedent or with the decisions from other courts faithfully applying it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "84 F.3d 1471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of his First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise his Religion",
		"context": "in effect, such a rule would force observant coaches to choose between abiding by public school policy or the basic tenets of their faith; and, stretched to its inevitable conclusion, it would allow the d istrict to, among other things, prevent an observant m uslim from wearing a hijab, an observant Jew from wearing a yarmulke, or an observant c hristian from wearing a cross. t his c ourt has made clear, however, that the e stablishment c lause cannot \"license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities.\" Mergens , 496 U.S. at 248 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the d istrict's policy does just that. Broadly speaking, it prevents any school employee from even acknowledging that they are religiously observant, it prohibits any practice of that religion on school grounds in the presence of others, and it explicitly promotes secularism.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of his First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise his Religion",
		"context": "JA44, 77. this directive is entirely inappropriate as it expresses a \"value judgment that secular motivations\" for giving an inspirational talk are more important than \"religious motivations.\" Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (preventing school employees from wearing religious jewelry is openly \"averse to religion\" because it only punishes \"symbolic speech by its employees having religious content or viewpoint, while permitting its employees to wear jewelry containing secular messages\"). 9 For these reasons, the d istrict's policy toward religion generally, and as applied to Coach Kennedy specifically \"is not neutral in effect, and does not pretend to be.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "170 F.3d 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IX. IF GRANTED RELIEF, PETITIONERS SHOULD RECEIVE REASONABLY NARROW RELIEF, SO AS NOT NEEDLESSLY TO HURT MEMBERS OF ANY VULNERABLE MINORITIES OR OTHER PERSONS",
		"context": "\"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amicus is acutely concerned about what lessons the Draft —written by the Court, which is part of the Government —is teaching the People; what lessons the Court's 303 Creativ e LLC v. Elenis Opinion might teach; and what the Court's efforts to be neutral, or non-neutral, in America's \"culture war\", might teach. Many critics wonder if the present Court is biased towards one side of the cultural conflicts in America , which may revolve around abortion, LGBT issues, etc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U. S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CFAA Must Be Construed Narrowly",
		"context": "The CFAA imposes both civil and criminal liability. For this reason, the rule of lenity applies;2 and the prohibitions in the Act, whether in the criminal or civil context, must be interpreted similarly. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The rule of lenity requires \"penal laws .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CFAA Must Be Construed Narrowly",
		"context": "18 U.S. 76. \"[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 5 Because it is a criminal law, the CFAA must be narrowly construed—even in the civil context. Questions as to the conduct proscribed, including the scope of safe harbors, must be resolved in favor of a defendant. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 848",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CFAA Must Be Construed Narrowly",
		"context": "Questions as to the conduct proscribed, including the scope of safe harbors, must be resolved in favor of a defendant. Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress's changes to the text of section 1782(a) confirm Congress's focus on governmental bodies",
		"context": "§ § 270– 270g , which addressed similar matters, conferring powers on commissioners or members of \"international tribunals .\" Nat 'l Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Commission -drafted revision expanded section 1782's reach by replacing the statute's former reference to \"any judicial proceeding\" with the phrase \"a proceeding in a foreign or international tri bunal .\" Compare Act of May 24, 1949, § 93, 63 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The government has invoked the bar on encouraging unlawful immigration to justify monitoring reporters at the border.",
		"context": "22, 2019) . As a result of the lawsuit, the Department and its components began producing records that make clear the extent and gravity of the inappropriate government scrutiny that journalists working at the border received . For one, the documents illustrate an agency whose hair -trigger suspicions were activated by the bare fact that members of the press were sometimes present \"capturing images and documenting the event\" duri ng attempted border crossings, U.S. 7 Border Patrol Incident Report s at 6 (Dec. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/A36N -MLU4 —conduct that the First Amendment unquestionably protects, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, border officials appear to have leapt from the banal observation that photojournalists could be seen using \"professional photography equipment\" to document border crossing attempts to the inappropriate inference that the events were \"staged.\" U.S. Border Patrol Email Exchange re: Professional Photography Equipment at 4 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/E34P -FC2W .",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 1035",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.",
		"context": "Morgan's question presented for review is based on arguments that were neither raised before nor addressed by the lower courts, and thus should not be considered. See Pennsylvania Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Yeskey , this Court refused to consider whether application of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power because such argument \"was addressed by neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.",
		"context": "10-11. As such, the dissent's unprompted discussion of prejudice, absent \"the adversarial dispute necessary to apprise the [] court of the arguments,\" does not amount to the Eighth Circuit's \"considered judgment\" on an issue that would warrant review from this Court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case does not represent one of the \"unusual circumstances\" that would allow the Court to abandon its default rule that it \"will not entertain arguments not made below.\" OBB Personenverkehr 577 U.S. 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.",
		"context": "OBB Personenverkehr 577 U.S. 27. Thus, given that this is \"a court of review, not of first view,\" it would be inappropriate for the Court to grant certiorari based on this new argument. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. WARRANTLESS HOME SEARCHES PERMITTED BY THE FIFTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON OTHER GROUNDS",
		"context": "The First Circuit accurately pointed out that \"[t]hreats to individual an d community safety are not confined to the highways.\" 953 F.3d 112. As shown in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 820 F.3d 356, however, the courts could ha ve, and should have, used other available methods to address those threats rather than expand the scope of the community caretaking exception to the home. In United States v. York , the Fifth Circuit upheld a warrantless entry into a home because the officers were involved in community caretaking. 895 F.2d at 1030.",
		"citation_value_orig": "895 F.2d 1026",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. WARRANTLESS HOME SEARCHES PERMITTED BY THE FIFTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON OTHER GROUNDS",
		"context": "The First Circuit accurately pointed out that \"[t]hreats to individual an d community safety are not confined to the highways.\" 953 F.3d 112. As shown in 895 F.2d 1026, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], however, the courts could ha ve, and should have, used other available methods to address those threats rather than expand the scope of the community caretaking exception to the home. In United States v. York , the Fifth Circuit upheld a warrantless entry into a home because the officers were involved in community caretaking. 895 F.2d at 1030.",
		"citation_value_orig": "820 F.3d 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. WARRANTLESS HOME SEARCHES PERMITTED BY THE FIFTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON OTHER GROUNDS",
		"context": "According to the court, \"activities or circumstances within a dwelling may lessen the owner's reasonable expectation of privacy by creating a risk of intrusion that is 'reasonably foreseeable.'\" Id. at 1029 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 8 In the present case, the actions of the . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "580 F.2d 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. WARRANTLESS HOME SEARCHES PERMITTED BY THE FIFTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON OTHER GROUNDS",
		"context": "Id. at 362. In other 11 words, the warrantless entry was justifiable based on the \"immediate aid\" exception that the Court recognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The decisions of the Fift h and Eighth Circuits may have been correct based on the facts and circumstances of the respective cases, but the justification did not need to be—and should not have been—the community caretaking exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Do Not Interfere With Reliance Interests—but Invalidating Them Would",
		"context": "Like their common law ancestors, these statutes reflect the principle that \"a divorce should wipe the slate clean as to the divorced spouse, without the testator having to go to the time and expense of making a new will. We can be sure that in almost every instance a divorced person does not desire a bequest to the former spouse to remain in effect.\" Bloomer v. Capps (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1990, the Uniform Probate Code extended this principle from probate assets disposed of through a will (\"probate assets\") to assets disposed of through other revocable instruments (\"nonprobate assets\"), \"such as revocable inter-vivos trusts, life-insurance and retirement-plan beneficia ry designations, [and] 8 transfer-on-death accounts.\" UPC § 2-804 cmt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "620 S.W.2d 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Do Not Interfere With Reliance Interests—but Invalidating Them Would",
		"context": "App. 4a-5a, 7a-8a. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit considered itself bound by its previous opinion in Whirlpool [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that Oklahoma's nearly identical revocation-on-divorce statute violated the Contracts Clause because it frustrated the policyholder's contractual rights and expectations with respect to beneficiary designations. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "929 F.2d 1318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Unanimity is not subject to incorporation because it is not a fundamental right of trial procedure",
		"context": "There is no showing here that liber ty or justice does not exist without jury unanimity. This is not a case like Loving v. Virginia , or the many other cases in this Court's history that deal with rights that are personal and substantive. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is this unenumerated procedure so rudimentary that a trial is not really a trial without it. By contrast , \"[t]he reasonable - doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Unanimity is not subject to incorporation because it is not a fundamental right of trial procedure",
		"context": "By contrast , \"[t]he reasonable - doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting o n factual error.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Unanimity cannot be ranked in the same category as Winship or other fundamental precepts, like the presumption of innocence . As the plurality in Johnson reasoned, \"[t]hat rational 16 The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins , at 478.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Unanimity is not subject to incorporation because it is not a fundamental right of trial procedure",
		"context": "at 363. Further, \"there is no general requirement that the jur y reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.\" Schad , 501 U.S. at 631 (plurality) (citation omitted); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So this Court also permits jurors to have inconsistent vi ews of the essential facts of a given case. With enough jurors there will be differences of opinion , no matter the proof.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 2243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Unanimity is not subject to incorporation because it is not a fundamental right of trial procedure",
		"context": "England, among other common law jurisdictions, does not require unanimous criminal verdicts.17 Many other civilian countries similarly allow non -unanimous criminal jury verdicts. In addition to English common law, Louisiana law also arises from Spanish and French civilian legal traditions as both countries ruled Louisiana's territory. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neither of those two countries employs a unanimous jury verdict system.18",
		"citation_value_orig": "624 So.2d 1156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "he private flag raisings on the City Hall Flag Poles pursuant to Boston 's \"public forums \" for \"all applicants \" policy and practice are private speech, protected by the First Amendment, and not Boston 's government speech . The First Circuit below distorted this Court 's holdings in Pleasant Grove [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 576 U.S. 200 (2015 ), to create a rigid, \"three -part Summum/Walker test,\" under which the court concluded the private flag raisings on the City Hall Flag Poles are Boston 's government speech , freeing Boston to censor flags based on religious viewpoint and content . The First Circuit 's test , however, overly focused on the traditi onal uses of other government flag poles and disregarded Boston 's express policies and longstanding practices evidencing the City 's intent to designate its Flag Poles a public forum for private flag raisings. The First Circuit test is incompatible with, an d does considerable damage to , this Court 's forum doctrine —particularly the designated and nonpublic forum categories —by creating an almost irrebuttable presumption that government property traditionally used for government speech can only be used for gove rnment speech , and that even a 23 neutral, minimal application requirement to access government property transforms private speech into government speech, no matter how clearly a government 's actual policy and practice evidence its intent to designate the property a public forum for private spee ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. \" W. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, as a private actor, Camp Constitution engages in speech protected by the First Amendment when it flies its flag. Camp Constitution sought the City 's approval to fly its flag on one of the City Hall Flag Poles , for Camp Constitution 's own flag raising event, pursuant to the City 's \"public forums \" for \"all applicants \" policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Camp Constitution sought the City 's approval to fly its flag on one of the City Hall Flag Poles , for Camp Constitution 's own flag raising event, pursuant to the City 's \"public forums \" for \"all applicants \" policy. Under this Court 's forum doctrine, determining the constitutionality of the 24 City's exclusion of Camp Constitution 's flag from the Flag Poles forum re quires proper characterization of the forum based on the access sought by Camp Constitution. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As used for displaying the private flags of all comers during their flag raising ev ents, the City Hall Flag Poles are a designated public forum. Camp Constitution 's Challenge of the City's Policy Excluding Camp Constitution 's Flag Requires the Court to Determine Whether the City Intended to Designate the City Hall Flag Poles a Public Forum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "When the government excludes from its own property private speech protected by the First Amendment, this Court 's precedents require a forum analysis for assessing the constitutionality of the speech restriction. Minn. Voters [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2018 ). \"The forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which government - owned property or a government program was capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or the program. \" Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. 460 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018 ). \"The forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which government - owned property or a government program was capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or the program. \" Pleasant Grove City, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court uses the forum analysis \"as a means of determining when the Government 's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the inter est of those wishing to use the property for other purposes. \" Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 800.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "See Ark. Educ. Television Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, by both name and range of expression permitted, the City has intentionally designated the City Hall Flag Poles a public forum. In addition to its written policy designating the Flag Poles among its \"public forums \" for \"all applicants, \" the documented practices of the City pursuant to that policy confirm the City 's intent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Religion is a viewpoint on multiple subjects , and exclusion of all religious sp eech on otherwise permissible subjects is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimin ation . See, e.g. , Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 515 U.S. 819140 S. Ct. 34. The City 's reason for denying Camp Constitution 's flag raising event was precisely and only because the City deemed the flag objectionable , because it was called a \"Christian Flag\" on the application (Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Religion is a viewpoint on multiple subjects , and exclusion of all religious sp eech on otherwise permissible subjects is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimin ation . See, e.g. , Good News 533 U.S. 98; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 S. Ct. 34. The City 's reason for denying Camp Constitution 's flag raising event was precisely and only because the City deemed the flag objectionable , because it was called a \"Christian Flag\" on the application (Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Strict scrutiny is \"the most demanding test known to constitutional law, \" City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 US. 507, 534 (1997), which government restrictions rarely survive . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The City 's sole reason for denying Camp Constitution 's flag raising was because the City deemed the message communica ted by Camp Constitution 's flag to be religious. ( App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "150a –151a, 153a –156a .) \"Regulation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint - based regulations, is also an objectionable form of content -based regulation. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if Camp Constitution 's request was not denied based on the Christian viewpoint of its flag raising event (which it was; see Part II.A, 36 supra ), it undoubtedly was denied based on the religious \"subject matter \" of its flag, which is a content -based restriction on speech that is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. See Reed , 576 U.S. at 163.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 703",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "of Educ. of Westside Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, \"a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of an Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion .\" Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Fostering \"Diversity\" By Focusing on Race Has Profoundly Negative Consequences.",
		"context": "As discussed above, Bakke and Grutter 's endorsement of race-based admissions policies, based on the \"diversity ration ale,\" is demonstrably and grievously wrong. That arguably should suffice to justify their repudiation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent & Principle in Constitutional Adjudication , 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 401-08 (1988); Charles J. Cooper, A Note on Justice Marshall & Stare Decisis , 1992 P UB. INT.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 1960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "3, are in any event mostly rhetoric. On fee land—the only land affected by reservation status—tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is \"presumptively invalid.\" Plains Commerce [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 450 U.S. 544. \"[ W]ith one minor exception,\" this Court has \"never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.\" 533 U.S. 353.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "3, are in any event mostly rhetoric. On fee land—the only land affected by reservation status—tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is \"presumptively invalid.\" Plains Commerce 554 U.S. 316; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[ W]ith one minor exception,\" this Court has \"never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.\" 533 U.S. 353.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "Plains Commerce 554 U.S. 316; 450 U.S. 544. \"[ W]ith one minor exception,\" this Court has \"never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Meanwhile, States retain jurisdiction over non-Indians absent specific preemption under White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136—which this Court, again, has never applied to find preemption on fee lands. No surprise, then, that cities thrive within reservations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "\"[ W]ith one minor exception,\" this Court has \"never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.\" 533 U.S. 353. Meanwhile, States retain jurisdiction over non-Indians absent specific preemption under White Mountain Apache [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—which this Court, again, has never applied to find preemption on fee lands. No surprise, then, that cities thrive within reservations. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "See Okla. Sec'y of State, Tribal Compacts and Agreements, https://www.sos.ok.gov/gov/tribal.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). Nor must the Court take these points on faith, as any lingering concerns have answers. Parker itself gave one answer: While claims of \"disruption\" are irrelevant to disestablishment, the doctrine of City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], can address such claims. Sherrill held that \"equitable considerations of laches and acquiescence may curtail\" Tribes' ability to exercise rights that would disrupt settled expectations. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1082.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "E.g., Wis. Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting role of federal regulation in addressing State's concerns). Unlike courts, Congress can make bespoke revisions that account for both historical practice and today's realities. And it will.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sky Is Not Falling",
		"context": "8, 2016) 4 Examples can be found throughout the U.S. Code. Cohen's § 6.04(3)(a), at 537 n.45, 538 n.50, 539 n.51, 52 & 56; § 6.04(4)(c), at 582 n.343, 582-83 n.347. 43 (warning of \"the release of hundreds or thousands of dangerous criminals\"); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And here, Oklahoma has offered no reason to believe the effects will be large. Even state prisoners who could bring claims will think twice: Success will subject them to federal prosecutions—which often yield harsher sentences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "The First Amendment enshrines \"the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.\" Turner Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also West Virginia State B d. of Educ 319 U.S. 624. Opinions of this Court ha ve struck down government efforts to compel ideological speech without reference to whether the government might establish that it meets strict scrutiny. For instance, Justice Jackson's 5 famous formulation in Barnette is practically a cliché by now: If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "The First Amendment enshrines \"the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.\" Turner Broad. 512 U.S. 622 ; see also West Virginia State B d. of Educ [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Opinions of this Court ha ve struck down government efforts to compel ideological speech without reference to whether the government might establish that it meets strict scrutiny. For instance, Justice Jackson's 5 famous formulation in Barnette is practically a cliché by now: If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "at 717 (emphasis added) . This language resonated. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court held that the government's compulsion of speech violated the fundamental protections of the First Amendment. See id. at 573 8 (\"[T]his use of the State' s power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "See id. at 573 8 (\"[T]his use of the State' s power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, in Wooley, the Court did not apply a rigorous strict scrutiny analysis to reject mandated government authorship or modification of an individual's message , and construed the First Amendment broadly to \"forbid\" compelled speech like that at issue in Hurley . Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578 (\"When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their ow n. But in the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object is merely to allow exactly what the general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids .\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "Many lower courts have agreed with the idea that not engaging in expressive conduct is absolutely protected by the First Amendment, without regard to the interests the government p urports to further by compelling speech . See 3 F.4th 152 (\"In the same way that the Council's choice of parade units [in Hurley ] was expressive conduct, so too is Amazon's choice of what charities are eligible to receive donations through AmazonSmile. Applying Title II in the way Coral Ridge proposes would … instead 'modify the content of Amazon's expression '—and thus modify Amazon's 'speech itself '\"); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Additionally, in other First Amendment contexts, the Court has s imilarly rejected government mandate s without pausing to consider w hether the importance of the government 's preferred message could allow it to co -opt a person's expressive conduct . For instance, in Boy Scouts of 530 U.S. 640, the Court engaged in an extensive analysis of compelled association.",
		"citation_value_orig": "845 F.Supp.2d 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "Applying Title II in the way Coral Ridge proposes would … instead 'modify the content of Amazon's expression '—and thus modify Amazon's 'speech itself '\"); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 845 F.Supp.2d 266. Additionally, in other First Amendment contexts, the Court has s imilarly rejected government mandate s without pausing to consider w hether the importance of the government 's preferred message could allow it to co -opt a person's expressive conduct . For instance, in Boy Scouts of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court engaged in an extensive analysis of compelled association. Without referring to strict scrutiny , it seemed to qui ckly weigh, but also quickly dismiss, the state's purported interest in compelling the Boy Scouts to convey a message contrary to their organization. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "Additionally, in the freedom of press context, this Court struck down compelled speech requirements imposed on newspap ers, while also seemingly suggesting that there is no need to evaluate the government's interest or its means. See Miami Herald Pub. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 4 In holding for the newspaper, the Court flatly rejected the idea that the government could compel newspapers to print certain pieces. There was no 3 In another part of the opinion, the Court seemed to suggest that it might consider compelling state interests so long as the interest was \"unrelated to the suppression of ideas.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "Admittedly , this Court has sent mixed messages. For instance, in Pacific Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court state d plainly that \" Appellant … [has] the right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own rights in order to enhance the relative voice of its opponents. \" (emphasis added) ; see id. at 16 (\"Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next .\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "at 20 (\"Notwithstanding that it burdens protected speech, the Commission 's order could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest. \"). Similarly, in National Institute of Family and Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court seemed to determine that California's law compelled certain clinics to provide state -sponsored messages contrary to their beliefs. 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (\" By requiring petitioners to inform women how they can 12 obtain state -subsidized abortions —at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly ' alters the content ' of petitioners ' speech . \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "Also, i n Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, the Court cited language from Barnette that seemed to suggest that compelled speech might be subject to a different test than suppression of speech , although not to a per se rule against such compulsion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding 'involuntary affirmation' of objected -to beliefs would require 'even more immediate and urgent grounds' than a law demanding silence. \") (emphasis added) . Yet the Court in Janus also cited 487 U.S. 781, which stated that \"[t] here is certainly some difference between compelled speech and 13 compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 2 (\"Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding 'involuntary affirmation' of objected -to beliefs would require 'even more immediate and urgent grounds' than a law demanding silence. \") (emphasis added) . Yet the Court in Janus also cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which stated that \"[t] here is certainly some difference between compelled speech and 13 compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance.\" 487 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added) . Likewise , some advocates may cite Justice Thomas 's concurring opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop either to support a per se ban on government compulsion of messages or to merely req uire \"the most exacting scrutiny\" for evaluation of compelled spe ech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "487 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added) . Likewise , some advocates may cite Justice Thomas 's concurring opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop either to support a per se ban on government compulsion of messages or to merely req uire \"the most exacting scrutiny\" for evaluation of compelled spe ech. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"While this Court acknowledged that the unit 's exclusion [in Hurley ] might have been \"misguided, or even hurtful, it rejected the notion that governments can mandate thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people as the antithesis of free speech .\") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added) and id. at 1745 (\" The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from requiring Phillips to bear witness to these facts, or to affirm a belief with which he disagrees .\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "at 1746. (\"In cases like this one, our precedents demand 'the most exacting scrutiny'\") . 5 5 Note, however, that Justice Thomas cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; and 561 U.S. 1, for the \"exacting scrutiny \" proposition. Neither case involved a government entity compelling a speaker to express a message contrary to his will. 14 The inconsistency between the blanket statements of invalidity, and the idea that the government may be able to establish that it has met either strict scrutiny —or some alternative heightened , but unspecified test —has never been resolved.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test",
		"context": "at 1746. (\"In cases like this one, our precedents demand 'the most exacting scrutiny'\") . 5 5 Note, however, that Justice Thomas cited 491 U.S. 397 ; and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the \"exacting scrutiny \" proposition. Neither case involved a government entity compelling a speaker to express a message contrary to his will. 14 The inconsistency between the blanket statements of invalidity, and the idea that the government may be able to establish that it has met either strict scrutiny —or some alternative heightened , but unspecified test —has never been resolved.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit has Given New Jersey an Engraved Invitation to Disregard the Constitution.",
		"context": "Instead of following the guidance provided in Heller , these courts minimized that decision's framework. Rogers , 140 S. Ct. at 1866 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"I share Justice Alito's concern that some federal and state courts may not be properly applying Heller and McDonald . \"); 577 U.S. 1039 Of all the courts to have relegated the Second Amendment to a second-class right, however, few have done it as thoroughly as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. And New Jersey has taken the ball and run with it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit has Given New Jersey an Engraved Invitation to Disregard the Constitution.",
		"context": "\"); 577 U.S. 1039 Of all the courts to have relegated the Second Amendment to a second-class right, however, few have done it as thoroughly as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. And New Jersey has taken the ball and run with it. The Third Circuit addressed essentially the same issue that is now before this Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Drake was a challenge to New Jersey's highly restrictive \"justifiable need\" requirement. In upholding the rule, the court engaged in two bits of judicial sleight of hand that illustrate just how unserious the Third Circuit seems about the Second Amendment and this Court's rulings in Heller and McDonald .",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit has Given New Jersey an Engraved Invitation to Disregard the Constitution.",
		"context": "The court accomplished this by stripping \"longstanding\" of any constitutionally significant meaning. The court discussed three possible dates of relevance: (1) 1966, the year New Jersey first imposed the highly restrictive requirement of \"justifiable need\" on all forms of handgun carry. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; (2) 1924, the year New Jersey first created the permit requirement for concealed carry (no permit was required for open carry until \u0003 \u0003 \u0003 \u0003\u0003 \u0003 \u0003 18 1966); and (3) 1911, the year New York imposed its permit requirement for handgun carry. Missing from the court's analysis, however, was any tether to Heller or McDonald or any explanation of why any of those dates had constitutional significance in concluding that New Jersey's exceedingly harsh rule is \"longstanding.\" Notably, none of those dates bear any relationship to the history of the Second Amendment or the right to keep and bear arms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 A.2d 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rescission would not redress plaintiffs' injuries because DACA's invalidity would require reinstating the pre-DACA status quo ante litem",
		"context": "Res. Def. Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that does nothing to protect the underlying rule from procedur al or substantive challenges. Indeed, judicially revoking an agency 's rescission sometimes \"casts a cloud over the very 9 regulations it implicitly reinstates \" because the rationale for vacating the agency 's revocation also affects the underlying rule, NRDC v. EPA , 725 F.2d at 772; 413 F.3d 999.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.2d 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rescission would not redress plaintiffs' injuries because DACA's invalidity would require reinstating the pre-DACA status quo ante litem",
		"context": "Council, 725 F.2d 761. But that does nothing to protect the underlying rule from procedur al or substantive challenges. Indeed, judicially revoking an agency 's rescission sometimes \"casts a cloud over the very 9 regulations it implicitly reinstates \" because the rationale for vacating the agency 's revocation also affects the underlying rule, NRDC v. EPA , 725 F.2d at 772; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a cloud would be cast by any judgment that revokes the federal defendants ' rescission of DACA. Specifically, plaintiffs ' prevailing here and in similar cases would make clear that DACA was procedurally invalid on the day that the federal defendants ' predecessors promulgated DACA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F.3d 999",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Alternative Interpretation of Section 1254a(f)(4) Is Incorrect",
		"context": "That rule applies squarely here. \"If Congress had intended to refer\" only to section 1255(c)(2) , \"it presumably would have done so — just by adding a letter, a number, and a few parentheti- cals.\" Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because Congress did not limit section 1254a(f)(4)'s coverage to one subsection of section 1255, the Court should not \"cherry pick from the mate- rial\" that section 1254a(f)(4) cover s. Id. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Alternative Interpretation of Section 1254a(f)(4) Is Incorrect",
		"context": "Each subsection of section 1254a(f) sets out, in parallel structure, a benefit or status that applies to individuals \"granted temporary protected status,\" re- gardless of how they entered the country. It would be bi- zarre to conclude that section 1254a(f)(4) alone —which uses the same structure as its neighboring subsections — applies to only a subset of TPS recipients. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] requires an applicant for adjustment of status to \"maintain contin- uously a lawful status since entry.\" Section 1254a(f)(4) , 32 however, provides that a TPS recipient \"shall be consid- ered as\" both \"being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Alternative Interpretation of Section 1254a(f)(4) Is Incorrect",
		"context": "If the only purpose of section 1254a(f)(4) were to insu- late persons who had nonimmigrant status when they re- ceived TPS from the bar in section 1255(c)(2) , Congress need only have used the word \"maintaining\" in section 1254a(f)(4) . The Third Circuit's decision thus renders the words \"being in\" surplusage. Advocate Health Care , 137 S. Ct. at 1659 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] refers to not only \"adjustment of status under section 1255\" but also \" change of status under section 1258.\" Section 1258 authorizes USCIS to change the status of \"any nonimmi- grant classification to any other nonimmigrant classifica- tion in the case of any alien lawfully admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant who is continuing to maintain that status and who is not inadmissible.\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Alternative Interpretation of Section 1254a(f)(4) Is Incorrect",
		"context": ". that Congress sought to accomplish in a 'surpassingly strange manner' what it could have accomplished in a much more straightforward way.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it knew how to do so in a far more straightforward way . The distinc- tion between section 1254a(f)(4) and this other legislation is yet another reason to reject the government's position. See 555 U.S. 379 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Alternative Interpretation of Section 1254a(f)(4) Is Incorrect",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 1804 , it knew how to do so in a far more straightforward way . The distinc- tion between section 1254a(f)(4) and this other legislation is yet another reason to reject the government's position. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . a. In the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, Congress sought to protect Chinese nationals who already had nonimmigrant status by providing that, \"[f]or purposes of any adjustment of status under\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute",
		"context": "2255(a). This Court has c larified that federal statutory claims involving fundamental defects are cognizable under Section 2255. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Peti- tioner's sentencing court could therefore adjudicate his statutory claim and, if the claim were successful, could provide full relief by \"vacat[ing] and set[ting] the judgment aside.\" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute",
		"context": "Regardless of the practical un-likelihood that the challenge woul d have succeeded within the Eighth Circuit at that time, the 2255 reme-dy was neither inadequate nor ineffective to test that claim. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is also undisputed that petitioner's sen- tencing court is still accessible and is able to afford complete relief on any 2255 motion that might be properly filed today. After all, courts within the Eighth Circuit have adjudicated numerous 2255 mo- tions raising Rehaif claims.3 ii.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute",
		"context": "Congress would have succeeded not in lim-iting collateral attacks but in enacting a set of obliquely worded forum -shifting provisions, which trans fer Congress's disfavored claims from the sen- tencing court to a habeas court. Put mildly, \"it would not be sensible to read [Sec- tion 2255(h)] as making § 2255 'inadequate or ineffec- tive' and thus nullifying itself.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even the courts of appeals that have adopted some variant of petitioner's theory have rejected that reasoning, though they have nevertheless carved out various unprincipled excep- tions to AEDPA's internal gatekeeping limits. See, e.g., Unit ed 178 F.3d 34; In re119 F.3d 245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "314 F.3d 832",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute",
		"context": "314 F.3d 832. Even the courts of appeals that have adopted some variant of petitioner's theory have rejected that reasoning, though they have nevertheless carved out various unprincipled excep- tions to AEDPA's internal gatekeeping limits. See, e.g., Unit ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re119 F.3d 245. It is nonsensical to attribute a self -defeating intent to the 1996 Congress that enacted AEDPA. And it is equally nonsensical to attribute to the 1948 Congress an intent to protect federal inmates from any future internal gatekeeping rules like AEDPA's, as opposed to protecting those inmates from the vagaries of sentencing -court availability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "178 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute",
		"context": "314 F.3d 832. Even the courts of appeals that have adopted some variant of petitioner's theory have rejected that reasoning, though they have nevertheless carved out various unprincipled excep- tions to AEDPA's internal gatekeeping limits. See, e.g., Unit ed 178 F.3d 34; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is nonsensical to attribute a self -defeating intent to the 1996 Congress that enacted AEDPA. And it is equally nonsensical to attribute to the 1948 Congress an intent to protect federal inmates from any future internal gatekeeping rules like AEDPA's, as opposed to protecting those inmates from the vagaries of sentencing -court availability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "119 F.3d 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's prior decision in this case does not support the constitutional right respondents assert",
		"context": "42 n.11 , nothing in the Court's summation suggests that it extended relief beyond the activities of \"domestic\" funding recipients, 570 U.S. at 210, so as to preclu de application of Section 7631 (f ) to foreign non -parties that lack constitutional rights. To the extent the sentence could be read in isolation to have broader implications, this Court has cautioned against such inferences based on \"[q] uestions which merely lurk in the record.\" Cooper Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] against respond- ents could not be alleviated through respondents' crea- tion of affiliated entities without producing \"evident hy- pocrisy.\" 570 U.S . at 219; see Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Federal Circuit Arrived at Its Erroneous Decision Using Flawed Logic and by Ignoring Binding Precedent",
		"context": "WesternGeco I , 791 F.3d at 1350. There was no argument in Power Integrations that the particular units of the patented invention that were manu factured in the United States in violation of the patent were subsequent ly sold or use d abroad. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit, in Power Integrations , did not attempt to justify a per se rule against damages based on foreign sales in all cases . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "711 F.3d 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Federal Circuit Arrived at Its Erroneous Decision Using Flawed Logic and by Ignoring Binding Precedent",
		"context": "at 1371. In WesternGeco I , the Federal Circuit likewise fails to provide any logical or persuasive reasoning to justify the per se rule it announced. Instead, the court below relied on broad pronouncements from 24 Power Integratio ns and this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which when taken out of context seem to dictate the holding below. But, as shown above, Power Integrations does not support the Federal Circuit's decision . Neither does Duches ne.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Intellectual Property Clause Reflects A Plan-Of-The-Convention Waiver Of Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "Petitioners recognize, just as this Court long has, that immunity from suit is \"a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States retain that immunity from suit today \"except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Intellectual Property Clause Reflects A Plan-Of-The-Convention Waiver Of Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "Id. (States do not retain sovereign immunity if \"surrender of this immunity [is] in the plan of the convention\") (quoting T HE FEDERALIST N O. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, this Court has held that Congress wields power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I when there is \"'compelling evidence' that the States were required to surrender this power to Congress pursuant to the constitutional design.\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 713 (quoting 501 U.S. 775).",
		"citation_value_orig": "292 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Intellectual Property Clause Reflects A Plan-Of-The-Convention Waiver Of Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "81 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also 292 U.S. 313. Accordingly, this Court has held that Congress wields power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I when there is \"'compelling evidence' that the States were required to surrender this power to Congress pursuant to the constitutional design.\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 713 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Such \"compelling evidence\" exists here, establish- ing that States surrendered their immunity from suit for infringement through the Intellectual Property Clause. 22",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kokesh's Characterization Of SEC Disgorgements As Penalties Is Not Confined To Limitations Of Actions. It Also Applies To Disgorgements Considered As A Form Of Court-Ordered Relief",
		"context": "BIO at 5 -7. First, the SEC invoked the inherent equitable powers of a court to grant all needed relief that is adjunct to an injunction. For this expansive conception of the \"inherent\" equitable powers of a federal court to do \"complete rather than truncated justice,\" it relied on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case which is pretty much the locus classicus for an enlarged view of equity jurisdiction .2 But i t is worth taking a look at the relief Porter allowed, before we consider the expansive language upon which the SEC so much relies as a basis for awards of punitive disgorgements . Porter dealt with rent overcharges under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1946 . While the word \"disgorge\" is applied once to the relief in that case, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kokesh's Characterization Of SEC Disgorgements As Penalties Is Not Confined To Limitations Of Actions. It Also Applies To Disgorgements Considered As A Form Of Court-Ordered Relief",
		"context": "to order restitution of rents collected by a landlord in excess of the permissible maximums\") , 397 (\"other order\") , 399 (same) . In fact, so far was that case from being concerned with anything like the punitive disgorgements at issue here that the Court wrote, \"Restitution, which lies within that equitable jurisdiction, is consistent with 2 A second case that the SEC cites , BIO at 5, relies o n Porter . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 and differs greatly from the damages and penalties which may be awarded under [another section of the act which granted a personal right of action at la w plus treble damages ].\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kokesh's Characterization Of SEC Disgorgements As Penalties Is Not Confined To Limitations Of Actions. It Also Applies To Disgorgements Considered As A Form Of Court-Ordered Relief",
		"context": "See 137 U.S. at 1644. Any more expansive language found in Porter would nowadays be read in light of this Court 's renewed and more cautious emphasis on traditional principles of equity . See Grupo Mexicano , 527 U.S. at 322 (\"equity is flexible; but in the federal system, at least, tha t flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief\") ; Great -West Life & Annuity Inc. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 547 U.S. 356 . See also supra pp. 4 -5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kokesh's Characterization Of SEC Disgorgements As Penalties Is Not Confined To Limitations Of Actions. It Also Applies To Disgorgements Considered As A Form Of Court-Ordered Relief",
		"context": "See BIO at 5 -6. The first case was decided under a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act and ruled that the law permitted an injunction against the employer to be accompanied by an order to \"reimburse\" workers for unlawfully detained wages. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying on Porter , the Court left no doubt that it regarded the reimbursement as restitutionary and not punitive. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kokesh's Characterization Of SEC Disgorgements As Penalties Is Not Confined To Limitations Of Actions. It Also Applies To Disgorgements Considered As A Form Of Court-Ordered Relief",
		"context": "See id . at 298 n.1 (Whit taker, Black, Clark, JJ., dissenting) (discussing \"restitution\" in Porter ), 301 ( arguing 1949 amendment ban ned such \"restitution order\"). See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As it happens, the words \"disgorge\" and \"disgorgement\" do not even appear in Mitchell . The second case was decided thirteen years after Sarbanes -Oxley was enacted and so it could scarcely have been \"back drop \" to the legislation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "Because \"[n]o party identifie[d] any reason to question the FCC's key competitive findings and judgments\" or even challenged its \"core determination that the ownership rules have ceased to serve the 'public interest,' \" Pet.App.55a (Scirica, J., dissenting), the Third Circuit should have upheld the Order. II. Notwithstanding the lack of any statutory requirement to consider minority and female ownership, the Third Circuit declared that factor an \"important aspect of the problem\" that the Commission must \"consider\" in Section 202(h) reviews under Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet.App.41a. The Third Circuit then vacated the Reconsideration 22 Order because the FCC did not collect sufficient empirical evidence or conduct an in-depth theoretical analysis of the prospective effect of the rule changes on minority and female ownership.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "1996 Act, § 202(h) (emphases added). Section 202's other provisions, which eliminated or relaxed various ownership rules, provide strong contextual evidence of Section 202(h)'s deregulatory bent. See Fox TV Stations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is not just review but reform, with the focus squarely on competition. Respondents' interpretation also \"encounter[s] a superfluity problem.\" Republic of 139 S. Ct. 1048 (2019 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 F.3d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "See Fox TV Stations, 280 F.3d 1027 is not just review but reform, with the focus squarely on competition. Respondents' interpretation also \"encounter[s] a superfluity problem.\" Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2019 ). If Section 202(h) imposes the same standard as \"any other\" grant of rulemaking authority, Resp.Br.24, and \"the public interest as the result of competition\" just means \"the public interest,\" see Resp.Br.27, Section 202(h) is nearly meaningless. The Communications Act already instructs \"the Commission from time to time\" to \"[m]ake such rules and re gulations\" as will serve the second sentence, because the \"determin[ation]\" identified there is the determination required by the first sentence, which is cabined by \"the result of competition.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1048",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "And the Commission already is legally bound to reevaluate its rules as \"time and changing circumstances\" demand. Nat'l Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 823 F.2d 1554 would do nothing more than impose a timing requirement on the Commission to take a general look at the ownership rules every four years, with no different orientation than in a typical rulemaking. But Congress knew how to instruct the Commission to review ownership rules without pursuing a deregulatory purpose or giving primacy to a specific factor. That is what Co ngress did in Section 202(c), ordering the FCC to \"conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to retain, modify, or eliminate\" its Local Television Rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "And the Commission already is legally bound to reevaluate its rules as \"time and changing circumstances\" demand. Nat'l Broad. 319 U.S. 190; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] would do nothing more than impose a timing requirement on the Commission to take a general look at the ownership rules every four years, with no different orientation than in a typical rulemaking. But Congress knew how to instruct the Commission to review ownership rules without pursuing a deregulatory purpose or giving primacy to a specific factor. That is what Co ngress did in Section 202(c), ordering the FCC to \"conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to retain, modify, or eliminate\" its Local Television Rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "823 F.2d 1554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "47 U.S. C. § 151. But a nondiscrimination policy for the availability of services is not an affirmative mandate to favor certain groups as station owners. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress instructed the FCC to consider minority and Other times, they suggest that Section 202(h) merely \"authorizes \" the Commission to do so. Resp.Br.26, 32-33.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "13620, 13627 (2003)). While this Court has \"recognized congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations of a statute in some situations,\" it has done so \"with extreme care.\" Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents fail to identify \"overwhelming evidence of acquiescence,\" id. at 169 n.5, to any \"settled\" constru ction endorsing their view, 543 U.S. 335.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 531 U.S. 159. Respondents fail to identify \"overwhelming evidence of acquiescence,\" id. at 169 n.5, to any \"settled\" constru ction endorsing their view, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 2004 appropriations rider was narrowly targeted: It decreased the frequency of Section 202(h) reviews from \"biennially\" to \"quadrennially,\" § 629(3), and raised the national television ownership cap (not at issue here) from 35% to 39%, § 629(1)-(2). It did not \"comprehensively revise[ ] [the] statutory scheme.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "The 2004 appropriations rider was narrowly targeted: It decreased the frequency of Section 202(h) reviews from \"biennially\" to \"quadrennially,\" § 629(3), and raised the national television ownership cap (not at issue here) from 35% to 39%, § 629(1)-(2). It did not \"comprehensively revise[ ] [the] statutory scheme.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, even if the FCC had previously adopted Respondents' understanding of Section 202(h), the 9 2004 rider's \"isolated amendments\" could not have ratified that interpretation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "Resp.Br.26 n.7. The canon of constitutional avoidance, however, is always relevant to statutory interpretation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The canon applies with pa rticular force here. In National Broadcasting Co. , this Court held that \"the public interest\" must \"be in terpreted by its context\" to prevent \"an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
		"context": "Accordingly, the only basis on which the Commission could have retained them—on Respondents' view—w ould be if it intended that they would result in more minorities and women owning broadcast stations. Interpreting Section 202(h) to permit that result would raise serious constitutional difficulties, even if the rules themselves are facially \"race- and gender-neutral.\" Resp.Br.26 n.7; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 11 (noting \"the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose\"). These constitutional concerns are hardly \"unfounded.\" Resp.Br.26 n.7; Southeastern.Legal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Privacy Is No Less Important for the Business Community.",
		"context": "94 -658, at 307– 08 (emphases added). In all events , all private persons —natural and cor- porate —have an \"interest in maintaining the privacy of [their] 'papers and effects. '\" Church of Scientology of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case that \"was undoubtedly fam iliar\" to \"every American statesman\" during the late eighteenth century, 116 U.S. 616, Lord Camden ob- served: \"Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are so far from en-during a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspec- tion,\" id. at 627 –628 (quoting Entick , 19 How. St. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Privacy Is No Less Important for the Business Community.",
		"context": "94 -658, at 307– 08 (emphases added). In all events , all private persons —natural and cor- porate —have an \"interest in maintaining the privacy of [their] 'papers and effects. '\" Church of Scientology of 506 U.S. 9, a case that \"was undoubtedly fam iliar\" to \"every American statesman\" during the late eighteenth century, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Lord Camden ob- served: \"Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are so far from en-during a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspec- tion,\" id. at 627 –628 (quoting Entick , 19 How. St. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Privacy Is No Less Important for the Business Community.",
		"context": "The interest in preserving the privacy of one's papers undoubtedly extends to ledgers, invoices, insurance policies, and other types of business records. Cf. Boyd , 116 U.S. at 622 (subpoenaed invoices were tantamount to \"compulsory production of a man's private papers\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]282 U.S. 344. Such records usually contain important information that reflects the cu rrent health of a business, its opportunities for future growth, and its potential vulnerabilities. For many businesses, their very survival often depends on keeping that in- formation private from their competitors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "201 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Privacy Is No Less Important for the Business Community.",
		"context": "The interest in preserving the privacy of one's papers undoubtedly extends to ledgers, invoices, insurance policies, and other types of business records. Cf. Boyd , 116 U.S. at 622 (subpoenaed invoices were tantamount to \"compulsory production of a man's private papers\"); 201 U.S. 43[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such records usually contain important information that reflects the cu rrent health of a business, its opportunities for future growth, and its potential vulnerabilities. For many businesses, their very survival often depends on keeping that in- formation private from their competitors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' State-Law Challenges",
		"context": "Either way, the court's order cannot stand. As to the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiffs concede that federal courts may not enjoin state laws on state- foreclose. Miller, 515 U.S. at 912; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 law grounds, Mot.31-32, but argue that the district court \"was not adjudicating any state-law claims,\" and ruled only that \"the General Assembly exceeded the scope of the redrawing authorized by the court.\" Mot.30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.",
		"context": "Based on precedent and the text of the FAA, this Court has held that courts have \"no business weighing the merits of [a] grievance\" that \"is assigned by con- tract to an arbitrator.\" Henry Schein, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet that is exactly what the minority rule permits—district courts in the Second, Fifth, and 5 Ninth Circuits are very much open for business to weigh the merits of a grievance subject to arbitration. The minority rule permits litigation to advance on the merits in the district court while the appellate court determines whether the matter should instead be arbitrated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.",
		"context": "See Blinco , 366 F.3d at 1251 (\"If the court of appeals reverses and orders the dispute arbitrated, then the costs of the litigation in the district court in-curred during appellate review have been wasted and the parties must begin again in arbitration.\"). That is why Judge Easterbrook noted that \"[t]he worst possible outcome would be to litigate the dis-pute, to have the court of appeals reverse and order the dispute arbitrated, to arbitrate the dispute, and finally to return to court to have the award enforced.\" Bradford-Scott Data [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This \"worst possible outcome\" has been business- as-usual in the Ninth Circuit in the over 30 years since Britton was decided. Appendix A lists the results of Amicus' empirical analysis of Ninth Circuit appeals 6 from denials of motions to compel arbitration from Oc- tober 11, 1990 to January 10, 2023.",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 F.3d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.",
		"context": "48. 7 After over two years on appeal, the Ninth Cir- cuit reversed the district court's order denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's claims about a month after the Ninth Circuit's mandate issued in August 2016, after spending years engaged in substantial motion practice and discovery proceedings before the district court. Stipula-tion of Dismissal, Geier , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.3d 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.",
		"context": "(ECF Nos. 200, 231.) x In Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp. , the Ninth Circuit also held that the district court errone- ously denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Appellate proceedings again lasted over two years, and the district court had denied de- fendant's motion for a stay pending appeal. Order, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 F.3d 1114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.",
		"context": "(ECF Nos. 66, 82.) x In Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc. , the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the district court pro- ceedings were not stayed pending appeal. Mem. Decision & Order, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "144 F.3d 1205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.",
		"context": "In these and many other cases that were not stayed pending appeal, the parties were ordered to en-gage in broad-ranging federal discovery while the appeal was pending. This \"cut[s] against the efficiency and cost-saving purposes of arbitration\" and \"could al- ter the nature of the dispute significantly\" because if the appellate court ultimately holds \"that the claims were indeed subject to mandatory arbitration, the par-ties will not be able to unring any bell rung by discovery, and they will be forced to endure the conse- quences of litigation disc overy in the arbitration process.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Counsel's research reveals that litigants in the Ninth Circuit regularly endure these consequences: 10 x In Meeks v. Experian Information Services, Inc. , the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a pu- tative class action, and remanded2022 WL 17958634. While the appeal was pending, the dis-trict court allowed \"discovery on the merits as to CACI and Experian\" to proceed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated",
		"context": "Bd. of Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that case, the students prevailed both before the dis-trict court and on appeal, but were denied relief for no other reason than they aged out. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated",
		"context": "This case and Jacobs are just two of many in which claims for prospective relief were not fully adjudi- cated prior to plaintiffs' graduation. Given that high school and university students are often within a few years—or only a few months—of graduation, the loss of prospective relief due to graduation is a recurring issue. See, e.g., 318 F. App'x 540; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 16 F.3d 785; 334 F.3d 470. However, stu- dents who graduate cannot benefit from the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception to moot- ness, because that exception only applies where the same plaintiff may be subject to the challenged regula- tions. See 416 U.S. 312.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated",
		"context": "This case and Jacobs are just two of many in which claims for prospective relief were not fully adjudi- cated prior to plaintiffs' graduation. Given that high school and university students are often within a few years—or only a few months—of graduation, the loss of prospective relief due to graduation is a recurring issue. See, e.g., 318 F. App'x 540; 495 F.3d 1182; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 334 F.3d 470. However, stu- dents who graduate cannot benefit from the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception to moot- ness, because that exception only applies where the same plaintiff may be subject to the challenged regula- tions. See 416 U.S. 312.",
		"citation_value_orig": "16 F.3d 785",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated",
		"context": "This case and Jacobs are just two of many in which claims for prospective relief were not fully adjudi- cated prior to plaintiffs' graduation. Given that high school and university students are often within a few years—or only a few months—of graduation, the loss of prospective relief due to graduation is a recurring issue. See, e.g., 318 F. App'x 540; 495 F.3d 1182; 16 F.3d 785; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, stu- dents who graduate cannot benefit from the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception to moot- ness, because that exception only applies where the same plaintiff may be subject to the challenged regula- tions. See 416 U.S. 312.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 F.3d 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated",
		"context": "See, e.g., 318 F. App'x 540; 495 F.3d 1182; 16 F.3d 785; 334 F.3d 470. However, stu- dents who graduate cannot benefit from the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception to moot- ness, because that exception only applies where the same plaintiff may be subject to the challenged regula- tions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this Court were to hold that a claim for nominal damages for a past constitutional violation is an insuf-ficient basis for judicial intervention, religious students would have practically no recourse for constitutional violations where there are no damages apart from the deprivation of constitutional rights. Having no claim for compensatory damages, such students would, in ef- fect, only have prospective relief and nominal damages that are unlikely to ever be fully adjudicated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated",
		"context": "See Brief for Student Press Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hazelwood Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, school districts, regardless of the merits of the students' case, will often be able to stave off final resolution of a mat- ter until the students have graduated and have no re- course. In such a scenario, even public interest groups that can mitigate the difference in resources may be discouraged from getting involved in matters where final resolution prior to gr aduation is unlikely.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Congress May Pass Rational Legislation Pursuant To Its Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority.",
		"context": "Text, history, structure, and precedent dictate that the rationality standard announced in South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , governs Congress's enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment . By contrast, t he congruence and propor- tionality test articulated in City of 521 U.S. 507 , \"has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution,\" a nd is a \"standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy -driven deci- sionmaking.\" 541 U.S. 509 , has no applica- tion to a nationwide statute like Section 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Congress May Pass Rational Legislation Pursuant To Its Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority.",
		"context": "Text, history, structure, and precedent dictate that the rationality standard announced in South 383 U.S. 301 , governs Congress's enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment . By contrast, t he congruence and propor- tionality test articulated in City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , \"has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution,\" a nd is a \"standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy -driven deci- sionmaking.\" 541 U.S. 509 , has no applica- tion to a nationwide statute like Section 2. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Congress May Pass Rational Legislation Pursuant To Its Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority.",
		"context": "Text, history, structure, and precedent dictate that the rationality standard announced in South 383 U.S. 301 , governs Congress's enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment . By contrast, t he congruence and propor- tionality test articulated in City of 521 U.S. 507 , \"has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution,\" a nd is a \"standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy -driven deci- sionmaking.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , has no applica- tion to a nationwide statute like Section 2. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 509",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. North Carolina relied in good faith on its contract with Allen",
		"context": ". If a contract grants a license to use a particular work, then \"the existence of actual consent negates the necessity of conducting a fair use analysis in the first place.\" Peter Letterese & Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a license, of course, is an \"independent affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 F.3d 1287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. North Carolina relied in good faith on its contract with Allen",
		"context": "In those instances, the fair-use doctrine provides an important backstop: When a user of a copyrighted work relies in good faith on a contract with the copyright holder, courts have \"routinely considered\" that factor as evidence of fair use. Patry, supra , § 10:156 (collecting cases). The rationale for considering that factor is that \"[f ]air use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing[,]' \" Harper , 471 U.S. at 562, which are features inherent in a contractual relationship, see Campbell , 510 U.S. at 585 n.18; see also Perfect 10, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, it is undisputed that there was a contract between the parties: an October 2013 settlement agreement. Pet'r's Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 F.3d 1146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "The Second Circuit held that a private party was a state actor without meaningfully engaging in any recognizable state action analysis—despite this Court's mandate that \"careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement … preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1. P et.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "Taking its cue from Justice Kennedy's partial dissent in Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Circuit then held that Manhattan's public access channels are constitutional public fora, and, relying on that finding, held that MNN is a state actor because any operator of a constitutional public forum is, by definition , a state actor. This conclusion— and this analysis —are in direct conflict with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "7 Not surprisingly, more than half of all states have statutes that require public access channels to be \"noncommercial.\" Respondents' argument fails for another reason. If Respondents are correct that these factors are dispositive— i.e., that the City \"created\" and \"controls\" MNN—this would clearly require engaging in the analysis this Court set forth in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which is used to determine whether a private entity created pursuant \"First Amendment rights\" is a red herring. Opp. 24.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "That is why the Second Circuit's ruling amounts to a per se test, inconsistent with this Court's repeated caution against such categorical analysis. Pet. 18-22 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Brentwood 531 U.S. 288). No amount of misdirection can avoid that conclusion. 8 Respondents also make a half-hearted attempt to argue that the decision below actually found that MNN was a state actor under the \"public function\" test— despite the fact that it explicitly did not do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "That is why the Second Circuit's ruling amounts to a per se test, inconsistent with this Court's repeated caution against such categorical analysis. Pet. 18-22 (citing 365 U.S. 715; Brentwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). No amount of misdirection can avoid that conclusion. 8 Respondents also make a half-hearted attempt to argue that the decision below actually found that MNN was a state actor under the \"public function\" test— despite the fact that it explicitly did not do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "11, 17. This Court has made clear that the stringent public function inquiry has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" and applies only to functions traditionally and exclusively performed by the state. Flagg Bros. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Respondents' case law makes clear, this test is limited to specific functions that are traditionally performed by the government—like regulating sidewalks ( Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 634 F.3d 3 and United Church of 383 F.3d 449) and running a town 326 U.S. 501). 10 Respondents cannot dispute the fact that the operation of a public access channel is not traditionally and exclusively a function of government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "This Court has made clear that the stringent public function inquiry has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" and applies only to functions traditionally and exclusively performed by the state. Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. 149. As Respondents' case law makes clear, this test is limited to specific functions that are traditionally performed by the government—like regulating sidewalks ( Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 634 F.3d 3 and United Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) and running a town 326 U.S. 501). 10 Respondents cannot dispute the fact that the operation of a public access channel is not traditionally and exclusively a function of government. As the dissent below noted, \"it is fortunate for our liberty that it is not at all a near-exclusive function of the state to provide the forums for public expression, politics, information, or entertainment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.3d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "This Court has made clear that the stringent public function inquiry has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" and applies only to functions traditionally and exclusively performed by the state. Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. 149. As Respondents' case law makes clear, this test is limited to specific functions that are traditionally performed by the government—like regulating sidewalks ( Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., 634 F.3d 3 and United Church of 383 F.3d 449) and running a town [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 10 Respondents cannot dispute the fact that the operation of a public access channel is not traditionally and exclusively a function of government. As the dissent below noted, \"it is fortunate for our liberty that it is not at all a near-exclusive function of the state to provide the forums for public expression, politics, information, or entertainment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below",
		"context": "26a. 10. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], concerns the constitutionality of Massachusetts legislation. It directly involves government action and does not implicate the state action inquiry relating to private actors. 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Early Presidential Administrations",
		"context": "Ibid. True to his word, Washington 8 adhered to a \"policy of excluding most [antifederalists].\" Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage 19 (1905); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For Washington, the government could not function effectively unless those carrying out the government's work supported the new constitutional system. See Fish, supra , at 9; Prince, supra , at 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Early Presidential Administrations",
		"context": "3. Politically motivated decision-making in public employment continued under Thomas Jefferson. See Elrod , 427 U.S. at 353 (plurality opinion); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Jefferson's election brought the Nation its first transfer of executive power from one political party to its rival. Following his inauguration, Jefferson \"found near- ly all the offices filled by his opponents,\" Fish, supra , at 10 29, and moved to construct a federal public service more amenable to carrying out his agenda, see Elrod , 427 U.S. at 378 (Powell, J., dissenting) (\"Jefferson, the first Presi- dent to succeed a President of an opposing party, made significant patronage use of the appointment and removal powers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A…………………………………. 12, 20 26 U.S.C. § 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U. S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A…………………………………. 12, 20 26 U.S.C. § 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U. S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A…………………………………. 12, 20 26 U.S.C. § 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U. S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "12, 20 26 U.S.C. § 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "12, 20 26 U.S.C. § 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U. S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U. S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …..…………………………………………………6 iv 357 U. S. 513………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7431……………………………………12, 20 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 …………………………..6 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ……..8 393 U. S. 175 ………8 380 U. S. 51 ………... 8 Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600 ...……………6 357 U.S. 449 …..……………………………. passim 371 U.S. 415 ……………….7 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 …..……………………………………………7 408 U. S. 593 …..………..9 461 U. S. 540 ……………………….9 487 U.S. 781 ….……………………………6, 7 444 U.S. 620 …………………………………….6 Secretary of 467 U.S. 947 …..…………………………………………………6 iv [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]………… …..10 MISCELLANEOUS AUT HORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev. 10- 2012), 1- 49 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs -pdf/p4639.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) …………………………………15 Internal Revenue Manual (09-22-2015), \"https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07 -028-002 (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)………………………………....19 1 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE American Target Advertising, Inc. has a strong interest in the matters raised in this litigation because it is America's oldest and largest for-profit agency of its type that provides creative services to nonprofit organizations that communicate about their tax-exempt missio ns and appeal for contributions. It is itself registered with the California Registry of Charitable Trusts , and its tax-exempt client s are harmed by Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U. S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "This hedge towards greater ability of government to infringe on rights can be or is dangerous for liberty. Respondent's acts in this case are inconsistent with other constitutional doctrines protecting liberty in the interplay of licensing and constitutionally protected rights. AFPF's Petition identifies throughout how the Respondent steamrolled over the right of private association articulated in NAACP v. Alabama .1 In their dragnet, shotgun violations of the right of private association, Respondent and his predecessor -- now United States Senator and presidential candidate 1 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 5 Kamala Harris -- have exceeded and abused their authority to regulate charitable solicitations in t heir capacities as head of the California Registry of Charitable Trusts. They have done so by requiring tax-exempt organizations seeking licenses to solicit contributions in California to, as a precondition of obtaining such licenses, disclose the identit y of donors named in the confidential Schedule B to Form 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": ". that are within the protection of the First Amendment, and therefore have not been dealt with as 'purely commercial speech.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Riley is consistent with prior decisions that rejected regulation of charitable solic itations that is not \"narrowly tailored\" (id. at 798), rejecting the \"prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly burdensome rule the State [had] adopted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Respondent's dragnet, prophylactic, and imprecise regulation using demands for the names and 2 Four times since 1980 this Court has needed to rebuff the over -aggressiveness of state charitable solicitation licensing laws, or the application of them, to protect the vital First Amendment interests of charitable speech and publication. \"Regulation of a solicitation must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristic ally intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech and for the reality that, without solicitation, the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing 444 U.S. 620, Secretary of 467 U.S. 947. See also Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Respondent's dragnet, prophylactic, and imprecise regulation using demands for the names and 2 Four times since 1980 this Court has needed to rebuff the over -aggressiveness of state charitable solicitation licensing laws, or the application of them, to protect the vital First Amendment interests of charitable speech and publication. \"Regulation of a solicitation must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristic ally intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech and for the reality that, without solicitation, the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.\" 487 U.S. 781, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Secretary of 467 U.S. 947. See also Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Respondent's dragnet, prophylactic, and imprecise regulation using demands for the names and 2 Four times since 1980 this Court has needed to rebuff the over -aggressiveness of state charitable solicitation licensing laws, or the application of them, to protect the vital First Amendment interests of charitable speech and publication. \"Regulation of a solicitation must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristic ally intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech and for the reality that, without solicitation, the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.\" 487 U.S. 781, citing 444 U.S. 620, Secretary of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Illinois ex rel. 538 U.S. 600.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "487 U.S. 781, citing 444 U.S. 620, Secretary of 467 U.S. 947. See also Illinois ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 addresses of certain donors to charitable organizations that register to solicit contributions -- regardless of innocence or lack thereof -- are by nature and reason the opposite of narrowly tailored regulation. \"Broad prophylactic rule s in the area of free expression are suspect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "\"Broad prophylactic rule s in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.\" Riley , 487 U.S. at 800, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Compounding the unlawfulness, such demands are acts of pure discretion by the Respondent in the licensing process, since they are not required by California law, as noted above. Discretion in the context of licensing where First Amendment rights are affected is dangerous and may be unconstitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Discretion in the context of licensing where First Amendment rights are affected is dangerous and may be unconstitutional. (\"At the root of this long line of precedent is the time-tested knowledge that in the area of free expression a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restra int and may result in censorship.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; \"Only standards limiting the licensor's discretion will eliminate this danger by adding an element of certainty fatal to self -censorship.\" Id. at 758.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "While Petitioner shows no examples of viewpoint discrimination by Respondent in the licensing process, First Amendment rights are nevertheless directly harmed by this discretionary act in California's prior restraint licensing process. 3 Rights are chilled by 3 \"Prior restraints on spe ech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.\" Nebraska Press [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"A system of prior restraint on expression comes to this Court 8 exposure to state officials and employees of private association with causes that may be ideologically at odds with the Attorney General and those employees of his office who have access to Schedule B donor information. As AFPF explains, \"[a]ctual , potential, and even perceived donors report that they have been singled out for audits and investigations by government officials as a result of their donations (real or perceived).\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "II. RESPONDENT'S ACTS CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON OBTAINING A LICENSE TO ENGAGE IN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS Besides not being a narrowly tailored regulation, Respondent's dragnet demands for donor information in the charitable solicitation registration process are an extortionate condition placed on registrants ' obtaining a \"prior restraint \" license to engage in the First Amendment right of soliciting bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; citing Bantam 372 U.S. 58; 380 U.S. 51. 9 contributions. The court of appeals did not give adequate consideration to the heavy presumption against prior restraint as a starting point in its analysis of Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "II. RESPONDENT'S ACTS CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON OBTAINING A LICENSE TO ENGAGE IN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS Besides not being a narrowly tailored regulation, Respondent's dragnet demands for donor information in the charitable solicitation registration process are an extortionate condition placed on registrants ' obtaining a \"prior restraint \" license to engage in the First Amendment right of soliciting bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.\" 393 U.S. 175; citing Bantam [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 380 U.S. 51. 9 contributions. The court of appeals did not give adequate consideration to the heavy presumption against prior restraint as a starting point in its analysis of Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "II. RESPONDENT'S ACTS CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON OBTAINING A LICENSE TO ENGAGE IN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS Besides not being a narrowly tailored regulation, Respondent's dragnet demands for donor information in the charitable solicitation registration process are an extortionate condition placed on registrants ' obtaining a \"prior restraint \" license to engage in the First Amendment right of soliciting bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.\" 393 U.S. 175; citing Bantam 372 U.S. 58; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 contributions. The court of appeals did not give adequate consideration to the heavy presumption against prior restraint as a starting point in its analysis of Respondent's acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Therefore, Respondent's demands interpose an unconstitutional condition to obtain such licenses to engage in constitutionally protected rights. As stated in Regan v. Taxation With Representation , \"[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing 408 U. S. 10, which had articulated the principle: [E]ven though a person has no \"right\" to a valuable governme ntal benefit, and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected i nterest, especially his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Therefore, Respondent's demands interpose an unconstitutional condition to obtain such licenses to engage in constitutionally protected rights. As stated in Regan v. Taxation With Representation , \"[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.\" 461 U.S. 540, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which had articulated the principle: [E]ven though a person has no \"right\" to a valuable governme ntal benefit, and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected i nterest, especially his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U. S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to \"produce a result which [it] could not command directly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]357 U. S. 526. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. The court of appeals seems to have ignored or failed t o give adequate consideration to this extortionate, unconstitutional condition in ruling against AFPF in its First A mendment -based challenge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U. S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to \"produce a result which [it] could not command directly.\" 357 U. S. 513[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. The court of appeals seems to have ignored or failed t o give adequate consideration to this extortionate, unconstitutional condition in ruling against AFPF in its First A mendment -based challenge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U. S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A ............................................... 18, 26 26 U.S. C. § 7431 .................................................. 18, 26 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2511 ..............................................5 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U. S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A ............................................... 18, 26 26 U.S. C. § 7431 .................................................. 18, 26 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2511 ..............................................5 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A ............................................... 18, 26 26 U.S. C. § 7431 .................................................. 18, 26 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2511 ..............................................5 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U. S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "§ 7213A ............................................... 18, 26 26 U.S. C. § 7431 .................................................. 18, 26 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2511 ..............................................5 Cal. Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U. S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U. S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U. S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................ 12, 13 357 U. S. 513 (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Gov't Code § 1 2585 ..............................................6 Cal Code Regs., tit 11, § 301 ..................................... 13 CASES Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ....... 14 361 U.S. 51 ...... 11 Carrol 393 U. S. 175 ........ 14 iv 479 U.S. 238 ...............................6 Freedman v. Maryland , 380 U . S. 51 (1965) ............14 Illinois ex rel. 538 U. S. 600 ................... 13 357 U.S. 449 ...................................... passim 371 U.S. 415 ................... 13 Nebraska Press 427 U.S. 539 .............................................. 14 408 U. S. 593 .............. 16 461 U. S. 540 ............................. 16 487 U.S. 781 ........................................ 12, 13 444 U.S. 620 .............................................. 12 Secretary of St 467 U.S. 947 ........................................ 12, 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (195 8) .................. 17 Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How St. Tr. 1153, (C.P.) (1763) ................... 9, 10 v MISCELLANEO US AUTHORITIES Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, IRS Publication 4639 (Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U. S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "This hedge towards greater abilit y of government to infr inge o n rights can be, or is , dangerous for lib erty. Respondent's acts in thi s case are inconsistent wi th other constitutional doctrin es protecting liberty in the interplay of licensing and constitutionally protected rights. AFPF's Pet ition id entifies th rougho ut how the Respondent steamrolled over th e right of private association articulated in NAACP v. Al abama.3 In their dragn et, sh otgun violations of the right of private association , Respon dent and his predecessor -- now Vice President Kamala Harris -- have exceeded and abused their auth ority to re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1958) . 5 solicitations in their capacities as hea d of the California Re gistry of Charitable T rusts. They have done so by requiri ng tax -exem pt organization s seekin g licenses to sol icit contributions i n Cali fornia to, as a precondition o f obtaining such licenses, disclose the identity of donors named in t he confidential Schedu le B to Form 990 filed with th e Interna l Revenue Service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "As explained below, prophylacti c, imprecise regula tion f or charitable solicitation licensing p urposes has been rejected by this Court. Respondent's stated motive for indisc riminately and extort ionat ely trespass ing on the ri ght of private association i n a way that can indicate need for law enforcement, and can help state in vestigators, may appear pur e and honorable. However, law e nforceme nt would alw ays be so much easier for Responden t and 5 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , \"In light o f the histori cal role of contributi ons in the co rruption of the el ectoral process, the n eed for a broad prophylac tic rule was thu s suf ficient … to support a limitation on the ability of a committee to ra ise money fo r direct contributi ons to candi dates. \" 7 other government offic ials when vio lating our fundament al and paramount law, the Constitution, and if Americans were to aba ndon many of th eir civil liber ties, part icularly those protecting privacy and private associ ation. Respondent would also have the Court f ocus on the peril s to the righ t of private asso ciation onl y in cases of l eaked public discl osure of Schedule B (whic h leaks alrea dy comes with pot ential civil and criminal penalties under federal la w described he rein below) instead of the inherent dangers of other abuses c aused by the p olitics, ideolog y, policy g oals, and power of government off icials themselves that ma y be \"weaponi zed.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "(1763) . 11 face of uncont roverted evide nce that rev elation of members' identities would lead to violen ce and other reprisals. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 361 U.S. 51. In view of the historical context, i t is n o surprise that those dis closure dema nds had nothing at all to do with the g overnments' purported regulatory interes ts. Such sweeping and pretextu al demands f or membe rship lists are not analogous to a state (or federal) requirement that en tities e njoyin g tax-exempt status provide regul ators with li mited information about their m ajor donors on a confiden tial basis, to advance co mpelling law enforcement and regul atory in teres ts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "(1763) . 11 face of uncont roverted evide nce that rev elation of members' identities would lead to violen ce and other reprisals. See 357 U.S. 449 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In view of the historical context, i t is n o surprise that those dis closure dema nds had nothing at all to do with the g overnments' purported regulatory interes ts. Such sweeping and pretextu al demands f or membe rship lists are not analogous to a state (or federal) requirement that en tities e njoyin g tax-exempt status provide regul ators with li mited information about their m ajor donors on a confiden tial basis, to advance co mpelling law enforcement and regul atory in teres ts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "I. RESP ONDENT'S DRAGNET SCHEME VIOLATE S TH E REQ UIREMEN T THA T CHA RITABL E SOLICITATION REGULATIO N BE NAR ROW LY TAILORE D This c ourt has repe atedly affirme d charit able solicitations ar e prot ected by the First Amendment,9 9 Four times since 1 980 this Court has ne eded to reb uff the over-aggressiven ess of state char itable solic itation licens ing regulation to prot ect the vital F irst Amendment in terests of charitable speech and publica tion. \"R egulation of a solicitation must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically in tertwined with infor mative and perha ps per suasiv e speech and fo r the reality that, with out solicitat ion, the flow of such informa tion and advocacy would likely cease.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (19 88), citing Scha umburg v. Citizens for Bett er Envi ronment , 444 U .S. 62 0, 63 2 (1980) , Secretary of Stat e v. 13 and not j ust a s commercial speech : \"[C]har itable solicitations 'involve a variety of speech int erests . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": ". that are within the prot ection of t he First A mendment, and therefore h ave not been dealt wi th as 'purely comme rcial s peech. '\" Ri [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1988). Riley is cons istent with prior deci sions that rejec ted re gulation of charitable so licitat ions that is n ot \"narro wly tailored\" (id. at 798), rejecti ng the \"prophylactic, imprecis e, and undu ly burdensome ru le the Sta te [had] adopted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U. S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Re spondent's dragnet, prophylactic, and imprecise regulation using dema nds for the names and addresse s of certain donors t o charitable o rganizations that r egister t o solicit contributions -- regardless of inn ocence or lack ther eof -- are by nature and reason the opposi te of narrowly tailor ed regulatio n. \"Broad prophylactic rules in the area of f ree expre ssion ar e sus pect. Pr ecisio n of regulation must be the touchsto ne in an ar ea so closely touching our m ost p recious freedoms.\" Riley , 487 U.S. at 800, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Munson, 467 U .S. 947, 959 - 960 (1984).",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "947, 959 - 960 (1984). See also, Illinois ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 Compounding the unlawf ulness, such demands are acts of pure discr etion by the R esponden t in the licensing process, since they are not required b y Californ ia la w, as noted above. Discretio n in the context of l icensing where First Amendm ent r ights are affected is dangerous and m ay be u nconstitutiona l. (\"At the root of thi s lon g line of preced ent is the time - tested kno wledge that in the area of free express ion a licensing statute placing unb ridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agenc y constitutes a prior res traint and may result in censo rship.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "14 Compounding the unlawf ulness, such demands are acts of pure discr etion by the R esponden t in the licensing process, since they are not required b y Californ ia la w, as noted above. Discretio n in the context of l icensing where First Amendm ent r ights are affected is dangerous and m ay be u nconstitutiona l. (\"At the root of thi s lon g line of preced ent is the time - tested kno wledge that in the area of free express ion a licensing statute placing unb ridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agenc y constitutes a prior res traint and may result in censo rship.\" Lakewo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; \"Only standards limiting the licensor's discreti on will el iminate this danger by adding an elem ent of cert ainty fatal to sel f-censorship.\" Id. at 758.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Whi le Petitioner s hows no ex ample s of viewpoin t discriminati on by Respondent i n the licen sing p rocess itself, F irst Amendment rights a re ne vertheless directly harmed by this discretionary act i n California 's prior re strain t licensing process.10 Private assoc iation w ith ca uses that may be ideologi cally , relig iously, or politically at odds wi th the Attorney General a nd those employees of his office who have acces s to Schedu le B donor inform ation , is thereby inherently placed at ri sk and chilled . 10 \"Prior restrai nts on spee ch and publica tion are th e most seri ous and the least toler able infringem ent on First Amend ment rig hts.\" Nebrask a Press [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 976). \"A sys tem of prior re straint on expre ssion co mes to thi s Co urt bearing a h eavy p resumption again st its constitutiona l validity. \" Carroll v. Princess Anne , 393 U.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Carroll v. Princess Anne , 393 U. S . 175, 181 (1968); citing Bantam [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 380 U. S. 5. 15 As AFPF expl ains, \"[ a]ctua l, potential, and even percei ved dono rs report that they have been singl ed out for audits an d investigations by governme nt officia ls as a resu lt of thei r donations (r eal or perceiv ed).\" AFPF Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U. S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Carroll v. Princess Anne , 393 U. S . 175, 181 (1968); citing Bantam 372 U. S. 58 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 As AFPF expl ains, \"[ a]ctua l, potential, and even percei ved dono rs report that they have been singl ed out for audits an d investigations by governme nt officia ls as a resu lt of thei r donations (r eal or perceiv ed).\" AFPF Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U. S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Therefore, Respo ndent's dema nds interpose an uncons titutiona l condition to obt ain such l icenses to engage in c onstitutionally pr otected rights. As stated in Regan v. Tax ation With Representa tion, \"[T]he government may not d eny a benefit to a p erson becau se he exerc ises a constitutio nal right.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1983), citing 408 U. S. 593 ( 1972), which had a rticulated the principle: [E]ven though a person ha s no \"r ight\" to a val uable governmental bene fit, and even though the gov ernment may de ny him the benefit for any number of reasons, ther e are some reasons upon whic h the governm ent may n ot rely. It may no t deny a benefi t to a person on a 17 basis th at infring es his constitutional ly prote cted interest, especially his inter est in freedom of speech. Fo r if the government could deny a b enefit to a person because of hi s cons titutionally protected speech or associa tions, his exercise of those fr eedoms would in effec t be pe nalized and in hibit ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Therefore, Respo ndent's dema nds interpose an uncons titutiona l condition to obt ain such l icenses to engage in c onstitutionally pr otected rights. As stated in Regan v. Tax ation With Representa tion, \"[T]he government may not d eny a benefit to a p erson becau se he exerc ises a constitutio nal right.\" 461 U.S. 540 ( 1983), citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1972), which had a rticulated the principle: [E]ven though a person ha s no \"r ight\" to a val uable governmental bene fit, and even though the gov ernment may de ny him the benefit for any number of reasons, ther e are some reasons upon whic h the governm ent may n ot rely. It may no t deny a benefi t to a person on a 17 basis th at infring es his constitutional ly prote cted interest, especially his inter est in freedom of speech. Fo r if the government could deny a b enefit to a person because of hi s cons titutionally protected speech or associa tions, his exercise of those fr eedoms would in effec t be pe nalized and in hibit ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U. S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
		"context": "Fo r if the government could deny a b enefit to a person because of hi s cons titutionally protected speech or associa tions, his exercise of those fr eedoms would in effec t be pe nalized and in hibit ed. This would allow the governm ent to \"produce a result which [it ] could not com mand directly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 357 … Such interfer ence with constitutional rights is impermi ssibl e. In further violation of the Fi rst Amend ment, Resp onden t uses discretion in the licensi ng proces s to create an unconst itutional co ndition on the rig ht of engaging in constitutionally p rotected ch aritable solicitat ions. III. RESPONDENT 'S ACTS VIOLATE CONS TITUTIONAL RIGH TS BY V IOLATING FEDERAL LAW PRO TECTING CONFI DENTIAL TAX RETU RN INFORMATION Respondent's pu rported law enforcem ent object ives in o btaining a nd using Sche dule B donor informati on may be achieved under the feder al statutory regime that gu ards the confide ntiality of tax return inform.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U. S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis",
		"context": "As the Seventh Circuit has stated, undertakings may \"accommodate [both] the interest in the child's welfare [and] the interests of the country of the child's habitual residence.\" Van De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Blondin II , the Second Circuit remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to \"take into 15 account any ameliorative measures (by the parents and by the authorities of the state having jurisdic - tion over the question of custody) that can reduce whatever risk might otherwise be associated with a child's repatriation.\" 189 F.3d 240.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis",
		"context": "Van De 431 F.3d 567. In Blondin II , the Second Circuit remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to \"take into 15 account any ameliorative measures (by the parents and by the authorities of the state having jurisdic - tion over the question of custody) that can reduce whatever risk might otherwise be associated with a child's repatriation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Second Circuit further stated that \"[i]n the exercise of comity that is at the heart of the Convention (an international agree - ment, we recall, that is an integral part of the 'supreme Law of the Land,' U.S. Const., art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 F.3d 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis",
		"context": "at 248-49 (internal citation omitted). Thus, \"[i]n cases of serious abuse, before a court may deny repatriation on the ground that a grave risk of harm exists under Article 13(b), it must examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child to the home country.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On remand, the Second Circuit directed the District Court \"to exercise its broad equitable discretion to develop a thorough record\" and \"should feel free to make any appropriate or necessary inquiries of the government of France—especially regarding the 16 availability of ameliorative placement options in France—and to do so, inter alia, by requesting the aid of the United States Department of State, which can communicate directly with that foreign government.\" Blondin, 189 F.3d at 249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "238 F.3d 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis",
		"context": "Id. The State Department has provided examples of undertak - ings that are appropriate, such as \"an agreement that the abducting parents return to the country of habitual residence with the child; assignment of costs for the return flight; and interim custody until a court in the country of habitual residence can arrive at a decision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mr. Nicholls, formerly of the Central Authority for England and Wales suggested that a better alternative to undertakings could be \"safe harbor\" orders in the country of habitual residence. See Report On Hague Convention Operations by the Lord Chancellor's Child Abduction Unit, Central Authority for England & Wales, November 1995 (note 4).",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis",
		"context": ". 'safe har - bor' orders, entered by a court in the country of habitual residence at the behest of the left-behind parent, prior to the entry of the return order.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Safe harbor\" orders are \"orders secured from the courts of the habitual residence that set forth the safeguards necessary to allow the U.S. court to make an order of return\" which \"[t]ypically . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Estoppel as Applied by the Lower Courts in the Arbitration Context Involves None of the Doctrine's Traditional Elements",
		"context": "At first glance, this arbitration-specific line of cases appears to maintain a link to equitable estoppel's conceptual underpinnings by preventing the estopped party from taking inconsistent positions with respect to 9 the contract containing the arbitration clause. See, e.g. , Hughes Masonry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But all too often, courts employ this \"estoppel\" doctrine even where the connection between the plaintiff's claims and the contract containing the arbitration requirement is tenuous or nonexistent. See Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d 753 (allowing a nonsignatory to compel arbitration \"when the signatory to the contract containing an arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract,\" even though the plaintiff's claims did not rely on the terms of that contract) (citing 282 F.3d 343).",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.2d 836",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Estoppel as Applied by the Lower Courts in the Arbitration Context Involves None of the Doctrine's Traditional Elements",
		"context": ", Hughes Masonry 659 F.2d 836. But all too often, courts employ this \"estoppel\" doctrine even where the connection between the plaintiff's claims and the contract containing the arbitration requirement is tenuous or nonexistent. See Sunkist Soft Drinks, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (allowing a nonsignatory to compel arbitration \"when the signatory to the contract containing an arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract,\" even though the plaintiff's claims did not rely on the terms of that contract) (citing 282 F.3d 343). While still using the name \"estoppel,\" these federally derived doctrines have largely abandoned any pretense of being rooted in equity. To the contrary, they are based on concepts of relatedness or similarity in the case of the close relationship test, and judicial efficiency in the case of the concerted misconduct test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 F.3d 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Estoppel as Applied by the Lower Courts in the Arbitration Context Involves None of the Doctrine's Traditional Elements",
		"context": ", Hughes Masonry 659 F.2d 836. But all too often, courts employ this \"estoppel\" doctrine even where the connection between the plaintiff's claims and the contract containing the arbitration requirement is tenuous or nonexistent. See Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d 753 (allowing a nonsignatory to compel arbitration \"when the signatory to the contract containing an arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract,\" even though the plaintiff's claims did not rely on the terms of that contract) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). While still using the name \"estoppel,\" these federally derived doctrines have largely abandoned any pretense of being rooted in equity. To the contrary, they are based on concepts of relatedness or similarity in the case of the close relationship test, and judicial efficiency in the case of the concerted misconduct test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 F.3d 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Estoppel as Applied by the Lower Courts in the Arbitration Context Involves None of the Doctrine's Traditional Elements",
		"context": "While still using the name \"estoppel,\" these federally derived doctrines have largely abandoned any pretense of being rooted in equity. To the contrary, they are based on concepts of relatedness or similarity in the case of the close relationship test, and judicial efficiency in the case of the concerted misconduct test. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Neither of these tests embodies the sort of \"traditional principles of state law\" that would allow nonsignatories to enforce contracts other than arbitration agreements. Arthur Andersen , 556 U.S. at 631.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 F. Supp. 2d 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "12a, which cannot be squared with this Court's precedents . This Court has explained that \"i n the absence of a class action, the 'capable of repetition, yet evading re- view' doctrine [i]s limited to the situation where two el-ements [are] combine d: (1) the challenged action [i]s in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its ces-sation or expiration, and (2) there [i] s a reasonable ex- pectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents cannot meet the second requirement, be- cause they cannot demonstrate a \"reasonable expecta- tion\" that they will themselves be subject to a future prosecution in the South ern District in which the secu- rity policy will again be applied to them . See City of Los 461 U.S. 95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "455 U.S. 478 . Respondents cannot meet the second requirement, be- cause they cannot demonstrate a \"reasonable expecta- tion\" that they will themselves be subject to a future prosecution in the South ern District in which the secu- rity policy will again be applied to them . See City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents contend (Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "Re- spondents a ssert, therefore, that yet another prosecu- tion in the Southern District is equally \"as likely\" as the recurrence of other disputes that this Court has adjudicated under the capable- of-repetition -yet-evading - review exception . Id. at 19 (citing Kingdomw are Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Press -Enter. 478 U.S. 1; 410 U.S. 113 ). This Court's decisions make clear, however, that a party 's avowed commitment to criminal recidivism is not a sufficient basis for maintaining his challenge on a matter of criminal procedure.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "Id. at 19 (citing Kingdomw are Techs., 136 S. Ct. 1969; Press -Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 410 U.S. 113 ). This Court's decisions make clear, however, that a party 's avowed commitment to criminal recidivism is not a sufficient basis for maintaining his challenge on a matter of criminal procedure. In O'She 414 U.S. 488, the Court declined to adjudicate on the merits the constitutional claims of plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief barring the discriminatory exe- cution of certain criminal procedures (such as the set- ting of pretrial bonds) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "Id. at 19 (citing Kingdomw are Techs., 136 S. Ct. 1969; Press -Enter. 478 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This Court's decisions make clear, however, that a party 's avowed commitment to criminal recidivism is not a sufficient basis for maintaining his challenge on a matter of criminal procedure. In O'She 414 U.S. 488, the Court declined to adjudicate on the merits the constitutional claims of plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief barring the discriminatory exe- cution of certain criminal procedures (such as the set- ting of pretrial bonds) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "478 U.S. 1; 410 U.S. 113 ). This Court's decisions make clear, however, that a party 's avowed commitment to criminal recidivism is not a sufficient basis for maintaining his challenge on a matter of criminal procedure. In O'She [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court declined to adjudicate on the merits the constitutional claims of plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief barring the discriminatory exe- cution of certain criminal procedures (such as the set- ting of pretrial bonds) . Id. at 491- 492.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "[The prisoners] themselves are able —and indeed required by law —to prevent such a possibility from occurring.\" Ibid. 43 Similarly, i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], th e Court refused to consider the claims of a prisoner who objected to an order revoking his parole , because the prisoner had been released from prison before his c hal- lenge was adjudicated. Even though the prisoner was later rearrested on separate charges, id. at 14, t he Court declined to accept his argument that \"the Order of Revocation could be used to increase his sentence in a future sentencing proceeding \" as a basis for continu- ing his suit .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
		"context": "That argument, the Court ex- plained, was \"contingent upon [his] violating the law, getting c aught, and being convicted.\" Ibid. ; see Wein- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. None o f the cases cited by respondents, all of which arise outside the criminal context, undermines the prin- ciple that a litigant may not establish a \"reasonable ex- pectation\" that a dispute will recur, for purposes of the capable -of-repetition -yet-evading -review exception, by arguing that he is likely in the future to violate a lawful criminal statute. S ee Kingdomwar e Techs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Contrary To The Theory Of Bakke And Grutter, College Campuses Have Systematically Suppressed Freedom Of Thought And Speech In The Name Of \"Diversity.\"",
		"context": "The same college administrations fighting for ra- cial preferences routinely allow suppression of student speech; in many cases their policies actively promote that 17 suppression. Amicus Speech First exists to fight this ab- horrent trend. In Janus , the Court stressed that \"factual and legal\" developments since [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], had \"eroded the decision's underpinnings and left it an outlier among [the Court's] First Amendment cases.\" Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2482. The same goes for Bakke and Grutter .",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Case Should Be Decided Along with Rather Than Held for Liu",
		"context": "The Solicitor General nowhere suggests that, as a matter of statutory construction, deciding whether a disgorge- ment \"penalty\" constitutes \"equitable relief \" under the Exchange Act answers whether a reference to \"injunc-tions\" authorizes monetary relief under the FTC Act. Nor does the Solicitor General identify any other way in which this Court's interpretation of § 21(d) of the Ex-change Act in Liu will address a fundamental \"premise\" underlying the court of appeals' differing interpretations of § 13(b) of the FTC Act so as to \"determine the ultimate outcome\" on that issue. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the contrary, the Solicitor General acknowledges that \"the FTC's and the SEC's authority to seek monetary relief \" under the respective statutory provisions at issue \"will not necessarily rise and fall together.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Case Should Be Decided Along with Rather Than Held for Liu",
		"context": "Not only the Ninth Circuit, but each of the eight courts of appeals that has already addressed whether §13(b) authorizes mone-tary relief would be left to consider what implications the decision in Liu may have for their existing precedent. And even if Liu's broader teachings do have implications about the FTC's authority under a different statute, en banc proceedings might be required for any court of appeals to overturn its precedent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Pet. App. 16a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 F.3d 889",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Case Should Be Decided Along with Rather Than Held for Liu",
		"context": "1 There is likewise reason to believe that any decision in Liu is unlikely to affect the Second Circuit's view that § 13(b)'s reference to \"injunctions\" authorizes monetary relief. The Second Circuit (unlike the Ninth Circuit) has held that a court \"may award only equitable restitution\" under § 13(b). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Pet. 26-29. Thus, the Second Circuit could well conclude that its precedent already forecloses any form of resti- tution under § 13(b) that might constitute a non-equitable \"penalty,\" rendering Liu irrelevant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 F.3d 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Justifies Its Departure from Settled Antitrust Principles on Grounds That Violate the Sherman Act's Central Tenet",
		"context": "201a , but rather \"reflect a stead- fast ' legislative judgment that ultimately [all forms of] competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.'\" I bid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Any line-drawing among types of competi- tion is a task reserved exclusively for Congress. See 405 U.S. 596 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Justifies Its Departure from Settled Antitrust Principles on Grounds That Violate the Sherman Act's Central Tenet",
		"context": "(quoting 493 U.S. 411 ). Any line-drawing among types of competi- tion is a task reserved exclusively for Congress. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And to da te Congress's judgment has been to protec t \"'competition , not competitors.'\" Atl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Justifies Its Departure from Settled Antitrust Principles on Grounds That Violate the Sherman Act's Central Tenet",
		"context": "App. 203a- 207a, 219a. See Cargill, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the d istrict court's opinion il- lustrates, such a stark departure from this Court's precedents was not necessary to ensure proper con- sideration of the NDPs' impact on competition within and across the \"two -sided\" platform at issue here. Based on the seven-week trial record, the district court found the failure of Discover's low -price cam- paign \"emblematic of the harm done to the competi- tive process by Amex's rules against merchant steer- ing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit's approach undermines the policies of the antitrust laws",
		"context": "As the preceding discussion of both the quick look and the Rule of Reason inquiries suggests, the under- standing that the antitrust laws do not empower courts to require defendants to upend otherwise rea- sonable restraints on commerce so as to make them somewhat less restrictive—even if some aspect of the restraints, considered in isolation, was not proved to be procompetitive—serves key Sherman Act purposes. First , that understanding prevents judges from acting as \"central planners\"—a role that courts are \"ill-suited\" to play. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Of- fices of Curtis V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Judges \"often lack the expert understanding of indus- trial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition.\" 457 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit's approach undermines the policies of the antitrust laws",
		"context": "Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Of- fices of Curtis V.540 U.S. 398. Judges \"often lack the expert understanding of indus- trial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If courts do not have the institutional capabil- ity to decide \"the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing\" ( Trinko , 540 U.S. at 408), they are all the more poorly equipped to determine the proper bundle of rules necessary to define a concept like \"am- ateurism.\" See Hovenkamp, supra , 12 N.Y.U.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit's approach undermines the policies of the antitrust laws",
		"context": "As leading antitrust scholars ex- plained prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in O'Ban- non,if such an approach to the Rule of Reason be- comes the norm, \"restraints reasonably necessary to achieving valid business objectives could be subject to antitrust condemnation—including exposure to treble damages—based solely on the creativity of antitrust lawyers imagining marginally less restrictive ap- proaches.\" Br. for Antitrust Scholars in Support of Ap- pellant at 15, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], ECF No. 17. As these scholars continued, pointing to examples of ac- tual litigation: With only a modest extrapolation from the reasoning of the [ O'Bannon district court], a court could have decided that obstetricians re- ally only need 30 months of residency training to perform C-sections rather than 36, and therefore condemned the credentialing re- quirements [that required the longer resi- 48 dency period.]",
		"citation_value_orig": "802 F.3d 1049",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit's approach undermines the policies of the antitrust laws",
		"context": "See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ig- norance and Antitrust , in Antitrust, Innovation, And Competitiveness 119 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992). And even if judges were sometimes just as capable of re-designing products as the prod- ucts' creators, \"the costs of wrongly condemning a ben- eficial practice may exceed the costs of wrongly toler- ating a harmful one.\" Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Markets slowly but surely undermine prac- tices that injure consumers,\" but \"[c]ompetition does not undermine judicial decisions.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "961 F.2d 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit's approach undermines the policies of the antitrust laws",
		"context": "646 (June 12, 2020) and Fla. Stat. § 1006.74. 50 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The future structure of col- lege sports is appropriately resolved by colleges and policymakers, not antitrust courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. THERE IS NO NEED FOR EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
		"context": "Failure to comply with a limitations deadline maycompletely bar a party from obtaining any judicialrelief. Accordingly, courts have traditionally appliedequitable tolling to limitations periods if the relevantstatutory language permits. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Holland, 560 U.S. at 645–46. These justifications for creating equitable exceptions simply do not apply to the Rule 23(f) 36 deadline. Rigid application of the Rule 23(f) deadline does not create the same harsh consequences becausea Rule 23(f) petition is not the only opportunity toobtain appellate review of an order granting or denyingclass certification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. THERE IS NO NEED FOR EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
		"context": "The Rule 23(f) deadline is therefore fundamentallydifferent than other contexts where equitableexceptions have been applied. Courts have also applied equitable exceptions to alleviate the harsh application of the law when alitigant is unsuspecting or unsophisticated. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] context. Parties to a class action are typicallyrepresented by competent counsel who are familiarwith the relevant rules and deadlines. Indeed, classcounsel must be appointed by the court only after adiligent scrutiny of their adequacy and competency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) VIOLATES AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEDERAL LAW",
		"context": "The State does not dispute that Lynch applied the \"settled\" rule of Simmons . Nor does the State dispute that, under federal law, such settled rules apply \"both on direct and collateral review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State thus appears to concede (at 34) that, had the Arizona Supreme Court reached the merits of Cruz's claim, the Supremacy Clause would require the application of Lynch . This Court's precedent makes that conclusion 4 indisputable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) VIOLATES AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEDERAL LAW",
		"context": "The State thus appears to concede (at 34) that, had the Arizona Supreme Court reached the merits of Cruz's claim, the Supremacy Clause would require the application of Lynch . This Court's precedent makes that conclusion 4 indisputable. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 552 U.S. 264. The State's argument instead rests on the theory (at 2) that federal law is \"irrelevant\" because Rule 32.1(g) supplied a \"threshold\" ground for denying relief. But this Court has \"repeated[ly]\" recognized that state procedural rules are not adequate if they \"operate to discriminate against claims of federal rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) VIOLATES AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEDERAL LAW",
		"context": "The State thus appears to concede (at 34) that, had the Arizona Supreme Court reached the merits of Cruz's claim, the Supremacy Clause would require the application of Lynch . This Court's precedent makes that conclusion 4 indisputable. 484 U.S. 211; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State's argument instead rests on the theory (at 2) that federal law is \"irrelevant\" because Rule 32.1(g) supplied a \"threshold\" ground for denying relief. But this Court has \"repeated[ly]\" recognized that state procedural rules are not adequate if they \"operate to discriminate against claims of federal rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) VIOLATES AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEDERAL LAW",
		"context": "The State's argument instead rests on the theory (at 2) that federal law is \"irrelevant\" because Rule 32.1(g) supplied a \"threshold\" ground for denying relief. But this Court has \"repeated[ly]\" recognized that state procedural rules are not adequate if they \"operate to discriminate against claims of federal rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The interpreta- tion of Rule 32.1(g) adopted below discriminates against federal rights in numerous respects—several of which the State hardly attempts to dispute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "A nd as this Court has recognized —also long before JASTA was enacted—the plain language of that provision criminalizes the provision of material support to a designated foreign -terrorist organization , regardless of whether that support is connected to any particular act of terrorism , as long as the defendant knows that the recipient \"is a designated terrorist organization\" or \"ha s engaged or engages in terrorist activity .\" Id. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The defendant need not know that the material support she furnishe s will itself substantially assist any particular terrorist act. Holder , 561 U.S. at 16-17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "Thus, if aiding the responsible organization in general , rather than the particular wrongful act, were enough, Congress could have easily said so. The conclusion that §2 333(d)(2) imposes liability only on those who knowingly provided substantial assist ance to the commission of the specific act of international terrorism that injured the plaintiff is thus reinforced by \"t he usual rule that when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another ,\" courts should \"assum[e]\" that \"different meanings were intended.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That reading of the ATA is also consistent with Congres s's approach to aiding -and-abetting liability in other contexts. For instance, the federal criminal aiding -and-abetting statute makes \"punishable as a principal\" whoever \"aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the] commission\" of \"an offense against the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "See, e.g. , U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual §2475 27 (1998) .5 Given the \"rough similarity\" between criminal and civil aiding and abetting, see Cent . Bank of Denver, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it would be odd to divorce the reach of §2333(d) from traditional concept s of aiding and abetting liability in the criminal- law context . And the notion that YouTube or Facebook could be criminally prosecuted for aiding and abetting the Reina attack when they had no direct interactions with the perpetrators and policies to prevent terrorists from exploiting their services is completely untenable. Thus, b oth statutory text and broader context confirm that aiding -and-abetting liability attaches only to those who knowingly provide substantial assist ance to the commission of the specific act of terrorism that caused the plaintiff's injuries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "The same conclusion follows from the common - law principles that Congress expressly incorporated to govern §2333(d)(2) claims. In its explicit findings in JASTA' s enacted text , Congress stated that the \"decision of the [D.C. Circuit] in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]\" —\"the leading case regarding Federal civil aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability\" —\"provides the proper legal framework for how such liability should function\" in §2333(d)(2). JASTA §2(a)(5), 130 Stat. at 852.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.2d 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "1984) . Accordingly, long before Halberstam , many courts had recognized that an \"aider- abettor [must] knowingly and substantially assis[t] the violation\" committed by the principal. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both Halberstam and the cases from which it drew therefore reflect the \"centuries -old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to complete its commission.\" 572 U.S. 65 ; Cent .",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 F.2d 1304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "493 F.2d 1304. Both Halberstam and the cases from which it drew therefore reflect the \"centuries -old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to complete its commission.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Cent . Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 29 (principal violator is one who aids or abets the commission of the offense or tort ); Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts §435 (2d ed. 2022) (one must \"knowingly provid [e] substantial aid or encouragement to another's commission of a tort\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
		"context": "Both Halberstam and the cases from which it drew therefore reflect the \"centuries -old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to complete its commission.\" 572 U.S. 65 ; Cent . Bank of Denver, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (principal violator is one who aids or abets the commission of the offense or tort ); Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts §435 (2d ed. 2022) (one must \"knowingly provid [e] substantial aid or encouragement to another's commission of a tort\"). Nothing in the text of §2333(d)( 2) gives any indication that Congress intended to radically depart from those traditional principles in the ATA, and Congress' s express incorporation of the settled framework articulated in Halberstam positively refutes such a counterintuitive claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Federal courts have jurisdiction to confirm awards that resolve federal-question disputes",
		"context": "Even worse, parties could evade that limitation by filing a motion to compel before arbitration begins, thereby enabling the party after arbitration to file a motion to confirm in that same lawsuit. \"Congress simply cannot be tagged with such a taste for the bizarre.\" Cortez Byrd Chips, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Petitioner's rule would harm the very commercial interests the FAA is meant to protect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "Rather, there will be a range of reasonable sentences for a particular subset of criminal activity. Within this range, district courts have wide discretion to fashion specific sentences.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g. , Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6; see also 835 F.3d 1371.",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 96",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "760 F.3d 96. See, e.g. , Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To preserve that argument for appeal, a defendant must specifically argue to the district court that his imposed sentence exceeds the range of reasonable sentences that §3553(a) allows. Only by doing so does a defendant inform the court of the \"action [he] wishes the court to take\" or his \"objection to the court's action,\" Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 1371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "For example, he might argue that his sentence is greater than necessary to afford adequate deterrence given the specific factual circumstances of his offense. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Or that his sentence is greater than necessary to protect the public in light of his personal circumstances. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "Or that his sentence fails to provide him with needed educational training. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would hardly be fair to the courts of appeals, or consistent with the principles predating and animating Rule 51, to allow defendants to advance those grounds for the first time on appeal. A defendant who never argued below that his sentence was unreasonably excessive because, for example, he suffers from a severe medical condition or requires educational or vocational training, has forfeited his ability to argue those grounds on appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 F. App'x 888",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "R. Crim. P. 51(b), and well supported in case law stretching back decades, see, e.g. , Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135-36; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 321 U.S. 414; 735 F. App'x 188; 680 F. App'x 649; 786 F.3d 1006; 517 F. App'x 657. This rule also advances the interests that underlie the timely assertion principle. See supra p.12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "R. Crim. P. 51(b), and well supported in case law stretching back decades, see, e.g. , Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135-36; 520 U.S. 461; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 735 F. App'x 188; 680 F. App'x 649; 786 F.3d 1006; 517 F. App'x 657. This rule also advances the interests that underlie the timely assertion principle. See supra p.12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "R. Crim. P. 51(b), and well supported in case law stretching back decades, see, e.g. , Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135-36; 520 U.S. 461; 321 U.S. 414; 735 F. App'x 188; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 786 F.3d 1006; 517 F. App'x 657. This rule also advances the interests that underlie the timely assertion principle. See supra p.12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F. App'x 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "R. Crim. P. 51(b), and well supported in case law stretching back decades, see, e.g. , Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135-36; 520 U.S. 461; 321 U.S. 414; 735 F. App'x 188; 680 F. App'x 649; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 517 F. App'x 657. This rule also advances the interests that underlie the timely assertion principle. See supra p.12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 1006",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "R. Crim. P. 51(b), and well supported in case law stretching back decades, see, e.g. , Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135-36; 520 U.S. 461; 321 U.S. 414; 735 F. App'x 188; 680 F. App'x 649; 786 F.3d 1006; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This rule also advances the interests that underlie the timely assertion principle. See supra p.12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 F. App'x 657",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "If a defendant fails to do either of those things, he has not preserved a substantive-reasonableness challenge, and the appellate court should review only for plain error. See Olano , 507 U.S. at 731; Puckett , 556 U.S. at 134; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], at JA 32-43; 709 F.3d 413.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
		"context": "If a defendant fails to do either of those things, he has not preserved a substantive-reasonableness challenge, and the appellate court should review only for plain error. See Olano , 507 U.S. at 731; Puckett , 556 U.S. at 134; see also, e.g. , 505 F.3d 389, at JA 32-43; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "709 F.3d 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Sixth Amendment Should Be Wholly Incorporated In The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court has repeated-ly held that the Sixth Amendment's protections meet this standard. The general constitutional right to trial by jury was held to be incorporated in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the Court, surveying historical practice and its own precedents, held unequivocally that \"trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American system of justice,\" id. at 149, and \"re- flect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Sixth Amendment Should Be Wholly Incorporated In The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "The jury trial right thus stands on equal footing with other aspects of the Sixth Amendment that are fully in-corporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. For exam-ple, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that trials be public was found embedded in the Fourteenth Amend-ment's Due Process Clause. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, \"the assistance of counsel is one of the safe-guards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights and liberty.\" Gideon 372 U.S. 335, as is its guarantee of com- pulsory process, 388 U.S. 14, and a speedy trial, 386 U.S. 213.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Sixth Amendment Should Be Wholly Incorporated In The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "See In re333 U.S. 257. Likewise, \"the assistance of counsel is one of the safe-guards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights and liberty.\" Gideon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as is its guarantee of com- pulsory process, 388 U.S. 14, and a speedy trial, 386 U.S. 213. Because the Sixth Amendment's Trial by Jury Clause requires jury unanimity, and because that Clause has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, the only way to conclude that the States are not bound by the unanimity requirement would be to hold that one particular aspect of the Sixth Amend-ment jury trial right has not been incorporated—essentially, the rationale for Justice Powell's separate opinion in Apodaca . But this Court has rejected that approach to incorporation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Sixth Amendment Should Be Wholly Incorporated In The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "See In re333 U.S. 257. Likewise, \"the assistance of counsel is one of the safe-guards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights and liberty.\" Gideon 372 U.S. 335, as is its guarantee of com- pulsory process, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and a speedy trial, 386 U.S. 213. Because the Sixth Amendment's Trial by Jury Clause requires jury unanimity, and because that Clause has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, the only way to conclude that the States are not bound by the unanimity requirement would be to hold that one particular aspect of the Sixth Amend-ment jury trial right has not been incorporated—essentially, the rationale for Justice Powell's separate opinion in Apodaca . But this Court has rejected that approach to incorporation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Sixth Amendment Should Be Wholly Incorporated In The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "See In re333 U.S. 257. Likewise, \"the assistance of counsel is one of the safe-guards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights and liberty.\" Gideon 372 U.S. 335, as is its guarantee of com- pulsory process, 388 U.S. 14, and a speedy trial, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the Sixth Amendment's Trial by Jury Clause requires jury unanimity, and because that Clause has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, the only way to conclude that the States are not bound by the unanimity requirement would be to hold that one particular aspect of the Sixth Amend-ment jury trial right has not been incorporated—essentially, the rationale for Justice Powell's separate opinion in Apodaca . But this Court has rejected that approach to incorporation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The statutory regime for quarterly fees was at all relevant times facially uniform throughout the United States",
		"context": "To the extent that the presence of the word \"may\" in Section 1930(a)(7) would render the 2017 Act uncon- stitutional under the theory that it authorized the pos- sibility of unequal fees , the Court should interpret the 33 two provisions as having requir ed the ongoing imposi- tion of equal fees. To be sure, this Court has \"repeatedly observed\" that \"the word 'may' clearly connotes discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is that Congress intended the imposition of equal fees. As explained above (see pp. 6-7, supra) , Congress en- acted Section 1930(a)(7) in response to St. 38 F.3d 152546 F.3d 969 , which found un- constitutional the authorization of two programs with divergent fee requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The statutory regime for quarterly fees was at all relevant times facially uniform throughout the United States",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 1601 is that Congress intended the imposition of equal fees. As explained above (see pp. 6-7, supra) , Congress en- acted Section 1930(a)(7) in response to St. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]46 F.3d 969 , which found un- constitutional the authorization of two programs with divergent fee requirements. Co ngress determined — consistent with the recommendation of the Judicial Conference itself —that Section 1930(a)(7) would cure any unconstitutional lack of uniformity in fees . That judgment warrants respect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 F.3d 1525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The statutory regime for quarterly fees was at all relevant times facially uniform throughout the United States",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 1601 is that Congress intended the imposition of equal fees. As explained above (see pp. 6-7, supra) , Congress en- acted Section 1930(a)(7) in response to St. 38 F.3d 1525[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which found un- constitutional the authorization of two programs with divergent fee requirements. Co ngress determined — consistent with the recommendation of the Judicial Conference itself —that Section 1930(a)(7) would cure any unconstitutional lack of uniformity in fees . That judgment warrants respect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 F.3d 969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The statutory regime for quarterly fees was at all relevant times facially uniform throughout the United States",
		"context": "Co ngress determined — consistent with the recommendation of the Judicial Conference itself —that Section 1930(a)(7) would cure any unconstitutional lack of uniformity in fees . That judgment warrants respect. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and replacing it with \"shall .\" See 2020 Act § 3(d)(2), 134 Stat. 5088.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The statutory regime for quarterly fees was at all relevant times facially uniform throughout the United States",
		"context": "Given that context, Section 1930(a)(7) was at least ambiguous as to whether the Judicial Conference had authority to impose unequal fees before the 2020 Act. If the Court determines that such discretion would violate the uniformity requirement , it should construe the im- position of equal fees as a mandatory requirement in light of the \"presumption of constitutionality,\" which in-structs that \"courts should, if possible, interpret ambig- uous statutes to avoid rendering them unconstitu- tional.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see ibid. (distinguishing this principle from the \"more debated\" \"constitutional doubt canon\"). 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1692a(6)'s First Sentence Subjects a Law Firm that Regularly Collects Mortgage Debts to the FDCPA's Broad Coverage",
		"context": "To the contrary, Congress stated that the definition of \"debt collector\" in §1692a(6) \"also includes\" certain security interest enforcers who violate §1692f(6) as described in the third sentence. Congress employed a term of inclusion, not exclusion, in establishing the relationship between the first and third sentences of §1692a(6). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"'Also' is a term of addition, not of subtraction, and it makes little sense to say that an entity that satisfies the 'regularly collects' definition has its broad exposure to liability under many substantive provisions erased simply because it also satisfies the 'se curity interests' definition and/or is enforcing a security interest. \"); 2012 WL 5330916, or the party falls within the second prong of the definition of a 'debt collector' in that it 'regularly collects or attempts to collect' debts owed to another.\") 16 (emphasis in original).",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 F.3d 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1692a(6)'s First Sentence Subjects a Law Firm that Regularly Collects Mortgage Debts to the FDCPA's Broad Coverage",
		"context": "\"); 2012 WL 5330916, or the party falls within the second prong of the definition of a 'debt collector' in that it 'regularly collects or attempts to collect' debts owed to another.\") 16 (emphasis in original). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F.3d 453",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. DETERMINING WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES REQUIRES EXAMINATION OF THE PARTICULAR STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER WHICH THEY OPERATE",
		"context": ". qualify as 'Officers of the United States,' who 'exercis[e] significant au-thority pursuant to the laws of the United States[.]' \" Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 506 (quoting Buck- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Not surprisingly, then, this Court has recognized that \"[w]hether ad-ministrative law judges are necessarily 'Officers of the United States' is disputed.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Appellate Standing Is A Constitutional Requirement, Not A Policy Choice",
		"context": "\"In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or controversy' between himself and the defend- ant within the meaning of Art. III.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Determining a litigant's Arti-cle III standing, therefore, is a constitutional question, not a policy consideration. Fo r this reason, this Court has declined to accord standing to interested parties who fail to meet the injury, causation, and redressabil- ity elements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Appellate Standing Is A Constitutional Requirement, Not A Policy Choice",
		"context": "Aside from embroiling federal courts of appeals in matters that are not justiciable, overlooking the lack of Article III appellate standing of objectors to non-man- datory class settlements has real pragmatic conse- quences. Giving these objectors free reign to appeal even from judgments to which they consented has cre- ated a pernicious cottage industry of \"professional ob- jectors who seek out class actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful protests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A leading treatise explains the modus operandi of these so-called \"professional ob- jectors\": Most often, the objections are nonmeritorious. However, the objectors may appeal a court's denial of their object ions, and that appeal might take several years in many circuits; during that time period, the class's recovery 24 and, as importantly for these dynamics, class counsel's fee, will likely not be distributed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 F. Supp. 2d 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Any Law that Restricts or Compels Physician Speech and is Targeted Toward a Matter of General Public Debate Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "The prime example of a publiclydebated issue leading to regulation of physician speechis whether abortions should be legal and, since theyare, to what extent should the state weigh in to support either \"right to life\" or \"freedom of choice.\" Butgovernment laws and policies have affected (and mayin the future affect) physician speech in publiclydebated areas that are divorced from the abortioncontext. Thus, laws have restricted physicians from advising patients about the use of contraceptives, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], penalized physicians if they have discussed possible medicinal benefits of marijuana withtheir patients, 309 F.3d 629, and restricted pediatricians from makingroutine inquiries of parents about possession ofunsecured firearms in their homes, 848 F.3d 1293797 F.3d 859, before the court, sitting en banc , finally held three provisions of the Florida Firearm Owners' Privacy Act to be a violation of physicians' Free Speech. Wollschlaeger v. 5 conceivable, too, that a law might require or forbid physicians who examine junior high school students toexpound or refrain from expounding on the advantagesand disadvantages of playing football. See Wollschlaeger IV , 848 F.3d at 1329 (Pryor, J., concurring) (commenting on \"the number of highlycontroversial topics that doctors [might] discuss as adirect part of their medical responsibilities\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Any Law that Restricts or Compels Physician Speech and is Targeted Toward a Matter of General Public Debate Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "The prime example of a publiclydebated issue leading to regulation of physician speechis whether abortions should be legal and, since theyare, to what extent should the state weigh in to support either \"right to life\" or \"freedom of choice.\" Butgovernment laws and policies have affected (and mayin the future affect) physician speech in publiclydebated areas that are divorced from the abortioncontext. Thus, laws have restricted physicians from advising patients about the use of contraceptives, 367 U.S. 497, penalized physicians if they have discussed possible medicinal benefits of marijuana withtheir patients, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and restricted pediatricians from makingroutine inquiries of parents about possession ofunsecured firearms in their homes, 848 F.3d 1293797 F.3d 859, before the court, sitting en banc , finally held three provisions of the Florida Firearm Owners' Privacy Act to be a violation of physicians' Free Speech. Wollschlaeger v. 5 conceivable, too, that a law might require or forbid physicians who examine junior high school students toexpound or refrain from expounding on the advantagesand disadvantages of playing football. See Wollschlaeger IV , 848 F.3d at 1329 (Pryor, J., concurring) (commenting on \"the number of highlycontroversial topics that doctors [might] discuss as adirect part of their medical responsibilities\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 F.3d 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Any Law that Restricts or Compels Physician Speech and is Targeted Toward a Matter of General Public Debate Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "The prime example of a publiclydebated issue leading to regulation of physician speechis whether abortions should be legal and, since theyare, to what extent should the state weigh in to support either \"right to life\" or \"freedom of choice.\" Butgovernment laws and policies have affected (and mayin the future affect) physician speech in publiclydebated areas that are divorced from the abortioncontext. Thus, laws have restricted physicians from advising patients about the use of contraceptives, 367 U.S. 497, penalized physicians if they have discussed possible medicinal benefits of marijuana withtheir patients, 309 F.3d 629, and restricted pediatricians from makingroutine inquiries of parents about possession ofunsecured firearms in their homes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]797 F.3d 859, before the court, sitting en banc , finally held three provisions of the Florida Firearm Owners' Privacy Act to be a violation of physicians' Free Speech. Wollschlaeger v. 5 conceivable, too, that a law might require or forbid physicians who examine junior high school students toexpound or refrain from expounding on the advantagesand disadvantages of playing football. See Wollschlaeger IV , 848 F.3d at 1329 (Pryor, J., concurring) (commenting on \"the number of highlycontroversial topics that doctors [might] discuss as adirect part of their medical responsibilities\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 1293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Any Law that Restricts or Compels Physician Speech and is Targeted Toward a Matter of General Public Debate Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "The prime example of a publiclydebated issue leading to regulation of physician speechis whether abortions should be legal and, since theyare, to what extent should the state weigh in to support either \"right to life\" or \"freedom of choice.\" Butgovernment laws and policies have affected (and mayin the future affect) physician speech in publiclydebated areas that are divorced from the abortioncontext. Thus, laws have restricted physicians from advising patients about the use of contraceptives, 367 U.S. 497, penalized physicians if they have discussed possible medicinal benefits of marijuana withtheir patients, 309 F.3d 629, and restricted pediatricians from makingroutine inquiries of parents about possession ofunsecured firearms in their homes, 848 F.3d 1293[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], before the court, sitting en banc , finally held three provisions of the Florida Firearm Owners' Privacy Act to be a violation of physicians' Free Speech. Wollschlaeger v. 5 conceivable, too, that a law might require or forbid physicians who examine junior high school students toexpound or refrain from expounding on the advantagesand disadvantages of playing football. See Wollschlaeger IV , 848 F.3d at 1329 (Pryor, J., concurring) (commenting on \"the number of highlycontroversial topics that doctors [might] discuss as adirect part of their medical responsibilities\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "797 F.3d 859",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Any Law that Restricts or Compels Physician Speech and is Targeted Toward a Matter of General Public Debate Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "These run-of-the-mill laws might or might not, depending on thespecifics, violate Freedom of Speech. At leastsuperficially, though, these laws would not suggestgovernment co-opting of physician/patientcommunications, and they would fall outside thisproposed rule of decision. Governor, Florida, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 1293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedural History",
		"context": "18- 1460) raised the issue of whether this Court had jurisdiction to hear this case under the doctrine of third-party standing, jus tertii . Standing, a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, presents a threshold issue that precedes the merits. Food Marketing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a prior case, the Fifth Circuit held that abortion clinics and their hired physicians had third-party standing to invoke the Roe/Casey precedents that constitutionalize abortion. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedural History",
		"context": "In a prior case, the Fifth Circuit held that abortion clinics and their hired physicians had third-party standing to invoke the Roe/Casey precedents that constitutionalize abortion. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also June Medical Services, 814 F.3d 319 and consolidated it with No. 18-1460 for briefing and oral argument.",
		"citation_value_orig": "748 F.3d 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Procedural History",
		"context": "Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 748 F.3d 583. See also June Medical Services, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and consolidated it with No. 18-1460 for briefing and oral argument. Thus, the merits of the third-party standing issue are before the Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 F.3d 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Federal Circuit Has Correctly Refused to Abrogate Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "L. Rev. 251, 259-60 (1989) (citing the doctrine's establishment in Great Britain in 1789 a nd first appearance in the United States in 1855). 19 By the time this Court \"fully considered\" assignor estoppel for the first time in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the doctrine was already \"well set tled\" in the lower courts. Id. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taft observed that \"a myriad\" of case s had followed the doctrine's first recorded application, and subsequent decades of \"judicial consideration and c on- clusion\" had led to remarkable unanimity about the doc- trine \"in the reports of the Circuit and District C ourt de- cisions,\" as well as those of \"nearly all the Circu it Courts of Appeal.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Federal Circuit Has Correctly Refused to Abrogate Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has repeatedly held that \"where a common-law princi ple is well established, as are the rules of preclusion , the courts may take it as given that Congress has legis lated with an expectation that the principle will apply e xcept when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Federal Circuit Has Correctly Refused to Abrogate Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "This Court regu- larly applies that presumption, including in patent cases. See, e.g. , Impression Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]507 U.S. 529. And there is nothing t o indicate that assignor estoppel's application would ren- der any aspect of the statute superfluous or inoper ative. See Astoria , 501 U.S. at 109; Warner-Jenkinson 520 U.S. 17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Federal Circuit Has Correctly Refused to Abrogate Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "This Court regu- larly applies that presumption, including in patent cases. See, e.g. , Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And there is nothing t o indicate that assignor estoppel's application would ren- der any aspect of the statute superfluous or inoper ative. See Astoria , 501 U.S. at 109; Warner-Jenkinson 520 U.S. 17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Federal Circuit Has Correctly Refused to Abrogate Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": ", Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523507 U.S. 529. And there is nothing t o indicate that assignor estoppel's application would ren- der any aspect of the statute superfluous or inoper ative. See Astoria , 501 U.S. at 109; Warner-Jenkinson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even in Lear , the Court never hinted that Congress abolished licensee es- 23 toppel or any other estoppel doctrine through the P atent Act. Minerva nonetheless claims that because the Patent Act does not expressly recognize assignor estoppel, it necessarily abolishes it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. North Carolina's Tax Violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": ". Although the Question Presented concerns whether North Carolina's tax violates the Due Process Clause, Respondent argued below that the tax also violates the Commerce Clause. Kimberly Rice Kaestner Family 2015 WL 1880607, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd814 S.E.2d 43. While the North Carolina Business Court ruled that the law violated both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, North Carolina's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court only ruled that the statute violated the Due Process Clause. Id., 814 S.E.2d at 47.",
		"citation_value_orig": "789 S.E.2d 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. North Carolina's Tax Violates the Commerce Clause",
		"context": ". Although the Question Presented concerns whether North Carolina's tax violates the Due Process Clause, Respondent argued below that the tax also violates the Commerce Clause. Kimberly Rice Kaestner Family 2015 WL 1880607, aff'd789 S.E.2d 645, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the North Carolina Business Court ruled that the law violated both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, North Carolina's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court only ruled that the statute violated the Due Process Clause. Id., 814 S.E.2d at 47.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 S.E.2d 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass\" and requires complex, burdensome procedural formalities to ensure absent parties are bound by the re sults of the arbitration. 563 U.S. at 334, 348-49; see also Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But many representative actions, including PAGA claims under California law, are bilateral and can be arbitrated without any of the procedural formalities that class actions demand. Legislatures began author- izing representative actions in response to the very early common law maxim that tort actions end with the death of either the injured party or the tortfeasors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) provides that a guardian, conservator, or next of kin may sue or defend a suit on behalf of an infant or in- competent person. And most st ates have statutes that require minors involved in civil actions to have a guardian represent their interests in the litigation. See, e.g., Dengler by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These representative actions are routinely re- solved through traditional, bilateral arbitration. For example, in Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partner- ship v. Clark , this Court enforced arbitration agree- ments with respect to representative wrongful death actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 A.2d 1231",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "In the employment context, representative wrong- ful death actions are also routinely resolved through bilateral arbitration. For example, the Texas Supreme Court has held that an arbitration agreement between an employee and employer, signed before the em-ployee's death, requires the employee's wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the employer even though they did not sign the agreement. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Labatt , the Texas Supreme Court relied on the fact that the cause of action available to beneficiaries under Texas's Wrongful Death Act is \"entirely deriva-tive of the decedent's right to have sued for his own injuries immediately prior to his death\"—the \"benefi- ciaries' claims place them in the exact 'legal shoes' of the decedent, and they are subject to the same defenses to which the decedent's claims would have been sub- ject.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "279 S.W.3d 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "See JA 86, 89. In these de- rivative actions, \"a shareh older asserts on behalf of a corporation a claim [that belongs] not to the share- holder, but to the corporation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These representative actions \"insure corporate accountability,\" \"protecting corpora- tions and minority shareh olders against officers and 9 directors who . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 A.2d 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "The statute also estab- lishes a cause of action, empowering individual plan beneficiaries to seek damages on behalf of the plan for losses caused by a breach of a fiduciary duty. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These ERISA actions brought on behalf of a bene- fit plan or trust are also arbitrable. See 780 F. App'x 510; 7 F.3d 1110; 926 F.2d 116; Arnulfo P. Sulit, 847 F.2d 475; see also 13 F.4th 613.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "§ 1132(a)(2); 552 U.S. 248. These ERISA actions brought on behalf of a bene- fit plan or trust are also arbitrable. See 780 F. App'x 510; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 926 F.2d 116; Arnulfo P. Sulit, 847 F.2d 475; see also 13 F.4th 613. These representative actions on behalf of a corpo- ration, trust, or benefit plan are still reso lved through traditional, bilateral arbitration even though they seek relief that would impact the interests of many others. Because there is no formal a ggregation of claims, there is no need for the \"burdensome procedural formalities\" necessary \"to ensure absent parties are bound.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "7 F.3d 1110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "§ 1132(a)(2); 552 U.S. 248. These ERISA actions brought on behalf of a bene- fit plan or trust are also arbitrable. See 780 F. App'x 510; 7 F.3d 1110; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Arnulfo P. Sulit, 847 F.2d 475; see also 13 F.4th 613. These representative actions on behalf of a corpo- ration, trust, or benefit plan are still reso lved through traditional, bilateral arbitration even though they seek relief that would impact the interests of many others. Because there is no formal a ggregation of claims, there is no need for the \"burdensome procedural formalities\" necessary \"to ensure absent parties are bound.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.2d 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "§ 1132(a)(2); 552 U.S. 248. These ERISA actions brought on behalf of a bene- fit plan or trust are also arbitrable. See 780 F. App'x 510; 7 F.3d 1110; 926 F.2d 116; Arnulfo P. Sulit, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 13 F.4th 613. These representative actions on behalf of a corpo- ration, trust, or benefit plan are still reso lved through traditional, bilateral arbitration even though they seek relief that would impact the interests of many others. Because there is no formal a ggregation of claims, there is no need for the \"burdensome procedural formalities\" necessary \"to ensure absent parties are bound.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "847 F.2d 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "Con- cepcion , 563 U.S. at 334. Similarly, a PAGA action un- der California law does not resolve any employee's individual claim; it seeks civil penalties on behalf of the State. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the public-serving nature of a PAGA action does not make it incompatible with traditional arbitration. All these examples illustrate that representative actions come in many different forms and arise in many different areas of the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 P.3d 923",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity",
		"context": "Pet.16. Yet it \"cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitu- tion is intended to be without effect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Nobility Clause (Pet.16) is not in the Bill of Rights. The Establishment Clause is the cornerstone of our democracy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
		"context": "14–24. And he clai ms that Rule 59 \"is thoroughly con- sistent with the spirit of the habeas statutes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Pet'r BOM 25 –27. But when both points are considered in the proper context , they provide no support for Ba nis- ter's argument. a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
		"context": "L. Reg. 553, 569 (1882) ; cf. Stokel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Banister and his amici may not engage in \"halfway originalism\" by pluck ing up the common -law rules they think will help while ignoring those that hurt. Janus v. Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
		"context": "Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty ., & Mun. Emps., Counc il 31 , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And a comprehensive view of common -law practice most assuredly hurts Banister. \"The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which exists today.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
		"context": "And a comprehensive view of common -law practice most assuredly hurts Banister. \"The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which exists today.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A t common law Ban- ister could never have collaterally attacked his convic- tion. See Ex parte Watkins , 28 U.S. (3 Pe t.) 193, 202– 03 (1830).",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
		"context": "Rep. 1006, 1009– 10; Vaugh. 135, 142– 43 (C.P.) ; see also Lang- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The writ is not framed or adapted to litigating facts: it is a summary short way of tak ing the opinion of the Court up on a mat- ter of law.\") . The court issued a writ and the custodian brought back a return .",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
		"context": "It had nothing to do with a prisoner seeking to alter or amend the federal district court's judgment. It goes without saying that AEDPA's second- or-successive bar, and the abuse- of- the-writ doctrine that it replace d, are not conc erned with repetitiv e filings by prison wardens . See Felker , 518 U.S. at 664; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Browder Court did not address the only question that matters here : whether repeated post -judgment re- quests for habeas relief by prisoner s are consistent with AEDPA. Even if the abuse -of-the-writ doctrine defined the full scope of AEDPA's second -or-successive bar, but see Magwood , 561 U.S. at 337– 38 (opinion of Thomas, J.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "The similarity of the State's conduct in this case and prior cases in which the State of Washington sought to disregard tribal treaty rights is striking. The State has presented these same arguments—that the State may charge the respondents a tax or fee for the purpose of maintaining public roads—in numerous 12 federal trial and appellate courts and been rejected,12 not to mention in the courts of its own State. See Yakama Indian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], affirmed sub nom. 157 F.3d 762; Cougar Den 188 Wn. 2d 55; see also the citations to numerous Washington State district court prosecutions referenced in Flores , 955 F. Supp. at 1245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "955 F. Supp. 1229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "The State has presented these same arguments—that the State may charge the respondents a tax or fee for the purpose of maintaining public roads—in numerous 12 federal trial and appellate courts and been rejected,12 not to mention in the courts of its own State. See Yakama Indian 955 F. Supp. 1229, affirmed sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cougar Den 188 Wn. 2d 55; see also the citations to numerous Washington State district court prosecutions referenced in Flores , 955 F. Supp. at 1245. Flores involved an attempt by the State of Wash- ington to impose a regulatory fee upon logging trucks owned by Richard \"Kip\" Ra msey, a member of the Yakama Nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "157 F.3d 762",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Ramsey is also the owner of the re- spondent in this cause, Cougar Den, Inc. According to principles established by this Court, \"[a] party that has once litigated a factual or legal issue and lost may be precluded from litigating the same issue in a subse- quent proceeding.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 449 U.S. 90; 953 F.2d 682. That this case involves the same i ssues which were previously litigated by the State with the same de facto party is demonstrated by Flores , where the district court noted: 12 \"Despite the unambiguous promises made to the Yakamas, defendants argue that the Yakamas 'must' have known that 'in common with' meant that tribal members stood on the same legal ground as non-Indians for the purposes of financing and main-taining public roads.\" Flores, supra at 1249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Ramsey is also the owner of the re- spondent in this cause, Cougar Den, Inc. According to principles established by this Court, \"[a] party that has once litigated a factual or legal issue and lost may be precluded from litigating the same issue in a subse- quent proceeding.\" See 440 U.S. 147; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 953 F.2d 682. That this case involves the same i ssues which were previously litigated by the State with the same de facto party is demonstrated by Flores , where the district court noted: 12 \"Despite the unambiguous promises made to the Yakamas, defendants argue that the Yakamas 'must' have known that 'in common with' meant that tribal members stood on the same legal ground as non-Indians for the purposes of financing and main-taining public roads.\" Flores, supra at 1249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Ramsey is also the owner of the re- spondent in this cause, Cougar Den, Inc. According to principles established by this Court, \"[a] party that has once litigated a factual or legal issue and lost may be precluded from litigating the same issue in a subse- quent proceeding.\" See 440 U.S. 147; 449 U.S. 90; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That this case involves the same i ssues which were previously litigated by the State with the same de facto party is demonstrated by Flores , where the district court noted: 12 \"Despite the unambiguous promises made to the Yakamas, defendants argue that the Yakamas 'must' have known that 'in common with' meant that tribal members stood on the same legal ground as non-Indians for the purposes of financing and main-taining public roads.\" Flores, supra at 1249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "953 F.2d 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "The only time the fuel is pos- sessed in the State of Washington is on the 27 mile stretch of road from the boundary of Oregon to the boundary of the Yakama Reservation. Under such cir- cumstances, the tax may not validly be applied, either by virtue of the tribe's treaty right to free use of the roads or because the State's motor vehicle fuel excise tax is not pro-rated to reflect an apportionment be-tween on-reservation and off-reservation use of the fuel in motor vehicles. Colville, supra 447 U.S. at 163; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Yakama Indian 955 F. Supp. 1229, affirmed sub nom. Cree v. Flores, supra. Notwithstanding that the State has previously fully litigated and lost on the issue in this case it con- tinues to attempt to impose taxes for the maintenance of public roads upon Yakama Indians.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "The only time the fuel is pos- sessed in the State of Washington is on the 27 mile stretch of road from the boundary of Oregon to the boundary of the Yakama Reservation. Under such cir- cumstances, the tax may not validly be applied, either by virtue of the tribe's treaty right to free use of the roads or because the State's motor vehicle fuel excise tax is not pro-rated to reflect an apportionment be-tween on-reservation and off-reservation use of the fuel in motor vehicles. Colville, supra 447 U.S. at 163; 425 U.S. 463; Yakama Indian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], affirmed sub nom. Cree v. Flores, supra. Notwithstanding that the State has previously fully litigated and lost on the issue in this case it con- tinues to attempt to impose taxes for the maintenance of public roads upon Yakama Indians.",
		"citation_value_orig": "955 F. Supp. 1229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Cree v. Flores, supra. Notwithstanding that the State has previously fully litigated and lost on the issue in this case it con- tinues to attempt to impose taxes for the maintenance of public roads upon Yakama Indians. The State openly 16 admits that it went so fa r as attempting to move the incidence of its motor vehic le fuel tax from imposition upon retailers to fuel \"importe rs\" in response to an ad- verse decision in Squaxin Island [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This caused tribal filling stations like Cougar Den to necessarily obtain their fuel supplies from outside the State of Washing-ton, since the State of Washington Department of Li- censing prohibited the sale of tax exempt fuel to tribal retailers by fuel distributors licensed to do business in Washington State. Targeting legislation or regulatory measures at a specific class of persons is reminiscent of the principle enunciated by this Court that statutes and regulations aimed at and motivated to disad- vantage particular classes of persons violate constitu- tional protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 F. Supp. 2d 1250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "This caused tribal filling stations like Cougar Den to necessarily obtain their fuel supplies from outside the State of Washing-ton, since the State of Washington Department of Li- censing prohibited the sale of tax exempt fuel to tribal retailers by fuel distributors licensed to do business in Washington State. Targeting legislation or regulatory measures at a specific class of persons is reminiscent of the principle enunciated by this Court that statutes and regulations aimed at and motivated to disad- vantage particular classes of persons violate constitu- tional protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 See also , the nu- merous pronouncement of this Court striking down State zoning laws which constituted exclusionary zoning. Such machinations, including invoking the juris- diction of this Court for the purpose of frustrating the adverse judgments of the federal and State appellate courts, should not be encour aged.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "15 See also , the nu- merous pronouncement of this Court striking down State zoning laws which constituted exclusionary zoning. Such machinations, including invoking the juris- diction of this Court for the purpose of frustrating the adverse judgments of the federal and State appellate courts, should not be encour aged. Such conduct is rem- iniscent of the State's \"ex traordinary machinations\" to resist the effect of federa l court judgments referenced in Puget Sound Gillnetters [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: 15 The Right to Travel embodied in the Yakama Treaty is similarly subject to Constitutional protection. U.S. Const., Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.2d 1123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). 17 Except for some desegregation cases (see Mor- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st Cir. ), cert. denied sub nom.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 F.2d 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "), cert. denied sub nom. 426 U.S. 935; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied429 U.S. 1042 ), the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a de cree of a federal court witnessed in this century. This case is another chapter in the Petitioner's long campaign to maximize revenue by infringing on treaty rights and is another chapte r in the State of Washing- ton's attempt to place Yakama Indians on the same ba- sis as all other citizens by denying Yakama retailers the ability to provide fuel for tribal vehicles unless a State tax is paid for the maintenance of all State high- ways—the free use of which the signers of the Yakama Treaty were guaranteed in return for relinquishing ti- tle to some 11 million acres of land ( see Joint Appendix, 101a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 F.2d 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "957 (1859). 19 situated in unincorporated agricultural communities. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 807,000 acres of the Tribe's 1.3 million acres are vacant forested lands within the reservation's \"Closed Area\", which is so named because it has been closed to the general public at least since 1972, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs restricted the use of fed-erally maintained roads in the area to members of the Yakama Nation and to its permittees, who must be rec- ord landowners or associated with the Tribe. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "See also Washington Administrative Code §458-20- 126(3)(e). A primary purpose of the United States for establishing the Yakama Reservation was agriculture. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given such demographics, as Washington State law and administrative regulations already exempt fuel sold within the Yakama Reservation from taxa- tion, the petitioner's claims of a massive loss of fuel tax revenues appears unfounded, especially when consid- ered in light of the numerous district and court deci-sions holding that 4 U.S.C. §104, commonly known as 20 the Hayden-Cartwright Act, conferred no authority upon States to even impose motor vehicle fuel excise taxes on Indian reservations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "121 Wn. 2d 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Given such demographics, as Washington State law and administrative regulations already exempt fuel sold within the Yakama Reservation from taxa- tion, the petitioner's claims of a massive loss of fuel tax revenues appears unfounded, especially when consid- ered in light of the numerous district and court deci-sions holding that 4 U.S.C. §104, commonly known as 20 the Hayden-Cartwright Act, conferred no authority upon States to even impose motor vehicle fuel excise taxes on Indian reservations. See, e.g., Marty Indian School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Goodman Oil 136 Idaho 53, cert. denied534 U.S. 1129. The scare tactics of the United States should sim- ilarly be disregarded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.2d 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Given such demographics, as Washington State law and administrative regulations already exempt fuel sold within the Yakama Reservation from taxa- tion, the petitioner's claims of a massive loss of fuel tax revenues appears unfounded, especially when consid- ered in light of the numerous district and court deci-sions holding that 4 U.S.C. §104, commonly known as 20 the Hayden-Cartwright Act, conferred no authority upon States to even impose motor vehicle fuel excise taxes on Indian reservations. See, e.g., Marty Indian School 824 F.2d 684; Goodman Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied534 U.S. 1129. The scare tactics of the United States should sim- ilarly be disregarded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 Idaho 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "Ra- ther, the scope of the right secured in the Yakama Treaty is in common with other citizens and the scope of this litigation is limited to the applicability of Wash- ington State's fuel excise tax. Courts do not render ad- visory opinions on issues or involving parties not before it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 18 Amicus is thoroughly confused by the inclusion of argu- ments in petitioner's and amici 's briefs referencing possible ex- emptions from various state cigarette taxes. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "219 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court",
		"context": "20 Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2341, et seq. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Counsel for amicus was present and seconded the motion to disapprove the proposed settlement agreement. See Joint Ap- pendix, 106a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "674 F.3d 1160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Invalidation of the ACE Rule Also Harms Petitioners",
		"context": "But the decision below makes doing so far easier. \"An agency may not … disregard rules that are still on the books,\" and must justify a change in policy if a \"prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respon dents want the decision below to stay on the books in order to keep ACE off the books , as that clears the f ield for a new EPA to begin its new regulatory onslaught. Once again, Petitioners suffer harm from that course for the same reason: Reversing the decision b elow and reviving ACE would make it harder for the EPA to flip positions and impose more burdensome regulations on the coal industry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Collection of Information Is Not Protected by the AIA Even When the IRS Subjects Noncompliance to an Assessable Penalty",
		"context": "See Direct Mktg. 575 U.S. 1. 34 Fla. Bankers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 IRC.35 Relying on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius36 for the holding that Chapter 68, Subchapter B penalties are considered taxes for pur- poses of the AIA, the D.C. Circuit found that the AIA barred bankers associations from challenging infor- mation reporting requirements imposed in U.S. banks concerning interest earned by non-resident aliens be-cause allowing such a challenge would in essence allow a challenge to the collection of the potential penalty/tax.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 1065",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Collection of Information Is Not Protected by the AIA Even When the IRS Subjects Noncompliance to an Assessable Penalty",
		"context": "In fact, if the IRS succeeded in inducing the behavior it 35 See id. at 1068. 36 National Federation of Inde pendent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37 Florida Bankers 799 F.3d 1065. 38 See CIC Servs., 925 F.3d 247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Collection of Information Is Not Protected by the AIA Even When the IRS Subjects Noncompliance to an Assessable Penalty",
		"context": "at 1068. 36 National Federation of Inde pendent 567 U.S. 519. 37 Florida Bankers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 38 See CIC Servs., 925 F.3d 247. 15 intended, it would never have collected a cent from tax- payers, only information.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 1065",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Collection of Information Is Not Protected by the AIA Even When the IRS Subjects Noncompliance to an Assessable Penalty",
		"context": "36 National Federation of Inde pendent 567 U.S. 519. 37 Florida Bankers 799 F.3d 1065. 38 See CIC Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 intended, it would never have collected a cent from tax- payers, only information. Unde r these facts, it is disin- genuous for the IRS to hide potentially faulty rule- making behind a law intended to protect the collection of revenue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Collection of Information Is Not Protected by the AIA Even When the IRS Subjects Noncompliance to an Assessable Penalty",
		"context": "This holding essentially hands the executive branch the power to decide when its own rule-making will be offered APA protections by writing rules that define the behavior which triggers the imposition of a penalty. The Sixth Circuit worried that to rule for the taxpayer would cause the AIA to be reduced to dust in the context of challenges to re gulatory taxes, but in so holding, the court all but obliterated the congression- ally provided pre-payment forum for necessary APA challenges. 39 While corporate taxpayers and wealthier individ- ual taxpayers may have the means to fight improper rule-making in a post-payme nt forum, the low-income taxpayer is particularly vulnerable to such a broad 39 See CIC [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 holding. In many cases such a taxpayer is left without any real protection at all.40",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Whether Eddings Error Can Be Remedied Only By the Trial Court",
		"context": "If thesupreme court finds that the mitigation isnot sufficiently substantial to warrantleniency, the supreme court shall affirm thedeath sentence. If the supreme court findsthat the mitigation is sufficiently substantialto warrant leniency, the supreme court shallimpose a life sentence pursuant to section 13-751, subsection A. C. The independent review required by subsection A does not preclude the supremecourt from remanding a case for furtheraction if the trial court erroneously excludedevidence or if the appellate record does notadequately reflect the evidence presented. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Arizona Supreme Court delineated itsstatutory obligations in the following manner: Because Prince committed the murder before August 1, 2002, we independently review thejury's findings on \"aggravation and mitigationand the propriety of the death sentence.\" A.R.S.§ 13-755(A)-(C); see 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "226 Ariz. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Whether Eddings Error Can Be Remedied Only By the Trial Court",
		"context": "11 In our review, we determine whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.Anderson , 210 Ariz. at 351 ¶ 104, 111 P.3d at 393. We \"consider the quality and the strength,not simply the number, of aggravating andmitigating factors.\" 255 Ariz. 91, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although we do not requirea nexus between the mitigating factors and thecrime, the defendant's failure to establish acausal connection \"may be considered inassessing the quality and strength of the mitigation evidence.\" Newell , 212 Ariz. at 405 ¶ 82, 132 P.3d at 849; accord Ellison , 213 Ariz. at 144 ¶132, 140 P.3d at 927.",
		"citation_value_orig": "222 Ariz. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision is wrong.",
		"context": "That is the approach followed in every other context in which a \"legitimate penological justification\" is relevant to the State's liability . Pet. 15, 18- 19; see e.g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Bell Atl. 550 U.S. 544 . Respondent s do not even attempt to justify deviating from that approach in the method -of- execution context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "627 F.3d 1178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision is wrong.",
		"context": "Pet. 15, 18- 19; see e.g ., 627 F.3d 1178 ; Bell Atl. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent s do not even attempt to justify deviating from that approach in the method -of- execution context. Here, petitioner has satisfied the applicable plead- ing standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision is wrong.",
		"context": "2019) (decision below). Here, by contr ast, the issue is squarely presented and is the sole ground upon which the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's com- plaint. 6 will avoid the violent seizures that petitioner 's medi- cal condition could otherwise cause, thereby further- ing the Sta te's interest in protecting witness sensibil- ities.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, additional research published after Bucklew 's issuance show s nitrogen gas to be humane, safe for witnesses, and easy to administer. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 Pet. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies",
		"context": "73, 78 (1789). That grant of jurisdiction, as this Court has explained, gave federal courts the \"authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time.\" Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The equitable jurisdiction thus conferred permits federal courts to grant traditional equitable relief, no matter whether that relief is also set forth in the text of an applicable statute. Fo r example, when a statute or rule is silent about whether a time period for acting may be suspended, courts retain the power to toll the deadline on equitable grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies",
		"context": "Emps.' Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 In the same way, courts have inherent equitable authority to award traditio nal restitution, whether or not it is also provided for in an applicable statute. Indeed, this Court itself has held on several occasions that courts have the inherent power to order restitu- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies",
		"context": "14 In the same way, courts have inherent equitable authority to award traditio nal restitution, whether or not it is also provided for in an applicable statute. Indeed, this Court itself has held on several occasions that courts have the inherent power to order restitu- tion. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a district court had \"inherent equitable jurisdiction\" to order a landlord to refund rents that it had c ollected in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. More recently, the Court awarded partial re stitution of one state's gains from breaching a water-rights compact with another state, pursuant to its inherent equitable authority. 135 S. Ct. 1042.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies",
		"context": "In 328 U.S. 395, the Court held that a district court had \"inherent equitable jurisdiction\" to order a landlord to refund rents that it had c ollected in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. More recently, the Court awarded partial re stitution of one state's gains from breaching a water-rights compact with another state, pursuant to its inherent equitable authority. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, a court can order restitution of a defen- dant's ill-gotten gains in a securities case pursuant to its inherent authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedent Requires Express Federal Law to Preempt Application of Nondiscriminatory, Off-Reservation Taxes Like the Tax Here",
		"context": "Mescalero Apache Tribe , 411 U.S. at 148. But if a State seeks to tax a tribe or its members within Indian Country, the opposite is true: the tax is invalid \"[a]bsent explicit congressional direction to the contrary[.]\" Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chickasaw Nation , 515 U.S. at 459 (\"If the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales ma de inside Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization.\"). 19 This bright-line standard about where the tax applies serves several crucial purposes emphasized by this Court. It avoids needless disputes and litigation between states and tribes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedent Requires Express Federal Law to Preempt Application of Nondiscriminatory, Off-Reservation Taxes Like the Tax Here",
		"context": "It avoids needless disputes and litigation between states and tribes. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It ensures efficiency and predictability in tax administration. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedent Requires Express Federal Law to Preempt Application of Nondiscriminatory, Off-Reservation Taxes Like the Tax Here",
		"context": "As to such a tax, this Court has forcefully described the principles to be applied. Tribes and their members are subject to nondiscriminatory off-reservation taxes \"[a]bsent a 'definitely expressed' exemption[.]\" Mescalero Apache Tribe , 411 U.S. at 156 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"[T]ax exemptions are not granted by implication.\" Mescalero Apache Tribe , 411 U.S. at 156 (quoting Oklahoma Tax 319 U.S. 598).",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedent Requires Express Federal Law to Preempt Application of Nondiscriminatory, Off-Reservation Taxes Like the Tax Here",
		"context": "Mescalero Apache Tribe , 411 U.S. at 156 (quoting 283 U.S. 691). \"[T]ax exemptions are not granted by implication.\" Mescalero Apache Tribe , 411 U.S. at 156 (quoting Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Instead, they must be \"clearly expressed\" and \"'unambiguously proved.'\" Chickasaw Nation , 534 U.S. at 95 (quoting Wells Fargo Bank , 485 U.S. at 354).",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedent Requires Express Federal Law to Preempt Application of Nondiscriminatory, Off-Reservation Taxes Like the Tax Here",
		"context": "Chickasaw Nation , 534 U.S. at 95 (quoting Wells Fargo Bank , 485 U.S. at 354). If Congress wants to preempt state 21 taxes, it must \"say so in plain words\"; \"[s]uch a conclusion cannot rest on dubious inferences.\" Mescalero Apache Tribe , 411 U.S. at 156 (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n , 319 U.S. at 607); The Cherokee Tobacco , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These are the principles that apply here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "78 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "The court must, there- fore, have some understanding of the defendant state's law and its effect on the issues in suit. But unlike the law of torts, s tate tax policies differ, in part, as a result of a \"healthy form of rivalry.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, of course, California imposes an individual income tax, along with all of the concomitant substantive and procedu ral rules, while Nevada does not. This is the very kind of conflict in public policy that entitles Ne- vada courts to favor Nevada's own policy choices.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "If it misconstrues that law, this does not implicate full faith and credit unless the mistake contradicts an established interpreta tion and is brought to the court's a ttention during the litigation. See Pennsyl- vania Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and Western Life Indem- nity 235 U.S. 261 . Also, the defendant state's appellate courts will have no op- portunity to review the court's application of its laws , creating the potential for persistent conflicts in interpretations that can be further exploited . 10 If, instead, the court chooses to apply the forum - state's law, it need not demonstrate that the fo rum state had the majority of the contacts with the iss ue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "243 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "If it misconstrues that law, this does not implicate full faith and credit unless the mistake contradicts an established interpreta tion and is brought to the court's a ttention during the litigation. See Pennsyl- vania Fire Ins. 243 U.S. 93 and Western Life Indem- nity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Also, the defendant state's appellate courts will have no op- portunity to review the court's application of its laws , creating the potential for persistent conflicts in interpretations that can be further exploited . 10 If, instead, the court chooses to apply the forum - state's law, it need not demonstrate that the fo rum state had the majority of the contacts with the iss ue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "Also, the defendant state's appellate courts will have no op- portunity to review the court's application of its laws , creating the potential for persistent conflicts in interpretations that can be further exploited . 10 If, instead, the court chooses to apply the forum - state's law, it need not demonstrate that the fo rum state had the majority of the contacts with the iss ue. For example, in Allstate Insurance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court held a Minnesota court properly applied Minnesota law to a case involving an out-of-state accident and the death of an out -of- state resident , in part because the plaintiff (the de- cedent's wife) had moved to Minnesota after the ac- cident. Id. at 318- 319.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "Nor would the choice to apply the forum -state's l aw normally implicate the Full Faith and Cred it Clause, Id. at 323 (Stevens, J. con- curring), unless, as this Court has previously held, the court adopted a \"policy of hostility\" to the laws of the defendant state. Franchise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But, of course, such hostility is in the eye of the beholder. See Franchise Tax 136 S. Ct. 1277.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "Franchise Tax 538 U.S. 488 . But, of course, such hostility is in the eye of the beholder. See Franchise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whichever law the court applies , its judgment will have preclusive effect for the issues litigated . A de- fendant state will not ordinarily be able to refuse to give effect to a judgment by another state's court, so long as the question of jurisdiction was fully and fairly litigated in that court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "A de- fendant state will not ordinarily be able to refuse to give effect to a judgment by another state's court, so long as the question of jurisdiction was fully and fairly litigated in that court. This Court has held, for example, that a federal court cannot consider wheth- er a state court had jurisdiction to decide an issue if the state court itself fully considered the question of jurisdiction. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See also Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Car- olina Life & A ccident & Health Ins. Guar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area",
		"context": "Guar. Ass'n. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Upholding the decision below would empower courts and arbitrators to impose class procedures on unconsenting parties and create substantial practical problems",
		"context": "The upshot of a class arbitration's vulnerability to collateral attack is that \"absent class members [can] unfairly 'claim the benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves to the bind- 25 ing effect of an unfavorable one.'\" Oxford Health , 569 U.S. at 575 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v.Utah , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That result is palpably unfair. An absent \"class member\" would be able to recover under a fa- vorable decision by the arbitrator, but could invoke due process principles to avoid being bound by an un- favorable decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Upholding the decision below would empower courts and arbitrators to impose class procedures on unconsenting parties and create substantial practical problems",
		"context": "The policy preference for class actions that may have animated the decision below is not a per- missible basis under the FAA for imposing class ar- bitration. Nearly three decades ago, this Court rejected the argument that arbitration should be denied in the employment context because the agreement did not provide for class procedures. Gilmer v.Inter- state/Lane Johnson Corp. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Concepcion , this Court specifically re- jected policy arguments that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims \"that might otherwise slip through the legal system.\" 563 U.S. at 351; ac- cord American Express Co. v.Italian Colors Rest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Upholding the decision below would empower courts and arbitrators to impose class procedures on unconsenting parties and create substantial practical problems",
		"context": "And in Concepcion , this Court specifically re- jected policy arguments that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims \"that might otherwise slip through the legal system.\" 563 U.S. at 351; ac- cord American Express Co. v.Italian Colors Rest. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court recently un- derscored, \" Concepcion 's essential insight\" is that courts may not \"reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration pro- cedures without the parties' consent.\" Epic Sys.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Upholding the decision below would empower courts and arbitrators to impose class procedures on unconsenting parties and create substantial practical problems",
		"context": ", 138 S. Ct. at 1623. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit failed to heed this Court's repeated recognition that \"there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions\" calling for traditional, bilateral arbitration, including \"allow[ing] parties to avoid the costs of litigation.\" 26 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.Adams , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, this Court has been \"clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitra- tion process somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context.\" Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 109, 123 (citing Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 30-32).",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": "This Court and other courts have applied the collateral con- sequences doctrine in cases where a judgment may af- fect the baseline by which future events are judged. For example, this Court held th at a challenge to a voting \"plan [that] 'will never again be used for any purpose' \" was not moot because it would \"serve as the baseline against which appellee's next voting plan will be eval- uated for the purposes of preclearance.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g., 474 F.2d 426. Similarly, a Fourth Amendment challenge was not moot despite all charges against the plaintiff being dis- missed and not \"deemed a conviction for . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": "This Court and other courts have applied the collateral con- sequences doctrine in cases where a judgment may af- fect the baseline by which future events are judged. For example, this Court held th at a challenge to a voting \"plan [that] 'will never again be used for any purpose' \" was not moot because it would \"serve as the baseline against which appellee's next voting plan will be eval- uated for the purposes of preclearance.\" 528 U.S. 320; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, a Fourth Amendment challenge was not moot despite all charges against the plaintiff being dis- missed and not \"deemed a conviction for . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 F.2d 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": ". [any] pur-pose\" because \"a nonpublic record of the charges\" could be used by courts \"in determining the merits of subse- quent proceedings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, an award of nominal damages sets a new baseline for Respondents and other state officials be- cause a determination that Respondents violated Peti- tioners' First Amendment rights will be used to evaluate whether law is \"clearly established\" for pur- poses of qualified immunity proceedings. See 555 U.S. 223 (\"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-tional rights of which a reasonable person would have 9 known.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": "508 U.S. 366. Here, an award of nominal damages sets a new baseline for Respondents and other state officials be- cause a determination that Respondents violated Peti- tioners' First Amendment rights will be used to evaluate whether law is \"clearly established\" for pur- poses of qualified immunity proceedings. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-tional rights of which a reasonable person would have 9 known.' \" (quoting 457 U.S. 800)). The possibility of subjecting officials to future lia- bility is not merely speculative.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": "Here, an award of nominal damages sets a new baseline for Respondents and other state officials be- cause a determination that Respondents violated Peti- tioners' First Amendment rights will be used to evaluate whether law is \"clearly established\" for pur- poses of qualified immunity proceedings. See 555 U.S. 223 (\"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-tional rights of which a reasonable person would have 9 known.' \" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). The possibility of subjecting officials to future lia- bility is not merely speculative. A court recently held that university administrators at the University of Iowa violated clearly est ablished law after repeated infractions against religious groups on campus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": "The development of \"clearly established law\" for purposes of qualified immunity does not have a mere trivial or immaterial effect on the parties. This Court once required that courts determine whether an allegation asserts violations of constitutional rights \"to prevent constitutional stagnation.\" Pearson , 555 U.S. at 232 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Though the Court eliminated the requirement in Pear- son, it acknowledged that \"we continue to recognize 2 Referencing Business Leaders in 2018 WL 4701879. 10 that [determining whether a constitutional right has been violated] is often beneficial.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged",
		"context": "See Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qu alified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Partic- ularly Unfortunate Consequences , 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1219, 1250 (2015) (\"At a time in which it is vital for con- stitutional law to keep pace with changes in technology, social norms, and political practices, this trend toward granting immunity while failin g to articulate constitu- tional rights will surely have far-reaching, negative re- percussions. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Plaintiffs must produce precedent even as fewer courts are pro- ducing precedent. Important constitutional questions go unanswered precisely because no one's answered them before. Courts then rely on that judic ial silence to conclude there's no equivale nt case on the books.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.3d 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE IMPROPERLY APPOINTED, IT SHOULD SEVER THEIR REMOVAL PROTECTIONS",
		"context": "A. When a statute contains a constitutional flaw, courts apply a \" strong presumption of severability. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The preference for severance rather than invalidation of the statute avoid s ahistorical spec- ulation about congressional preferences in favor of sal- vaging the duly enacted statute to the greatest extent 4 possible. Here, the court of appeals ' narrow remedy — severing administrative patent judges ' tenure protec- tions so that they are removable at -will— is the narrow- est remedy that is sufficient to cure any Appointments Clause violation by rendering administrative patent judges inferior officers (assuming they are not already) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE IMPROPERLY APPOINTED, IT SHOULD SEVER THEIR REMOVAL PROTECTIONS",
		"context": "art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Ed- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Ed- mond , the Court explained that t he essential character- istic of an inferior officer is that her \"work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were ap- pointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate. \" 520 U.S. at 663.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IF THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE IMPROPERLY APPOINTED, IT SHOULD SEVER THEIR REMOVAL PROTECTIONS",
		"context": "Subsequent decisions confirm that the infe- rior-officer inquiry is a pragmatic one that asks whether, in light of the statutory and regulatory scheme as a whole, the officer 's work is subject to meaningful super- vision by principal officers. E.g., Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Viewed holistically , there is little question that the PTO's administrative patent judges are \" directed and supervised \" by the Director of the PTO and, ultimately, by the Secretary of Commerce, both of whom are ap- pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties",
		"context": "laims should therefore be dismissed for lack of statutory standing, and the Court need not rule on the constitutionality of Act 620. The plaintiffs have also failed to allege or establish third-party standing under this Court's \"prudential standing\" doctrine. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An abortion patient who encounters an \"undue burden\" on account of Act 620 faces no \"hindrance\" to asserting her own rights, because 410 U.S. 113 , allows her to sue under a pseudonym and ensures that her claims will not become moot at the conclusion of her preg- nancy . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties",
		"context": "The plaintiffs have also failed to allege or establish third-party standing under this Court's \"prudential standing\" doctrine. See 543 U.S. 125. An abortion patient who encounters an \"undue burden\" on account of Act 620 faces no \"hindrance\" to asserting her own rights, because [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , allows her to sue under a pseudonym and ensures that her claims will not become moot at the conclusion of her preg- nancy . See id. at 125 (\"Pregnancy provides a classic justi- fication for a conclusion of nonmootness.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties",
		"context": "at 125 (\"Pregnancy provides a classic justi- fication for a conclusion of nonmootness.\"). More import- antly , an abor tion provider cannot assert the 4 constitutional rights of its patients when challenging health -and -safety regulations, because third-party stand- ing is forbidden whenever the interests of the litigant and the third-party rights holder are even \"potentially in con- flict.\" Elk Grove Unified School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally , a ruling from this Court that allows aborti on providers to assert the constitutional rights of abortion patients will overrule Roe v. Wade 's mootness holding, because Jane Roe's constitu- tional claim s would not have \"evaded review\" if an abor- tion provider could have litigated those claims on her be-half. See 416 U.S. 312.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties",
		"context": "Elk Grove Unified School 542 U.S. 1. Finally , a ruling from this Court that allows aborti on providers to assert the constitutional rights of abortion patients will overrule Roe v. Wade 's mootness holding, because Jane Roe's constitu- tional claim s would not have \"evaded review\" if an abor- tion provider could have litigated those claims on her be-half. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If th is Court decides to resolve the constitutionality of Act 620, it should overrule Whole Woman 's 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016 )—or, at the very least, it should narrowly construe that decision and begin the pro- cess of removing this Court from the abortion-umpiring business. The Constitution does not allow this Court to in- vent or enforce rights that have no grounding in the Con-stitution 's language, and it does not permit this Court to impose its preferred abortion policies over decisions made by the people and their elected representatives .",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties",
		"context": "Finally , a ruling from this Court that allows aborti on providers to assert the constitutional rights of abortion patients will overrule Roe v. Wade 's mootness holding, because Jane Roe's constitu- tional claim s would not have \"evaded review\" if an abor- tion provider could have litigated those claims on her be-half. See 416 U.S. 312. If th is Court decides to resolve the constitutionality of Act 620, it should overrule Whole Woman 's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2016 )—or, at the very least, it should narrowly construe that decision and begin the pro- cess of removing this Court from the abortion-umpiring business. The Constitution does not allow this Court to in- vent or enforce rights that have no grounding in the Con-stitution 's language, and it does not permit this Court to impose its preferred abortion policies over decisions made by the people and their elected representatives . The Court must obey the Constitution over its precedent, and stare decisis cannot be used to perpetuate this Court's usurpatious and unconstitutional abortion edict s. See 306 U.S. 466.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties",
		"context": "If th is Court decides to resolve the constitutionality of Act 620, it should overrule Whole Woman 's 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016 )—or, at the very least, it should narrowly construe that decision and begin the pro- cess of removing this Court from the abortion-umpiring business. The Constitution does not allow this Court to in- vent or enforce rights that have no grounding in the Con-stitution 's language, and it does not permit this Court to impose its preferred abortion policies over decisions made by the people and their elected representatives . The Court must obey the Constitution over its precedent, and stare decisis cannot be used to perpetuate this Court's usurpatious and unconstitutional abortion edict s. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Finally, t he Court should remind abortion providers that judicially disapproved abortion statutes continue to exist as laws —even if their enforcement has been en- joined by a federal court. And the penalties accumulated under these currently unenforced statutes will become enforceable if this Court decides to overrule Whole Woman 's Health or Roe v. Wade.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "Allowing government officials to enter the home based on \"community caretaking \" needs would create an exception that swallow s the Fourth Amendment . Because \"law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social pu rpose or objective,\" virtually any search or seizure could \" be justified by reference to the broad social benefits that … laws might bring about (or, put another way, the social harms that they might prevent).\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An officer's \"subjective motivation is irrelevant,\" Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 404, and it would not be difficult for an officer to articulate some objective health or safety reason for his actions. For example, absent consent or exigent circumstances, police cannot enter a home without a warrant to make an arrest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "The same public safety interest would eliminate the need for officers to rely on hot pursuit . Even when the police know that a suspect is alone in a home, they could justify their entries in many instances, including virtually any involving drug s or alcohol, by the need to make sure the suspect himself 13 is okay. Compare Welsh , 446 U.S. at 742, 754 (prohibiting warrantless entry into home of driver who was \" very inebriated or very sick \"), with 826 N.W.2d 87[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]494 U.S. 325; 395 U.S. 752, officers could search far more broadly in the name of \"community caretaking \"—for instance, examining every drawer and medici ne cabinet for pills in situations involving potential suicide by overdose . Respondents' and the United States' rule would have ramifications beyond the home , too. The Court has meticulously defined the circumstances in which a closely regulated business may be searched without a warrant, see New 482 U.S. 691, and has restricted warrantless searches of other businesses, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 N.W.2d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "The same public safety interest would eliminate the need for officers to rely on hot pursuit . Even when the police know that a suspect is alone in a home, they could justify their entries in many instances, including virtually any involving drug s or alcohol, by the need to make sure the suspect himself 13 is okay. Compare Welsh , 446 U.S. at 742, 754 (prohibiting warrantless entry into home of driver who was \" very inebriated or very sick \"), with 826 N.W.2d 87785 N.W.2d 592[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 395 U.S. 752, officers could search far more broadly in the name of \"community caretaking \"—for instance, examining every drawer and medici ne cabinet for pills in situations involving potential suicide by overdose . Respondents' and the United States' rule would have ramifications beyond the home , too. The Court has meticulously defined the circumstances in which a closely regulated business may be searched without a warrant, see New 482 U.S. 691, and has restricted warrantless searches of other businesses, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "The same public safety interest would eliminate the need for officers to rely on hot pursuit . Even when the police know that a suspect is alone in a home, they could justify their entries in many instances, including virtually any involving drug s or alcohol, by the need to make sure the suspect himself 13 is okay. Compare Welsh , 446 U.S. at 742, 754 (prohibiting warrantless entry into home of driver who was \" very inebriated or very sick \"), with 826 N.W.2d 87785 N.W.2d 592494 U.S. 325; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], officers could search far more broadly in the name of \"community caretaking \"—for instance, examining every drawer and medici ne cabinet for pills in situations involving potential suicide by overdose . Respondents' and the United States' rule would have ramifications beyond the home , too. The Court has meticulously defined the circumstances in which a closely regulated business may be searched without a warrant, see New 482 U.S. 691, and has restricted warrantless searches of other businesses, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "Compare Welsh , 446 U.S. at 742, 754 (prohibiting warrantless entry into home of driver who was \" very inebriated or very sick \"), with 826 N.W.2d 87785 N.W.2d 592494 U.S. 325; 395 U.S. 752, officers could search far more broadly in the name of \"community caretaking \"—for instance, examining every drawer and medici ne cabinet for pills in situations involving potential suicide by overdose . Respondents' and the United States' rule would have ramifications beyond the home , too. The Court has meticulously defined the circumstances in which a closely regulated business may be searched without a warrant, see New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and has restricted warrantless searches of other businesses, see, e.g. , Barlow's , 436 U.S. at 320 – 21 (enforcing warrant requirement for OSHA inspections) . Allowing the government to justify a search simply by point ing to a public health or safety concern would nullify the Court's analysis in those",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Poses Important Questions About the Scope of Review Under the AIA",
		"context": "Con- gress designed section 1498(a) to aid patent owners whose inventions are appropriated by government 3 agen cies, but relief under section 1498(a) will be una- vailable if such suits are displaced by CBM reviews. Additionally, a s amici observe, the Federal Circuit's ruling allows the Postal Service to have it both ways by exercising sovereign powers while simulta neously taking advantage of AIA review rights this Court has characterized as belonging to \"private parties.\" See Brief of 15 Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 2; SAS Institute, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e Court has granted certio- rari to address other important aspects of the AIA's structure,1 and should do so here as well. The Government's argument that the \"infringe- ment\" question is of d iminishing practical importance because the CBM program is scheduled to expire in September 2020, Brief in Opposition ( Opp. )",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Poses Important Questions About the Scope of Review Under the AIA",
		"context": "The Government's argument that the \"infringe- ment\" question is of d iminishing practical importance because the CBM program is scheduled to expire in September 2020, Brief in Opposition ( Opp. ) 20, over- looks the fact that CBM reviews will continue well past the statutory sunset date . 2 As the Patent and Trademark Office explained in adopting regulations for the CBM program, \"Section 18 of the AIA and the regulations issued [thereunder] will continue to apply 1 See SAS Institute , 138 S. Ct. at 1354, 1359- 60 (reversing 2-1 ruling, over Judge Newman's \"vigorous dissent,\" that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may review a subset of challenged patent claims); Oil States Energy Services, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 Elsewhere, the Government inaccurately asserts that both questions presented \"have diminishing practical importance \" due to the CBM program's sunset date. Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is Limited to the Due Process Clause and Would Likely Return on Commerce Clause Grounds If the Department Was Successful",
		"context": "The Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause \"pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States,\" meaning \"a State ma y, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer,\" but \"imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.\" Quill [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has ex- plained that the Commerce Clause imposes limits upon a state's ability to tax interstate commerce and activity. See 488 U.S. 252, 259 trust consists .",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is Limited to the Due Process Clause and Would Likely Return on Commerce Clause Grounds If the Department Was Successful",
		"context": "Quill 504 U.S. 298. This Court has ex- plained that the Commerce Clause imposes limits upon a state's ability to tax interstate commerce and activity. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 259 trust consists . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is Limited to the Due Process Clause and Would Likely Return on Commerce Clause Grounds If the Department Was Successful",
		"context": ". was a resident of this state at the time the trust became irrevocable\" and noting that the taxable income of the trust is modified if all the non-contingent benefi-ciaries do not reside within the state); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-30-5(c)(4)(5) (defining a resident tr ust to include \"[ a]n irrevocable trust created by or consisting of property contributed by a person who is a resident individual in th is state at the time the trust was created\" and \"the beneficiaries are Rhode Island resident individ-uals\"). 24 (1989); Complete Auto Transit, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case does not present an opportunity to ad- dress the Commerce Clause. The validity of a state tax under the Commerce Clause is determined by the four- part test set forth by this Court in Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is Limited to the Due Process Clause and Would Likely Return on Commerce Clause Grounds If the Department Was Successful",
		"context": "24 (1989); Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274. This case does not present an opportunity to ad- dress the Commerce Clause. The validity of a state tax under the Commerce Clause is determined by the four- part test set forth by this Court in Complete Auto Transit, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Complete Auto test, a state complies with the Com- merce Clause if: \"the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against in- terstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the ser-vices provided by the State.\" Quill Corp. , 504 U.S. at 311 (quoting 430 U.S. at 279).",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
		"context": "See 327 P.3d at 151. Critical to Waffle House 's determination that the employee's arbitration agreement did not apply was the fact that the government agency itself was pursu- ing the enforcement action and controlled the litiga- tion. See 534 U.S. at 291-94; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court stressed that \"the EEOC is in com- mand of the process\" and that the \"statute clearly makes the EEOC the master of its own case.\" Waffle House , 534 U.S. at 291.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
		"context": "That view is incorrect; this Court's precedents make clear that the effective-vindication exception simply does not apply to state-law claims. See Am. Express [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 should be resolved\"); 681 F. App'x 592. In other words, Iskanian holds that representa- tive PAGA actions belong to the State just enough to prevent application of this Court's decision in Concep- cion, but not enough to prevent the employee and em- ployer from agreeing to arbitrate a PAGA claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
		"context": "See Am. Express 570 U.S. 228. 21 should be resolved\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, Iskanian holds that representa- tive PAGA actions belong to the State just enough to prevent application of this Court's decision in Concep- cion, but not enough to prevent the employee and em- ployer from agreeing to arbitrate a PAGA claim. That conclusion is untenable and amounts to little more than a blatant misuse of Waffle House .",
		"citation_value_orig": "681 F. App'x 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
		"context": "And it proves far too much because the fact that the State obtains a portion of recovered penalties is no basis for exempt- ing private claims from arbitration. For instance, a number of States have enacted laws requiring that as much as 75% of a punitive- damages award won by a private plaintiff be distrib- uted to the State or its agencies.9 Yet this Court has long held that agreements to arbitrate punitive-dam- ages claims are fully enforceable under the FAA. Mas- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, Iskanian represents the very type of \"ju- dicial hostility to arbitration\" that the FAA was de- signed to prevent. The Iskanian rule is irreconcilable with Epic and Concepcion , and this Court's interven- tion is needed to restore uniform application of the FAA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Unworkable, Encourages Draconian Speech Regulation, And Risks Diluting Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "This type of cursory ex-amination of content to determine a rule's applicabil- ity—even to just establish the contours of the mode of expression—would unnecessarily trigger strict scru- tiny under the Fifth Circuit's rule. Some circuits have already begun applying Reed in this untenable way. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Eighth Circuit en- countered a local sign ordi nance that exempted flags from its regulation of signs. The law defined a flag as \"any fabric or bunting containing distinctive colors, patterns or symbols used as a symbol of a government or institution.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "924 F.3d 995",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Unworkable, Encourages Draconian Speech Regulation, And Risks Diluting Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "Yet it would be impossible to impose even modest regulations on those categories of expression if local law enforcement must ignore all communicative aspects of the speech. A \"parade\" is not merely a group of marchers, but \"marchers who are making some sort of collective point.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What distin- guishes graffiti from a blan k wall is that it contains some sort of \"inscription, figure, or mark\" meant to communicate something. 476 F.3d 74.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Unworkable, Encourages Draconian Speech Regulation, And Risks Diluting Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "515 U.S. 557. What distin- guishes graffiti from a blan k wall is that it contains some sort of \"inscription, figure, or mark\" meant to communicate something. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e ordinary definition of \"picketing,\" this Court has explained, encompasses activity that is not only located in a particular place, but \"focused on\" that location. Frisby , 487 U.S. at 482.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 F.3d 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Unworkable, Encourages Draconian Speech Regulation, And Risks Diluting Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "Many other areas of First Amendment law also allow at least some consideration of content, including, crit-ically, the commercial speech doctrine, as well as en- forcement of libel laws, identification of protected ver- sus unprotected speech, government subsidization of speech, and speech affecting critical government func-tions. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No decision of this Court has suggested that all regulations that touch on content must automatically be subjected to strict scrutiny. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation",
		"context": "See Pet'r's Br. 18–21 (discussing applicability of Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It should be overturned on this ground alone. But the decision is also wrong on the facts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Policy Requirement Is a Legitimate Eligibility Requirement",
		"context": ". Certainly the government cannot willy-nilly use the carrot of taxpayer funding to obtain the forfeiture ofconstitutional rights. While he who \"pays the piper\" generally gets to \"call the tune,\" Democratic Senatorial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, \"'the government may not deny a benefit toa person on a basis that infringes his constitutionallyprotected . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "660 F.2d 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Policy Requirement Is a Legitimate Eligibility Requirement",
		"context": "freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.'\" Id. (quoting United States [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That does not mean, however, that Congress must be indifferent to the qualifications of the applicants for federal grants. \"When Congress established a NationalEndowment for Democracy to encourage othercountries to adopt democratic principles, .",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Policy Requirement Is a Legitimate Eligibility Requirement",
		"context": ". ., it was notconstitutionally required to fund a program toencourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the same way, Congress need notignore whether applicants for funding under agovernment program in fact support the goals they are expected to promote. An overseas campaign against abortion can disqualify groups that do or promote abortions, even on their own time and money, just as an overseas campaign to increase access to abortion could presumably disqualify groups that oppose abortion, even on their own time and money.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "13,041 (2011) ( statement of Sen. Whitehouse) ; see 2011 House Report 45 -46 (discussing the history of reexamination proceedings and the problems with existing proce- dures ). To ensure that the new review procedures func- tioned effectively, Congress gave \"challenger[s] broader participation rights\" in AIA post -issuance re- view proceedings than third parties had enjoyed in prior reexamination procedures before the USPTO. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Third -party participation is important in post -issuance review proceedings, as third parties often have greater information than the USPTO abou t a pa- tent and any relevant prior art, as well as incentives to bring that information to the USPTO's attention. Efficiently eliminating suspect business -method pa- tents, like the one at issue in this case, was a matter of particular concern to Congress.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Rec. 3416 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (referring to such patents as \"the bane of the patent world\") . Congress sought to \"reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of invalid bu siness -method patents\" that sprung up following the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank & Trust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated by 561 U.S. 593. 157 Cong. Rec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 F.3d 1368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Rec. 3416 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (referring to such patents as \"the bane of the patent world\") . Congress sought to \"reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of invalid bu siness -method patents\" that sprung up following the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank & Trust 149 F.3d 1368, abrogated by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 157 Cong. Rec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "3416 (statement of Sen. Kyl) ; see ibid. (statement of Sen. Schumer) (\"State Street launched an avalanche of 31 patent applications seeking protection for common business practices and a cottage industry of busi- ness method patent litigation.\"). CBM review, in par- ticular, p rovided an alternative mechanism to \"ad- dress[] disputes \" about the \"large number of business - method patents that are no longer valid\" in light of this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 157 Cong. Rec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "There is no sound reason to includ e federal agen- cies generally in the patent system , and to subject the government to monetary liability under Section 1498(a), while excluding federal agencies from a ccess to gener- ally available statutory mechanisms that are intended to avoid unnecessary and burdensome litigation and to improve patent quality . This result would be particularly anomalous because the presumption of patent validity, 35 U.S.C. 282, which requires a litigant to prove patent invalidity in litigation 32 by \"clear and convincing evidence,\" Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , equally applies in infringement litigation against the United States. S ee Hitkansut 130 Fed. Cl. 353721 Fed. Appx. 992. Under petitioner's view, how- ever, federal agencies could not invoke the AIA mecha- nisms that Congress de emed neces sary and appropriate to \"restore confidence in the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "This result would be particularly anomalous because the presumption of patent validity, 35 U.S.C. 282, which requires a litigant to prove patent invalidity in litigation 32 by \"clear and convincing evidence,\" Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 , equally applies in infringement litigation against the United States. S ee Hitkansut [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]721 Fed. Appx. 992. Under petitioner's view, how- ever, federal agencies could not invoke the AIA mecha- nisms that Congress de emed neces sary and appropriate to \"restore confidence in the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents.\" 2011 House Report 48.",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 Fed. Cl. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 24 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Res [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court has made clear, however, that \"there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion, \" 316 U.S. 159, and it has repeatedly rejected \"me- chanical rule[s]\" for determining whether particular statutes that use that term apply to governmental bod- ies, Pfizer , 434 U.S. at 316. Instead, the Court has ex- plained that \"much depends on the context, the subject matter, legislative history, and executive interpretation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Br. 24 (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Res 529 U.S. 765). This Court has made clear, however, that \"there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and it has repeatedly rejected \"me- chanical rule[s]\" for determining whether particular statutes that use that term apply to governmental bod- ies, Pfizer , 434 U.S. at 316. Instead, the Court has ex- plained that \"much depends on the context, the subject matter, legislative history, and executive interpretation.\" 442 U.S. 653.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "This Court has made clear, however, that \"there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion, \" 316 U.S. 159, and it has repeatedly rejected \"me- chanical rule[s]\" for determining whether particular statutes that use that term apply to governmental bod- ies, Pfizer , 434 U.S. at 316. Instead, the Court has ex- plained that \"much depends on the context, the subject matter, legislative history, and executive interpretation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 As the court of appeals observed, moreover, the pre- sumption that the word \"person\" excludes government agencies has less force where the provision would grant a benefit or opportunity , rather than impose liability or a new restraint . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "30a . As applied to stat- utory provisions that impose liability on \"persons\" who engage in specified conduct, the interpretive canon that the term \"person\" presumptively excludes the sover- eign complements the established rules t hat \"a waiver of sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally expressed' in statutory text,\" and that \"[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor of im- munity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No similar clear -statement rule applies, however, when the question is whether government agencies can file suit or invoke other procedural mechanisms that are availa- ble to the general public. In Stevens , for example, t he Court appli ed the pre- sumption that the term \"person\" exclude s the sovereign in holding that States and state agencies are not subject to private qui tam suits under the False Claims Act (FCA).",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "After finding several \"affirmative indica- tions\" that the term \"person\" in the FCA's liabili ty pro- vision did not include States, the Court \"le[ft] open\" the question whether \"States can be 'persons' for pur- poses of commencing \" an FCA action. Id. at 787 & n.18 .4 4 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United States 34 In Evans , the Court held that a State was a \"person\" who could bring suit under the Sherman Act. The Court explained that it could \"perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a State, as purchaser of commodities shipped in interstate commerce, of the civil remedy which is available to other purchas- ers who suffer through violation of the Act.\" 316 U.S. at 162.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "The rule that the term \"per- son\" presumptively excludes the sovereign was derived from the ancient English common -law principle that \"the King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular words.\" Dollar Sav . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (187 4). Under that principle, \"[t]he most gen- eral words that can be dev ised (for example, any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect not him in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights and interests .\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "86 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Ibid. (emphasis added) . The Court in Dollar Savings Bank explained that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 35 principle \"thus settle d respecting the British Crown i s equally applicable to [the United States] government.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "35 principle \"thus settle d respecting the British Crown i s equally applicable to [the United States] government.\" Ibid. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same presumption, however, did not apply to statutory provisions that grant ed benefits. To the con- trary, under the common -law rule, although \" he is not bound by such as do not particularly and expressly men- tion him ,\" the King could always \"avail himself of the provisions of any acts of Parliament.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "The same presumption, however, did not apply to statutory provisions that grant ed benefits. To the con- trary, under the common -law rule, although \" he is not bound by such as do not particularly and expressly men- tion him ,\" the King could always \"avail himself of the provisions of any acts of Parliament.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has view ed that rule too as \"equally applica- ble to this government.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "147 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Ibid. Indeed, as the Court elsewhere explained, \"[i]t would present a strange anom- aly, if, having the power to make contracts and hold property as other persons, natural or arti ficial, [the United States] were not entitled to the same remedies for their protection.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (185 1). 337 U.S. 426, exempli- fies this approach . In that case, the Court considered whether the U nited States, acting as a shipper operat- ing certain piers at Norfolk, Virginia, could invoke In- terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) procedures for obtaining reparations from railroads that had charg ed unjust and unreasonable rates, and then challenge the ICC 's denial of such reparations in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "52 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "Indeed, as the Court elsewhere explained, \"[i]t would present a strange anom- aly, if, having the power to make contracts and hold property as other persons, natural or arti ficial, [the United States] were not entitled to the same remedies for their protection.\" 52 U.S. 229 (185 1). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], exempli- fies this approach . In that case, the Court considered whether the U nited States, acting as a shipper operat- ing certain piers at Norfolk, Virginia, could invoke In- terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) procedures for obtaining reparations from railroads that had charg ed unjust and unreasonable rates, and then challenge the ICC 's denial of such reparations in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 1001 et seq .",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "46 (1946). See Director, Office of Workers' Comp . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly here , no provision specifically bars federal agencies from invoking the AIA's post -issuance review procedures. There is consequently no basis for infer- ring that, having authorized federal agencies to fully participate in the patent system, Congress intended to \"deprive[] the United States as [such a participant] of powers of self -protection accorded all other [parties] .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "ICC, 337 U.S. at 431. The absence of any evident reason to disable the government in that manner is particularly striking here, since the USPS was alleged to have in- fringed petitioner's patent not in the course of some regulatory action, but by engag ing in market behavior 37 that a private party, including its competitors in the shipping industry, might also pursue . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is to the contrary. In Cooper , this Court held that the United States was not a \"person\" who was entitled to sue for antitrust violations under Section 7 of the Sherman Act. 312 U.S. at 604; see Sherman Act, § 7, 26 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "at 42-43), the fed- eral government is sometimes subject to common -law estoppel . In particular, under principles of mutual col- lateral estoppel ( i.e., issue preclusion), \"the Govern- ment may be estopped under certain circumstances from relitigating a question when the parties to the two lawsuits are the same.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 464 U.S. 165; 440 U.S. 147. This Court's recent decision in B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293, strongly suggests that decisions of the PTAB wou ld have preclusive effect where \"the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. \" See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "at 42-43), the fed- eral government is sometimes subject to common -law estoppel . In particular, under principles of mutual col- lateral estoppel ( i.e., issue preclusion), \"the Govern- ment may be estopped under certain circumstances from relitigating a question when the parties to the two lawsuits are the same.\" 464 U.S. 154; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 440 U.S. 147. This Court's recent decision in B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293, strongly suggests that decisions of the PTAB wou ld have preclusive effect where \"the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. \" See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "at 42-43), the fed- eral government is sometimes subject to common -law estoppel . In particular, under principles of mutual col- lateral estoppel ( i.e., issue preclusion), \"the Govern- ment may be estopped under certain circumstances from relitigating a question when the parties to the two lawsuits are the same.\" 464 U.S. 154; see, e.g., 464 U.S. 165; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's recent decision in B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293, strongly suggests that decisions of the PTAB wou ld have preclusive effect where \"the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. \" See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "In particular, under principles of mutual col- lateral estoppel ( i.e., issue preclusion), \"the Govern- ment may be estopped under certain circumstances from relitigating a question when the parties to the two lawsuits are the same.\" 464 U.S. 154; see, e.g., 464 U.S. 165; 440 U.S. 147. This Court's recent decision in B & B Hardware, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], strongly suggests that decisions of the PTAB wou ld have preclusive effect where \"the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. \" See id. at 1299 (holding that decisions of the USPTO's Trade- mark Trial and Appellate Board have such preclusive effect).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA",
		"context": "42 This Court has \"long recognized that 'the Govern- ment is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant,' \" and that principles of estoppel therefore do not apply equally against the United States. Mendoza , 464 U.S. at 159 (quoting INS v. Hibi , 414 U .S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam)); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For a number of reasons , the government's litigation conduct \"is apt to differ from that of a private litigant .\" Men- doza , 464 U.S. at 161.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Clear-Statement Rule Applies to Puerto Rico",
		"context": "Br. 28), the clear - statement rule is not rooted in the States' \"special con- stitutional status.\" See Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 790 (ap- plying clear -statement rule to question of abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 521 U.S. 261; U.S. Br. 21 –22. The rule also serves the important functions of promoting clarity, predictability, and deliberative policymaking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Clear-Statement Rule Applies to Puerto Rico",
		"context": "Br. 28), the clear - statement rule is not rooted in the States' \"special con- stitutional status.\" See Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 790 (ap- plying clear -statement rule to question of abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity); 566 U.S. 284; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; U.S. Br. 21 –22. The rule also serves the important functions of promoting clarity, predictability, and deliberative policymaking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Clear-Statement Rule Applies to Puerto Rico",
		"context": "This Court long ago held that , although Congress has \"com- plete power\" to repeal territorial law, \"an intention to supersede the local law (of a t erritory) is not to be pre- sumed, unless clearly expr essed .\" Inter -Island Steam Nav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. CPI buries these cases in a footnote, mischaracterizing them as merely reflecting the rule against repeals by implica- tion of a governmental body's own laws . Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The ATS does not authorize liability for domestic corporations",
		"context": "at 1400 (plurality opinion) . After all, \"[i]nternational law is not silent on the question of the subjects of international law —that is, those that, to varying extents, have legal status, perso n- ality, rights, and duties under international law .\" Jes- ner, 138 S. Ct. at 1400 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ki- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff 'd, 565 U.S. 961 ) (brackets in original) . As the Jesner plurality explained , whether an international -law norm extends to a particular category of actors arguably represents an important aspect of the norm itself. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "621 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The ATS does not authorize liability for domestic corporations",
		"context": "But that \"falls far short of establishing a specific, universal, and obliga-tory n orm of corporate liability \" under Sosa . Ibid. ; see Doe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as Sosa 's second step plainly does so . In particu- lar, multiple considerations —including the separation of power s, foreign policy, and ana logous statutes —indicate that imposing ATS liability on domestic corporations would not represent an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "654 F.3d 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Fail",
		"context": "In any event, the harms alleged here— privacy invasions—are the sort of non-pecuniary injuries long held actionable by courts. ARGUMENT The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated through \"an extensive deliberative process\" that includes consideration by the Rules Advisory Committee, circu- lation for public comment, subcommittee review, consi-deration by the Judicial Conference, this Court's consid- eration, and submission to Congress. Amchem Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventive- ness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Fail",
		"context": "Petitioners seek to overturn that deliberate choice. This Court \"ha[s] no warrant to encumber [class-action] litigation by adopting an atextual requirement that Congress, despite its extensive involvement in the field, has not sanctioned.\" Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the standards set forth by the Federal Rules, cy pres settlements should be (and are) rare. The courts of appeals have converged on limited circumstances where such settlements can meet Rule 23's standards.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Should Reinvigorate the \"Intelligible Principle\" Requirement If It Will Not Reject It as a Legal Fiction",
		"context": "It has been held to be enough for a statute to tell an agen cy to regulate in the \"public inter- est,\" i.e., whatever the agency regards to be the \"public interest. \" See, e.g. , National Broadcasting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] offers no prin- ciple, let alone an \"intelligible\" one, to guide the Attorney General's discretio n—and that is enough to condemn the statute under existing doctrine. But we urge the Court to go further and to put some teeth in the \"intelligible prin- ciple \" requirement. A statute that empowers an agency to go forth and \"regulate in the public interest \" is a legisla- tive abdication that confers lawmaking powers on agency officials and allows Congress to escape responsibility and accountability for federal policy decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Brazos Elec. Power Coop., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]872 S.W.2d 713. And in Oliver , the CCA vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration because the court of appeals \"did not have the benefit of our opinion delivered this day in Green .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 S.W.3d 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Brazos Elec. Power Coop., 576 S.W.3d 374[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Oliver , the CCA vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration because the court of appeals \"did not have the benefit of our opinion delivered this day in Green .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 S.W.2d 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "Texas courts of appeals likewise treat CCA opinions as binding when issued . \"[U]nder the dictat es of vertical stare decisis,\" those courts adhere to the CCA's inter- pretations in criminal matter s immediately \"under the dictates of vertical stare decisis.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 728 n.10 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.]",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 S.W.3d 720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "ref'd). And they do so even when the CCA has not yet denied rehearing or issued its mandate. For example, in Brooks v. State , the CCA held that the legal -sufficiency standard that this Court articulated in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"is the only standar d that a reviewing court should apply in deter- mining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.\" 323 S.W.3d 893 ; accord id. at 926 (Cochran, J., concurring) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "And they do so even when the CCA has not yet denied rehearing or issued its mandate. For example, in Brooks v. State , the CCA held that the legal -sufficiency standard that this Court articulated in 443 U.S. 307, \"is the only standar d that a reviewing court should apply in deter- mining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord id. at 926 (Cochran, J., concurring) . The controlling opinion in Brooks issued on October 6, 2010.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 S.W.3d 893",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "2010 WL 4225863. That intermediate appellate court ordered supplement al briefs addressing Brooks even though the CCA had not yet denied rehearing.7 Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 52- 53 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.]",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 S.W.3d 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64",
		"context": "Nor does Reed suggest that the statute of limitations runs from the issuance of the CCA's ma ndate —again for good reason. Like most appellate -court mandates, the CCA's mandate is its \"official notice, directed to the court below, advising it of the appellate court's decision and directing it to have the appellate court's judgment duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But th e mandate does not construe any law. In this instance, the mandate states that the cause was \"determined\" on April 12, 2017— the date of the CCA's opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 S.W.3d 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit Erroneously Reversed Dismissal of an ATA Aiding-and-Abetting Claim Against Manufacturers and Suppliers of Medical Goods Based on Legal Errors Similar to Those Presented Here.",
		"context": "Third , like the Ninth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit failed to require that the plaintiffs adequately plead that defendants \"know when and to what degree [it] is furthering\" the principal wrong. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Twitter Br. at 42. The court of appeals did not recognize that the word \"abet\" requires at least \"knowledge of a wrongful purpose,\" and that aiding- and-abetting liability demands a \"higher degree of knowledge\" where \"business pr actices\" are said to aid and abet a wrong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 F.2d 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit Erroneously Reversed Dismissal of an ATA Aiding-and-Abetting Claim Against Manufacturers and Suppliers of Medical Goods Based on Legal Errors Similar to Those Presented Here.",
		"context": "at 42. The court of appeals did not recognize that the word \"abet\" requires at least \"knowledge of a wrongful purpose,\" and that aiding- and-abetting liability demands a \"higher degree of knowledge\" where \"business pr actices\" are said to aid and abet a wrong. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Twitter Br. at 40. Similarly, in applying Halberstam 's standard for what constitutes \"substantial assistance,\" the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "948 F.2d 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Genus claiming is especially important for chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology inventions.",
		"context": "7F8 5 Seymore , supra n.3. 6 See, e.g. , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 7 See Rese arch & Development , GSK, https://www.gsk.com/en - gb/research -and-development/ [https://perma.cc/T8AJ -5G8E ]. 8 See GSK , GSK Public Policy Positions: Patents & Access to Medicines in Developing Countries 2 (2019) , https://www.gsk.com/media/2958/patents -and-access -to-medicines - in-developing -countries -july19.pdf [https://perma.cc/G338 -TN7Q ].",
		"citation_value_orig": "919 F.2d 1575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "Rather, it focused on the nature of the specific tribunal's function. The Court held that there was \"no warrant to exclude\" an entity from section 1782(a)'s ambit to the extent it \"exercises quasi-judicial powers\" or \"acts as a first- instance decisionmaker .\" Intel , 542 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added) (citing Advanced Micro Devices, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (remarking that \"the language used by Congress in Section 1782 is broad and inclusive\" and \"the legislative history surrounding the adoption of Section 1782 broadly [] include[s] 'bodies of a quasi-judicial or administrative nature' . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "292 F.3d 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "The Court thus focused on the tribunal's ability to bind the parties before it and to render a decision capable of resolving the underlying dispute. Id., also at 246-47 (\"the Commission is a § 1782(a) 'tribunal' when it acts as a first instance decisionmaker\"); see also FedEx , 939 F.3d at 725 n.9 (\"The Supreme Court seems to have primarily focused on the decision-making power of the Commission—and Congress's substitution in 1964 of the broad phrase 'foreign or international tribunal' for the specific phrase 'judicial proceeding in a foreign 26 country'—in reaching its conclusion that the Commission was a 'tribunal'\"; \"the DFIC-LCIA [arbitration] panel is a 'first-instance decisionmaker' with the power to bind the parties—an exercise of 'quasi-judicial powers'.\") (internal citation omitted); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Thus, while this Court did not specifically address whether private arbitral panels are \"tribunals,\" it provided sufficient guidance to determine that arbitral panels are \"tribunals\" within the statute's scope. See, e.g., FedEx , 939 F.3d at 723 (\"Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the particular question facing us here, its decision in Intel did address the scope of § 1 782( a )' s use of 'tribunal' in a different factual context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "620 F.2d 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "While this review does not encompass a de novo reconsideration of the merits of the arbitral award (including the arbitrators' determinations of fact and law), courts will perform a de novo review for certain jurisdictional decisions. In any event, there is no basis to conclude that a full substantive review was either necessary or warranted by Congress in its liberalization 28 permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed. \"); Hall St. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; FedEx , 939 F.3d at 710 n.11 (\"[R]eview of awards under the FAA is considered 'judicial review.'\") (internal citations omitted). Those reviews are, moreover, appealable to the Circuit Courts of Appeal and, potentially, to the Supreme Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "(internal citations omitted). Those reviews are, moreover, appealable to the Circuit Courts of Appeal and, potentially, to the Supreme Court. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, despite the reliance placed by some courts on the judicial reviewability of a tribunal's of the statute. See Consorcio 685 F.3d 987747 F.3d 1262.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "See,552 U.S. 576. In any event, despite the reliance placed by some courts on the judicial reviewability of a tribunal's of the statute. See Consorcio [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]747 F.3d 1262. Put simply, that awards are only reviewable for limited reasons does not undermine the fact that there exists judicial reviewability of such awards for purposes of assessing whether a tribunal may be included within section 1782(a). Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "685 F.3d 987",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "See,552 U.S. 576. In any event, despite the reliance placed by some courts on the judicial reviewability of a tribunal's of the statute. See Consorcio 685 F.3d 987[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put simply, that awards are only reviewable for limited reasons does not undermine the fact that there exists judicial reviewability of such awards for purposes of assessing whether a tribunal may be included within section 1782(a). Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "747 F.3d 1262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
		"context": "at 154)), also confirmed while sitting as a D.C. Court of Appeals judge that Professor Smit was \"the dominant drafter of, and commentator on, the 1964 revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1782.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31",
		"citation_value_orig": "870 F.2d 686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The access regulation does not effect a per se taking",
		"context": "amdt. V. Its purpose \"is to prevent the government from forcing some people 15 alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the time of the found ing, \"'it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner' s possession,' like the permanent flooding of property.\" Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting 505 U.S. 1003) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The access regulation does not effect a per se taking",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 1933. At the time of the found ing, \"'it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner' s possession,' like the permanent flooding of property.\" Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Since the n, however, the Court has recognized that certain government regulations short of physical ap- propriations may also effect a taking. The Court has mostly \"refrained from elaborating this principle through definitive rules,\" instead conducting \"ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examina- tion and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The access regulation does not effect a per se taking",
		"context": "Id. ; see Penn Central Transp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That sort of case -specific inquiry is the proper framework for evaluating the regulation challenged here, which creates a narrow right of inter- mittent access to the property of agricultural employ- ers, subject to detailed limitations and restrictions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "1. Stare decisis has \"special force\" with respect to this Court's decisions interpreting statutes because \"Congress remains free to alter what [the Court] ha[s] done.\" John R. Sand & Gravel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More than 50 years ago, this Court acknowledged that Garmon is not \"without imperfection\" but explained that \"until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial insights that are born of further experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon those who would, at this late date, ask this Court to abandon Garmon and set out again in quest of a system more nearly perfect.\" Lockridge , 403 U.S. at 302.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": ". is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one.\" Apex Hosiery [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That's precisely what happened here. Garmon issued in April 1959, as Congress was formulating the Landrum-Griffin Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "Tex. & Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court interpreted that grant of authority to mean that courts must defer adjudicating disputes over rate - setting and instead allow the Commission to make an initial determination of the appropriate rate. See 352 U.S. 59.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "204 U.S. 426. This Court interpreted that grant of authority to mean that courts must defer adjudicating disputes over rate - setting and instead allow the Commission to make an initial determination of the appropriate rate. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before the NLRA became law in 1935, the Court had reaffirmed that rule on multiple occasions. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "Ry. , 204 U.S. at 440-41; N. Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The NLRA mirrored the Interstate Commerce Act by creating a new regulatory body and vesting it with jurisdiction over particular conflicts. This Court interpreted the NLRA accordingly, assuming that Congress intended the NLRA's new regulatory body also to have the first opportunity to adjudicate disputes within its jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "247 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "In the ensuing decades, the two bodies of law informed one another. See, e.g. , Local 189, Amalgamated Meat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 40 3. In the sixty years since Garmon , its framework has proven judicially administrable, furthered the statutory goal of uniformity, and benefited employers and employees alike.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 676",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "In the sixty years since Garmon , its framework has proven judicially administrable, furthered the statutory goal of uniformity, and benefited employers and employees alike. Before Garmon , courts struggled to discern \"the area in which state action [was] still permissible\" in light of the enactment of the NLRA. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the decade before Garmon , \"almost a score of cases\" about federal labor law crowded this Court's docket, raising \"difficult problems of federal-state relations.\" 359 U.S. at 239.",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function",
		"context": "Indeed, employers routinely rely on Garmon to argue that a state court should not adjudicate claims against them. See, e.g. , 29 F.4th 567; 2022 WL 159034; 2021 WL 1090786; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 F.3d 772",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "Ayotte , 546 U.S. at 330. The re- mainder of the statute is presumptively severable un- less it is evident that its continued enforcement would produce \"a scheme sharply different from what Con- gress contemplated.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, severing Section 5000A from the remainder of the Act results in a statute materially identical to the law that Congress passed. Even assuming —con- trary to principles of statutory interpretation and Con- gress's evident intent, see Part I, supra —that the 39 amended version of Section 5000A(a) should be under- stood as a legal requirement to purchase insurance, the 2017 Congress stripped the provision of any force.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "That is dispositive evidence of Congress's intent to retain the rest of the Act even if Section 5000A were held to be without legal effect as well. And even if Congress's intent were not so clea r, the outcome of the severabil- ity analysis would be the same because the rest of the ACA can —and does —function without Section 5000A in a manner consistent with Congress's intent. NFIB , 567 U.S. at 587- 588; Murphy , 138 S. Ct. at 1482; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents nonetheless urge this Court to strike down the ACA's hundreds of other provisions, among them transformative statutory protections such as provisions mandating coverage for preexisting medical conditions; federal insurance premium tax credits; penalties for employers who decline to offer insurance; and automatic enrollment of employees in employer - sponsored health plans. Yet respondents are unable to muster a shred of evidence that Congress viewed the amended ver sion of Section 5000A as critical to the op- eration of the rest of the ACA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "Congress retained the architecture of a tax should it decide to reinstate the shared -responsibility payment. The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to take that step because it is \"conducive to the [taxing] authority's beneficial exercise.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see House Br . 37-38. 17 Those principles require that the remainder of the ACA be preserved.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "AAPC , slip op. 16 -17; Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Because the guaranteed -issue and community - rating provisions remain fully operative, the Court need not consider \"other indicia of congressional in- tent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "It is a finding without opera- tive force. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 217 (2012). Had Con- gress wanted to enact a binding nonseverability provi- sion, it knew how to do so. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 U.S. 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "20 22. Legislative findings, by contrast, are nonbinding aids to interpretation that are intrinsically prone to being \"superseded\" by subsequent events or legisla- tion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, previously enacted findings are not probative of congressional intent when a subse- quent enactment represents a \"sharp break\" from the original legislation containing the findings . 514 U.S. 549; see 403 F.3d 1263 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "550 U.S. 124. For that reason, previously enacted findings are not probative of congressional intent when a subse- quent enactment represents a \"sharp break\" from the original legislation containing the findings . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 403 F.3d 1263 . The 2017 amendment represents such a \"sharp break\": it eliminated the payment that the 2010 Con- gress viewed as a needed inducement to purchase in- surance. Even if Section 18091(2)(I) were not textually limited to creating insurance mark ets, therefore, the finding would have been rendered irrelevant to the severability analysis by Congress's 2017 amendment of Section 5000A's operative text.9 c. Even if (contrary to all indications) the 2017 Congress believed the amended Section 5000A woul d continue to play a role in inducing individuals to pur- chase insurance , Congress unquestionably would have preferred to maintain the ACA's guaranteed -issue and community -rating protections if Section 5000A were invalidated .",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "550 U.S. 124. For that reason, previously enacted findings are not probative of congressional intent when a subse- quent enactment represents a \"sharp break\" from the original legislation containing the findings . 514 U.S. 549; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The 2017 amendment represents such a \"sharp break\": it eliminated the payment that the 2010 Con- gress viewed as a needed inducement to purchase in- surance. Even if Section 18091(2)(I) were not textually limited to creating insurance mark ets, therefore, the finding would have been rendered irrelevant to the severability analysis by Congress's 2017 amendment of Section 5000A's operative text.9 c. Even if (contrary to all indications) the 2017 Congress believed the amended Section 5000A woul d continue to play a role in inducing individuals to pur- chase insurance , Congress unquestionably would have preferred to maintain the ACA's guaranteed -issue and community -rating protections if Section 5000A were invalidated .",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 F.3d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
		"context": "23 Respondents seek to invalidate one of the most con- sequential legislative enactme nts in American history on the basis of the flimsiest of legal arguments. But whether the case is viewed through the lens of stand- ing, the constitutional merits, or severability, there is no justification for this Court to undo what Congress has done. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That respondents persist in such a meritless chal- lenge —in the midst of a public -health emergency that continues to claim thousands of lives each week , rav- age the economy , and make normal life impossible —is difficult to comprehend. Millions of Americans have lost their health insurance along with their jobs as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Surrounding provisions of ANILCA confirm that Section 103(c) did not strip the Park Service of authority to regulate activities on navigable waters within the National Park System",
		"context": "It explained that \"[s]tatu- tory language 'cannot be construed in a vacuum,' \" and that the words of Section 103(c) must \" 'be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall stat-utory scheme. ' \" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Here, statutory context removes any doubt that Congress understood and intended that the Park Service could adopt rules to protect navigable waters and regulate conduct on or re- lating to those waters within the National Park System in Alaska.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Fetal homicide laws and other similar laws now protect new human life in most states throughout human development",
		"context": "27 See id. 28 American Pregnancy Association, \"First Fetal Movement: Quickening,\" https://americanpregnancy.org/healthy - pregnancy/pregnancy -health -wellness/first -fetal -movement/ . 29 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 that are warranted in degree only if the fetus is understood to be a human life, not just a potential, future human life.30 Third, these laws establish a separate offense for harming the f etus, rather than simply enhancing the penalty for an offense against the woman.31 Thus, it is acknowledged that the definitions, the identification of a separate victim, and the penalties provided for in such laws protecting unborn children reflect a judg ment that it is human life being protected, not just some pre - 30 Others have noticed the implication s of the UVVA in particular, noting that \"[w]hile the Act disclaims its power to affect abortion rights, the substance of the UVV[A] appears to contradict the fundamental premises of abortion law —that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not include fetu ses in the definition of 'person' —by punishing violence against fetuses by third parties as harshly as violence against human beings.\" Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, Recent Developments: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act , 39 HARV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Adams' standing to challenge the major party provision rests on a self-serving statement contradicted by the rest of the record",
		"context": "The record contains no evidence suggesting that Adams had a reasonable probability of becoming a judge. As many lower courts have explained, standing requires \"[a] realistic possibility [that] those compet- ing for a position [will] receive it once the supposed illegality is corrected.\" Albuquerque Indian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ex- haustless 931 F.3d 1209. Here, the record at most shows that Adams \"believes that he meets the minimum qualifications\" to be a judge. JA62–63.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.2d 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Adams' standing to challenge the major party provision rests on a self-serving statement contradicted by the rest of the record",
		"context": "The record contains no evidence suggesting that Adams had a reasonable probability of becoming a judge. As many lower courts have explained, standing requires \"[a] realistic possibility [that] those compet- ing for a position [will] receive it once the supposed illegality is corrected.\" Albuquerque Indian 930 F.2d 49; see also Ex- haustless [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the record at most shows that Adams \"believes that he meets the minimum qualifications\" to be a judge. JA62–63.",
		"citation_value_orig": "931 F.3d 1209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Adams' standing to challenge the major party provision rests on a self-serving statement contradicted by the rest of the record",
		"context": "At a minimum, it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment to Adams without an evidentiary hearing, and for the court of appeals to affirm on such a sketchy and implausible record. See Int'l Bhd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Adams' \"testimony with regard to his intention is, of course, to be given full and fair consideration,\" but it is \"self- serving,\" \"lack[s] persuasiveness,\" and is \"contra- dicted\" by \"inconsistent acts.\" District of 314 U.S. 441.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Adams' standing to challenge the major party provision rests on a self-serving statement contradicted by the rest of the record",
		"context": "of 431 U.S. 324. Adams' \"testimony with regard to his intention is, of course, to be given full and fair consideration,\" but it is \"self- serving,\" \"lack[s] persuasiveness,\" and is \"contra- dicted\" by \"inconsistent acts.\" District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 Adams failed to prove, as a matter of law, that he genuinely intended, and had a concrete plan, to apply for a judgeship. Without that intent and plan, he suf- fered no harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "314 U.S. 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "a. \"When a statute does not define a term, we typi- cally give the phrase its ordinary meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because Title VII does not define the term \"undue hardship,\" the Court must deter- mine \"the ordinary public meaning of [that] term[] at the time of its enactment.\" 140 S. Ct. 1731.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "562 U.S. 397. Because Title VII does not define the term \"undue hardship,\" the Court must deter- mine \"the ordinary public meaning of [that] term[] at the time of its enactment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Hardship\" ordinarily means \"a condition that is diffi- cult to endure,\" \"suffering,\" or \"something hard to bear.\" The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 602 (1968).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "Logic dictates that an \"undue hardship\" cannot be less than a \"hardship.\" Cf . Weyerhaeuser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, \"undue\" cannot be used to weaken the meaning of the core term by \"weigh[ing] the employer's costs against the value of accommodating the employee's religious beliefs or practices.\" U.S. Patterson Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "§ 207(r)(3). \"Given the parallel purpose, structure, and language of [these statutes],\" the Court should interpret Title VII's undue-hardship provision \"in the same man- ner.\" Commc'ns Workers of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Outside of the civil-rights context, courts regularly construe the undefined term \"undue hardship\" consist- ently with its plain meaning rather than following Hardi- son. For example, the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to discharge a student loan if they can show that the debt imposes an \"undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "§ 523(a)(8). Courts have explained that \"[t]he plain meaning of the words chosen by Congress is that student loans are not to be discharged unless requiring repayment would impose intolerable dif- ficulties on the debtor,\" such as \"prevent[ing] the debtor from maintaining a minimal standard of living over the course of the repayment period despite good faith efforts to fulfill her obligations.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts specifically note the intensifying effect of the modifier \"undue.\" \"[T]he existence of the 22 adjective 'undue' indicates that Congress viewed garden- variety hardship as insufficient excuse for a discharge of student loans.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "931 F.3d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "Courts specifically note the intensifying effect of the modifier \"undue.\" \"[T]he existence of the 22 adjective 'undue' indicates that Congress viewed garden- variety hardship as insufficient excuse for a discharge of student loans.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s exemption of certain documents from discovery unless a party \"cannot, without undue hard- ship,\" obtain their equivalent through other means. Courts applying that rule have held that \"undue hardship\" may be satisfied with a showing of \"unusual expense.\" In re693 F.2d 1235.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 F.3d 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
		"context": "In re433 F.3d 393's exemption of certain documents from discovery unless a party \"cannot, without undue hard- ship,\" obtain their equivalent through other means. Courts applying that rule have held that \"undue hardship\" may be satisfied with a showing of \"unusual expense.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, both plain meaning and consistency with iden- tically worded statutory provisions strongly support con- struing Title VII's \"undue hardship\" defense to require a showing of significant difficulty or expense in light of the circumstances of the employer. See Commc'ns Workers of Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "693 F.2d 1235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
		"context": ". Holguin asks the Court to take his case to resolve a split among the courts of appeal . The Fifth Circuit requires that a post -sentence objection be made in the district court to trigger appellate review of a sentence under the abuse -of-discretion, reasonableness standard this Court set out in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g., 505 F.3d 389. No other circuit has such a requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
		"context": "Holguin asks the Court to take his case to resolve a split among the courts of appeal . The Fifth Circuit requires that a post -sentence objection be made in the district court to trigger appellate review of a sentence under the abuse -of-discretion, reasonableness standard this Court set out in 552 U.S. 38. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No other circuit has such a requirement. The requirement imposed by the Fifth Circuit means that a significant number of criminal sentences are reviewed differently in that court than in the other courts of appeals .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
		"context": "That relegation runs contrary to this Court's teaching on appellate review of federal sentences, contrary to the principal animating directive of federal sentencing , and contrary to the Court's teachings concerning the wrong caused by unnecessary imprisonment. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 49-50 (appellate review of a sentence is abuse -of-discretion inquiry into reasonableness); 531 U.S. 198. 2 The government acknowledges the circuit split. BIO 6.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
		"context": "That relegation runs contrary to this Court's teaching on appellate review of federal sentences, contrary to the principal animating directive of federal sentencing , and contrary to the Court's teachings concerning the wrong caused by unnecessary imprisonment. Cf. 552 U.S. 85; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 49-50 (appellate review of a sentence is abuse -of-discretion inquiry into reasonableness); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 The government acknowledges the circuit split. BIO 6.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
		"context": "It admits that the Fifth Circuit applies the wrong approach , one that improperly extends the reach of the contemporaneous -objection requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51. BIO 6-7; see Holguin Pet. 9-11; see also 425 F.3d 430; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It nonetheless argues that review is not warranted. The first ground the government offers for opposing certiorari is that the circuit split is long established and so the Fifth Circuit's mistaken view has become routinized in its provinces .",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 F.3d 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit's requirement of a post -sentence objection is also in conflict with the standard applied in other circuits . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Fifth Circuit's requirement of a post -sentence objection, as the government a dmits, runs contrary to federal law −it is a misapplication of 3 a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure . BIO 6 -7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 F.3d 864",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the event of a conflict, Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not restrict the President's exercise of his authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)",
		"context": "First, Section 1152(a)(1)(A) contains no clear indica- tion that Congress intended its limitation on immigrant - visa issuance by consular officers to supersede the Pres- ident's authority to suspend entry. \" While a later enacted statute can sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory provision[,] 'repeals by implication are not favored ' and will not be presumed unless the 'intention of the legislature to re- peal [is] clear a nd manifest. ' \" National Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s text —which does not mention either en- try or the President —demonstrates a \"clear and mani- fest\" congressional intent to narrow Section 1182(f )'s special grant of authority. Id. at 662 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed",
		"context": "But this misunderstands the role of foreign affairs con-cerns in separation-of-powers analysis. The Executive Branch is owed foreign affairs deference when \"deci-sions in these matters may implicate 'relations with foreign powers,' or involve '…changing political and economic circumstances.'\" E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But there are no such activities that an indi vidual wrongful death action might disrupt. And if it were relevant one way or the other, the Government of Mexico has, in fact, made clear its position that th e Hernández family should have a remedy in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed",
		"context": "But there are no such activities that an indi vidual wrongful death action might disrupt. And if it were relevant one way or the other, the Government of Mexico has, in fact, made clear its position that th e Hernández family should have a remedy in this case. Third , the Fifth Circuit, citing Abbasi , concluded that \"Congress's failure to provide a damages remedy 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is inapposite. That case held that a chal- lenge to the official response to an alleged bomb threat in an air-port implicated Executive Branch policies concerning airport safe-ty, id. at 206.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed",
		"context": "Malesko , 534 U.S. at 70. By contrast, the provision of an alternative remedi-al scheme counsels against the extension of Bivens . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (same) . In the absence of clear evidence of intentional omission, as in Abbasi , im- plying a Bivens remedy does not disrespect Congress. 11 Congress has enacted legislation regarding exclusion of remedies for foreign injuries only a handful of times in the 120- year period since the 1871 Civil Rights Act, most notably the Fed-eral Tort Claims Act passed in 1946 and the Torture Victim Pre-vention Act passed in 1991.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed",
		"context": "But this case involves the application of U.S. law to a U.S. law enforcement officer acting within U.S. territory. This Court' s concerns about the extra- territorial application of U.S. law involve situations where \"the sovereign will of th e United States\" is ap- plied to \"conduct occurring within the territorial juris-diction of another sovereign.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Officer Mesa was standing in the U.S. when he fired shots across the border. If anything, he is properly beyond the authori-ty of Mexican law, which would apply extraterritorial- ly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "617, 653 (2010) (\"Redish\"). This growth is a direct consequence of lower courts' refusal to police compliance with Rule 23's essential requirements. See In re8 F.2d 179 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156). The most powerful tool for limiting the growth of cy pres settlements is strict adherence to Rule 23 and this Court's class -action precedents. Unfortunately, many lower courts continue to disregard this Court's instructions, treating them as at best hortatory — principles to be dutifully recited but rarely applied to curtail class -action abuse in any meaningful fashion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 F.2d 1005",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "617, 653 (2010) (\"Redish\"). This growth is a direct consequence of lower courts' refusal to police compliance with Rule 23's essential requirements. See In re8 F.2d 179 (quoting 479 F.2d 1005 , vacated on other grounds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The most powerful tool for limiting the growth of cy pres settlements is strict adherence to Rule 23 and this Court's class -action precedents. Unfortunately, many lower courts continue to disregard this Court's instructions, treating them as at best hortatory — principles to be dutifully recited but rarely applied to curtail class -action abuse in any meaningful fashion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Packaging claims in a class vehicle does not enlarge the power of federal courts to hear claims they would not otherwise have jurisdiction to hear. As the Chief Justice recently noted, \"Article III does not give federal courts the power to order relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not .\" Tyson Foods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These lawsuits also raise serious due process concerns, because there is little incentive for unnamed class members to monitor and participate in litigation where they have sustained or will sustain no actual damages. Due process requires that the class representative \"fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by\" the outcome of the litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1036",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "These lawsuits also raise serious due process concerns, because there is little incentive for unnamed class members to monitor and participate in litigation where they have sustained or will sustain no actual damages. Due process requires that the class representative \"fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by\" the outcome of the litigation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In turn, absent class members must receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard and participate in the class proceedings. See Phillips Petrol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "In turn, absent class members must receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard and participate in the class proceedings. See Phillips Petrol. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The adequ ate representation requirement \"serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.\" Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "472 U.S. 797 . The adequ ate representation requirement \"serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.\" Amchem Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In a no -injury class action, however, the class representatives —to say nothing of absent class members—have little incentive to monitor the litigation and hold their class counsel accountabl e, since they \"have individually too little at stake to spend time monitoring the lawyer —and their only coordination is through\" counsel. Mars Steel 834 F.2d 677 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591 . In a no -injury class action, however, the class representatives —to say nothing of absent class members—have little incentive to monitor the litigation and hold their class counsel accountabl e, since they \"have individually too little at stake to spend time monitoring the lawyer —and their only coordination is through\" counsel. Mars Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The practical result is that \"class counsel effectively appoint themselves as agents for the class, wielding a power to transact in class members' rights.\" Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action , 103 Colum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.2d 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "215, 237 -38 (1998) . Despite these fundamental due process concerns, lower courts have disregarded this Court's directive that a class plaintiff must suffer harm th at \"actually exist[s]\" and is not \"'abstract.'\" Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held that a class 8 representative had standing to seek injunctive relief under California consumer protection law because she had purchased flushable wipes with an allegedly false or misleading label, since they were not \"flushable\" according to her standards. The disgruntled consumer threw the wipes away and vowed never to purchase them again.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Id . at 969- 70. This holding —replete with \"mights\" and \"mays\"— runs directly contrary to this Court's express statement that mere \"'[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief,'\" City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]9 U.S. 167. Davidson is a recent example of lower courts bending the rules of standing and Rule 23 to save specious class allegations in no -injury cases. But it is not the only one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Id . at 969- 70. This holding —replete with \"mights\" and \"mays\"— runs directly contrary to this Court's express statement that mere \"'[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief,'\" City of Los 461 U.S. 95[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Davidson is a recent example of lower courts bending the rules of standing and Rule 23 to save specious class allegations in no -injury cases. But it is not the only one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "But it is not the only one. The Third Circuit recently held that a class had Article III standing to bring suit against an eye -drop manufacturer because the dropper dispensed the fluid in a way that caused some of it to roll out of the user's eye. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied138 S. Ct. 2029. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured financially because manufacturers did not use alternative, supposedly more efficient product packaging that would have enabled them to get more doses from the same volume of medicine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 F.3d 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "But plaintiffs presented no concrete allegation that the manufacturers priced their medicine based on the volume of fluid in the bottle and not the number of doses the bottle contained, or that manufacturers would have passed marginal cost savings on to consumers instead of pocketing them. 10 Similarly, a district court in Wisconsin certified a class and approved a settlement where plaintiffs alleged that the fast food r estaurant Subway was defrauding consumers by selling \"Footlong\" sandwiches that were sometimes slightly shorter than twelve inches. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, the district court found that the plaintiff class had standing to pursue injunctive relief, despite it being undisputed that the sandwiches rarely fell short of twelve inches, and even when they did, the variations were due to natural variability in the baking process —the unbaked bread sticks were uniform, so all customers received the same amount of food. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.3d 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "P. 23(b)(3) . This inquiry requires courts to \"conduct a 'rigorous analysis' to determine whether\" plaintiffs have carried that burden, \"even when that requires inquiry into the merits of the claim.\" Comcast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Class- actio n plaintiffs must offer \"a theory of liability that is . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. For ex ample, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the strict commonality requirement set forth in Dukes by certifying classes of consumers who bought certain washing machines, even though it was admitted that very few of the purchasers experienced any actual problems. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , judgment vacated , 569 U.S. 1015, on remand , reinstated , 727 F.3d 796; In re678 F.3d 409 , cert. granted, judgment vacated, sub nom , Whirlpool 569 U.S. 901, aff'd722 F.3d 838. In those cases, consumers sued washing machine manufacturers based on an alleged design defect that resulted in mold.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.3d 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. For ex ample, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the strict commonality requirement set forth in Dukes by certifying classes of consumers who bought certain washing machines, even though it was admitted that very few of the purchasers experienced any actual problems. See 702 F.3d 359 , judgment vacated , 569 U.S. 1015, on remand , reinstated , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re678 F.3d 409 , cert. granted, judgment vacated, sub nom , Whirlpool 569 U.S. 901, aff'd722 F.3d 838. In those cases, consumers sued washing machine manufacturers based on an alleged design defect that resulted in mold.",
		"citation_value_orig": "727 F.3d 796",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. For ex ample, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the strict commonality requirement set forth in Dukes by certifying classes of consumers who bought certain washing machines, even though it was admitted that very few of the purchasers experienced any actual problems. See 702 F.3d 359 , judgment vacated , 569 U.S. 1015, on remand , reinstated , 727 F.3d 796; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. granted, judgment vacated, sub nom , Whirlpool 569 U.S. 901, aff'd722 F.3d 838. In those cases, consumers sued washing machine manufacturers based on an alleged design defect that resulted in mold.",
		"citation_value_orig": "678 F.3d 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "For ex ample, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits allowed plaintiffs to circumvent the strict commonality requirement set forth in Dukes by certifying classes of consumers who bought certain washing machines, even though it was admitted that very few of the purchasers experienced any actual problems. See 702 F.3d 359 , judgment vacated , 569 U.S. 1015, on remand , reinstated , 727 F.3d 796; In re678 F.3d 409 , cert. granted, judgment vacated, sub nom , Whirlpool 569 U.S. 901, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In those cases, consumers sued washing machine manufacturers based on an alleged design defect that resulted in mold. When both classes were certified, the manufacturers appealed, arguing that the classes were overbroad as it was undisputed that most of the consumers experienced no problems with their washing machines and the consumers had all purchased different models and configurations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "722 F.3d 838",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes",
		"context": "denied137 S. Ct. 1582569 U.S. 33. In light of these stringent requirements, this Court has applied presumptions in the class action context only in very limited circumstances, where the market to which the presumption is applied is one that is \"impersonal, well- developed,\" and \"information -hungry,\" meaning that the presumption is \"supported by common sense and probability.\" Basic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Lower courts have nonetheless expanded the use of these presumptions of injury to markets that are not impersonal, well -developed, and information - hungry. For example, in Waggoner, the Second Circuit allowed a class suing under Rule 10b -5 to rely on a presumption of injury to establish an element of its claim, despite the fact that the econometric model 15 used could not disaggregate whether declines in stock prices were caused by defendant's alleged conduct or state regulatory action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Authority to Regulate Beneficiary Designations",
		"context": "Such prospective application would continue the very inequity which the legislature sought to remedy and would place the present generation of married couples at a decided disadvantage in comparison with subsequent generations of married couples. Moreover, in each dissolution proceeding involving property, courts would be presented with the impracticable dilemma of applying, depending upon the acquisition date of any disputed property, differing sets of laws and policies. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For two reasons, these statutes impaired vested interests to a far greater extent than revocation-on-divorce statutes. First, they significantly altered asset distribution in divorce, as opposed to merely serving a gap-filling function for decrees otherwise silent on beneficiary designations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 N.E.2d 1382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Authority to Regulate Beneficiary Designations",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 1387; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 376 A.2d 100; 320 A.2d 496. Courts reasoned that the acquisition of property does not confer \"a vested right in a particular statutory procedure governing the disposition of property upon divorce.\" Fournier , 376 A.2d at 102.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 A.2d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Authority to Regulate Beneficiary Designations",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 1387; 445 A.2d 1194; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 320 A.2d 496. Courts reasoned that the acquisition of property does not confer \"a vested right in a particular statutory procedure governing the disposition of property upon divorce.\" Fournier , 376 A.2d at 102.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 A.2d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Authority to Regulate Beneficiary Designations",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 1387; 445 A.2d 1194; 376 A.2d 100; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts reasoned that the acquisition of property does not confer \"a vested right in a particular statutory procedure governing the disposition of property upon divorce.\" Fournier , 376 A.2d at 102.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 A.2d 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Authority to Regulate Beneficiary Designations",
		"context": "To be sure, Congress could, through its Commerce Clause authority over insurers, enact statutes regulating the effect of divorce on beneficiary designations. Indeed, Congress has exercised that power—this Court has held twice, in recent years, that federal statutes regulating insurance preempted state revocation-on-divorce laws (neither federal statute applies here). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Respondent's position would impose constitutional constraints on revocation-on-divorce statutes—even when there is no connection to interstate commerce and even when Congress wants to leave the decision up to the States. The Court should not constitutionalize the law of divorce in this way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Other constitutional provisions",
		"context": "Id. Thus, absent a preexisting Article I power to legislate regarding Indian child -custody disputes, the Necessary and Proper Clause has no role to play. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Bond , 572 U.S. at 854. Fourth , respondents cited the \"preconstitutional powers\" described in Lara— those which this Court de- scribed as \"necessary concomitants of nationality\"— and suggested that these powers could give Congress the necessary authority to enact ICWA. 541 U.S. at 201.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Other constitutional provisions",
		"context": "Fourth , respondents cited the \"preconstitutional powers\" described in Lara— those which this Court de- scribed as \"necessary concomitants of nationality\"— and suggested that these powers could give Congress the necessary authority to enact ICWA. 541 U.S. at 201. But Lara referred to a particularly sweeping view of the war powers, Lara , 541 U.S. at 201 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), which has not been applied since the World War II era and has since been called into serious question, cf. 138 S. Ct. 2392. Assuming such atextual powers exist, they extend, at most, to matters of war and peace —not to core domestic matters such as state -court child -custody proceedings .",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Other constitutional provisions",
		"context": "541 U.S. at 201. But Lara referred to a particularly sweeping view of the war powers, Lara , 541 U.S. at 201 (citing 299 U.S. 304 ), which has not been applied since the World War II era and has since been called into serious question, cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Assuming such atextual powers exist, they extend, at most, to matters of war and peace —not to core domestic matters such as state -court child -custody proceedings . After all, as described in Lara, thes e powers depend on the United States' previous dealings with Indian tribes through military and foreign policy, rather than through domestic legislation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "See Pet. App. 1 a-10a; La Resolana Architects, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 . The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d 357 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, 462 F.3d 1010.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 F.3d 1195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "See Pet. App. 1 a-10a; La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d 357 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, 462 F.3d 1010.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "1 a-10a; La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 . The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d 357 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, 462 F.3d 1010. The existence of 10 that circuit split has been widely recognized by courts of appeals, see, e.g., 748 F.3d 120; 744 F.3d 773 ; Brooks - 564 F.3d 804, with 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[B][3] (2018 ) (proposing a variant of the application approach) . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "606 F.3d 612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "1 a-10a; La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 . The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, 462 F.3d 1010. The existence of 10 that circuit split has been widely recognized by courts of appeals, see, e.g., 748 F.3d 120; 744 F.3d 773 ; Brooks - 564 F.3d 804, with 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[B][3] (2018 ) (proposing a variant of the application approach) . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 F.3d 357",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "1 a-10a; La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154 . The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d 357 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The existence of 10 that circuit split has been widely recognized by courts of appeals, see, e.g., 748 F.3d 120; 744 F.3d 773 ; Brooks - 564 F.3d 804, with 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[B][3] (2018 ) (proposing a variant of the application approach) . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 F.3d 1010",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d 357 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, 462 F.3d 1010. The existence of 10 that circuit split has been widely recognized by courts of appeals, see, e.g., 748 F.3d 120; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Brooks - 564 F.3d 804, with 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[B][3] (2018 ) (proposing a variant of the application approach) . 2. The question presented warrants this Court's re- view.",
		"citation_value_orig": "744 F.3d 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
		"context": "The F ifth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast , have take n the \"application appr oach\" advocated by pe- titioner, under which \"receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies th e registration re- quirement of § 411(a).\" Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612562 U.S. 1062 ; see Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d 357 , abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier , su- pra; see also Action Tapes, 462 F.3d 1010. The existence of 10 that circuit split has been widely recognized by courts of appeals, see, e.g., 748 F.3d 120; 744 F.3d 773 ; Brooks - [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.16[B][3] (2018 ) (proposing a variant of the application approach) . 2. The question presented warrants this Court's re- view.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 F.3d 804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No subsequent enactment supports Respondents' interpretation of the expropriation exception",
		"context": "§ 1605(h). What the Act clarifies, however, is what counts as commercial activity for the exception's commercial-nexus requirement, not the definition of \"property taken in violation of interna-tional law.\" The Clarification Act arose from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that foreign museums' loans of works to U.S. museums are \"commercial activity in the United States\" under the expropriation exception, even if the loaned work wa s immune from seizure un- der 22 U.S.C. § 2459. Malewicz \" undermined the inter- ests\" Section 2459 \"was designed to foster,\" making foreign states \"less willing to loan cultural objects\" to U.S. museums, harming the American public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F. Supp. 2d 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No subsequent enactment supports Respondents' interpretation of the expropriation exception",
		"context": "14 Even if methodologically sound, the argument would be unpersuasive. Prior Nazi-looted art claims under the exception involved seizures of foreign na- tionals' property, claims that fall within the exception even under Petitioners' interpretation. See, e.g., Repub- lic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So even if Congress assumed that Nazi-looted art claims would be brought under the existing expropriation exception, that does not tell us that Congress thought the exception reached domestic takings. 1 Moreover, the Nazi-era claims exception applies only when the disputed work has been loaned into the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTION 1226(C) IMPOSES A MANDATORY DUTY ON DHS TO ARREST AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS",
		"context": ". and causing their deportation.\" Wong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress did just that when it en- acted 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c)(1), requiring that the execu- tive branch \"shall take into custody any alien who\" has been convicted of certain crimes \"when the alien is released.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
		"context": "When, as here, a patent claim s an entire genus based on its func- tion, the patent must enable that entire genus. This Court's decisions confirm that the full scope of the claims must be considered in assessing enablement. In Consolidated Electric Light Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the inventors disclosed carbon- ized paper and wood carbon filaments and obtained a patent covering filaments composed of any \" carbonized fibrous or textile material .\" Id. at 467 -468.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
		"context": "Id. at 476. Similarly in Holland Furn iture [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court held that the disclosure of \"a par- ticular starch glue\" with a certain function did not ena- ble a claim for \"all starch glues\" with that function , given that \"[o] ne attempting to use or avoid the use of [the] discovery as so claimed and described functionally could do so only after elaborate experimentation ,\" id. at 256-257. The Court explained that \"[a] claim so broad \" would improperly \"extend[ ]\" the \"patent monopoly\" \"beyond the discovery\" by p ermitting \"the inventor who has discovered that a defined type of starch answers the required purpose to exclude others from all other types of starch .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
		"context": "16 -17, supra (discussing Con- solidated Electric Light Co. and Holland Furniture Co.). Petitioners rely heavily (Pet. 26) on Minerals Sep- aration , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , where the Court upheld patent claims for separating metallic from nonmetallic material in ore by agitating the ore in a so- lution of water and oil. Id. at 265 -266.",
		"citation_value_orig": "242 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
		"context": "27) follow a similar pat- tern. See Wood , 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 5 (explaining that \"the general rule is given with entire exactness ,\" and that \" the notice of the variations \" accounts for clay th at is \"more or less hard to burn than the kind ordinarily employed \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (187 2) (observing that \" no particular science or skill \" was required to make the necessary adjustments in light of \" the object of the process \"). In this case, by contrast, the district court deter- mined that a \"person of ordinary skill in the art\" using the random -generation method and \"attempting to ob- tain a claimed antibody that is not disclosed\" \" 'would have to do essentially the sa me amount of work as the inventors of the patents -in-suit.' \" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "81 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
		"context": "The court has ex- plained that the specification need not \"describe how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed in- vention,\" Pet. App. 8a (citation omitted) , and that \"[e]ven 'a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible,' \" Wyeth & Cordis [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] for the proposition that the Federal Circuit applies a lower enablement threshold to non-genus claims, see McRO, Inc. , 959 F.3d at 1100, it- self involved a genus cl aim, id. at 1096. And here, al - though the court of appeals observed that the use of broad functional claiming \"pose[s] high hurdles,\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.3d 1380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
		"context": "App. 12a, and \"raises the bar for enablement,\" id. at 13a, those comments simply reflect the fact that a dis- closure must be \"commensurate with the scope of the claims,\" National Recovery Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 F.3d 1190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Eighth Circuit properly rejected the Excessive Fines claim",
		"context": "9a-10a.) The district court held that Minnesota's tax forfeitur e statutes do not impose a fine under the Excessive Fines Clause. In doing so, the court appropriately applied the standard estab-lished in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. (App. 41a.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Eighth Circuit properly rejected the Excessive Fines claim",
		"context": "at 610. Punitive penalties are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, while remedial penalties are not. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In determining whether a statute is punitive or re- medial, a court should consider the statute's text, 32 purpose, and history, as th e district court recognized. (See App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Eighth Circuit properly rejected the Excessive Fines claim",
		"context": "41a n.18 (describing the process used in Ba- jakajian and Austin for analyzing whether a statute was punitive).) This Court has also described this step as a \"categorical approach.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Many times, remedial stat- utes compensate the government for a loss or promote public safety. See Bajakajian , 524 U.S. at 329; Austin , 509 U.S. at 621.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Eighth Circuit properly rejected the Excessive Fines claim",
		"context": "(citation omitted). In fact, this Court has ruled that penalties that ar e facially disproportionate can still be remedial. See, e.g., Bajakajian , 524 U.S. at 331 (stating that traditional in rem forfeitures were not considered punishment even if the value of the for-feiture exceeded the money owed); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As such, the fact that Minnesota's tax forfeiture statutes can result in \"the confiscation of substantial excess property\" does not render it a fine. 34 Petitioner also asserts that \"[t]he holding in Aus- tin hinged on two factors\": (1 ) that the forfeiture stat- ute at issue included an innocent owner defense; and (2) that the forfeitures permitted under the statute were not fixed in amount.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Ninth Circuit's approach inappropriately precludes many investigatory stops altogether",
		"context": "Making matters even more difficult, land status within a reservation may vary from plot to plot . See, e.g., Oliphant , 435 U.S. at 193 & n.1 (describing the Port Madison Reservation near Seattle, which in 1978 con- sisted of 63% non -Indian fee land, as \"a check erboard of tribal community land, allotted In dian lands, property held in fee simple by non -Indians, and various roads and public highways maintained by Kitsap County\"); Big Horn Count y Elec. Coop., Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A tri bal officer may therefore not even be able to determine , in the moment , whether his en- counter with a suspect is occurring on unencumbered tribal land or alienated non-Indian fee land. C f. Sey- 368 U.S. 351 (rejecting an interpretation of 39 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "219 F.3d 944",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Ninth Circuit's approach inappropriately precludes many investigatory stops altogether",
		"context": "Coop., Inc 219 F.3d 944. A tri bal officer may therefore not even be able to determine , in the moment , whether his en- counter with a suspect is occurring on unencumbered tribal land or alienated non-Indian fee land. C f. Sey- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (rejecting an interpretation of 39 18 U.S.C. 1151 that would have required \"law enforce- ment officers\" to \"search tract books in order to deter- mine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though committed within the reserv ation, is in the State or Federal Government\") . As a result, the importance that the Ninth Circuit places on land status may chill tribal policing even on non -alienated and unencumbered lands.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court should honor Congress' choice not to put a futility exception in section 1415(l).",
		"context": "of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415 . Congress directed that all FAPE disputes be resolved pursuant to a three -tiered process: informal resolu- tion, administrative review, and judicial review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court should honor Congress' choice not to put a futility exception in section 1415(l).",
		"context": "As for specific remedies, a hearing officer can declare that the school has failed to provide a FAPE, issue a n injunction ordering the school to take certain actions that will guarantee a FAPE, and award parents reimburse ment for past expenses that should have been funded by the state. See School Comm. of Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. iii. Judicial review of the FAPE issue is available after the agency has issued a final decision based on the record: \"Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of the agency] … shall have the right to bring a civil action.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court should honor Congress' choice not to put a futility exception in section 1415(l).",
		"context": "App. 8a -11a. Smith and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the court explained, do not hold otherwise . Smith did not \"announce a futility exception\" to § 1415( l) because § 1415( l) \"did not exist at the time.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Claim Preclusion",
		"context": "New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748. \"Under the[] rules of claim preclusion, the effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not raised at trial.\" Kaspar Wire Works, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, claim preclusion \"puts an end to the cause of action.\" Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.2d 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Claim Preclusion",
		"context": "(\"a verdict in a prior suit may be given in evidenc e as a bar to another suit [only] for the same cause of action\"). And \"whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action depends on factual overlap.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, claim preclusion \"bar[s] 'claims arising from the same transaction,'\" but does not bar claims arising from distinct, albeit related, transactions. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Claim Preclusion",
		"context": "Thus, claim preclusion \"bar[s] 'claims arising from the same transaction,'\" but does not bar claims arising from distinct, albeit related, transactions. Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioner's contrary arguments are incompatible with ANILCA's text",
		"context": "6 (rules regarding solid -waste disposal sites made appli- cable on all lands within National Park System bounda- ries); 36 C.F.R. 9.1 (rules regarding mining made appli- cable on all land s within National Park System bounda- ries); see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] its ordi- nary meaning would leave the Park Service with \"unfet- tered authority \" to regulate state, Native Corporation, and private lands, 14-1209 Reply Br. 4-5 , is incorrect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. What Level of Scrutiny Applies to Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Rights?",
		"context": "at 590 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 32 Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 728. 33 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 the burden was on the challenger to show that the stat- ute was unreasonable.34 Second : The Court made the presumption of con- stitutionality virtually irrebuttable. In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. ,35 the Court upheld a law that only allowed licensed optometrists or ophthalmol- ogists to replace broken lenses, and which prohibited out-of-state eyeglass retailer s from advertising in Ok- lahoma.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. What Level of Scrutiny Applies to Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Rights?",
		"context": "In FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. ,39 the Court explained that \"[i]n areas of social and economic policy, 34 Id. at 258. 35 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 36 See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land , 106 Michigan Law Review 1479, 1485 (June 2008; \" Scrutiny Land \"). 37 Williamson , 348 U.S. at 487.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. What Level of Scrutiny Applies to Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Rights?",
		"context": "38 Id. at 488 (italics added). 39 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. What Level of Scrutiny Applies to Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Rights?",
		"context": "41 Since Meyer , Pierce , and Lawrence all applied a form of heightened scrutiny, Petitioners are not simply challenging Roe and Casey by arguing that \"height- ened scrutiny\" should be replaced with \"the rational-basis review that applies to all laws\"; 42 they are also unabashedly undermining the results and reasoning in all of these personal autonomy cases. Consequently, 40 Id. at 315 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 Petitioners must either show that Roe and Casey are not personal autonomy cases at all or concede that they are asking the Court to ad opt a scrutiny standard un- der which the Meyer , Pierce , Griswold , and Lawrence plaintiffs would now lose . This is not to say that the meaning of \"heightened scrutiny\" requires no refinement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. \"Both Verdicts Must be Vacated and a New Trial Ordered\"",
		"context": "2d at 578, 580-582. 17 In line with Georgia's rule on mutually exclusive verdicts, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that \"repugnant verdicts suffer from a similar infirmity as mutually exclusive verdicts\" because to have a jury find a defendant both sane and insane, \"the jury must make affirmative findings shown on the record that cannot logically or legally exist at the same time.\" McElrath I , 308 Ga. at 111, 839 S.E.2d at 579 (empha- sis in original); see 311 Ga. 374; 846 S.E.2d 73; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, for McElrath's repugnant verdicts, the Geor- gia Supreme Court, consistent with other rules in Georgia, stated, \"both verdicts must be vacated and a new trial ordered.\" McElrath I , 308 Ga. at 111, 839 S.E.2d at 579; accord, Dumas 266 Ga. at 800, 471 S.E.2d at 510.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 Ga. 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Failing to Provide Fair Procedures for DNA Testing Undermines the Integrity of Mr. Reed's Conviction and the Courts.",
		"context": "None of these items were previously tested for DNA evidence, including the murder weapon —an oversight which consulting forensics experts for Mr. Reed found \"troubling.\" See 71 CENTER FOR DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION , Saved From The Executioner: The Unlikely Exoneration of Henry McCollum, 1, 3 , (June 2017) available at http://www.cdpl.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/06/SAVED -FROM -EXECUTION -web- final1.pdf. 72 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Saved From The Executioner: The Unlikely Exoneration of Henry McCollum, supra note 71. 26 Ex Parte Reed , 271 S.W.3d at 744.73 Notably, if M r. Reed had been tried today —after the passage of Article 38.43 to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (\"Article 38\")74—Texas law would have required that this evidence75 be tested before the trial even commenced. Yet, despite failing to test critical crime -scene evidence such as the murder weapon, the State did rest its case on select DNA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 S.E.2d 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Failing to Provide Fair Procedures for DNA Testing Undermines the Integrity of Mr. Reed's Conviction and the Courts.",
		"context": "Yet, for over two decades , it has objected to Mr. Reed having access to potentially exculpatory scientific evidence. It is profoundly unjust for the State to be allow ed to rest on the value of DNA evidence at trial, while denying Mr. Reed access to th e DNA evidence that could exonerate him —particularly where, as outlined below, Mr. Reed has, against the odds, established a strong actual innocence claim. There is a \"considerable body of evidence,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that Mr. Reed is innocent. Witnesses who have no connection to Mr. Reed but who knew Ms. Stites confirmed that the two had a romantic relationship. 2019 Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Failing to Provide Fair Procedures for DNA Testing Undermines the Integrity of Mr. Reed's Conviction and the Courts.",
		"context": ". in the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Far from satisfying the heightened reliability standard, this is a case defined by doubt and the specter of racial bia s. By refusing to consider the merits of Mr. Reed's § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing the decision below risks \"poison [ing] public confidence in the judicial process,\" injuring \"not just the defendant, but the law as an institution,\" and \"the community at large.\" 137 S. Ct. 759.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 66",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Failing to Provide Fair Procedures for DNA Testing Undermines the Integrity of Mr. Reed's Conviction and the Courts.",
		"context": "483 U.S. 66. Far from satisfying the heightened reliability standard, this is a case defined by doubt and the specter of racial bia s. By refusing to consider the merits of Mr. Reed's § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing the decision below risks \"poison [ing] public confidence in the judicial process,\" injuring \"not just the defendant, but the law as an institution,\" and \"the community at large.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Executing a likely innocent person destroys the ability 82 \"[F]alse and misleading\" forensic evidence was present in 31.9 percent of death -row exoneration cases and a staggering 71.4 percent of death -row exonerations based on DNA evidence. See e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Factors that Petitioners Deem Indicative of a Major Question Are Unworkable and Fail to Distinguish the Clean Power Plan from Many Other Regulations",
		"context": "These include regulatory costs; congressional attention; and public salience as represented by such factors as the volume of public comments, related litigation, and presidential statements. But such factors hardly distinguish this case, and would stretch a doctrine meant to apply only \"[i]n extraordinary cases\" beyond both recognition and workability. Food & Drug [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In many circumstances, these factors would also create perverse incentives for both regulators and regulated entities. Because they fail to offer \"limited and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral,\" Rucho v. Common Cause , 139 S. c t. 2484, 2500 (2019), petitioners' justifications for applying the major questions doctrine are unpersuasive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "9 F.4th 300. Petitioners ignore entirely the inherently discretionary nature of a court's disposition of a permissive interven- tion motion, and that the Ninth Circuits decision on Petitioners' request for permissive intervention may be reversed only if that court abused its discretion. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, Petitioners devote the majority of their briefing on permissive intervention to an argument untethered from the Rule 24(b) standard: that the eq- uities \"demanded\" intervention here because of the \"unprecedented\" nature of Respondents' actions, alleg-edly designed to circumvent the APA process and deny interested parties their notice-and-comment rights. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "During the same one-year period, there were 426 cases in which the Solicitor General decided not to petition for certiorari.\" Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor Gen- eral and His Client , 59 Wash.U.L.Q. 337, 340-41 (1981); see also , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 464 U.S. 154 acknowledges that there is no tradition—let alone requirement—that DOJ appeal every ruling against an agency action. Ed Whelan, Biden Admin- istration Defies Longstandi ng DOJ Norm on Agency Litigation , Nat'l Rev. (Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "During the same one-year period, there were 426 cases in which the Solicitor General decided not to petition for certiorari.\" Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor Gen- eral and His Client , 59 Wash.U.L.Q. 337, 340-41 (1981); see also , e.g., 485 U.S. 693; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] acknowledges that there is no tradition—let alone requirement—that DOJ appeal every ruling against an agency action. Ed Whelan, Biden Admin- istration Defies Longstandi ng DOJ Norm on Agency Litigation , Nat'l Rev. (Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "§ 553(b)(B). And courts have held that \"good cause\" exists wh ere, as here, the rulemaking is \"a reasonable and perhap s inevitable response to\" a \"court order.\" American Federation of Government Em- ployees, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also EME Homer City Generation, 795 F.3d 118. Indeed, the Trump Administration acknowledged as much in circumstances strikingly similar to those presented here. In 2018, the federal government chose not to seek en banc review or petition for a writ of cer- tiorari after the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Obama- era conflict-of-interest rule, known as the \"Fiduciary Rule,\" that President Trump had been critical of since the early days of his presidency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "655 F.2d 1153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "§ 553(b)(B). And courts have held that \"good cause\" exists wh ere, as here, the rulemaking is \"a reasonable and perhap s inevitable response to\" a \"court order.\" American Federation of Government Em- ployees, 655 F.2d 1153; see also EME Homer City Generation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Trump Administration acknowledged as much in circumstances strikingly similar to those presented here. In 2018, the federal government chose not to seek en banc review or petition for a writ of cer- tiorari after the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Obama- era conflict-of-interest rule, known as the \"Fiduciary Rule,\" that President Trump had been critical of since the early days of his presidency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "795 F.3d 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
		"context": "In 2018, the federal government chose not to seek en banc review or petition for a writ of cer- tiorari after the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Obama- era conflict-of-interest rule, known as the \"Fiduciary Rule,\" that President Trump had been critical of since the early days of his presidency. See Chamber of Com. of the United States of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Fifth Circuit Mandate Officially Ends DOL Fiduciary Rule (June 15, 2018) (noting that the \"DOL had until June 13, 2018, to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but it declined to do so\"); see also Presidential Memorandum, Presidential Memorandum on Fiduci- ary Duty Rule (Feb. 3, 2017), available at https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/ presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 11 11 Notably, the attorneys genera l of California, New York, and Oregon sought to intervene in the Fifth Circuit for purposes of seeking further review, but the Fifth Circuit denied the motion without opinion. Chamber of Com.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that this case is justiciable because Tingley showed intent to speak in a way that would prompt enforcement against him",
		"context": "That's especially true when First Amendment rights are at stake. Given \"the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression,\" this Court has long allowed plaintiffs to challenge laws without \"risk[ing] prosecution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To establish standing, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that (1) he intends to speak in a way the law arguably proscribes, and (2) the state will likely enforce its law against him. SBA List , 573 U.S. at 159.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that this case is justiciable because Tingley showed intent to speak in a way that would prompt enforcement against him",
		"context": "Pet.App.181a. This \"self-censorship\" is a \"harm that can be realized even withou t an actual prosecution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Tingley also alleged past, present, and future conversations that the Law \"arguably … proscribe[s].\" SBA List , 573 U.S. at 159.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that this case is justiciable because Tingley showed intent to speak in a way that would prompt enforcement against him",
		"context": "E.g., Washington.CA9.Br.18. And this Court accepts state officials' pronouncements about a statute's breadth, not that of interested observers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While Tingley has not resisted the statute's appli- cation, he has admittedly resisted Respondents' attempts to recharacterize his conversations with clients as \"conversion ther apy.\" Intervenor.BIO.20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "1763) (\"one who d wells or lives in a Place.\") . Indeed, i n earlier drafts , the Appor- tionment Clause referenced a Direct Taxation Clause , 20 Ramsay's History of the American Revolution was cited by Jus- tice Scalia in dissent in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled by Citizens 558 U.S. 310. 38 which provided that \"direct taxation shall be regu- lated by the whole number of free citizens and inhab- itants of every age, sex, and cond ition .\" Farrand's Rec- ords, vol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "1763) (\"one who d wells or lives in a Place.\") . Indeed, i n earlier drafts , the Appor- tionment Clause referenced a Direct Taxation Clause , 20 Ramsay's History of the American Revolution was cited by Jus- tice Scalia in dissent in 540 U.S. 93, overruled by Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 38 which provided that \"direct taxation shall be regu- lated by the whole number of free citizens and inhab- itants of every age, sex, and cond ition .\" Farrand's Rec- ords, vol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "35-36. But \"[t]he Constitution was writ- ten to be understood by t he voters,\" Dist. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and there is no indication that Vat- tel's international law treatise reflects how \"voters\" at 40 the Founding understood \"inhabitant\" in the context of apportionment. Defendants cannot offer any evidence that the Founders relied on Vattel's definition of \"inhabitant.\" It was never c ited in the Constitutional Convention, the Reconstruction Debates, or the 1929 Congress.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "34 (quoting a letter by Adams referring to \"[b]oth Citizens and Inhabitants\") (empha- sis added, citation omitted). 41 \"interpretations … [that] would produce absurd re- sults are to be avoided.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 267 U.S. 228 , is similarly un- availing . That case addressed the \"narrow question of whether Ms. Kaplan was 'dwelling in the United States' for the purposes of naturalization under the immigration laws in effect at the time.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "41 \"interpretations … [that] would produce absurd re- sults are to be avoided.\" 458 U.S. 564 . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is similarly un- availing . That case addressed the \"narrow question of whether Ms. Kaplan was 'dwelling in the United States' for the purposes of naturalization under the immigration laws in effect at the time.\" San Jose , 2020 WL 6253433 (quoting Kaplan , 267 U.S. at 230)). \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "Many people in immigration detention or pending removal proceedings are lawful permanent resid ents or otherwise have lawful status . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 138 S. Ct. 1204. They retain th e right to re side here unless and until they are ordere d removed. 8 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "Many people in immigration detention or pending removal proceedings are lawful permanent resid ents or otherwise have lawful status . See, e.g. , 139 S. Ct. 954 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They retain th e right to re side here unless and until they are ordere d removed. 8 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "8 C.F.R. § 1.2. And many noncitizens in removal proceedings are never re- moved, either because they ultimately prevail, thereby retain ing (or obtain ing) lawful status , J.S.App.86a -87a, or becau se they cannot be deported, even after subject to a final order of removal , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In fact , \"illegal alien s\" as Defendants use that term , include individuals with \"the sovereign's per- mission\" to remain in the country.22 Br. 35.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "And \"[a] person living in a State but facing fu- ture removal is no less a 'person[] in that State' … than someone living in the State without the prospect of removal.\" J.S.App.86a (alteration in original) (cita- tion omitted). As of 2017 , the median undocumented 1224; 575 U.S. 798 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 23 Defendants are wrong to rely on Department of Homeland Se- 140 S. Ct. 1959 . Thuraissigiam asked only how an asylum seeker stopped 25 yards from the bor- der ought be \"treated\" for due process purposes in removal, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "J.S.App.86a (alteration in original) (cita- tion omitted). As of 2017 , the median undocumented 1224; 575 U.S. 798 ; 569 U.S. 184 . 23 Defendants are wrong to rely on Department of Homeland Se- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thuraissigiam asked only how an asylum seeker stopped 25 yards from the bor- der ought be \"treated\" for due process purposes in removal, id. at 1982, not whether he would count in the census.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment",
		"context": "Thuraissigiam, like many other asylum seekers, was paroled into the country pending proceedings. See U.S. Br., Dep't of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], at 13 n.6 . During that time, he had \"permiss ion\" to live here, and no resi- dence outside of the United States . 44 adult in the country had lived \"in\" the United States for 15.1 years, and 66% of them had li ved here more than 10 years.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Investigative stops like the one here are reasonable and important to public safety.",
		"context": "ARGUMENT This Court has repeatedly recognized that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, initiate a brief investigative stop of an automobile when that officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion is a minimal standard that requires the officer to have only \"a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The purpose of such a stop is to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion. When Deputy Mehrer learned that the truck he was following was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that Glover's driver's license had been revoked, he suspected that Glover was unlawfully driving.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because the censure was demonstrably punitive, Wilson has stated a claim",
		"context": "B. HCC's and the United States' contrary position is a distortion of the government speech doctrine, and it is not compatible with basic First Amendment principles. True enough, it is sometimes the \"business of govern- ment to favor and disfavor points of view.\" Pleasant Grove [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the cas es in which the Court has made that observation do not remotely endorse govern- mental authority to censure disfavored policy positions and order expressions of public support for those po- sitions to \"immediately cease.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because the censure was demonstrably punitive, Wilson has stated a claim",
		"context": "39 The Court held in Summum and 576 U.S. 200, for example, that private citizens may not com- pel the government to adopt pa rticular messages on pub- lic monuments or specialty license plates. Wilson's posi- tion is not that the Board had to adopt a resolution agree- ing with him; his point is only that it was forbidden from punishing him for his views. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held only that there is \"no First Amendment right not to fund government speech\" on packaging labels. Id. at 562.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Because the censure was demonstrably punitive, Wilson has stated a claim",
		"context": "The United States' assertion (Br. 18) that the cen- sure here \"easily qualifies as governmental speech under those precedents\" is thus unsupportable. Indeed, if HCC and the United States were correct, cases like Ibanez , 512 U.S. 136, and Peel , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—both of which found that formal censures by state licensing boards vio-lated the First Amendment (see FIRE Br. 3-4)—would have been wrongly decided. HCC's and the United States' position is also limit- less and would lead to intolerable results.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "Broad use of National Parks cannot overcome that precedent's utter infidelity to the statutory text. \"[ T]his Court's responsibility [is] to say what a statute means,\" and lower courts then must \"respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In FOIA, as in many other contexts, this Court has rejected longstanding and widely shared—yet atextual or otherwise erroneous—statutory interpretations. Milner, for example, abrogated extratextual tests for FOIA Exemption 2 that the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "Milner, for example, abrogated extratextual tests for FOIA Exemption 2 that the D.C. Circuit had developed, replacing them with a plain-text interpretation of the ex- emption based on dictionary definitions of \"personnel.\" 562 U.S. at 579-580 (abrogating [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Our consideration of Exemption 2's scope starts with its text,\" the Court explained, regardless of whether an atextual decision had become entrenched in the courts below. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.2d 1051",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "Id. at 569; see also, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the significance that the en banc D.C. Circuit accorded to the fact that several Circuits had adopted, while none had rejected, National Parks , is im- material here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "The D.C. Circuit also erred when it implied that Congress has approved of National Parks and when it 239 to 5 Org. for Women Office [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. 566 F.2d 373519 F.2d 31750 F.2d 1394784 F.3d 448906 F.2d 1345250 F. App'x. 284.",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "for Women Office 721 F.2d 1. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]519 F.2d 31750 F.2d 1394784 F.3d 448906 F.2d 1345250 F. App'x. 284. Exemption 4 has remained unchanged since 1966; Congress has neither amended nor reenacted it. The only relevant question, therefore, is what Congress meant when it enacted that statutory provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.2d 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "for Women Office 721 F.2d 1. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. 566 F.2d 373[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]750 F.2d 1394784 F.3d 448906 F.2d 1345250 F. App'x. 284. Exemption 4 has remained unchanged since 1966; Congress has neither amended nor reenacted it. The only relevant question, therefore, is what Congress meant when it enacted that statutory provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 F.2d 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "for Women Office 721 F.2d 1. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. 566 F.2d 373519 F.2d 31[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]784 F.3d 448906 F.2d 1345250 F. App'x. 284. Exemption 4 has remained unchanged since 1966; Congress has neither amended nor reenacted it. The only relevant question, therefore, is what Congress meant when it enacted that statutory provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.2d 1394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "for Women Office 721 F.2d 1. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. 566 F.2d 373519 F.2d 31750 F.2d 1394[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]906 F.2d 1345250 F. App'x. 284. Exemption 4 has remained unchanged since 1966; Congress has neither amended nor reenacted it. The only relevant question, therefore, is what Congress meant when it enacted that statutory provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "784 F.3d 448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "for Women Office 721 F.2d 1. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. 566 F.2d 373519 F.2d 31750 F.2d 1394784 F.3d 448[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]250 F. App'x. 284. Exemption 4 has remained unchanged since 1966; Congress has neither amended nor reenacted it. The only relevant question, therefore, is what Congress meant when it enacted that statutory provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "906 F.2d 1345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "for Women Office 721 F.2d 1. 24 See, e.g., Cont'l Stock Transfer & Tr. 566 F.2d 373519 F.2d 31750 F.2d 1394784 F.3d 448906 F.2d 1345[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Exemption 4 has remained unchanged since 1966; Congress has neither amended nor reenacted it. The only relevant question, therefore, is what Congress meant when it enacted that statutory provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "250 F. App'x. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "Critical Mass suggested the opposite by citing the legislative history of a different and later-enacted stat- ute—the Open Meetings Act of 1976. 975 F.2d at 876-877 (citing CNA Fin. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). Language in that separate Act mirrored Exemption 4, and a Member of Congress com- mented that this language was \"as interpreted in cases such as National Parks .\" CNA Fin.",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.2d 1132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "at 22. In all events, the opinion of a House committee regarding the meaning of statute enacted by a different Congress over a decade earlier is at best an unreliable tool to interpret the meaning of the language Congress used to enact FOIA in 1966. See, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. Finally, National Parks has proven to be increas- ingly unworkable. In its Critical Mass petition for rehear- ing en banc, the Government explained that \"[d]ozens of federal agencies as well as the courts now devote substan- tial resources to analyzing whether agency records con- tain information that is confidential under the National Parks test.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 S.Ct. 2658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4",
		"context": "E.g., id. at 309 (reporting a case in which the D.C. Circuit originally affirmed the district court's determination that Exemption 4 applied but, upon reconsideration following a panel member's death, reversed and remanded on the same record—and observing that this case \"well illustrate[s]\" the \"individualized and sometimes conflicting determinations indicative of competitive harm holdings\" (citing 775 F.2d 1169, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 27Id. at 309.",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 F.2d 1213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional bailment principles that are still in place today would have been understood to apply at the time of the Fourth Amendment's drafting",
		"context": "at 492, 497. On the other hand, the bailment also makes the bailee liable for damage done to the owner's chattel while he has possession of it, if his negligence or unauthorized use caused the damage. See 1838 Pa. LEXIS 143; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Lear Inc. , 749 A.2d at 971, 974. Common law cases elucidated these principles long before our independence, and courts continued to apply them in the early republic. For example, over 400 years ago a bailee was held liable for his servant's theft of the goods entrusted to him.",
		"citation_value_orig": "178 A.2d 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional bailment principles that are still in place today would have been understood to apply at the time of the Fourth Amendment's drafting",
		"context": "This scenario describes a classic bailment relationship, not dissimilar from the relationship this Court identified in its recent decision in Jones . There, this Court concluded that although Jones \"was not the owner,\" he was the \"exclusive driver\" of 21 the vehicle and \"had at least the property rights of a bailee.\" Jones, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Jones was a bailee of the vehicle tracked by GPS technology because his wife, the registered owner, granted him possession of the vehicle for his \"exclusive use.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": "Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. at 353. This Court has continued to include language making its retention of jurisdiction clear in its later decrees , 12 including most recently , the 2006 Consolidated De- cree. Arizona v. California, 547 at 166-67; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 466 U.S. 144; 439 U.S. 419 . By r etain ing jurisdiction , this Court ensured that any claimants seeking relief that would disrupt the distribution of apportionment of Mainstream wa- ter in the Consolidated Decree would participate in the existing litigation and would involv e all parties to that litigation. And nothing in this Court's language suggests its retention of jurisdiction was anything other than exclusive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": "Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. at 353. This Court has continued to include language making its retention of jurisdiction clear in its later decrees , 12 including most recently , the 2006 Consolidated De- cree. Arizona v. California, 547 at 166-67; 531 U.S. 1 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 439 U.S. 419 . By r etain ing jurisdiction , this Court ensured that any claimants seeking relief that would disrupt the distribution of apportionment of Mainstream wa- ter in the Consolidated Decree would participate in the existing litigation and would involv e all parties to that litigation. And nothing in this Court's language suggests its retention of jurisdiction was anything other than exclusive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": "Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. at 353. This Court has continued to include language making its retention of jurisdiction clear in its later decrees , 12 including most recently , the 2006 Consolidated De- cree. Arizona v. California, 547 at 166-67; 531 U.S. 1 ; 466 U.S. 144; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By r etain ing jurisdiction , this Court ensured that any claimants seeking relief that would disrupt the distribution of apportionment of Mainstream wa- ter in the Consolidated Decree would participate in the existing litigation and would involv e all parties to that litigation. And nothing in this Court's language suggests its retention of jurisdiction was anything other than exclusive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": "Most recently, in 2006, this Court issued a Consolidated Decree that both aggregated the changes made since the 1964 Decree and im-plemented additional modifications related to tribal claims to Mainstream water. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. at 152 13 That this Court retained exclusive jurisdiction is also in keeping with the \"clear federal policy\" to avoid the \" piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system.\" Colo. River Water Conservation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, \"actions seeking the allocation of wa- ter . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": "A unified approach avoids the piecemeal litigation of water claims and judgments that are binding on some parties but not other water users. See Pac. Live Stock [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The importance of having all interested parties in a single proceeding has even led to federal courts abstaining from adjudicating individual water claims in light of a consolidated preexisting state pro- ceeding despite the federal courts' \"virtually unflag- ging obligation . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": ". to exercise the jurisdiction g iven to them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It would depart from this Court's longstand- ing recognition that water rights disputes are best handled in the context of a unified proceeding to con- clude that th is Court 's retention of jurisdiction was not (describing effect of the decr ee). This history of modification in the context of Arizona v. California only further demonstrates the exclusivity of this Court's retained jurisdiction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream",
		"context": "20 . The decision below asserted that this only required the district court \"to consider whether the Nation needs water to fulfil l the promise of 3 Both the decision below and the Navajo Nation point out that this Court previously indicated the circumstances surrounding the retention of jurisdiction suggest that it \"was mainly a safety net added to retain jurisdiction and to ensure that we had not, by virtue of res judicata, precluded ourselves from adjusting the De- cree in light of unforeseeable changes in circumstances.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], discussed in 21-1484 Pet. App. 21-22 and 21-1484 Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": ". Field preemption analysis must start with defining the field because only then can it be determined whether a state's exercise of its police powers intrudes upon an area of exclusive federal control. See generally Oneok, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 312 U.S. 52. Respondents have struggled to articulate what field they think Congress has occupied, positing along the way at least five different proposed fields specifically involving \"aliens,\" JA 132, 198, Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": ". Field preemption analysis must start with defining the field because only then can it be determined whether a state's exercise of its police powers intrudes upon an area of exclusive federal control. See generally Oneok, 135 S. Ct. 1591; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents have struggled to articulate what field they think Congress has occupied, positing along the way at least five different proposed fields specifically involving \"aliens,\" JA 132, 198, Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "42. That phrase—when present—connotes a broad field Congress is occupying. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should reject Respondents' invitation to read into the statute a material phrase Congress omitted. Instead, any occupied field is no \"broader than the statute's express language,\" 505 U.S. 504, this Court should analyze this case with a presumption against implied preemption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "See, e.g., 504 U.S. 374. This Court should reject Respondents' invitation to read into the statute a material phrase Congress omitted. Instead, any occupied field is no \"broader than the statute's express language,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court should analyze this case with a presumption against implied preemption. In \"all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": ". [this Court] start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and, at most, only narrowly traces the textual contours of the I-9 verification system established by § 1324a(b)(1)-(3), and the use-preemption in § 1324a(b)(5). \"Implicit 'field preemption' will not do.\" 567 U.S. 387.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "555 U.S. 555, and, at most, only narrowly traces the textual contours of the I-9 verification system established by § 1324a(b)(1)-(3), and the use-preemption in § 1324a(b)(5). \"Implicit 'field preemption' will not do.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this textually supported view, states may be field preempted from using documents submitted to employers to satisfy I-9 requirements even if not physically \"appended to\" the I-9. See § 1324a(b)(5).",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "Puente 2017 WL 1133012. By contrast, Respondents' sweeping field would preclude Kansas from prosecuting fraud on its own state tax form , the K-4. Express, field, and conflict analyses are not \"rigidly distinct,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because ultimately they \"work in the same way.\" 138 S. Ct. 1461. Section 1324a(b)(5)'s prohibition on \"use\" of the I-9 verification system, rather than terms with broader preemptive effect, see CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. at 664-65 16 (discussing preemptive effective of various statutory terms), reveals at most federal occupation of a narrow field closely surrounding the I-9 verification system itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "By contrast, Respondents' sweeping field would preclude Kansas from prosecuting fraud on its own state tax form , the K-4. Express, field, and conflict analyses are not \"rigidly distinct,\" 496 U.S. 72, because ultimately they \"work in the same way.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1324a(b)(5)'s prohibition on \"use\" of the I-9 verification system, rather than terms with broader preemptive effect, see CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. at 664-65 16 (discussing preemptive effective of various statutory terms), reveals at most federal occupation of a narrow field closely surrounding the I-9 verification system itself. After all, the statute's plain wording \"contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "43-46. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. , which is not a Supremacy Clause case, did not address the preemptive scope of IRCA, see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"this Court is bound by holdings, not language,\" 532 U.S. 275. Arizona held that conflict preemption prevented enforcement of a state law that sought to penalize unauthorized aliens who seek employment, see 567 U.S. at 406, but the Kansas statutes in this case do \"not make it illegal to attempt to secure employment as an unauthorized alien\" and Respondents' \"immigration status[es] [were] not relevant to whether this conduct was unlawful.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "43-46. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. , which is not a Supremacy Clause case, did not address the preemptive scope of IRCA, see535 U.S. 137, and \"this Court is bound by holdings, not language,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Arizona held that conflict preemption prevented enforcement of a state law that sought to penalize unauthorized aliens who seek employment, see 567 U.S. at 406, but the Kansas statutes in this case do \"not make it illegal to attempt to secure employment as an unauthorized alien\" and Respondents' \"immigration status[es] [were] not relevant to whether this conduct was unlawful.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions",
		"context": "(even broad field preempted by federal advertising law did not preempt state-law warranty claim based on representation in an advertisement). Respondents' convictions were for identity theft on W-4 and K-4 tax withholding forms, which are not \"information employees submit to indicate their work status.\" Arizona , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],6 which IRCA's heading describes as the \"employment verification system,\" nor in the \"Lists of Acceptable Documents\" the I-9 form requires as evidence of authorization to work in the United States. It matters not that the State's theory of identity theft relied on the \"benefit\" of obtaining employment, Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": "Deferring to state courts is tantamount to granting states a veto over access to federal court, making them de facto federal court gatekeepers. The Court has repeatedly concluded that \"Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1988). Indeed, to relegate Section 1983 suits to control by state courts (as Williamson County does with respect to regulatory takings) is to ignore the entire history of the statute. As the Court summarize d in Felder, 487 U.S. at 147: Congress enacted § 1983 in response to widespread deprivations of civil rights in the Southern States and the inability or unwillingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights or punish wrongdoers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": ". .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Far from being \"thrown open,\" the federal courthouse doors have been slammed shut to regulatory taking victims since Williamson County was decided more than 30 years ago. Put another way, section 1983 is one of the most consequential laws passed by Cong ress.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": "(emphasis added). In the Court 's stirring words: \"We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit , human rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we hav e not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To those who have found their property rights regulated into near or total valuelessness since Williamson County , the Court's words ring hollow. They need to have life breathed back into them by overruling Williamson County and once again \"throw[ing] open the doors of the United States 11 courts\" for \"immediate access\" as envisioned in Patsy , 467 U.S. at 504.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": "1 Ann. Cong. 813, quoted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Williamson County 's state court litigation mandate inverted this basic building block of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: it interposed state courts to shield municipalities from federal accountability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": "Any required suit for 12 payment would be contrary to Congressional policy established in 1970 in the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, which provides that the days when government could simply grab property first and then say \"sue me\" to the aggrieved owner are over. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 416 F.2d 945 . That Act makes it illegal for government agencies to make it necessary for property owners to sue for their just compensation. Rather, the duty is the government's to acquire whatever property interests are needed for the public good, either b y negotiation ( 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 F.2d 381",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": "Any required suit for 12 payment would be contrary to Congressional policy established in 1970 in the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, which provides that the days when government could simply grab property first and then say \"sue me\" to the aggrieved owner are over. Cf. 471 F.2d 381 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That Act makes it illegal for government agencies to make it necessary for property owners to sue for their just compensation. Rather, the duty is the government's to acquire whatever property interests are needed for the public good, either b y negotiation ( 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 F.2d 945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
		"context": "13 to sue for payment, as the Relocation Act now makes clear. That is why the Court has held the Just Compensation Claus e to be self -executing. First English Evangelical Lutheran [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In any event, if suit is required to demonstrate the actuality of a Fifth Amendment violation, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment d irecting that the only place to seek that determination is in state court. As state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide constitutional claims, the choice of forum, as in other cases, should belong in the first instance to the plainti ff.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Insofar As Petitioner Has Not Waived Her Arguments, the Eighth Circuit's Decision Faithfully Applies This Court's Precedent",
		"context": "Under the latter prong, ERISA preempts a state law if it has a \"connection with\" ERISA plans. Id. A state law has a \"connection with\" ERISA plans if it interferes with plan administration, Gobeille , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or employee benefit structures, Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658. \"A question which is merely 'complementary' or 'related' to the question presented in the petition for certiorari is not 'fairly included therein.' \" Izumi , 510 U.S. at 31–32 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 537).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Insofar As Petitioner Has Not Waived Her Arguments, the Eighth Circuit's Decision Faithfully Applies This Court's Precedent",
		"context": ". also 'relate to[]' ERISA-exempt [entities].\" District of Co- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, regulatory exclusivity is not required. In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon , this Court held that a state-law wrongf ul-discharge cause of ac- tion made \"reference to\" ERISA where a former em-ployee alleged he was terminated because the em-ployer did not want to con tribute to his pension fund.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Insofar As Petitioner Has Not Waived Her Arguments, the Eighth Circuit's Decision Faithfully Applies This Court's Precedent",
		"context": "In other words, regulatory exclusivity is not required. In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon , this Court held that a state-law wrongf ul-discharge cause of ac- tion made \"reference to\" ERISA where a former em-ployee alleged he was terminated because the em-ployer did not want to con tribute to his pension fund. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained: \"Here, the existence of a pens ion plan is a critical fac- tor in establishing liability under the State's wrongful discharge law. As a result, this cause of action relates not merely to pension benefi ts, but to the essence of the pension plan itself.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs do not —themselves—suffer cognizable religious injury",
		"context": ". To the extent that they seek to assert free -exercise claims against the Proclamation , plaintiffs must show how the Proclamation coerces their religion, not the rights of third parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in McRae , however, the challenged action has no effect whatsoever on plaintiffs ' religious exercise. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs do not —themselves—suffer cognizable religious injury",
		"context": "By the same token, mem bership groups cannot press these claims. Id. at 321 ( citing Abington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Consequently, plaintiffs cannot assert religious rights of their own.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Squarely Presented The Issue Below",
		"context": "That does not prescribe avoidance. This Court frequently grants certiorari under these circumstances. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]558 U.S. 310.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Squarely Presented The Issue Below",
		"context": "That does not prescribe avoidance. This Court frequently grants certiorari under these circumstances. E.g., 513 U.S. 374[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Constitutes Judicial Legislating and Disrupts the Settled Understanding of Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) Standing.",
		"context": "The Constitution gives only Congress the power to legislate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reflecting \"the confined role of the Ju- diciary in our system of separated powers, \" courts must \"avoid judicial policymaking or de facto judicial legislati on\" and \"respect … Congress 's legislative role.\" 140 S. Ct. 2335.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Constitutes Judicial Legislating and Disrupts the Settled Understanding of Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) Standing.",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 1731. Reflecting \"the confined role of the Ju- diciary in our system of separated powers, \" courts must \"avoid judicial policymaking or de facto judicial legislati on\" and \"respect … Congress 's legislative role.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The role of the federal judi- ciary is thus to interpret the law, not rewrite it . For that reason, this Court instructs that t he text of the statute as enacted controls.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Constitutes Judicial Legislating and Disrupts the Settled Understanding of Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) Standing.",
		"context": "\"[W]hen [a] stat- ute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts —at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd —is to enforce it according to its terms. \" Hartford Underwriters Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court below departed from that well -settled canon of statu- tory interpretation . 5",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. HHS's Concerns About the Administration of Medicare Are Unfounded",
		"context": "In that case, the question was whether HHS's acquiescence to the four circuit court decisions discussed above invalidating HH S's narrow interpretation of \"eligible for Medicaid\" required HHS to reopen settled cost reports to reflect HHS's updated policy. The D.C. Circuit held that reopening was required, In Re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , after the Tenth Circuit had held the opposite, Bartlett Mem'l Med. Ctr., None Thompson 347 . In sharp contrast to its petition here, HHS explained in detail \"the staggering and immediate financial and administrative burdens imposed by the 30 decision below.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 F.3d 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing",
		"context": "Petr.Br.35 (emphasis added). That \"convoluted textual argument\" is \"refuted by the plain terms of the\" statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Copyright Act provides that \"the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs.\" 17 U. S.C. §505.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing",
		"context": "Just as \"full\" means full, \"discretion\" means discretion. To read a statute that explicitly confers \"discretion\" to award \"full costs\" as implicitly eliminating discretion to award anything but the maximum amount of taxable costs \"would be confusing and downright silly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is no surprise, then, that the government flatly rejects this atextual argument. See U.S.Br.28 (courts under the Copyright Act may \"award full costs, no costs, or any amount in between \") (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing",
		"context": "If the government's theory were correct, each of those statute's gran t of discretion to award \"full costs\" was superfluous the day it was enacted. That is reason enough to reject the United States' position. \"The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but it certainly applies where multiple sentences in multiple enac tments would be rendered nugatory, and \"where a competing interpretation gives effect 'to every clause and word of a statute.'\" Microsoft 564 U.S. 91. And here, there is a readily available reading that gives every word of the statute \"real and substantial effect.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing",
		"context": "That is reason enough to reject the United States' position. \"The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule,\" 568 U.S. 371, but it certainly applies where multiple sentences in multiple enac tments would be rendered nugatory, and \"where a competing interpretation gives effect 'to every clause and word of a statute.'\" Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And here, there is a readily available reading that gives every word of the statute \"real and substantial effect.\" Husted , 138 S. Ct. at 1844-45.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "The former right is de-signed to effectuate the latter; the Sixth Amendment does not require the defendant to choose between them. The purpose of the right to counsel is not to dis- place other trial rights, but \"to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Counsel's \"presence is essen-tial\" precisely because the right to counsel is \"the means through which the other rights of the person on trial are secured.\" 466 U.S. 648.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "466 U.S. 668. Counsel's \"presence is essen-tial\" precisely because the right to counsel is \"the means through which the other rights of the person on trial are secured.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Without counsel the right to a fair tri-al itself would be of little consequence,\" as \"it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights.\" 477 U.S. 365.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "466 U.S. 648. \"Without counsel the right to a fair tri-al itself would be of little consequence,\" as \"it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, \"absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we … insist that [defense counsel] defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty.\" 388 U.S. 218.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "477 U.S. 365. Accordingly, \"absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we … insist that [defense counsel] defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Defense counsel must \"put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth.\" Wade , 388 U.S. at 258 (White, J., dissent- ing in part and concurring in part).",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "Wade , 388 U.S. at 258 (White, J., dissent- ing in part and concurring in part). Consistent with \"'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law,'\" a defendant may 5 choose to represent himself rather than accept repre- sentation by counsel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this respect for the defendant's au-tonomy in controlling his defense does not disappear if a defendant invokes his right to counsel. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "Because it is still \"[t]he defendant, and not his lawyer\" who bears the consequences of a conviction, Faretta , 422 U.S. at 834, the defendant who exercises his right to counsel retains the basic right to control the objec-tives of his defense. \"[T]he [Sixth] Amendment speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel \" because it contemplates that \"the accused, and not a lawyer, is master of his own defense.\" Gannett [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Faretta , 422 U.S. at 819-820; Criminal Bar Ass'n of Engl and & Wales Br. 3-5; Cato Br. 5-14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "5-14. Even when represented by counsel, the accused thus retains \"the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case,\" including \"whether to plead guilty, waiv e a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The decision whether to admit guilt is equally fundamental to the personal defense guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and, like those other decisions, must belong to the defendant, not counsel. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "\"Our system of laws gen- erally presumes that the criminal defendant, after be-ing fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the State. Any other approach is unworthy of a free people.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A defendant may de cide, in the exercise of his autonomy, that his day in court and the chance of acquittal—even if remote—are worth more to him than the speculative advantages a concession of guilt might provide at sentencing. See 137 S. Ct. 1958.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "528 U.S. 152. A defendant may de cide, in the exercise of his autonomy, that his day in court and the chance of acquittal—even if remote—are worth more to him than the speculative advantages a concession of guilt might provide at sentencing. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That judgment is not le-gal or tactical, but value-laden and personal. And it is the defendant's to make.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "1 1 The Restatement guideline on clients with diminished ca- pacity is thus inapposite beca use McCoy was capable of making \"adequately considered decisions\" about his own objectives. Re- 8 3. Louisiana's reliance (at 30-32) on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], fails. Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "4. Contrary to Louisiana's unsupported sugges- tion (at 28-29, 50), the adversary process can—and does—function effectively when defendants retain the right to decide whether to admit guilt. Many jurisdic-tions have considered this issue and barred defense counsel from admitting the defendant's guilt in a capital case over the defendant's objection, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 3 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §11.6(a), at 904-905 & n.30 (4th ed. 2015); Cato Br. 20, yet Louisian a has identified none of the problems it imagines here in those jurisdictions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "977 A.2d 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "That question is not presented here, since Louisiana's hypothetical lawyer is at least pursuing the client's objective of acquittal. But the notion that a lawyer should refrain from telling the jury that his client committed an act that the client de- nies is hardly absurd. It instead reflects the lawyer's 11 role to \"hold the prosecut ion to its heavy burden of proof\" when the defendant has decided to contest guilt, Cronic , 466 U.S. at 656 n.19, and \"the necessarily close working relationship between lawyer and client, the need for confidence, and the critical importance of trust\" that underlie the defendant's right to counsel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Louisiana suggests that defense counsel should betray a client who asserts his innocence if the prosecu-tion has evidence, such as DNA in a rape case, that ap- pears sufficiently strong. But as this Court has recog-nized, no evidence is uniquely infallible, 557 U.S. 305—including DNA evidence in rape cases, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1083",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "It instead reflects the lawyer's 11 role to \"hold the prosecut ion to its heavy burden of proof\" when the defendant has decided to contest guilt, Cronic , 466 U.S. at 656 n.19, and \"the necessarily close working relationship between lawyer and client, the need for confidence, and the critical importance of trust\" that underlie the defendant's right to counsel, 136 S. Ct. 1083. Louisiana suggests that defense counsel should betray a client who asserts his innocence if the prosecu-tion has evidence, such as DNA in a rape case, that ap- pears sufficiently strong. But as this Court has recog-nized, no evidence is uniquely infallible, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—including DNA evidence in rape cases, see, e.g. , 567 U.S. 50. Louisiana would deny the defendant—particularly the indigent defendant who lacks the means to hire counsel of choice—the opportunity to challenge such evidence and to demand that the pros ecution prove his guilt of all the elements of the crim e, unless the defendant re- linquishes the right to counsel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel",
		"context": "Louisiana suggests that defense counsel should betray a client who asserts his innocence if the prosecu-tion has evidence, such as DNA in a rape case, that ap- pears sufficiently strong. But as this Court has recog-nized, no evidence is uniquely infallible, 557 U.S. 305—including DNA evidence in rape cases, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Louisiana would deny the defendant—particularly the indigent defendant who lacks the means to hire counsel of choice—the opportunity to challenge such evidence and to demand that the pros ecution prove his guilt of all the elements of the crim e, unless the defendant re- linquishes the right to counsel. Yet it is precisely so that defendants can challenge evidence and \"'meet the case of the prosecution'\" that the Sixth Amendment se-cures to all defendants the assistance of counsel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Distinction Drawn by Courts between \"Governmental\" or \"State Sponsored\" Arbitrations and \"Private\" Arbitrations is False and, in any Event, is Irrelevant under Section 1782(a)",
		"context": "Some courts have distinguished between so-called \"private\" arbitral tribunals and \"public,\" \"governmental,\" or \"state-sponsored\" arbitral tribunals. 8 According to on the statute's scope and affirms the considerable discretion accorded the district courts to determine whether particular \"tribunals\" are of a sufficient nature and character to be permitted assistance under the statute. See Intel , 542 U.S. at 247; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Smit, The Supreme Court Rules , at 306 (\"Excluding [private international arbitral tribunals] from the reach of Section 1782 would . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F. Supp. 2d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Distinction Drawn by Courts between \"Governmental\" or \"State Sponsored\" Arbitrations and \"Private\" Arbitrations is False and, in any Event, is Irrelevant under Section 1782(a)",
		"context": "7. A broad interpretation of section 1782(a) would certainly be consistent with the \"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Epic Sys. 138 S. Ct. 1612; Am. Express 570 U.S. 228.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Distinction Drawn by Courts between \"Governmental\" or \"State Sponsored\" Arbitrations and \"Private\" Arbitrations is False and, in any Event, is Irrelevant under Section 1782(a)",
		"context": "A broad interpretation of section 1782(a) would certainly be consistent with the \"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.\" 537 U.S. 79; see also Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Am. Express 570 U.S. 228. 8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Distinction Drawn by Courts between \"Governmental\" or \"State Sponsored\" Arbitrations and \"Private\" Arbitrations is False and, in any Event, is Irrelevant under Section 1782(a)",
		"context": "537 U.S. 79; see also Epic Sys. 138 S. Ct. 1612; Am. Express [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "Nearly fifty years ago, this Court found it \"intoler- able that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the lower court held that the defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing could later be used against him at trial. This Court reversed, holding that the defendant could not be put to the choice \"either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "at 393-94. Applying a similar rationa le, this Court rejected a law that required an office r of a political party to either waive his right against self-incrimination and testify in response to a s ubpoena or else be barred from political office, thereby forgoing his First Amendment \"right to participate in private, voluntary political associations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Citing Simmons , the Court explained that the law unfairly \"require[d] [the officer] to forfeit one constitutionally protected right as the price for exercising another.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 801",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "at 807-08. 5 Beyond situations involvin g an unfair choice between two constitutional rights, this Court has refused to find voluntary waiver when the \"choice\" was to forgo a constitutional right or face some serious hardship. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court found it impermissible to require public employees either to answer questions by criminal investigators, or else lose their jobs. \"The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the pe nalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 493",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "In short, \"[t]here are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.\" Id. at 500; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the Court held that defendants could not be forced to \"choose\" between either contesting guilt at trial or avoiding a death penalty charge. 390 U.S. 570.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "at 500; accord 392 U.S. 273. Similarly, the Court held that defendants could not be forced to \"choose\" between either contesting guilt at trial or avoiding a death penalty charge. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The option to either risk one's life or exercise the right to a trial by jury was not a valid \"ch oice\"—the law \"impose[d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitu- tional right.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "at 572, 582-83. And notably, this Court has found that a defendant does not waive the double j eopardy protection by exer- cising his right to challen ge his conviction and suc- cessfully obtaining a reversal on appeal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When a man has been convicted of second degree murder and given a long term of imprisonment it is wholly fictional to say that he 'chooses' to forego his constitutional defense of former jeopardy on a charge of murder in the first degree in order to secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction of the lesser offense. In short, he has no meaningful choice.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "Relying on this Court's pre cedents, federal courts of appeals likewise have rejected putting defendants to a Hobson's choice of sacrificing one important right to preserve another. Lower cou rts thus have held that a defendant cannot be put to sa crifice one constitutional right to secure another. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They likewise have rejected a \"coerced choice\" of having to forgo an important non- constitutional right in order to exercise a constitu- tional right. 261 F.3d 575 (\"While [the defendant's] statutory right to a speedy trial under Ohio law may not equate precisely to his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment , the element of coerced choice decried by the Court in Simmons is neverthe- less present here.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 F.2d 326",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "568 F.2d 326. They likewise have rejected a \"coerced choice\" of having to forgo an important non- constitutional right in order to exercise a constitu- tional right. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"While [the defendant's] statutory right to a speedy trial under Ohio law may not equate precisely to his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment , the element of coerced choice decried by the Court in Simmons is neverthe- less present here.\" (citation omitted)). 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 F.3d 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Whether and How To Restructure an Entire Industrial Sector Is a Paradigmatic Major Question",
		"context": "The Government 8 (at 47–48) contends otherwise, assuring the Court that EPA will exercise this newfound power modestly and responsibly. The Court should not be taken in. With the President having declared a \"Climate Crisis\" and ordered an \"whole-of-government effort…to take direct actions that will reduce greenhouse gas emis- sions,\" 2 it is no exaggeration to observe that \"this wolf comes as a wolf,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] averts to statutory factors th at it says serve as \"con- straints\" against \"transfor mative\" application of Sec- tion 111. See also ConEd.Br.48; NGO.Br.48; States.Br.44, 48. But factors like the \"adequately demonstrated\" requirement pr ovide no constraint at all when EPA settles on reduced utilization as a BSER.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Whether and How To Restructure an Entire Industrial Sector Is a Paradigmatic Major Question",
		"context": "See, e.g., Oneok, 575 U.S. 373; Pac. Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Only \"exceedingly clear language\" enacted by Congre ss could possibly support that unlikely result. Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting U.S. Forest 140 S. Ct. 1837).",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Whether and How To Restructure an Entire Industrial Sector Is a Paradigmatic Major Question",
		"context": "461 U.S. 190. Only \"exceedingly clear language\" enacted by Congre ss could possibly support that unlikely result. Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting U.S. Forest [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is no legal basis for imposing an automatic stay on the whole case when a party files a Section 16(a) appeal.",
		"context": "Because Congress \"legislates against the backdrop of existing law,\" this stark contrast between the text of two interrelated FAA sections (one that contains mandatory stay language and one that does not) provides clear evidence of Congress's intent. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], another provision providing for interlocutory appeals, and in that section included express language providing for automatic stays of district court proceedings. \"Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" Nken , 556 U.S. at 430 (cleaned up).",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "And those interests are even clearer now that the district court has ordered the House —not the Senate, the attorney general, or any executive agency —reconstituted in ways that profoundly disrupt its day-to-day operations. The House's enduring interests in its own composition and constituencies justified its intervention, and those interests, not the mere act of intervening, give the House standing to appeal. That is clear from Sixty -Seventh Minnesot a State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . While the attorney general attempts to dismiss (or more accurately, discard) Beens as having erroneously held that the Minnesota senate had standing solely because it had intervened below, AG.Br.37, Beens in fact held that the senate had standing because \"certainly the senate is directly affected by the District Court's orders\" reconstit uting the senate. 406 U.S. at 194.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "Indeed, Beens quoted a prior summary 4 affirmance for the proposition that a state senate was properly permitted \"to intervene as a substantially interested party\" in a malapportionment case \" because it would be directly affected by the decree of \" the district court invalidating its districting map. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd381 U.S. 415). The commonsense proposition that a legislative body is \"directly affected\" by legislation constituting its districts and judicial orders reconstituting them is confirmed by the Constitution, which assigns \"the Legislature\" and Congress authority over \"[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding E lections for Senators and Representatives.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 F. Supp. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "Indeed, Beens quoted a prior summary 4 affirmance for the proposition that a state senate was properly permitted \"to intervene as a substantially interested party\" in a malapportionment case \" because it would be directly affected by the decree of \" the district court invalidating its districting map. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 241 F. Supp. 576 , aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The commonsense proposition that a legislative body is \"directly affected\" by legislation constituting its districts and judicial orders reconstituting them is confirmed by the Constitution, which assigns \"the Legislature\" and Congress authority over \"[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding E lections for Senators and Representatives.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "Most did not ev en involve institutional standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry and Diamond v. Charles involved neither legislatures nor legislators, but \"concerned bystanders\" with no \"direct stake\" in the litigation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 476 U.S. 54 . Wittman v. Personhuballah dealt with individual congressmen proceeding in their individual capacity and lacking individual injury because the court -ordered map there did not impair their individual reelection prospects, 136 S. Ct. 1732 , not (as Appellees would have it) because an order invalidating a map causes legislatures \"no cognizable harm,\" App.Br.14. Nor did 521 U.S. 811 , establish that an \"'injury to [the] official authority or power'\" of a legislature is categorically \"non - cognizable.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "Most did not ev en involve institutional standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry and Diamond v. Charles involved neither legislatures nor legislators, but \"concerned bystanders\" with no \"direct stake\" in the litigation. 570 U.S. 693 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Wittman v. Personhuballah dealt with individual congressmen proceeding in their individual capacity and lacking individual injury because the court -ordered map there did not impair their individual reelection prospects, 136 S. Ct. 1732 , not (as Appellees would have it) because an order invalidating a map causes legislatures \"no cognizable harm,\" App.Br.14. Nor did 521 U.S. 811 , establish that an \"'injury to [the] official authority or power'\" of a legislature is categorically \"non - cognizable.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "Hollingsworth v. Perry and Diamond v. Charles involved neither legislatures nor legislators, but \"concerned bystanders\" with no \"direct stake\" in the litigation. 570 U.S. 693 ; 476 U.S. 54 . Wittman v. Personhuballah dealt with individual congressmen proceeding in their individual capacity and lacking individual injury because the court -ordered map there did not impair their individual reelection prospects, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , not (as Appellees would have it) because an order invalidating a map causes legislatures \"no cognizable harm,\" App.Br.14. Nor did 521 U.S. 811 , establish that an \"'injury to [the] official authority or power'\" of a legislature is categorically \"non - cognizable.\" US.Br.15 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 826).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1732",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "570 U.S. 693 ; 476 U.S. 54 . Wittman v. Personhuballah dealt with individual congressmen proceeding in their individual capacity and lacking individual injury because the court -ordered map there did not impair their individual reelection prospects, 136 S. Ct. 1732 , not (as Appellees would have it) because an order invalidating a map causes legislatures \"no cognizable harm,\" App.Br.14. Nor did [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , establish that an \"'injury to [the] official authority or power'\" of a legislature is categorically \"non - cognizable.\" US.Br.15 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 826). T his Court already rejected that argument when 6 the federal executive branch pressed it in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC ), concluding that Raines addresses only the mismatch between plaintiff and injury when individual members seek to vindicate an instit utional injury, and that \"an institutional plaintiff\" can \"assert[] an institutional injury .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "US.Br.15 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 826). T his Court already rejected that argument when 6 the federal executive branch pressed it in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC ), concluding that Raines addresses only the mismatch between plaintiff and injury when individual members seek to vindicate an instit utional injury, and that \"an institutional plaintiff\" can \"assert[] an institutional injury .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 462 U.S. 919 . 1 Here, as in AIRC , there is a perfect match between the House and the institutional interests it seeks to vindicate. As much as the executive branch may wish legislative standing did not exist, this Court has repeatedly declined its overtures to embrace that proposition .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "US.Br.15 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 826). T his Court already rejected that argument when 6 the federal executive branch pressed it in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC ), concluding that Raines addresses only the mismatch between plaintiff and injury when individual members seek to vindicate an instit utional injury, and that \"an institutional plaintiff\" can \"assert[] an institutional injury .\" 135 S. Ct. 2652 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 1 Here, as in AIRC , there is a perfect match between the House and the institutional interests it seeks to vindicate. As much as the executive branch may wish legislative standing did not exist, this Court has repeatedly declined its overtures to embrace that proposition .",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing.",
		"context": "2. The House also has standing to defend the State's interests. That conclusion flows directly from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The attorney general contends that, because the House intervened to defend its institutional interests, Karcher precludes it from defending the State's interests too. AG.Br.21 -23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Political activity is a core function of labor unions",
		"context": "It is no t true for industry or fi- nance. Neither is it true for labor.\" Street , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Professor Clyde W. Summers, a labor law expert and one of the drafters of the Labor Management Re-porting and Disclo sure Act of 1959 (\"Landrum-Griffin Act\"), wrote that political activity was one of a union's functions. [U]nions engage in extensive political activity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE OTHER ISSUES RESPONDENT AND AMICI IDENTIFY ARE NOT PROPERLY PRESENTED",
		"context": "Respondent and amici speculate about how plain- tiffs in future cases might show that they bought reg- istered shares. They invoke concepts like statistical tracing, judicially imposed burden -shifting frame- works, and technological means of determining which shares are registered. Many of those proposals defy longstanding law —respondent's contention that plaintiffs should have recourse to discovery even if they cannot plausibly allege that they bought regis- tered shares , for instance, is contrary to the rule that plaintiffs \"armed with nothing more than conclusions\" cannot \"unlock the doors of discovery ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and statistical -trac- ing arguments have been correctly rejected in the lower courts, e.g., Krim , 402 F.3d at 498 -99. But in any event, none of these forfeited questions is properly before the Court . If anything, those arguments further undermine respondent's theory on the question that is presented .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "Ramirez , 141 S. Ct. at 2210. Thus, an individual sub- ject to \"threatened enforcement of a law\" that assert- edly would infringe constitutional or other rights \"sat- isfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges 'an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of 8 prosecution thereunder.' \" Driehaus , 573 U.S. at 158– 59 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In such circumsta nces, the plaintiff need not \"expose himself\" to the consummation of the threatened injury to have standing. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "In such circumsta nces, the plaintiff need not \"expose himself\" to the consummation of the threatened injury to have standing. Id. at 158–61 (cit- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118, 484 U.S. 383, and 561 U.S. 1). As to the required element of causation, the plain- tiff's injury (or the substant ial threat of injury) must be \"fairly traceable to the ch allenged action of the de- fendant.\" 520 U.S. 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "In such circumsta nces, the plaintiff need not \"expose himself\" to the consummation of the threatened injury to have standing. Id. at 158–61 (cit- ing 415 U.S. 452, MedImmune, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 484 U.S. 383, and 561 U.S. 1). As to the required element of causation, the plain- tiff's injury (or the substant ial threat of injury) must be \"fairly traceable to the ch allenged action of the de- fendant.\" 520 U.S. 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "In such circumsta nces, the plaintiff need not \"expose himself\" to the consummation of the threatened injury to have standing. Id. at 158–61 (cit- ing 415 U.S. 452, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 561 U.S. 1). As to the required element of causation, the plain- tiff's injury (or the substant ial threat of injury) must be \"fairly traceable to the ch allenged action of the de- fendant.\" 520 U.S. 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "In such circumsta nces, the plaintiff need not \"expose himself\" to the consummation of the threatened injury to have standing. Id. at 158–61 (cit- ing 415 U.S. 452, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118, 484 U.S. 383, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As to the required element of causation, the plain- tiff's injury (or the substant ial threat of injury) must be \"fairly traceable to the ch allenged action of the de- fendant.\" 520 U.S. 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "at 158–61 (cit- ing 415 U.S. 452, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118, 484 U.S. 383, and 561 U.S. 1). As to the required element of causation, the plain- tiff's injury (or the substant ial threat of injury) must be \"fairly traceable to the ch allenged action of the de- fendant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a challenge to the implementation of an allegedly unconstitutional statutory provision, causation requires an injury \"fairly traceable to the defendants' conduct in enforcing the specific statutory provision [plaintiffs] atta ck as unconstitutional.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "That the plaintiff's own conduct plays a role in bringing to bear the challenged injurious application (or threat of application) of a statute to his conduct does not normally mean that the resulting injury or threat of injury is not fairly attributable to the chal- lenged action. A plaintiff who claims a constitutional right or some other form of legal protection may en- gage in the conduct she claims is legally protected, knowing or expecting that she will be exposed to an action she views as illegal, and the resulting injury 9 will serve as a basis for a legal challenge because it is fairly attributable to the assertedly illegal conduct. See, e.g., Havens Realty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That the plaintiff could have avoided the injury by not exercising her claimed rights \"does not negate the simple fact of injury\" attributable to the defendant's assertedly illegal response. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "at 374. That the plaintiff exe rcised her rights \"for the purpose of instituting … litigation\" likewise \"is not significant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, an injury resulting from the application of an allegedly unconstitutional statute to a plaintiff willing to accept that consequence in order to bring a test case remains fairly traceable to the challenged conduct not-withstanding that it might be described as being \"self- inflicted\" in some sense. Denying standing based on the characterization of such harm as \"self-inflicted\" would represent a signif-icant, and unwarranted, extension of standing doc- trine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "Denying standing based on the characterization of such harm as \"self-inflicted\" would represent a signif-icant, and unwarranted, extension of standing doc- trine. This Court has given relatively little considera- tion to \"self-inflicted\" harm in the context of standing, using the term only twice. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 426 U.S. 660. Some lower courts, in particular the D.C. Circu it, have used that termi- nology more widely. See 659 F.3d 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "Denying standing based on the characterization of such harm as \"self-inflicted\" would represent a signif-icant, and unwarranted, extension of standing doc- trine. This Court has given relatively little considera- tion to \"self-inflicted\" harm in the context of standing, using the term only twice. See 568 U.S. 398; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some lower courts, in particular the D.C. Circu it, have used that termi- nology more widely. See 659 F.3d 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous",
		"context": "See 568 U.S. 398; 426 U.S. 660. Some lower courts, in particular the D.C. Circu it, have used that termi- nology more widely. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have not, however, applied it to direct consequences of statutory prohibitions or requirements that are trig- gered by a plaintiff's choice of engaging in conduct for which he claims constitutional or legal protection. Ra- ther, as Clapper and Pennsylvania v. New Jersey illus- trate, courts have generally used the concept in at-tempting to distinguish between those indirect conse- quences of challenged laws and actions that are fairly 10 traceable to the defendant's conduct and those that are not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.3d 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment",
		"context": "North Carolina's Democratic Party managed to preserve its power from any meaningful challenge for much of the twentieth century . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The party preserved its power in part through racial and p artisan gerrymandering. See Douglas M. Orr Jr., The Persistence of the Gerrymander in North Carolina Congressional Redistricting , 9 S.E.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F. Supp. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment",
		"context": "\"). In 198 2, the General Assembly enacted a redistricting plan \"for the election of members of the [state] Senate and House of Representatives .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. 478 U.S. 30. Under the plan, the state's urban counties were composed of multimember districts, which resulted in a twenty - percent population disparity between legislative districts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "590 F. Supp. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment",
		"context": "In 198 2, the General Assembly enacted a redistricting plan \"for the election of members of the [state] Senate and House of Representatives .\" 590 F. Supp. 345, aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the plan, the state's urban counties were composed of multimember districts, which resulted in a twenty - percent population disparity between legislative districts. Robert N. Hunter Jr., Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina , 9 Campbell L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment",
		"context": "During the 1990s, gerrymandering disputes in North Carolina were primarily a by -product of the preclearance procedures of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. In 1990, North Carolina gained a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives as a result of the 1990 census. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The General Assembly presented a reapportionment plan to the U.S. Department of Justice that featured one majority -black congressional district. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment",
		"context": "This Court summarily rejected the GOP challenge, id., but ultimately struck down the 1992 reapportionment plan as an unconstitutional racial 22 gerrymander , 517 U.S. 899. The Court subsequently upheld a 1997 revised plan against a racial -gerrymandering challenge. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2000, North Carolina gained another seat in Congress as a result of the census and the General Assembly enacted a new redistricting plan which was in effect fro m 2001 to 2010 . Rucho , 318 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "121 S. Ct. 1452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment",
		"context": "As Justice Kagan has noted, \"technology makes today's gerrymandering 2 The post -2010 legislative majority has followed its Democrat predecessors in attempting to disadvantage voters of opposing views thro ugh other means as well as gerrymandering. In 2016, North Carolina's General Assembly enacted an election law \"that restricted voting and registration in five different ways,\" each of which \"target[ted] African Americans with almost surgical precision.\" N.C. State Conference of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Noting that African Americans in North Carolina tend not to vote Republican, and that the legislature, before enacting the law, \"requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting practices,\" the Fourth Circuit concluded that the law was passed \"with racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Fact-Specific Approach Of The Van Orden Concurrence Does Not Solve The Problem",
		"context": "In Van Orden v. Perry, this Court considered whether a Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds violated the Establishment Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After declaring the Lemon test \"not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument\" at issue, a plurality of this Court looked instead to \"the nature of the monument and ...o u r N a t i o n ' s h i s t o r y . \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Fact-Specific Approach Of The Van Orden Concurrence Does Not Solve The Problem",
		"context": "Justice Breyer issued an opinion concurring in the judgment, which lower courts have concluded is the \"controlling opinion.\" See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It observed that although the \"Commandments' text undeniably has a religious message,\" \"encourag[ing] disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depictions . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 F.3d 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Fact-Specific Approach Of The Van Orden Concurrence Does Not Solve The Problem",
		"context": "That is because the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the government action is akin to practices that would have been considered an \"establishment of religion\" when the First Amendment was enacted. See Lynch , 465 U.S. at 673 (Establishment Clause interpretation should \"comport[] with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees\"). 56 Americans who fell in battles\"); Trunk, 660 F.3d at 1100 (Bea, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc ) (noting at least 114 Civil War memorials incorporating crosses); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]he erection of crosses as memorials is a practice that dates back centuries, and . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 1169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
		"context": "Gen. Motors ,461 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added). The principle of complete compensation for patent infringement gives effect to the patentee's right to exclude and to the incentive provided by the Patent Act for innovation. See King Instruments [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 284 protects these interests by 7 \"deterring infringers and recouping market value lost when deterrence fails.\" Id.at 950.",
		"citation_value_orig": "65 F.3d 941",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
		"context": "Compensatory damages recoverable under Section 284 include \"any damages the complainant can prove,\" consistent with common law principles of proximate causation. Aro Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's precedents establish that Section 284 is intended to restore the patent owner to \"as good a position as he would have in\" absent the patent infringement. See Gen. Motors , 461 U.S. at 655; Aro, 377 U.S. at 507; 155 U.S. 565; Yale Lock Mfg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
		"context": "377 U.S. 476. This Court's precedents establish that Section 284 is intended to restore the patent owner to \"as good a position as he would have in\" absent the patent infringement. See Gen. Motors , 461 U.S. at 655; Aro, 377 U.S. at 507; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Yale Lock Mfg. 117 U.S. 536. A patent owner is entitled to recover \"'the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
		"context": "This Court's precedents establish that Section 284 is intended to restore the patent owner to \"as good a position as he would have in\" absent the patent infringement. See Gen. Motors , 461 U.S. at 655; Aro, 377 U.S. at 507; 155 U.S. 565; Yale Lock Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A patent owner is entitled to recover \"'the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.'\" Aro, 377 at 507 (quoting Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552).",
		"citation_value_orig": "117 U.S. 536",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
		"context": "Aro, 377 at 507 (quoting Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552). To recover lost profits, \"the patent owner must show 'causation in fact,' establishing that 'but for' the infringement, he would have made additional profits.\" Grain Processing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neither Section 284 nor the principles of proximate causation provide support for a categorical rule prohibiting the recovery of damages that accrue overseas. To the contrary, they require a case-specific damages analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "185 F.3d 1341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
		"context": "Indeed, \"[u]nder the patent statute, damages should be awarded 'where necessary to afford the plaintiff full compensation for the infringement.' Thus, to refuse to award reasonably foreseeable damages necessary to make [the patentee] whole would be inconsistent with the meaning of § 284.\" Rite-Hite [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given \"sound economic proof of the nature of the market,\" Section 284 provides \"significant latitude to prove and recover lost profits for a wide variety of foreseeable economic effects of the infringement.\" Grain Processing , 185 F.3d at 1350.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.3d 1538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "A. To begin, Respondents have \"confused mootness with standing.\" Friends of the Earth, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Federal Respondents, for instance, argue that \"circumstances have mooted \" the dispute, so Petitioners \"cannot establish standing .\" U.S.Br.17 (emphases added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "In their view, \"changed circumstances\" long after filing—EPA's request to partially stay the mandate—have \"eliminated\" any possibility Petitioners will suffer harm. U.S.Br.16, 21- 22. But the argument that \"intervening circumstances [have] deprive[d] the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome\" goes to mootness.2Genesis Healthcare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Munsingwear vacatur applies in mootness cases, not standing ones. See 484 U.S. 72.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 66",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "But the argument that \"intervening circumstances [have] deprive[d] the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome\" goes to mootness.2Genesis Healthcare 569 U.S. 66. Munsingwear vacatur applies in mootness cases, not standing ones. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Federal Respondents' request for partial vacatur only, U.S.Br.23 n.2, also provides evidence that at least some part of the D.C. Circuit's holding gives Respondents a real benefit and, conversely, causes Petitioners real harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "Id. Precision matters because swapping standing for mootness \"place[s] the burden of proof on the wrong party.\" Adarand Constructors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents could not bear their \"heavy burden\" to show mootness by making it \"absolutely clear\" that \"the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.\" Friends of the Earth , 528 U.S. at 189-90.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "Most never try, as doing so would close off the aggressive regulatory options they want to preserve. Even Federal Respondents admit that EPA \" might \" re- adopt the same \"regulatory provisions\" that the lower court faulted it for repealing. U.S.Br.20-21 (emphasis in original); see also Nat'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That reservation shows that EPA's temporary cessation should not end this appeal. B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "Standing would be no reason to dismiss even if it were relevant. If one Petitioner is in danger of \"actual or imminent\" injury that is \"fairly traceable to the challenged action\" and \"likely\" to be \"redressed by a favorable decision,\" the case proceeds. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All Petitioners meet these requirements here. See NACCO.Reply.16-23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "A few additional points warrant mention for the States. First , the States undeniably had standing at the time of filing—when courts evaluate it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No Respondent 20 suggests otherwise, and Federal Respondents admit the States did. U.S.Br.21-22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "U.S.Br.21-22. For good reason: \"The lower the emissions budget [EPA sets], the more difficult and onerous is the states' task\" to comply; lower targets thus injure \"the states as states.\" West [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Beyond that, the rules the States defended below would have removed \"significant and costly compliance measures.\" 484 U.S. 383.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F.3d 861",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "West 362 F.3d 861. Beyond that, the rules the States defended below would have removed \"significant and costly compliance measures.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These injuries are enough. Respondents invoke cases in which parties press appeals from decisions that did not injure them in an Article III sense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "More important, they are not side actors. They are not vindicating \"quasi-legislative interest[s],\" Arizonans for Off. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or a non-existent right to force the government to prosecute, 476 U.S. 54. Rather, the States must implement and bear the economic fallout of EPA's regulatory scheme. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 562 (explaining that it is \"substantially more difficult\" to establish standing when parties are not \"the object of the [challenged] government action\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "More important, they are not side actors. They are not vindicating \"quasi-legislative interest[s],\" Arizonans for Off. 520 U.S. 43, or a non-existent right to force the government to prosecute, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the States must implement and bear the economic fallout of EPA's regulatory scheme. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 562 (explaining that it is \"substantially more difficult\" to establish standing when parties are not \"the object of the [challenged] government action\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 562 (explaining that it is \"substantially more difficult\" to establish standing when parties are not \"the object of the [challenged] government action\"). So unlike in Respondents' cases, the judgment below affects Petitioners' rights and requires \"them to do [and] refrain from doing\" certain things. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , it does not matter that EPA might think things over (again) while part of the judgment is stayed. Jurisdiction \"cannot be ousted by subsequent events\" after it vests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "Second , it does not matter that EPA might think things over (again) while part of the judgment is stayed. Jurisdiction \"cannot be ousted by subsequent events\" after it vests. Grupo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lest we forget: the court below struck down an effort to repeal the CPP, vacated its replacement, and ordered EPA to consider even more aggressive options. Respondents say the partial stay renders the States' injuries intangible.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "See NACCO.Reply.17-20. Because EPA remains free to \"reenact[] precisely the same provision\" on remand, the Court has jurisdiction to reverse. City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A \"realistic danger of … direct injury\" to the States also arises \"as a result of the … operation or enforcement\" of the un-stayed ACE vacatur. 442 U.S. 289.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "City of 455 U.S. 283. A \"realistic danger of … direct injury\" to the States also arises \"as a result of the … operation or enforcement\" of the un-stayed ACE vacatur. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. EPA will issue a new rule. U.S.Br.19 (\"EPA is legally obligated to promulgate a rule governing greenhouse-gas emissions from existing power plants.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "The States face harm from the decision requiring it to consider system-wide measures and affirmatively justify any choice not to impose them when it does. \"The mere possibility\" EPA will exercise restraint \"does not suffice to\" start this seven-year odyssey anew. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court has intervened before—over protests that it was too soon—when an agency acted \"in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition.\" 358 U.S. 184; see also Champion Int'l 850 F.2d 182.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "566 U.S. 120. Indeed, the Court has intervened before—over protests that it was too soon—when an agency acted \"in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Champion Int'l 850 F.2d 182. Standing's bar is low. If nominal damages, Uzuegbunam , 141 S. Ct. at 798, or a prospect of future enforcement, Susan B. Anthony 573 U.S. 149, suffice, then the interests at stake here should, too.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot — And Petitioners Have Standing",
		"context": "566 U.S. 120. Indeed, the Court has intervened before—over protests that it was too soon—when an agency acted \"in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition.\" 358 U.S. 184; see also Champion Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Standing's bar is low. If nominal damages, Uzuegbunam , 141 S. Ct. at 798, or a prospect of future enforcement, Susan B. Anthony 573 U.S. 149, suffice, then the interests at stake here should, too.",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F.2d 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Conflicts With Indians",
		"context": "of Oral Arg. at 8, Dist. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of course, not all violent interactions with Indians were defensive in nature. See, e.g., Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison: Genius, Partisan, President 14 – 16 (2017) (describing series of Indian raids on settlors in retaliation for prior attacks as Virginians moved west).",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Permitting the government to take property to collect a tax debt without compensating the owner for the value exceeding the debt creates skewed incentives that disproportionately harm vulnerable people.",
		"context": "Id. ; see also Coleman ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Similarly, in Kalamazoo County, Michigan, a woman lost a home that she had purchased for $156,000 in cash, because of an unpaid $2,000 tax bill; the county sold the home for $80,000 and \"retain[ed] all of the profits from the sale.\" Jenna Christine Foos, State Theft in Real Property Tax Foreclosure Procedures , 54 Real Prop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 F. Supp. 3d 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Considering the state's purported justifications",
		"context": "at 1941 (Kagan, J., concurring).  A state might further contend that it drew dis- trict lines based on a legitimate interest in minimizing the pairing of incumbents. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts also have judicially manageable methods for evaluating the strength of these asserted justifica- tions. For example, the parties can submit alternative district maps that incorporate traditional redistrict- ing principles and account for political geography.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)",
		"context": "at 67a. In any statutory construction case, this Court be- gins with the statute's text, considering \"whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 21 meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]566 U.S. 101. Here, the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and their context are in harmony. Critically, §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) identifies the \"temporary exemption\" granted under subparagraph (A) as the specific thing that may extended.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Solicitation of suicide, if it can be punished, can only be punished under strict scrutiny",
		"context": "And the Melchert -Dinkel court likewise applied strict scru- tiny in evaluating a ban on speech that advises or 10 encourages suicide, but held that the particular Min- nesota statute in that case was overinclusive with re- gard to the government's interest. 844 N.W.2d at 23 - 24. See also C [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "52 N.E.3d 1054",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "Petit ioners have a sked this Court to overrule its decis ions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Planned 505 U.S. 8, and t heir progeny, and t o subject all regulati on of the prac tice of abortion, incl uding prohibitions of abortion, t o the rat ional basis standard of review . Amicus curiae joins in that request. In t his brief, amicu s curiae argues t hat, in restoring t he States ' authority to p rohibit abortion, the Court should not require or in any wa y suggest that, under the rat ional bas is standa rd, the Sta tes must permit abortions s ought because of t he mental or ps ychologica l health of t he pregnant woman, or because of undefined \"healt h\" reas ons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "Petit ioners have a sked this Court to overrule its decis ions in 410 U.S. 1, and Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and t heir progeny, and t o subject all regulati on of the prac tice of abortion, incl uding prohibitions of abortion, t o the rat ional basis standard of review . Amicus curiae joins in that request. In t his brief, amicu s curiae argues t hat, in restoring t he States ' authority to p rohibit abortion, the Court should not require or in any wa y suggest that, under the rat ional bas is standa rd, the Sta tes must permit abortions s ought because of t he mental or ps ychologica l health of t he pregnant woman, or because of undefined \"healt h\" reas ons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "The most stri king evidence of the i nherent manipulabilit y of a mental healt h except ion may be found in examining Cali fornia's exp erience (p re-Roe) with its Therapeutic Abortion Act of 19 67. Acc ording to dat a cited by the California Supreme Court, more than 60 ,000 abortions were a uthorized a nd performed in 197 0 for 2 alleged \"mental hea lth\" rea sons, even though the sta ndard for invoking the except ion was the s ame as the s tanda rd for civil commitment, to wi t, the pregnant woman ha d to pose a danger to herself or to ot hers or to t he property of others. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Cal. 1 972). It is absurd to believe that more than 60 ,000 women m et the st andard for c ivil c omm itment merely because they were pregnant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 P.2d 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "It is absurd to believe that more than 60 ,000 women m et the st andard for c ivil c omm itment merely because they were pregnant. Other evidenc e indirect ly confirms t hat a mental heal th excep tion, or even a n undefined \"health\" except ion, is subject to w idesprea d abuse. Prior to Roe v Wade , thirt een States enact ed one version or another of Sect ion 23 0.3 of the Model Penal Code (set forth in Appendix B t o [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 2 30.3 permitted a bortion when, among other reas ons, the p hysici an believed tha t there was a \"substant ial risk\" t hat c ontinuation of the pregnancy w ould \"gravel y impair the physi cal or mental health of t he mother . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "The dis trict court gra nted the physic ian's motion to dis miss t he indict ments. On a ppeal , this Court reversed and upheld t he sta tute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Vuitch , the Court, exerc ising i ts authority t o provide a definitive c onstructi on of a st atute adopted by Congress for the Dist rict of Colum bia, broadly int erpreted the word \"hea lth\" t o include \" psychological as well as physic al well-being.\" Vuitch , 402 U.S. a t 72.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "It is apparent from this dat a that the pre- Roe Distric t of Columb ia abortion stat ute, a s construed by this 4 Court, effectively allow ed abortion for any reas on.1 Experience wit h federal funding of abortions for indigent women is also revealing. Prior to t he enforcement of the Hyde Amendm ent, rest ricting federal funding of abortions for women enro lled in t he Medicai d program, the Government wa s paying for between 25 0,000 and 3 00,000 abortions per year. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (E.D.N.Y. 1 980), rev'd sub nom. 448 U.S. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 F. Supp. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "491 F. Supp. 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1 980), rev'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Once t he Hyde Amendm ent went into effect, t hose numb ers dropped by mor e than 98%, even w hen federal funding was allowed for reasons relati ng to the w oman's li fe or physic al hea lth, a nd in ca ses where the pregnanc y resulted from rape or inces t. Id. at 654.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "at 654. That s uggests that the overwhelming majority of abortions obtained by indigent women prior to the implementation of t he Hyde Amendm ent were a uthorized for mental healt h reasons. And, given tha t the numbers of In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court1 adopted the Vuitch definition of health to resolve a vagueness issue in what was left of the Georgia abortion statute after the district court had struck down the permitted exceptions as too narrow, leaving the statute to read that the physician could perform an abortion whenever he determined that it was \"necessary.\" Doe, 410 U.S. at 191-92. The Court held that \"the medical judgment,\" as to the necessity of an abortion, \"may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
		"context": "1SS (Feb. 1987), 11SS, 12SS (Table 1). This conclusion–that, under Medicaid (before the3 Hyde Amendment went into effect), any desired abortion was deemed \"medically necessary\" and would be paid for with government funds–is consistent with Justice Brennan's view that, regardless of a pregnant woman's choice–to carry her pregnancy to term or to undergo an abortion–\"the procedures in each case constitute necessary medical treatment for the condition of pregnancy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
		"context": "This Court should not take the painting at issue in this case only at face value, ignoring the meaning 13 Warhol's transformation conveys to different audi- ences—customers, critics, and the public at large. In- deed, the Second Circuit stands alone among its sister circuits in doing so. Compare Seltzer , 725 F.3d at 1177 (holding that the defendant's use of a copyrighted work with \"few physical changes to the original\" is trans- formative \"as long as new ex pressive content or mes- sage is apparent,\" even if the meaning of that message is \"debatable\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.\" Yankee Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 F.3d 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
		"context": "\"First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.\" Yankee Pub. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And likewise, First Amendment protections do not apply only to artists whose message appears plainly on the face of their art- work. --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F. Supp. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FHFA'S STRUCTURE VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS",
		"context": "ERS Plaintiffs agree with mu ch of what Defendants say in response to the Court-Appointed Amicus about the constitutionality of FHFA's structure. Without re- treading ground covered by this Court in Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Plaintiffs offer two observations about Amicus's argument. First, a premise of Amicus's position is that cases like this one should be decided on a \"sliding scale,\" Amicus Br. 40, with the extent of the officer's powers and the scope of the President's removal authority providing the grounds for ad hoc, case-by-case deci-sions about whether a particular removal restriction is constitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FHFA'S STRUCTURE VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS",
		"context": "40, with the extent of the officer's powers and the scope of the President's removal authority providing the grounds for ad hoc, case-by-case deci-sions about whether a particular removal restriction is constitutional. That approach would give Congress almost no guidance in a context in which it is essential to establish \"high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, much of Amicus's argument turns on the claim that FHFA exercises little if any \"coercive power.\" Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees",
		"context": "Nineteenth -century court cases contemporaneous with the enactment of the statutes similarly confirm that \" Expensæ Litis \" did not include attorneys' fees or compensation for a party's own time. This Court in Day v. Woodworth explained that \"all the law allows as expensa litis \" is the \"legal taxed costs\" —not \"counsel -fees.\" Day, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Riding circuit, Justice Grier made this same point in several other cases both before and after Day. See 18 F. Cas. 1115; 23 F. Cas. 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "at 1008-1009 (emphasis added). That is because, as a general matter, \"invocation of the [district court's] inherent power\" to sanction a contemnor for violating a court order \"would require a finding of bad faith.\" Chambers , 501 U.S. at 49 (citing Roadway Express, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). See also id . at 50 (a court imposing sanctions under its inherent 26 power for violating a discovery order must make \"the requisite bad faith\" finding).9 In Hardy , the Eleventh Circuit held that bad faith is not a prerequisite to a sanctions award entered pursuant to Section 105(a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Ibid. But in making that statement, the Eleventh Circuit undertook no actual analysis of the issue. Instead, it merely cited an automatic-stay case— Jove Engineering, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—and unthoughtfully asserted that the frame- work for deciding violations of Section 362's automatic stay \"is likewise applicable to determining willfulness for violations of the discharge injunction of [Section] 524.\" Hardy , 97 F.3d at 1390. That is plainly wrong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 F.3d 1539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "11 U.S.C. 362(a), (k)(1) (emphasis added). That language is notable because it requires an assessment of damages (the debtor \"shall\" recover) 9 Although [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], suggests that any willful violation of a court order is sanc- tionable in contempt and that \"the state of mind of respondents\" is irrelevant ( id. at 191), the accepted rule in the bankruptcy context is that good faith is a defense to contempt sanctions imposed under the court's inherent authority. See Hardy , 97 F.3d at 1390 (\"[A] defendant may be cited for contempt under the court's inherent powers only upon a showing of 'bad faith.'\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "That observation is dispositive here. \"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten- tionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put another way, \"[i]f Congress had wanted\" to impose a mandatory damages for any willful viola- tion of a discharge injunction, it \"would have said so\" because \"other statutes, in other contexts, speak in 28 just that way.\" 570 U.S. 254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "464 U.S. 16. Put another way, \"[i]f Congress had wanted\" to impose a mandatory damages for any willful viola- tion of a discharge injunction, it \"would have said so\" because \"other statutes, in other contexts, speak in 28 just that way.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. There is good reason, moreover, for treating a violation of an automatic stay differently from a violation of a statutory discharge injunction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "See generally W. E. Shipley, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with Injury to or Interference with Tangible Property , 28 A.L.R. 2d 1070 (1953, with supplements); Joel E. Smith, Recovery by Debtor, Under Tort of Intentional or Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, for Damages Resulting from Debt Collection Methods , 87 A.L.R. 3d 201 (1978, with supplements). That matters because Congress presumptively in- corporates common law standards into the Bank- ruptcy Code. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hardy did not consider any of these basic points, unthinkingly conflating a violation of the automatic 29 stay with a violation of the discharge injunction. That is indefensible.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "at 32). All appellees subsequently sought attorney fees from Mr. Taggart, and SPBC alone was awarded ap- proximately $45,000. The state court judge, citing In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.2005), rea- soned that attorney fees could be assessed against Mr. Taggart despite his bankruptcy discharge, because he never abandoned his counterclaim for attorney fees and because he continued to seek dismissal from the lawsuit post-petition, which if successful, would have given him a contractual right to attorney fees. There- after, Mr. Taggart re-opened his bankruptcy case and 3a filed a Motion to Hold Stuart M. Brown, Terry W. Em- mert and Keith Jehnke in Contempt for Violating Dis- charge Injunction Under 11 U.S.C. § 524.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.3d 1018",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "In denying the contempt motion, the bankruptcy court reiterated that the § 524 dis- charge injunction was inapplicable because Mr. Tag- gart reentered the fray of the state court lawsuit. STANDARD OF REVIEW A bankruptcy court's \"conclusions of law [are re- viewed] de novo and its factual findings for clear er- ror.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit applies \"de novo review to 'mixed ques- tions' of law and fact,\" because such cases \"require consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values that animate the legal principles.\" In re374 B.R. 221 (B.A.P.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 F.3d 1140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "In re290 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit applies \"de novo review to 'mixed ques- tions' of law and fact,\" because such cases \"require consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values that animate the legal principles.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (B.A.P. 9th Cir.2007); see also In re503 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.2007). This case involves largely undis- puted facts and a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore, I review de novo the Bankruptcy Court's de- cision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 B.R. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit applies \"de novo review to 'mixed ques- tions' of law and fact,\" because such cases \"require consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values that animate the legal principles.\" In re374 B.R. 221 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.2007); see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.2007). This case involves largely undis- puted facts and a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore, I review de novo the Bankruptcy Court's de- cision. DISCUSSION \"A Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge releases the debtor from personal liability\" for pre-bankruptcy debts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 F.3d 856",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "A debtor alleging a violation of § 524 must bring a motion for contempt under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (\" § 105(a)\") of the 4a bankruptcy code. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A party must \"knowingly\" violate the discharge injunction in order to be held in contempt under § 105(a). In re450 F.3d 996 intended the actions which violated the injunc- tion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 F.3d 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "See 276 F.3d 502. A party must \"knowingly\" violate the discharge injunction in order to be held in contempt under § 105(a). In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] intended the actions which violated the injunc- tion.\" Id. The threshold issue, however, is whether appel- lees' request for attorney fees in connection with the pre-petition state court lawsuit that was recom- menced subsequent to Mr. Taggart's discharge impli- cates the § 524 injunction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 F.3d 996",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "If the claim for attorney fees was not discharged, there inevitably can be no knowing violation of the injunction. The Ninth Circuit holds that \"claims for attorney fees and costs incurred post-petition are not discharged where post-petition, the debtor voluntarily commences litigation or other- wise voluntarily 'return[s] to the fray.' \" In re Ybarra , 424 F.3d at 1026 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"Whether attorney fees and costs incurred through the continued prosecution of litigation initiated pre- petition may be discharged depends on whether the debtor has taken affirmative post-petition action to litigate a prepetition claim and has thereby risked the liability of these litigation expenses.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 F.3d 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Stat. § 20.105, Mr. Taggart would have had to have proven that: (1) he \"was the prevailing party\"; (2) \"the opposing party's claim was meritless\"; and (3) \"the meritless claim was advanced for an improper pur- pose.\" 987 P.2d 17 (Or.Ct.App.1999) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Or.1990)). Section 13.6 of the SPBC Operating Agreement states in relevant part that \"the prevailing party shall be entitled to recovery, in addition to other costs, reasonable attorney fees in 10a otherwise appear or defend in the trial after he was ordered to remain a party, it is unclear whether Ore- gon law2 would permit this designation on these facts. If he could not have prevailed on his counterclaim by seeking dismissal from the suit in the fashion he did, it cannot be said that Mr. Taggart took affirmative post-petition action to recommence his pursuit of at- torney fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 P.2d 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Stat. § 20.105 defines \"prevailing party.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue is irrelevant as to Or. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "77 P.3d 1143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "I further have taken judicial notice of the docket and documents filed in Mr. Taggart's main chapter 7 case, Case No. 09- 39216-rld7 (\"Main Case\"), for the purpose of confirm- ing and ascertaining facts not reasonably in dispute. Federal Rule of Evidence 201; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, I have reviewed relevant legal authorities, both as cited to me by the parties and as located through my own re- search. In light of that consideration and review, this Memorandum Opinion sets forth the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under Civil Rule 52(a), applicable with respect to this contested matter under Rules 7052 and 9014.",
		"citation_value_orig": "350 B.R. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "That was the express holding in In re Ybarra, 424 F[. ]3d 1018 (2005), a copy of which is attached to this brief. It held that where a litigant actively asserts claims in liti- gation post-petition, only then can he be as- sessed post-petition attorney fees, overruling In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that even then attorney fees could not be awarded. As explained in the Ninth Circuit's deci- sion, and there are numerous other cases that have so held in other jurisdictions, when one is discharged in bankruptcy from liability, in- cluding liability associated with prepetition litigation, the fact that the litigation contin- ues without any involvement by the dis- charged debtor means that no attorney fees or 20a costs on account of those claims can be as- serted against the discharged debtor. His right to a fresh start is preeminent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 BR 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "See Exhibit M. The Petition reflected the understand- ing that any liability of Mr. Taggart for fees \"would be limited to fees incurred after he filed for bankruptcy on November 4, 2009 . . , \" citing Boeing North Amer- ican, Inc. v. Ybarra (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Id. at p. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F. 3d 1018",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": ". \" Procedurally, an alleged violation of the discharge injunction is pursued, as in this case, by a motion in- voking the contempt remedies allowed for in § 105(a). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In order to be subject to sanc- tions for violating the discharge injunction, a party's violation must be \"willful.\" The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two-part test to determine whether the will- fulness standard has been met: 1) Did the alleged of- fending party know that the discharge injunction ap- plied; and 2) did such party intend the actions that violated the discharge injunction?",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 F.3d 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "In order to be subject to sanc- tions for violating the discharge injunction, a party's violation must be \"willful.\" The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two-part test to determine whether the will- fulness standard has been met: 1) Did the alleged of- fending party know that the discharge injunction ap- plied; and 2) did such party intend the actions that violated the discharge injunction? See Zilog, Inc. v. Corning (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hardy v. United States (In re97 F.3d 1384. The burden of proof for the moving party is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Zilog, Inc., 450 F.3d at 1007; Renwick v. Bennett (In re298 F.3d 1059.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 F.3d 996",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "In order to be subject to sanc- tions for violating the discharge injunction, a party's violation must be \"willful.\" The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two-part test to determine whether the will- fulness standard has been met: 1) Did the alleged of- fending party know that the discharge injunction ap- plied; and 2) did such party intend the actions that violated the discharge injunction? See Zilog, Inc. v. Corning (In re450 F.3d 996; Hardy v. United States (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The burden of proof for the moving party is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Zilog, Inc., 450 F.3d at 1007; Renwick v. Bennett (In re298 F.3d 1059.",
		"citation_value_orig": "97 F.3d 1384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "See Zilog, Inc. v. Corning (In re450 F.3d 996; Hardy v. United States (In re97 F.3d 1384. The burden of proof for the moving party is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Zilog, Inc., 450 F.3d at 1007; Renwick v. Bennett (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where litigation is commenced prepetition and is recommenced postpetition or postdischarge, the Ninth Circuit has set forth the standards to determine whether the continued prosecution of such litigation violates the discharge injunction of § 524(a)(2) in Boe-ing North American, Inc. v. Ybarra (In re424 F.3d 1018. The ultimate question is 27a whether the discharged debtor has voluntarily \"re- turned to the fray\" in the renewed litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "298 F.3d 1059",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "The burden of proof for the moving party is clear and convincing evidence. See In re Zilog, Inc., 450 F.3d at 1007; Renwick v. Bennett (In re298 F.3d 1059. Where litigation is commenced prepetition and is recommenced postpetition or postdischarge, the Ninth Circuit has set forth the standards to determine whether the continued prosecution of such litigation violates the discharge injunction of § 524(a)(2) in Boe-ing North American, Inc. v. Ybarra (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The ultimate question is 27a whether the discharged debtor has voluntarily \"re- turned to the fray\" in the renewed litigation. 143 F.3d 525.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.3d 1018",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Where litigation is commenced prepetition and is recommenced postpetition or postdischarge, the Ninth Circuit has set forth the standards to determine whether the continued prosecution of such litigation violates the discharge injunction of § 524(a)(2) in Boe-ing North American, Inc. v. Ybarra (In re424 F.3d 1018. The ultimate question is 27a whether the discharged debtor has voluntarily \"re- turned to the fray\" in the renewed litigation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In re Ybarra is the saga of a die-hard litigant who paid the ultimate price for her belief in her claims. Ms. Ybarra sued her former employer, Rockwell Interna- tional Corporation (\"Rockwell\"), originally in 1988.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 F.3d 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "1-2. Injunctions issuing from the core jurisdictional authority of the bankruptcy court are not subject to collateral attack in other courts. Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is such an injunction. However, the Ninth Circuit further has held that a state court is not divested of jurisdiction \"to deter- mine the applicability of a discharge order when dis- charge in bankruptcy is raised as a defense to a state cause of action filed in a state court . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "202 F.3d 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": ". .\" McGhan v. Rutz (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, a state court, such as the Circuit Court in this case, has concurrent jurisdiction with this court to interpret the bankruptcy court's dis- charge orders, but it has no authority to modify them. See In re McGhan, 288 F.3d at 1179-80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 F.3d 1172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "288 F.3d at 1181; In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1083-84. \"In short, the state court has jurisdiction to construe the bankruptcy discharge correctly, but not incorrectly.\" Pavelich v. McCormick Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, LLP (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Huse v. Huse-Sporsem, A.S. (In re300 B.R. 489. What the foregoing authorities do·not make clear is, in circumstances where the state court has applied the correct legal authority in interpreting this court's discharge order, what standard of review applies to the state court's fact findings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "229 B.R. 777",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "\"In short, the state court has jurisdiction to construe the bankruptcy discharge correctly, but not incorrectly.\" Pavelich v. McCormick Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, LLP (In re229 B.R. 777. See Huse v. Huse-Sporsem, A.S. (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What the foregoing authorities do·not make clear is, in circumstances where the state court has applied the correct legal authority in interpreting this court's discharge order, what standard of review applies to the state court's fact findings. Ordinarily, the stand- ard for review of a trial court's fact findings is \"clear error.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "300 B.R. 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "What the foregoing authorities do·not make clear is, in circumstances where the state court has applied the correct legal authority in interpreting this court's discharge order, what standard of review applies to the state court's fact findings. Ordinarily, the stand- ard for review of a trial court's fact findings is \"clear error.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re391 B.R. 25. There are important reasons behind that standard. The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority 31a of the trial judge's position to make determi- nations of credibility [although that superior- ity of position is important in itself].",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 F.3d 939",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": ". ra- ther than a 'tryout on the road.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For these reasons, review of factual findings under the clearly-erroneous standard - with its defer-ence to the trier of fact - is the rule, not the exception. 470 U.S. 564.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "433 U.S. 72. For these reasons, review of factual findings under the clearly-erroneous standard - with its defer-ence to the trier of fact - is the rule, not the exception. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\" 333 U.S. 364.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "470 U.S. 564. \"A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"This standard plainly does not entitle a re- viewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have de- cided the case differently.\" Anderson v. City of Besse- mer City, 470 U.S. at 573.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Review of \"mixed questions\" of law and fact requires consideration of legal princi- ples and the exercise of judgment about the values un- derlying those legal principles. Consequently, review is de novo. Wolkowitz v. Beverly (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In re Beverly and In re Bammer involved determinations regarding, respectively, a debtor's en- titlement to a general discharge and to the discharge- ability of a particular debt. This case involves yet an- other determination to be made with respect to the bankruptcy discharge: the application of the injunc- tion arising upon its entry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 B.R. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Accordingly, generally, a determination made pursuant to § 524(a)(2) also is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo re- view. De novo review requires that I consider a matter anew, independent of any prior decision, as if it had not been heard before. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; B-Real, LLC v. Chaussee (In re399 B.R. 225. Setting aside the Judgment and the Letter Opin- ion of the Circuit Court, the record reflects the follow- ing as to Mr. Taggart's participation in the Circuit Court Lawsuit postdischarge: When Mr. Brown subpoenaed Mr. Taggart for a second deposition in the Circuit Court Lawsuit, Mr. Taggart had Mr. Berman file a motion for a protective order, requesting that the subpoena be quashed and further requesting attorney's fees. One day before the Trial, Mr. Berman filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Tag- gart from the Circuit Court Lawsuit in Mr. Taggart's behalf, without offering to dismiss Mr. Taggart's coun- terclaim for attorney's fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.2d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Accordingly, generally, a determination made pursuant to § 524(a)(2) also is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo re- view. De novo review requires that I consider a matter anew, independent of any prior decision, as if it had not been heard before. 861 F.2d 571; B-Real, LLC v. Chaussee (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Setting aside the Judgment and the Letter Opin- ion of the Circuit Court, the record reflects the follow- ing as to Mr. Taggart's participation in the Circuit Court Lawsuit postdischarge: When Mr. Brown subpoenaed Mr. Taggart for a second deposition in the Circuit Court Lawsuit, Mr. Taggart had Mr. Berman file a motion for a protective order, requesting that the subpoena be quashed and further requesting attorney's fees. One day before the Trial, Mr. Berman filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Tag- gart from the Circuit Court Lawsuit in Mr. Taggart's behalf, without offering to dismiss Mr. Taggart's coun- terclaim for attorney's fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 B.R. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
		"context": "It is anathema to our constitutional system for legislative power to be wielded by an agency— especially by an independent one. An agency's 20 independence—its comparative lack of accountability and insulation from democratic oversight—must be premised on, indeed, conditional on, rigorous adherence to the law. The Court recently made clear that Humphrey's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the decision that blessed the FTC's independent structure, should be \"take[n] . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
		"context": ". . on its own terms,\" Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Humphrey's Executor stands on the assumption that the FTC is merely a \"legislative . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights",
		"context": "and, if no other damage is established, the party in- jured is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages.\" Webb , 29 F. Cas. at 507 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's cases addressing the significance of nominal damages affirm these common -law principles. In Memphis Communi ty School District , for example, this Court held that \"nominal damages, and not dam- ages based on some undefinable 'value' of infringed rights , are the appropriate means of 'vindicating ' rights \" when the deprivation does not cause compen- sable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights",
		"context": "Nominal damages also provide real , tangible re- dress . They involve a court judgment requiring real money to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in recognition of past wrongs . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 106–07 (injury is not redressed where civil fines are paid to the government rather than to the plaintiff). The resistance to recognizing that nominal damages provide redress arises from the fact that nominal dam- ages are small.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights",
		"context": "Farrar , 506 U.S. at 116 (O'Connor, J., concur- ring). And c ourts cannot refuse to decide cases they deem insufficiently significant. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1983 's mandatory text—which provides that state officers who deprive a person of his constitutional rights \" shall be liable to the party injured,\" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added) —is perfectly clear that courts have no discretion to carve out some sort of abstention doctrine based on judicial disdain for \"pa rties' right to a single dollar. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "19 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights",
		"context": "Other stand- ard measures of damages, such as damages for pain and suffering fr om a traumatic injury or damages for loss of consortium following the wrongful death of a spouse , likewise remedy harms that are impossible t o quantify in dollars and cents. Cf . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. N or could those measures of damages ever fully make up for the loss of a limb or of a loved one , any more than the payment of damages can fully recompense —other than by vindi- cating a person's rights —a constitutional injury. But that is no reason to find those damages awards mean- ingless or insufficient to support a live controversy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights",
		"context": "Constitu- tional rights are at least as valuable as the private rights protected by tort law. They are certainly \"worth a dollar.\" Sprint Commc' ns [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Petitioners' claim s for nominal damages for past vi- olations of their constitutional rights satisf y each of the re quirements for an Article III case or controversy. The violations inflicted actionable injuries ; the injuries were caused by respondents ; and they would be re- dressed by a n award of nominal damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": ", 49 So.3d 192 5; Bennett , 26 P.3d at 796-97 (\"party to a written contract may waive a provision of that contract by conduct\" and employer's promulgation of new policy requiring termination for cause unequivocally waived inconsistent at-will provision in plaintiff's employment contract); 706 N.E.2d 629. Or as the Virginia Supreme Court succinctly put it, \"intent is the essence of waiver.\" Stanley's Cafeteria, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contractual waivers frequently arise in the insurance context, where an insurer acts 5 Unless otherwise noted, all internal quotations are omitted. 20 inconsistently with an intent to enforce a contractual condition of coverage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 S.E.2d 870",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Contractual waivers frequently arise in the insurance context, where an insurer acts 5 Unless otherwise noted, all internal quotations are omitted. 20 inconsistently with an intent to enforce a contractual condition of coverage. For example, in U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the owner of a commercial building sought to recover on its insurance policy after a burglar stole electrical wiring from the building. The insurance company refused to pay for any of the damage to the building, arguing that the insured had breached the policy by failing to timely file a formal proof of loss. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 S.W.2d 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Other courts confronting similar facts have reached the same conclusion. 6 An ongoing course of conduct can also constitute a waiver of contractual terms and the rights they afford. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], upheld a jury's conclusion that a purchaser of cattle had waived his security interest in the animals when, over a five-year period, he inspected the herd, had reason to know that it was shrinking and that the farmer was selling cattle outside the terms of the 6 324 N.W.2d 302. 21 contract, yet renewed the contract anyway. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a construction contract case, finding waiver where \"the written terms\" of the contract, while \"clear,\" had been \"disregarded by the parties.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 N.W.2d 762",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Other courts confronting similar facts have reached the same conclusion. 6 An ongoing course of conduct can also constitute a waiver of contractual terms and the rights they afford. 396 N.W.2d 762, upheld a jury's conclusion that a purchaser of cattle had waived his security interest in the animals when, over a five-year period, he inspected the herd, had reason to know that it was shrinking and that the farmer was selling cattle outside the terms of the 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 contract, yet renewed the contract anyway. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a construction contract case, finding waiver where \"the written terms\" of the contract, while \"clear,\" had been \"disregarded by the parties.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "324 N.W.2d 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "21 contract, yet renewed the contract anyway. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a construction contract case, finding waiver where \"the written terms\" of the contract, while \"clear,\" had been \"disregarded by the parties.\" D. M. Holden, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And U.S. Pipeline , 930 N.W.2d at 480-81, held th at a natural gas company that had contracted with a pipeline construction company waived its right to claim liquidated damages for delay in the project's completion by requesting extra work after the completion date and failing to inform the pipeline company that it intended to enforce the liquidated damages provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 A.2d 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Pipeline , 930 N.W.2d at 480-81, held th at a natural gas company that had contracted with a pipeline construction company waived its right to claim liquidated damages for delay in the project's completion by requesting extra work after the completion date and failing to inform the pipeline company that it intended to enforce the liquidated damages provision. Even in contractual contexts closer to arbitration, involving provisions about alternative dispute resolution and forum selection, the laser focus remains on the waiving party's acts inconsistent with an intention to enforce the right at issue. See Windham Land [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 366 P.3d 577. 7 7 Russo pointed to earlier Arizona cases on waiver of the right to arbitrate in reaching its conclusion, noting that an agreement to arbitrate is \"a specialized kind of forum selection clause.\" 366 P.3d at 580 (quoting Scherk , 417 U.S. at 519).",
		"citation_value_orig": "967 A.2d 690",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Pipeline , 930 N.W.2d at 480-81, held th at a natural gas company that had contracted with a pipeline construction company waived its right to claim liquidated damages for delay in the project's completion by requesting extra work after the completion date and failing to inform the pipeline company that it intended to enforce the liquidated damages provision. Even in contractual contexts closer to arbitration, involving provisions about alternative dispute resolution and forum selection, the laser focus remains on the waiving party's acts inconsistent with an intention to enforce the right at issue. See Windham Land 967 A.2d 690; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 7 Russo pointed to earlier Arizona cases on waiver of the right to arbitrate in reaching its conclusion, noting that an agreement to arbitrate is \"a specialized kind of forum selection clause.\" 366 P.3d at 580 (quoting Scherk , 417 U.S. at 519).",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 P.3d 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "366 P.3d at 580 (quoting Scherk , 417 U.S. at 519). Those Footnote continued on next page 22 In state after state, court after court has emphasized that waiver of contractual rights is accomplished unilaterally. E.g., Best Place, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]80 Cal. App. 4th 666. According to the law of mo st states, waiver of a contractual term need not be supported by consideration 8 or another party's reliance.9 And once earlier Arizona cases did not include prejudice as an element of arbitration waiver. E.g., Bolo 464 P.2d 788.",
		"citation_value_orig": "920 P.2d 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "366 P.3d at 580 (quoting Scherk , 417 U.S. at 519). Those Footnote continued on next page 22 In state after state, court after court has emphasized that waiver of contractual rights is accomplished unilaterally. E.g., Best Place, 920 P.2d 334[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. According to the law of mo st states, waiver of a contractual term need not be supported by consideration 8 or another party's reliance.9 And once earlier Arizona cases did not include prejudice as an element of arbitration waiver. E.g., Bolo 464 P.2d 788.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 Cal. App. 4th 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "E.g., Best Place, 920 P.2d 33480 Cal. App. 4th 666. According to the law of mo st states, waiver of a contractual term need not be supported by consideration 8 or another party's reliance.9 And once earlier Arizona cases did not include prejudice as an element of arbitration waiver. E.g., Bolo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Arizona courts have since adopted the Ninth Circuit test for arbitration waiver, where prejudice is a necessary and in fact the \"most significant[]\" factor. Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 P.2d 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Sec. Alarm Fin. Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 E.g., Bennett , 26 P.3d at 796; In re327 N.W.2d 230; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty , 464 S.W.2d at 358; Alsens American, 118 N.E. at 210.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 P.3d 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "Alarm Fin. Enters., 398 P.3d 578. 8 E.g., Bennett , 26 P.3d at 796; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty , 464 S.W.2d at 358; Alsens American, 118 N.E. at 210. 9 E.g., Lafayette Car Wash, 282 N.E.2d 837; Salloum Foods & Liquor, In 388 N.E.2d 23; 66 S.E. 29, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 135 S.E.2d 496; Horne v. Radiological Footnote continued on next page 23 waived, most contractual rights can't be reinstated through retraction or revocation of the waiver.10 Finally, outside the arbitration context, prejudice is rarely mentioned when courts discuss waiver of contractual rights.11 Where the concept of prejudice does come up, it is usually to distinguish waiver— which does not require a showing of prejudice—from the related doctrines of laches and estoppel—which do.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 N.W.2d 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "8 E.g., Bennett , 26 P.3d at 796; In re327 N.W.2d 230; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty , 464 S.W.2d at 358; Alsens American, 118 N.E. at 210. 9 E.g., Lafayette Car Wash, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Salloum Foods & Liquor, In 388 N.E.2d 23; 66 S.E. 29, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 135 S.E.2d 496; Horne v. Radiological Footnote continued on next page 23 waived, most contractual rights can't be reinstated through retraction or revocation of the waiver.10 Finally, outside the arbitration context, prejudice is rarely mentioned when courts discuss waiver of contractual rights.11 Where the concept of prejudice does come up, it is usually to distinguish waiver— which does not require a showing of prejudice—from the related doctrines of laches and estoppel—which do. See Part I.B, infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 N.E.2d 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party",
		"context": "8 E.g., Bennett , 26 P.3d at 796; In re327 N.W.2d 230; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty , 464 S.W.2d at 358; Alsens American, 118 N.E. at 210. 9 E.g., Lafayette Car Wash, 282 N.E.2d 837; Salloum Foods & Liquor, In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 66 S.E. 29, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 135 S.E.2d 496; Horne v. Radiological Footnote continued on next page 23 waived, most contractual rights can't be reinstated through retraction or revocation of the waiver.10 Finally, outside the arbitration context, prejudice is rarely mentioned when courts discuss waiver of contractual rights.11 Where the concept of prejudice does come up, it is usually to distinguish waiver— which does not require a showing of prejudice—from the related doctrines of laches and estoppel—which do. See Part I.B, infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 N.E.2d 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": ". A state tax will survive scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause so long as it: \"(1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services the State provides.\" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 An analysis of the tax under the 3. In finding that the tax ran afoul of the Commerce Clause, the North Carolina Business Court held that the tax did not satisfy the first or fourth prong, and did not address the other two prongs. 22 Complete Auto Transit test shows that North Carolina's tax does not fulfill any of these requirements, much less all of them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": "22 Complete Auto Transit test shows that North Carolina's tax does not fulfill any of these requirements, much less all of them. The substantial nexus requirement commands that there be \"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.\" Miller Brothers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in the wake of Wayfair , Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to a Pennsylvania personal income tax upon non-resident taxpayers because the underlying entity derived its income from real property owned in Pennsylvania, which created a substantial nexus with the state. 196 A.3d 1090.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": "Miller Brothers 347 U.S. 340. For example, in the wake of Wayfair , Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to a Pennsylvania personal income tax upon non-resident taxpayers because the underlying entity derived its income from real property owned in Pennsylvania, which created a substantial nexus with the state. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The operative activity – Respondent accumulating undistributed income – and the taxpayer (the trustee) did not create a nexus with North Carolina, much less a substantial nexus. The trustee did not live or work in North Carolina, none of the income was earned in North Carolina, and the trust did not own any assets in North Carolina.",
		"citation_value_orig": "196 A.3d 1090",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": "This is not the case here, as North Carolina's tax is designed to capture all income earned by a trustee, regardless of whether the trustee used or profited from any of North Carolina's services.4 Nor is the tax fairly apportioned. This prong of the Complete Auto Transit test serves to \"ensure that each [s]tate taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.\" Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Doing so requires analyzing whether the tax is both internally consistent and externally consistent. Internal consistency is achieved \"when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by every other [s]tate would add no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": "This is a virtue of the test because it allows courts to distinguish between (1) tax schemes that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax policies of other [s]tates, and (2) tax schemes that create disparate incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and sometimes result in double taxation) only as a result of the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes. The first category of taxes is typically unconstitutional; the second is not. Comptroller of Maryland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If imposed nationwide, the North Carolina tax would discriminate against interstate commerce, as it would create double taxation upon any trust where the trustee resided in a state that taxed trust income, and a trust beneficiary, intentionally or not, resided in a different state.5 In some instances, this would be unavoidable. As an illustration, consider a testamentary trust where the trustee had absolute discretion over distributing trust income, and a minor beneficiary resided in another state, and since she was a minor, could not relocate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1787",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": "J.D. Adams Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 double taxation, and would be without recourse, as neither the trustee nor the beneficiary could relocate.6 This scheme would also create a sea change in trusts and estates practice for inter vivos trusts, as every time a beneficiary relocated to another state, grantors and trustees would be compelled to create a new trust (or decant a trust into a new trust) to avoid double taxation. Arguably, a trustee would be breaching its fiduciary duty if the trustee did not create a new trust (or decant).",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met",
		"context": "Jefferson Lines , 514 U.S. at 185; see also J.D. Adams Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Burden to Prove Threats and Retaliation Should Shift to the Private Association Only After the Government Has Satisfied Its Demanding Burden",
		"context": "But the Supreme Court has rejected requiring such proof to establish a facial infringement in a number of cases. See, e.g. , Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], quoting McIntyre , 514 U.S. at 341 - 342; accord Talley , 362 U.S. a t 69 (Clark, dissenting ). Evidence of harassment or retaliation should become relevant only in an as -applied challenge to a disclosure law that the government has justified facially. Even there, the government still should bear the burden of justifying t he as -applied burden.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Burden to Prove Threats and Retaliation Should Shift to the Private Association Only After the Government Has Satisfied Its Demanding Burden",
		"context": "at 64 - 68. A few years later, the Court returned to this privacy exception in Brown v. Socialist Worker s '74 Campaign Committee , which applied Buckley to a minor political party. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Were there any doubt, the Court's remand in Doe made clear that Buckley 's exception for as -applied challenges is available to all organizations – i.e., it is not merely limited to minority or dissident groups. 561 U.S. at 186 (applying the Buckley exception to a broad range of citizens).",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Burden to Prove Threats and Retaliation Should Shift to the Private Association Only After the Government Has Satisfied Its Demanding Burden",
		"context": "No one needs self -expression more. The Constitution protects them as it protects others. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That this reasonable evidentiary standard was applied in Buckley and Socialist Workers to campaign finance disclosure, the north star of compelled public exposure regimes, indicates that no more demanding evide ntiary standard should apply in other associational contexts such as presented by the Petitioners here. -31- In the District Courts below, Petitioners each presented copious and compelling evidence that its founders and funders faced death threats, public vilification, economic retaliation in the form of boycotts, and enough overall harassment so that its donor base was highly sensitive to exposure.",
		"citation_value_orig": "167 F.2d 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Indian water rights settlements",
		"context": "The Crow Reservation was established by the Treaty of May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, but in 1891 the reservation was diminished in exchange for funds to build an irriga- tion project for a portion of the remaining lands (the same irrigation project that has since fallen into disrepair). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Much of that water was then lost when the irrigated lands were allotted and sold out of tribal ownership. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The scientific literature has established that fertilization initiates a new human being.",
		"context": "17. This Court has recognized that human zygotes are organisms: \"[B]y common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood [Federation of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] being as an infant, a teenager,18 or an adult -- a human zygote is simply a human being in a different stage of its development. Scientific articles routinely advance this view as an uncontroversial and basic fact of biology:19 \"The life cycle of mammals begins when a sperm enters an egg\"20 and \"[f]ertilization is the sum of the cellular mechanisms that pass the genome from one generation to the next and initiate development of a new organism. \"21 at 971–972.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 F. Supp. 2d 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The scientific literature has established that fertilization initiates a new human being.",
		"context": "\"21 at 971–972. We do not understand this point to be contested by the parties.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18. Dr. Alfred Bongiovanni, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, in his testimony in connection with the 1981 hearing on Senate Bill 158, the \"Human Life Bill, see infra at 15-16, concluded, \"I am no more prepared to say that these early stages [of development in the womb] represent an incomplete human being than I would be to say that the child prior to the dramatic effects of puberty .",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Deprive State Legislatures of Their Authority to Provide for State Court Judicial Review of Congressional Election Regimes as Part of Their Prescribed Time, Place, and Manner Regulations",
		"context": "State court adjudication, while a form of check on the legal- ity of lawmaking, is not itself lawmaking. It is the ex- ercise of judicial power. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a state legislature authorizes st ate courts to act, it au- thorizes courts to exercise judicial rather than legisla- tive power. Such a grant of jurisdiction to engage in traditional judicial review is not a delegation of legis- lative power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Deprive State Legislatures of Their Authority to Provide for State Court Judicial Review of Congressional Election Regimes as Part of Their Prescribed Time, Place, and Manner Regulations",
		"context": "State legislatures and Congress are exercising legislative power when they make state election laws that govern federal elections or that override such laws, respectively. Yet neither state courts 17 regulations of federal elections. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (citing League of Women Voters of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Courts do not cease to act judicially when they inter- pret and apply general constitutional provisions such as \" 'free' or 'fair' election s\" or \"equal protection.\" Con- tra Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "172 So. 3d 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Deprive State Legislatures of Their Authority to Provide for State Court Judicial Review of Congressional Election Regimes as Part of Their Prescribed Time, Place, and Manner Regulations",
		"context": "56, 81-82 (2014 ) (\"Judicial review is based on the assumption that the courts have the power to decide cases and to give parties remedies that prevent or alleviate legally cognizable harms.\"). And this Court has already approved state courts' crafting of remedial redistricting plans for both congressional and state legislative districts. See Growe , 507 U.S. at 34 (in parallel proceedings, federal courts should defer to state courts' remedial redistricting plans); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (rejecting argument reviewing state election laws no r federal courts reviewing con- gressional enactments that override such laws are legislating. Both are exercising judicial power. 9 Significantly, this Court has frequently applied general fed- eral constitutional provisions while reviewing election regula-tions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Deprive State Legislatures of Their Authority to Provide for State Court Judicial Review of Congressional Election Regimes as Part of Their Prescribed Time, Place, and Manner Regulations",
		"context": "Both are exercising judicial power. 9 Significantly, this Court has frequently applied general fed- eral constitutional provisions while reviewing election regula-tions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": ". Payne v. Tennessee is perhaps the leading modern decision where the Court looked to several factors to 6 See also Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]491 U.S. 164; Continental T.V. 433 U.S. 36; 506 U.S. 461; Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877. 7 determine whether precedent is unsettled or settled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": ". Payne v. Tennessee is perhaps the leading modern decision where the Court looked to several factors to 6 See also Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067509 U.S. 86[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Continental T.V. 433 U.S. 36; 506 U.S. 461; Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877. 7 determine whether precedent is unsettled or settled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": "Payne v. Tennessee is perhaps the leading modern decision where the Court looked to several factors to 6 See also Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067509 U.S. 86491 U.S. 164; Continental T.V. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 506 U.S. 461; Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877. 7 determine whether precedent is unsettled or settled. There the Court observed why the two precedents overturned were unsettled: they \"were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": "Payne v. Tennessee is perhaps the leading modern decision where the Court looked to several factors to 6 See also Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067509 U.S. 86491 U.S. 164; Continental T.V. 433 U.S. 36; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877. 7 determine whether precedent is unsettled or settled. There the Court observed why the two precedents overturned were unsettled: they \"were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": "Payne v. Tennessee is perhaps the leading modern decision where the Court looked to several factors to 6 See also Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067509 U.S. 86491 U.S. 164; Continental T.V. 433 U.S. 36; 506 U.S. 461; Leegin Creative Leather Products, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 determine whether precedent is unsettled or settled. There the Court observed why the two precedents overturned were unsettled: they \"were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": "Intervening doctrinal developments may unsettle a precedent, 7 as well as the constant search for a new rationale for the precedent. 8 7 Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2460 ( Abood \"is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. \"); Gant , 556 U.S. at 358 (Alito, J., dissenting) (considering \"whether there has been an important change in circumstances in the outside world\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 See also Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2481 n.25 (\"the fact that [t]he rationale of [ Abood] does not withstand careful analysis is a reason to overrule it\" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Citizens 558 U.S. 310 (\"When neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent, the principle of adhering to that precedent 8",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED",
		"context": "8 7 Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2460 ( Abood \"is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. \"); Gant , 556 U.S. at 358 (Alito, J., dissenting) (considering \"whether there has been an important change in circumstances in the outside world\"); 521 U.S. 203. 8 See also Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2481 n.25 (\"the fact that [t]he rationale of [ Abood] does not withstand careful analysis is a reason to overrule it\" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"When neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent, the principle of adhering to that precedent 8",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. It Is Appropriate For The Court To Consider EU Domestic Law As It Pertains To Searches Of Data Stored In The European Union",
		"context": "3(5), 21(1); Case 52/69, Geigy v. Commission , ¶ 11, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73; Case C-366/10, Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Sec' y of State for Energy and Climate Change , ¶ 123, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864. The European Union understands this Court's precedents to embody similar principles via two canons of construction—the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the Charming Betsy canon— which each serve to mitigate the risk of conflict with foreign law and advance international comity. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (extraterritorial ity canon \"avoid[s] the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries,\" and \"the need to enforce the presumption is at its apex\" when there is a \"risk of conflict between [an] American statute and … foreign law\" (quotation marks omitted)); F. Hoffmann- La Roche [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Under Charming Betsy canon, a statute \"ought 8 never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any possible construction remains,\" and must be interpreted in light of \"principles of prescriptive comity\" that prohibit \"unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations\" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Insofar as these canons aim to avoid risks of conflict with foreign law, they may i nvite an inquiry into the content of foreign law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The context of the City's actions reveals impermissible hostility toward religion",
		"context": "This progression from one rationale to the next sug- gests that the City was not seeking to neutrally enforce existing, generally applicable law. Cf. Christian Legal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That inference is particu- larly strong here because the City eventually decided to add language to its future contracts, effectively conced- ing that its existing policies did not require Catholic So- cial Services to act in contravention of its religious be-liefs. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The context of the City's actions reveals impermissible hostility toward religion",
		"context": "At a minimum, it shows that Commissioner Figuero a relied on religious stereo- types to guide enforcement, assuming that religious or- ganizations are less likely to comply with the City's re- quirements than are secular organizations. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]508 U.S. 538 . When Catholic Social Services indicated that it intended to adhere to its religious beliefs , city of- ficials put in place a \"referral freeze.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 952",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The context of the City's actions reveals impermissible hostility toward religion",
		"context": "App. 15a, 33a. But as a city official exercising govern-mental power to decide whether Catholic Social Ser- vices could continue providing foster care in Philadel-phia, Commissioner Figueroa had no business \"pro- mot[ing] one religion or religious theory again st an- other,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , by attempting to persuade Catholic Social Services that its views on same -sex marriage were inconsistent with those attributed to Pope Francis and should therefore be changed . At a minimum, the comment s demonstrate impermissible hostility to religion when considered in the context of the other evidence of discrimination by the City. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The registration interpretation deprives copyright owners of important enforcement rights",
		"context": "§ 507. Accrual occurs when an infringement is discovered. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court held in Petrella that a copyright owner can only re cover damages for the three -year period leading up to suit. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The registration interpretation deprives copyright owners of important enforcement rights",
		"context": "Additionally, the delay caused by the registration interpretatio n could prevent a copyright owner from obtaining injunctive relief. Some courts have held that delay in seeking an injunction counters a finding of irreparable harm in the copyright context. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Accordingly, by requiring claimants to wait several months for a registration decision before 7 Sandra Edelman & Fara Sunderji, Delay in Filing Preliminary Injunction Motions: 2015 Edition , 105 THE TRADEMARK REPORTER 1012 (2015), http://www.inta.org/TMR /Documents/Volume%20105/TMR_Vol 105_No5_Edelman_Sunderji.pdf. 20 filing suit, the registration interpretation could prevent claimants from obtaining preliminary injunctive r elief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Race-Based Criteria, Such As Diversity, Is Inherently Unequal",
		"context": "ual. Indeed, the Court itself articulated equality of opportunity in its cases including [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There , it observed that educational \" opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. \" But all this went out the window with the introduction of affirmative action , followed by diversity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Race-Based Criteria, Such As Diversity, Is Inherently Unequal",
		"context": "There , it observed that educational \" opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. \" But all this went out the window with the introduction of affirmative action , followed by diversity . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , previously held \" separate but equal \" was constitutional. Today , \"diverse but equal \" is the rule. But a ccording to 347 U.S. 483 , the rule became \"separate is inherently unequal. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Race-Based Criteria, Such As Diversity, Is Inherently Unequal",
		"context": "163 U.S. 537 , previously held \" separate but equal \" was constitutional. Today , \"diverse but equal \" is the rule. But a ccording to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the rule became \"separate is inherently unequal. \" Amicus urge this C ourt to follow in Brown 's footsteps and declare \" diversity is inherently unequal. \" In essence, affirmative action and diversity mean that \"people who control access to important social resources [should] offer preferential access to those resources for particular groups that they think need special treatment \", especially racially defined groups.17 However, affirmative action at least was always defended as a short term remedy, as a temporary expedient to be continued only until the favored groups can achieve ... what?",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Theory Is Inconsistent With This Court's Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "It is not only NLRA precedents that are in conflict with Petitioners' theory. This Court's Takings Clause precedents likewise are in conflict with that theory. Prun eYard Shopping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is the most relevant precedent in this regard. The central question in PruneYard was whether state constitutional provisions that permitted individ- uals to enter and remain on the grounds of a privately - owned shopping center , over the owner's objection , for the purpose of engaging in peaceful speech and peti- tioning activity during business hours violated the federal constitution's Takings C lause. The Court unanimously answered that question in the negative .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Theory Is Inconsistent With This Court's Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "The fact that the shopping center owner in Prune- Yard allowed on the property those members of the public who were there for other purposes , including shopping, dining , strolling, or working for one of the mall's stores, does not detract from the reality that the state constitutional provisions challenged in that case required the owner to allow, over his objection, addi- tional persons to enter onto the property for additional purpos es, including soliciting others on the property to sign petitions. O n Petitioners' definition, that is an \"easement in gross\" and is no different, in property -law terms, from the access here. Furthermore, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court explained that the provisions challenged in Prune- Yard did not trigger per se analysis because , inter alia, (i) they did not grant \"permanent access\" to the 18 petition circulators and other beneficiaries of the ac- cess gra nt but only access during business hours when other third parties were already on the property; and (ii) they did not grant a \"classic right -of-way ease- ment\" but only access to the shopping center's general grounds rather than some dedicated strip of land or delineated pathway that the access holder could rec- ord on a map and claim a specific right to possess. The same is true of the ALRB regulations challenged here. Nothing in them requires the employer/landowner to dedicate any particular portion of its la nd to union or- ganizing; the employer can choose from time to time where its employees may congregate and eat lunch and thereby determine for itself where the organizer access is to occur.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Theory Is Inconsistent With This Court's Takings Jurisprudence",
		"context": "The same is true of the ALRB regulations challenged here. Nothing in them requires the employer/landowner to dedicate any particular portion of its la nd to union or- ganizing; the employer can choose from time to time where its employees may congregate and eat lunch and thereby determine for itself where the organizer access is to occur. It should come as no surprise, then, that when this Court held in Lo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that the permanent installation of cable boxes on the roofs of apartment owners were \"per se\" takings , it distinguished both its PruneYard decision and its NLRA access decisions on the same g round: namely, that access rights accorded to those who wish to enter another's property to com- municate with third parties already invited on the property during the times of day those third parties are present are not akin to permanent physical occu- pation s or permanent invasions that qualify as per se takings. Id. at 434 & n.11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "8 \"The State distinguishes betw een business income, which it apportions between it and other States for tax purposes, and nonbusiness income, which it genera lly allocates to a single State on the basis of commercial domicile.\" F.W. Woolworth [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 to the Due Process Clause. In another case involving North Carolina, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. 915, this Court specifically reined in the State when it attempted to assert general jurisdiction because the defendant's connection with the State was too limited.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 354",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "Woolworth 458 U.S. 354. 8 to the Due Process Clause. In another case involving North Carolina, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court specifically reined in the State when it attempted to assert general jurisdiction because the defendant's connection with the State was too limited. While the case dealt with a tragic bus accident involving a North Carolina youth playing soccer in France, this Court unanimously held the petitioners lacked \"continuous and systematic general business contacts\" requisite for North Carolina to entertain a suit that was unrelated to the contacts th e petitioners had with the State. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "While the case dealt with a tragic bus accident involving a North Carolina youth playing soccer in France, this Court unanimously held the petitioners lacked \"continuous and systematic general business contacts\" requisite for North Carolina to entertain a suit that was unrelated to the contacts th e petitioners had with the State. Id. at 928 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The North Carolina Departm ent of Revenue appears to, yet again, be pushing the boundaries of the State's jurisdictional reach over no n-domiciled entities, and in doing so, is relying on the \"stream-of-commerce\" theory that this Court rejected in Goodyear Dunlop . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "Where the trust 9 conducts business is a \"pu rposeful activity\" of the trust; the domicile of the beneficiaries is not, however, something a trust can directly control and does not demonstrate that the trust purposely availed itself to conduct business in North Carolina. 9 In 2014, this Court further clarified the issue of general jurisdiction, which is relevant to general tax jurisdiction, in two cases. The Court in Daimler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], justifiably expressed concerns relating to California's assertion of general jurisdiction over a foreign entity with very limited activity in the State. See Daimler AG , 571 U.S. at 139. The Court noted that if California had general juris- diction over such an entity, then so would practically every other state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "\"Such exorbitant exercises of all- purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurances as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.\" Id. at 139 (citing Burger King [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same holds true for the autho rity for a state and its local jurisdictions to have broad taxing authority over an entity, absent specific tax jurisdiction, that should be limited to an entity's home state location. This Court also decided 571 U.S. 277, which limits a state's general tax jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "at 139 (citing Burger King 471 U.S. 462. The same holds true for the autho rity for a state and its local jurisdictions to have broad taxing authority over an entity, absent specific tax jurisdiction, that should be limited to an entity's home state location. This Court also decided [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which limits a state's general tax jurisdiction. Citing Burger King , the Court noted that \"the relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.\" 9 See J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. 873.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "This Court also decided 571 U.S. 277, which limits a state's general tax jurisdiction. Citing Burger King , the Court noted that \"the relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.\" 9 See J. McIntyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"At no time did petitioner engage in any activities in New J e r s e y t h a t r e v e a l a n i n t e n t t o i n v o k e o r b e n e f i t f r o m t h e protection of its laws.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile",
		"context": "In this case, the activities of a current beneficiary are being used inappropriately to assert that the trust, which is a separate legal entity, has sufficient contacts with North Carolina to be subject to the State's genera l jurisdiction. As noted in Helicopteros, \"[the] unilateral activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.\" Helicopteros , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the beneficiary's residency is undisputed and the beneficiary clearly benefited from protections provided by the state of North Carolina, the trust, as a separate legal entity from the benefici ary, reaped no benefits or protections from the State. This Court would greatly enhance the understand- ing of Due Process Clause limitations for state and local taxes by making it clear that general tax jurisdiction is restricted to the location where a taxpayer is domiciled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "8. A \"pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy\" because at some point a State can determine that \"another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.\"",
		"context": "If no one can or does know when life begins, then the Court cannot and does not know whether the fetus (at conception or some other point) is an actual or potential human life. To claim otherwise leaves one to wonder along with Chief Justice Roberts in Obergefell , \"[j]ust who do we think we are?\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, much of what the Chief Justice said in Obergefell applies to Roe's analysis of abortion: The majority's decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court's precedent….",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "8. A \"pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy\" because at some point a State can determine that \"another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.\"",
		"context": "at 687-88 (citations omitted). The vibrant debate over abortion has remained despite Roe's 21 constitutionalizing the issue, with States continuing to enact abortion regulations that test the limits of this Court's fractured and confusing abortion precedents. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 S.Ct. 2103 (\"I joined the dissent in Whole Woman's Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided.\"). In addition, outside the abortion context, many States have expanded the protections afforded prenatal human life, moving away from viability toward a broader recognition of the humanity of the fetus. See 97 So.3d 728.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "8. A \"pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy\" because at some point a State can determine that \"another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.\"",
		"context": "at 687-88 (citations omitted). The vibrant debate over abortion has remained despite Roe's 21 constitutionalizing the issue, with States continuing to enact abortion regulations that test the limits of this Court's fractured and confusing abortion precedents. Compare 550 U.S. 124[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"I joined the dissent in Whole Woman's Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided.\"). In addition, outside the abortion context, many States have expanded the protections afforded prenatal human life, moving away from viability toward a broader recognition of the humanity of the fetus. See 97 So.3d 728.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority",
		"context": "Cy pres awards should not be used when the funds recovered from the defendants can be effectively deliv- ered to class members. Courts should scrutinize these 23 closely, which indeed numer ous federal courts have done. Examples include: the Second Circuit in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir.2007) (noting it appeared the district court was not aware that it could allocate excess funds to class members as treble damages); and the Seventh Circuit in Pearson v. NBTY , No.11-07972, Dkt. 213-1 ¶¶7-8 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2015) (renegotiated cy pres to give class members $4 million more). These examples are the exception rather than the rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 F.3d 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority",
		"context": "If this is not possible, but class me mbers can be sent checks, this should constitute an acceptable method of distri-bution provided the transaction costs are not greater than the settlement. On the other hand, virtually all Circuits have cor- rectly recognized that distribution to class members should not result in a wind fall to members who have submitted claims and alread y been fully compensated. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st Cir.2012); Klier , 658 F.3d at 475. See Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Dis tributions in Parens Pa- triae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys Gen- eral, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 361,393 (1999).",
		"citation_value_orig": "677 F.3d 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Tax Court Needlessly Expends Considerable Judicial Resources Each Month Incorrectly Policing Petition Filing Deadlines as a Jurisdictional Issue",
		"context": "Circuit, which, under § 7482(b)(1) (flush language), hears all appe als of Tax Court whistleblower award actions under § 7623(b)(4), has overruled the Tax Court and held that the filing deadline for such an action is not jurisdic-tional and is subject to equitable tolling under this Court's recent authority. Myers v. Commissioner , supra . Under its opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]445 F.2d 985, the Tax Court follows the precedent of the Circuit to which a case is appealable, even if the Tax Court disagrees with that precedent. Also, Congress, at § 7345(e)(1), recently gave the Ta x Court jurisdiction to review the IRS' certification to the Department of State that an individ-ual taxpayer has \"seriously delinquent tax debt,\" which triggers passport revocation. Passport actions brought by taxpayers are similarly all appealable from the Tax Court only to the D.C. Cir- cuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 T.C. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Tax Court Needlessly Expends Considerable Judicial Resources Each Month Incorrectly Policing Petition Filing Deadlines as a Jurisdictional Issue",
		"context": "Circuit, which, under § 7482(b)(1) (flush language), hears all appe als of Tax Court whistleblower award actions under § 7623(b)(4), has overruled the Tax Court and held that the filing deadline for such an action is not jurisdic-tional and is subject to equitable tolling under this Court's recent authority. Myers v. Commissioner , supra . Under its opinion in 54 T.C. 742[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Tax Court follows the precedent of the Circuit to which a case is appealable, even if the Tax Court disagrees with that precedent. Also, Congress, at § 7345(e)(1), recently gave the Ta x Court jurisdiction to review the IRS' certification to the Department of State that an individ-ual taxpayer has \"seriously delinquent tax debt,\" which triggers passport revocation. Passport actions brought by taxpayers are similarly all appealable from the Tax Court only to the D.C. Cir- cuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 F.2d 985",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Tax Court Needlessly Expends Considerable Judicial Resources Each Month Incorrectly Policing Petition Filing Deadlines as a Jurisdictional Issue",
		"context": "The prohibition is absolute. The parties can-not waive it, nor can a court extend that deadline for equitable reasons.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Every month, the Tax Court dismisses multiple cases only because the court's filing deadlines are cur- rently treated as jurisdictional and so the Tax Court judges, sua sponte , police late filing. The court's posi- tion that filing deadlines are jurisdictional necessi- tates that judges examine th e files in every case for late filing – the judges not being able merely to rely on the IRS to raise all late filing issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Tax Court Needlessly Expends Considerable Judicial Resources Each Month Incorrectly Policing Petition Filing Deadlines as a Jurisdictional Issue",
		"context": "24954-17 (dated Jan. 26, 2018) (a deficiency ac-tion). A further example of overuse of judicial resources is where the IRS agrees with the taxpayer that a peti- tion was timely filed, but the Tax Court takes the time to disagree. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2015 T.C. Memo. 188, the parties initially disputed whether a deficiency pe- tition had been timely filed under the rules of § 7502. Section 7502 provides a timely-mailing-is-timely-filing rule applicable to Tax Court petitions. The initial dis- pute concerned which regulatory provision applied to the case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 882",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "Although the more general —and equally pro - arbitration —text of Section 2 ultimately supplies the same answer, see infra Part II, there is no need to look beyond Section 3, which specifically addresses the question and provides clear direction: E nter a stay absent default. \"It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 183-88 (2012) . That is particularly true where, as here, \"Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.\" RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ; see also Int'l Paper 479 U.S. 481.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "504 U.S. 374 ; accord Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 183-88 (2012) . That is particularly true where, as here, \"Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.\" RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Int'l Paper 479 U.S. 481. Congress \"deliberately targeted\" the specific question of when to stay litigation in favor of a valid arbitration agreement in Section 3, and it provided the \"speci fic solution[]\" of directing courts to stay litigation unless the party seeking t o arbitrate is \"in default.\" Section 2, by contrast, deals with the distinct question of whether the arbitration agreement itself is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "504 U.S. 374 ; accord Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 183-88 (2012) . That is particularly true where, as here, \"Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.\" RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ; see also Int'l Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress \"deliberately targeted\" the specific question of when to stay litigation in favor of a valid arbitration agreement in Section 3, and it provided the \"speci fic solution[]\" of directing courts to stay litigation unless the party seeking t o arbitrate is \"in default.\" Section 2, by contrast, deals with the distinct question of whether the arbitration agreement itself is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "Thus, Section 3 provides both the mos t specific and the most apposite basis on which to decide whether Sundance waited or litigated too long before seeking to stay this litigation in favor of agreed -upon arbitration. 17 Consistent with that understanding, this Court has previously resolved a lit igation -conduct -grounded objection to a Section -3 stay application by reference to Section 3 and its \"in default\" standard, not by reference to state- law contract defenses saved by Section 2. See Shanferoke Coal & Supply [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So too has every court of appeals —not just \"some\" or \"several\" of them, Pet'r.Br.15, 38. While most modern cases now cite established circuit precedent without referencing any specific FAA provision, every circuit's test can be traced back to an earlier case that recogni zed Section 3 as controlling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "293 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "So too has every court of appeals —not just \"some\" or \"several\" of them, Pet'r.Br.15, 38. While most modern cases now cite established circuit precedent without referencing any specific FAA provision, every circuit's test can be traced back to an earlier case that recogni zed Section 3 as controlling. The decision below, for example, does not cite any specific FAA section, but circuit precedent traces back to N & D Fashions, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which expressly invoked Section 3. Id. at 728.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 F.2d 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "at 728. The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "at 728. The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 F.3d 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "at 728. The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 F.2d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "at 728. The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date.",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F.2d 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "at 728. The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 F.3d 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date. Not only is it sound as a matter of statutory construction, but treating this litigation -conduct -based defense as governed by Section 3 and its stay -absent -default rule has the considerable virtue of ensuring a uniform federal standard that does not turn on the vagaries of any one state's contract law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "712 F.2d 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date. Not only is it sound as a matter of statutory construction, but treating this litigation -conduct -based defense as governed by Section 3 and its stay -absent -default rule has the considerable virtue of ensuring a uniform federal standard that does not turn on the vagaries of any one state's contract law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F.2d 1328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date. Not only is it sound as a matter of statutory construction, but treating this litigation -conduct -based defense as governed by Section 3 and its stay -absent -default rule has the considerable virtue of ensuring a uniform federal standard that does not turn on the vagaries of any one state's contract law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 1287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d 919 . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date. Not only is it sound as a matter of statutory construction, but treating this litigation -conduct -based defense as governed by Section 3 and its stay -absent -default rule has the considerable virtue of ensuring a uniform federal standard that does not turn on the vagaries of any one state's contract law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 F.3d 1309",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default",
		"context": "The s tory is the same in every other circuit. 2 2 See 402 F.3d 1 ; Shanferoke Coal, 70 F.2d at 299; 482 F.3d 207 ; Carolina Throwing 442 F.2d 329 ; Tenneco Resins, 770 F.2d 416 ; JPD, 539 F.3d 388 ; Ohio -Sealy Mattress Mfg. 712 F.2d 270 ; Shinto Shipping 572 F.2d 1328 ; Legal Servs., 786 F.3d 1287 ; Ivax 286 F.3d 1309 ; Zuckerman Spaeder, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 18 Morgan identifies no reason to depart from that long-settled consensus at this late date. Not only is it sound as a matter of statutory construction, but treating this litigation -conduct -based defense as governed by Section 3 and its stay -absent -default rule has the considerable virtue of ensuring a uniform federal standard that does not turn on the vagaries of any one state's contract law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation",
		"context": "If FWS wants to conscript Unit 1 into frog habitat and translocate the frog there, Section 5 provides the 41 appropriate mechanism—not a critical habitat designation that imposes all the costs for creating a new frog preserve on private landowners. And as Judge Mikva recognized in Sweet Home , Section 5 \"suggests a type of intervention more complex and proactive than simply forbidding certain activities on private lands,\" and \"[f]ederal wildlife managers can surely do more to help such species on government-owned and controlled preserves than they could ever accomplish on private lands.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FWS has agreements with most States and provided $56 million in federal funding in FY2016. Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund Grants 1 (Sept. 2016), perma.cc/4DWV-68U2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation",
		"context": "And unless the experimental population is \"essential to the continued existence of a species\"—which FWS never seems to have found— Section 10(j) prohibits the designation of that land as \"critical habitat.\" Id. § 1539(j)(2)(C)(ii); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress added Section 10(j) in 1982 to \"'encourage private parties to host such populations.'\" Id.at 705.",
		"citation_value_orig": "611 F.3d 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation",
		"context": "16 U.S.C. § 1532(3); e.g., Calf Island Cmty. Trust, Inc. v.Young Mens Christian Ass'n of Greenwich , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any of these tools is more equitable to a private landowner than critical habitat designation. That is especially so when the designation costs the landowner $20 to $34 million in lost development value for a species that was last seen on the land before the ESA's enactment and that cannot live there now.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F.Supp.2d 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation",
		"context": "Koontz v.St. Johns River Water Management Dist. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet there is no guarantee that the landowners will agree to being strong-armed out of 60 percent of their land. They could instead forego CWA permitting or other federal involvement and continue to operate Unit 1 as a commercial forest, with no benefit to the frog.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 560 U.S. 258 ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; 535 U.S. 625 ; 520 U.S. 461 ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1060",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; 535 U.S. 625 ; 520 U.S. 461 ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; 560 U.S. 258 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; 535 U.S. 625 ; 520 U.S. 461 ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; 560 U.S. 258 ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 535 U.S. 625 ; 520 U.S. 461 ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; 560 U.S. 258 ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 520 U.S. 461 ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; 560 U.S. 258 ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; 535 U.S. 625 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "1. As explained in the Petition (at 21 –22), this case is an ideal vehicle : Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legal error; the 1 See, e.g. , 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; 560 U.S. 258 ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; 535 U.S. 625 ; 520 U.S. 461 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg 569 U.S. 383 and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": ", 141 S. Ct. 2090 (deciding jointly two separate plain -error cases ); 140 S. Ct. 1060 ; 560 U.S. 258 ; 556 U.S. 129 ; United St 542 U.S. 74 ; 535 U.S. 625 ; 520 U.S. 461 ; 507 U.S. 725 . The Court also frequently addresses the stringent \"miscarriage of justi ce\" exception to procedural bars. See McQuigg [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and so was subject to Rule 60(c)(1) 's one -year deadline; and neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit denied rel ief on any alternative ground. Thus, this case squarely presents and implicates the question dividing the circuits. Notably, the government does not argue otherwise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "BIO 11, 27–30. But, as the government ac knowledges (see BIO 7 –10), the lower courts did not address those merits arguments , and so they are not before this Court . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], they do not risk obstructing this Court's review of the question presented . And t his Court routinely overrules similar vehicle objections , granting review to resolve threshold issues notwithstanding unresolved issues that would need to be addressed on remand.2 Even more telling, this Court granted review in Gonzalez to resolve the 2 See, e.g. , BIO 9 –10, 28 –29, 141 S. Ct. 18582020 WL 99095082017 WL 3053629 relief was not warranted in that very case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "9a. At minimum, then , they are not \"frivolous.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That determination should suffice for present purposes . There is no space here to re-litigate his nine claims , which stem from a 21 -day trial and compl ex sentencing , and which have no bearing on the Rule 60(b) question here.3 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Iskanian Rule Is Plainly Wrong",
		"context": "There is thus no sense in which PA GA claims should be re- garded as belonging to the State, nor is there any way that an employee's bilate ral arbitration agreement could frustrate the State's interest in actually enforc- ing its laws. In this regard, the California Supreme Court seems to have taken the exact opposite of the right lesson from this Court's decision in EEOC v. Waf- fle House, Inc. , which holds only that a public enforcer can prosecute a claim against an employer itself even when the underlying employee claim is subject to a bi- lateral arbitration agreem ent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead of being a claim belonging to the State and prosecuted by the employee as a state agent, a PAGA \"claim\" is better understood as a procedural mecha- nism that the State offers to aggrieved employees in exchange for a bounty: Assuming the State passes on its own right of first refu sal, employees can litigate claims otherwise belonging to themselves and others as representative claims so long as they send 75 percent of the returns to the State. That mechanism offends the FAA twice over because it allows the employee to avoid not only their own arbitration agreement but po- tentially the arbitration agreements of all the other implicated employees as we ll, without the direct in- volvement of any state acto r whatsoever.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Iskanian Rule Is Plainly Wrong",
		"context": "4 Instead, this is just the \"straightforward\" situation where \"state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim,\" and so \"[t]he conf licting rule is displaced by the FAA.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Concepcion 's holding that state laws re- quiring classwide dispute resolution \"stand as an ob-stacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives,\" id. at 343, thus helps to clarify the problem with Is- kanian , but is not even necessary to invalidate it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.",
		"context": "The Federal Circuit applied the same enablement requirement that it and its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have required of patents for more than 50 years: to enable the full scope of the invention they claim. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 516 F.3d 993 (no enablement where claims encompassed video games and movies but enabled only video games because \"'[t]he scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement' to 'ensure[ ] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims '\") (quoting Nat'l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d 1190). More than thirty years ago, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims of another Amgen patent based on the same reasoning. There, the claims broadly recited an entire category of biological matter (genes encoding the protein erythropoietin), but the specification only described a handful of exemplary gene sequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 F.2d 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.",
		"context": "The Federal Circuit applied the same enablement requirement that it and its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have required of patents for more than 50 years: to enable the full scope of the invention they claim. See,427 F.2d 833; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (no enablement where claims encompassed video games and movies but enabled only video games because \"'[t]he scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement' to 'ensure[ ] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims '\") (quoting Nat'l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d 1190). More than thirty years ago, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims of another Amgen patent based on the same reasoning. There, the claims broadly recited an entire category of biological matter (genes encoding the protein erythropoietin), but the specification only described a handful of exemplary gene sequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 F.3d 993",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.",
		"context": "The Federal Circuit applied the same enablement requirement that it and its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have required of patents for more than 50 years: to enable the full scope of the invention they claim. See,427 F.2d 833; 516 F.3d 993 (no enablement where claims encompassed video games and movies but enabled only video games because \"'[t]he scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement' to 'ensure[ ] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims '\") (quoting Nat'l Recovery Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). More than thirty years ago, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims of another Amgen patent based on the same reasoning. There, the claims broadly recited an entire category of biological matter (genes encoding the protein erythropoietin), but the specification only described a handful of exemplary gene sequences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 F.3d 1190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.",
		"context": "More than thirty years ago, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims of another Amgen patent based on the same reasoning. There, the claims broadly recited an entire category of biological matter (genes encoding the protein erythropoietin), but the specification only described a handful of exemplary gene sequences. See Amgen, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Circuit explained that the narrow disclosures did not enable the broad functional claim. \"There may be many other genetic sequences that code for EPO-type products.",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.2d 1200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.",
		"context": "at 1213 –14. Those decisions are faithful to this Court's precedents. For example, in Holland Furniture [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held a patent invalid for failing to enable a broad functional claim, just as the Federal Circuit did in this case. In Holland, the patentee claimed a glue made of a starch ingredient \"having substantially the properties of animal glue.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.",
		"context": "These changes suggest the patent system is functioning properly. After all, \"[h]e who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long path to tread before reaching the Patent Office.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 https://ssrn.com/abstract=4032912 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. What the Federal Circuit Thought the Appointments Clause Requires, This Court's Justices Have Vigorously Denounced",
		"context": "1667, 1678–80 (2019). A pre–inter partes review example of panel stacking occurred in 1992, relating to rejection of a patent application. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]868 F.3d 1013138 S. Ct. 1365. 25 denied due process.80Judge Wallach of the Federal Circuit questioned whether panel stacking ran afoul of \"fundamental rule of law questions\" such as \"neutrality of decision makers,\"81and other commentators have criticized how \"the ostensibly neutral and independent adjudicatory process\" of inter partes review is now \"much more beholden to the agency's political hierarchy\" due to panel stacking.82 The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the Appoint- ments Clause essentially demands panel stacking to the extreme. The two powers that the Federal Circuit weighed most heavily, direct authority to reverse Board decisions and removal power over administrative patent judges, would have far more influence over patentability outcomes than adding members to panels until the out- come shifts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "33 F.3d 1526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. What the Federal Circuit Thought the Appointments Clause Requires, This Court's Justices Have Vigorously Denounced",
		"context": "1667, 1678–80 (2019). A pre–inter partes review example of panel stacking occurred in 1992, relating to rejection of a patent application. See In re33 F.3d 1526[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]138 S. Ct. 1365. 25 denied due process.80Judge Wallach of the Federal Circuit questioned whether panel stacking ran afoul of \"fundamental rule of law questions\" such as \"neutrality of decision makers,\"81and other commentators have criticized how \"the ostensibly neutral and independent adjudicatory process\" of inter partes review is now \"much more beholden to the agency's political hierarchy\" due to panel stacking.82 The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the Appoint- ments Clause essentially demands panel stacking to the extreme. The two powers that the Federal Circuit weighed most heavily, direct authority to reverse Board decisions and removal power over administrative patent judges, would have far more influence over patentability outcomes than adding members to panels until the out- come shifts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. What the Federal Circuit Thought the Appointments Clause Requires, This Court's Justices Have Vigorously Denounced",
		"context": "1667, 1678–80 (2019). A pre–inter partes review example of panel stacking occurred in 1992, relating to rejection of a patent application. See In re33 F.3d 1526868 F.3d 1013[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 denied due process.80Judge Wallach of the Federal Circuit questioned whether panel stacking ran afoul of \"fundamental rule of law questions\" such as \"neutrality of decision makers,\"81and other commentators have criticized how \"the ostensibly neutral and independent adjudicatory process\" of inter partes review is now \"much more beholden to the agency's political hierarchy\" due to panel stacking.82 The Federal Circuit's interpretation of the Appoint- ments Clause essentially demands panel stacking to the extreme. The two powers that the Federal Circuit weighed most heavily, direct authority to reverse Board decisions and removal power over administrative patent judges, would have far more influence over patentability outcomes than adding members to panels until the out- come shifts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. What the Federal Circuit Thought the Appointments Clause Requires, This Court's Justices Have Vigorously Denounced",
		"context": "To the extent that panel stacking sounds im- proper, there is greater impropriety in what the Federal Circuit thought the Appointments Clause demands. Given that it is settled that the Board may consti- tutionally adjudicate patentability disputes,83one would think it preferable to make that body as objective and impartial—like Article III judges—as possible. There is no reason to read the Appointments Clause as the 80SeeTranscript of Argument at 32–33, OilStates , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],reproducedin Vishnubhakat, supranote 76, at 1681. 82Vishnubhakat, supranote 76, at 1684; seeChristopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication , 107CAL. L. REV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Text of Section 1981 Does Not Require But-For Causation",
		"context": "This Court ha s held that it is these words that create a requirement for a plaintiff to allege and prove but-for causation. Gross , 557 U.S. at 176-77; Nassar , 570 U.S. at 350; see also Safeco Ins. Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Gross , this Court held that but-for causation, and not the Price Waterhouse burden shifting frame- work, applied to disparate treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Text of Section 1981 Does Not Require But-For Causation",
		"context": "36. The decisions cited by Comcast used the phrase \"solely because of \" not to describe the appropriate cau- sation standard, but rather to describe what the evi- dence showed in those cases: that the contract or property rights at issue were impaired solely because of race. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Jones , 392 U.S. at 409 (reversing the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that African Americans were denied housing solely because of race). 34 The language quoted by Comcast is taken out of the context of the decisions; not one of the cases it cites considered whether but-for causation is required un- der section 1981.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "By definition, preemption is focused upon congressional power vis-a-vis the States. Actingpursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the federalgovernment may invalidate particular state lawsthrough legislation, regulation, or otherwise. See generally Oneok, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 135 S. Ct. 1378. But, owing to thesovereign interests of federal and state governments,this Court has started with the presumption thatCongress does not intend to supplant state law, see New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue 514 U.S. 645, especially when such a rule would undermine thehistoric police powers of the States, 505 U.S. 504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "By definition, preemption is focused upon congressional power vis-a-vis the States. Actingpursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the federalgovernment may invalidate particular state lawsthrough legislation, regulation, or otherwise. See generally Oneok, 135 S. Ct. 1591; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But, owing to thesovereign interests of federal and state governments,this Court has started with the presumption thatCongress does not intend to supplant state law, see New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue 514 U.S. 645, especially when such a rule would undermine thehistoric police powers of the States, 505 U.S. 504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1378",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "See generally Oneok, 135 S. Ct. 1591; accord 135 S. Ct. 1378. But, owing to thesovereign interests of federal and state governments,this Court has started with the presumption thatCongress does not intend to supplant state law, see New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], especially when such a rule would undermine thehistoric police powers of the States, 505 U.S. 504. This Court has frequently admonished lower courts not to broadly read preemptive statements into federallaws given the unique sovereignty concerns that areimplicated by express preemption. See CTS 134 S. Ct. 2175.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "See generally Oneok, 135 S. Ct. 1591; accord 135 S. Ct. 1378. But, owing to thesovereign interests of federal and state governments,this Court has started with the presumption thatCongress does not intend to supplant state law, see New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue 514 U.S. 645, especially when such a rule would undermine thehistoric police powers of the States, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has frequently admonished lower courts not to broadly read preemptive statements into federallaws given the unique sovereignty concerns that areimplicated by express preemption. See CTS 134 S. Ct. 2175.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "of Blue Cross & Blue 514 U.S. 645, especially when such a rule would undermine thehistoric police powers of the States, 505 U.S. 504. This Court has frequently admonished lower courts not to broadly read preemptive statements into federallaws given the unique sovereignty concerns that areimplicated by express preemption. See CTS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Kansas Supreme Court did not heed this Court'sadmonitions. Thus, the unique and unexpected decisionbelow necessarily begs the question whether Congressintended to extinguish the traditional police power ofthe State of Kansas and, if Congress did so intend, then 8 whether the federal Constitution grants Congress power to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "Thus, the unique and unexpected decisionbelow necessarily begs the question whether Congressintended to extinguish the traditional police power ofthe State of Kansas and, if Congress did so intend, then 8 whether the federal Constitution grants Congress power to do so. See id. (recognizing courts should accept the reading of the statute that disfavors preemption);see also CSX Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , Respondents cite a newspaper article that quotes after-the-fact, extra-judicial comments of a stateofficial who has no involvement with this case toinsinuate that these local prosecutions were adisguised form of immigration enforcement. See , e.g., Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "Nonsense. Such assertions have nobearing upon the viability of a Kansas statute or theprosecutions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For purposes of Kansas's identity theft statute, it matters not one whit whether the offender is legallypresent or authorized to work. A citizen or legal alienwho steals someone else's personal identifyinginformation and uses it on documents such as a statetax form, lease, or credit application would be just asguilty of identity theft as an undocumented alien who does so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "See , e.g., 2013 WL 3868066; 2012 WL 5973917. This happens statewide, even inthe county where Respondents were convicted. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, it is not necessarily surprising that those without valid social security numbers might becaught up in using another's stolen information. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "190 P.3d 995",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
		"context": "To be sure, it is not necessarily surprising that those without valid social security numbers might becaught up in using another's stolen information. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even so, there is no evidence tosuggest those prosecutions are limited to just JohnsonCounty, Kansas. Indeed, the prosecutions existstatewide.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Act 620 Confers No Medical Benefits and Serves No Relevant Credentialing Function",
		"context": "Louisiana cannot pretend as though no trial o c- curred. Rather, in this Court, the district court 's fac- 6 tual findings \"must govern\" when they are plausible in light of the record. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, t he district court 's factual findings are beyond plausible —they are virtually identical to the findings credited by this Court in Whole Woman 's Health . Despite the district court 's determination that Act 620 \"is an inapt remedy for a problem that does not exist,\" App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "There was clear consensus that the measure prohibited \"censorship,\" but there was de- bate about the extent to which the government could punish speech after it was published. That debate is revealed in the sources recounting the debates over the Sedition Act of 1798. See History of Congress, February, 1799 at 2988; New York Times [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bu t to determine whether the founding generation intended the First Amend- ment to protect against compelled speech we must re-sort to the \"practices and beliefs of the Founders\" in general. See 514 U.S. 334.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "See History of Congress, February, 1799 at 2988; New York Times 376 U.S. 254. Bu t to determine whether the founding generation intended the First Amend- ment to protect against compelled speech we must re-sort to the \"practices and beliefs of the Founders\" in general. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While there was no discussion of compelled sup- port for political activity, there was significant debate over compelled financial support of churches in Mas- sachusetts and Virginia, the Virginia debate being the most famous. This Court ha s often quoted Jefferson's argument \"That to compel a man to furnish contribu- tions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "While there was no discussion of compelled sup- port for political activity, there was significant debate over compelled financial support of churches in Mas- sachusetts and Virginia, the Virginia debate being the most famous. This Court ha s often quoted Jefferson's argument \"That to compel a man to furnish contribu- tions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical.\" Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in 5 T HE FOUNDERS ' CONSTITUTION , University of Chicago Press (1987) at 77; quoted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chicago 13 Teachers Union v. Hudson , 475 U.S. at 305 n.15; Abood , 431 U.S. at 234-35 n.31. James Madison was another prominent voice in the Virginia debate, and again this Court has relied on his arguments for the scope of the First Amend- ment protection against compelled political support: \"Who does not see…[t]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?\" James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 T HE FOUNDERS ' CONSTITUTION at 82; quoted in Chi- cago Teachers Union , 475 U.S. at 305, n.15; Abood , 431 U.S. at 234-25 n.31.16 Although these statements were made in the con- text of compelled religious assessments, the Court easily applied them to compelled political assess- ments in Chicago Teachers Union and Abood .",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "Jefferson noted that freedom of conscience is violated when people are taxed to pay simple living expenses for th eir own pastors. Jefferson, Re- ligious Freedom, supra at 77. See also Pacific Gas & Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (198 6) (Marshall, J., concurring). 14 Inaugural Address (1801), in 5 T HE FOUNDERS ' CON- STITUTION at 152. The theme of his address was unity after a bitterly partisan election, and the goal he ex- pressed was \"representative government\" – a govern- ment response to the forc e of public opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "Although this Court had previously noted the weakness of the First Amendment analysis in the cases leading up to Abood , the Abood Court did not explore just how anomalous the \"labor peace\" ra- tionale really was when applied in the public-sector context. Legislative and executive officials can certainly choose with whom they will meet. Minnesota State Bd for Cmty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But, they cannot forbid members of the public, includ- ing dissident, nonunion members, from submitting their own views on public issues. City of Madison, Joint Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is so even if it leads to fear of \"chaos in labor management relations.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "The right of individuals, either singly or jointly with others, to present their views to legislative and executive officials is protected by the First Amend-ment right of Petition. \"The very idea of a govern- ment, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in re- spect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Co urt has noted, \"the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of 17 the people to make their wi shes known to their repre- sentatives.\" E.R.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
		"context": "As this Co urt has noted, \"the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of 17 the people to make their wi shes known to their repre- sentatives.\" E.R.R. Presidents [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any at- tempt to restrict the right of the people to instruct their representatives in government raises \"serious constitutional questions.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Majority's Strict Scrutiny Analysis Was Legally and Factually Unfounded",
		"context": "JS.App.91 n.56. In stead, it was based solely on returns from the 2008 presidential election and the 2009 state gubernatorial race— elections that had little, if any, bearing on the legislature's obligation to ensure that minority voters would have the opportunity elect their candidates of choice, as opposed to reinforcing the unsurprising phenomenon that they tend to vote for Democratic candidates who survive the primary. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even putting the flaws in Dr. Palmer's study aside, this Court has already rejected the argument that citizen -legislatures must consider econometric studies in lieu of a functional analysis based on the demographics of benchmark districts and the experiences of colleagues who have stood for election in them. 60 As the foregoing c onfirms, the majority fundamentally failed to appreciate the exceedingly \"difficult task\" the legislature faced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "Reply Br. 9 (emphasis added). The Court \"strongly disapprove[s of] the practice of smuggling additional questions into a case after [it] grant[s] certiorari,\" Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (merits briefs \"may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented\" in the petition). A question is \"fairly included\" in a petition only if it is a \"necessary predicate to the resolution of the question presented in the petition,\" 510 U.S. 383, or \"essential to [the] analysis,\" 515 U.S. 70. Those rules establish a \"heavy presumption\" against consideration of newly raised issues that the Court will disregard \"only in the most exceptional cases.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "9 (emphasis added). The Court \"strongly disapprove[s of] the practice of smuggling additional questions into a case after [it] grant[s] certiorari,\" Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki 510 U.S. 27 (merits briefs \"may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented\" in the petition). A question is \"fairly included\" in a petition only if it is a \"necessary predicate to the resolution of the question presented in the petition,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or \"essential to [the] analysis,\" 515 U.S. 70. Those rules establish a \"heavy presumption\" against consideration of newly raised issues that the Court will disregard \"only in the most exceptional cases.\" Izumi, 510 U.S. at 32 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "9 (emphasis added). The Court \"strongly disapprove[s of] the practice of smuggling additional questions into a case after [it] grant[s] certiorari,\" Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki 510 U.S. 27 (merits briefs \"may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented\" in the petition). A question is \"fairly included\" in a petition only if it is a \"necessary predicate to the resolution of the question presented in the petition,\" 510 U.S. 383, or \"essential to [the] analysis,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those rules establish a \"heavy presumption\" against consideration of newly raised issues that the Court will disregard \"only in the most exceptional cases.\" Izumi, 510 U.S. at 32 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "Those rules establish a \"heavy presumption\" against consideration of newly raised issues that the Court will disregard \"only in the most exceptional cases.\" Izumi, 510 U.S. at 32 (quotation marks omitted). Petitioners did not include their new \"arising-under\" argument in their petition or briefs in support of certiorari (which would have been insufficient regardless, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Nor is this purported ground for removal a \"necessary predicate\" to the Court's construction of Section 1447(d) or \"essential\" to that analysis; it has no bearing on the Question Presented. Petitioners nonetheless contend the Court should reach their arising-under argument because they have asserted it in other cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "Only the Ninth Circuit has reached the issue here, making petitioners' theory particularly inappropriate for this Court's review, given the absence of any circuit conflict or any meaningful consideration by other appellate courts. Zivotofsky ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 556 U.S. 502. 3. Petitioners' contention that broad appellate review does not apply to removal petitions based on \"a bad-faith or frivolous argument for federal-officer or civil-rights removal,\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "Only the Ninth Circuit has reached the issue here, making petitioners' theory particularly inappropriate for this Court's review, given the absence of any circuit conflict or any meaningful consideration by other appellate courts. Zivotofsky ex rel. 566 U.S. 189; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Petitioners' contention that broad appellate review does not apply to removal petitions based on \"a bad-faith or frivolous argument for federal-officer or civil-rights removal,\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.",
		"context": "of San 294 F. Supp. 3d 934. Accordingly, petitioners' arising-under argument comes before this Court in the first instance, and the Court should decline to address it. See Expressions 44 Hair [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Introduction",
		"context": "In addition, the Hardison Court's equation of \"undue hardship\" with de minimis is dicta. Id. at 15; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put simply, the Hardison Court \"deal[t] a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious prac-tices.\" Hardison , 432 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissent- ing).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Introduction",
		"context": "20 Ninth, and District of Columb ia Circuits. In that case, the United States explained that §2333(d)(2) imposes liability on a defendant which, inter alia , \"provides ... support [and] is generally aware that it is playing a role in unlawful activity fr om which acts of interna- tional terrorism are a foreseeable risk....\" (U.S. Amicus Br., 20). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied, 558 U.S. (2009), the government urged the court of appeals to construe §2333(a), prior to the enactment of JASTA, to impose liability for aiding and abetting, and to utilize the Halberstam standard in delineating the nature of that liability. (U.S. C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 F.3d 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Introduction",
		"context": "I, cl.1. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause \"forbid two quite different kinds of government encroachment upon re-ligious freedom.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The Establishment Clause was designed to keep government out of personal religious exercise, not purge religion from the public square.\" 4 F. 4th 910.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Introduction",
		"context": "4 F. 4th 910. As Judge O'Scannlain wrote in dissent, \"[T]he most basic lesson of the Supreme Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence teaches that when government actions 'target the religious for \"special disabilities\" based on their 'religious status,' they trigger 'the strictest scrutiny.' \" Id., 4 F. 4th at 939 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (quoting Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 4",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1252(d)(2) cuts strongly against a jurisdictional reading.",
		"context": "The discretionary judgment a court must under- take in determining whether a paragraph (d)(2) excep- tion applies cannot be squared with interpreting the 23 very same provision as a ju risdictional limitation. In order to \"find[]\" whether an exception applies to the general condition, the reviewing court must have ju- risdiction over the petition itself. And while a court necessarily has \"jurisdiction to determine its own ju- risdiction\" ( e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), it would be \"unusual\" —at minimum —\"to ascribe jurisdictional significance to a condition sub-ject to exceptions\" (Reed Elsevier , 559 U.S. at 165). Indeed, if the government were correct, courts would appear to have some measure of discretion to decide whether a jurisdiction -stripping provision ap- plies , as there is no objective factual inquiry to iden- tify whether the remedy in a prior proceeding was \"in- adequate\" or \"ineffective.\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1252(d)(2) cuts strongly against a jurisdictional reading.",
		"context": "It would be bizarre , to say the least , for Congress to del- egate to the courts of appeals discretion to decide for themselves whether jurisdiction even exists . Cf. Hud- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting the \"basic constitu- tional principle\" \"that only Congress may confer juris-diction on the lower federal courts\" and distinguishing the impermissible \"delegation of the power to confer jurisdiction\" to courts themselves from Congress's del- egation of \" rulemaking authority over the courts' own practices\") . Because paragraph (d)(2) is not jurisdictional, paragraph (d)(1) is not either . 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "156 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive",
		"context": "The cases petitioner cites (Br. 46 -47) do not show otherwise . In three of them , the authority of the bailee to transfer the property to a third person was not ques- tione d. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United States Fire Ins. 156 N.E.2d 121. In the fourth case , the court addressed only the property rights of the bailee (not the putative subbailee), con- cluding that she maintained \"constructive possession\" of the property, notwithstanding the creation of any subbailment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "581 P.2d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive",
		"context": "Ins. 2009 WL 4505497. But see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding unauthorized driver to be covered by omnibus insurance policy in absence of \"ev- idence that he intended to steal or convert the vehicle\") , review denied,791 N.W.2d 381 . In the event of a conversion, the bailor may be able to sue not only the bailee, but also the person who took possession of the property and \"knowingly participated in the bailee's diversion of [it].\" 8 C.J.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 So. 2d 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive",
		"context": "In driving the car, he faced the constant threat of discov- ery and dispossession of the vehicle by law enforcement. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even in the absence of a prior police report by Avis, a lawful traffic stop could lead Avis to ask, as rental -car compa- nies often do, that steps be taken to preclude the unau- thorized driver from occupying the car and to return the car to its rightful owner. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "App. 10a-15a; see El Paso Nat. Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And as the court correctly observed, none of the decisions ARCO cites addressed circumstances like those present here. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "Pet. 15-17. But the Mon-tana Supreme Court expressly relied on one decision ARCO invokes, ARCO Environmental Remediation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "The other Ninth Circuit decisions ARCO invokes provide it no better support. In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd ., the plaintiffs brought a CER- CLA citizen suit. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but instead sought to compel the defendant to pay CERCLA 20 penalties set forth in an EPA order. Pakootas , 646 F.3d at 1217. Because the EPA had expressly chosen not to enforce this penalty, the Ninth Circuit concluded the action was a Section 113(h) \"challenge.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 1214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "at 1220. By con- trast, Landowners do not challenge any of EPA's CER- CLA determinations, nor even invoke CE RCLA; they simply press their state-law right to recover for dam- age to their properties. Similarly distinguishable is McClellan Ecological Seepage [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling the Air Force to comply with reporting requirements that EPA, in a CERCLA c leanup plan, deemed unnec- essary. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "47 F.3d 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "21 When the Ninth Circuit confronted claims similar to those here, it concluded they were not \"challenges.\" In Beck v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , for example, the court held that plaintiffs who sought damages resulting from a CERCLA cleanup plan did not press a \" 'chal- lenge to the cleanup effort\"; rather, they merely sought \"to recover damages under Montana law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, in Weiss v. Kuck Trucking, Inc. , the court held Section 113(h) inapplicable where \"plaintiff 's alleged causes of action are based entirely on stat e law and do not challenge any CERCLA cleanup plan,\" even though the claims might \"draw money\" away from the cleanup. 166 Fed. Appx. 931.",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 F.3d 1240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "17) are likewise inapposite. In Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson , the Third Circuit confronted a direct suit against EPA challenging its \"ability to conduct [a study] pursuant to § 104 of CERCLA.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Pollack v. Department of Defense , the plaintiff sought to invalidate a transfer of a CERCLA- designated landfill and thereby \"halt the ongoing remediation efforts at the landfill.\" 507 F.3d 522.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.2d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "923 F.2d 1011. In Pollack v. Department of Defense , the plaintiff sought to invalidate a transfer of a CERCLA- designated landfill and thereby \"halt the ongoing remediation efforts at the landfill.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Schalk v. Reilly , the plaintiff sought an injunction compelling EPA to consider studies that might lead it to reconsider its CERCLA plan. 900 F.2d 1091.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 F.3d 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "507 F.3d 522. In Schalk v. Reilly , the plaintiff sought an injunction compelling EPA to consider studies that might lead it to reconsider its CERCLA plan. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. EPA , the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that would \"order th e defendants to alter the 22 remedial plan.\" 311 F.3d 1066.",
		"citation_value_orig": "900 F.2d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "900 F.2d 1091. In Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. EPA , the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that would \"order th e defendants to alter the 22 remedial plan.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in El Paso Natural Gas Co. , the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the government to compel \"spe- cific cleanup activities that would threaten to obviate the very point of the [CERCLA] remedial investigation and feasibility study\" EPA was then conducting. 750 F.3d at 881.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 F.3d 1066",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "Landowne rs' state-law damages request bears no resemblance to any of these direct challenges to EPA action. Below, ARCO recognized as much. It described New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] as the \" only\" case addressing a remedy like that Landowners seek here. ARCO MT Reply 1 (emphasis added).4 But New Mexico is different. There, the plaintiff 's state-law action was premised on a challenge to the \"alleged inadequacy\" of the EPA's \"ongoing remediation\" efforts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 F.3d 1223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "169, 175 (2008) (characterizing New Mexico as turning on how \"the plaintiff[ ] addressed the underlying EPA remedial action plan\"). By contrast, Landowners' requested damages depend on no attack on EPA's remedial orders, but rather their contentions that additional efforts are required (after the EPA has \"pull[ed] up 4 The other Tenth Circuit decision ARCO cites, Cannon v. Gates , involved a suit against the government seeking \"injunctive relief ordering the remediation of [the plaintiffs'] property,\" and is thus distinguishable for the same reasons as the decisions dis- cussed above. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 stakes,\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 F.3d 1328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)",
		"context": "1-4:6. When the Tenth Circuit has confronted state- law suits that seek to sup- plement CERCLA cleanup efforts—even suits that (unlike here) request injuncti ve relief regarding ongoing cleanups—it has permitted them. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"chal lenge,\" application of that Circuit's law would not be \"outcome-determinative.\" Pet. 14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "990 F.2d 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": ". Nearly a century ago, Congress enacted the FAA \"to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitr ation agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adop ted by American courts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Later, as part of the 1988 J u- dicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Con- gress enacted § 16 (a) of the FAA to ensure that a party who escapes its duty to arbitra te with the aid of a sympathetic district judge cannot avoid that o b- ligation for long. Section 16 \" respond[ed] to the needs of arb i- tration by generally denying immediate appeals from orders giving arbitration precedence over litig a- tion and permitti ng immediate appeals from orders giving litigation precedence over arbitration.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": "7 Congres s was not writing on a blank slate in 1988. Long before Congress enacted § 16, \"one ge n- eral rule in all cases\" was that \"an appeal susp ends the power of the court below to proceed further in the cause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By the time of § 16's enactment, it was \"ge n- erally u nderstood that a federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt t o assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.\" 459 U.S. 56.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": "109 U.S. 150. By the time of § 16's enactment, it was \"ge n- erally u nderstood that a federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt t o assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court reiterated in Griggs , \"the filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional si g- nifican ce—it confers jurisdiction on t he court of a p- peals and d ivests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the a ppeal.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": "Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which permits interlocutory appeals from or- ders granting or denying class cert ification. Fed. R. Civ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": "R. Civ. P. 23(f). In its decision embra cing the minority rule, the Fifth Circuit ana logized to one of its Rule 23(f) precedent s. Weingarten Realty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Even though the di strict court was 8 hearing an issue that was 'practically identical' to that on appeal,\" Weingarten explained, \"it could pr o- ceed because, as a matter of law, the findings on class certification would not resolve the merits i s- sue.\" 661 F.3d at 909.",
		"citation_value_orig": "661 F.3d 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": "That choice must be given effect. Second, appeals under Rule 23(f) are discr e- tionar y, not a matter of right. Heeding this Court's warnings in Coopers & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] about excessive appeals of class certific a- tion rulings, those who fashioned Rule 23(f) left the matter to the appellate courts. See Fed. R. Civ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE",
		"context": "3152, supra (\"Denial of appeal when arbitration is given precedence should not o f- ten be costly: district courts usually will be co rrect, 9 and the arbitration process is apt to produce consi d- erable savings in the proces s of preparing for trial if the dispute is ultimately found non -arbitrable.\") Rule 23(f) aside , the \"central reason and just i- fication\" for interlocutory appeals is the \"interru p- tion of the trial proceedings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Above all, Congress sought in § 16 to mi n- imize any judicial obstruction of arbitration by allo w- ing the courts of appeal s to resolve arbitrability questions before litigation gets underway. Congress never would ha ve granted parties the right to an immediate interlocutory appeal from refusals to compel arbitration if it had contemplated that litig a- tion could proceed to discovery and even judgment while the appeal was pen ding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F.3d 1158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "A state may not avoid the First Amendment by contracting the function out to a private entity. 54 1. This is not an open question; the Court re- solved it in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying upon its early public forum cases, includ- ing Hague ,23 the Court identified the restrictions the First Amendment imposes on the ability of state ac- tors to restrict speech rights in \"streets\" and \"side- walks.\" Marsh , 326 U.S. at 504 & n.1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "Marsh thus establishes that \"the exercise of con- stitutionally protected rights on the public streets\"— which are a quintessential public forum—\"could not be denied by the owner,\" even where that entity is nominally private. Evans , 382 U.S. at 299. See also Brentwood , 531 U.S. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Marsh recognized that administering \"the streets of a company town\" is state action); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Even if the question were open, the answer remains.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "This is also the sort of function to which the Con- stitution directly speaks. As this Court has long identified, the First Amendment strongly protects speech in a public forum. See Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 829; Police Dep't of City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That the Constitution bears specifical- ly on this particular sovereign function helps confirm that it is among the narrow range of \"public func- tions.\" Administration of a public forum is also tradi- tionally a state function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "Jackson , 419 U.S. at 353. Likewise, the education of special-needs students is not the \"exclusive province of the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The lower courts agree that administering a pub- lic forum is a public function. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "App. 19a (Lo- hier, J., concurring) (\"A private entity's regulation of speech in a public forum is a public function when the State has expressly delegated the regulatory function to that entity. \"); Watchtower Bible & Tract 634 F.3d 3; United Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 276 F.3d 550. 3. Petitioners, trying to make this case about all public access channels, characterize the relevant function as \"[t]he provision of cable television gener- 57 ally\" or \"public access channels in particular.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.3d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "App. 19a (Lo- hier, J., concurring) (\"A private entity's regulation of speech in a public forum is a public function when the State has expressly delegated the regulatory function to that entity. \"); Watchtower Bible & Tract 634 F.3d 3; United Church of 383 F.3d 449; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Petitioners, trying to make this case about all public access channels, characterize the relevant function as \"[t]he provision of cable television gener- 57 ally\" or \"public access channels in particular.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 F.3d 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "By contrast, administering a gathering place that is not a \"public forum\" within the meaning of the First Amendment is not a public function. For exam- ple, because they do not qualify as traditional or des- ignated public forums, the First Amendment does not govern privately-owned shopping malls. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. While our argument focuses on the public function analysis, \"the direct and indispensable par- ticipation\" of what is \"beyond all question a state actor\" helps confirm the presence of state ac- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "They do not, however, assert that this has any bearing on re- spondents' claims here. A state cannot avoid constitutional claims by creating an administrative agency; \"overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to the question of the exist- ence of a cause of action under [Section] 1983.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is there any basis to con- clude that the state agency actually adjudicates First Amend- ment claims or provides remedies commensurate with a consti- tutional claim. Indeed, respondents tried to bring such a claim, but they secured no remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "The City, meanwhile, maintains con- trol over the public access channels. As amicus ACLU argues, in the entirety of these unique cir- cumstances, MNN engages in state action when making content decisions. See National Collegiate Athletic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 398 U.S. 144. C.The public function doctrine precludes cir- cumvention of the First Amendment. As Rosenberger , Good News Club , Marsh , and others hold, the public forum doctrine precludes dis- crimination against disfavored speakers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Administering a public forum is a public function",
		"context": "The City, meanwhile, maintains con- trol over the public access channels. As amicus ACLU argues, in the entirety of these unique cir- cumstances, MNN engages in state action when making content decisions. See National Collegiate Athletic 488 U.S. 179; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. C.The public function doctrine precludes cir- cumvention of the First Amendment. As Rosenberger , Good News Club , Marsh , and others hold, the public forum doctrine precludes dis- crimination against disfavored speakers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Abortion Precedents And A Viability Rule Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "15-17. Outside the abortion context, this Court extends special due -process protection to interests, \"care- ful[ly] descri[bed],\" that are \"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That approach an-chors substantive due process to the time -tested in- sight of the American people, rather than leaving it to be molded by the \"policy preferences\" of an unelected judiciary. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Abortion Precedents And A Viability Rule Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "This point defeats respondents' re- liance on contraception cases . Resp.Br. 19; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it dooms the United States' suggestion that over- ruling Roe and Casey would \"threaten\" certain liberty and privacy rights. U.S.Br.25-26 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Abortion Precedents And A Viability Rule Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "21. But rational -basis review applies to innu- merable matters that are central to dignity an d au- tonomy. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]521 U.S. 728; San Antonio Independent School 12 411 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Abortion Precedents And A Viability Rule Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "21. But rational -basis review applies to innu- merable matters that are central to dignity an d au- tonomy. E.g., 528 U.S. 62521 U.S. 728; San Antonio Independent School 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "See, e.g., Paroline , 572 U.S. at 447; Standard Brewery , 251 U.S. at 218; United Verde Copper , 196 U.S. at 213. Re- spondents' interpretation would leave \"otherwise\" with no function, violating the rule against superfluity. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Standard Brew- ery, 251 U.S. at 218. In light of Congress's use of \"other- wise,\" there can be no serious debate that \"otherwise available to the public\" is a catch-all provision—and, con-sistent with this Court's case s construing other catch-all provisions, it sheds light on the meaning of the provisions that precede it. See Paroline , 572 U.S. at 447; Seatrain Lines , 411 U.S. at 734.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "Again, respondents' conclusion does not follow from their premise. The rule of the last antecedent provides that \"a limiting clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it im- mediately follows.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The question in this case, however, is not whether \"to the public,\" as a prepositional phrase, modifies (and only modifies) \"otherwise av ailable\"; it plainly does. 6 In- stead, the relevant question is whether the adjectival phrase \"otherwise available to the public\"—as a whole—informs the meaning of the parallel adjectival phrases that precede it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "If respondents' invocation of the rule of the last antecedent were ac- cepted, it would leave \"other wise\" with no function, be- cause the catch-all provision would shed no light on the meaning of the preceding prov isions. This Court has pre- viously refused to create superfluity by applying the rule of the last antecedent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The only way to give \"operative meaning\" to \"otherwise\" is to read \"otherwise available to the public\" as qualifying the preceding categories. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "The doctrine of congressional ratification is likewise inapplicable. As a general matter, the Court presumes that Congress was \"aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute,\" and intended to \"adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bu t \"the doctrine of con- gressional ratification applie s only when Congress reen- acts a statute without relevant change.\" 566 U.S. 583.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "434 U.S. 575. Bu t \"the doctrine of con- gressional ratification applie s only when Congress reen- acts a statute without relevant change.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The AIA does not satisfy that requirement. Most ob- viously, in the AIA, Congress did not merely retain the phrase \"on sale\"; it added the catch-all phrase \"or other- wise available to the public.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "Much of that law had nothing to do with the publ ic availability of a claimed invention. For example, this Court es tablished a two-prong test for determining whether an inve ntion is \"on sale,\" consid- ering (1) whether the product was the subject of a com-mercial offer of sale and (2) whether the invention is ready for patenting. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federa l Circuit has elaborated on that test in a series of case s on what constitutes a com- mercial sale, see, e.g., Medicines 827 F.3d 1363. No ne of those authorities bears on the question presen ted here: namely, whether a 41 claimed invention must be made available to the public in order to qualify as prior art under the AIA.7 Before the AIA, however, th e Federal Circuit had also applied the on-sale bar even if an inventor's sale of an in- vention to another party did no t disclose the invention to the public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "For example, this Court es tablished a two-prong test for determining whether an inve ntion is \"on sale,\" consid- ering (1) whether the product was the subject of a com-mercial offer of sale and (2) whether the invention is ready for patenting. See 525 U.S. 55. The Federa l Circuit has elaborated on that test in a series of case s on what constitutes a com- mercial sale, see, e.g., Medicines [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No ne of those authorities bears on the question presen ted here: namely, whether a 41 claimed invention must be made available to the public in order to qualify as prior art under the AIA.7 Before the AIA, however, th e Federal Circuit had also applied the on-sale bar even if an inventor's sale of an in- vention to another party did no t disclose the invention to the public. For example, in Special Devices, 270 F.3d 1353, the court held that a patentee's contract with a supplier to manufacture the product embodying an inventio n constituted a disqualify- ing \"sale,\" even though the production activity and the in- vention remained secret.",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.3d 1363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "The Federa l Circuit has elaborated on that test in a series of case s on what constitutes a com- mercial sale, see, e.g., Medicines 827 F.3d 1363. No ne of those authorities bears on the question presen ted here: namely, whether a 41 claimed invention must be made available to the public in order to qualify as prior art under the AIA.7 Before the AIA, however, th e Federal Circuit had also applied the on-sale bar even if an inventor's sale of an in- vention to another party did no t disclose the invention to the public. For example, in Special Devices, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court held that a patentee's contract with a supplier to manufacture the product embodying an inventio n constituted a disqualify- ing \"sale,\" even though the production activity and the in- vention remained secret. See id. at 1357.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 F.3d 1353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "See id. at 1357. Similarly, in In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court up- held the application of the on-sale bar to an offer to sell the claimed invention to a single entity, even though the counterparty \"kept the claime d invention secret from the purchasing public\" and the sale activity was \"kept secret from the trade.\" Id. at 674-675.",
		"citation_value_orig": "761 F.2d 671",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "8 This case presents no occasion for the Court to consider whether those Federal Circuit cases correctly construed the pre-AIA version of the on-sale bar. See p. 10 n.1, supra . 42 time, the retention of the phra se \"on sale\" avoids \"throw- [ing] the baby out with the bath water,\" Federal Trade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because it preserves the substantial body of law on other aspects of the on-sale bar. Far from ratifying every aspect of preexisting law, Congress acted with precision in order to modify the aspect of preexis ting law with which it dis- agreed. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "20-21, supra ; Seatrain Lines , 411 U.S. at 733-734. 43 In any event, despite the word \"public\" in the phrase \"in public use,\" the Federal Circuit had construed the pre-AIA version of the public-use ba r to reach some uses that did not disclose the claimed in ventions to the public. For example, in New Railhead Manufacturing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,537 U.S. 1232 (2003 ), the court applied the public-use bar where the inventor allowed an acquaint-ance to test a drill embodying the patented method, even though the method was not otherwise available to the pub- lic. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "298 F.3d 1290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "43 In any event, despite the word \"public\" in the phrase \"in public use,\" the Federal Circuit had construed the pre-AIA version of the public-use ba r to reach some uses that did not disclose the claimed in ventions to the public. For example, in New Railhead Manufacturing, 298 F.3d 1290, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2003 ), the court applied the public-use bar where the inventor allowed an acquaint-ance to test a drill embodying the patented method, even though the method was not otherwise available to the pub- lic. See id. at 1298.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 1232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "See id. at 1298. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court applied the public-use bar where the designer of a patented invention displayed it at a party but did not oth- erwise disclose it to the public. See id. at 1159-1160.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 F.3d 1154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "To be sure, the on-sale bar and the public-use bar may both apply to the same claimed invention: an inventio n that is \"on sale\" can also be \"in public use.\" Indeed, when the Court first articu- lated the on-sale bar, it treated \"sale\" and \"use\" together. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44 But any overlap would exist under either interpretation; it depends on the respective me anings of \"sale\" and \"use,\" not on whether those actions make the claimed invention available to the public. At any rate, under petitioner 's interpretation, the on- sale and public-use bars would serve independent func- tions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "27 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "At any rate, under petitioner 's interpretation, the on- sale and public-use bars would serve independent func- tions. For example, \"[an] offe r to sell is enough to bar pa- tentability whether or not the offer is accepted,\" A.B. Chance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], while \"public use\" requ ires \"actual use by someone at some point,\" Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 303 F.3d 1294, cert. dismissed,538 U.S. 972 ( 2003). As a result, the on- sale bar could apply even wher e a claimed invention is not yet in public use (if the produc t is sold but not used, or an offeree declines an offer to sell the product embodying the invention), and the public-use bar could apply even where the invention is not yet on sale (if the product enters the public domain without a sale or offer to sell, such as through an inventor's own use).",
		"citation_value_orig": "854 F.2d 1307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "At any rate, under petitioner 's interpretation, the on- sale and public-use bars would serve independent func- tions. For example, \"[an] offe r to sell is enough to bar pa- tentability whether or not the offer is accepted,\" A.B. Chance 854 F.2d 1307, while \"public use\" requ ires \"actual use by someone at some point,\" Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. dismissed,538 U.S. 972 ( 2003). As a result, the on- sale bar could apply even wher e a claimed invention is not yet in public use (if the produc t is sold but not used, or an offeree declines an offer to sell the product embodying the invention), and the public-use bar could apply even where the invention is not yet on sale (if the product enters the public domain without a sale or offer to sell, such as through an inventor's own use).",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 F.3d 1294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid",
		"context": "For example, \"[an] offe r to sell is enough to bar pa- tentability whether or not the offer is accepted,\" A.B. Chance 854 F.2d 1307, while \"public use\" requ ires \"actual use by someone at some point,\" Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 303 F.3d 1294, cert. dismissed,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2003). As a result, the on- sale bar could apply even wher e a claimed invention is not yet in public use (if the produc t is sold but not used, or an offeree declines an offer to sell the product embodying the invention), and the public-use bar could apply even where the invention is not yet on sale (if the product enters the public domain without a sale or offer to sell, such as through an inventor's own use). The critical point is that, under petitioner's interpreta tion, the on-sale and public- use bars would not be coterminous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 972",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "1. \"[A]n unbroken current of judicial decisions,\" based on \"long continued legislative and executive usage,\" have recognized Congress's broad \"power and the duty\" to \"exercis[e] a fostering care and protection over\" Indians, \"whether within or without the limits of a state.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; e.g., 572 U.S. 782; Jicarilla Apache , 564 U.S. at 175; 541 U.S. 193; Seber , 318 U.S. at 715-16; 255 U.S. 373. This \"plenary power\" derives \"explicitly\" from the Constitution. Mancari , 417 U.S. at 551-52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "231 U.S. 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "1. \"[A]n unbroken current of judicial decisions,\" based on \"long continued legislative and executive usage,\" have recognized Congress's broad \"power and the duty\" to \"exercis[e] a fostering care and protection over\" Indians, \"whether within or without the limits of a state.\" 231 U.S. 28; e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jicarilla Apache , 564 U.S. at 175; 541 U.S. 193; Seber , 318 U.S. at 715-16; 255 U.S. 373. This \"plenary power\" derives \"explicitly\" from the Constitution. Mancari , 417 U.S. at 551-52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "1. \"[A]n unbroken current of judicial decisions,\" based on \"long continued legislative and executive usage,\" have recognized Congress's broad \"power and the duty\" to \"exercis[e] a fostering care and protection over\" Indians, \"whether within or without the limits of a state.\" 231 U.S. 28; e.g., 572 U.S. 782; Jicarilla Apache , 564 U.S. at 175; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Seber , 318 U.S. at 715-16; 255 U.S. 373. This \"plenary power\" derives \"explicitly\" from the Constitution. Mancari , 417 U.S. at 551-52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "1. \"[A]n unbroken current of judicial decisions,\" based on \"long continued legislative and executive usage,\" have recognized Congress's broad \"power and the duty\" to \"exercis[e] a fostering care and protection over\" Indians, \"whether within or without the limits of a state.\" 231 U.S. 28; e.g., 572 U.S. 782; Jicarilla Apache , 564 U.S. at 175; 541 U.S. 193; Seber , 318 U.S. at 715-16; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This \"plenary power\" derives \"explicitly\" from the Constitution. Mancari , 417 U.S. at 551-52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "255 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "Worcester , 31 U.S. at 559; see Lara , 541 U.S. at 200-02. Indeed, this Court has held the Indian Commerce Clause itself \"provide[s] Congress with plenary power\" in \"Indian affairs.\" Cotton Petroleum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has also emphasized the Founding-era understanding that 20 \"Indian affairs were … an aspect of military and foreign policy\" and that authority to address such matters is \"inherent in any Federal Government\" as a \"'necessary concomitant[] of nationality.'\" Lara , 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting 299 U.S. 304).",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "Cotton Petroleum 490 U.S. 163. The Court has also emphasized the Founding-era understanding that 20 \"Indian affairs were … an aspect of military and foreign policy\" and that authority to address such matters is \"inherent in any Federal Government\" as a \"'necessary concomitant[] of nationality.'\" Lara , 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 2. The Framers understood Congress's Indian- affairs powers just that broadly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "The Secretary of War told Congress that \"unless the United States do in reality possess the power 'to manage all affairs with the independent tribes of Indians,'\" \"a general Indian war may be expected.\" H. Knox, Report of the Secretary of War (July 18, 1787), reprinted in 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 , at 368 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936). The Constitution removed the Articles' \"shackles,\" Worcester , 31 U.S. at 559, and \"[w]ith [its] adoption\" restored \"Indian relations\" as \"the exclusive province of federal law,\" Oneida [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It gave \"congress, as the only safe and proper depositary, the exclusive power, which belonged to the crown.\" 2 Story, supra , §1094.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §§4-5, 1 Stat. 137; accord Mohegan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1796, Congress provided that non-Indians wronged by Indians who \"c[a]me over or across the … boundary line, into any state\" had a \"duty\" to apply to the federal government for remedy. Act of May 19, 1796, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "638 F.2d 612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs",
		"context": "362, 385. Meanwhile, this Court has understood Congress to have exercised its \"plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.\" Santa Clara [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Later, Congress \"relaxe[d]\" some \"restrictions.\" Lara , 541 U.S. at 200.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Neither Strict Nor Exacting Scrutiny Applies When The Government Acts As Employer",
		"context": "Pickering , 391 U.S. at 568. As the Cour t recently explained, \"the Government has a much freer hand in dealing 'with citizen employees than it d oes when it brings its sov- ereign power to bear on citizens at large.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Abood 's \"failure\" to apply heightened scrutiny is no failure at all. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioner misinterprets the historical sources",
		"context": "19 -20) is equally unsound. Even if viewed in purely modern terms, defamation law supports at most a recklessness requirement. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; se e also pp. 28-31, infra . Historically, however, not even that was required.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "51a. This analysis is difficult to square with this Court's precedents condemning competitiv e re- straints that \"impede[] the ordinary give and take of the marketplace and substantially deprive[] custom- er[s]\" of the chance \"to utilize and compare prices .\" Prof'l Eng'rs , 435 U.S. at 692- 93; Catalano, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"p rice is the 'central nervous system' of the economy,\" Unit- ed 310 U.S. 150, price competition is \"an object of special solicitude under the antitrust laws.\" Unit- ed 384 U.S. 127; NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106 & n.30 (\"[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of con- sumer preference in setting price\" is inconsistent \"with th[e] fundamental goal of antitrust law\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "This analysis is difficult to square with this Court's precedents condemning competitiv e re- straints that \"impede[] the ordinary give and take of the marketplace and substantially deprive[] custom- er[s]\" of the chance \"to utilize and compare prices .\" Prof'l Eng'rs , 435 U.S. at 692- 93; Catalano, 446 U.S. 643. Because \"p rice is the 'central nervous system' of the economy,\" Unit- ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], price competition is \"an object of special solicitude under the antitrust laws.\" Unit- ed 384 U.S. 127; NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106 & n.30 (\"[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of con- sumer preference in setting price\" is inconsistent \"with th[e] fundamental goal of antitrust law\"). A c- cordingly, this Court's precedents support the district court's conclusion th at the record evidence here was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the NDPs unreasonably restrain trade, and thus to shift the burden to Amex to identify procompetitive justifi- cations for the rules.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "Prof'l Eng'rs , 435 U.S. at 692- 93; Catalano, 446 U.S. 643. Because \"p rice is the 'central nervous system' of the economy,\" Unit- ed 310 U.S. 150, price competition is \"an object of special solicitude under the antitrust laws.\" Unit- ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106 & n.30 (\"[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of con- sumer preference in setting price\" is inconsistent \"with th[e] fundamental goal of antitrust law\"). A c- cordingly, this Court's precedents support the district court's conclusion th at the record evidence here was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the NDPs unreasonably restrain trade, and thus to shift the burden to Amex to identify procompetitive justifi- cations for the rules. The court of appeals' contrary conclusion does not serve the purpose of the antitrust laws it purports to apply, becaus e it preemptively terminates the anti- trust analysis out of concern for procompetitive justi- fications that could be (and in the district court were) addressed in the second and thi rd stage s of the bur- den shifting analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "N. Pac. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Scrutinizing competitive restraints on either side of the \"two -sided\" platform the court of appeals de- scribed is critical to ensuring competition both within and across the platform. Yet that is precisely what the court of appeals' analysis precludes .",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "There is no basis in the law or rec ord for affirming this approach. 5 This Court has in some contexts discouraged such cross - market defenses on the ground that courts have an \"inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 374 U.S. 321 (\"If anticompetitive effects in one mar- ket could be justified by procompetitive consequences in anoth- er, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader.\"). That said, this Court has entertained such arguments in cases where the challenged practice impacts multiple related markets, see, e.g., NCAA , 468 U.S. at 117- 19, and some lower courts have likewise recognized the need in some circumstances to \"balance the anticompetitive effects on competition in one market with certain procompetitive b enefits in other markets.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "5 This Court has in some contexts discouraged such cross - market defenses on the ground that courts have an \"inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector.\" 405 U.S. 596; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"If anticompetitive effects in one mar- ket could be justified by procompetitive consequences in anoth- er, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader.\"). That said, this Court has entertained such arguments in cases where the challenged practice impacts multiple related markets, see, e.g., NCAA , 468 U.S. at 117- 19, and some lower courts have likewise recognized the need in some circumstances to \"balance the anticompetitive effects on competition in one market with certain procompetitive b enefits in other markets.\" 34 F.3d 1091, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
		"context": "374 U.S. 321 (\"If anticompetitive effects in one mar- ket could be justified by procompetitive consequences in anoth- er, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader.\"). That said, this Court has entertained such arguments in cases where the challenged practice impacts multiple related markets, see, e.g., NCAA , 468 U.S. at 117- 19, and some lower courts have likewise recognized the need in some circumstances to \"balance the anticompetitive effects on competition in one market with certain procompetitive b enefits in other markets.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied513 U.S. 1190 . 28",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 F.3d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress provided no clear statement that the Director's timeliness determinations under Section 315(b) ought to be unreviewable",
		"context": "1. Determin ing whether Congress clearly stated an in- tention to foreclose judicial review of the Director's deci- sions interpreting Section 315 (b)'s begins here —and ulti- mately ends —with the statutory text . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the text is unambiguous. Section 315's prohi- bition is clear .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress provided no clear statement that the Director's timeliness determinations under Section 315(b) ought to be unreviewable",
		"context": "5. The decisions of this Court do not —and should not—suggest any other result. The Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] may have decided that Section 314(d) 's shield against reviewability \"applie[d] where the grounds for attacking the decision t o institute inter partes review consist of quest ions that are closely tied to the application and interpretation of stat- utes related to the Patent Office's decision to initiate inter partes review.\" But if including questions \"closely tied\" to the institution decision under Section 314(d)'s unreviewa- bility shield is an expansion at all beyond the Section 314(a) 's plain terms , it is a n extremely minor one. Nothing suggests that the decisions \"closely tied\" enough to the in- stitution decision to fall within Section 314(d)'s reviewabil- ity shield include anyt hing entirely unrelated to the threshold patentability determination .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Appointments Clause Protects Institutional Concerns as well as Liberty",
		"context": "It is of no consequence that in enacting PROMESA , the S enate voluntarily relinquished its advice -and- consent power or that the President abandoned his power of appointment. The Constitution does not al-low for an end -run around the Appointments Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because \"[n]either Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive' the structural provisions of the Constitution any more than they could agree to disregard an enu-merated right.\" Id. (quoting Freytag , 501 U.S. at 880).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Appointments Clause Protects Institutional Concerns as well as Liberty",
		"context": "§ 2127(b). Yet the appropriations process has long been considered \"the most potent form of Congressional oversight.\" PHH [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Founding generation \"generally embraced the maxim that the power which holds the purse - strings absolutely will rule.\" ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rachel E. Barkow, Insu- lating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institu-tional Design , 89 Tex. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "881 F.3d 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The \"quick look\" doctrine is about invalidating restraints, not upholding them as lawful per se",
		"context": "\"Quick loo k\" is a level of antitrust scrutiny between \"per se\" and \"rule of reason.\" It relieves the plaintiff of the obligation to plead and prove detailed competitive harm in a relevant market when \"the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.\" 34 California Dental [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Board of Regents put it, \"[t]he essential point is that the rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye\"—referring specifically to restraints that do not qualify for per se condemnation but nonetheless have sufficiently obvious anticompetitive effects that a court need not engage in a detailed analysis of the market. 468 U.S. at 110 n.39 (quotation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The \"quick look\" doctrine is about invalidating restraints, not upholding them as lawful per se",
		"context": "468 U.S. at 110 n.39 (quotation omitted). \"Quick look\" is appropriate when the anticompetitive effects of a restraint are sufficiently obvious to \"an ob- server with even a rudimentary understanding of eco- nomics,\" so that the court may depart from the tradi- tional rule-of-reason steps and \"shift[] to a defendant the [initial] burden to show empirical evidence of pro- competitive effects.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Board of Regents , 468 U.S. at 109 (\"As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary , when there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, no elaborate in- dustry analysis is required to demonstrate the anti- competitive character of such an agreement.\" (quota- tion omitted)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The \"quick look\" doctrine is about invalidating restraints, not upholding them as lawful per se",
		"context": "29 (quotation omitted). Both cases Petitioners cite for this proposition contemplate that a court may use its experience to depart from the \"full rule of reason\" to find the restraint per se unlaw- ful. See Leegin Creative Leather [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Other than the Seventh Circuit's decision in Deppe, we are aware of no case that has applied the \"quick look\" doctrine to uphold a restraint without scrutiniz- ing the impact of that restraint in the relevant market. And until Deppe, even the Seventh Circuit had de- scribed \"quick look\" accurately: \"[i]f a plaintiff can show that a defendant has engaged in naked re- strictions on price or output, he can dispense with any showing of market power until a procompetitive justi- fication is shown.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "1. There can be little doubt that , as courts around the country have held, public -school teachers hold a position of \"public trust.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as amended (Oct. 25, 2019) (\" The position of public school teacher requires a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public employment. \" (cleaned up)); 464 F.3d 1182 ; 157 F.3d 1169 ; 27 Although this Court has never directly ruled on incorpora- tion of the No Religious Test Clause, see 367 U.S. 488 , the Clause's protection is so \"fundamen- tal to our scheme of ordered liberty\" and \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,\" 139 S. Ct. 682 , that there is no reason to doubt the propriety of incor- poration in the appropriate case. Alternatively, the right to be free from Religious Tests should be deemed a \"privilege[] or im- munit[y] of citizenship\" that the States may not abridge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "805 F.3d 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "There can be little doubt that , as courts around the country have held, public -school teachers hold a position of \"public trust.\" 805 F.3d 454 , as amended (Oct. 25, 2019) (\" The position of public school teacher requires a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public employment. \" (cleaned up)); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 157 F.3d 1169 ; 27 Although this Court has never directly ruled on incorpora- tion of the No Religious Test Clause, see 367 U.S. 488 , the Clause's protection is so \"fundamen- tal to our scheme of ordered liberty\" and \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,\" 139 S. Ct. 682 , that there is no reason to doubt the propriety of incor- poration in the appropriate case. Alternatively, the right to be free from Religious Tests should be deemed a \"privilege[] or im- munit[y] of citizenship\" that the States may not abridge. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "There can be little doubt that , as courts around the country have held, public -school teachers hold a position of \"public trust.\" 805 F.3d 454 , as amended (Oct. 25, 2019) (\" The position of public school teacher requires a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public employment. \" (cleaned up)); 464 F.3d 1182 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 27 Although this Court has never directly ruled on incorpora- tion of the No Religious Test Clause, see 367 U.S. 488 , the Clause's protection is so \"fundamen- tal to our scheme of ordered liberty\" and \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,\" 139 S. Ct. 682 , that there is no reason to doubt the propriety of incor- poration in the appropriate case. Alternatively, the right to be free from Religious Tests should be deemed a \"privilege[] or im- munit[y] of citizenship\" that the States may not abridge. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "157 F.3d 1169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "There can be little doubt that , as courts around the country have held, public -school teachers hold a position of \"public trust.\" 805 F.3d 454 , as amended (Oct. 25, 2019) (\" The position of public school teacher requires a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public employment. \" (cleaned up)); 464 F.3d 1182 ; 157 F.3d 1169 ; 27 Although this Court has never directly ruled on incorpora- tion of the No Religious Test Clause, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Clause's protection is so \"fundamen- tal to our scheme of ordered liberty\" and \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,\" 139 S. Ct. 682 , that there is no reason to doubt the propriety of incor- poration in the appropriate case. Alternatively, the right to be free from Religious Tests should be deemed a \"privilege[] or im- munit[y] of citizenship\" that the States may not abridge. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "There can be little doubt that , as courts around the country have held, public -school teachers hold a position of \"public trust.\" 805 F.3d 454 , as amended (Oct. 25, 2019) (\" The position of public school teacher requires a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public employment. \" (cleaned up)); 464 F.3d 1182 ; 157 F.3d 1169 ; 27 Although this Court has never directly ruled on incorpora- tion of the No Religious Test Clause, see 367 U.S. 488 , the Clause's protection is so \"fundamen- tal to our scheme of ordered liberty\" and \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that there is no reason to doubt the propriety of incor- poration in the appropriate case. Alternatively, the right to be free from Religious Tests should be deemed a \"privilege[] or im- munit[y] of citizenship\" that the States may not abridge. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "amdt. 14 § 1 . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even if the No Religious Test Clause is not itself formally applied to the States, the dictates of that Clause —the only provision ad- dressing religion in the original Constitution —should at very least inform the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment. See generally 435 U.S. 618 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "See 561 U.S. 742. But even if the No Religious Test Clause is not itself formally applied to the States, the dictates of that Clause —the only provision ad- dressing religion in the original Constitution —should at very least inform the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That conclusion flows directly from \"the fact that schools at times stand in loco parentis , i.e., in the place of parents. \" Mahanoy Area Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "Moreover, l imiting public employment to persons from non -expressive faiths, or firing them if they re- fuse to abandon the \"mode of wors hip\" of their faith, likewise seems a straight -forward \"religious test.\" While there is little caselaw in this area, Justice Bren- nan addressed the issue in the Free Exercise context and concluded that the First Amendment forbids the conditioning of eligibility for office on a \"religious clas- sification.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He explained that a disability placed on those who \"exhibit a defined level of intensity of involvement in protected religious activity as much imposes a test for office based on religious conviction as one based on denominational preference.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "A requirement that public employees forsake the outward expression of belief they deem required by their religion, or else lose their position of public trust, is no different and no less a forbidden religious test . That conclusion is reinforced by t his Cour t's re- peated caution that \"constitutional guarantees, so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, [should not be] open to destruction by the indirect, but no less effective , process of requiring a surrender [.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 570 U.S. 595. To the person of faith who is told they are forbidden from engaging in required religious expression, it makes no difference whether the prohi- bition serves as a barrier to entry or as a continued condition of employment , i.e., a \"back -end\" religious test. Such a condition on public employment undoubt- edly triggers, and fails, First Amendment scrutiny .",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "A requirement that public employees forsake the outward expression of belief they deem required by their religion, or else lose their position of public trust, is no different and no less a forbidden religious test . That conclusion is reinforced by t his Cour t's re- peated caution that \"constitutional guarantees, so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, [should not be] open to destruction by the indirect, but no less effective , process of requiring a surrender [.]\" 271 U.S. 583 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the person of faith who is told they are forbidden from engaging in required religious expression, it makes no difference whether the prohi- bition serves as a barrier to entry or as a continued condition of employment , i.e., a \"back -end\" religious test. Such a condition on public employment undoubt- edly triggers, and fails, First Amendment scrutiny .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
		"context": "See, e.g., June Med. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, w hether applied on its own or used to inform the analysis of the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, the Clause can provide greater cer- tainty and brighter lines that will benefit courts, em- ployers, and employees alike. To see why, o ne might return to th e example of a Muslim whose beliefs require her to wear a hijab when in public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Acts' review schemes encompass the removal-power claims that Axon and Cochran have asserted",
		"context": "107a (Cost a, J., dissenting). \"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication,\" it is that a federal court should decide constitutional question s only if \"such adjudication is un- avoidable.\" Spector Motor Se rvice, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the scheme that Axon and Cochran advocate , however, district courts would be required to adjudicate (some) constitutional claims at the start of the agency proceeding, before it is clear whether resolution of those claims is actually necessary to the proper disposition of the case . A special exception for constitutional claims would also be difficult to admi nister.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Should Be Treated No Differently Than Other Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Id. at 906. Petitioner claims (at 18) that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], undermines this conclusion. It does not. Johnson merely held, sever- al years before the Federal Rules' enactment, that where a district court consolidated two cases at th e end of litigation solely for purposes of entering a joint order in both actions, the two cases did not merge into a \"single cause\" for purposes of issue preclus ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Should Be Treated No Differently Than Other Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "But the Rule provides a safety valve: If the district court wishes to auth orize an earlier appeal, it \"may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, 4 The other three cases on which petitioner relies ( at 18) are even less relevant. All three were decided before Rule 42 went into effect. Furthermore, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court authorized an appeal because the particular decision at issue sat isfied the collateral order doctrine, not because of any rule generally applicable to consolidated cases. Id. at 413-414.",
		"citation_value_orig": "269 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Should Be Treated No Differently Than Other Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Id. at 413-414. In Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered a limited-purpose consolidation \"f or trial,\" not an all-purpose consolidation. Id. at 286.",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Should Be Treated No Differently Than Other Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Id. at 286. And [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was an admiralty case governed by an entirely different body of procedura l law from ordinary civil actions. See id. at 820-821 (relying on a rule applicable to \"a prize cause\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "72 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Should Be Treated No Differently Than Other Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "And parties often seek to split claims in order to obtain tactical litigation ad- vantages. Indeed, even unsophisticated litigants sometimes file a bevy of claims separately and then seek to appeal them one-by-one. See, e.g., Ivanov- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor would joinder rules and claim-splitting doctrines be suff i- cient to prohibit these pleading maneuvers: The Federal Rules require joinder only for a handful of mandatory counterclaims and crossclaims, see Fed. R. Civ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "719 F.2d 927",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel enables the use of invalid patents to block disruptive technologies and nascent companies",
		"context": "Supra , part I. Furthermore, \"both [the Federal Circuit] and the Supreme Court have rec-ognized that there is a significant public policy interest in removing invalid patents from the public arena.\" SmithKline Beecham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the ability to challenge the validity of a patent is a vital safeguard provided to defendants in infringement suits. For startups, the harm caused by invalid patents is particularly acute, and the ability to challenge low-quality patents is especially important.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 F.3d 1331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel enables the use of invalid patents to block disruptive technologies and nascent companies",
		"context": "These and numerous others demonstrate that many cases invoking assignor estoppel against startups are weak on the merits and underscore just how prev- alent these cases are. See, e.g. , Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Performance Plas- tics Corp., HCM [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hexcel 716 F. Supp. 974960 F.2d 155; Arista , 908 F.3d at 793 (cases in which assignor's previous employer sues assignor's new company and uses assign or estoppel to try to pre- vent invalidity challenges). 3 In Carroll Touch , the district court even held that the as- serted patent would have been obvious and that the assignee-plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct. Carroll Touch, 1992 WL 361702.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 F. Supp. 2d 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel enables the use of invalid patents to block disruptive technologies and nascent companies",
		"context": "These and numerous others demonstrate that many cases invoking assignor estoppel against startups are weak on the merits and underscore just how prev- alent these cases are. See, e.g. , Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Performance Plas- tics Corp., HCM 351 F. Supp. 2d 290; Hexcel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]960 F.2d 155; Arista , 908 F.3d at 793 (cases in which assignor's previous employer sues assignor's new company and uses assign or estoppel to try to pre- vent invalidity challenges). 3 In Carroll Touch , the district court even held that the as- serted patent would have been obvious and that the assignee-plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct. Carroll Touch, 1992 WL 361702.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F. Supp. 974",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel enables the use of invalid patents to block disruptive technologies and nascent companies",
		"context": "These and numerous others demonstrate that many cases invoking assignor estoppel against startups are weak on the merits and underscore just how prev- alent these cases are. See, e.g. , Battle-ABC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 873; Brilliant Instruments, 2014 WL 516244; Juniper Networks 15 F. Supp. 3d 499; L-3 Commc'ns 69 F. Supp. 3d 1136; Saint-Gobain Performance Plas- tics Corp., HCM 351 F. Supp. 2d 290; Hexcel 716 F. Supp. 974[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Arista , 908 F.3d at 793 (cases in which assignor's previous employer sues assignor's new company and uses assign or estoppel to try to pre- vent invalidity challenges). 3 In Carroll Touch , the district court even held that the as- serted patent would have been obvious and that the assignee-plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct. Carroll Touch, 1992 WL 361702.",
		"citation_value_orig": "960 F.2d 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Assignor estoppel enables the use of invalid patents to block disruptive technologies and nascent companies",
		"context": "543 (2014) (describing how \"incumbents [are] able to exploit de- fects in the patent system in order to prevent disrup-tive technologies from competing with their outmoded products and services\"). As this Court has recognized, even if a \"patent is ultimately held invalid, patent holders may be able to use it to threaten litigation and bully competitors, especially those that cannot bear the cost of litigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Assignor estoppel increases costs and risks that startups face in litigation, because it removes the op- tion of a validity defense. In the types of meritless cases startups often face, that too often forces com- panies to pursue alternative, costly defenses or pay 14 damages, settlements, or license fees over invalid pa- tents that should not have issued.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Secret Prior Art and The Incentives Of The First-Inventor-To-File System",
		"context": "Under the first- to-invent system, inventors had a compelling incentive to defer filing for a patent. The first inventor could extend its exclusive use of the invention by waiting to seek a patent until the invention became public, through either another person 's (1) public disclosure of the invention or (2) filing a patent application on the invention. Metallizing Eng'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is the seminal decision on secret prior art. In that case, the issue was the secret use of a process before the grace period and the sale of the unpatented products of that process. One basis for the secret use to be prior art was that the patent owner was benefitting from both trade secret and patent protection.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 F.2d 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Secret Prior Art and The Incentives Of The First-Inventor-To-File System",
		"context": "Individual and/or unsophisticated inventors forfeited their right to a patent because of limited and private uses that did not disclose the claimed invention to the public.6 \"The only effect of rulings like these is to create heavy discovery costs in every patent case, and to punish small inventors who are unaware of the pitfalls of the [pre-AIA sec tion 102(b)].\" Id.7 As noted above, with the enactment of the AIA, the United States joined the rest of the industrialized world in having a system which awards patents to the first inventor to file an application covering the claimed invention. Under a first-inventor- to-file standard, the reasons for barring an inventor from 6 As examples, the Congressional Record cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]191 Fed. Appx. 926. All citations to the Congressional Record in this brief are to volume 157 of the daily edition. 7 See also cases discussed at note 12 supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Disgorgement Itself Is a Shape-Shifting Punishment",
		"context": "12, 2010). When the Com- mission seeks disgorgement, courts first require the SEC to distinguish between legally and illegally ob- tained profits. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Commis- sion then is required to identify the causal link be- tween the unlawful activity and the profit to be disgorged. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "890 F.2d 1215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Disgorgement Itself Is a Shape-Shifting Punishment",
		"context": "at 1231 (\"Since disgorgement primarily 12 serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may ex- ercise its equitable power on ly over property causally related to the wrongdoing.\"). Because these calculations are logistically difficult for courts to verify, the SEC is required to provide merely a \" 'reasonable approximation of profits caus-ally connected to the violation.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The defendant then shoulders the burden of proving that the SEC's estimate is unreason- able. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FACT ACT, WHICH COMPELS SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATES BASED ON CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT, MUST BE ANALYZED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, WHICH IT CANNOT SURVIVE",
		"context": "The First Amendment protec ts against both speech prohibitions and comp ulsions . \"Since all speech inher- ently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide what no t to say.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It was wrong for the Ninth Circuit to apply in- termediate scrutiny when assessing the constitution- ality of the compulsory disclosures. Regulations that compe l speech , such as the Cali- fornia FACT Act , are per se content -based because they require the speaker to alter the content of their message or to speak where they would otherwise re- main silent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FACT ACT, WHICH COMPELS SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATES BASED ON CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT, MUST BE ANALYZED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, WHICH IT CANNOT SURVIVE",
		"context": "Regulations that compe l speech , such as the Cali- fornia FACT Act , are per se content -based because they require the speaker to alter the content of their message or to speak where they would otherwise re- main silent. Riley , 487 U.S. at 795 (\"Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.\") Content -based regu- lations of speech \"are presumptively invalid,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and courts \"apply the most exacting scrutiny\" to determine 14 whether regulations that discriminate based on con- tent are constitutional. Turner Broad. Sys.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FACT ACT, WHICH COMPELS SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATES BASED ON CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT, MUST BE ANALYZED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, WHICH IT CANNOT SURVIVE",
		"context": "Turner Broad. Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Contrary to the Ninth Circuit 's analysis , it is not necessary for a provision to discriminate based on viewpoint , in addition to regulating speech based on content , to warra nt strict scrutiny. As th e Court re- cently affirmed in Reed v. Town of Gilbert , \"Govern- ment di scrimination among viewpoints —or the regu- lation of speech based on 'the specific motivating ide- ology of the opinion or perspecti ve of the speaker' —is a 'more blatant' and 'egregious form of content discrim- ination.'\"135 S. Ct. 2218.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FACT ACT, WHICH COMPELS SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATES BASED ON CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT, MUST BE ANALYZED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, WHICH IT CANNOT SURVIVE",
		"context": "512 U.S. 622 . Contrary to the Ninth Circuit 's analysis , it is not necessary for a provision to discriminate based on viewpoint , in addition to regulating speech based on content , to warra nt strict scrutiny. As th e Court re- cently affirmed in Reed v. Town of Gilbert , \"Govern- ment di scrimination among viewpoints —or the regu- lation of speech based on 'the specific motivating ide- ology of the opinion or perspecti ve of the speaker' —is a 'more blatant' and 'egregious form of content discrim- ination.'\"[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, the laudable pur pose of protecting public health cannot save the disclosure provisions from the most intense levels of inquiry. \"A law that is content -based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content -neutral justificati on, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contai ned' in the regulated speech.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE FACT ACT, WHICH COMPELS SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATES BASED ON CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT, MUST BE ANALYZED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, WHICH IT CANNOT SURVIVE",
		"context": "\"A law that is content -based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content -neutral justificati on, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contai ned' in the regulated speech.\" Id. at 2228 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), and \"an innocuous justifica- tion cannot transform a facially content -based law into one that is content neutral.\" Id. at 2228.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity to Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of the Law",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Am. Needle, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]388 U.S. 350. In that light, this case is particularly important. In 2014, trademarks account ed for $6.1 trillion in value added to the U.S. gross domestic product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity to Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of the Law",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Am. Needle, 560 U.S. 183[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that light, this case is particularly important. In 2014, trademarks account ed for $6.1 trillion in value added to the U.S. gross domestic product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity to Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of the Law",
		"context": "Even where the litigants are willing to take a bankruptcy case all the way to this Court, the bankruptcy doctrine of \"equitable mootness\" may preclude appellate review. Under that doctrine, an appellate court may decline to review the merits of a bankruptcy appeal \"when, even though effective 27 relief conceivably could be fashioned, implementation of that relief would be inequitable\" because the debtor's plan of reorganization has been confirmed and \"substantially consummated.\" E.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That doctrine is not applicable here because no plan of reorganization has been filed, and there plainly is monetary relief that could be granted to petitioner. 6 Despite the fact that the issue presented by the petition is not likely to come again soon before this Court, it frequently is litigated below and is of day- to-day concern to trademark owners and practitioners as it affects essentially every trademark license.",
		"citation_value_orig": "691 F.3d 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity to Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of the Law",
		"context": "INTA urges this Court to take advantage of the opportunity before it to resolve the split and to adopt the approach taken in Sunbeam . 6 The equitable mootness doctrine has been criticized because it \"can easily be used as a weapon to prevent any appellate review of bankruptcy court orde rs confirming reorganization plans.\" Nordhoff Invs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 F.3d 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent",
		"context": "Those cases thus provide no meaningful support for petitioners' effort to read \"full\" to mean nothing at all. 1. The first decision in petitioners' trilogy, Crawford Fitting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) authorizes courts to award costs \"above and beyond\" those set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§1920 and 1821. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent",
		"context": "at 441-42, 445. 2. The next case in petitioners' trilogy is West Virginia University Hospitals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Casey did not involve how to interpret the word \"costs\" (let alone the te rm \"full costs\"). Instead, it involved only how to in terpret the term \"attorney's fees.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent",
		"context": "Far from supporting petitioners' position, then, Casey affirmatively undermines it. 3. Petitioners' final case, Arlington Central School District Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is no more helpful to them. Murphy involved whether an attorneys'-fees-shifting statute virtually identical to the one in Casey permitted recovery of expert fees. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A GENERAL \"INFORMATIONAL INTEREST\" IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONAL INFORMATION",
		"context": "That said, however, this case adumbrates a deeper error that has increasingly permeated thejurisprudence of the lower federal courts—namely, thata nebulous \"informational interest\" asserted by thegovernment can justify the compelled disclosure bynon-profit organization s of sensitive internal information, including the identities of their donors.Although the precise formulation varies somewhatamong jurisdictions, this concept is generally framed by(1) appeals to the precedents of this Court, and 16 (2) conclusory and superficia l assertions that coerced disclosure is conducive to more efficacious voter decision-making in candidate or ballot measureelections. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (stating that \"the reporting anddisclosure obligations provide information to theelectorate about who is speaking—information that 'isvital to the efficient functioning of the marketplace ofideas, and thus to advancing the democratic objectivesunderlying the First Amendment'\" (internal citationsomitted)); Nat'l Org. for Marriage, 669 F.3d 34.Both underpinnings of this argument are incorrect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A GENERAL \"INFORMATIONAL INTEREST\" IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONAL INFORMATION",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 786 F.3d 1182 (stating that \"the reporting anddisclosure obligations provide information to theelectorate about who is speaking—information that 'isvital to the efficient functioning of the marketplace ofideas, and thus to advancing the democratic objectivesunderlying the First Amendment'\" (internal citationsomitted)); Nat'l Org. for Marriage, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].Both underpinnings of this argument are incorrect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "669 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal Indian law applies to members of recognized tribes",
		"context": "For federal Indian law purposes, an Indian is a person that is recognized as having a political relationship with one of the 574 recognized tribes. That has been the required relationship since this Nation was founded. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; The Kansas Indians , 72 U.S. 737; 31 U.S. 515. The other material point is that the federally rec- ognized tribes always have had, and still do have, the sole authority to determine their own membership. Plains Com.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal Indian law applies to members of recognized tribes",
		"context": "For federal Indian law purposes, an Indian is a person that is recognized as having a political relationship with one of the 574 recognized tribes. That has been the required relationship since this Nation was founded. 70 U.S. 407; The Kansas Indians , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 31 U.S. 515. The other material point is that the federally rec- ognized tribes always have had, and still do have, the sole authority to determine their own membership. Plains Com.",
		"citation_value_orig": "72 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal Indian law applies to members of recognized tribes",
		"context": "For federal Indian law purposes, an Indian is a person that is recognized as having a political relationship with one of the 574 recognized tribes. That has been the required relationship since this Nation was founded. 70 U.S. 407; The Kansas Indians , 72 U.S. 737; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The other material point is that the federally rec- ognized tribes always have had, and still do have, the sole authority to determine their own membership. Plains Com.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal Indian law applies to members of recognized tribes",
		"context": "The other material point is that the federally rec- ognized tribes always have had, and still do have, the sole authority to determine their own membership. Plains Com. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Santa Clara 436 U.S. 49. In older cases, determining whether a recognized tribe considered a person to be a member of the tribe could be difficult; but under current practice it rarely is. Most tribes have constitutional and statutory law governing membership.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal Indian law applies to members of recognized tribes",
		"context": "The other material point is that the federally rec- ognized tribes always have had, and still do have, the sole authority to determine their own membership. Plains Com. 554 U.S. 316; Santa Clara [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In older cases, determining whether a recognized tribe considered a person to be a member of the tribe could be difficult; but under current practice it rarely is. Most tribes have constitutional and statutory law governing membership.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying a Standard Based on Sex Stereotyping would Require a Court to Second Guess Every Employment Decision to Determine if it was Tainted by a Sex Stereotype",
		"context": ". Title VII was never meant to be a \"general civility code.\" Oncale , 523 U.S. at 81; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue is whether the employee can prove he or she was discriminated against based on his or her sex. Oncale , 523 U.S. at 81.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying a Standard Based on Sex Stereotyping would Require a Court to Second Guess Every Employment Decision to Determine if it was Tainted by a Sex Stereotype",
		"context": "Oncale , 523 U.S. at 81. As such, courts have properly held that sexual behav- ior, including sexual orientation, are not covered under Title VII. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fourth Circuit looked at the scope of Title VII in a post- Price Waterhouse world. In his concurring opinion, Judge Niemeyer noted that 27 Title VII does not cover every difference based on sex. \"It follows that in prohibiti ng sex discrimination solely on the basis of whether the employee is a man or a woman, Title VII does not reach discrimination based on other reasons, such as the employee's sexual behav- ior, prudery, or vulnerability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "77 F.3d 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Border crossing is a key part of foreign or interstate transportation",
		"context": "For example, the Court has held that tra nsportation \"wholly within a State\" is not \"in- terstate transportation\" even though, for the passenger, th e intrastate transportation was \"simply one element in a continuous interstate transporta- tion.\" New York ex rel. Pa. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Knight , as in Gulf Oil and Hopkins , the Court rejected a \"close relation to interstate com- merce\" test because it lacked any objective limits. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "192 U.S. 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Border crossing is a key part of foreign or interstate transportation",
		"context": "§ 1). That's Southwest's point: Congress didn't want to exempt classes of workers th at trans- ported goods or people exclusively within federal territories and thus crossed no borders. Saxon relies on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Br. 35 -36.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 642",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard",
		"context": "1. Like the Eleventh Circuit in this case, the Ninth Circuit has determined, in light of Gross , that the ADEA's federal -sector provision requires but -for cau- sation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those decisions directly conflict with the D.C. Circuit's decision in Ford , which was decided after Gross but nevertheless rejected the but -for standard 19 and held that a federal -sector ADEA violation is estab- lished if \"age was a factor in the employer's decision.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F.3d 599",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard",
		"context": "Other courts after Ford have noted the D.C. Circuit's ADEA causation holding but have de- clined to resolve the question . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The importance of th at circuit conflict is height- ened by the fact that the EEOC and MSPB agree with the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "737 F.3d 1093",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard",
		"context": "1101 et seq ., the employee may also as an alternative seek MSPB review of certain more serious personnel actions allegedly violating th ose federal -sector provisions . 5 U.S.C. 7702(a)(1)(B) (i) and (iv); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in both contexts, if the EEOC or MSPB rules against the agency employer, the govern- ment cannot obtain judicial review of th e decision , which then bind s the government . See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard",
		"context": "7703(d)(1). But because the Federal Circuit has held that OPM cannot seek judicial review under Section 7703(d) on the ground that the MSPB erroneously interpreted \" statutes and regulations relating to employment dis- crimination as set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1)(B),\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], at present the government cannot obtain judicial review of MSPB decisions that erroneously interpret the ADEA. 21 \" 'but for' standard\" for federal -sector ADEA and Title VII claims); 2015 WL 5042782. The MSPB is effectively bound by the EEOC's decisions on this issue , because a federal employee may obtain EEOC review of an MSPB decision concerning her discrimina- tion claim s. See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 F.3d 1084",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard",
		"context": "There is accordingly no basis to conclude that the standard implicitly applies to any federal -sector retali- ation claim that may b e available under Section 2000e -16. Even more fundamentally, t his Court has not deci ded whether Section 2000e -16(a)'s prohibition on \"discrimi- nation based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin\" extends to retaliation for protected EEO activity . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gomez -Perez , 553 U.S. at 4 88 n.4. B ut the Court has noted a possible basis for concluding that it does , and that basis would require applying a but ‐for causation standard . Although Section 2000e -16 does not directly 23 incorporate Title VII's private -sector retaliation prohi- bition in Section 2000e -3(a), it \"does incorporate a re- medial provision, [Section] 2000e- 5(g)(2)(A), that [itself ] authorizes relief for a violation of [Section] 2000e- 3(a).\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard",
		"context": "B. Every court of appeals to consider the question has held that a but -for causation governs federal -sector Title VII retaliation cla ims. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2017 WL 2241342; Miguel 2015 WL 1635932; Nita 2014 WL 3788011. Th e EEOC's mistaken approach is effectively binding on federal -agency de fendants. Such agencies are unable to seek judicial review of adverse EEOC decisions that 24 apply the wrong causation standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 1258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "C -11 n. 6. Any law or decree that deprives a property owner of a previously held right \"cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Inherent in Growers' private property rights is the right to exclude others from entering their properties. In fact, this Court has recog nized that the right to exclude is inherent in, and essential to, the \"bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "Inherent in Growers' private property rights is the right to exclude others from entering their properties. In fact, this Court has recog nized that the right to exclude is inherent in, and essential to, the \"bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]he con cept of property is often said to refer to a 'bundle of rights' that may be exercised with respect to that object —principally the right to possess the property , to use the property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by sale or gift . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "In identifying the sorts of physical entry that may constitute a taking, California Courts have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts , which provides additional insight into how the common law defines Growers' property rights by explaining the exceptions to liability for the tort of trespass. 3 See, e.g. , Wilson v. 3 The Court of Federal Claims has aptly explained the relationship between takings jurisprudence and tort law in defining property rights: [T]he common law of property relie[s] on tort principles, particularly trespass and nuisance, to help define the 7 Interlake Steel Co. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Restatement prohibits third parties from trespassing onto private property and provides only limited exceptions to a landowner 's right to exclude. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158.",
		"citation_value_orig": "649 P.2d 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "The development of takings law was, in effect, an ext ension of the principles of trespass and nuisance to the actions of the government. 65 Fed. Cl. 76. 4 Appeal voluntarily dismissed after being held in abeyance pending decision by the Virginia Supreme Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which similarly found a common -law right for utility company employees to enter private property to conduct survey work in conjunction with lawful eminent domain proceedings . 8 place. See 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (\"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in th e absence of a contrary legislative intent.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "801 S.E.2d 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "4 Appeal voluntarily dismissed after being held in abeyance pending decision by the Virginia Supreme Court in 801 S.E.2d 414 , which similarly found a common -law right for utility company employees to enter private property to conduct survey work in conjunction with lawful eminent domain proceedings . 8 place. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 616–17 (\"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in th e absence of a contrary legislative intent.\") (citing Continental Casualty 314 U.S. 527) . Thus, Growers continue to have the right to exclude union organizers from their private property as part of the \"bundle of sticks\" t hat makes up their property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "8 place. See 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (\"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in th e absence of a contrary legislative intent.\") (citing Continental Casualty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Thus, Growers continue to have the right to exclude union organizers from their private property as part of the \"bundle of sticks\" t hat makes up their property. See Loretto , 458 U.S. at 433.",
		"citation_value_orig": "314 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "A -17–A-18 (panel emphasizing that the Access Regulation does not give union organizers \"24 hours a day, 365 days a year\" access to Growers' properties ), with Chicago, B. & Q.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit erred in failing to analyze how Growers' property rights were defined by state law prior to the Access Regulation and specifically in failing to recognize the significant violation of the \"bundle of sticks\" that make up Growers' property rights when the state rescinds their right to exclude . 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "C -11 n.6. Any law or decree that deprives a property owner of a previously held right \"cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of 5 property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Inherent in Growers' private property rights is the right to exclude others from entering their properties. In fact, this Court has recognized that the right to exclude is \"perhaps the most funda mental of all property interests.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "Inherent in Growers' private property rights is the right to exclude others from entering their properties. In fact, this Court has recognized that the right to exclude is \"perhaps the most funda mental of all property interests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, state law may define property rights to allow a right of access to property for certain persons and purposes, but it must compensate the property owner for the taking —a fact recognized under California law. In Prop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "In identifying the sorts of physical entry that may constitute a taking, California c ourts have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts , which provides additional insight into how the common law defines Growers' property rights by explaining the except ions to liability for the tort of trespass. 2 See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Restatement prohibits third parties from trespassing onto private property and provides only limited exceptions to a landowner's right to exclude. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158.",
		"citation_value_orig": "649 P.2d 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "Cf. , Klemi 138 F. Supp. 3d 673.3 Indeed, the existence of such limited common -law exceptions demonstrates that Growers have the right to exclude in the first place. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, Growers continue to have the right to exclude union organizers from their private property. See 458 U.S. 419 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "See 446 U.S. 608 . Thus, Growers continue to have the right to exclude union organizers from their private property. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Growers must , therefore, be compensated when union organizers exercise the right of access granted them by the Access Regulation , regardless of the Access Regulation's provision of procedures for union organizers to follow when accessing Growers' properties. Compare Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "Growers must , therefore, be compensated when union organizers exercise the right of access granted them by the Access Regulation , regardless of the Access Regulation's provision of procedures for union organizers to follow when accessing Growers' properties. Compare Pet. 3 Appeal voluntarily dismissed after being held in abeyance pending decision by the Virginia Supreme Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which similarly found a common -law right for utility company employees to enter private property to conduct survey work in conjunction with lawful eminent domain proceedings . 8 App. A -17–A-18 (panel emphasizing that the Access Regulation does not give union organizers \"24 hours a day, 365 days a year\" access to Growers' properties ), with Chicago, B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "801 S.E.2d 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
		"context": "A -17–A-18 (panel emphasizing that the Access Regulation does not give union organizers \"24 hours a day, 365 days a year\" access to Growers' properties ), with Chicago, B. & Q.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit erred in failing to analyze how Growers' property rights were defined by state law prior to the Access Regulation and specifically in failing to recognize the significant violation of those property rights when the state rescinded Growers' right to exclude.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Sought To Promote Innovation For Minority Small Inventors .. 8",
		"context": "See Lisa D. Cook, Policies to Broaden Participation in the Innovation Process, T HE HAMILTON PROJECT , 8-10, 12- 13 (2020). Parsing the Congressional record for the \"extra - textual evidence\" reveals th at th e purpose of the statute is to balance the needs to protect the small , non-corporate inventor before the PTAB, and allow greater efficiency and uniformity of patent decisions . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fears of the disproportionate effect of the AIA on African -American , Hispanic, and female inventors i s well- founded. Today, the PTAB is extremely popular with large corporate entities due to the more favorable standards and procedure s to challenge patents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Delegate Sovereign Authority to SEC ALJs Because They Lack the Power to Render and Enforce Final, Binding Decisions",
		"context": "Their st atutory duties include neither final decision-making authority nor enforcement power, unlike the special trial judges in Freytag (who could enforce discovery orders in all cases and make final decisions in many, 501 U.S. at 881-82). 1. The creation in the APA of ALJs (then hearing examiners) as \"classified Civil Service employees,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was a grand compromise between two competing objectives: agency control and adjudicative impartiality. How Congress ultimately struck the balance confirms that ALJs are employees, not officers. ALJs assist agencies through impartial fact finding and adjudication—but the agency may disregard their determinations at will.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Delegate Sovereign Authority to SEC ALJs Because They Lack the Power to Render and Enforce Final, Binding Decisions",
		"context": "ALJs assist agencies through impartial fact finding and adjudication—but the agency may disregard their determinations at will. a. As other amici have well described, 4 the Administrative Procedure Act was extraordinary legislation, passed unanimous ly by both houses, only after \"a long period of study and strife,\" Wong Yang [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Among the \"key objectives\" of the Act was the \"prevention of agency abuses of examiners' integrity and impartiality.\" Victor G. Rosenblum, Contexts and 4 See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Delegate Sovereign Authority to SEC ALJs Because They Lack the Power to Render and Enforce Final, Binding Decisions",
		"context": "The absence of the authority to bind confirms that Congress did not delegate sovereign power of the United States to ALJs. ALJs are instead unique civil service employees insulated from political influence through tenure and removal protections. They are insulated \"from political interference,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and are \"not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at th e whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons.\" Ramspeck , 345 U.S. at 142. But they are not shielded from plenary agency policy control, and serve as front-line, advisory adjudicators—not final decision-makers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Drivers Must Not Be Precluded From Claiming Fourth Amendment Protection Merely Because The Place Searched Was An Automobile",
		"context": ". While i t is undisputed that the home is entitled to \"s pecial protection as the center of the private lives of our people, \" Carter , 525 U.S. at 99, the court has repeatedly held that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in places other than the person's own home. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host's home); see also 565 U.S. 400 ; 480 U.S. 709. In O'Connor , the Court found that a public employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. O'Connor , 480 U.S. at 718.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Drivers Must Not Be Precluded From Claiming Fourth Amendment Protection Merely Because The Place Searched Was An Automobile",
		"context": ". While i t is undisputed that the home is entitled to \"s pecial protection as the center of the private lives of our people, \" Carter , 525 U.S. at 99, the court has repeatedly held that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in places other than the person's own home. See495 U.S. 91 (holding that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host's home); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 480 U.S. 709. In O'Connor , the Court found that a public employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. O'Connor , 480 U.S. at 718.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Drivers Must Not Be Precluded From Claiming Fourth Amendment Protection Merely Because The Place Searched Was An Automobile",
		"context": ". While i t is undisputed that the home is entitled to \"s pecial protection as the center of the private lives of our people, \" Carter , 525 U.S. at 99, the court has repeatedly held that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in places other than the person's own home. See495 U.S. 91 (holding that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host's home); see also 565 U.S. 400 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In O'Connor , the Court found that a public employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. O'Connor , 480 U.S. at 718.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Drivers Must Not Be Precluded From Claiming Fourth Amendment Protection Merely Because The Place Searched Was An Automobile",
		"context": "Prouse , 440 U.S. at 662. As the Court noted in Terry v. Ohio , people are not stripped of Fourth Amendment protection when they walk out of their homes onto public sidewalks. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.\" Prouse , 440 U.S. at 66 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Drivers Must Not Be Precluded From Claiming Fourth Amendment Protection Merely Because The Place Searched Was An Automobile",
		"context": "\"Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.\" Prouse , 440 U.S. at 66 3. Recently, the Court reaffirmed a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the automobile context in Jones , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court found that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy on the underbody of a vehicle. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "Petitioners' object -of-the-challenged -action rule ig- nores the bedrock principle that the federal government may not regulate the States directly . \"[T]he Framers ex- plicitly chose a Const itution that confers upon Congress 18 the power to regulate individuals, not States.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[C]onspicu- ously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States.\" 138 S. Ct. 1461.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "New 505 U.S. 144 . \"[C]onspicu- ously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A rule prohibiting States from suing the federal government unless the federal government has directly regulated States is , at first approximation, a rule that States may not sue at all .2 That constitutional flaw aside , DHS argues (at 11- 13) that no matter how much harm a S tate might suffer be- cause of e xecutive action , that S tate lacks standing so long as that injury is imposed indirectly. T hat ignores that the injury in Massachusetts arose indirectly : Mas- sachusetts based its injury on the possibility that the EPA's decision whether to regulate greenhouse gases might contribute to a rise in sea levels, which might con- tribute to the erosion of its shoreline.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522- 23. Because petitioners assert that such a downstream effect is non-cognizable, accepting petition- ers' argument would require overrul ing Massachusetts . So, too, with this Court's recent decision in Depart- ment of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , where a State \"assert[ ed] a number of injuries —dimin- ishment of political representation, loss of federal funds, degradation of census data, and diversion of resources — all of which turn[ed] on their expectation that reinstating a citizen ship question will depress the census response rate and lead to an inaccurate population count.\" Id. at 2 Nor do petitioners explain how their principle would operate elsewhere.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "Other cases suggest the same result. DACA at most indirectly affected the University of California . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. DAPA likewise indirectly injured Texas, yet an equally divided Court affirmed a judgment holding the program unlawful. 579 U.S. 547.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "E.g. , Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Petitioners fail to ground the ir direct -injury rule in precedent or even sound policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "2. Petitioners fail to ground the ir direct -injury rule in precedent or even sound policy. a. DHS 's reliance (at 12-13) on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is misplaced. There, a State challenge d the collection of federal inheritance taxes when state law barred such taxes. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "273 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "12 (citing Printz v. United States , 521U.S. 898, 920 (1997)), or from a generalized \"injur[y]\" to State econo- mies, id. at 13 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court's unreasoned order in 400 U.S. 886, is similarly distinguishable for at least three reasons. First , that case involved a bill of complaint regarding the legality of the Vietnam W ar, which w as a nonjusticiable political question .",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "898, 920 (1997)), or from a generalized \"injur[y]\" to State econo- mies, id. at 13 (quoting 502 U.S. 437). This Court's unreasoned order in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is similarly distinguishable for at least three reasons. First , that case involved a bill of complaint regarding the legality of the Vietnam W ar, which w as a nonjusticiable political question . E.g., 457 F.2d 809.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "This Court's unreasoned order in 400 U.S. 886, is similarly distinguishable for at least three reasons. First , that case involved a bill of complaint regarding the legality of the Vietnam W ar, which w as a nonjusticiable political question . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast , the district court found here that the States suffered specific, particularized harms not shared by the public at large . Supra pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 F.2d 809",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "§ 702. b. Petitioners' less-relevant policy objections fare no better. DHS complains (at 16-17) that S tates sometimes challenge executive actions, pointing to litigation brought in recent years by California and Texas. But as the scope of the federal government has expanded to reach nearly every aspect of daily life, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that California filed 122 lawsuits against the Trump Admin- istration and Washington filed 82, the Center for Biolog- ical Diversity boasted that it \"resisted the Trump a dmin- istration in every way possible\" through \"266 lawsuits against the Trump administration from its inception to its last day.\" Administration Lawsuit Tracker , C ENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY , https://www.biologi- caldiversity.org/campaigns/ trump_ lawsuits/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2022) . And the ACLU filed at least \"400 legal ac- tions against the Trump administration.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "237. It could have been for any number of other partisan or practical reasons, or for no reason at all . And contrary to petitioners' assertions (at 15), nei- ther [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], nor Raines , 521 U.S. at 826, are analogous. Georgia re- jected a challenge to the legality of Reconstruction as a nonjusticiable question, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77, and Raines refused to recognize a group of legislators' argu- ments for standing based on the \"meaning\" and \"integ- rity\" of their votes , 521 U.S. at 825.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
		"context": "Not even petitioners claim that the legality of the F inal Memorandum is a po- litical question, and the States' standing rests on 23 concrete financial injuries —not abstract claims of politi- cal power. By contrast, \"certain harms readily qualify as con- crete injuries under Article III .\" TransUnion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The most obvious are traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 S. Ct. 2190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The majority rule does not eliminate the mootness doctrine.",
		"context": "The mootness doctrine is alive and well for those cases. The situation here—where the officials already violated Chike's and Joseph's constitutional rights—presents the flip side of mootness: fed eral courts are obligated to adjudicate live controversies. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plus, the officials' concer n for the vitality of the mootness doctrine is selective. They concede that the doctrine has not crumbled ev en though a plaintiff can avoid mootness by seeking compensation for negli-gible financial damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
		"context": "\"The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.\" Volt Info. Scis., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, the only possible way that the statute can preempt state law is through implied \"purposes and objectives\" preemption—that is, a state law is preempted if, and only if, it \"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
		"context": "Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1901 . The text of the FAA's \"primary substantive provision,\" section 2, serves as the basis of its implied preemptive power. AT&T Mobility, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It provides that: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
		"context": "at 1426–27 (noting the \"FAA's edict against singling out [arbitration] contracts for disfavored treatment\"). The most obvious example of such laws are those that prohibit outright the arbitration of certain claims. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this category of preempted laws also includes other -8- state laws that explicitly or implicitly disfavor arbitration, such as \"clear-statement rules\" requiring explicit language before arbitration contracts will be enforceable that do not apply to other kinds of contracts. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1425; Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. 681.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
		"context": "See, e.g., Marmet Health Care 565 U.S. 530. But this category of preempted laws also includes other -8- state laws that explicitly or implicitly disfavor arbitration, such as \"clear-statement rules\" requiring explicit language before arbitration contracts will be enforceable that do not apply to other kinds of contracts. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1425; Doctor's Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Category 2: The second category includes state laws that override the parties' arbitration contract by rewriting \"the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted\" or the terms specifying \"with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes.\" Epic Sys.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
		"context": "Category 2: The second category includes state laws that override the parties' arbitration contract by rewriting \"the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted\" or the terms specifying \"with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes.\" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Once again focusing on section 2 , this Court has read the statute's textual command that arbitration contracts \"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable\" as articulating a \"principal purpose\" of ensuring \"that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.\" Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
		"context": ". . arbitration procedures without the parties' consent\"); Lamps Plus, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In sum, the FAA's text reflects two purposes: Arbitration contracts should be treated the same as non- arbitration contracts, and agreements about how and with whom to arbitrate should be enforced according to their terms. State laws that conflict with those textually discernible purposes—and only those purposes—are preempted under the FAA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. U-M's Sustained Race-Neutral Initiatives Have Not Achieved Racial Diversity In Enrollments",
		"context": "\"59 Indeed, making socioeconomically based admissions the sole means of seeking to increase nonwhite enrollment can exacerb ate stereotypes rather than alleviating them. 57 See generally Park, supra n.6, at 472 (\"data indicate that class - based affirmative action would result in substantially lower levels of racial diversity\"); id. at 490 (\"class -based affirmative action does not yield the sa me amount of racial diversity as race -conscious admis- sions policies\"); San Francisco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Elena M. Bernal, Alberto F. Cabrera, & Patrick T. Terenzini, The Relationship Between Race and Socioeco- nomic Status (SES): Implications for Institutional Research and Admissions Policies 8-14 (AIR 2000 Annual Forum Paper) (conclud- ing that class -based admissions policies will not maintain or increase racial or ethnic diversity); Richard H. Fallo n, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage , 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1913, 1947 -1948 (1996) (arguing that socioeconomic admissions policies will not pro- duce racial diversity).",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F. Supp. 2d 1051",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hardison's undue hardship test is dicta that lacks stare decisis effect",
		"context": "16 Basic principles of precedent confirm this conclusion. \"[E]xpressions\" in an opinion that \"are beyond the point involved do not come within the rule of stare deci- sis.\" Humphrey's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44. In other words, if the prior case \"did not address the point now at issue,\" the Court is \"not bound to follow any dicta in the case.\" Van 141 S. Ct. 1648.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hardison's undue hardship test is dicta that lacks stare decisis effect",
		"context": "16 Basic principles of precedent confirm this conclusion. \"[E]xpressions\" in an opinion that \"are beyond the point involved do not come within the rule of stare deci- sis.\" Humphrey's 295 U.S. 602; see also Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, if the prior case \"did not address the point now at issue,\" the Court is \"not bound to follow any dicta in the case.\" Van 141 S. Ct. 1648.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hardison's undue hardship test is dicta that lacks stare decisis effect",
		"context": "; see also 142 S. Ct. 2486. Rather, the Court is free to depart from its earlier statements where \"more complete argu- ment demonstrate[s] that the dicta is not correct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying these settled principles, the Court owes no deference to Hardison 's dicta about the meaning of Title VII's undue-hardship provision, and it should proceed to interpret that phrase in accord with statutory-construc- tion precepts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.",
		"context": "42a-45a. This Court has interpreted this provision as \"appl [ying] only to three discrete actions that the [Sec- retary] may take: her 'decision or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal or- ders.'\" AADC , 525 U.S. at 482 (quoting section 1252(g)) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that this Court rejected in AADC . They assert that the rescission is unreviewable be- cause it is \"part of the process by which [the alien's] removability will be determined.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit also correctly held that the APA permits j udicial review here. The APA \"mani- fests a congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The APA thus provides that \"[a] person suffering legal wrong be-cause of agency action is entitled to judicial re- view thereof.\" 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 879",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.",
		"context": "§ 704. Consistent with Congress's intent, t his Court ap- plies a \"strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action ,\" which the government \"bears a heavy burden\" to overcome. Mach Mining, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (courts shall \"set aside agenc y action\" that is \"not in accordance with law\"). This Court has recognized that it is the role of the Judiciary to evaluate an agency's claims that Congress has re- quired it to act, or refrain from acting. See 555 U.S. 511.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.",
		"context": "Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (courts shall \"set aside agenc y action\" that is \"not in accordance with law\"). This Court has recognized that it is the role of the Judiciary to evaluate an agency's claims that Congress has re- quired it to act, or refrain from acting. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recognizing that courts are the ultimate arbiters of the scope of agency authority , the courts of appeals have long held that agency action is reviewable where it is based on an agency' s interpretation of a statu te. See, e.g., Montana Air, 898 F.2d at 757 (\"Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act precludes re- view of a proper plaintiff's timely challenge of an agency's announcement of its interpretation of a stat-ute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.",
		"context": "Bowen , 476 U.S. at 672 n.3. One such \"very narrow\" exception that applies only in \"rare instances,\" Overton Park , 401 U.S. at 410, is for actions \"committed to agency discretion by law,\" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) ; see also Weyerhaeuser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To escape judi- cial review, an agency action must be one for which a court \"would have no meaningful standard against 28 which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion,\" i.e. , where there is \"no law to apply.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.",
		"context": "30 \"[i]n contrast to nonenforcement decisions,\" such de-nials are \"more apt to involve legal as opposed to fac- tual analysis\" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The rescission of DACA \"involves the sort of routine dispute that federal courts regularly review,\" Weyer- haeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370, namely, an agency's belief that its actions are compelled by statute . This Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is not to the contrary. BLE involved an agency action —de- nial of a petition to reconsider based on material er- ror—that , like the individual nonenforcement deci- sion at issue in Chaney , was \"traditionally\" unreview- able. The Court noted that an \"otherwise unreviewa- ble action\" does not \"become[] reviewable\" merely be- cause \"the agency gives a 'reviewable' reason.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Employment Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Do Not Involve Sex Discrimination Using Sex-Specific Stereotypes Prohibited By Price Waterhouse",
		"context": "( Id.) For decades, the Courts of Appeals had no diffi- culty rejecting this argument. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Vick- ers, 453 F.3d at 763; Medina , 413 F.3d at 1135. The Sec- ond Circuit and Seventh Circuit recently changed course and adopted the Price Waterhouse sex stereo- typing argument advanced by Bostock. However, sex stereotyping is not a stand-alone claim, but rather may constitute evidence that one sex was favored over another sex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.3d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Including harm from foreign conduct for full compensation under section 284 does not impermissibly extend U.S. law extraterritoriality",
		"context": "This Court has not applied its extraterritorial- ity framework to the relief granted once a cause of ac- tion is established. This is consistent with the C ourt's prior patent de- cisions. For example, in Goulds Manufacturing Com- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], infringe- ment liability was based on the defendant 's manufac- ture of the accused devices in the United States and the issue on appeal was limited to the remedy for such infringement —i.e., disgorgement of the infringer's 10 profits.7 The remedy considered profits from the de- fendant's domestic and foreign sales: \"there was no market for pumps adapted to this particular use, ex- cept in the oil-producing regions of Pennsylvania and Canada .\" Goulds , 105 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added). The Court awarded disgorgement of profits from all of the defendant's sales without parsing out profits from the Canadian sales.",
		"citation_value_orig": "105 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Including harm from foreign conduct for full compensation under section 284 does not impermissibly extend U.S. law extraterritoriality",
		"context": "The right conferred by a patent un- der our law is confined to the United States and its Territories (Rev. Stat., § 4884) and infringement of this right can- not be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country. … The cause of [ Goulds ] Manufacturing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Disgorgement of the infring- ers profits was an available remedy under the patent statute at that time. 11 States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "105 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Including harm from foreign conduct for full compensation under section 284 does not impermissibly extend U.S. law extraterritoriality",
		"context": "Only en- tities that perform the domestic conduct covered by § 271(f) are liable under that provision. Entities whos e relevant conduct occurred entirely abroad — e.g., entities that combined abroad the components supplied from the U.S. —are not liable under § 271(f). 12 This is consistent with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where an improved gaffe for sailing vessels covered by a U.S. patent was made and in- stalled abroad on a foreign vessel. The patent holder sought to establish infringement liability based on that vessel entering and anchoring in a U.S. port. The Court ruled that liability in such instances \"were not in the contemplation of Congress in enacting the pa- tent laws, and cannot, upon any sound construction, be regarded as embracing them.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mallory's position would expand general jurisdiction by gutting Goodyear and Daimler.",
		"context": "Since International Shoe , specific jurisdiction has been \"the centerpiece of mo dern jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced role.\" Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Spec ific jurisdiction allows a suit that \"arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts\" with the forum. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mallory's position would expand general jurisdiction by gutting Goodyear and Daimler.",
		"context": "14 Specific jurisdiction's primacy makes sense. Before International Shoe , most personal-jurisdiction doc- trine involving corporations sought to ensure \"the ju- risdiction of local courts in controversies growing out of transactions within the state.\" Morris & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts developed various work-arounds—including registration-jurisdiction—to try to square that com- mon-sense goal with Pennoyer 's rigid, territorial rules. Specific jurisdiction replaced those rickety concepts, ensuring that an activity \"subject to the State's regulation\" will suppo rt a suit in the state's courts, Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, and making regis- tration-jurisdiction \"obsolete,\" see Matthew Kipp, In- ferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction , 9 Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "279 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mallory's position would expand general jurisdiction by gutting Goodyear and Daimler.",
		"context": "571 U.S. at 137–38. It would, in countle ss cases, render irrele- vant the \"relationship among the defendant, the fo-rum, and the litigation,\" which is International Shoe 's touchstone. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it would largel y moot the \"reciprocity\" analysis underlying specific jurisdiction: \"When (but only when) a company 'exercises the privilege of con- ducting activities within a state' … the State may hold the company to account for related misconduct .\" Ford Motor 141 S. Ct. 1017.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation",
		"context": "92-238, at 22; S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 12-13. This Court highlighted the link between Title VII's federal-sector provision and the Constitution's equal protection guarantee in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a lengthy discussion of the provision's history, the Court emphasized that the statute was needed because— even though \"federal employment discrimination clearly violated . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 820",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation",
		"context": "32 Title VII's roots in the Constitution's nondiscrimination guarantee bear directly on the question presented here. As noted above, the Constitution makes it unlawful for the government to discriminate by \"erect[ing] a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group.\" Northeastern Fla., 508 U.S. at 664-66 (1993) (citing Turner , 396 U.S. at 362, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court has therefore repeatedly indicated that discrimination violates the Constitution even if it is not proved to be the but-for cause of the denial of a particular benefit. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation",
		"context": "Schs. , 551 U.S. at 718-19; Gratz , 539 U.S. at 261-62; Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20; Adarand Constructors , 515 U.S. at 211; Bakke , 438 U.S. at 280 n.14; cf. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 This Court's teaching thus makes clear that the Constitution protects against unequal treatment in the federal decision-making process. A person suffers a constitutional injury under the equal protection clause not only when discriminatory animus causes a particular adverse decision, but when he or she is 4 In Lesage , this Court held that the government can avoid liability for damages in a Section 1983 action by proving that the discrimination in question was not a but-for cause of the underlying decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation",
		"context": "Dist. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the Court nonetheless confirmed that such discriminatory conduct is unlawful—and can therefore be enjoined—without such a showing. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation",
		"context": "92- 415, at 13-14. As this Court explained in Morton v. Mancari , the provision was \"in large part merely a codification of prior anti-discrimination Executive Orders that had proved ineffective because of inadequate enforcement machinery.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It also sought to give effect to the Civil Rights Act's statement that it is \"the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for Federal employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.\" See H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation",
		"context": "6 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-599, at 23 (1994) (noting that President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10590 in response to the Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Second Amendment Has Historically Protected the Right and Ability of Minority Groups to Defend Themselves",
		"context": "The Federal 5 Government realized this too. Congressional debate surrounding the Freedmen's Bureau Act noted that the Founders favored personal firearm owner ship for self - defense, and understood that this right extended to African -Americans. District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Military officials entrusted with g overning these areas countermanded State legislation stripping African -Americans of their firearms. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Permit Governments to Enact Race-Conscious Measures to Ensure Equality of Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race",
		"context": "Rejecting efforts to es- tablish a constitutional proscription solely on racial discrimination, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend- ment wrote a broad universal guarantee of equality that swept men and women of all races and groups into its coverage. \"Though in some initial drafts the Four- teenth Amendment was written to prohibit discrimi- nation against 'persons because of race, color, or previ- ous condition of servitude,' the Amendment submitted for consideration and later ratified contained more comprehensive terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather than simply prohibiting discrimination on ac- count of race or previous condition of servitude, \"[t]he fourteenth amendment extends its protection to races and classes, and prohibits any state legislation, which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws.\" The Civil Rights Cases , 109 U.S. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Permit Governments to Enact Race-Conscious Measures to Ensure Equality of Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race",
		"context": "511 U.S. 127. Rather than simply prohibiting discrimination on ac- count of race or previous condition of servitude, \"[t]he fourteenth amendment extends its protection to races and classes, and prohibits any state legislation, which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws.\" The Civil Rights Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In writing the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws into the Constitution, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment established an all-encom- passing guarantee of equality under the law in order to protect, among others, Black persons newly freed from enslavement, white Union sympathizers residing in the South, and Chinese immigrants in the West from state-sponsored discrimination. Report of the 6 Joint Committee on Reconstruction at the First Session Thirty-Ninth Congress xiii (1866) (\"[i]t was impossible to abandon [the newly freed slaves] without securing them their rights as free men and citizens\"); Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Permit Governments to Enact Race-Conscious Measures to Ensure Equality of Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race",
		"context": "There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What Justice Harlan's famous statement meant is that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, states were constitutionally forbidden to enact measures to \"humiliat[e] citizens of a particular race\" and thereby \"place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens now constituting a part of the political community called the People of the 7 United States.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Permit Governments to Enact Race-Conscious Measures to Ensure Equality of Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race",
		"context": "Faced with the task of ful- filling President Abraham Lincoln's promise of a \"new birth of freedom,\" and integrating Black Americans into the civic life of the nation as equals, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment concluded that race- conscious efforts were appropriate to further \"the le- gitimate interest government has in ensuring all peo- ple have equal opportunity regardless of their race.\" Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourteenth Amendment's Framers time and again rejected proposed constitutional language that would have precluded race-conscious measures de- signed to assist Black Americans in their transition to equal citizenship. See Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Permit Governments to Enact Race-Conscious Measures to Ensure Equality of Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race",
		"context": "In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to pre- vent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, under the Fourteenth Amendment, \"race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion\" to help realize the constitutional prom- ise of equal protection. Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 F.2d 836",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "The balancing analysis begins with the individual privacy interests at issue in this case —which heavily weigh the scale in favor of a categorical ban on the war- rantless pursuit of nonviolent misdemeanants into the home. The home , as w e have explained, is regarded as being at the \"archetype\" and \"very core\" of Fourth Amendment protection, the \"first among equals,\" where \"privacy expectations are most heightened\" and as be- ing the \"center of the private lives of our people.\" Geor- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, when weighing the privacy interests in an individual's \"cas- tle\" (Semayne's Case , 77 Eng. Rep. at 194) that \"the [K]ing of England may not enter\" (Cooley, supra at 299 n.3), the other side—legitimate governmental interests 13 in law enforcement —must bring incredibly dire inter- ests to the scale.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "See Blackstone, supra at 5. They are \"petty -offense[s].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Repeated scholarship reinforces the point that law enforcement interests in apprehending misdemean- ants are not as weighty as those in apprehending more serious crimes, because the \"conduct at issue in misde- meanors is typic ally not particularly dangerous. \" Alex- andr a Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low -Level Criminal Justice , 128 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "None of the recognized bases for the exigent circum- stances exception provide sufficient weight to vitiate the paramount right that nonviolent misdemeanants be secure in their homes. The exigent circumstances excep- tion in this Court's law can trace its origins to Johnson v. United States , where the Court explained that \" ex- ceptional circumstances\" can exist to tip this balance. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has never recog- nized that any such exceptional c ircumstances exist in the contex t of apprehending a suspected nonviolent misdemeanant . Instead , the Court has explained that the circumstances must be dire before it will permit warrantless home entry, such as \"assist[ing] persons 14 who are seriously injured or threatened with such in- jury\" (Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403), putting out a fire in a residence ( 436 U.S. 499 ), and preventing the \"'imminent destruction of evidence. '\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "333 U.S. 10. This Court has never recog- nized that any such exceptional c ircumstances exist in the contex t of apprehending a suspected nonviolent misdemeanant . Instead , the Court has explained that the circumstances must be dire before it will permit warrantless home entry, such as \"assist[ing] persons 14 who are seriously injured or threatened with such in- jury\" (Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403), putting out a fire in a residence ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), and preventing the \"'imminent destruction of evidence. '\" King , 563 U.S. at 460. In fact, this Court has long -recognized th e opposite for minor offenses —exi gent circumstances do not justify a warrantless entry into the home.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "King , 563 U.S. at 460. In fact, this Court has long -recognized th e opposite for minor offenses —exi gent circumstances do not justify a warrantless entry into the home. This Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that a warrantless entry into the home of an individual to arrest him for a minor, nonjailable, traffic offense is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, but the Court also intimated that nonviolent misde- meanors generally might also not qualify for the exigent circumstances exception in the home. For instance, the Court favorably cited to Justice Jackson's concurrence in 335 U.S. 451, a case involving the misdemeanor of carrying on a lottery, where Justice Jackson states it is a \"shocking proposi- tion that private homes\" may be invaded by officers \"fol- lowing up offenses that involve no violence or thr eats of it.\" Welsh , 466 U.S. at 751.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "In fact, this Court has long -recognized th e opposite for minor offenses —exi gent circumstances do not justify a warrantless entry into the home. This Court in 466 U.S. 740, held that a warrantless entry into the home of an individual to arrest him for a minor, nonjailable, traffic offense is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, but the Court also intimated that nonviolent misde- meanors generally might also not qualify for the exigent circumstances exception in the home. For instance, the Court favorably cited to Justice Jackson's concurrence in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case involving the misdemeanor of carrying on a lottery, where Justice Jackson states it is a \"shocking proposi- tion that private homes\" may be invaded by officers \"fol- lowing up offenses that involve no violence or thr eats of it.\" Welsh , 466 U.S. at 751. It thus followed, in the Court's words, that \"it is difficult to conceive of a war- rantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying of- fense is extremely minor.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "at 753. Nor will it be \"rea- sonable to enter a dwelling to make a warrantless ar- rest\" when there is a \"risk of losing evidence of a minor offense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Law enforcement also cannot point to the need for effective policing as a valid rationale for tipping the bal- ance in the contex t of nonviolent misdemeanors . Police officers can \"often request warrants rather quickly 15 these days\" and a majority of states \"provide for elec- tronic warrant applications\" or other procedures that allow officers to secure warrants by phone or email, without leaving the scene.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "Law enforcement also cannot point to the need for effective policing as a valid rationale for tipping the bal- ance in the contex t of nonviolent misdemeanors . Police officers can \"often request warrants rather quickly 15 these days\" and a majority of states \"provide for elec- tronic warrant applications\" or other procedures that allow officers to secure warrants by phone or email, without leaving the scene. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cal. Penal Code §§ 817, 1526. Indeed, officers in many states can call a judge directly and be authorized to affix the judge's signature to a warrant, can use an e -warrant procedure that can be electronically returned to an of- ficer, and can even e -mail warr ant requests to judges' iPads.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
		"context": "And, while offi cers are waiting those five short minutes before crossing the \"firm line at the entrance to the house\" (Payton , 445 U.S. at 590) , officers (including Weikert in this case) are entitled to stand guard outside the suspect's home and apply for a warrant there. While outside the suspect's home , an officer can still utilize or- dinary \"visual observation \" to determine if there is an- other exigency that would allow warrantless entry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Of course, securing a home and obtaining a warrant are not the only tools at an officer's disposal for effective policing. An officer, after following a misdemeanant to his house, can simply \"knock and talk,\" which is an \"in- creasingly popular law enforcement tool,\" although one which can be abused by police.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "A. \"The APA 'sets forth the procedure by which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject to review by the courts. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"directs that agency actions be 'set aside' if they are 'arbitrary ' or ' capricious, '\" id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "§ 706(2)(A) ). \"[I]n ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, \" a court must \"examin[e] the reasons for [an] agency decision[ ]\" and assess \"whether the decision was based on a consider - ation of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If an agency fails to engage in reasoned decision - making, \"[t]he reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for [the agency's] deficiencies. \" Motor Vehicle Mfrs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "If an agency fails to engage in reasoned decision - making, \"[t]he reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for [the agency's] deficiencies. \" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. U nder a \"foundational principle of administrative law \" predating and incorporated into the APA, \"a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. \" Michigan , 576 U.S. at 758 (citing 318 U.S. 80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "463 U.S. 29. U nder a \"foundational principle of administrative law \" predating and incorporated into the APA, \"a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. \" Michigan , 576 U.S. at 758 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As applied here, that foundational principle requires evaluating the FCC's rule changes based solely on the reasoning the agency set forth in the agency orders on review. If the Court determines that the FCC's orders do not reflect reasoned decisionmaking, the appropriate remedy is to direct the agency to \" 'deal with the problem afresh' by taking new agency action\" and \"comply[ing] with the procedural requirements \" associated therewith.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "If the Court determines that the FCC's orders do not reflect reasoned decisionmaking, the appropriate remedy is to direct the agency to \" 'deal with the problem afresh' by taking new agency action\" and \"comply[ing] with the procedural requirements \" associated therewith. 8 Regents of Univ. of Cal ., 140 S. Ct. at 1908 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]351 U.S. 192 . This Court has accorded the FCC's \"judgment regarding how the public interest is best served … substantial judicial deference. \" 450 U.S. 582 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "If the Court determines that the FCC's orders do not reflect reasoned decisionmaking, the appropriate remedy is to direct the agency to \" 'deal with the problem afresh' by taking new agency action\" and \"comply[ing] with the procedural requirements \" associated therewith. 8 Regents of Univ. of Cal ., 140 S. Ct. at 1908 (quoting 332 U.S. 194[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has accorded the FCC's \"judgment regarding how the public interest is best served … substantial judicial deference. \" 450 U.S. 582 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "of Cal ., 140 S. Ct. at 1908 (quoting 332 U.S. 194351 U.S. 192 . This Court has accorded the FCC's \"judgment regarding how the public interest is best served … substantial judicial deference. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Exercising its statutory charge, the FCC has determined that the public interest is served when ownership of broadcast media is diverse. See, e.g., NAB Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "NAB Pet. App . 40a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The court correctly conclude d that the FCC had not met that burden. As the court determined, the FCC's conclusions on the effect of its rule changes on minority and female ownership did not rest on \" its general expertise\" or \"support from commenters \" (except with respect to the newspaper/ broadcast cross -ownership rule), and the agency did not offer \" any theoretical models or analysis of what the likely effect of consolidation on ownership diver - sity would be. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "Further , in doing so, the court of appeals did not , as the FCC contends, impose procedures on the agency beyond those found in the APA \" as a prerequisite to any change \" in the ownership rules. See FCC Br. 35 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). In State Farm, this Court explained that Vermont Yankee is not \"a talisman under which any decision is by definition unimpeachable \" and that holding agency action arbitrary is not \" to dictate to the agency the procedures it is to follow. \" 463 U.S. at 50.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "That distinction, however, does not excuse the FCC from engaging in reasoned decisionmaking . An agency is not free to dismiss possible adverse impacts of its action on an arbitrary -and-capricious basis, any more than it may rely on arbitrary -and-capricious rationales to support its action. See United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Okla [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 The FCC, moreover , cites nothing in the order s on review that purports to adopt such a novel burden- shifting approach to its public -interest analysis. Neither the court of appeals nor respondents dispute that the FCC has discretion to weigh various public - interest factors when deciding what action to take.",
		"citation_value_orig": "933 F.3d 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.",
		"context": "at 171, 180, 214. If the FCC now believes that no connection can been shown between its ownership rules and minority and female ownership of broadcast outlets, it must acknowledge the change and provide \" good reasons for it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The FCC has not done so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
		"context": "Moreover, many of these defendants, like Mr. Garza, will be forced to make these claims pro se. As this Court wrote when it recognized the right to counsel for a first appeal, \"[w]hen an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Defendants rely on counsel to pursue their objectives. To allow lawyers to do otherwise would undermine the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship and defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
		"context": "2 This Court has previously looked to national ethical standards in construing constitutional requirements. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Principles of agency law have often been used to illuminate a lawyer's duties in the course of representation. See 565 U.S. 266; 560 U.S. 631 (noting that \"[c]ertain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel,\" and providing that the decisions to be made by defendants include \"whether to appeal\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
		"context": ", 475 U.S. 157. Principles of agency law have often been used to illuminate a lawyer's duties in the course of representation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 560 U.S. 631 (noting that \"[c]ertain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel,\" and providing that the decisions to be made by defendants include \"whether to appeal\"). The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers likewise states that the decision to appeal a criminal prosecution is reserved to the client. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 22(1) (Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
		"context": ", 475 U.S. 157. Principles of agency law have often been used to illuminate a lawyer's duties in the course of representation. See 565 U.S. 266; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that \"[c]ertain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel,\" and providing that the decisions to be made by defendants include \"whether to appeal\"). The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers likewise states that the decision to appeal a criminal prosecution is reserved to the client. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 22(1) (Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 631",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
		"context": "This assignment of authority reflects broader principles of agency law and legal ethics which give the client control over final decisions. It is well- established under the common law that lawyers are their clients' agents. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (\"An agent has a duty to comply with all lawful instructions received from the principal .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
		"context": ". . \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3 likewise assign the authority to define the objectives of the representation to the client. See 3 The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct follow the Model Rules in all relevant respects.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Itself Can and Should Enjoin the Rescission of MPP",
		"context": "The equities here tip heavily in favor of injunctive relief . The States must rely on Congress and the Ex- ecutive Branch to protect their sovereign interests with respect to illegal immigration . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Biden Administration's refusal to heed Congress's command to prevent entry by asylum seekers who lack a clear right to admission , see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) , saddle s States with significant additional costs for 13 healthcare, education, and law enforcement, not to mention human trafficking, drug smuggling, and other criminal activity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Federal And State Measures Enacted In Smith's Wake Have Discredited The Prediction On Which Smith Was Premised",
		"context": "Contrary to the \"anarchy\" Smith feared, state and federal courts have preserved order while ably vindicating religious liberties. More than once, this Court has recognized \"the feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 544 U.S. 709. In short, history has shown that Smith 's concern about administering an accommodation regime—a fundamental premise of the opinion—was unfounded. The swift and emphatic rejection of Smith by a nearly-unanimous Congress, the President, and a broad bipartisan coalition ought to weigh significantly against Smith 's preservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Federal And State Measures Enacted In Smith's Wake Have Discredited The Prediction On Which Smith Was Premised",
		"context": "Contrary to the \"anarchy\" Smith feared, state and federal courts have preserved order while ably vindicating religious liberties. More than once, this Court has recognized \"the feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules.\" 546 U.S. 418; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, history has shown that Smith 's concern about administering an accommodation regime—a fundamental premise of the opinion—was unfounded. The swift and emphatic rejection of Smith by a nearly-unanimous Congress, the President, and a broad bipartisan coalition ought to weigh significantly against Smith 's preservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In view of the long and widespread tradition of legislative prayer, this Court has repeatedly upheld the practice and affirmed that the content of prayers is a matter of conscience",
		"context": "Marsh taught that courts should not \"emba rk on a sensitive evaluation or parse the content of a particular prayer\" (463 U.S. at 795) , and Town of Greece taught that the government cannot dictate the 16 content of prayers or \"insist[] on nonsectarian or ecu- menical prayer\" (134 S. Ct. at 1820) . These admoni- tions, moreover, were grounded in several lines of this Court's precedents. In Presbyterian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court held that \"[i]f civil courts undertake\" such matters as \"the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion,\" \"the hazards are ever present of inhibiti ng the free development of religious doctrine.\" Id. at 449.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In view of the long and widespread tradition of legislative prayer, this Court has repeatedly upheld the practice and affirmed that the content of prayers is a matter of conscience",
		"context": "Thus, \"the First Amendment for- bids civil courts from playing such a role.\" Ibid. Similarly, the Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], observ ed that \"[c]ourts are not arbi- ters of scriptural interpretation ,\" and that \"the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve [intra - faith] differences.\" Id . at 715, 716.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In view of the long and widespread tradition of legislative prayer, this Court has repeatedly upheld the practice and affirmed that the content of prayers is a matter of conscience",
		"context": "Id . at 715, 716. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court explained that the Framers —who instituted legislative pr ayer and viewed it as constitutional —recognized that \"one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one partic- ular kind of prayer.\" Id. at 429 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. In view of the long and widespread tradition of legislative prayer, this Court has repeatedly upheld the practice and affirmed that the content of prayers is a matter of conscience",
		"context": "But t his Court's deci- sions foreclose the Fourth Circuit's view that it was constitutionally compelled to rein in prayers that it deemed too \"sectarian .\" Prayer is \"too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Notably, t his aspect of the Fourth Circuit's analysis is likewise inconsistent with the historical analysis on which Marsh and Town of Greece rest. In Marsh , this Court relied on the prayers opening the Continental Congress to show \"that the delegates did not consi der opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as sym-bolically placing the government's 'official seal of ap- proval on one religious view .'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": ". Banister argues that Rule 59(e) motions are different because they \"suspend[] the finality of the original judg- ment.\" Pet'r BOM 23 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see id. at 27 –33. To be sure, the Court ha s said filing a \"motio n for reconsid- eration\" \"renders an otherwise final decision of a district court not final for purposes of appeal .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "at 27 –33. To be sure, the Court ha s said filing a \"motio n for reconsid- eration\" \"renders an otherwise final decision of a district court not final for purposes of appeal .\" Nutraceutical [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] motion filed within 28 days of judgment. Moreover, it disregards the limited 2 The Court has used similar langu age in other decisions, but always in reference to finality for purposes of appeal and, notably, never with referen ce to Rule 59(e). See 502 U.S. 1's ability to \"sus pend the finality\" refer to finality for purposes of the appeal deadline.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 710",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Nutraceutical 139 S. Ct. 710 motion filed within 28 days of judgment. Moreover, it disregards the limited 2 The Court has used similar langu age in other decisions, but always in reference to finality for purposes of appeal and, notably, never with referen ce to Rule 59(e). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s ability to \"sus pend the finality\" refer to finality for purposes of the appeal deadline. It does not mean the judgment is not final in any sense. T he judgment that a par ty seeks to \"alter\" (Rule 59(e)) or obtain \"relief from\" (Rule 60(b)) is final ; the parties can execute it immediately.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "T he judgment that a par ty seeks to \"alter\" (Rule 59(e)) or obtain \"relief from\" (Rule 60(b)) is final ; the parties can execute it immediately. The motion merely suspends the appeal deadline to allow the district court to reconsider its final judgment. See Dep't of Bank- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] motion does not suspend the fina l- ity of a judgment for purposes of claim or issue preclu-sion.\" Blystone , 664 F.3d at 414 n.10 . In fact, the district court's judgment has cla im- and issue -preclusiv e effect not only during the 28 -day period, but even while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pen ding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Blystone , 664 F.3d at 414 n.10 . In fact, the district court's judgment has cla im- and issue -preclusiv e effect not only during the 28 -day period, but even while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pen ding. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 18A Wright & Mil- ler, supra , § 4432; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f; accord 171 U.S. 203. A judgment is also final in that it is immediately su b- ject to execution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "In fact, the district court's judgment has cla im- and issue -preclusiv e effect not only during the 28 -day period, but even while a timely Rule 59(e) motion is pen ding. See 135 S. Ct. 1759; 18A Wright & Mil- ler, supra , § 4432; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. f; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A judgment is also final in that it is immediately su b- ject to execution. \"Un less a court issues a stay, a trial court's judgment .",
		"citation_value_orig": "171 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Moreover, a distinction based on the appeal deadline would contravene Gonzalez . Parties may —and do —file Rule 60(b) m otions within 28 days. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see, e.g. , Santos 842 F.3d 163; 804 F.3d 919. And since 1993, the Rules of Appellate Procedure have given such a filing the same effect on fin ality as a Rule 59(e) motion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Parties may —and do —file Rule 60(b) m otions within 28 days. See 514 U.S. 386 ; see, e.g. , Santos [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 804 F.3d 919. And since 1993, the Rules of Appellate Procedure have given such a filing the same effect on fin ality as a Rule 59(e) motion. See Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "842 F.3d 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Parties may —and do —file Rule 60(b) m otions within 28 days. See 514 U.S. 386 ; see, e.g. , Santos 842 F.3d 163; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And since 1993, the Rules of Appellate Procedure have given such a filing the same effect on fin ality as a Rule 59(e) motion. See Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "The two types of motions are substantively distinct . As one court explained, \"a Rule 59(e) motion is normally gran ted only to correct manifest errors of law or to pre- sent newly discovered evidence,\" while a Rule 60(b) mo- tion can be granted under the particula r circumstances contemplated by that Rule, such as \"counsel's mistake, inadvertence, or excu sable neglect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There is also a historical explanation for why courts of appeals sometimes confla te the two types of motions. That history hurts Banister.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 F.3d 850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "That history hurts Banister. The lower courts began treating Rule 60(b) motions filed within the Rule 59(e) deadline as filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) in order to elim- inate uncertainty regarding the deadline to appeal. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That uncertainty arose under the 1979 version of Rule 4 , 27 which reset the deadline to appeal after a timely Rule 59(e) motion, but not after a Rule 60(b) motion filed within the same timeframe . See B orrero , 456 F.3d at 701– 02 (explaining the origins of the practice); 97 F.3d 434459 U.S. 56 advisory committee 's note to 1993 amendments .",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 F.3d 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "See, e.g., 2 F.3d 752. That uncertainty arose under the 1979 version of Rule 4 , 27 which reset the deadline to appeal after a timely Rule 59(e) motion, but not after a Rule 60(b) motion filed within the same timeframe . See B orrero , 456 F.3d at 701– 02 (explaining the origins of the practice); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]459 U.S. 56 advisory committee 's note to 1993 amendments . As of 1993, a premature notice of appeal is not void, but will take effect only after the district court disposes of the deadline- extending motion. Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "97 F.3d 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "See, e.g., 2 F.3d 752. That uncertainty arose under the 1979 version of Rule 4 , 27 which reset the deadline to appeal after a timely Rule 59(e) motion, but not after a Rule 60(b) motion filed within the same timeframe . See B orrero , 456 F.3d at 701– 02 (explaining the origins of the practice); 97 F.3d 434[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] advisory committee 's note to 1993 amendments . As of 1993, a premature notice of appeal is not void, but will take effect only after the district court disposes of the deadline- extending motion. Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "A Rule 60(b) motion is \"a 28 continuation of the original suit ,\" not a collateral attack. Bankers Mortg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see als o Indian Head Nat'l Bank of 689 F.2d 245; cf. 556 U.S. 904; 346 U.S. 502 motion is a collateral attack. This rationale also suffers fr om the same deficiency that dooms Banister's reliance on the suspension of final- ity under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 F.2d 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "A Rule 60(b) motion is \"a 28 continuation of the original suit ,\" not a collateral attack. Bankers Mortg. 423 F.2d 73 ; see als o Indian Head Nat'l Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 556 U.S. 904; 346 U.S. 502 motion is a collateral attack. This rationale also suffers fr om the same deficiency that dooms Banister's reliance on the suspension of final- ity under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "689 F.2d 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Bankers Mortg. 423 F.2d 73 ; see als o Indian Head Nat'l Bank of 689 F.2d 245; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 346 U.S. 502 motion is a collateral attack. This rationale also suffers fr om the same deficiency that dooms Banister's reliance on the suspension of final- ity under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) . Even assuming a Rule 60( b) motion is a \"collateral attack\" on the judg- ment, the same would be true of Rule 59(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "Bankers Mortg. 423 F.2d 73 ; see als o Indian Head Nat'l Bank of 689 F.2d 245; cf. 556 U.S. 904; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] motion is a collateral attack. This rationale also suffers fr om the same deficiency that dooms Banister's reliance on the suspension of final- ity under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) . Even assuming a Rule 60( b) motion is a \"collateral attack\" on the judg- ment, the same would be true of Rule 59(e).",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
		"context": "When a Rule 60(b) motion is filed within 28 days of final judgment , it is re- viewed along with that judgmen t. See, e.g. , \"R\" B est Pro- duce , 540 F.3d at 121–22; Brumley , 269 F.3d at 637; cf. York Grp ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] motions can precede appeal, applying the same AEDPA standards to both is in keeping with AEDPA's goal of speedy and final disposition. A prison er can appeal the final judgment af- ter disposition of his Rule 59(e) motion, and he can like-wise appeal the final judgment after disposition of his Rule 60(b) motion when it is filed promptly. The Gonza-lez Court did not view that possibility as a reason to ex- empt Rule 60(b) motions from AEDPA's strictures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "632 F.3d 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The Ninetieth Congress",
		"context": "When this Court handed down its ruling in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Representative Emanuel Celler [D -NY] had been trying for over a decade to pass legislation requiring districting based on fair apportionment. Emanuel Celler, Congressional Apportionment -Past, Present, and Future, 17 Law & Contemp. Probs .",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The Ninetieth Congress",
		"context": "268 (1952).19 In 1965 Celler finally got a bill, H.R. 5505, through the House.20 It required districts to be compact to prevent gerrymandering and prohibited 19 The account of the legislative history given here expands on the one given by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Branch v. Smith . See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 For the committee hearings see Congressional Redistricting. Hearings before Subcommittee No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The Ninetieth Congress",
		"context": "§ 2a(c), even though its use of at- large elections directly conflicts with Baker's clearly articulated intent to eliminate the at -large option. Section 2a(c) remains today, though subord inate to § 2c. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. - 32 -",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Finding That Act 620 Confers Benefits",
		"context": "Pet. App. 127a; see also Planned Parenthood of Wis., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless cited two specific concerns regarding the vetting of physicians done by clinics that it supposed vetting by hospitals might ad- dress. Both concerns are unfounded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "738 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Finding That Act 620 Confers Benefits",
		"context": "To start, Texas defended H.B.2 on conformity grounds, claiming through its expert that \"hospital credentialing\" is \"mandated in other areas of elective surgical procedures\" and that H.B.2 merely ensured that \"abortion-providing physicians are held to the same standards as other ph ysicians.\" Joint App. 883- 84, Whole Woman's Health, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Texas also advanced all the \"reaso ns\" that the Fifth Circuit attributed to conformity in defense of H.B.2, includ- ing \"continuity of care,\" \"evaluating physician compe-tency,\" \"reducing miscommunications between doc- tors,\" and \"preventing pati ent abandonment.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Finding That Act 620 Confers Benefits",
		"context": "Texas also advanced all the \"reaso ns\" that the Fifth Circuit attributed to conformity in defense of H.B.2, includ- ing \"continuity of care,\" \"evaluating physician compe-tency,\" \"reducing miscommunications between doc- tors,\" and \"preventing pati ent abandonment.\" Br. of Resp'ts 32-33, Whole Woman's Health, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Court in Whole Woman's Health was not moved by that argument, and in fact rejected the premise that abortion facilities must be regulated like ASCs. 136 S. Ct. at 2315.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Clarify That Its Transformative Test Employs a Totality of the Circumstances Approach",
		"context": "66 (1976)) . Consistent with the Congressional intent, this Court has explain ed that the fair use analysis was an \"equitable rule of reason\" that \"permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1990 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": ". This Court has long held that \"the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context underlying\" challenged conduct. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, \"[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.\" Mergens , 496 U.S. at 250.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": "18 It is hard to fathom why this same reasoning would not be equally applicable to an assistant football coach's private, 15–30 second, silent, non-sectarian prayer. Indeed, numerous courts have found limited personal religious expressions by school employees not to offend the Establishment Clause because no reasonable observer could determine that such were state-sponsored actions. E.g., Warnock , 380 F.3d at 1082 (framed psalm on the wall of a teacher's office \"is clearly personal and does not convey the impression that the government is endorsing it\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (\"Given the inconspicuous nature of plaintiff's expression of her religious beliefs by wearing a small cross on a necklace, and the fact that other jewelry with secular messages or no messages is permitted to be worn at school, it is extremely unlikely that even elementary students would perceive Penns Manor or ARIN to be endorsing her otherwise unvoiced Christian viewpoint, and defendants certainly presented no evidence to support such a perception. Merely employing an individual, such as plaintiff, who unobtrusively displays her religious adherence is not tantamount to government endorsement of that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement or coercion\"); 1 N.E. 3d 335.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 F. Supp. 2d 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": "E.g., Warnock , 380 F.3d at 1082 (framed psalm on the wall of a teacher's office \"is clearly personal and does not convey the impression that the government is endorsing it\"); 403 F. Supp. 2d 608; Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (\"Given the inconspicuous nature of plaintiff's expression of her religious beliefs by wearing a small cross on a necklace, and the fact that other jewelry with secular messages or no messages is permitted to be worn at school, it is extremely unlikely that even elementary students would perceive Penns Manor or ARIN to be endorsing her otherwise unvoiced Christian viewpoint, and defendants certainly presented no evidence to support such a perception. Merely employing an individual, such as plaintiff, who unobtrusively displays her religious adherence is not tantamount to government endorsement of that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement or coercion\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 This conclusion is all the more apparent in this context because there are many post-game rituals, practices, and activities involved in high school football games. For example, coaches and players will ordinarily shake hands with the opposing coaches and players, greet their families, and interact with their respective school communities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 N.E. 3d 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": "Although these are typically non-religious activities, the point is that the post-game high school football field is, as the District itself recognizes, a public space filled with activity, but none of which would a reasonable observer find the school to have endorsed.4 Any objective observer familiar with the full history and context of Coach Kennedy's activities would view Coach Kennedy's actions as one aspect of the broader post-game rituals and not as the District's endorsement of Christianity. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, the District's policies on religious expression have the opposite of their stated intended effect. A reasonable observer, familiar with the history and context of Coach Kennedy's activities, and the District's corresponding positions, would likely conclude that the District is hostile toward religion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": ". This Court has long held that \"the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context underlying\" challenged conduct. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, \"[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.\" Mergens , 496 U.S. at 250.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": "It is hard to fathom why this same reasoning would not be equally applicable to an assistant football coach's private, 15–30 second, silent, non-sectarian prayer. Indeed, numerous courts have found limited personal religious expressions by school employees not to offend 19 the Establishment Clause because no reasonable observer could determine that such were state-sponsored actions. E.g., Warnock , 380 F.3d at 1082 (framed psalm on the wall of a teacher's office \"is clearly personal and does not convey the impression that the government is endorsing it\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (\"Given the inconspicuous nature of plaintiff's expression of her religious beliefs by wearing a small cross on a necklace, and the fact that other jewelry with secular messages or no messages is permitted to be worn at school, it is extremely unlikely that even elementary students would perceive Penns Manor or ARIN to be endorsing her otherwise unvoiced Christian viewpoint, and defendants certainly presented no evidence to support such a perception. Merely employing an individual, such as plaintiff, who unobtrusively displays her religious adherence is not tantamount to government endorsement of that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement or coercion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 F. Supp. 2d 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": "2d at 554 (\"Given the inconspicuous nature of plaintiff's expression of her religious beliefs by wearing a small cross on a necklace, and the fact that other jewelry with secular messages or no messages is permitted to be worn at school, it is extremely unlikely that even elementary students would perceive Penns Manor or ARIN to be endorsing her otherwise unvoiced Christian viewpoint, and defendants certainly presented no evidence to support such a perception. Merely employing an individual, such as plaintiff, who unobtrusively displays her religious adherence is not tantamount to government endorsement of that religion, absent any evidence of endorsement or coercion. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This conclusion is all the more apparent in this context because there are many post-game rituals, practices, and activities involved in high school football games. For example, coaches and players will ordinarily shake hands with the opposing coaches and players, greet their families, and interact with their respective school 20 communities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 N.E. 3d 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
		"context": "2 Any objective observer familiar with the full history and context of Coach Kennedy's activities would view Coach Kennedy's actions as one aspect of the broader post-game rituals and not as the District's endorsement of Christianity. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, the District's policies on religious expression have the opposite of their stated intended effect. A reasonable observer, familiar with the history and context of Coach Kennedy's activities, and the District's corresponding positions, would likely conclude that the District is hostile toward religion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt a per se rule that viewpoint discrimination against private speech is unconstitutional",
		"context": "at 641. Then, in Rosenberger , the Court invalidated, as impermissible viewpoint discrimination, a state- university policy prohibiting religious student organizations from equal participation in a student funding program. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, this Court rejected the university's proffered justification not 59 because it was insufficiently weighty, but because viewpoint discrimination is never legitimate: \"nothing in our [prior] decision indicated that scarcity would give the State the right to exercise viewpoint discrimination that is otherwise impermissible.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court should adopt a per se rule that viewpoint discrimination against private speech is unconstitutional",
		"context": "at 548. This Court has repeatedly treated a finding of viewpoint bias as determinative. 18 Though the level of 18 This Court also recently addressed viewpoint discrimination in Matal , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plurality rejected the government's claim that its interest in preventing the issuance of trademarks disparaging any person or group could justify viewpoint discrimination. The Court held that the appropriate level of review \"need not be resolved here because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even Central Hudson review.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The District's Actions Were Justified by the Legitimate Governmental Interests it Sought to Protect and Advance",
		"context": "If the accommodation solution is not immediately apparent, the employer should discuss the request with the employee to determine what accommodations might be effective. If the employer requests additional information reasonably needed to evaluate the request, the employee should provide it. EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 12-IV(A)(2) (Discussion of Request).2 Although the Court has noted that EEOC guidelines are accorded less weight than 2 https://perma.cc/UE8Y-EATY 16 administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law, General Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in Ansonia the Court confirmed that an employer meets its obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious observance or practice under Title VII once it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee, and that an employer does not have to demonstrate undue hardship related to other potential accommodations: Under the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals, however, the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict. This approach, we think, conflicts with both the language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Corporate Conduct Relating to Aiding and Abetting Liability Is Even More Fraught and Unsettled",
		"context": "Aiding and abetting liability as a general matter, whether for natural persons or corporations, is even more unsettled.5 Jurisdictions \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 5 Indeed, civil aiding and abetting liability is \"at best uncertain in application\" even within the United States itself. Cent. Bank, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the jurisdictions of a single country cannot reach \"definite content and acceptance\" on civil accessorial liability, then, a fortiori , respondents cannot reach the showing \u0003 19 \u0003 take varied approaches to whether, and how, to regulate conduct relating to aiding and abetting activity, such as through \"blanket\" aiding and abetting statutes or instead a situational approach. The United Kingdom, for example, takes the blanket approach to criminal offenses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2(a) \"Modified\" the Statutory Penalties for Crack in Section 841(b)(1)(C)",
		"context": "2004) (\"[t]o make par- tial changes in\"); Black's Law Dictionary 1025 (8th ed. 2004) (\"[a] change to something; an alteration\"); Web- ster's Third New Internat ional Dictionary 1452 (2002) (\"to make minor changes in the form or structure of: alter without transforming\"); Random House D iction- ary of the English Language 1236 (2d ed. 1987) (\"to change somewhat the form or qualities of; alter par- tially\") ; see also MCI Telecomms., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"modified \" the statuto ry penalties for crack in Section 841(b)(1)(C) . Thus, as a matter of plain statutory text, Petitioner has a \"covered offense \" under Section 404(a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
		"context": "To the extent a defendant provides clear and express instructions not to concede guilt, however, defense lawyers have other strategic and tactical options to retain credibility. First, and perhaps most significantly, defense counsel can emphasize that the government must be put to its proof, with the formidable protection for the defendant of a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 443 U.S. 307. This requirement can be emphasized by defense counsel in both opening statement and closing argument, and, of course, the court will instruct the jury regarding this burden. 511 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
		"context": "To the extent a defendant provides clear and express instructions not to concede guilt, however, defense lawyers have other strategic and tactical options to retain credibility. First, and perhaps most significantly, defense counsel can emphasize that the government must be put to its proof, with the formidable protection for the defendant of a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra; 421 U.S. 684; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This requirement can be emphasized by defense counsel in both opening statement and closing argument, and, of course, the court will instruct the jury regarding this burden. 511 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
		"context": "In re Winship, supra; 421 U.S. 684; 443 U.S. 307. This requirement can be emphasized by defense counsel in both opening statement and closing argument, and, of course, the court will instruct the jury regarding this burden. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, during trial, defense counsel has many legitimate options for attacking the government's case, without conceding guilt. These may include challenges to the admissibility of evidence, challenges to the reliability of evidence, conduct of cross-examination, and vigorous advocacy on jury instructions and legal motions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
		"context": "To the extent a defendant provides clear and express instructions not to concede guilt, however, defense lawyers have other strategic and tactical options to retain credibility. First, and perhaps most significantly, defense counsel can emphasize that the government must be put to its proof, with the formidable protection for the defendant of a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship , supra; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 443 U.S. 307. This requirement can be emphasized by defense counsel in both opening statement and closing argument, and, of course, the court will instruct the jury regarding this burden. 511 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
		"context": "To the extent a defendant provides clear and express instructions not to concede guilt, however, defense lawyers have other strategic and tactical options to retain credibility. First, and perhaps most significantly, defense counsel can emphasize that the government must be put to its proof, with the formidable protection for the defendant of a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship , supra; 421 U.S. 684; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This requirement can be emphasized by defense counsel in both opening statement and closing argument, and, of course, the court will instruct the jury regarding this burden. 511 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
		"context": "In re Winship , supra; 421 U.S. 684; 443 U.S. 307. This requirement can be emphasized by defense counsel in both opening statement and closing argument, and, of course, the court will instruct the jury regarding this burden. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, during trial, defense counsel has many legitimate options for attacking the government's case, without conceding guilt. These may include challenges to the admissibility of evidence, challenges to the reliability of evidence, conduct of cross-examination, and vigorous advocacy on jury instructions and legal motions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ARIZONA'S ELECTION RULES COMPLY WITH section 2'S RESULTS TEST BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ALL VOTERS",
		"context": "See supra at 4-6. Since the 1982 amendments to the VRA, this Court has confronted vote-dilution claims many times and has developed a familiar (albeit not uniformly accepted) framework to govern them. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 512 U.S. 874. It also prohibits vote denial or abridgement (opportunity \"to participate\"). Most obviously, § 2 forbids the us e of \"voting qualifications\" that \"den[y]\" the right to ca st a vote, if their impact falls adversely on minorities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ARIZONA'S ELECTION RULES COMPLY WITH section 2'S RESULTS TEST BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ALL VOTERS",
		"context": "See supra at 4-6. Since the 1982 amendments to the VRA, this Court has confronted vote-dilution claims many times and has developed a familiar (albeit not uniformly accepted) framework to govern them. See478 U.S. 30; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It also prohibits vote denial or abridgement (opportunity \"to participate\"). Most obviously, § 2 forbids the us e of \"voting qualifications\" that \"den[y]\" the right to ca st a vote, if their impact falls adversely on minorities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 874",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ARIZONA'S ELECTION RULES COMPLY WITH section 2'S RESULTS TEST BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ALL VOTERS",
		"context": "So what is this case about? Rather than the design of the electoral system, or the requirements for voter eligibility, this case asks ho w § 2 applies to the rules that govern how citizens vote—the time, place, and manner of exercising that right. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the statutory parlance, when does a voting \"practice\" or \"procedure\" render the process \"not equally open,\" and deprive minority voters of the \"opportunity ... to participate\" in that political process? Petitioners' position is simple: Race-neutral time, place, or manner regulations that are equally applied and impose only the ordinary burdens of voting do not implicate § 2—period.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "Thus, the deci- sion of the Mississippi Supreme Court on this issue cannot be said to be clear error. As the Court held in Miller-El II regarding com- parative analysis, \"[m]ore powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, th e Court declined to \"de- velop a comparative juror analysis\" but \"did note that the prosecution's reasons for exercising peremptory strikes against some black panel members appeared equally on point as to some white jurors who served.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 231",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "Appellate courts then, are tasked with testing \"the veracity\" of \"timely expressed neutral reasons.\" Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (accepting prosecutor's distinction be- tween a Hispanic juror who was struck due to potential bias against the prosecution because a close relative was convicted by federal prosecutors and two seated jurors with DWI convictions where those convictions did not involve federal prosecutors). 27 Flowers alleges that disparate questioning be- tween black jurors and other jurors warrants relief in the case sub judice . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "735 F.3d 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "J.A. 385. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fifth Circuit held that a juror's familiarity with the defendant or his family is a race-neutral rea- son for a strike. Striking a juror who worked with the Petitioner or a member of his family is an accepted race-neutral reason for a strike. A juror's history of lit- igation with any of the part ies or their attorneys is a valid race-neutral reason warranting a strike.",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "J.A. 397. Specifically, during individual voir dire, Cunningham stated that 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34 she was against the death penalty. However, she then equivocated on the issue: Court: Would you or would you not be able to consider the death penalty?",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 2187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "1328-29. Cer- tainly, lying in your answers to voir dire questions is a sufficiently race-neutral reason for a strike. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regarding the allegation of disparate treatment of Cunningham, at trial Petitioner claimed the State ten-dered white Juror 30, Mr. Whitfield, who also had mixed feelings about the death penalty. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 F.3d 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "The 14 Petitioner makes numerous clai ms that District Attorney Evans made false representations to the trial court regarding rea- sons for his strikes. The Respon dent disagrees and would submit that a valid, legitimate reason \"is not a reason that makes sense, but [rather is] a reason that do es not deny equal protection.\" Pur- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What is to be considered is the \"genuineness of the motive\" behind the racially neutral 38 Respondent submits the record demonstrates that Burnside, like Carolyn Wright, was also sued by Tardy Furniture. Additionally, although not apparent from the Petitioner's arguments, Burnside also equivocated on whether she could impose the death penalty: Court: And so I want to know if the facts jus- tified it and the law allowed it, could you consider the death penalty as a sentencing possibility?",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "\"To accept a prosecutor's stated nonracial reasons, the court need not agree with them. The question is not whether the stated reason represents a sound strategic judgment, but 'whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 39 Q: So if the facts justi fied it and the law allowed it, you would consider it? A: Yes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 F.3d 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "However, the record belies that allegation. Petitioner also argued Burnside testified she could be fair even though she had been sued. However, as the trial court noted, her promise to be fair was at odds with her apparent reluc-tance to serve, her reluct ance to judge, and her belief that such reluctance would affect her judgment: 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 41 She first stood up when the district attorney asked her if she could judge, and she said she could not. I have seen no white person that was left on this panel that responded in a sim-ilar fashion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "This was no t error, much less clear er- ror, and Petitioner is entitled to no relief based on the strike of Burnside. 4. Flancie Jones The Petitioner next makes another cursory argu- ment concerning the strike of Flancie Jones saying District Attorney Evans gave \"demonstrably false\" 42 testimony concerning Jones.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Flowers claims Evans statements regarding Jones' familial relation- ship to Petitioner's family was false. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "16 Pet. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "1786. Lack of respect for court proceedings is a race-neutral reason support- ing a strike. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, Jones is indeed related to Flowers. The rela-tionship appeared to be through two different veins, albeit both through marriage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 F.2d 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "Petitioner's false testimony claim and his Batson claim are devoid of legal merit. 43 A familial relationship to the Petitioner is certainly a race-neutral reason justifying a strike. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Additionally, striking a venire member who knows a defendant or his family is a valid race-neutral reason justifying a peremptory strike. See 593 F.3d 765.",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "See 720 F.3d 255. Additionally, striking a venire member who knows a defendant or his family is a valid race-neutral reason justifying a peremptory strike. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, Jones admitted to lying on her jury ques- tionnaire. There, she indicated her strong opposition to the death penalty but during voir dire by the trial court, however, Jones testified that she had \"an open mind,\" and that she \"could consider both\" sentencing options.",
		"citation_value_orig": "593 F.3d 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "Equivocation and lying are independent, valid race-neutral reasons justifying the strike of a member of the venire. \"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]111 S.Ct. 1859 (quoting 470 U.S. 564). In addition to prevarication, a juror's views on the death penalty are also valid race-neutral reasons supporting a strike. At trial, Petitioner's counsel argued the State en- gaged in disparate treatment by striking Jones for lying on her questionnaire, but not striking Juror 51, Mr. Huggins, who initially stated that he had no knowledge of the Flowers case , but then later admitted to being in the 2007 voir dire panel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "Equivocation and lying are independent, valid race-neutral reasons justifying the strike of a member of the venire. \"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\" 500 U.S. 352[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting 470 U.S. 564). In addition to prevarication, a juror's views on the death penalty are also valid race-neutral reasons supporting a strike. At trial, Petitioner's counsel argued the State en- gaged in disparate treatment by striking Jones for lying on her questionnaire, but not striking Juror 51, Mr. Huggins, who initially stated that he had no knowledge of the Flowers case , but then later admitted to being in the 2007 voir dire panel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "111 S.Ct. 1859",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "Equivocation and lying are independent, valid race-neutral reasons justifying the strike of a member of the venire. \"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\" 500 U.S. 352111 S.Ct. 1859 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In addition to prevarication, a juror's views on the death penalty are also valid race-neutral reasons supporting a strike. At trial, Petitioner's counsel argued the State en- gaged in disparate treatment by striking Jones for lying on her questionnaire, but not striking Juror 51, Mr. Huggins, who initially stated that he had no knowledge of the Flowers case , but then later admitted to being in the 2007 voir dire panel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
		"context": "This was a sufficient race-neutral reason to strike her from the jury. 18 Additionally, while Copper stated she could be fair, she also testified that she would lean towards voting in favor of Flowers' fam- ily. Copper stated that \"it's possible\" the fact that she 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 48 knew many of Flowers' family members could affect her and make her \"lean toward [Petitioner].\" Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers",
		"context": "These remedies looked to property in the 12 defendant's possession that rightly belonged to the plaintiff, and required that the defendant give up the property so that it could be returned to its equitable owner. Dobbs, supra , § 4.3(1). The paradigmatic forms of restitution in equity, as this Court noted in Great- West Life & Annuity Insurance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], were the constructive trust and equitable lien. An equity court \"order[ed] a defendant to transfer title (in the case of the constructive trust) or to give a security interest (in the case of the equitable lien) to a plaintiff who was, in the eyes of equity, the true owner.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress's Repeated References to ANCs within NAHASDA Confirm that ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes.\"",
		"context": "See HUD, Native American Housing Assistance and Self- Determination Act of 1996 , https://tinyurl.com/ y6hgotpf (tracking all amendments to NAHASDA). \"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative … interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation wh en it re-enacts a statute without change.\" Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally , congressional appropriations have repeatedly reaffirmed that ANCs are Indian tribes under NAHASDA by confirming the eligibility of their designees for NAHASDA funds. Since 2005, Congress has enacted an appropriations rider specifying that funds made available for Alaska Natives under NAHASDA block grants must \"be allocated to the same Native Alaskan housing block grant recipients that received funds in fiscal year 2005,\" which includes the Regional Native Housing Authorities as tribally designated housing entities for regional ANCs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress's Repeated References to ANCs within NAHASDA Confirm that ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes.\"",
		"context": "Id. Congress's repeated, express recognition of ANCs as \"Indian tribes\" under NAHASDA, within a definition that is substantially similar to—and cross- references while reinforcing through use of the \"pursuant to\" clause—the ISDEAA definition confirms that the definitions' eligibility clauses embrace ANCs in both statutes. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that no ANC could meet, Congress in NAHASDA and ISDEAA plainly intended for ANCs, as the entities authorized by Congress to promote the health, education, and welfare of Alaska Natives, to be eligible to participate in federal programs that enable Alaska Natives to set their own course and meet the 13 needs of their communities in the ways that they determine are best.4",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Challenges To The Implementation Of Lethal Injection In Light Of A Prisoner's Unique Medical Conditions Require Specific Factual Development Of Both Aspects",
		"context": "nges to lethal injection pro-tocols, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]] [appeared to have] cleared any legal obstacle to use the most common three-drug protocol that had enabled States to carry out the death penalty in a quick and pain-less fashion.\" 135 S. Ct. 2726. However, two obstacles soon emerged, one broad and one narrow.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Challenges To The Implementation Of Lethal Injection In Light Of A Prisoner's Unique Medical Conditions Require Specific Factual Development Of Both Aspects",
		"context": "nges to lethal injection pro-tocols, 553 U.S. 35] [appeared to have] cleared any legal obstacle to use the most common three-drug protocol that had enabled States to carry out the death penalty in a quick and pain-less fashion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, two obstacles soon emerged, one broad and one narrow. The broader obstacle, inapplicable here, has to do with procurement of lethal injection drugs by the states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Challenges To The Implementation Of Lethal Injection In Light Of A Prisoner's Unique Medical Conditions Require Specific Factual Development Of Both Aspects",
		"context": "22 ment of Corrections itself determined that the execu-tion could not be completed. See Bernard E. Har-court, The Barbarism of Alabama's Botched Execu-tion, The New York Review of Books (Mar. 13, 2018); Jeva Lange, Severely Ill Inmate's Execution Called Off Mid-procedure, The Week (Nov. 17, 2017); Peter Krouse, Failed Execution of Romell Broom Prompts Efforts to Block Second Attempt, Cleveland Plain Dealer (Sept. 17, 2009); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alva Campbell objected to the application of Ohio's execution protocol based on medical diagnoses, including venous issues similar to those in the pre-sent case. Campbell had a history of multiple illness-es and surgeries requiring IV treatment and result-ing in compromised veins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 U.S. 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Respondents Cannot Paper Over The Well-Acknowledged Split",
		"context": "Instead, as the Petition explained, the Seventh Circuit remains committed to looking at equality of opportunity ra-ther than being satisfied by a mere disparate out-come alongside historical analysis. Pet. 27-28; Luft, 963 F.3d at 672; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": ". Ordinary Article III principles require plaintiffs to have standing for each provision of law they challenge. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If those principles are applied in the usual way here, Adams cannot challenge the bare majority provision. As a registered Independent, he cannot possibly be injured by that provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "16a–17a n.32), this Court has never explicitly addressed whether there should be an implied exception to standing principles for severability. As to cases where the question of standing and severability has been present but not discussed, candor compels us to note that the Court's precedent goes both ways. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court invalidated sections of the Brady Act that ap- plied to the plaintiff law enforcement officers. But it refused to address the \"severability question, which the parties have briefed and argued\" because the other subsections at issue \"burden only firearms deal- ers and purchasers, and no plaintiff in either of those categories is before us here.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "The Court \"decline[d] to speculate regarding the rights and obli- gations of parties not before the Court.\" Ibid. ; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court concluded that an ob- 5 In some cases, the Court has refrained from address- ing severability after holding a part of a statute unconsti- tutional, without even mentioning it. E.g., 570 U.S. 744; Shelby 570 U.S. 529. 49 scenity statute was unconstitutional as to the plain- tiffs but went on to review and reverse the lower court's holding that related provisions were not sever- able, even though those provisions were inapplicable to the plaintiff.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "Ibid. ; accord 468 U.S. 641, the Court concluded that an ob- 5 In some cases, the Court has refrained from address- ing severability after holding a part of a statute unconsti- tutional, without even mentioning it. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Shelby 570 U.S. 529. 49 scenity statute was unconstitutional as to the plain- tiffs but went on to review and reverse the lower court's holding that related provisions were not sever- able, even though those provisions were inapplicable to the plaintiff. Accord 521 U.S. 844; N. Pipeline Construction Co 458 U.S. 50.6 An implied exception to standing for severability would create numerous opportunities for litigation mischief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "Ibid. ; accord 468 U.S. 641, the Court concluded that an ob- 5 In some cases, the Court has refrained from address- ing severability after holding a part of a statute unconsti- tutional, without even mentioning it. E.g., 570 U.S. 744; Shelby [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 scenity statute was unconstitutional as to the plain- tiffs but went on to review and reverse the lower court's holding that related provisions were not sever- able, even though those provisions were inapplicable to the plaintiff. Accord 521 U.S. 844; N. Pipeline Construction Co 458 U.S. 50.6 An implied exception to standing for severability would create numerous opportunities for litigation mischief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "E.g., 570 U.S. 744; Shelby 570 U.S. 529. 49 scenity statute was unconstitutional as to the plain- tiffs but went on to review and reverse the lower court's holding that related provisions were not sever- able, even though those provisions were inapplicable to the plaintiff. Accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; N. Pipeline Construction Co 458 U.S. 50.6 An implied exception to standing for severability would create numerous opportunities for litigation mischief. A party could obtain sweeping relief against an entire statutory scheme even though it is harmed by only a small part of it. Here, for example, the bare majority requirement has existed for 120 years with- out controversy or legal challenge, but it has been in- validated at the behest of a litigant who could not pos- sibly be injured by it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "E.g., 570 U.S. 744; Shelby 570 U.S. 529. 49 scenity statute was unconstitutional as to the plain- tiffs but went on to review and reverse the lower court's holding that related provisions were not sever- able, even though those provisions were inapplicable to the plaintiff. Accord 521 U.S. 844; N. Pipeline Construction Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].6 An implied exception to standing for severability would create numerous opportunities for litigation mischief. A party could obtain sweeping relief against an entire statutory scheme even though it is harmed by only a small part of it. Here, for example, the bare majority requirement has existed for 120 years with- out controversy or legal challenge, but it has been in- validated at the behest of a litigant who could not pos- sibly be injured by it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "We respectfully ask the Court to resolve the clash of precedents in favor of rejecting the implied exception to ordinary standing rules in cases of severability. 6 In many cases where the Court addressed severabil- ity without first considering standing, it appears that the plaintiffs, or other parties, did have standing to challenge the allegedly unseverable provisions. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477; 546 U.S. 320; 543 U.S. 220; New 505 U.S. 144. 50",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "6 In many cases where the Court addressed severabil- ity without first considering standing, it appears that the plaintiffs, or other parties, did have standing to challenge the allegedly unseverable provisions. E.g., 567 U.S. 519; Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 546 U.S. 320; 543 U.S. 220; New 505 U.S. 144. 50",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "6 In many cases where the Court addressed severabil- ity without first considering standing, it appears that the plaintiffs, or other parties, did have standing to challenge the allegedly unseverable provisions. E.g., 567 U.S. 519; Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 543 U.S. 220; New 505 U.S. 144. 50",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "6 In many cases where the Court addressed severabil- ity without first considering standing, it appears that the plaintiffs, or other parties, did have standing to challenge the allegedly unseverable provisions. E.g., 567 U.S. 519; Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477; 546 U.S. 320; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New 505 U.S. 144. 50",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff",
		"context": "6 In many cases where the Court addressed severabil- ity without first considering standing, it appears that the plaintiffs, or other parties, did have standing to challenge the allegedly unseverable provisions. E.g., 567 U.S. 519; Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477; 546 U.S. 320; 543 U.S. 220; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 50",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. These two aspects of the meaning of \"to discriminate\" explain the leading disputes about the scope of the anti-sex-discrimination norm",
		"context": "But these debates, Amicus submits, can be understood largely as reasonable disagreements in light of this definition of discrimination. For instance, in 1961, the Chief Justice of this Court concluded that a law specifically exempting females from mandatory jury duty was consistent with \"a good faith effort to have women perform jury duty without discrimination on the ground of sex.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1961) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). And in 1963, the President's Commission on the Status of Women treated the following question as serious: \"Is it discrimination, when providing [on-the-job] training, 29 to limit it to men on the assumption that women will not be in the labor force continually? \"45 If Plaintiffs' reading of sex discrimination represents the original plain meaning, then these remarks were inexplicably absurd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. These two aspects of the meaning of \"to discriminate\" explain the leading disputes about the scope of the anti-sex-discrimination norm",
		"context": "Reasonable disagreement remained as to what extent the bar on sex discrimination, whether statutory or constitutional prohibited some manifestly sex-specific rules. Their resolution required liquidation by administrative and judicial decisions—all involving reasonable disagreements. 48 47 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 , 20 H ASTINGS L.J. 305, 320, 335 (1968) (noting that \"[o]ne of the most difficult questions raised by the sex provisions of Title VII has been their effect on the so-called 'protective' laws of the states\" and recommending that generally Title VII should be read to require \"the extension of state protective laws to men\" on a facially sex-neutral basis) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The County and EPA propose atextual exceptions to the statute",
		"context": "Both the County's and EPA's constructions read language into the CWA that is absent from the rele-vant provisions. As this Court has emphasized, courts \"must presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], merely because \"they might deem its effects susceptible of im-provement,\" 464 U.S. 386. In particular, courts may not, as both the County and EPA advocate, \"read an absent word\"—or, here, phrase—\"into the statute.\" Lamie , 540 U.S. at 538.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The County and EPA propose atextual exceptions to the statute",
		"context": "Both the County's and EPA's constructions read language into the CWA that is absent from the rele-vant provisions. As this Court has emphasized, courts \"must presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.\" 545 U.S. 353, merely because \"they might deem its effects susceptible of im-provement,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, courts may not, as both the County and EPA advocate, \"read an absent word\"—or, here, phrase—\"into the statute.\" Lamie , 540 U.S. at 538.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The County and EPA propose atextual exceptions to the statute",
		"context": "Lamie , 540 U.S. at 538. Cour ts \"do not—[and] can- not—add provisions to a federal statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Efforts to create atextual exceptions to provisions that already include express exceptions are particu- larly suspect. \"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of ev- idence of a contrary legislative intent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The County and EPA propose atextual exceptions to the statute",
		"context": "Efforts to create atextual exceptions to provisions that already include express exceptions are particu- larly suspect. \"Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of ev- idence of a contrary legislative intent.\" TRW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] into the Act's prohibition of \"any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,\" 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), whic h already expressly ex- empts oil-production-related discharges into disposal 29 wells, id. § 1362(6)(B); return fl ows from irrigated ag- riculture, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Separation of powers",
		"context": "And, as the Jesner plural- ity recognized, that congressional determination pro- vides a guide generally for ATS claims. 138 S. Ct. 1403.7 7 Plaintiffs cite (Br. 49-50) the Act's legislative history, but it re- veals that Congress was responding to Judge Bork's concurring opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—which had \"questioned the existence of a private 22 Second , Congress in the TVPRA did not simply es- tablish a private action and authorize courts to flesh out the liability standard. Congress specified the ele- ments of a private TVPRA claim—requiring proof of a predicate criminal violation as well as additional facts necessary to establish civil liability. To take just one example, the statute does not authorize aiding-and- abetting claims—because there the law contains no textual authorization of such claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "726 F.2d 774",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Any concerns with misaligned incentives can be addressed by providing guidance on attorneys' fees",
		"context": "Rather than carve out a separate scheme for attorneys' fees in cy pres cases, more meaningful reforms would tie fee awards to a lodestar value of the hourly services rendered rather than automatically awarding 25% to 40% of multi-million- dollar recoveries irrespective of the amount of legal work the plaintiffs' attorneys had performed. The hourly lodestar measure is the presumptive basis for attorneys' fees under the civil rights laws. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a lodestar-based fee, with any appropriate multiplier, would provide a sufficient incentive to bring meritorious cases. See id.at 552.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Margiotta Theory Is Unconstitutionally Vague",
		"context": "Ibid. The fair notice principle also underlies the corollary rule of len- ity, which holds that \"an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Yates , 574 U.S. at 547-48. This Court repeatedly invokes these fundamental due process and separation of powers principles to limit the reach of criminal statutes in public corrup-tion cases. In McNally , for instance, the Court limited the mail fraud statute to schemes to obtain \"money or property\" and rejected the government's broader read-ing, because Congress had not \"spoken in clear and definite language\" if its inte nt was to go further.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Margiotta Theory Is Unconstitutionally Vague",
		"context": "Margiotta , 688 F.2d at 122. Instead, the court adopted \"a gestalt approach\" that leaves it up to juries to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether someone who is not a pu blic official is a public fiduciary. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is the antithesis of what the Constitution re- quires. It is one thing to presume that people have fair notice that public officials owe the public a duty, and quite another to allow prosecutors, courts, or ju- ries, without any legislative guidance, to create such a duty for private citizens ou t of whole cloth.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 F.3d 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Margiotta Theory Is Unconstitutionally Vague",
		"context": "What all this illustrates is that the facts suppos- edly evidencing the requisite dominance, control, and reliance under Margiotta c o u l d j u s t a s e a s i l y b e deemed mere influence—depending on who is decid- ing which side of the \"line\" his status fits. Different judges or jurors can come to different conclusions about whether the very same facts create a duty to the public, because the \"test\" provides no \"ascertainable standard of guilt.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ult imately, it leaves the public \"in the dark about what the law demands.\" Ses- 138 S. Ct. 1204.",
		"citation_value_orig": "255 U.S. 81",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Margiotta Theory Is Unconstitutionally Vague",
		"context": "255 U.S. 81. Ult imately, it leaves the public \"in the dark about what the law demands.\" Ses- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No ordinary person would have reason to suspect that paying Percoco while he was \"off the 2nd floor\" to lobby the state was a federal felony. The Margiotta theory is quintessentially vague.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Railroads Do Not Have The Unilateral Right To Abandon A Market",
		"context": "§ 10903(d). In applying that standard, the Board must balance the competing interests of the railroad, the affected shippers and communities, and interstate commerce generally. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Waterloo Ry. Co.—Adverse Abandonment , 2004 STB LEXIS 280 at 9 (Apr. 30, 2004).",
		"citation_value_orig": "727 F.2d 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PTO's Failure To Seek Attorneys' Fees For More Than 170 Years Demonstrates That Such Fees Are Unavailable",
		"context": "On appeal, the applicant argued that failing to limit \"expenses\" to \"costs\" would invite abuses, including attempts by the PTO to recover \"parts of the salaries of the Patent Office solicitor, of the solicitor general, [and] of the Patent Office clerks.\" JA87 (Br. for Appellee at 37, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The app licant noted that such charges \"might practically bankrupt an ordinary litigant.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 F.2d 766",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PTO's Failure To Seek Attorneys' Fees For More Than 170 Years Demonstrates That Such Fees Are Unavailable",
		"context": "In response, the PTO called items such as salaries for its personnel \"so remote that they need not be seriously considered.\" JA89 (Def.-Appellant's Reply to Pl.-Appellee's Br. at 10, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the PTO's assertion that Congress intended to permit the PTO to recoup its attorneys' fees for litigating § 145 act ions because \"[t]hose pro- ceedings can subject the USPTO to greater financial burdens . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 F.2d 766",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PTO's Failure To Seek Attorneys' Fees For More Than 170 Years Demonstrates That Such Fees Are Unavailable",
		"context": "trial in the District Court\" as \"relatively small\" in comparison to \"the much greater expenses of an appeal whenever the applic ant saw fit to take one.\" JA80 (Br. for Appellee at 5, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is exactly the opposite of the position the PTO takes here. 25 The PTO offers no explanation for why it has never before sought attorneys' fees though it supposedly had the power to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "208 F.2d 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The PTO's Failure To Seek Attorneys' Fees For More Than 170 Years Demonstrates That Such Fees Are Unavailable",
		"context": "It states that the \"[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.\" 35 U.S.C. § 145 (emphasis added); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this language truly requires applicants to reim- burse the PTO for attorneys' fees, as the PTO now contends, then the PTO was not free to ignore this statutory directive for 170 years. 9 Of course, the more plausible explanation as to why the PTO never before sought attorneys' fees is not that it was deliberately shirking its statutory obligations for the better part of two centuries, but that it understood that § 145 did not authorize such fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COURTS SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT AN EXECUTION WILL GO AS INTENDED WHEN CONSIDERING AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO A METHOD OF EXECUTION",
		"context": "Id. The plurality in Baze thus contrasted an innocent mistake with a predictable failure, the latter of which is illustrated by Louisiana ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Resweber teaches that an \"unforeseeable accident,\" such as a mechanical fa ilure in the operation of the electric chair, would not make a second attempt at execution by electrocution unconstitutional, but a \"'hypothetical situation' involving 'a series of abortive attempts at electrocution' would present a different case.\" Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 U.S. 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COURTS SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT AN EXECUTION WILL GO AS INTENDED WHEN CONSIDERING AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO A METHOD OF EXECUTION",
		"context": "Baze and Glossip were facial challenges: the inmates did not suggest that they were uniquely exposed to a risk of suffering. Instead, they argued that the relevant protocols w ere 27 inherently problematic, as applied to them or anyone else. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in Baze, this Court considered the generally applicable risks posed by i mproper mixing of chemicals, as well as failures of IV administration and of procedures for monitoring consciousness. 553 U.S. at 54 –56 (plurality opinion) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COURTS SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT AN EXECUTION WILL GO AS INTENDED WHEN CONSIDERING AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO A METHOD OF EXECUTION",
		"context": "The Eighth Circuit's erroneous assumption also obscures a kind of cruelty that has been a focus of this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for de cades. This Court has long understood that \"deliberate indifference\" to an inmate's medical condition can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, because it \"constitutes the ' unnecessary and wanton infl iction of pain, '\" contrary to contemporary standards of decency. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no reason to cas t this principle aside in the methods -of- execution context: if s tate officials know that an inmate suffers from a rare med ical condition that makes him uniquely likely to endure gratuitous 29 suffering if the y follow ordinary execution protocols, their decision to go forward is culpably cruel.5 To ask medical personnel to carry out an execution when they have not been alerted to the serious medical condition of the inmate, and have no training or experience dealing with that condition, is to invite catastrophe. When such an execution predictably goes very badly, it would be no \"innocent\" mistake in the carrying out of an execution that does not \"suggest cruelty.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "\"Admission of aliens to the U nited States is a privilege granted by the sover- eign United States Government,\" and \"only upon such terms as the United States shall prescribe.\" Ibid. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 408 U.S. 753. 27 This Court has, however, twice engaged in limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen contended that the denial of a visa to an alien abroad violated the citizen's own constitutional rights. In Mandel , the Court consid- ered a claim by U.S. citi zens that the denial of a waiver of visa -ineligibility to a Belgian national who wished to speak to U.S. citizens about communism violated the citizens' own First Amendment right to receive infor- mation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "\"Admission of aliens to the U nited States is a privilege granted by the sover- eign United States Government,\" and \"only upon such terms as the United States shall prescribe.\" Ibid. ; see 494 U.S. 259; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 27 This Court has, however, twice engaged in limited judicial review when a U.S. citizen contended that the denial of a visa to an alien abroad violated the citizen's own constitutional rights. In Mandel , the Court consid- ered a claim by U.S. citi zens that the denial of a waiver of visa -ineligibility to a Belgian national who wished to speak to U.S. citizens about communism violated the citizens' own First Amendment right to receive infor- mation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "In Mandel , the Court consid- ered a claim by U.S. citi zens that the denial of a waiver of visa -ineligibility to a Belgian national who wished to speak to U.S. citizens about communism violated the citizens' own First Amendment right to receive infor- mation. 408 U.S. at 756 -759, 762 -770. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered a claim by a U.S. citizen that the exclusion of her husband vio- lated her own due -process rights. Id. at 2131 (opinion of Scalia, J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "2. Mandel and Din do not help respondents because respondents' claimed injuries do not stem from alleged infringement of their own Establishment Clause rights. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that individuals who are indirectly injured by alleged religious discrimination against others gen- erally may not sue, because they have not suffered vio- lations of their own constitutional rights to religious freedom. Id. at 429- 430; see Elk Grove Unified Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "Id. at 429- 430; see Elk Grove Unified Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The McGowan Court concluded that the plaintiffs — employees of a store subject to a State's Sunday -closing law—lacked standing to challenge that law on free - exercise grounds because they \"d[id] not allege any in-fringement of their own religious freedoms.\" 366 U.S. at 429.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "at 283 -285 (Agee, J., dissenting). This Court has \"ma[de] cle ar\" that \"the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial [or other invidious] discrimination accords a basis for standing only to 'those persons who are personally de- nied equal treatment' by the challenged discriminatory 29 conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although Allen applied that rule to an equal -protection claim, see IRAP , slip op. 33 n.6, the Court has applied the same rule to Establishment Clause claims: \"the psychological consequence presum- ably produce d by observation of conduct with which one disagrees\" is not the type of \"personal injury\" that sup-ports standing, \"even though the disagreement is phrased in [Establishment Clause] terms.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "Although Allen applied that rule to an equal -protection claim, see IRAP , slip op. 33 n.6, the Court has applied the same rule to Establishment Clause claims: \"the psychological consequence presum- ably produce d by observation of conduct with which one disagrees\" is not the type of \"personal injury\" that sup-ports standing, \"even though the disagreement is phrased in [Establishment Clause] terms.\" Valley Forge Chris- tian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, a plaintiff may suffer a \"spiritual\" injury from the violation of his own Establishment Clause rights where he himself has been \"subjected to unwel- come religious exercises\" or \"forced to ass ume special burdens to avoid them.\" Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486- 487 n.22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable",
		"context": "But the Proclamation says nothing about religion and does not subject respondents to any reli-gious exercise. Allowing a putative Establishment Clause plaintiff to \"re -characteri ze[ ]\" an abstract injury flowing from \"government action \" directed against oth- ers as a personal injury from \"a governmental message [concerning] religion\" directed at the plaintiff would \"eviscerate well -settled standing limitations.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Re- spondents' position would mean that the plaintiffs in Valley Forge would have had standing if they had simply alleged that the transfer of land without c ost to a Christian college sent a pro -Christian or anti -atheist message. That cannot be correct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT \"SUBSTANTIALLY\" IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS",
		"context": "For instance, this Court has upheld a statute providing that a bondholder's failure to object 15 to a settlement would be deemed to be the equivalent of express assent. The Court observed that \"[i]f he does not wish to abandon his old rights and accept the new, all he has to do is to say so in writing to the president of the company.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, this Court has upheld multiple statutes that imposed recording obligations, even when those obligations did not exist at the time of co ntracting. These cases are dispositive: they establish that the paperwork obligation of re-designating an ex-spouse as beneficiary does not implicate the Contracts Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Severability Questions May Arise in Formulating a Remedy, but Severance Is Not a Remedy Given by the Courts",
		"context": "Reflecting that connection, the Court and its members in recent decades have sometimes referred to questions of severability as questions of remedy. In some leading cases, the question of severability has arisen in connection with the Court 's disposition of the case, and hence in connection with the remedy strictly speaki ng. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the lower courts had enjoined the defendant from enforcing any feature of the New Hampshire statute at issue against the plaintiffs. Id. at 325.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Severability Questions May Arise in Formulating a Remedy, but Severance Is Not a Remedy Given by the Courts",
		"context": "at 331 -332. Questions of severability had to be decided to decide a remedial question in the strict sens e—a question concerning the scope of an injunction. The Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], also addressed severability to decide on a remedy in the narrow sense: the directions the Court was to give concerning proceedi ngs on remand. The Court had concluded that the proceedings in Booker 's sentencing were inconsistent with the Constitution. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Severability Questions May Arise in Formulating a Remedy, but Severance Is Not a Remedy Given by the Courts",
		"context": "Severability is thus a question that often arises after a constitutional question is resolved. That does not make severability a question of remedy in the strict sense or imply that the courts administer a remedy that alters the content of statutory law.11 11 The connection between severability and remedy in the Court 's cases may have its roots in equal -treatment cases that raise severability -type questions and address those question while formulating a remedy. The statutory provision at issue in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, gave a benefit to women but not to men. A severability provision stated that if the sex-based distinction was unconstitutional neither men nor women were to receive the benefit. That provision raised the question whether Mathews would be entitled to a remedy even if he were correct about the constitutional question .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Severability Questions May Arise in Formulating a Remedy, but Severance Is Not a Remedy Given by the Courts",
		"context": "Were the Court to find the grants of power severable from the removal restriction, while concluding that the restriction is uncon - stitutional, the conclusion about the constitutional issue would be unnecessary in the sense that a different opinion could have been written that did not address the constitutional issue. The Court does not treat statements that are unnecessary in that sense as dicta. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court decided a constitutional question that it could have avoided by deciding severability first. \"The gender - based distinction infecting [the immigrati on provisions at issue], we hold, violates the equal protection principle.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Severability Questions May Arise in Formulating a Remedy, but Severance Is Not a Remedy Given by the Courts",
		"context": "This Court sometimes exercises its discretion to proceed in that order . See, e.g., Champlin Ref in. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The point of avoidance is to prevent avoidable holdings, not avoidable dicta.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 U.S. 210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Exhaustion requirements are paradigmatic nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules.",
		"context": "1. In response to the well-established, \"general proposition\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) that the Court \"treat[s] as nonjurisdictional threshold requirements that claimants must command to courts. See 7 F.4th 120. 8 complete, or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit\" ( Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166), the government points to pre-Arbaugh cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Exhaustion requirements are paradigmatic nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules.",
		"context": "8 complete, or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit\" ( Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166), the government points to pre-Arbaugh cases. See Gov't Br. 25 (discussing Woelke & Romero Framing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 508 U.S. 106). Since Arbaugh , however, lower courts have \"reevaluate[d] \" McNeil 's holding. 3 F.4th 875.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Exhaustion requirements are paradigmatic nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules.",
		"context": "8 complete, or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit\" ( Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166), the government points to pre-Arbaugh cases. See Gov't Br. 25 (discussing Woelke & Romero Framing, 456 U.S. 645 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Since Arbaugh , however, lower courts have \"reevaluate[d] \" McNeil 's holding. 3 F.4th 875.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Exhaustion requirements are paradigmatic nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules.",
		"context": "But there in lies the problem: If an ad min- istrative agency may fashion exhaustion rules that de- fine a court's jurisdiction, then the court does not have any \"power\" unless those procedures are followed, al- lowing the Executive Branch to circumscribe the judi- cial power. That troubling outcome counsels against a jurisdictional reading. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s history confirms that petitioner cannot discharge her fraud debt",
		"context": "Although t he 1867 Act was repealed in 1878, see Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99, this Court consid- ered Section 33 of the 1867 Act in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Strang, a partner in the firm Strang & Holland Brothers , made misrepresentation s in the course of securing notes for his firm. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s history confirms that petitioner cannot discharge her fraud debt",
		"context": "Strang , 114 U.S. at 556 -557. This Court unanimously disagreed . The Court ob- served that under its then -recent decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , \"fraud\" in Section 33 of the 1867 Act \"should be construed to mean positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or in- tentional wrong, and not implied fraud or fraud in law, which may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.\" Strang , 114 U.S. at 559. Considering the evidence before the jury, the Court found \"that the debt in question was created by positi ve fraud upon the part of Strang, representing his firm.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s history confirms that petitioner cannot discharge her fraud debt",
		"context": "523(a)(2)(A), rather than on the conduct of the debtor .5 It is thus inappropriate to interpret Section 523(a)(2)(A) as a stark departure from Strang . c. Petitioner contends ( Br. 4, 15, 39-47) that Strang rests on federal common law abrogated by Erie Rail- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That misreads Strang . The Court considered both whether the Hol- land brothers could be subject to liability under princi- ples of partnership law and whether such liability was subject to discharge in bankruptcy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s history confirms that petitioner cannot discharge her fraud debt",
		"context": "As to that question, Strang does not necessarily determine how the text (or context or history) of other discharge exceptions should be interpreted. Nor is Strang the only decision of this Court to hold that partnership lia- bility may survive a bankruptcy discharge even when the individual partner did not \"personally participate\" in the wro ngful act . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 139 -142 (1916 ) (construing exception to dis- charge for \"wil lful and malicious injury\" in predecessor to Section 523(a)) . Petitioner thus provides no sound reason for discounting Strang 's relevance to the proper interpretation of Section 523(a)(2)(A).",
		"citation_value_orig": "242 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent and practical considerations support the application of standard forfeiture doctrine to Social Security proceedings",
		"context": "Peti- tioners cite no case in which a court of appeals has adopted that broad exception . To the contrary, f or dec- ades before Lucia , courts of appeals consistently ap- plied forfeiture principles when Social Security claim- ants failed to raise matters at ALJ hearings. See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 694 Fed. Appx. 670 . The three courts of appeals that have sided with pe- titioners on the question presented have all done so on narrow grounds limited to Appointments Cla use chal- lenges to SSA ALJs, not on the broad ground that for- 31 feiture rules categorically do not apply to Social Secu- rity cases . See 980 F.3d 1015; 973 F.3d 537; 948 F.3d 148.",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 F.3d 857",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent and practical considerations support the application of standard forfeiture doctrine to Social Security proceedings",
		"context": ", 441 F. Supp. 3d 1284 . Finally, although these cases inv olve Appointments Clause claims, petitioners' expansive theory would force courts in other cases to address questions con- cerning the application of SSA's own regulations and policies on technical and often fact -based issues that the agency ha s never consid ered , and that the claimant is airing for the first time in court . Here are some exam- ples (all taken from cases finding issues forfeited): whether there was \"an insufficient number\" of \"surveil- lance system s monitor position[s]\" in the claimant's \"lo- cal area,\" Meanel , 172 F.3d at 1115; whether a claim- ant's \"high blood pressure, gout, arthritis, poor vision and a nervous condition,\" considered alongside \"voca- tional factors,\" established inability to work, Gonz alez- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; and whether a claimant's \"em- ployment as a gambling cashier [or] as a phlebotomist lasted long enough for her to learn the job and meet the durational requirement to qualif y as past relevant work\" under \"St ep 4 of the disability analysis,\" Hulsey 794 Fed. Appx. 659 . Allowing claimants to raise such matters for the first time in court would deprive courts of the agency's expertise and drain the administrative proceedings of much of their utility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "807 F.2d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Does Not Support a \"Significant Nexus\" Test to Determine Jurisdiction Over Wetlands",
		"context": "816 . Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in this case, is a quintessential state and local power. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 513 U.S. 30 . \"But the expansive theory advanced by the Corps, rather than preserving the primary rights and responsibilities of the States [has brought] virtually all planning of the development and use of land and water resources by the States under federal control.\" Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 737.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Does Not Support a \"Significant Nexus\" Test to Determine Jurisdiction Over Wetlands",
		"context": "816 . Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in this case, is a quintessential state and local power. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm 456 U.S. 742 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"But the expansive theory advanced by the Corps, rather than preserving the primary rights and responsibilities of the States [has brought] virtually all planning of the development and use of land and water resources by the States under federal control.\" Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 737.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act Does Not Support a \"Significant Nexus\" Test to Determine Jurisdiction Over Wetlands",
		"context": "The Corps has eviscerated the Act's carefully constructed balance between state and federal authority over land use. The Court allows such conduct only with a \"clear and manifest\" statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into state authority. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"The phrase 'the waters of the United States' hardly qualifies.\" Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 738.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. FREYTAG DOES NOT HOLD THAT STJS MAKE DECISIONS INDEPENDENT OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY TAX COURT JUDGES",
		"context": "at 872, n. 2. \"Pursuant to section 7443A and Rules 180, 181 and 182,\" the petitions in First Western Govt. Securi- ties, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975, cert. denied502 U.S. 957, were also assigned to STJ Powell. After the test-cases deci- sion, but before their cases were tried, the petitioners filed motions to vacate the assignment, requesting their cases be \"assigned to a Presidentially appointed Tax Court judge.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 T.C. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. FREYTAG DOES NOT HOLD THAT STJS MAKE DECISIONS INDEPENDENT OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY TAX COURT JUDGES",
		"context": "at 872, n. 2. \"Pursuant to section 7443A and Rules 180, 181 and 182,\" the petitions in First Western Govt. Securi- ties, 94 T.C. 549 and Samuels, Kramer & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied502 U.S. 957, were also assigned to STJ Powell. After the test-cases deci- sion, but before their cases were tried, the petitioners filed motions to vacate the assignment, requesting their cases be \"assigned to a Presidentially appointed Tax Court judge.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.2d 975",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. FREYTAG DOES NOT HOLD THAT STJS MAKE DECISIONS INDEPENDENT OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY TAX COURT JUDGES",
		"context": "at 557. The Tax Court then addressed whether STJs were inferior or principal officers. Relying on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court acknowledged the \"line between inferior and principal officer is one that is far from clear,\" but concluded STJs were inferior of-ficers, \"[c]onsidering the limitations placed on the du- ties, jurisdiction and tenure of special trial judges.\" Id. at 558-59.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies",
		"context": "\" 'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]563 U.S. 452. The warrant requirement has exceptions, one of which \" 'applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' \" 569 U.S. 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies",
		"context": "\" 'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' \" 392 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The warrant requirement has exceptions, one of which \" 'applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' \" 569 U.S. 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies",
		"context": "\" 392 U.S. 1563 U.S. 452. The warrant requirement has exceptions, one of which \" 'applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Circuit courts have often dealt with the \"emergency aid\" exception where police officers seize allegedly suicidal individuals . In that event, \" '[t]he Fourth Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining a person for a psychiatric evaluation to have probable cause to believe that the person is dangerous to himself or others.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies",
		"context": "Circuit courts tailored the probable cause requirement to this non- criminal context. \"If a dangerous mental condition is analogized to the role 21 of criminal activity in traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, a showing of probable cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a 'probability or substantial chance' of dangerous behavior, not an actual showing of such behavior.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 643 F.3d 899. Still, a ny warrantless search or seizure in the mental health context \"must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.\" Roberts , 643 F.3d at 905 (citation omitted ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 F.3d 1099",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies",
		"context": "Circuit courts tailored the probable cause requirement to this non- criminal context. \"If a dangerous mental condition is analogized to the role 21 of criminal activity in traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, a showing of probable cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a 'probability or substantial chance' of dangerous behavior, not an actual showing of such behavior.\" 118 F.3d 1099 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Still, a ny warrantless search or seizure in the mental health context \"must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.\" Roberts , 643 F.3d at 905 (citation omitted ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "643 F.3d 899",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"waters of the United States\" include adjacent wetlands",
		"context": "22 By using the pre -existing regulatory term \"adja- cent\" wetlands, Congress signaled its intent to incorpo- rate the Corps' regulatory conception of adjacency. \"When a statutory term is ' obviously transplanted from another legal source,' it ' brings the old soil with it. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, t hat soil includes the Corps' speci- fication that a berm or barrier does not defeat adja- cency . And that specification also accords with the term's plain meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"waters of the United States\" include adjacent wetlands",
		"context": "(emphasis omitted) . 3. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court considered the \"lan- guage, policies, and history\" of the CWA , including the amendments in t he 1977 Act, and unanimously upheld the Corps' exercise of CWA jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands. Id. at 139.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "III, § 2, Cl. 2. It has been settled since [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that Congress may not ex- pand the original jurisdiction conferred by Article III. In that case , the Court famously held that to issue a writ of mandamus requir ing an Executive Branch officer to deliver a commission would be \"to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "And by exempting \"cases arising in the land or naval forces, \" the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause con- tains a \"recognition and sanction of an existing military jurisdiction, \" Winthrop 48 (emphasis omitted) . This Court has long recognized that those constitu- tional provisions \"show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and na- val offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations,\" and that its power to do so is \"entirely independent\" of Article III. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has thus held tha t the judgments of a properly constituted court -martial, actin g within its jurisdiction, \"rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri- bunals.\" Ex parte100 U.S. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "61 U.S. 65. The Court has thus held tha t the judgments of a properly constituted court -martial, actin g within its jurisdiction, \"rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri- bunals.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The valid, final judgments of military courts, like those of any court of competent jurisdiction , have res ju- dicata effect.\" Councilman , 420 U.S. at 746.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "Councilman , 420 U.S. at 746. They are likewise given effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Constitution's broad grant of authority to Con- gress to \"make rules for the government of the mili- tary\" does not \"freeze court -martial usage at a particu- lar time.\" 483 U.S. 435.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "206 U.S. 333. The Constitution's broad grant of authority to Con- gress to \"make rules for the government of the mili- tary\" does not \"freeze court -martial usage at a particu- lar time.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congress has gradually changed the system of military justice so that it has come to more closely re- semble the civilian system.\" Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "802(a), 805; s ee Solorio , 483 U.S. at 449-451. As a result, courts -martial exercise jurisdiction that overlaps with the criminal jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Professor Bamzai argues that because the CAAF is an Article I tribunal located \"within the Executive Branch,\" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 6 64 n.2, any review of the CAAF's decisions is original rather than appellate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "1257, and the non-Article III courts Congress has established for federal territories and the District of Columbia, 28 U.S.C. 1257(b), 1258, 1260. This Court upheld the exercise of appell ate jurisdic- tion over non -Article III territorial courts in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that Congress's plenary authority to \"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,\" U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "I, § 8, Cl. 17, authorizes it to establish non -Article III courts for the District . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that \"the re- quirements of Article III must in proper circum- stances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to special- ized areas having particularized nee ds and warranting distinctive treatment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "\"It too involves a constitutional grant of power that has been historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at issue.\" Northern Pipeline Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court in Palmore identified the court -martial system as one of the \"specialized areas having particularized needs\" where Congress has permissibly create d non- Article III courts . 411 U.S. at 408; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "III courts\"). Accordingly, just a s the decisions of the territorial courts \"may, in accordance with the C onstitution, be 50 subjected to the appellate jurisdiction\" of this Court, Coe, 155 U.S. at 86, Congress may grant this Court ap- pellate jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. And because courts -martial, like territorial courts, \"are unique historical exceptions \" to Article III grounded in \"other provisions of the Constitution ,\" Wellness Int'l Network, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court can uphold Section 1259 without deciding whether Congress could confer jurisdiction on the Court to review directly the decisions of other non -Article III tribunals, such as those tha t ad- judica te matters of \"public rights,\" ibid. See Caleb Nel- son, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "4. Professor Bamzai observes (Br. 14 -17) that in a line of cases beginning with Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has held or stated that it lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of military commissions. But those cases, i ncluding Val- landigham , noted the absence of statutory jurisdiction. See Vallandigham , 68 U.S. at 251.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "Id. at 243. And in concluding that the military commission was not of a \"judicial character,\" the Court relied in part on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (185 2), which held that a district judge was not acting in a judicial capacity when he rendered decisions subject to review by the Secretary of the Treas ury. Id. at 47 -48; see Vallandigham , 68 U.S. a t 253.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "942(c). But judges on t erritorial courts have likewise been removable by the President. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 755 F.3d 929, cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2309. 52 petitions for review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "942(c). But judges on t erritorial courts have likewise been removable by the President. See 189 U.S. 311; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2309. 52 petitions for review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "867(a)(3). At most, therefore, this Court could review the CAAF's action for \"abuse of discretion.\" Highmark [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citation omitted ). The CAAF did not abuse its discretion in denying review in Dalmazzi and Cox after it discovered that the questions it had agreed to decide were not pre- sented . This Court, too, has dismissed writs of certio- rari as improvidently granted when it becomes appar- ent that the question on which it granted review is not cleanly presented.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "III, § 2, Cl. 2. It has been settled since [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that Congress may not ex- pand the original jurisdiction conferred by Article III. In that case , the Court famously held that to issue a writ of mandamus requir ing an Executive Branch officer to deliver a commission would be \"to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "And by exempting \"cases arising in the land or naval forces, \" the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause con- tains a \"recognition and sanction of an existing military jurisdiction, \" Winthrop 48 (emphasis omitted) . This Court has long recognized that those constitu- tional provisions \"show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and na- val offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations,\" and that its power to do so is \"entirely independent\" of Article III. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has thus held tha t the judgments of a properly constituted court -martial, actin g within its jurisdiction, \"rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri- bunals.\" Ex parte100 U.S. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "61 U.S. 65. The Court has thus held tha t the judgments of a properly constituted court -martial, actin g within its jurisdiction, \"rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri- bunals.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The valid, final judgments of military courts, like those of any court of competent jurisdiction , have res ju- dicata effect.\" Councilman , 420 U.S. at 746.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "Councilman , 420 U.S. at 746. They are likewise given effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Constitution's broad grant of authority to Con- gress to \"make rules for the government of the mili- tary\" does not \"freeze court -martial usage at a particu- lar time.\" 483 U.S. 435.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "206 U.S. 333. The Constitution's broad grant of authority to Con- gress to \"make rules for the government of the mili- tary\" does not \"freeze court -martial usage at a particu- lar time.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congress has gradually changed the system of military justice so that it has come to more closely re- semble the civilian system.\" Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "802(a), 805; s ee Solorio , 483 U.S. at 449-451. As a result, courts -martial exercise jurisdiction that overlaps with the criminal jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Professor Bamzai argues that because the CAAF is an Article I tribunal located \"within the Executive Branch,\" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 6 64 n.2, any review of the CAAF's decisions is original rather than appellate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "1257, and the non-Article III courts Congress has established for federal territories and the District of Columbia, 28 U.S.C. 1257(b), 1258, 1260. This Court upheld the exercise of appell ate jurisdic- tion over non -Article III territorial courts in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that Congress's plenary authority to \"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,\" U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "I, § 8, Cl. 17, authorizes it to establish non -Article III courts for the District . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that \"the re- quirements of Article III must in proper circum- stances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to special- ized areas having particularized nee ds and warranting distinctive treatment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "\"It too involves a constitutional grant of power that has been historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at issue.\" Northern Pipeline Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court in Palmore identified the court -martial system as one of the \"specialized areas having particularized needs\" where Congress has permissibly create d non- Article III courts . 411 U.S. at 408; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "III courts\"). Accordingly, just a s the decisions of the territorial courts \"may, in accordance with the C onstitution, be 50 subjected to the appellate jurisdiction\" of this Court, Coe, 155 U.S. at 86, Congress may grant this Court ap- pellate jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. And because courts -martial, like territorial courts, \"are unique historical exceptions \" to Article III grounded in \"other provisions of the Constitution ,\" Wellness Int'l Network, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court can uphold Section 1259 without deciding whether Congress could confer jurisdiction on the Court to review directly the decisions of other non -Article III tribunals, such as those tha t ad- judica te matters of \"public rights,\" ibid. See Caleb Nel- son, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "4. Professor Bamzai observes (Br. 14 -17) that in a line of cases beginning with Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has held or stated that it lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of military commissions. But those cases, i ncluding Val- landigham , noted the absence of statutory jurisdiction. See Vallandigham , 68 U.S. at 251.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "Id. at 243. And in concluding that the military commission was not of a \"judicial character,\" the Court relied in part on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (185 2), which held that a district judge was not acting in a judicial capacity when he rendered decisions subject to review by the Secretary of the Treas ury. Id. at 47 -48; see Vallandigham , 68 U.S. a t 253.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "942(c). But judges on t erritorial courts have likewise been removable by the President. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 755 F.3d 929, cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2309. 52 petitions for review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "942(c). But judges on t erritorial courts have likewise been removable by the President. See 189 U.S. 311; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2309. 52 petitions for review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "867(a)(3). At most, therefore, this Court could review the CAAF's action for \"abuse of discretion.\" Highmark [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citation omitted ). The CAAF did not abuse its discretion in denying review in Dalmazzi and Cox after it discovered that the questions it had agreed to decide were not pre- sented . This Court, too, has dismissed writs of certio- rari as improvidently granted when it becomes appar- ent that the question on which it granted review is not cleanly presented.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Weiss , 510 U.S. 163. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "11 -33) that Section 1259 is an unconstitutional ex- pansion of the Cou rt's original jurisdiction —which would mean that this Court lacks j urisdiction in Ortiz as well, and that it likewise lacked jurisdiction in each of the nine cases it has previously reviewed under Section 1259.15 That is not correct. Section 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction in Ortiz . 15 Denedo , 556 U.S. 904; 523 U.S. 303; Edmond, 520 U.S. 651; 515 U.S. 177; 512 U.S. 452; Weiss , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 46 1. Article III grants this Court original jurisdiction \"[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public M in- isters and C onsuls, and those in which a S tate shall be a party,\" and provides that \"[i]n all other cases\" the Court \"shall have appellate J urisdiction, both as to L aw and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such R egulations as the Congress shall make.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "III, § 2, Cl. 2. It has been settled since [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that Congress may not ex- pand the original jurisdiction conferred by Article III. In that case , the Court famously held that to issue a writ of mandamus requir ing an Executive Branch officer to deliver a commission would be \"to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "And by exempting \"cases arising in the land or naval forces, \" the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause con- tains a \"recognition and sanction of an existing military jurisdiction, \" Winthrop 48 (emphasis omitted) . This Court has long recognized that those constitu- tional provisions \"show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and na- val offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations,\" and that its power to do so is \"entirely independent\" of Article III. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has thus held tha t the judgments of a properly constituted court -martial, actin g within its jurisdiction, \"rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri- bunals.\" Ex parte100 U.S. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "61 U.S. 65. The Court has thus held tha t the judgments of a properly constituted court -martial, actin g within its jurisdiction, \"rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tri- bunals.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The valid, final judgments of military courts, like those of any court of competent jurisdiction , have res ju- dicata effect.\" Councilman , 420 U.S. at 746.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "Councilman , 420 U.S. at 746. They are likewise given effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Constitution's broad grant of authority to Con- gress to \"make rules for the government of the mili- tary\" does not \"freeze court -martial usage at a particu- lar time.\" 483 U.S. 435.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "206 U.S. 333. The Constitution's broad grant of authority to Con- gress to \"make rules for the government of the mili- tary\" does not \"freeze court -martial usage at a particu- lar time.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congress has gradually changed the system of military justice so that it has come to more closely re- semble the civilian system.\" Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "802(a), 805; s ee Solorio , 483 U.S. at 449-451. As a result, courts -martial exercise jurisdiction that overlaps with the criminal jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Professor Bamzai argues that because the CAAF is an Article I tribunal located \"within the Executive Branch,\" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 6 64 n.2, any review of the CAAF's decisions is original rather than appellate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "1257, and the non-Article III courts Congress has established for federal territories and the District of Columbia, 28 U.S.C. 1257(b), 1258, 1260. This Court upheld the exercise of appell ate jurisdic- tion over non -Article III territorial courts in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that Congress's plenary authority to \"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,\" U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "I, § 8, Cl. 17, authorizes it to establish non -Article III courts for the District . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that \"the re- quirements of Article III must in proper circum- stances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to special- ized areas having particularized nee ds and warranting distinctive treatment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "\"It too involves a constitutional grant of power that has been historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at issue.\" Northern Pipeline Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court in Palmore identified the court -martial system as one of the \"specialized areas having particularized needs\" where Congress has permissibly create d non- Article III courts . 411 U.S. at 408; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "III courts\"). Accordingly, just a s the decisions of the territorial courts \"may, in accordance with the C onstitution, be 50 subjected to the appellate jurisdiction\" of this Court, Coe, 155 U.S. at 86, Congress may grant this Court ap- pellate jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. And because courts -martial, like territorial courts, \"are unique historical exceptions \" to Article III grounded in \"other provisions of the Constitution ,\" Wellness Int'l Network, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court can uphold Section 1259 without deciding whether Congress could confer jurisdiction on the Court to review directly the decisions of other non -Article III tribunals, such as those tha t ad- judica te matters of \"public rights,\" ibid. See Caleb Nel- son, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "4. Professor Bamzai observes (Br. 14 -17) that in a line of cases beginning with Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has held or stated that it lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of military commissions. But those cases, i ncluding Val- landigham , noted the absence of statutory jurisdiction. See Vallandigham , 68 U.S. at 251.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "Id. at 243. And in concluding that the military commission was not of a \"judicial character,\" the Court relied in part on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (185 2), which held that a district judge was not acting in a judicial capacity when he rendered decisions subject to review by the Secretary of the Treas ury. Id. at 47 -48; see Vallandigham , 68 U.S. a t 253.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "942(c). But judges on t erritorial courts have likewise been removable by the President. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 755 F.3d 929, cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2309. 52 petitions for review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "942(c). But judges on t erritorial courts have likewise been removable by the President. See 189 U.S. 311; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2309. 52 petitions for review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction",
		"context": "867(a)(3). At most, therefore, this Court could review the CAAF's action for \"abuse of discretion.\" Highmark [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citation omitted ). The CAAF did not abuse its discretion in denying review in Dalmazzi and Cox after it discovered that the questions it had agreed to decide were not pre- sented . This Court, too, has dismissed writs of certio- rari as improvidently granted when it becomes appar- ent that the question on which it granted review is not cleanly presented.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Adhesion contracts are particularly ill-suited to delineating Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "To this end, it bears repeating that most of the contracts that we all deal with on a day-to-day basis are adhe- sion contracts. Public utilities, banks, and cellular pro- viders all use \"standard-form contract[s]\" that they prepare \"to be signed by the party in [the] weaker po- sition, usually a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. State-level variation in enforcing adhesion con- tracts, in turn, indicates the substantial likelihood for chaos if Fourth Amendment rights are tethered to contract provisions. In Pennsylvania, \"contracts of adhesion are per se procedurally unconscionable.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "673 F.3d 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Adhesion contracts are particularly ill-suited to delineating Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "State-level variation in enforcing adhesion con- tracts, in turn, indicates the substantial likelihood for chaos if Fourth Amendment rights are tethered to contract provisions. In Pennsylvania, \"contracts of adhesion are per se procedurally unconscionable.\" 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same is true in New Mexico, Nevada, 13 Courts have reached this conc lusion because of the \"lack of meaningful choice\" that adhesion contracts entail. Quilloin , 673 F.3d at 235.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 F. App'x 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The agency's claim that it proceeded through adjudication does not avoid Section 1395hh(a)(4)",
		"context": "T he agency issued the fractions treating Part C days as Part A entitled for all DSH hospitals nationwide. That is not the \" individual, ad hoc litigation\" that typifies adjudication. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Pet. App. 18a (D .C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT SECURES THE INHERENT, INDIVIDUAL AND PRIVATE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE.",
		"context": "II (emphasis added). The substantive effect of the Second Amendment is to codify and secure a pre - existing right of the American people to keep and bear arms for self-defense. See District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Both the text and the 4 history of the Second Amendment demonstrate that its drafters expressly intended to preserve the right of the American citizenry to keep and bear arms for self- defense –including outside the home .",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court noted that enhanced scrutiny is especially appropriate when legislation trenches on \"a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those 6 of the firs t ten Amendments.\" Id. at 152 n.4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "San Antonio Indep. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Police Dept. of the City of 408 U.S. 92 ; 405 U.S. 330 . Even regulations limiting non-textual fundamental rights are tested by strict scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "Sch. 411 U.S. 1 ; Police Dept. of the City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 405 U.S. 330 . Even regulations limiting non-textual fundamental rights are tested by strict scrutiny. Kra- 395 U.S. 621 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "Sch. 411 U.S. 1 ; Police Dept. of the City of 408 U.S. 92 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Even regulations limiting non-textual fundamental rights are tested by strict scrutiny. Kra- 395 U.S. 621 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "of the City of 408 U.S. 92 ; 405 U.S. 330 . Even regulations limiting non-textual fundamental rights are tested by strict scrutiny. Kra- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Identification of a compelling interest alone is not sufficient when fundamental rights are at stake. The state must also prove that the regulation or ordi nance is narrowly tailored to further that interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "Identification of a compelling interest alone is not sufficient when fundamental rights are at stake. The state must also prove that the regulation or ordi nance is narrowly tailored to further that interest. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This analysi s applies when the regulation interferes with a constitutional right or a liberty interest recognized as \"fundamental.\" 521 U.S. 702 ; 487 U.S. 450 ; Perry Educ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "378 U.S. 500 . This analysi s applies when the regulation interferes with a constitutional right or a liberty interest recognized as \"fundamental.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 487 U.S. 450 ; Perry Educ. 460 U.S. 37 . The Second Circuit, however, has chose n to apply what it term s \"inte rmediate scrutiny, \" requiring merely that the government show that the restriction \"is substantially related to the achievement of an im- portant governmental interest .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "378 U.S. 500 . This analysi s applies when the regulation interferes with a constitutional right or a liberty interest recognized as \"fundamental.\" 521 U.S. 702 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Perry Educ. 460 U.S. 37 . The Second Circuit, however, has chose n to apply what it term s \"inte rmediate scrutiny, \" requiring merely that the government show that the restriction \"is substantially related to the achievement of an im- portant governmental interest .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "This analysi s applies when the regulation interferes with a constitutional right or a liberty interest recognized as \"fundamental.\" 521 U.S. 702 ; 487 U.S. 450 ; Perry Educ. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Second Circuit, however, has chose n to apply what it term s \"inte rmediate scrutiny, \" requiring merely that the government show that the restriction \"is substantially related to the achievement of an im- portant governmental interest .\" Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 96.4 That court has found that New York meets this 4 The specific decision of the Second Circuit at issue here merely reaffirmed its prior decision in Kachalsky .",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "App. at 2. The Second Circuit also reaffirmed Kachalsky in N.Y. State Rif le & Pistol [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but that decision was vacated by this Court after New York modified its law in the wake of this Court's grant of the petition for writ of 7 test because New York has reasonably \"determined that limiting handgun possession to persons who have an articulable basis for believing they will need the weapon for self -defense is in the best interest of public safety and outweighs the need to have a handgun for an unexpected confrontation.\" Id. at 100.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 45",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "This is con- sistent with the resistance to this Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald that seems to underlie several decisions of the various Courts of Appeals. None ap- ply strict scrutiny, notwithstanding that the laws they consider infringe on a textually explicit constitutional right. Instead, they, like the Second Circuit here, ap- ply what they term \"intermediate\" scrutiny.5 E.g., 746 F.3d 953 ; National Rifle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 201 1). Worse, what these courts, including the Second Circuit below, applied was not even \"intermediate scrutiny\" as that term has been applied by this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "700 F.3d 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "This is con- sistent with the resistance to this Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald that seems to underlie several decisions of the various Courts of Appeals. None ap- ply strict scrutiny, notwithstanding that the laws they consider infringe on a textually explicit constitutional right. Instead, they, like the Second Circuit here, ap- ply what they term \"intermediate\" scrutiny.5 E.g., 746 F.3d 953 ; National Rifle 700 F.3d 185 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir. 201 1). Worse, what these courts, including the Second Circuit below, applied was not even \"intermediate scrutiny\" as that term has been applied by this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.3d 1244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "In Kachalsky , for example, the Second Circuit gave \"substantial deference\" to the New Yor k legislature . Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated and remanded140 S. Ct. 1525. 5 Even the decision of the Seventh Circuit striking down a ban on carrying a weapon did not apply strict scrutiny. 702 F.3d 933 8 drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial ev- idence.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "In Kachalsky , for example, the Second Circuit gave \"substantial deference\" to the New Yor k legislature . Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. 180, vacated and remanded[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Even the decision of the Seventh Circuit striking down a ban on carrying a weapon did not apply strict scrutiny. 702 F.3d 933 8 drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial ev- idence.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "Sys., 520 U.S. 180, vacated and remanded140 S. Ct. 1525. 5 Even the decision of the Seventh Circuit striking down a ban on carrying a weapon did not apply strict scrutiny. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 8 drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial ev- idence.\" Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.3d 933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "702 F.3d 933 8 drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial ev- idence.\" Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the two Turner Broadcasting cases relied upon by the Second Circuit were Free Speech cases, and \"the intermediate level of scrutiny\" applied in them was th at which is applicable to content -neu- tral restrictions that impose [only] an incidental bur- den on speech .\" Turner I , 512 U.S. at 662 (emphasis added) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "Turner I , 512 U.S. at 662 (emphasis added) . New York's complete ban on the public carrying of handguns by most citizens is hardly an \"incidental burden\" on the exercise of Second Amendment rights , as the Second Circuit itself has recognized. See Ka- chalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 (\"New York's proper cause re- quirement places substantial limits on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for self-de- fense in public\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the \"deference\" the Second Circuit gave to the legislature is more akin to rational basis review than to the lack of deference that this Court gives, even when applying intermediate scrutiny, when more than an \"incidental burden\" on rights is in- volved. Cf., e.g., 573 U.S. 464 (describing, in First Amendment context, that intermediate scrutiny requires that a restriction \"still must be 'narro wly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest'\" and that \"the government still 'may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "And the \"deference\" the Second Circuit gave to the legislature is more akin to rational basis review than to the lack of deference that this Court gives, even when applying intermediate scrutiny, when more than an \"incidental burden\" on rights is in- volved. Cf., e.g., 573 U.S. 464 (describing, in First Amendment context, that intermediate scrutiny requires that a restriction \"still must be 'narro wly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest'\" and that \"the government still 'may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.'\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); 9 see also 482 U.S. 641. Moreover, even under the more deferential \" inter- mediate scrutiny \" applied by the Second Circuit, it is not enough to posit a public safety rationale. Instead, the state must demonstrate that the regulation at is- sue \"advances the Government's interest in a direct and material way.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "And the \"deference\" the Second Circuit gave to the legislature is more akin to rational basis review than to the lack of deference that this Court gives, even when applying intermediate scrutiny, when more than an \"incidental burden\" on rights is in- volved. Cf., e.g., 573 U.S. 464 (describing, in First Amendment context, that intermediate scrutiny requires that a restriction \"still must be 'narro wly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest'\" and that \"the government still 'may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.'\" (quoting 491 U.S. 781 ); 9 see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, even under the more deferential \" inter- mediate scrutiny \" applied by the Second Circuit, it is not enough to posit a public safety rationale. Instead, the state must demonstrate that the regulation at is- sue \"advances the Government's interest in a direct and material way.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
		"context": "Moreover, even under the more deferential \" inter- mediate scrutiny \" applied by the Second Circuit, it is not enough to posit a public safety rationale. Instead, the state must demonstrate that the regulation at is- sue \"advances the Government's interest in a direct and material way.\" Florida [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This standard cannot be sat- isfied by unnamed studies and data, cited by the Sec- ond Circuit in Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 99, particularly when the various studies \"do not provide more than a rational basis for believing that [a ban on public car- riage] is justified by an increase in public safety,\" as Judge Posner rightly concluded in Moore , 702 F.3d at 939, 942. Instead, the government must demonstrate that the restriction will actually alleviate some real harm in a material way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
		"context": "See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560. And the Complaint leaves no doubt the injuries would \"be redressed by the requested relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Complaint prays for precisely the remedies—injunctive relief, an award of the wrongdoer's profits, and damages (as well as statutory sums)—courts have awarded for the wrongful disclosure of communications for centuries. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
		"context": "Doe, 540 U.S. at 625. With power to hear at least one claim for one named representative under Article III, the district court had jurisdiction to review and approve the parties' settlement—the terms of their contractual compromise—as well. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Fire- 478 U.S. 501. 5 Jurisdiction exists so long as at least one class representative has s t a n d i n g .",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
		"context": "With power to hear at least one claim for one named representative under Article III, the district court had jurisdiction to review and approve the parties' settlement—the terms of their contractual compromise—as well. See 502 U.S. 367; Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Fire- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Jurisdiction exists so long as at least one class representative has s t a n d i n g . S e e F e d .",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
		"context": "C i v . P . 2 3 ( a ) ( \" [ o ] n e o r m o r e m e m b e r s o f a class may sue or be sued as representative parties\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 419 U.S. 393. 23 CONCLUSION To the extent the Court addresses standing, rather than remanding or dismissing, the Court should find standing sufficiently alleged. KASSRA P. NASSIRI Counsel of Record NASSIRI & JUNG LLP 47 Kearny St. Suite 700 San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 762-3100 kass@njfirm.com M ICHAEL ASCHENBRENER KAMBER LAW, LLC 201 Milwaukee St. Suite 200 Denver, CO 80206 (303) 222-0281 masch@kamberlaw.com Respectfully submitted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
		"context": "C i v . P . 2 3 ( a ) ( \" [ o ] n e o r m o r e m e m b e r s o f a class may sue or be sued as representative parties\"); see also 557 U.S. 433; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 CONCLUSION To the extent the Court addresses standing, rather than remanding or dismissing, the Court should find standing sufficiently alleged. KASSRA P. NASSIRI Counsel of Record NASSIRI & JUNG LLP 47 Kearny St. Suite 700 San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 762-3100 kass@njfirm.com M ICHAEL ASCHENBRENER KAMBER LAW, LLC 201 Milwaukee St. Suite 200 Denver, CO 80206 (303) 222-0281 masch@kamberlaw.com Respectfully submitted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
		"context": "45.\u0003Google's awareness of the privacy concerns sur- rounding search queries was also demonstrated in re- sponse to a massive disclosure of user search queries by AOL. In August 2006, AOL released an \"anonymized\" dataset of 20 million search queries conducted by 658,000 AOL users over a three-month period. 25 T h a t d a t a i n - cluded search queries revealing names, addresses, local 25 Complaint at ¶ 16, Doe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21a landmarks, medical ailments, credit card numbers and social security numbers.26 46.\u0003In an article about the incident, the New York Times wrote that the AOL dataset \"underscored how much people unintentionally reveal about themselves when they use search engines,\" and referred to search queries about \"depression and medical leave,\" \"fear that spouse contemplates cheating,\" \"child porno,\" and \"how to kill oneself by natural gas.\" 27 47.\u0003Even more surprising, however, was that the New York Times journalists were able to reidentify individual \"anonymized\" AOL search users due to the vanity searches they had conducted, and then link other, non- vanity search queries in the dataset to those individuals through the crosssession identifiers (cookies) included in the dataset.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2010 WL 2524494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society",
		"context": ". Keeping religion out of the government's hands best enables religion to \"flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (195 2). History proved that \"politically appointed ministers in colonial Virginia were, in the view of the fa ithful, often 'less than zeal- ous in their spiritual responsibilities.' \" Our Lady of Guadalupe 140 S.Ct. 2049.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society",
		"context": "343 U.S. 306 (195 2). History proved that \"politically appointed ministers in colonial Virginia were, in the view of the fa ithful, often 'less than zeal- ous in their spiritual responsibilities.' \" Our Lady of Guadalupe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Our founders knew that \"many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread its faith.\" Engel , 370 U.S. at 431.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 2049",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Assessed in Light of the Totality of Circumstances",
		"context": ". The Court has explained that \"the concept of rea- sonable suspicion is somewhat abstract,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and that \"[a]rticulating precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Assessed in Light of the Totality of Circumstances",
		"context": ". mean[s] is not possible,\" Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 695. The Court has therefore \"deliberately avoided reduc-ing it to a neat set of legal rules,\" Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted), explaining in-stead that \"[o]ne simple rule will not cover every situ-ation\" when assessing whether a particular type of ev-idence can support reasonable suspicion, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1. Out of that lack of cl arity emerges at least one clear rule: whether an offi cer has reasonable suspicion at the time of a seizure can be determined only in con-text, with reference to the totality of the relevant cir- cumstances and understood in light of the experience and training of the officer who makes the stop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Assessed in Light of the Totality of Circumstances",
		"context": "Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-887; Terry , 392 U.S. at 20-30. It is well settled that reason- able suspicion may arise from a series of acts, each of which is innocent standing alone. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the \"essence\" of the reasonable-suspicion analysis is that \"the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account\" and that \"a ssessment of the whole pic- ture must yield a particularized suspicion . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Assessed in Light of the Totality of Circumstances",
		"context": "The Court noted that, although \"each of the[] factors alone [wa]s susceptible of innocent explana-tion,\" \"[t]aken together,\" and assessed \"in light of \" the officer's \"specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area's inhabitants,\" \"they sufficed to form a particularized and o bjective basis for [the of- ficer's] stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasona-ble within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\" Id. at 276-278; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reciting record evidence and explaining that, although \"[p]erhaps none of these facts, standing alone, would give rise to a reasonable suspicion,\" \"taken together as appraised by an experi-enced law enforcement officer, they provided clear jus-tification to stop the vehic les and pursue a limited in- vestigation\"). The situation in United States v. Cortez , supra , was similar. There, the office rs testified that they had studied physical evidence of the movement patterns of an individual who ferried undocumented aliens on foot into the United States from Mexico and that the de-fendant's movements fit that pattern.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 675",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVIEWING THE DISTRICT COURT'S HABITUAL-RESIDENCE DETERMINATION FOR CLEAR ERROR",
		"context": ". To determine \"whether a district court's decision should be subject to searching or deferential appellate review,\" McLane [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court applies the framework set forth in 487 U.S. 552. The Court first asks whether a \"relatively explicit statutory com- mand\" answers the question. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVIEWING THE DISTRICT COURT'S HABITUAL-RESIDENCE DETERMINATION FOR CLEAR ERROR",
		"context": ". To determine \"whether a district court's decision should be subject to searching or deferential appellate review,\" McLane 137 S. Ct. 1159, this Court applies the framework set forth in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court first asks whether a \"relatively explicit statutory com- mand\" answers the question. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"artistic relevance\" prong",
		"context": "Gordon , 909 F.3d at 261 . Illustrations of how the Rogers test can separate out legitimate artistic expressions from illegitimate ones that claim the name come from the Second Circuit's decisions after Rogers . For example, in Harley -Davidson, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which involved the motorc ycle manufacturer's suit against a shop that was repairing Harleys, the court explained that, under Rogers , \"[w]e have accorded considerable leeway to parodists whose expressive works aim their parodic commentary at a trademark or a trademarked product.\" Id. at 812 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"artistic relevance\" prong",
		"context": "E.S.S. Ent. 2000, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d at 1243. Rather, \"the level of relevance merely must be above zero.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 F.3d 1095",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the City delegates part of its foster care process to private agencies, it retains full constitutional responsibility for that process",
		"context": "Judge Wood, writing for the Sev- enth Circuit in such a case, explained that \"[t]he County cannot shield itself from § 1983 liability [for violation of the Eighth Amendment] by contracting out its duty to provide medical services. If the County is faced with actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate constitutional rights, [the County] may not adopt a policy of inac- tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Rogers v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 4743162; id. at 3 (noting that the agency \"is the largest CPA in both the state and the upstate South Carolina region\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the City delegates part of its foster care process to private agencies, it retains full constitutional responsibility for that process",
		"context": "Circuit similarly found liability on the part of the District of Columbia for constitutional vio- lations in a private prison. \"Deliberate indifference,\" the court wrote, \"is determined by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional violations, but did not act.\" War- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, in one of the earliest and most influential of these de- cisions involving a private medical services provider, the Eleventh Circuit held that \"the county itself re- mains liable for any constitutional deprivations caused by the policies and customs of the [private pro- vider].\" 769 F.2d 700.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 F.3d 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the City delegates part of its foster care process to private agencies, it retains full constitutional responsibility for that process",
		"context": "War- 353 F.3d 36. Likewise, in one of the earliest and most influential of these de- cisions involving a private medical services provider, the Eleventh Circuit held that \"the county itself re- mains liable for any constitutional deprivations caused by the policies and customs of the [private pro- vider].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions hold that the state is liable when it stands by, knowing that private parties acting on its behalf are departing from the requirement of the Con- stitution. Here, the City learned that two of its FFCAs, engaged in certifying couples and individuals for foster care placement on the City's behalf, were discriminating against same-sex couples.",
		"citation_value_orig": "769 F.2d 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "as Amici Curiae 5 (observing that i f the key probability \"is exceedingly low\" the stop would be unconstitutional, but that if it \"approaches anywhere near 50% —though certainly it need not be that high —the conclusion that [the stop was] reason able will be hard to escape\").5 The 5 As noted supra n.1, the precise threshold for reasonable suspicion need not be specified here . But cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees? , 35 Vand.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "Id. This Court has been similarly wise in its own precedents . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That wisdom should prevail her e. Nationwide rule s are useful —essential, even —when resolving uniform questions of law . But they have no place in answering highly variable question s of fact.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "The question presented is inescapably empirical. Its answer cannot be divined by common sense but rather requires some facts describing the \"proportion\" of vehicles observed to be registered to unlicensed owners that are actually driven by those unlicensed individuals. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State, however, did not introduce any such facts into the record, opting instead to draft a stipulation of facts wholly devoid of this essential information . That unusual litigation decision requires affirmance of the judgment below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "Few legal principles are better established than the idea that the party with the burden of production has the \"obligation to come forward with evidence to support its claim.\" Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.2(b), at 49 (5 th ed. 2012) ( \"If the party who has the burden of producing evidence does not meet that burden, the consequence is an adverse ruling on the matter at issue. \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "17 –19 (insisting that the State is not trying to \"shift the bu rden to the defendant\"). And rightly so, given the widely accepted rule that \" if the police acted without a warrant the burden of proof is on the prosecution .\" 6 LaFave, Search & Seizure §11.2(b), at 50; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, the State not only concedes that it bears the burden of production —it attempts to satisfy that burden in its briefing to this Court, where for the very first time it offers data supporting its asserted factual inference . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "But of course this belated effort to slide the key facts of the case into the record is not permissible. This is \"a court of review, not of first view .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nowhere is that admonition more important than when a part y attempts to litigate the central factual question of a case for the first time on appeal. As this Court has long held , requiring the parties to present their factual claims \" in the trial forum\" is \"essential\" to ensuring that both sides \" have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues [that] the trial tribunal is alone competent to decide, \" and that neither is \" surprised on appeal by [a] final decision \" that turns on \"issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "Nowhere is that admonition more important than when a part y attempts to litigate the central factual question of a case for the first time on appeal. As this Court has long held , requiring the parties to present their factual claims \" in the trial forum\" is \"essential\" to ensuring that both sides \" have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues [that] the trial tribunal is alone competent to decide, \" and that neither is \" surprised on appeal by [a] final decision \" that turns on \"issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Supreme Court briefs,\" in other words, \"are an inappropriate place to develop the key facts in a case. \" 564 U.S. 1.9 Notably, in this case , the State's newly proffered evidence not only arrive s too late, but is potentially unreliable as well .",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "312 U.S. 552 . \"Supreme Court briefs,\" in other words, \"are an inappropriate place to develop the key facts in a case. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].9 Notably, in this case , the State's newly proffered evidence not only arrive s too late, but is potentially unreliable as well . Cf. 521 U.S. 346.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "564 U.S. 1.9 Notably, in this case , the State's newly proffered evidence not only arrive s too late, but is potentially unreliable as well . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For one thing, the State's primary source is an insurance company website that uses the wrong denomi nator when describing the ratio of drivers to cars , and that curiously mixes driver data from one year with vehicle data from another —defects that the State does not mention in its b rief and of which it may be un aware. See supra n. 6.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law",
		"context": "22 have fared under adversarial testing at the trial level , where the respondent could have been aided by cross - examination, \" expert witnesses [,] and the procedural protections of disco very.\" Sykes , 564 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, \"it was incumbent upon the prosecution to\" present the trial court with sufficient \"information\" to support \"the constitutional validity\" of the stop at issue . Beck , 379 U.S. at 97; id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur",
		"context": "754, § 3, 50 Stat. 752 -753; Mallinckrodt Chem . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Harrison 43 -45 (discussing other exam- ples). The phrasing in that context means that courts disregard unconstitutional statutes when deciding the cases before them, not that they vacate the st atutes. Courts \"have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitu- tional.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "238 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur",
		"context": "44 (1946) —an unlikely choice if that language was intended to establish a new and far -reaching rem- edy. Moreover, Congress enacted the APA against a background rule that statutory remedie s should be con- strued in accordance with \"traditions of equity prac- tice.\" Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Consistent with that principle, the legislative history explains that the APA \"declar es the existing law con- cerning the scope of judicial review.\" Senate Report 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur",
		"context": "398, but universal relief \"upset [s] the bedrock practice of case -by-case judgments with re- spect to the parties in each case ,\" Arizona , 31 F.4th at 484 (Sutton, C.J., concurring) ; see Bray 438 n.121. And reading Section 706(2) to authorize hundreds of district judges around the Nation to grant universal relief in 44 every APA case would perpetuate all of the now -familiar problems with nationwide injunctions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 599 -601 (2020 ) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay) ; 138 S. Ct. 2392 .6",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 599",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur",
		"context": "398, but universal relief \"upset [s] the bedrock practice of case -by-case judgments with re- spect to the parties in each case ,\" Arizona , 31 F.4th at 484 (Sutton, C.J., concurring) ; see Bray 438 n.121. And reading Section 706(2) to authorize hundreds of district judges around the Nation to grant universal relief in 44 every APA case would perpetuate all of the now -familiar problems with nationwide injunctions. See, e.g., 140 S. Ct. 599, 599 -601 (2020 ) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .6",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any power of a State to regulate commerce outside of its borders was delegated to the federal government by the Commerce Clause.",
		"context": "at 63 (citing Act of Jan. 1784, Connecticut Acts, at 271). At the time of the Founding, therefore, \"as to com- mercial advantages, few subjects were viewed with deeper interest, or excited more irritation, than the manner in which the several States [of the Confeder- acy] exercised, or seemed disposed to exercise, the power of laying duties on imports.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Many prominent Fram- ers viewed such protectionist state laws as detri- mental to the Union, believing that unifying Ameri- can policy as to domestic and foreign commerce was 13 essential to the Nation's economic health. Friedman & Deacon,97 Va. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. States Have a Substantial Interest in Regulating Non-Judicial Foreclosures and the Practice of Law",
		"context": "The practice of law has long been held to high standards. 7 Courts may prescribe standards for admission to the bar and prevent the unauthorized practice of law by the lay public. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts also promulgate codes of professional conduct for attorneys. The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. States Have a Substantial Interest in Regulating Non-Judicial Foreclosures and the Practice of Law",
		"context": "This is another reason to take a narrow interpretation of whether the FDCPA applies to attorneys conducting non-judicial foreclosure sales. Specifically, states can be expected to regulate the attorneys practicing in their jurisdictions and avoid the abuses the FDCPA was intended to prevent. While the Court has previously ruled that the FDCPA applies to attorneys engaging in debt collection generally, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court should consider the ability of states to regulate attorneys in deciding what constitutes debt collection. 8",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment neither enforces unenumerated substantive rights against the states nor alters the federalist meaning of the Ninth Amendment",
		"context": ". . an expressgrant of power in the Constitution to enable the wholepeople of every State, by congressional enactment, toenforce obedience to these requirements of the 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Constitution .\" Bingham, Feb. 26, 1866, in 2 Reconstruction Amendments at 100 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "32 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment neither enforces unenumerated substantive rights against the states nor alters the federalist meaning of the Ninth Amendment",
		"context": "See, 2 Reconstruction Amendments, at 155. This final phrasing uses language with deep roots in antebellum legal debates as a reference to the enumerated rights of American citizens. See Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment, at 47-66; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Bingham explained three years afterthe ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment: Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of thelimitations imposed by the first section,fourteenth amendment of the Constitution maybe more fully understood, permit me to say thatthe privileges and immunities of citizens of theUnited States, as contradistinguished fromcitizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the firsteight amendments to the Constitution of the 18 United States. Those eight amendments are as follows: Article I.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Discovery Requests Made Under 28 U.S.C. section 1782",
		"context": "§ 1782. District courts consider multiple factors when deciding whether to grant section 1782 discovery requests. 20 This Court's judgment in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. represents the clearest judicial statement on how district courts should approach section 1782 discovery re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It establishes a di scretionary four-part test under which district courts consider a number of factors bearing upon whether to grant section 1782 discovery. 25 One of the issues presented in Intel was whether section 1782 imposes a foreign-discoverability rule, which would prevent a U.S. court from ordering production of documents that the applicant could not obtain \"if they were located in the foreign jurisdiction.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Refutation of the fiction and possible backpedaling",
		"context": "A technician does an X-ray, not \"X-ray care\". And an abortionist does abortions, not \"abortion care.\" See also ProMedica Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://tinyurl.com/WWH- ACLJ-Amicus. The ACLJ filed an updated amicus brief making this argument in June Medical , see Amicus Brief of American Cent er for Law & Justice et al. , June Medical Serivces LLC v. Gee , Nos.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.3d 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "To make petitioner s' theory work, that term must include qui tam suits where the government declines to intervene for purposes of subsection (b)(1), and exclude those very sa me suits for purposes of subsection (b)(2). This Court has emphatically rejected \"the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 510 U.S. 135. The provi sion of the Immigration and Nationality Act at issue in Clark said that three categories of aliens \"may be detained beyond the removal period.\" 543 U.S. at 377 (quoting 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "To make petitioner s' theory work, that term must include qui tam suits where the government declines to intervene for purposes of subsection (b)(1), and exclude those very sa me suits for purposes of subsection (b)(2). This Court has emphatically rejected \"the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.\" 543 U.S. 371; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The provi sion of the Immigration and Nationality Act at issue in Clark said that three categories of aliens \"may be detained beyond the removal period.\" 543 U.S. at 377 (quoting 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "The Court had previously held that, with respect to one of the three categories, the phrase \"may be detained beyond the removal period\" meant that the aliens could be detained \"only so long as 'reasonably necessary' to remove them from the country.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The question presented in Clark was whether that limitation applied to another of the categories of aliens as well. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "Section 3731(b)(2) contains no such distinction between relators and the government. \"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners make their own appeal to statutory context. See Petr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "As explained in detail in Part B, infra, the principal way that Congress sought to help the government in 1986 was by encouraging more qui tam suits; thus, Congress understood that helping relators also necessarily helps the government. 15 The sparse and oblique contextual clues petitioners cite cannot overwhelm the contrary evidence of Congress's intent—and they cannot support the radical interpretation petitioners propose. To be sure, this Court regularly relies on statutory context in deciding how broadly a particular statutory term should apply—as it did in Graham County Soil & Water Conservation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the Court reasoned that the phrase \"civil action under section 3730\" must exclude retaliation actions altogether. But this Court has never suggested that context can give a single statutory term two concurrent, irreconcilable meanings, in violation of th e clear rule set forth in Clark . Indeed, in Clark itself, the Court acknowledged that \"the statutory purpose and the constitutional concerns\" that had motivated its prior decisions did not apply with equal force to aliens who had not been admitted to the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "Br. 27 (quoting United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This argument fails for two reasons. 16 First, reliance on the canon against superfluity is misplaced here: Even petitioners do not argue that subsection (b)(1) would be rendered entirely superfluous; they simply argue that it would govern fewer cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 F.3d 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "16 First, reliance on the canon against superfluity is misplaced here: Even petitioners do not argue that subsection (b)(1) would be rendered entirely superfluous; they simply argue that it would govern fewer cases. The canon against superfluity, however, is not a canon against relati ve disuse under specific circumstances; rather, it forbids statutory interpretations that render provisions \"inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners have not shown that applying the statute of limitations as wr itten would produce that result. They speculate that cases in which \"the government learned about the fraud within the first three years of its occurrence but then declined to file its own suit\" are \"likely to be rare.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Not Grant Certiorari To Revisit McGirt",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. at 2462, and \"once a reservation is established, it retains that status 'until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.'\" Id. at 2469 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added).5 Second, the Nation responds to the State's amici 's flawed and misleading present ation of the situation in eastern Oklahoma as follows.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of the ministerial exception is a vital and recurring question of nationwide importance.",
		"context": "EEOC C.A. Br. at 1, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Left undisturbed, t he Ninth Circuit decision will harm religious educati on. The decision forces religious schools in the Ninth Cir cuit to decide who their ministers are based on title and training, which depending on the religion , may not necessarily reflect the importance of a religious role.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of the ministerial exception is a vital and recurring question of nationwide importance.",
		"context": "Biel EEOC C.A. Br. at 13, 22; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://bit.ly/2WwwWmN ; (exception applies only with \"a role of leadership within the church\" or a showing of \"at least two factors\"). Notably, this tracks the EEOC's unsuccessful argument s in Hosanna- Tabor . EEOC Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of the ministerial exception is a vital and recurring question of nationwide importance.",
		"context": "Notably, this tracks the EEOC's unsuccessful argument s in Hosanna- Tabor . EEOC Br. at 51, Hosanna- Tabo r, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 10-553) 9 (ministerial exception limited to those with an \"exclusively\" religious role, such as \"clergy,\" \"chaplain[s],\" and \"spiritual lea ders\"). Without correction by this Court, the EEOC can enforce its narrow view of the ministerial exception and press courts to do the same.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Standing Alone\" Rule Results In Prejudice To Defendants.",
		"context": ". This evidence interlocked so closely with other e vidence demonstrating that Samia , alone among the other alleged participants, met up with Stillwell in the Philippines and carried a firearm , that the inference that Stillwell had identified Samia was not just likely, but unavoidable . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the Second Circuit applied the \"standing - alone\" rule and affirmed the conviction , is another instructive example . The court reasoned that it would not have been \"immediately apparent to a jury\" that the accomplice, Le ight, was inculpating the co - defendant Jass, because, looking at the statement \"in isolation,\" the \"other pe rson\" \"could have been anyone .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Standing Alone\" Rule Results In Prejudice To Defendants.",
		"context": "Id., Dkt. No. 164 (Memorandum in 6 The convictions in Blaszczak were ultimately reversed, following this Court's remand of the case in light of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 14122893v.17 Support of Motion to Sever) at 3-6 (docketed S.D.N.Y. Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Standing Alone\" Rule Results In Prejudice To Defendants.",
		"context": "The uniquely unreliable species of hearsay involved here poses grave Confrontation Clause concerns beyond the problematic nature of using any type of inadmissible hearsay to convict an accused . This Court's Bruton rule is expressly based on the principle that accomplice confessions are \"inherently suspect\" and the \"unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross - examination .\" 391 U.S. at 136 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 146 -47 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (agreeing that untested custodial confessions should be viewed with \"special suspicion\"). This unreliability stems from the accomplice's \"strong motivation ,\" Lilly , 527 U.S. at 132 (quotation and citation omitted ), to implicate the defendant and help himself, through a potential cooperation agreement or other form of favorable treatment that reduces or eliminates his own jail time .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Standing Alone\" Rule Results In Prejudice To Defendants.",
		"context": "753, 775 (1996) (noting that \"police manuals advise interrogators to 'play on the subject's desire to shift blame'\") (cleaned up). Even when an accomplice testifies at trial as a cooperating witness subject to cross -examination, this Court has long cautioned that the testimony should be \"received with suspicion\" and analyzed with \"the very greatest care and caution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Examples of c ooperat ing witnesses being thoroughly discredited on cross - examination are hardly unknown .8 When dealing with a Brutonized statement, a defense lawyer does not even have the opportunity to challenge the statement's reliability —by eliciting, for example, how the co- defendant may have been motivated or induced to falsely incriminate the lawyer's client —because the co - defendant will not be testifying and it would be a poor strategic choice to cross -examine the agent on the subject and thereby tacitly admit to the jury that the \"other person\" is the lawyer's client. In short, a llowing incrimination of a defendant via an unsworn, uncross - examined hearsay statement of an accomplice is, as Bruton rightly recognized , simply \"intolerabl[e] .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"constitutional power\" question does not warrant review.",
		"context": "ii. Petitioner's waiver, however, prevents this Court from considering it. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Zivotofsky v.Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076. Should the Court ever wish to review this issue, it should await a vehicle in which the state did not waive a core por- tion of its argument below. Nor does petitioner attempt to identify a dis- agreement on this question that warrants review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"constitutional power\" question does not warrant review.",
		"context": "ii. Petitioner's waiver, however, prevents this Court from considering it. See137 S. Ct. 759; Zivotofsky v.Kerry, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Should the Court ever wish to review this issue, it should await a vehicle in which the state did not waive a core por- tion of its argument below. Nor does petitioner attempt to identify a dis- agreement on this question that warrants review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2076",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"constitutional power\" question does not warrant review.",
		"context": "Indeed, petitioner cites nocase to have ever consid- ered its novel theory. This Court should not be the first to do so. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, it was the federal government's prosecution which would have intruded on historic state police powers—there, \"common law assault.\" Id. at 2087.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"constitutional power\" question does not warrant review.",
		"context": "Policing fraud in the context of work authorization, a ques- tion resolved at the federal level, \"is hardly a field which the States have traditionally occupied.\" Buck- man Co. v.Plaintiffs' Legal Comm. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is unclear, in fact, whether the Kansas law principally invoked below even applies. Kan. Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"constitutional power\" question does not warrant review.",
		"context": "31 Ann. § 21-6107 requires, among other things, \"intent to deceive.\" In City of Liberal v.Vargas , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], one Kansas intermediate court held that use of false identity documents to obtain employment does not show that an individual \"intended to de- fraud [his employer] by stealing money or by being compensated for services not actually rendered.\" The open question as to whether state law even regulates this conduct confirms that this sort of immigration- related prosecution is not within the heartland of pe- titioner's traditional police powers. Finally, in the context of both unauthorized em- ployment of aliens generally and alien registration, the Court has held that the comprehensive federal regime preempts state laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 P.3d 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below conflicts with the decision of another court of appeals",
		"context": "As the court of appeals recognized, Pet. App. 11a - 14a, its decision squarely conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit 's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Sheely , a medical fa cility refused to allow a parent who was blind to bring her 19 guide dog past a main waiting area , which meant that the parent was unable to further accompany her mino r child during his examination. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 1173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE RULE SET BY THE COURT WILL AFFECT NOT JUST SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH, BUT ALL OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH, INCLUDING LAWSUITS AND TESTIMONY",
		"context": "The Court is being asked to diminish students' First Amendment rights because of the perceived power of social media to reach a large audience, but it bears emphasizing: There is only one First Amendment. As this Court held in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], online speech is governed by the same First Amendment standards as all other expressive mediums. A rule giving educational institutions 24/7 control over student speech that is about their schools, 16 See 527 F. 3d 41. 22 or that has the potential to cause a reaction at school, will encompass all off-campus expression: Giving an interview to the news media, speaking at the open-mic period to the school board or college trustees, circulating a petition seeking the firing of an abusive school employee, sending a complaint letter to the NCAA – or even giving testimony in a lawsuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE RULE SET BY THE COURT WILL AFFECT NOT JUST SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH, BUT ALL OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH, INCLUDING LAWSUITS AND TESTIMONY",
		"context": "The Court is being asked to diminish students' First Amendment rights because of the perceived power of social media to reach a large audience, but it bears emphasizing: There is only one First Amendment. As this Court held in 521 U.S. 844, online speech is governed by the same First Amendment standards as all other expressive mediums. A rule giving educational institutions 24/7 control over student speech that is about their schools, 16 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 or that has the potential to cause a reaction at school, will encompass all off-campus expression: Giving an interview to the news media, speaking at the open-mic period to the school board or college trustees, circulating a petition seeking the firing of an abusive school employee, sending a complaint letter to the NCAA – or even giving testimony in a lawsuit. All of this is off-campus expression, all of it has the potential to reach and affect the sch ool – and all of it would become subject to punishment, if the School District prevails.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 F. 3d 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE RULE SET BY THE COURT WILL AFFECT NOT JUST SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH, BUT ALL OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH, INCLUDING LAWSUITS AND TESTIMONY",
		"context": "See 767 F. 3d 764. And third, Tinker is understood to permit prior restraint of student speech, so that administrators may pre-review a publication to check for potentially disruptive content. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 440 F. 2d 803. Now, imagine applying that level of authority to a student testifying before a school board or a college board of trustees: A speech that a student delivers with benign intent can be grounds for suspension or expulsion from school if people at school might irrationally overreact to it – and administrators can in sist on pre-approving the speech, under pain of discipline. It is not idle speculation that, armed with Tinker authority, schools and colleges will use it to deter or punish whistleblowing speech – because they do already.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 F. 2d 1071",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE RULE SET BY THE COURT WILL AFFECT NOT JUST SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH, BUT ALL OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH, INCLUDING LAWSUITS AND TESTIMONY",
		"context": "See 767 F. 3d 764. And third, Tinker is understood to permit prior restraint of student speech, so that administrators may pre-review a publication to check for potentially disruptive content. See 475 F. 2d 1071; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Now, imagine applying that level of authority to a student testifying before a school board or a college board of trustees: A speech that a student delivers with benign intent can be grounds for suspension or expulsion from school if people at school might irrationally overreact to it – and administrators can in sist on pre-approving the speech, under pain of discipline. It is not idle speculation that, armed with Tinker authority, schools and colleges will use it to deter or punish whistleblowing speech – because they do already.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 F. 2d 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Established a Unique —but Unconstitutional —Independent Agency When It Devised the Bureau",
		"context": "Central to that independence is a provision in 7 Title X mandating that the President may only remove the Director for cause. The Constitution is designed to secure individual liberty, and \"[t]he Framers re cognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The separation-of-powers vi- olation Petitioner seeks to remedy here strikes at the heart of this constitutional promise. Petitioner, the CFPB, and the dissenting opinions in PHH 881 F.3d 75, master- fully dissect the reasons why the Bureau's single- director structure cannot stand.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Established a Unique —but Unconstitutional —Independent Agency When It Devised the Bureau",
		"context": "478 U.S. 714. The separation-of-powers vi- olation Petitioner seeks to remedy here strikes at the heart of this constitutional promise. Petitioner, the CFPB, and the dissenting opinions in PHH [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], master- fully dissect the reasons why the Bureau's single- director structure cannot stand. CUNA agrees with that analysis and adopts it here. The remainder of CUNA's argument here tackles the remedial issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "881 F.3d 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The President's tweets are neither relevant nor anti-Muslim",
		"context": ". As this Court has said of Twitter, \"[p]rejudice can come through a whisper or a byte. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, a fter the Government 's petition and applications on EO -2 were filed, the President went online to lament courts as \"slow and political, \" to characterize EO-2 as a \"watered down \" and \"politically correct version \" of EO-1, and to identify the need for a \"much tougher version. \" Glenn Thrush, National Desk : Online Defiance Starts Early at the Oval Office , N.Y. TIMES , June 7, 2017, at A18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 1885",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The President's tweets are neither relevant nor anti-Muslim",
		"context": "at 377 . Federal courts cannot render advisory opinions because their Article III juris diction extends only to cases or controversies presented by affected parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Article III extends only to the current order; whatever was in the prior orders is now moot. Similarly, as explained in Sections II.B.3 (no anti - Muslim prejudice) and II.C.2 (prior versions do not impugn amended policies), supra , these tweets do not express any unconstitutional or otherwise improper motive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "219 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE HISTORY OF RELOCATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE ICWA'S NECESSITY, AND THEREFORE, THE PURPOSE OF THE ICWA WOULD BE DEFEATED IF IT WERE LIMITED TO INDIAN CHILDREN ON OR NEAR INDIAN LANDS",
		"context": "95-597], at 52 [1977].\" (Miss. Band of Choctaw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].) \"[A]pproximately 78% of American Indians live outside of Indian country. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE HISTORY OF RELOCATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE ICWA'S NECESSITY, AND THEREFORE, THE PURPOSE OF THE ICWA WOULD BE DEFEATED IF IT WERE LIMITED TO INDIAN CHILDREN ON OR NEAR INDIAN LANDS",
		"context": "215.) \"The overriding duty of our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located has been recognized by this Court on many occasions. See, e.g., Seminole [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Board of County 318 U.S. 705.\" 415 U.S. 199.) Lim- iting the ICWA's application to Indian children living on or near reservations offend s this duty as well as the wellbeing of Indian children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE HISTORY OF RELOCATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE ICWA'S NECESSITY, AND THEREFORE, THE PURPOSE OF THE ICWA WOULD BE DEFEATED IF IT WERE LIMITED TO INDIAN CHILDREN ON OR NEAR INDIAN LANDS",
		"context": "215.) \"The overriding duty of our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located has been recognized by this Court on many occasions. See, e.g., Seminole 316 U.S. 286; Board of County [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" 415 U.S. 199.) Lim- iting the ICWA's application to Indian children living on or near reservations offend s this duty as well as the wellbeing of Indian children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE HISTORY OF RELOCATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE ICWA'S NECESSITY, AND THEREFORE, THE PURPOSE OF THE ICWA WOULD BE DEFEATED IF IT WERE LIMITED TO INDIAN CHILDREN ON OR NEAR INDIAN LANDS",
		"context": "\"The overriding duty of our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located has been recognized by this Court on many occasions. See, e.g., Seminole 316 U.S. 286; Board of County 318 U.S. 705.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].) Lim- iting the ICWA's application to Indian children living on or near reservations offend s this duty as well as the wellbeing of Indian children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The removal protection has no bearing on the CID at issue here",
		"context": "§ 5491(c)(3); see2017 WL 6419154. The ratification of the CID by an officer removable by the Presiden t at will \"purge[d] any residual taint or prejudice\" that might be attributable to the allegedly invalid removal protection. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even in the appointments context, courts have \"repeatedly held that a properly appointed official's ratification of an allegedly improper official's pr ior action . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "920 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The removal protection has no bearing on the CID at issue here",
		"context": "(brackets and citation omitted); see, e.g. , Advanced Disposal Servs. E., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 819 F.3d 1179; 75 F.3d 704. So too here. Given Acting Director Mulvaney's ratification, petitioner can no longer argue that the 8 CID is an \"exercise of power by an officer who has been impermissibly insulated from removal\" (Petr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "820 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The removal protection has no bearing on the CID at issue here",
		"context": "(brackets and citation omitted); see, e.g. , Advanced Disposal Servs. E., 820 F.3d 592; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 75 F.3d 704. So too here. Given Acting Director Mulvaney's ratification, petitioner can no longer argue that the 8 CID is an \"exercise of power by an officer who has been impermissibly insulated from removal\" (Petr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The removal protection has no bearing on the CID at issue here",
		"context": "(brackets and citation omitted); see, e.g. , Advanced Disposal Servs. E., 820 F.3d 592; 819 F.3d 1179; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So too here. Given Acting Director Mulvaney's ratification, petitioner can no longer argue that the 8 CID is an \"exercise of power by an officer who has been impermissibly insulated from removal\" (Petr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F.3d 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "(J.A. at 10a (quot-ing Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Rep. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ) In other words, the California judgment is a judgment, plain and sim- ple. It matters not how or why it originally arose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "665 F.3d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "T he fact that the California judgment may be considered intangible property does not , as a matter of law, render the situs of the California judgment in Russia where Respond- ent Smagin resides. As several circuit courts have rec-ognized, \"attaching a situs to intangible property is necessarily a legal fiction; therefore, the selection of a situs for intangibles must be context -specific, embod- ying a 'common sense apprais al of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions.'\" Af - Cap In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Ninth Circuit observed in this case, \"[i]t would make no sense to conclude that the California Judgment ex-ists as property in Russia, because the judgment grants no rights whatsoever to Plaintiff in Russia.\" (J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.3d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "at 10a.) In fact, the California judgment is much more similar to the bank accounts targeted in Bascu-nan where the Second Circuit found domestic injury to be alleg ed than the intangible rights in the other cases cited by Petitioners. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he California judgment exists in, and was harmed by the RICO scheme, in California alone. Petitioners' intangible property argument remains premised on the Seventh Circuit's residency test as stated in Armada (Singapore) PTE 885 F.3d 1090 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.3d 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "The Armada test was de- rived from the same general economic -injury rule s Pe- titioners rely on for their textual approach to § 1964(c), i.e., economic injuries are felt at a person's residence. See id. at 1094–9 5 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); CMACO Auto. Sys. 589 F.3d 235; Engine Specialties, 605 F.2d 1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "108 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "at 1094–9 5 (citing 108 F.3d 799 ); CMACO Auto. Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Engine Specialties, 605 F.2d 1). But the Seventh Circuit modified the general economic -injury rule to create an artificial distinction between eco-nomic injury to tangible property and economic injury to intangible property. In so doing, the A rmada test \"precludes all foreign plaintiffs alleging intangible in- juries from recovering under § 1964(c) regardless of their alleged connection with the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "589 F.3d 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "at 1094–9 5 (citing 108 F.3d 799 ); CMACO Auto. Sys. 589 F.3d 235; Engine Specialties, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the Seventh Circuit modified the general economic -injury rule to create an artificial distinction between eco-nomic injury to tangible property and economic injury to intangible property. In so doing, the A rmada test \"precludes all foreign plaintiffs alleging intangible in- juries from recovering under § 1964(c) regardless of their alleged connection with the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "605 F.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This action is not moot",
		"context": ". The test for mootness is rigorous: \"A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As explained in this Section, relief remains available to the Arizona parties vis-à-vis both the 2019 Rule and the 1999 Field Guidance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. BECAUSE MCDONOUGH HAS ALLEGED A CONTINUING VIOLATION, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION",
		"context": "McDonough's suit is also timely under the continu- ing violation doctrine. That doctrine holds that where the plaintiff complains of a \"continuing viola- tion\" rather than a \"discrete act,\" the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the violation 45 ends. Havens Realty , 455 U.S. at 380-381 (internal quotation marks omitted); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Heard v.Sheahan , 253 F.3d 316. The constitutional violation in this case was being subject to criminal proceedings on the basis of fabricated evidence, and the resulting loss of liberty. See supra pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. BECAUSE MCDONOUGH HAS ALLEGED A CONTINUING VIOLATION, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION",
		"context": "McDonough's suit is also timely under the continu- ing violation doctrine. That doctrine holds that where the plaintiff complains of a \"continuing viola- tion\" rather than a \"discrete act,\" the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the violation 45 ends. Havens Realty , 455 U.S. at 380-381 (internal quotation marks omitted); see536 U.S. 101; Heard v.Sheahan , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The constitutional violation in this case was being subject to criminal proceedings on the basis of fabricated evidence, and the resulting loss of liberty. See supra pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. BECAUSE MCDONOUGH HAS ALLEGED A CONTINUING VIOLATION, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION",
		"context": "Whelan , 953 F.2d at 673. \"A lawsuit is thus different from the typical case of a mere failure to right a wrong and make the plaintiff whole.\" Loumiet v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike a \"single\" wrongful act, \"the commencement of a lawsuit is only the first link in a chain of conduct that does not end until the complaining party ceases prosecution of the suit.\" Whelan , 953 F.2d at 674; see48 A. 109.",
		"citation_value_orig": "828 F.3d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. BECAUSE MCDONOUGH HAS ALLEGED A CONTINUING VIOLATION, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION",
		"context": "To hold that McDonough's constitutional rights were violated only the first time fabricated evidence was used against him—but not the second, or the third—is to ignore the sustained violation of McDonough's rights in this case. The initiation and maintenance of criminal pro- ceedings on the basis of fabricated evidence is not \"a cinematographic series of distinct\" wrongs. United States v.Kissel , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is a continuing constitutional violation that persists until those proceedings terminate. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the violation ends, which in this case occurred when McDonough was acquitted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "218 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The question before the Court is not whether \"sex\" means \"sexual orientation,\" but whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of discrimination based on sex",
		"context": "But an assessment of whether an employer 's action violates the statute should be made in the vocabulary of the statute. While Ivy Tech may well say that it fired Kim Hively because she is a lesbian, that is the substantive equivalent of saying that it fired her \"because she is a woman attracted to women.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled on definition. See Hively , 853 F.3d at 345- 46. Regardless, nothing in this Court's two most recent cases on statutory interpretation would suggest any need to raise t he issue of \"original public meaning.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.3d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The question before the Court is not whether \"sex\" means \"sexual orientation,\" but whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of discrimination based on sex",
		"context": "See Wis. Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New Prime 139 S. Ct. 532. Once it is clarified that a man attracted to women would not have been fired, there can be no denying that a valid Title VII claim has been alleged.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The question before the Court is not whether \"sex\" means \"sexual orientation,\" but whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of discrimination based on sex",
		"context": "See Wis. Cent. 138 S.Ct. 2067; New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Once it is clarified that a man attracted to women would not have been fired, there can be no denying that a valid Title VII claim has been alleged.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents have not established standing",
		"context": "G Article III requires \"an injury in fact\" that is \"fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defen dant\" and \"likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.\" Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs carry the burden of supporting e ach element of standing \" in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bea rs the burden of proof.\" 504 U.S. 555.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents have not established standing",
		"context": "Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540. Plaintiffs carry the burden of supporting e ach element of standing \" in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bea rs the burden of proof.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where standing is addressed \"at the summary judgment stage, \" as here, a plaintiff cannot \"rest on mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or 18 other evidence specific f acts.\" 568 U.S. 398.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents have not established standing",
		"context": "504 U.S. 555. Where standing is addressed \"at the summary judgment stage, \" as here, a plaintiff cannot \"rest on mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or 18 other evidence specific f acts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. None of the plaintiffs in this case carried that burden.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Equitable Tolling",
		"context": "Id. at 649 (citation omitted); see also Menominee Indian Tribe, 136 S. Ct. at 756 (\"We therefore reaffirm thatthe second prong of the equitable tolling test is metonly where the circumstances that caused a litigant's 39 delay are both extraordinary and beyond its control. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 549 U.S. 327; Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Equitable Tolling",
		"context": "Id. at 649 (citation omitted); see also Menominee Indian Tribe, 136 S. Ct. at 756 (\"We therefore reaffirm thatthe second prong of the equitable tolling test is metonly where the circumstances that caused a litigant's 39 delay are both extraordinary and beyond its control. \"); 544 U.S. 408; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Equitable Tolling",
		"context": "Pub. Employees' Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, this Court has refused to apply equitable tolling where no extraordinary circumstanceprevented a timely filing. In Menominee Indian Tribe , for example, equitable tolling did not apply where thepetitioners had mistakenly relied on a district court'sorder in another case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Proposition 12 Imposes No Substantial Burden On Interstate Commerce",
		"context": "None of the three options imposes a substantial burden because produc-ers are free to choose among them and will convert their operations only if the benefits outweigh the bur- dens. 4 4 In any event, the dormant Commerce Clause \"protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms\" or particular \"methods of operation.\" Exxon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It was thus irrelevant in Exxon that \"[s]ome re- finers may choose to withdraw entirely from the Maryland mar- ket\" in response to the challenged regulation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Vacatur Is Required",
		"context": "Pet.App.72a. The court buttressed this con- clusion by extensively citing the Fifth Circuit's view that district courts have \"limited authority to consider reduc- ing a sentence previously imposed.\" Pet.App.73 a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). On appeal, the government then defended the district court's interpretation, arguing that it had been correct to hold that the First Step Act \"does not authorize the dis- trict court to consider other legal changes that may have occurred after the defendant committed the offense.\" U.S. C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "934 F.3d 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Vacatur Is Required",
		"context": "When the respondent defends the judgment but not the reasoning below, this Court's usual practice is to an- swer the question presented and leave the respondent's new arguments for remand. E.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Travelers Cas. & Sur . Co. of 549 U.S. 443; 549 U.S. 183.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Vacatur Is Required",
		"context": ", 140 S. Ct. 713; Travelers Cas. & Sur . Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 549 U.S. 183. The Court should follow that practice here. The First Circuit major- ity did not weigh in on whether the district court properly 23 unders tood its authority under a \"must\" or \"may con- sider\" rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Vacatur Is Required",
		"context": ", 140 S. Ct. 713; Travelers Cas. & Sur . Co. of 549 U.S. 443; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court should follow that practice here. The First Circuit major- ity did not weigh in on whether the district court properly 23 unders tood its authority under a \"must\" or \"may con- sider\" rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Havens Realty was correctly decided.",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 142 S. Ct. 1638 ; Bank of Am. 581 U.S. 34 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1998 ); 465 U.S. 728 ; Spokeo, 578 U.S. 330. TransUnion i n particular, affirms Havens Realty 's core tenet: \" [D]iscriminatory treatment\" is among the \"harms that exist in the real world\" that Congress \"may elevate to the status of legally cognizable inju- ries\" under Article III. 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (internal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Havens Realty was correctly decided.",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 142 S. Ct. 1638 ; Bank of Am. 581 U.S. 34 ; 524 U.S. 11 (1998 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Spokeo, 578 U.S. 330. TransUnion i n particular, affirms Havens Realty 's core tenet: \" [D]iscriminatory treatment\" is among the \"harms that exist in the real world\" that Congress \"may elevate to the status of legally cognizable inju- ries\" under Article III. 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (internal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "As the D.C. Circuit observed in an opinion by then-J udge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, sub- jecting limitations directed at a Territory to heightened scrutiny \"would be inconsistent with Congress's large powers\" in this field. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That conclusion draws additional force from the Ad- mission Clause, which provides that \"[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 1154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See 30 Aurelius , 140 S. Ct. at 1658- 1659. Article III judges en- joy life tenure, but Congress may limit the tenure of Ar- ticle IV judges. See American Insurance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And States qualify as separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but Territories do not. See Sanchez Valle , 136 S. Ct. at 1873.",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "b. This Court's precedents under the Due Process Clause reflect that understanding. In Secretary of Ag- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], fo r example, the Court rejected a due- process challenge to the Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. , which imposed different sugar quotas in Puerto Rico than in the mainland United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. at 618 -619. Likewise, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court applied the rational -basis test to a law that treated the District of Columbia differently than the rest of the United States. Id. at 379 n.12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "As the D.C. Circuit later explained in an opinion by then -Judge Scalia, Swain represented \"a considered rejection of [the] assertion that provisions uniquely applicable to the District demand a higher degree of scrutiny.\" 32 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Aurelius , 140 S. Ct. at 1658- 1661, 1663 -1665 (relying on the analogy be- tween the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico). Similarly, in 306 U.S. 1, the Court upheld the Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. 511 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "733 F.2d 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Circuit later explained in an opinion by then -Judge Scalia, Swain represented \"a considered rejection of [the] assertion that provisions uniquely applicable to the District demand a higher degree of scrutiny.\" 32 733 F.2d 128; see, e.g., Aurelius , 140 S. Ct. at 1658- 1661, 1663 -1665 (relying on the analogy be- tween the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico). Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court upheld the Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. 511 et seq. , which permitted different tobacco regulations in different regions of the country .",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. at 14. So too, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclama- tion Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq. , which imposed different mining regulations in different regions of the country .",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. at 332. c. This Court's precedents on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment point in the same direction . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], lit- tle more than a decade after the Amendment's ratifica- tion, the Court rejected an equal -protection challenge to Missouri's creation of different court systems for dif- ferent parts of the State . Id. at 29 -33.",
		"citation_value_orig": "101 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "In the years since Lewis , this Court has clarified that geographic classifi cations are subject to rational -basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "In the years since Lewis , this Court has clarified that geographic classifi cations are subject to rational -basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "In the years since Lewis , this Court has clarified that geographic classifi cations are subject to rational -basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "237 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "199 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 120 U.S. 68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "172 U.S. 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g., Rodriguez , 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-tionality, \"territorial uniformity is not a constitu tional requisite,\" 366 U.S. 420 ; that \"[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain counties,\" 377 U.S. 218; and that the Clause \"does not prohibit legislation merely be- cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-ticular geographical or political subdivision,\" 487 U.S. 450; Ohio ex rel . 281 U.S. 74; Fort Smith Light & Trac- tion 274 U.S. 387; 237 U.S. 171; 199 U.S. 325; Chap pell Chemical & Fer- tilizer 172 U.S. 474; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "120 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "In a world where trademarks are part of common political discourse, \"trademarks [must] not be transformed from rights against unfair competition to rights to control language.\" CPC Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rogers a nd it s progeny help prevent t hat t ra nsfor mat ion, while simultaneously protecting consumers and the legitimate business interests of mark owners. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works , 80 Washington L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "Under that test, the law is presumptively unconstitutional and is upheld only if the restriction is actually necessary to advancing a compelling state interest. Id. at 171; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Rogers test is also less demanding than the intermediate scrutiny test courts apply to content-neutral restrictions on speech, see Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361; or the \"exacting scrutiny\" test applied to compelled associational disclosures, Americans for Prosperity 141 S. Ct. 2373.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "at 171; 564 U.S. 786. The Rogers test is also less demanding than the intermediate scrutiny test courts apply to content-neutral restrictions on speech, see Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; or the \"exacting scrutiny\" test applied to compelled associational disclosures, Americans for Prosperity 141 S. Ct. 2373. Because it is largely objective, the Rogers test is also less demanding than the subjective actual malice standard this Court imposed upon a centuries-old body of common law defamation law, requiring public figures to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the speaker knew a statement was false or seriously doubted its truth. See New York 376 U.S. 254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361; or the \"exacting scrutiny\" test applied to compelled associational disclosures, Americans for Prosperity 141 S. Ct. 2373. Because it is largely objective, the Rogers test is also less demanding than the subjective actual malice standard this Court imposed upon a centuries-old body of common law defamation law, requiring public figures to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the speaker knew a statement was false or seriously doubted its truth. See New York [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court later imposed a similar rigorous standard on 18 the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when the predicate conduct is the making of a false statement, requiring the public figure plaintiff to prove that the defendant subjectively intended for others to believe a false statement to be true. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "See New York 376 U.S. 254. This Court later imposed a similar rigorous standard on 18 the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when the predicate conduct is the making of a false statement, requiring the public figure plaintiff to prove that the defendant subjectively intended for others to believe a false statement to be true. Hustler Magazine, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition to its relatively low burden, Rogers offers legal certainty to trademark owners, competitors, consumers, and activists alike. The test has been adopted in multiple circuits, creating almost uniform rules across the nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "See, e.g. , L.L. Bean, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nike, Inc. v. \"Just Did It\" Enter. , 6 F .3d 1225, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993); 332 F.3d 915; Utah Lighthouse 527 F.3d 1045; Univ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "811 F.2d 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "Bean, 811 F.2d 26; Nike, Inc. v. \"Just Did It\" Enter. , 6 F .3d 1225, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Utah Lighthouse 527 F.3d 1045; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266; see generally McCarthy at § 31:139 (describing Rogers rule of analysis as a \"judicial consensus\"); Lynn M. Jordan & David M. Kelly, Another Decade of Rogers v. Grimaldi: Continuing to Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of Artistic Works , 109 Trademark Rptr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 F.3d 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "Bean, 811 F.2d 26; Nike, Inc. v. \"Just Did It\" Enter. , 6 F .3d 1225, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993); 332 F.3d 915; Utah Lighthouse [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266; see generally McCarthy at § 31:139 (describing Rogers rule of analysis as a \"judicial consensus\"); Lynn M. Jordan & David M. Kelly, Another Decade of Rogers v. Grimaldi: Continuing to Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of Artistic Works , 109 Trademark Rptr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 F.3d 1045",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "1993); 332 F.3d 915; Utah Lighthouse 527 F.3d 1045; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see generally McCarthy at § 31:139 (describing Rogers rule of analysis as a \"judicial consensus\"); Lynn M. Jordan & David M. Kelly, Another Decade of Rogers v. Grimaldi: Continuing to Balance the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of Artistic Works , 109 Trademark Rptr. 833, 834 (2019) (the Rogers test has \"clearly become the standard in disputes involving trademarks\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 1266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The petitioner cannot challenge 8 C.F.R. section 1240.8(d) as ultra vires under the INA.",
		"context": "§ 1240.8(d) on non-constitutional bases such as the rule's failure to conform to the INA. To be sure, courts sometimes allow what would be a time -barred direct challenge to a rule \"apart from the original rulemaking… when [a] rule is brought before [a] court for review of [agency] action applying it.\" Murphy Explor 'n & Prod 'n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But that line of cases is inapposite in the face of a statute precluding or channeling re view. Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 F.3d 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The petitioner cannot challenge 8 C.F.R. section 1240.8(d) as ultra vires under the INA.",
		"context": "Rd. & Transp. Builders [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such statutes evince \"the twin congressional purposes of insuring that the substantive provisions of the standard would be uniformly applied and interpreted and that the circumsta nces of its adoption would be 6 quickly reviewed by a single court intimately familiar with administrative procedures. \" Adamo Wrecking 434 U.S. 275.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 453",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The petitioner cannot challenge 8 C.F.R. section 1240.8(d) as ultra vires under the INA.",
		"context": "Builders 705 F.3d 453. Such statutes evince \"the twin congressional purposes of insuring that the substantive provisions of the standard would be uniformly applied and interpreted and that the circumsta nces of its adoption would be 6 quickly reviewed by a single court intimately familiar with administrative procedures. \" Adamo Wrecking [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If anything, national uniformity is even more important for immigration law than for Clean Air Act emission standards. See, e.g., 567 U.S. 387, with in 60 days of a rule 's promulgation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The petitioner cannot challenge 8 C.F.R. section 1240.8(d) as ultra vires under the INA.",
		"context": "Adamo Wrecking 434 U.S. 275. If anything, national uniformity is even more important for immigration law than for Clean Air Act emission standards. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with in 60 days of a rule 's promulgation. Id. § 1252(e)(3)(B) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Review is inappropriate as the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the action to vacate, despite Petitioner's forum shopping and attempts to relitigate dismissed claims",
		"context": "claims This Court previously held that \"a court with the power to stay an action under [FAA] § 3 also has the power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award[.]\" 29 , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's earlier decision in went further: \"We do not conceive it to be open to question that, where the court has authority under the statute . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Review is inappropriate as the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the action to vacate, despite Petitioner's forum shopping and attempts to relitigate dismissed claims",
		"context": "There is no indication that Congress intended to allow a court to compel arbitration under § 4 on the basis that the underlying claim arose under federal law and then to require 30 the parties to go to court to review the arbitration's procedures or to enforce its awards. , 909 F.3d at 682 (emphasis in original). Citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fourth Circuit thus opined that \"the court that has jurisdiction to compel arbitration under § 4 also has jurisdiction to supervise the arbitration procedures and to confirm, vacate, modify, and enforce the resulting arbitration award.\" , 909 F.3d at 683; , 294 F.3d 702.12 After the district court compelled arbitration and stayed the litigation of the claims against Ameriprise in the REJ Suit until the",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Review is inappropriate as the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the action to vacate, despite Petitioner's forum shopping and attempts to relitigate dismissed claims",
		"context": ", 909 F.3d at 682 (emphasis in original). Citing284 U.S. 263, the Fourth Circuit thus opined that \"the court that has jurisdiction to compel arbitration under § 4 also has jurisdiction to supervise the arbitration procedures and to confirm, vacate, modify, and enforce the resulting arbitration award.\" , 909 F.3d at 683; , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].12 After the district court compelled arbitration and stayed the litigation of the claims against Ameriprise in the REJ Suit until the",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 F.3d 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
		"context": "A. The permissibility of electronic surveillance was the subject of intense national debate in the years leading up to Title III's enactment. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Presid ential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 203 (1967) (Presi- dential Commission Report). Influential figures, includ- ing President Johnson, argued that electronic surveil- lance should be outlawed entirely, except in cases present- ing grave national-secur ity concerns. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
		"context": "But that \"scrupulous sys- tem\" could easily be undermin ed if prosecutors were free to pick a favorable judge (or p ool of judges) to whom their wiretap application would be submitted. Such forum shopping would present a \"substantial\" danger by \"cir- cumvent[ing]\" the requirement of \"detached, neutral[] ju- d i c i a l r e v i e w . \" N a t i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n R e p o r t 7 3 ; s e e [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Strict enforcement of the territorial-jurisdiction limi- tation restricts the ability of prosecutors to engage in fo- rum shopping. Like the authorization requirement con- sidered in Chavez and Giordano , the territorial-jurisdic- tion limitation protects pr ivacy by \"inevitably fore- clos[ing] resort to wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel wou ld otherwise seek intercept authority from the court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "735 F.3d 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
		"context": "The court of appeals' conclusion is especially puzzling because the limitation in question involves jurisdiction and thereby implicates a \"core concern\" of our entire legal system. It is axiomatic that a court may act only within its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 58 U.S. 322; 37 U.S. 300. Consistent with that principl e, a federal district court possesses extraterritorial juri sdiction to issue a search warrant only in certain exceptional circumstances. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data , 125 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
		"context": "The court of appeals' conclusion is especially puzzling because the limitation in question involves jurisdiction and thereby implicates a \"core concern\" of our entire legal system. It is axiomatic that a court may act only within its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., 281 U.S. 18; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 37 U.S. 300. Consistent with that principl e, a federal district court possesses extraterritorial juri sdiction to issue a search warrant only in certain exceptional circumstances. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data , 125 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "58 U.S. 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
		"context": "The court of appeals' conclusion is especially puzzling because the limitation in question involves jurisdiction and thereby implicates a \"core concern\" of our entire legal system. It is axiomatic that a court may act only within its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., 281 U.S. 18; 58 U.S. 322; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with that principl e, a federal district court possesses extraterritorial juri sdiction to issue a search warrant only in certain exceptional circumstances. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data , 125 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 U.S. 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
		"context": "326, 354-360 (2015). Th e presumption against extra- territoriality in this context is so well established that, where a statute authorizing the issuance of search war- rants failed to contain a terri torial limitation, one was im- plied. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Fed. R. Cr im.",
		"citation_value_orig": "126 F.2d 1004",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "In three concurrent -powers cases between 1847 and 1852, the Court began to suggest that the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar successive prosecutions by state and federal governments. The foundation stone of the Court's reasoning in each case 21 was that the Dou ble Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states. The first was [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the State of Ohio prosecuted a defendant for counterfeiting money. The Court upheld the conviction, holding that that the federal government did not have exclusive power to criminalize counterfeiting.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "Id. at 434– 35. Citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state governments, the Court deemed it unlikely \"that the States should have anxiously insisted to ingraft upon the federal constitution restrictions upon their own authority.\" Id. at 435.",
		"citation_value_orig": "32 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "Id. at 435. The Court confronted a federal prosecution for counterfeiting in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Taking the opposite tack of the defendant in Fox, this defendant argued that the states had exclusive jurisdiction over counterfeiting. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "50 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "Because the Fifth Amendment \"applies only to proceedings by the federal government,\" the Court explained, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits only \"a second prosecution under authority of the Federal 24 Government after a first trial for the same offense under the same authority.\" Id. at 382. c. The separate -sovereigns exception metastasized further in a pair of cases —Bartkus , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Abbate, 359 U.S. 187 —decided ten years before this Court held in Benton , 395 U.S. at 787, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states. The primary battle played out in Bartkus, a five -to- four decision that upheld a state prosecution after a federal acquittal for the same bank robbery. A t great length, the Court explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause had not been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 U.S. 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "Because the Fifth Amendment \"applies only to proceedings by the federal government,\" the Court explained, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits only \"a second prosecution under authority of the Federal 24 Government after a first trial for the same offense under the same authority.\" Id. at 382. c. The separate -sovereigns exception metastasized further in a pair of cases —Bartkus , 359 U.S. 121, and Abbate, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —decided ten years before this Court held in Benton , 395 U.S. at 787, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states. The primary battle played out in Bartkus, a five -to- four decision that upheld a state prosecution after a federal acquittal for the same bank robbery. A t great length, the Court explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause had not been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "At its core, the Clause protects against that ancient abuse of governmental power. In doing so it embodies a principle of funda mental fairness—a \"constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The underlying idea . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": ". is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Permitti ng consecutive prosecutions for the same offense simply because different sovereigns initiate 28 those prosecutions \"hardly serves\" the deeply rooted principles of finality and fairness the Clause was designed to protect. Sanches Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1877 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "These concerns are far from theoretical. The separate -sovereigns exception forces defendants like Gamble —who have already been convicted or acquitted of an offense—to \" 'run the gauntlet' a second time.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Gamble is far from the only one who has suffered that fate. Justice Black's dissent in Bartkus noted multiple examples of \"a conviction following acquittal.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "Justice Black's dissent in Bartkus noted multiple examples of \"a conviction following acquittal.\" 359 U.S. at 163. And this Court's own cases provide many other examples of successive prosecutions, such as the defendant in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], who was tried in Georgia and sentenced to life in prison, then tried again in Alabama and sentenced to death —all for the same crime. Indeed, the exception 29 woul d permit a defendant acquitted in federal court to be convicted and sentenced to death by a state for the same crime. These results are intolerable— \"contrary to the [very] spirit of our free country.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
		"context": "51, supra at 323. Federalism, in other words, was supposed to protect liberty, not destroy it. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court should therefore be \"suspicious of any supposed 'requirements' of 'federalism' which result in obliterating ancient safeguards\" of individual liberty. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "But the conclusion that the Bill of Rights does not ex-tend to territories is at lea st somewhat consistent with this Court's jurisprudence in the early 1900s, when the Bill of Rights did not apply to state governments ei-ther. \"When ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal Government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend- ment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights wasn't applied to state govern- ments until many years later, with the Court subject-ing state governments to the requirements of the First Amendment for the first time in 1925.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend- ment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights wasn't applied to state govern- ments until many years later, with the Court subject-ing state governments to the requirements of the First Amendment for the first time in 1925. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]330 U.S. 1372 U.S. 229. 16 Since then, \"[w]ith only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections con- tained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend- ment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights wasn't applied to state govern- ments until many years later, with the Court subject-ing state governments to the requirements of the First Amendment for the first time in 1925. 268 U.S. 652[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]372 U.S. 229. 16 Since then, \"[w]ith only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections con- tained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend- ment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights wasn't applied to state govern- ments until many years later, with the Court subject-ing state governments to the requirements of the First Amendment for the first time in 1925. 268 U.S. 652330 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 Since then, \"[w]ith only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections con- tained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687. This includes the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]561 U.S. 742, and most recently the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated. Timbs , 139 S. Ct. 682. So there was at least some logic to holding in the early 1900s that Congress was not restricted by the Bill of Rights when acting with the power of a state government in a territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687. This includes the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s. 367 U.S. 643[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and most recently the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated. Timbs , 139 S. Ct. 682. So there was at least some logic to holding in the early 1900s that Congress was not restricted by the Bill of Rights when acting with the power of a state government in a territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "This includes the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s. 367 U.S. 643561 U.S. 742, and most recently the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated. Timbs , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So there was at least some logic to holding in the early 1900s that Congress was not restricted by the Bill of Rights when acting with the power of a state government in a territory. When the Insular Cases were decided, a state government was likewise not re- stricted by the Bill of Rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
		"context": "Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 IV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Assignor Estoppel Is More, Not Less, Important in the Context of Former Employees",
		"context": "As Professor Merges obse rves, employee-employer patent assignments promote innovation for a number of 2 When confronted with a request to overrule existing patent-law precedent, this Court occasionally ha s considered doing so only on a prospective basis to minimize the impact of the decision on reliance interests. See, e.g. , Lear, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the Court agrees with Minerva's view that assignor estoppel should be abandoned or significantly limite d, it may similarly wish to con- sider making its holding prospective only to limit the extent of disrup- tion to existing patent assignment s agreements. Assignees then can attempt to contractually patch the tear in the \"fabric of our law\" going forward.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Assignor Estoppel Is More, Not Less, Important in the Context of Former Employees",
		"context": ". have initiated the infringing operations without [his] assistance.\" HWB, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If assignor estoppel does act as a \"partial nonc ompete agreement,\" Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Assignor Estoppel , 54 Hous. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F. Supp. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Assignor Estoppel Is More, Not Less, Important in the Context of Former Employees",
		"context": "Moreover, even if, as Minerva and its amici contend, application of assignor esto ppel can sometimes resemble the constraints imposed by a noncompete agreement, nothing prevents assignors and assignees from agreeing to limit the scope of the doct rine. Such provisions could take the form of an \"express reservation by the assignor of the right to challenge the validity of the patent or an express waiver by the assignee of the right to assert as- signor estoppel.\" Mentor Graphics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Parties to an assignment could also contractually restrict the application of assignor es toppel in ways in between, such as limiting estoppel to certain defenses, or a particu- lar version of the claims. Adopting Minerva's position , by contrast, will mean that employer-assignees cannot obtain the benefits of as-signor estoppel even when employees are willing to grant them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment",
		"context": "508 U.S. at 547. Once unlawful discrimination is identified as a reason for a law's enactment, that law \"has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 1972 Constitutional Convention, which voted to maintain Montana's Blaine Amendment without substantive changes, did not cure the discriminatory purpose behind the Blaine. The convention d elegates considered amending the provision that would become Article X Section 6 of the Montana Constitution, which forbids direct or indirect appropriation of funds for any educational institution \"controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government cannot target for dilution messages and views it disfavors",
		"context": ". It is well established under the Free Speech Clause that \"[t]he government may not regulate … based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Content- based restrictions on private speech, particularly in the abortion context, allow government officials to \"effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.\" Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government cannot target for dilution messages and views it disfavors",
		"context": "505 U.S. 377. Content- based restrictions on private speech, particularly in the abortion context, allow government officials to \"effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.\" Simon & Schuster, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act's compelled disclosures plainly detract from private speakers' lawful messages in a blatant attempt to regulate the marketplace of ideas on abortion by controlling the words communicated to abortion-determined women. California has enacted a targeted speech regulation of a particular group—which, by operation, manifestly consists of those opposed to that state government's viewpoint on abortion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. USERRA's Alternative Enforcement Provision is Ineffective.",
		"context": "See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.288– 89. (2016); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 12). 23 If DOL finds the claim merit orious , the agency will then attempt to resolve the matter through negotiation or mediat ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 S.W.3d 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]45 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "754 F.3d 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F. Supp. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F.3d 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "................................ ............................... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Aberdeen & Rockfish 422 U.S. 289 ................................ .............................. 21 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. 592 ................................ ........ 7 468 U.S. 737 ................................ ...... 3 American Hosp. 867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art. III ................................ ............................. 3, 5 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............. 16 555 U.S. 7 ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art. III ................................ ............................. 3, 5 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 S. Ct. 2190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "867 F.3d 160 ................................ ............. 13 40 F.4th 375 ........... 5, 9, 10 142 S. Ct. 2528 ................................ ................ 19 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1891 ................................ 7, 11 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 255145 F.4th 127 ...... 13 142 S. Ct. 2057470 U.S. 821 ............................... 13 508 U.S. 182 ................................ ... 15 Linda 410 U.S. 614 ..................... 6 497 U.S. 871 ................................ .............................. 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 12 Massachuse 549 U.S. 497 ..................... 4, 5 754 F.3d 1002 ............. 16 NRDC, 392 F. Supp. 685 ................................ ......... 21 National Min. 758 F.3d 243 ................................ ............. 16 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019 ) ....................... 8, 9, 1 1 142 S. Ct. 1614 ............................... 8 54 U.S. 518 ................................ ................ 5 Professionals & Patients for Customized 56 F.3d 592 ............................. 15 464 U.S. 16 ..................... 22 415 U.S. 61 ............................. 17 Scripps -Howard Radio, 316 U.S. 4 ................................ ................................ . 17 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 ................................ .............. 9, 11, 12, 13 III Cases —Continued: Page TransUnion 141 S. Ct. 2190 ................................ ............. 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................ 23 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Art. III ................................ ............................. 3, 5 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "On re- spondents' theory, States could challenge virtually any federal policy because all federal polic ies regulating the people within a State have derivative effects on the State itself . Respondents make no serious effort to rec- oncile that result with \"the proper —and properly limited —role of the courts in a democratic society.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents' limitless theory has no basis in history and tradition. Respondents and their amici fail to iden- tify a single 18th -, 19th -, or even 20th -century case af- ford ing a State standing to sue the national governme nt based on the incidental effects of a federal policy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "19) are from the 21st century. The incidental effects of federal policies on States thus have not been \"tradition- ally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.\" TransUnion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor do the recent cases that respondents invoke (Br. 18-19) supp ort their theory .",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 S. Ct. 2190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "Nor do the recent cases that respondents invoke (Br. 18-19) supp ort their theory . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court considered a challenge to the rescission of the De- ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program; because the plaintiffs included \"individual DACA recip- ients,\" who unquestionably had standing, the Court had no occasion to consider the state plaintiffs ' standing . Id. at 1903.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "Id. at 1903. In Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court held that States had stand- ing to challenge the con duct of the Census . But t he Census directly affects the States in a way that the Guidelines do not; its very purpose is to determine how congressional seats and federal funds are distributed among the States. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "Id. at 2565. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court held only that a State had standing to challenge the denial of a rulemak- ing petition when the denial threatened to diminish its \"sovereign territory\" and the Clean Air Act vested it with specific procedu ral rights related to the subject 5 matter of the suit . Id. at 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "17 (emphasis omitted ). When a State sues to vindicate a proprietary interest, it may proceed \"on the same ground and to the same extent as a corporation or individual .\" Pennsyl- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Distinctive principles apply only when a State asserts that a federa l policy has affected its gov- ernmental activities , such as regulating, taxing, and spending . No private party could bring such a claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "13 How. 518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "15) between chal- lenging an \"individual [non -enforcement] decision\" and challenging an enforcement policy. But the \"Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen l acks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting au- thority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.\" Linda [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Linda R.S. , for example, the Court held tha t a mother lacked standing to challenge a district attorney's general pol- icy against prosecuting \"fathers of illegitimate chil- dren\" for failure to pay child support.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "314. The evidence in the record, in short, does not establish that the Guidelines caused a reduction in over- all immigration enforcement —much less a reduction that impos ed financial costs on Texas. D. Finally, citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], respond- ents assert (Br. 23) that they have parens patriae standing to protect the well -being of their residents. But respondents ignore that Snapp itself reaffirmed the long -settled rule that a \"State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "26 -27) precedents holding that Section 1226(e) does not bar habeas petitions challeng- ing the legislative or regulatory framework governing detention . But that line of decisio ns rests on Section 1226(e) 's lack of the \"particularly clear statement\" needed to \"bar habeas review .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2003). No comparable clear -statement rule applies here. The presumption in favor of judicial 8 review of administrative action, on which respondents rely (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "But Section 1226(a) specifies that limit for all ex- ercises of authority under Section 1226. 8 U.S.C. 1226(a); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] provides that the Secre- tary \"shall\" take custody of criminal noncitizens , this Court has repeatedly held that even \"seemingly manda- tory\" words such as \" 'shall' \" do not supersede \"deep - rooted\" principles of law -enforcement discretion. Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 those deci- sions on the ground that they involved challenges to \"in- dividual non -enforcement decisions\" rather than to gen- eral policies. In fact, Castle Rock involved a challenge to an alleged \"official policy or custom\" of refusing to enforce restraining orders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "8 U.S.C. 1226(a); see 139 S. Ct. 954 provides that the Secre- tary \"shall\" take custody of criminal noncitizens , this Court has repeatedly held that even \"seemingly manda- tory\" words such as \" 'shall' \" do not supersede \"deep - rooted\" principles of law -enforcement discretion. Town of Castle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] those deci- sions on the ground that they involved challenges to \"in- dividual non -enforcement decisions\" rather than to gen- eral policies. In fact, Castle Rock involved a challenge to an alleged \"official policy or custom\" of refusing to enforce restraining orders. 545 U.S. at 751.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "Respondents suggest (Br. 33) that such surplusage is \"not atypical,\" but \"[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. Respondents err in suggest ing (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 Cranch 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "130-131, 133, 417, 423 -434. In a context like this one, i nterpreting \"seemingly mandatory legislative commands\" to accommodate background norms of en- forcement discretion recognizes \"[t]he practical neces- sity for discretion.\" Castle Rock , 545 U.S. at 761-762; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents' contrary reading violates the principle that courts should \"strongly disfavor any in- terpretation that would make statutory commands un- fulfillable.\" Finnbin, 45 F.4th 127 (D.C. Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "Finnbin, 45 F.4th 127 (D.C. Cir. 202 2); see, e.g., American Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Adopting respondents' interpretation could not and would not lead to enforcement against all of the noncit- izens covered by those provisions. Instea d, it would simply mire courts in litigation superintending the Sec- retary's efforts to deploy DHS's limited resources to best fulfill its many competing responsibilities in the face of on-the-ground immigration realities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "553( b)(A). The Guidelines are a general statement of policy be- cause they explain how DHS will exercise its prosecuto- rial discretion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents do not contest that the Guidelines authorize officers to make enforcement decisions on a case -by-case basis. Instead, they complain (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "38) that the Guidelines \"bind[ ]\" officers to \" consider [ ]\" certain \"factors.\" But requiring officers to consider general factors is not the kind of \"binding\" effect with whi ch the APA is concerned. See Professionals & Patients for Customized [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More fundamentally , respondents err in asking whether a policy binds lower -level officials . The Secre- tary is not required to go t hrough notice and comment to give binding instructions to his subordinates; indeed, guiding those officials is a central purpose of general statements of policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "12 -19. Instead, t he question is whether the policy statement binds \"regulated enti- ties,\" National Min. Ass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Guidelines do neither. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F.3d 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "37-38. Alternatively , the Guidelines qualify as a rule of practice or procedure because they guide the agency's own behavior without changing the substantive rights of third parties . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents do not address that exemption except to assert (Br. 38 -39) that the Guide- lines bind line officers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "754 F.3d 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "But Section 705 (like Section 706) did not create new remedies. Section 705 \"was primarily intended to reflect existing law,\" not \"to fash- ion new rules of intervention for District Courts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By authorizing a stay only when \"necessary and appropri- ate,\" Section 705 codified pre -APA equitab le principles under which reviewing courts could temporarily stay certain agency orders challenged in special statutory review proceedings. See Scripps -Howard Radio , 316 U.S. 4 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "415 U.S. 61. By authorizing a stay only when \"necessary and appropri- ate,\" Section 705 codified pre -APA equitab le principles under which reviewing courts could temporarily stay certain agency orders challenged in special statutory review proceedings. See Scripps -Howard Radio , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 18 Respondents also invoke (Br. 40) 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "Br. 40 (citing Cream Wipt Food Prods. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And that case involved a \"special statutory review pr oceeding,\" 5 U.S.C. 703 , permitting a court of appeals to review an agency order and \"affirm the order \" or \" set it aside in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "187 F.2d 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "20 Pointing to more recent cases, respondents assert (Br. 42) that the availability of vacatur has been well - established \"[f ]or more than 30 years.\" They cite [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that an \"entire \" agency program can be \"affected\" when a discrete agency action is \"chal- lenged under the APA.\" Id. at 890 n.2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "But respondents do not explain why those distinctions matter. Vacatur is prac- tically equivalent to an injunction compelling the agency to rescind or stop implementing the challenged action . See , e.g., NRDC, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that vacatur is not coercive because it does not directly instruct officials \"to do anything,\" and instead \"operates against a challenged action.\" But that argument simply restates their point that vacatur is not in personam , which is dis- tinct from the question whether vacatur is coercive. Re- spondents cannot deny that the district court's vacatur coercively requires DHS to \"refrain\" from implement- ing the Guidelines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F. Supp. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
		"context": "J.A. 395. Respondents' hypertechnical approach to the term \"enjoin\" is inconsistent with this Court's decision in Aberdeen & Rockfish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, the Court construed a statute conferring jurisdiction over appeal s from certain \" injunction [s],\" 28 U.S.C. 1253 (emphasis added), to cover \"appeals from orders not cast in injunctive language but which by their terms simply 'set aside' or declined to 'set aside' [agency] orders \" because such orders have \"as coercive an effect on the [agency] .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. EO-3's avowed purpose is a \"sham\"",
		"context": "That requirement is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes.\" Lynch , 465 U.S. at 690–91. Government action violates the Establishment Clause when secular purposes played a role in the action but were overshadowed by a primary religious purpose, such as in McCreary Cty., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In McCreary, the Court credited some secular purposes advanced by the government but ultimately found its Ten Commandments display unconstitutional because of its core religious purpose. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Serial Litigant Arguments Are Unwarranted",
		"context": "8 Although tens of millions of disabled Americans visit places of public accommodation or attempt to book rooms at hotels and all suffer the same discriminatory barriers, the ADA does not provide for any award of damages. It is for this reason that the ADA is enforced by only a small handful of plaintiff advocates. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has previously recognized the necessity that persons like this plaintiff serve as private attorneys general and \"[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement ... to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.\" See 461 U.S. 424.",
		"citation_value_orig": "733 F.3d 1323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Serial Litigant Arguments Are Unwarranted",
		"context": "See 733 F.3d 1323. This Court has previously recognized the necessity that persons like this plaintiff serve as private attorneys general and \"[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement ... to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Christiansburg Garment 434 U.S. 412. Petitioner and the Amici would have this Court ignore the reasoning of Hensley so that they can immunize themselves from suits by civil rights advocates seeking to enforce the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 424",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Serial Litigant Arguments Are Unwarranted",
		"context": "This Court has previously recognized the necessity that persons like this plaintiff serve as private attorneys general and \"[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement ... to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.\" See 461 U.S. 424. See also Christiansburg Garment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner and the Amici would have this Court ignore the reasoning of Hensley so that they can immunize themselves from suits by civil rights advocates seeking to enforce the law. Without civil rights advocates such as this plaintiff, there would be no enforcement of the ADA, and the Amici would be free to continue with their discriminatory practices without consequence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": ". \"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Article III vests federal courts with the authority \"to decide legal questions only in the course of resolving 'Cases ' or 'Controver sies.' One of the essential elements of a legal case or controversy is that the plaintiff have standing to sue.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": "Article III vests federal courts with the authority \"to decide legal questions only in the course of resolving 'Cases ' or 'Controver sies.' One of the essential elements of a legal case or controversy is that the plaintiff have standing to sue.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Standing is the \"hard floor\" upon which a federal case may be built. Ctr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": "Standing is the \"hard floor\" upon which a federal case may be built. Ctr. for Biological [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . While discussed less frequently, Article III also has a ceiling : \"the power to render judgments in individual cases.\" Murphy , 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.3d 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": "Lewis , 518 U.S. at 349. \"No Article III case or controversy \" therefore remains once the plaintiff has been afforded \"complete relief. \" Campbell -Ewald [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court's task, in short, is to decide the parties' legal dispute and, should the plaintiff prevail, remedy the injury that created the standing to bring a federal case. See Lewis , 518 U.S. at 357 ; see also Brian Charles Lea, Situational Severability , 103 VA. L. REV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": "This time -honored understanding of the judiciary's remedial powers has been fused to Article III. This Court has held that \"generalized grievances about the conduct of Government \" are not a basis for standing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \" Similarly, this Court has long 'adhered to the rule that a party general ly must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'\" 5 Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": ". is made to rest upon such an act .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, invalidating the enforcement proceeding is the only relief needed to render judgment for Petitioner .2 It is the Article III ceiling of this case. 2 The same relief should also be available, at a minimum, to others who have raised a similar challenge to the CFPB's structure.",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability",
		"context": "2 The same relief should also be available, at a minimum, to others who have raised a similar challenge to the CFPB's structure. As the Court has explained, \"'one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional va lidity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case' is entitled to relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this Court holds that the 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Essential to the ADA framework is the requirement that the employee requesting accommodation can perform the essential functions of the position",
		"context": "See Vargas v. DeJoy , 980 F .3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 2020); Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 161 F .3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Only once an otherwise qualified employee has identified a reasonable accommodation must an employer provide the accommodation or show that doing so would cause an undue hardship to the conduct of the business. At this point, the bar is rightfully high for an employer to prove undue hardship.",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 F.3d 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Essential to the ADA framework is the requirement that the employee requesting accommodation can perform the essential functions of the position",
		"context": "It requires individuals seeking accommodations to first show that they are qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. And \"[i]t is well settled that an employer is under no obligation to reallocate the essential functions of a position that a qualified individual must perform.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because no such analysis takes place under Title VII, expanding its undue hardship definition while minimizing the legal significance of burdens on third parties will lead to extreme disruptions to businesses that are not seen in the ADA context. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "147 F.3d 784",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The repeated references of petitioner and its amici to \"avoidance,\" \"revocation,\" and \"rescission\" are red herrings",
		"context": "Avoidance unwinds a contractual obligation or transfer of interest in property, essentially treating that obligation or transfer as void and restoring the debtor to the status quo ante . See generally Merit Mgmt. Grp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 548.10[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. 2018). By contrast, re- jection does not unwind a contract; it limits remedies for rejection to a pre-petition claim for breach-of-contract damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Private speakers bear ultimate responsibility for the messages conveyed by the flags",
		"context": "Who originates themessage? See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Who designs the message? If an event is involved, whoorganizes and promotes it?",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 F.3d 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Private speakers bear ultimate responsibility for the messages conveyed by the flags",
		"context": "This factor is tricky with license plates. Private vehicle owners display the message, so private speech concerns are implicated, but the stateowns the plates. Planned Parenthood of S.C., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]759 F.3d 388547 F.3d 853288 F.3d 610. The license plate factors are \"instructive but neither exhaustive nor always uniformly applicable.\" ACLU v.Tata , 742 F.3d at 569.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Private speakers bear ultimate responsibility for the messages conveyed by the flags",
		"context": "This factor is tricky with license plates. Private vehicle owners display the message, so private speech concerns are implicated, but the stateowns the plates. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 361 F.3d 786[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]547 F.3d 853288 F.3d 610. The license plate factors are \"instructive but neither exhaustive nor always uniformly applicable.\" ACLU v.Tata , 742 F.3d at 569.",
		"citation_value_orig": "759 F.3d 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Private speakers bear ultimate responsibility for the messages conveyed by the flags",
		"context": "This factor is tricky with license plates. Private vehicle owners display the message, so private speech concerns are implicated, but the stateowns the plates. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 361 F.3d 786759 F.3d 388[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]288 F.3d 610. The license plate factors are \"instructive but neither exhaustive nor always uniformly applicable.\" ACLU v.Tata , 742 F.3d at 569.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 F.3d 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Private speakers bear ultimate responsibility for the messages conveyed by the flags",
		"context": "This factor is tricky with license plates. Private vehicle owners display the message, so private speech concerns are implicated, but the stateowns the plates. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 361 F.3d 786759 F.3d 388547 F.3d 853[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The license plate factors are \"instructive but neither exhaustive nor always uniformly applicable.\" ACLU v.Tata , 742 F.3d at 569.",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 F.3d 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "1. Respondents rely on the line of cases holding that state legislatures are subject to various state -con- stitutional procedural requirements when enacting federal election regulations —including the veto, Smi- ley, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 285 U.S. 380 , and ref- erendum , State of Ohio ex rel. 241 U.S. 565. But these cases merely hold that state legislatures must exercise their federally -as- signed function consistent with \"the method which the state has prescribed for legislative enactments .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "1. Respondents rely on the line of cases holding that state legislatures are subject to various state -con- stitutional procedural requirements when enacting federal election regulations —including the veto, Smi- ley, 285 U.S. 355 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and ref- erendum , State of Ohio ex rel. 241 U.S. 565. But these cases merely hold that state legislatures must exercise their federally -as- signed function consistent with \"the method which the state has prescribed for legislative enactments .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "1. Respondents rely on the line of cases holding that state legislatures are subject to various state -con- stitutional procedural requirements when enacting federal election regulations —including the veto, Smi- ley, 285 U.S. 355 ; 285 U.S. 380 , and ref- erendum , State of Ohio ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But these cases merely hold that state legislatures must exercise their federally -as- signed function consistent with \"the method which the state has prescribed for legislative enactments .\" Smi- ley, 285 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "The Court's E lectors Clause precedents strongly support our interpretation. McPherson v. Blacker explained that the Electors Clause \" leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object \" and \"operat[es] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circum- scribe the legislative power.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1892 ). Earlier language notes that a State's \" legislative power is the supreme authority, except as limited by the constitution of the state,\" id. at 25, but that pas- sage was discussing the state's ordinary legislative power, not the legislature's exercise of federal func- tions.12 Respondents argue that McPherson 's interpreta- tion of the Electors Clause as foreclosing state-consti-tutional restrictions was dic ta, but it was part of the Court's holding in Palm Beach County , 531 U.S. at 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "Palm Beach County , 531 U.S. at 78. Because there is no reason to interpret the Elections Clause and the Electors Clause differently in this con- text, that principle, squarely endorsed by this Court, resolves this case. Chief Justice Rehnquist again defended this view in his concurrence in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents say that this opinion \"stands for the un-remarkable proposition that state courts' authority to interp ret state law is not itself unchecked by federal constitutional constraints .\" Non-State Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "Pet.App.121a. 30 4. Respondents intone the Court's statement in Rucho v. Common Cause that \" Provisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide stand- ards and guidance for state courts to apply\" in parti- san gerrymandering cases, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but that statement did not purport to defini- tively resolve the question presented here . As Rucho itself explained: \" [w]e express no view on any of these pending proposal s.\" Id. at 2508 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "And several strategies cited by Rucho —such as creating redistricting commissions —are consistent with our theory. Similarly, Wesberry v. Sanders 's conclusion that federal constitutional constraints govern Congress's authority to \"make or alter\" a state legislature's elec-tion regulations under the Elections Clause has no relevance here. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those same fed- eral constitutional constraints also govern state leg is- latures when they exercise the federal function as- signed to them by the Clause. For that reason, 507 U.S. 25, and other cases estab- lishing that state courts, as well as federal courts, may review congressional districts for compli ance with fed- eral constitutional standards are also irrelevant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.",
		"context": "376 U.S. 1. Those same fed- eral constitutional constraints also govern state leg is- latures when they exercise the federal function as- signed to them by the Clause. For that reason, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and other cases estab- lishing that state courts, as well as federal courts, may review congressional districts for compli ance with fed- eral constitutional standards are also irrelevant. 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Legislatures may reasonably regulate firearms to protect public safety",
		"context": "Safety The Second Amendment states : \"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.\" I n District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that the Second Amend- ment protects an individual right to possess arms for lawful purposes, including self -defense. And in McDon- 561 U.S. 742, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes that right binding on the States. That right is not, however, abso- lute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Legislatures may reasonably regulate firearms to protect public safety",
		"context": "Safety The Second Amendment states : \"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.\" I n District of 554 U.S. 570, this Court held that the Second Amend- ment protects an individual right to possess arms for lawful purposes, including self -defense. And in McDon- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes that right binding on the States. That right is not, however, abso- lute. Heller and McDonald instruct that the scope of the right is determined by history and tradition .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
		"context": "At the heart of the Indiana Supreme Court's deci- sion was the incorrect assumption that this Court's dictum in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that the Excessive Fines Clause \"re- main[s] unincorporated\" should be deferred to as an affirmative declaration that that guarantee does not apply to the states. Thus, while the court below acknowledged that this Court \"has never held that States are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause,\" it nevertheless concluded that addressing the merits of the issue or holding that the guarantee applied to the states would require \"ignor[ing] McDonald .\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
		"context": "In reaching this conclusion, Indiana joined a signif- icant minority of lower courts that have adopted simi-lar rationales for ruling against those invoking the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause against a state. For example, in Reyes v. North Texas Tollway Authority, the district court engaged in a lengthy summary of this Court's decisions regarding the in- corporation of the Excessive Fines Clause, reasoning \"that [that clause] has not yet been incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,\" and, as a result, \"a state-created entity like the [defendant] could not have violated it.\" 830 F. Supp. 2d 194[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In Re654 N.W.2d 646 (alterations in original) (quot-ing In re560 N.W.2d 341). This reasoning wrongly interprets the fact that this Court has not authoritatively addressed the issue as an indication that incorporation of this right was viewed by this Court with disfavor. \"That the Su-preme Court has not yet issued a case expressly in- corporating the Excessive Fines Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "202 P.3d 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
		"context": "In reaching this conclusion, Indiana joined a signif- icant minority of lower courts that have adopted simi-lar rationales for ruling against those invoking the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause against a state. For example, in Reyes v. North Texas Tollway Authority, the district court engaged in a lengthy summary of this Court's decisions regarding the in- corporation of the Excessive Fines Clause, reasoning \"that [that clause] has not yet been incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,\" and, as a result, \"a state-created entity like the [defendant] could not have violated it.\" 830 F. Supp. 2d 194202 P.3d 782; In Re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (alterations in original) (quot-ing In re560 N.W.2d 341). This reasoning wrongly interprets the fact that this Court has not authoritatively addressed the issue as an indication that incorporation of this right was viewed by this Court with disfavor. \"That the Su-preme Court has not yet issued a case expressly in- corporating the Excessive Fines Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "654 N.W.2d 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
		"context": "In reaching this conclusion, Indiana joined a signif- icant minority of lower courts that have adopted simi-lar rationales for ruling against those invoking the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause against a state. For example, in Reyes v. North Texas Tollway Authority, the district court engaged in a lengthy summary of this Court's decisions regarding the in- corporation of the Excessive Fines Clause, reasoning \"that [that clause] has not yet been incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,\" and, as a result, \"a state-created entity like the [defendant] could not have violated it.\" 830 F. Supp. 2d 194202 P.3d 782; In Re654 N.W.2d 646 (alterations in original) (quot-ing In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This reasoning wrongly interprets the fact that this Court has not authoritatively addressed the issue as an indication that incorporation of this right was viewed by this Court with disfavor. \"That the Su-preme Court has not yet issued a case expressly in- corporating the Excessive Fines Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 N.W.2d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
		"context": "This was a mistake. This Court is not \"a legis- lature charged with formulating public policy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does the fact that this Court has the fi-nal word on many question s of constitutional inter- pretation grant state courts a right to discriminate against those seeking to enforce rights that have not yet been held to be incorporated by this Court. As the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged, \"[w]hether a Bill of Rights provision applies to the States is a purely legal question.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
		"context": "Cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is, in a word, no basis for treating incorpora- tion as exempt from the Constitutional requirement that state courts consider federal rights on the same terms as state rights. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress could alter Seminole Rock deference",
		"context": "City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296 . A regulation is ambiguous in the relevant sense only if, \"carefully considered\" in light of all those tools, the regulation nonetheles s \"can yield more than one reasonable interpretation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1991 ) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A regulation is not ambiguous merely because \" discerning the only possible interpre- tation requires a taxing inquir y.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress could alter Seminole Rock deference",
		"context": "Ibid. ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, s ome genuine ambiguity is inevitable — for example, because an agency cannot foresee all the future applications of a rule at the time it issues the 29 rule. But many seeming ambiguities can be resolved by careful consideration of the text, structure, purpose , and history of a regulation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress could alter Seminole Rock deference",
		"context": "At times, this Court has suggested that agency inter- pretations receive greater deference in this context than under Chevron . See, e.g., Larionoff , 431 U.S. at 873; Seminole Rock , 325 U.S. at 414; cf. Capital Net- work Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court should lay to rest any doubt and make clear that an agency's interpreta- tion must be reasonable —i.e., it must be one of the rea- sonable readings to which the regulation is susceptible even after applying the traditional tools of construction. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 F.3d 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Economic Reprisals",
		"context": "Publicly identified Prop 8 supporters also suffered \"widespread economic reprisals.\" Reply Brief for Appellant at 28-29, Citizens United , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 08-205). Employers of Prop 8 supporters were 15 Attack Outside of Catholic Church Part of 'Wave of Intimidation,' Says Yes on 8 , Catholic News Agency (Oct. 15, 2008), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/attack_outside_of_catholic_church_part_of_wave_of_intimidation_says_yes_on_8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Statutory Text Shows that section 315(b) Violations Are Not Immune from Judicial Review",
		"context": "Furthermore, 35 U.S.C . § 315(b) directs the PTO that it \"may not\" institute an IPR under such circumstances and limits the PTO's jurisdiction over IPRs. See Intellectual Ventures II [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put otherwise, if the petitio n for review is time -barred, the PTO lacks discretion to determine \"whether\" (or not) 9 to institute review pursuant to § 314(a), since § 315(b) instructs that the PTO \" may not \" do so —irrespective of the perceived substantive merits of the petition. The PTO' s own regulations recognize the \"jurisdictional\" nature of the § 315(b) time -bar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.3d 1372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "……………………… 21 CONCLUSION…………………………………………. 24 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES 941 F.3d 410……………………………………….. 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]…………………. 6 445 Fed.Appx. 365……………… 1 930 F.3d 215……………………………………………………….. 1 930 F.3d 543…………………………………………………. 4, 5, 6 896 F.3d 260….. 1 Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "……………………… 21 CONCLUSION…………………………………………. 24 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES 941 F.3d 410……………………………………….. 7 566 U.S. 284…………………. 6 445 Fed.Appx. 365……………… 1 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]……………………………………………………….. 1 930 F.3d 543…………………………………………………. 4, 5, 6 896 F.3d 260….. 1 Tex. Dep't of Housing and Community 135 S.Ct. 2507……………………………………………... 2 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 158 Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "……………………… 21 CONCLUSION…………………………………………. 24 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES 941 F.3d 410……………………………………….. 7 566 U.S. 284…………………. 6 445 Fed.Appx. 365……………… 1 930 F.3d 215……………………………………………………….. 1 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]…………………………………………………. 4, 5, 6 896 F.3d 260….. 1 Tex. Dep't of Housing and Community 135 S.Ct. 2507……………………………………………... 2 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 158 Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "24 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES 941 F.3d 410……………………………………….. 7 566 U.S. 284…………………. 6 445 Fed.Appx. 365……………… 1 930 F.3d 215……………………………………………………….. 1 930 F.3d 543…………………………………………………. 4, 5, 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]….. 1 Tex. Dep't of Housing and Community 135 S.Ct. 2507……………………………………………... 2 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 158 Cong. Rec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "896 F.3d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "6 445 Fed.Appx. 365……………… 1 930 F.3d 215……………………………………………………….. 1 930 F.3d 543…………………………………………………. 4, 5, 6 896 F.3d 260….. 1 Tex. Dep't of Housing and Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]……………………………………………... 2 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 158 Cong. Rec. S1162 (2012)…………………………….",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no party or party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, or contributed money that was intended to fund its preparation or submission; and no person other than the amicus curi ae, its members, or its counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 2 See e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]445 Fed.Appx. 365. 2 for a large number of African-American women, and thus, presents a grave thre at to the communities the Clinic serves. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT As this Court has acknowledged, both recently and in the past, the United States has a long and unfortunate history of raci al discrimination against African-Americans.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
		"context": "In some cases, these vestiges are the product of residential segregation; in others, they are the product of analogous explicit discriminatory practices that have had the effect of denying African Americans health care. 4 Tex. Dep't of Housing and Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Id. at 2515.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. The Bladensburg Cross does not evoke a World War I headstone nor was it intended to",
		"context": "Second, the Founders were concerned that a union with government would strip the favored religion of its potency and water it down into a pablum for the masses. See School Dist. of Grand [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the de vout believer who fears the secularization of a creed.\" Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. The Bladensburg Cross does not evoke a World War I headstone nor was it intended to",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. of Abington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 51 political figures reshape th e religion's beliefs for their own purposes.\" Lee, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., con- curring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "In the Bankruptcy Code, Congress defined prop- erty of the bankruptcy estate broadly to maximize the estate for the benefit of all creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Bankruptcy Code, simi- larly situated creditors generally are treated equally with respect to the distribution of a bankruptcy es- tate. In some circumstances, however, a claimant ar-gues that some of the property of the estate is held in 7 trust for that claimant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "The circuits generally are in agreement that the members of a consolidated tax group are free to enter into a tax sharing agreement to allocate income tax attributes and the ultimate incom e tax liability among themselves . See, e.g. , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cantor v. FDIC (In re593 F. App'x 123; Capital Bancshares, 957 F.2d 203; Bob Richards , 473 F.2d at 264; In re United Western Bancorp, Inc. , 914 F.3d at 1270; Zucker v. FDIC (In re727 F.3d 1100. The circuits di-verge, however, in how they address the issue of allo- cating tax liabilities among consolidated group members where there is no tax sharing agreement or the agreement does not unambiguously address the ownership of tax attributes that generate a tax refund or the ownership of the tax refund itself . In Bob Richards , the Ninth Circuit ruled that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a tax re- fund resulting solely from offsetting the losses of one member of a consolidated filing group against the in-come of that same member in a prior o r subsequent year should inure to the benefit of that member.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "The circuits generally are in agreement that the members of a consolidated tax group are free to enter into a tax sharing agreement to allocate income tax attributes and the ultimate incom e tax liability among themselves . See, e.g. , In re928 F.2d 565; Cantor v. FDIC (In re593 F. App'x 123; Capital Bancshares, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bob Richards , 473 F.2d at 264; In re United Western Bancorp, Inc. , 914 F.3d at 1270; Zucker v. FDIC (In re727 F.3d 1100. The circuits di-verge, however, in how they address the issue of allo- cating tax liabilities among consolidated group members where there is no tax sharing agreement or the agreement does not unambiguously address the ownership of tax attributes that generate a tax refund or the ownership of the tax refund itself . In Bob Richards , the Ninth Circuit ruled that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a tax re- fund resulting solely from offsetting the losses of one member of a consolidated filing group against the in-come of that same member in a prior o r subsequent year should inure to the benefit of that member.",
		"citation_value_orig": "957 F.2d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "The circuits generally are in agreement that the members of a consolidated tax group are free to enter into a tax sharing agreement to allocate income tax attributes and the ultimate incom e tax liability among themselves . See, e.g. , In re928 F.2d 565; Cantor v. FDIC (In re593 F. App'x 123; Capital Bancshares, 957 F.2d 203; Bob Richards , 473 F.2d at 264; In re United Western Bancorp, Inc. , 914 F.3d at 1270; Zucker v. FDIC (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The circuits di-verge, however, in how they address the issue of allo- cating tax liabilities among consolidated group members where there is no tax sharing agreement or the agreement does not unambiguously address the ownership of tax attributes that generate a tax refund or the ownership of the tax refund itself . In Bob Richards , the Ninth Circuit ruled that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a tax re- fund resulting solely from offsetting the losses of one member of a consolidated filing group against the in-come of that same member in a prior o r subsequent year should inure to the benefit of that member.",
		"citation_value_orig": "727 F.3d 1100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "Id . The Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on the precise basis for these conclusions , most notably whether the result was based on stat e law . See Bob Richards, 473 F.2d at 265; FDIC v. Siegel (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As reflected in this case, the Tenth Circuit too has adopted, as a default rule, the Bob Richards rule. As the Tenth Circuit explained, a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company respon-sible for the losses that form the basis of the refund unless the parties have unambiguously agreed other- wise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 F. App'x 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "As reflected in this case, the Tenth Circuit too has adopted, as a default rule, the Bob Richards rule. As the Tenth Circuit explained, a tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company respon-sible for the losses that form the basis of the refund unless the parties have unambiguously agreed other- wise. In re United Western Bancorp, Inc. , 914 F.3d at 1269- 70; see 2013 WL 6732122, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Fifth Circuit has also followed the reasoning of Bob Richards in holding that, in the absence of a n agreement to the contrary, a tax refund belongs to a group member, rather than the common parent, wher e the refund was generated by a loss that was entirely attributable to the group member and such member could have generated the refund on its own had it f iled income taxes separately from the group. Capital Bancshares, Inc. , 957 F.2d at 208.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 1185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "at 207. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly re- jected the Bob Richards rule in determining the own- ership of a tax re fund in the consolidated group context, referring to the rule as \"a creature of federal common law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, the Sixth Circuit noted that Congress generally left the determination of property ri ghts in the assets of a bankrupt 's estate to state law , and the court explained that, in its view, this was not an instance where federal common law should be in voked . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "757 F.3d 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "Instead, the Sixth Circuit noted that Congress generally left the determination of property ri ghts in the assets of a bankrupt 's estate to state law , and the court explained that, in its view, this was not an instance where federal common law should be in voked . Id. at 536 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension 112 F.3d 252; 440 U.S. 715).",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "at 536 (citing 440 U.S. 48; Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 440 U.S. 715). T he Sixth Cir- cuit also noted that prior cases employing the Bob Richards rule did not address the threshold q uestion of whether federal common law should govern. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 F.3d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "at 536 (citing 440 U.S. 48; Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension 112 F.3d 252; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). T he Sixth Cir- cuit also noted that prior cases employing the Bob Richards rule did not address the threshold q uestion of whether federal common law should govern. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "T he Sixth Cir- cuit also noted that prior cases employing the Bob Richards rule did not address the threshold q uestion of whether federal common law should govern. Id. (citing In re Prudential Lines Inc. , 928 F.2d at 570- 71; Capital Bancshares, Inc. , 957 F.2d at 208; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Eleventh Circuit too has re jected the premise of the Bob Richards rule, stating that \"Federal law does not govern the allocation of the [consolidated] 10 Group's tax refunds; hence a parent and its subsidiar- ies are free to provide for the allocation of tax refunds by contract.\" Zucker v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin.",
		"citation_value_orig": "111 B.R. 631",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "The Eleventh Circuit too has re jected the premise of the Bob Richards rule, stating that \"Federal law does not govern the allocation of the [consolidated] 10 Group's tax refunds; hence a parent and its subsidiar- ies are free to provide for the allocation of tax refunds by contract.\" Zucker v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.) , 727 F.3d at 1102- 03; FDIC v. Zucker (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Eighth Circuit, while not explicitly rejecting the Bob Richards rule, has declin ed to consider it. See 579 F.2d 449.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 1344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "Corp.) , 727 F.3d at 1102- 03; FDIC v. Zucker (In re729 F.3d 1344 . The Eighth Circuit, while not explicitly rejecting the Bob Richards rule, has declin ed to consider it. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, the Eighth Circuit has taken the view that , in the absence of controlling federal law, state law governs the rights and respon- sibilities as between a parent corporation and its sub- sidiaries. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.2d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
		"context": "In a more recent case, howe ver, the Sec- ond Circuit analyzed whether to impose a construc- tive trust on a tax refund received by the common parent of a consolidated group and did so under state 11 law, without referenc ing Bob Richards . Superinten- dent of Ins. v. Ochs (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other circuits , such as the Third Circuit, have cited to Bob Richards but have not dealt specifically with the ownership of a tax refund in the consolidated tax group context where there was no governing tax sharing agreement. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 F.3d 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best",
		"context": "And no special justification warrants such a departure. This Court is a \"court of review, not of first view.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property",
		"context": ".\" Id. at 363; see also , Tahoe- Sierra Preservation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e raisin growers in Horne lost their \"entire 'bundle' of property rights\" in the raisins that were appropriated under the Department of Agriculture's regulation . They were forced to s urrender their personal property to government to satisfy a national agricultural policy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property",
		"context": "Cedar Point Nursery , 141 S. Ct. at 2074 (\"The upshot of this line of precedent is that government -authorized invasions of property — whethe r by plane, boat , cable, or beachcomber —are physical takings requiring just compensation.\"). Here, the Supreme Court of Washington's interpretation of the NLRA as authorizing unions to 10 intentionally destroy private property has compelled Glacier Northwest to sacrifice its entire 'bundle' of property rights in the destroyed concrete in service of national labor policy, where such loss is not needed to effectuate the policy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"W e see no difference in the destruction of personal property and real property, where is either case the owner is deprived of its use, not by a negligent act, but as the natural consequence of the deliberate, intended exercise of an asserted power. In each case there is a taking for which the Constitution requires just compensation. \"); see also Cooley, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F.Supp. 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property",
		"context": "But for the quick action of its management, Glacier Northwest would have lost numerous cement- mixing trucks as well . Moreover, NLRA preemption has a lso deprived Glacier Northwest of any right to sue in state court for its loss. See 505 P.3d 1190[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 This lack of remedy, coupled with the interpretation of the NLRA permitting the destruction of property, not only prevents Glacier Northwest from recovering any compensation for its property from those who destroyed it, but in essence gives workers the ability to take property with impunity. Like the California statute in Cedar Point Nursery , the Washington Supreme Court's application of the NLRA amounts to a \"government - authorized\" taking of Glacier Northwest's personal property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property",
		"context": "141 S. Ct. at 2074 (\"The upshot of this line of precedent is that government- authorized invasions of property — whether by plane, boa t, cable, or beachcomber —are physical takings requiring just compensation.\"). Here, the Supreme Court of Washington's interpretation of the NLRA as authorizing unions to intentionally destroy private property has compelled Glacier Northwest to sacrifice its entire \" bundle \" of property rights in the destroyed concrete in service of national labor policy, where such loss is not needed to effectuate the policy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We see no difference in the destruction of personal property and real property, where is either case the owner is deprived of its use, not by a negligent act, but as the natural consequence of the deliberate, intended exercise of an 10 asserted power. In each case there is a taking for which the Constitution requires just compensation. \"); see also Cooley, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F. Supp. 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property",
		"context": "But for the quick action of its management, Glacier Northwest would have lost numerous cement- mixing trucks as well . Moreover, NLRA preemption has also deprived Glacier Northwest of any right to sue in state court for its loss. See 505 P.3d 1190[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This l ack of remedy , coupled with the interpretation of the NLRA permitting the destruction of property, not only prevents Glacier Northwest from recovering any compensation for its property from those who destroyed it, but in essence gives workers the ability to take property with impunity. Like the California statute in Cedar Point Nursery , the Washington Supreme Court's application of the NLRA 11 amounts to a \"government -authorized\" taking of Glacier Northwest's personal property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The \"Right to Control\" Theory of Mail and Wire Fraud Conflicts with the Statutory Text.",
		"context": "First, notwithstanding the Second Circuit's protestations, there is no meaningful distinction between these standards. Materiality is an objective standard; it requires a showing that a statement is objectively capable of influencing a decision. See Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 808 F.3d 160. If a misstatement is incapable of producing tangible economic harm—in other words, if it is harmless —why would it be objectively capable of influencing the relevant decision? The only reason a misstatement would be objectively capable of influencing a relevant decision ( i.e., the materiality standard) is that harm might result from not knowing the full truth ( i.e., the right-to-control standard).",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Montana's Student-Aid Program Affords Wholesome Neutrality Protections",
		"context": "Pet. at 2 (citing Ariz. Christian 15 Sch. Tuition [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]),5 and instead simply provides a tax credit, capped at $150, to donors who give to a participating private scholar- ship program. Donors who contribute to public schools enjoy a similar tax credit. See MCA § 15-30- 3110.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A defendant's sentence is \"based on\" a calculation of the Guidelines range only when that calculation is the foundation of the defendant's sentence",
		"context": "\"When interpreting a statute,\" the Court \"give[s] words their ordinary or natural meaning.\" Pasquan- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the na t- ural meaning of \"based on\" refers to the legal founda- tion of a sentence. The verb phrase to \"base on\" or to \"base upon\" means \"to use as a base or basis for,\" and the noun \"base\" means \"the fundamental part of something: 40 basic principle.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A defendant's sentence is \"based on\" a calculation of the Guidelines range only when that calculation is the foundation of the defendant's sentence",
		"context": "1957 ) (definition 4.a of \"base\": \"[t]he main or chief ingredient of anything, viewed as its fun- damental element or constituent\"). In accordance with that standard definition, this Court has held on multiple occasions that a cause of action is \"based upon\" only the events that provide the foundation for the elements of the legal claim —not any other events that may be caus- ally connected to the cause of action. In Saudi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court considered a clause in the Foreign Sovereign Im-munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. , permitting suit against a foreign state when \"the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state,\" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A defendant's sentence is \"based on\" a calculation of the Guidelines range only when that calculation is the foundation of the defendant's sentence",
		"context": "The Court explained that the suit could not be \" based upon\" the defendants' earlier activities, despite their causal connection to the suit, because \"those facts alone entitle the [plaintiffs] to nothing.\" Ibid. In OBB Personenverkehr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court again made clear that a claim is only \"based upon\" the core or fundamental basis of the claim. OBB Personenverkehr concerned whether a plaintiff 's tort and contract claims arising from a railway accident could be described as \"based upon a commercial activity carried out in t he United States,\" when the plaintiff bought her train ticket in the United States and was then injured boarding a train in Austria. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A defendant's sentence is \"based on\" a calculation of the Guidelines range only when that calculation is the foundation of the defendant's sentence",
		"context": "It does not apply merely because a case relied on as prec- edent has since been reversed.\" 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Prac tice and Procedure § 2863, at 451- 453 (3d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted) (citing cases); see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.3d 1237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "This case concerns the second step, and in par- ticular one of the limitations Section 1117(a) imposes on a plaintiff's \"entitle[ment]\" to monetary remedies. The text is plain that an award of profits \"will [not] be ordered merely because there has been an in- fringement.\" Champion Spark Plug [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Being under the contingency of; dependent upon or 17 exposed to (some contingent action)\"); Subject , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (\"Dependent on or exposed to (some contingency)\"). And the phrase \"principles of equity\" refers to the established rules of equity jurisprudence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", eBay , 547 U.S. at 391 (holding that the Patent Act's statement that courts \"may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity,\" 35 U.S.C. § 283, incor- porated a four-factor test found in \"well-established principles of equity\"); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] carries over limitations on monetary remedies embodied in traditional equitable princi- ples. This textual limit only confirms that the Lanham Act codified the traditional willfulness requirement. \"[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously gov- erned by the common law,\" a court \"must presume that Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "This textual limit only confirms that the Lanham Act codified the traditional willfulness requirement. \"[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously gov- erned by the common law,\" a court \"must presume that Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.\" Kirtsaeng , 568 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter- pretation of Legal Texts 318 (2012). That is equally true for rules of equity: \"[A] major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.\" 456 U.S. 305.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "Kirtsaeng , 568 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Microsoft 564 U.S. 91; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter- pretation of Legal Texts 318 (2012). That is equally true for rules of equity: \"[A] major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When Congress enacted Sec- tion 1117(a) and included a profits award as a poten- tial monetary remedy, willfulness was a well- established prerequisite to a profits award. See infra 18 at 30–35 (setting out the precedents that contain the traditional willfulness requirement).",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "See infra 18 at 30–35 (setting out the precedents that contain the traditional willfulness requirement). The presump- tion is that \"where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and mean- ing of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A second canon of construction, governing statutory reenactments after a statute has been judicially construed, leads to the same result. See Teva Pharm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "§ 19, 33 Stat. at 729 (providing that if a court enjoined the \"wrongful use of a trademark,\" the plaintiff could \"recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the 19 Where statutory text has \"already been construed,\" a court is \"especially justified in presuming both that\" Congress was \"aware of the prior interpretation\" and that the \"interpretation reflects their intent\" in enacting similar statutory text. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That presumption is doubly justified here: Con- gress not only declined to disavow that settled inter- pretation, it added words of limitation to the 1905 provision, making monetary remedies \"subject to the principles of equity.\" 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "Microsoft Corp. , 564 U.S. at 102. The statutory text Congress enacted confirms that it meant to carry over limitations on monetary reme- dies embodied in traditional equitable principles. See Universal Health Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. All of this explains why courts continued to re- quire willfulness to award an infringer's profits after the Lanham Act was enacted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "Most courts adopted the requirement expressly. See, e.g. , ALPO Petfoods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, 671 F.2d 636784 F.2d 75241 F.3d 1242154 F.3d 1220855 F.2d 779750 F.2d 903.",
		"citation_value_orig": "913 F.2d 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d 958. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]784 F.2d 75241 F.3d 1242154 F.3d 1220855 F.2d 779750 F.2d 903. And where the case did not present an opportunity to set out a rule, courts nonetheless recognized that willfulness could limit the availability of an infring- er's profits award.5 That powerful consensus testifies 5 Courts recognized that willfulness could limit the availability 21 both to the stability of the willfulness requirement at equity—discussed below—and the textual reinforce- ment that requirement received in the Lanham Act.6 of an infringer's profits award in cases that did not require the court to set out a broader rule. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 F.2d 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d 958. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, 671 F.2d 636[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]41 F.3d 1242154 F.3d 1220855 F.2d 779750 F.2d 903. And where the case did not present an opportunity to set out a rule, courts nonetheless recognized that willfulness could limit the availability of an infring- er's profits award.5 That powerful consensus testifies 5 Courts recognized that willfulness could limit the availability 21 both to the stability of the willfulness requirement at equity—discussed below—and the textual reinforce- ment that requirement received in the Lanham Act.6 of an infringer's profits award in cases that did not require the court to set out a broader rule. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "784 F.2d 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d 958. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, 671 F.2d 636784 F.2d 752[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]154 F.3d 1220855 F.2d 779750 F.2d 903. And where the case did not present an opportunity to set out a rule, courts nonetheless recognized that willfulness could limit the availability of an infring- er's profits award.5 That powerful consensus testifies 5 Courts recognized that willfulness could limit the availability 21 both to the stability of the willfulness requirement at equity—discussed below—and the textual reinforce- ment that requirement received in the Lanham Act.6 of an infringer's profits award in cases that did not require the court to set out a broader rule. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "41 F.3d 1242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d 958. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, 671 F.2d 636784 F.2d 75241 F.3d 1242[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]855 F.2d 779750 F.2d 903. And where the case did not present an opportunity to set out a rule, courts nonetheless recognized that willfulness could limit the availability of an infring- er's profits award.5 That powerful consensus testifies 5 Courts recognized that willfulness could limit the availability 21 both to the stability of the willfulness requirement at equity—discussed below—and the textual reinforce- ment that requirement received in the Lanham Act.6 of an infringer's profits award in cases that did not require the court to set out a broader rule. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "154 F.3d 1220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d 958. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, 671 F.2d 636784 F.2d 75241 F.3d 1242154 F.3d 1220[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]750 F.2d 903. And where the case did not present an opportunity to set out a rule, courts nonetheless recognized that willfulness could limit the availability of an infring- er's profits award.5 That powerful consensus testifies 5 Courts recognized that willfulness could limit the availability 21 both to the stability of the willfulness requirement at equity—discussed below—and the textual reinforce- ment that requirement received in the Lanham Act.6 of an infringer's profits award in cases that did not require the court to set out a broader rule. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.2d 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": ", ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d 958. 20 defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.\" (citing Foxtrap, 671 F.2d 636784 F.2d 75241 F.3d 1242154 F.3d 1220855 F.2d 779[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And where the case did not present an opportunity to set out a rule, courts nonetheless recognized that willfulness could limit the availability of an infring- er's profits award.5 That powerful consensus testifies 5 Courts recognized that willfulness could limit the availability 21 both to the stability of the willfulness requirement at equity—discussed below—and the textual reinforce- ment that requirement received in the Lanham Act.6 of an infringer's profits award in cases that did not require the court to set out a broader rule. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.2d 903",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Valmor Prods. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits initially adopted this interpre- tation, though later decisions retreated without explanation. Compare Radio Shack 180 F.2d 200886 F.2d 931, and Pebble Beach 155 F.3d 526 declines to defend the argument in these cases \"that the 1999 amendment eliminates a pre-1999 requirement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.2d 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "464 F.2d 200. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits initially adopted this interpre- tation, though later decisions retreated without explanation. Compare Radio Shack [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]886 F.2d 931, and Pebble Beach 155 F.3d 526 declines to defend the argument in these cases \"that the 1999 amendment eliminates a pre-1999 requirement.\" See Dir. of Revenue of 531 U.S. 316; Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "180 F.2d 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "464 F.2d 200. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits initially adopted this interpre- tation, though later decisions retreated without explanation. Compare Radio Shack 180 F.2d 200[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Pebble Beach 155 F.3d 526 declines to defend the argument in these cases \"that the 1999 amendment eliminates a pre-1999 requirement.\" See Dir. of Revenue of 531 U.S. 316; Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 931",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "464 F.2d 200. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits initially adopted this interpre- tation, though later decisions retreated without explanation. Compare Radio Shack 180 F.2d 200886 F.2d 931, and Pebble Beach [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] declines to defend the argument in these cases \"that the 1999 amendment eliminates a pre-1999 requirement.\" See Dir. of Revenue of 531 U.S. 316; Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 F.3d 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief",
		"context": "Compare Radio Shack 180 F.2d 200886 F.2d 931, and Pebble Beach 155 F.3d 526 declines to defend the argument in these cases \"that the 1999 amendment eliminates a pre-1999 requirement.\" See Dir. of Revenue of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Br. of Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae In Support of Neither Party at 5–8. 22",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. In Any Event, There Was No Abuse of Discretion by the District Court.",
		"context": "He cannot provide his own testimony because the United States is holding him incommunicado indefinitely and without charges, a perverse state of affairs that is unprecedented in our history . Like all private individuals, Abu Zubaydah may seek discovery under §1782 , even if the foreign state could also seek the same information through an MLAT re quest. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the third Intel factor does not preclude discover y—at most, it \"cuts both ways, \" as the district court found. 53 As to the final Intel factor —whether discovery is unduly intrusive or burdensome —the court noted that Mitchell and Jessen (not the Government) were the targets of the discovery requests, and they had previously argued before the same judge that discovery in this area \"was not unduly burdensome.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 F.3d 1379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. In Any Event, There Was No Abuse of Discretion by the District Court.",
		"context": "Yet the Government ignores and contradicts what the district court actually he ld in exercising its discretion — inviting this Court to undertake de novo review , without regard to what the district court actually decided or the arguments the parties presented . If, as the Government apparently believes, the district court's Intel analys is was incomplete or premature, the proper remedy would be what the court of appeals actually ordered: to remand for further proceedings , 54 not to undertake that analysis for the first time in this Court , based on arguments not presented below .56 56 See Ansonia v. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 55",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The district court's application of Gingles misconstrues this Court's precedents",
		"context": "If, as here, a racial \"quota operated as a filter 68 through which all line-drawing decisions had to pass,\" then as a matter of law and language, race \"predomi- nates.\" 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, aff'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c.Ultimately, injecting race into the first step of Gingles makes the test a useless gatekeeper. It ren- ders Gingles circular by allowing Plaintiffs to assume from the start that they warrant a §2 remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
		"context": "Petitioner disagrees. However, even if the government's case were particularly strong, the harm- less error inquiry asks not whether an appellate court believes the defendant guilty, but whether Respondent can prove the error \"did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In undertaking harmless-error analysis \"it is not the [reviewing] court's function . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
		"context": ". to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to how the speculation comes out.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The question is not whether this Court would convict under the correct standard, but whether the government can prove beyond a reasona- ble doubt that the jury's ve rdict was unimpacted by in- structional error. If the instructions incorrectly defined both the act and the mental state required for conviction, it is hard to see what can be salvaged from the verdict.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
		"context": "If the instructions incorrectly defined both the act and the mental state required for conviction, it is hard to see what can be salvaged from the verdict. This is not a case where the jury's findings so \"conclusively es-tablish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the fa cts of this case, there is simply \"no way of knowing here whether the jury's 26 verdict was based on facts within the condemned in- structions.\" 330 U.S. 395.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
		"context": "478 U.S. 570. Under the fa cts of this case, there is simply \"no way of knowing here whether the jury's 26 verdict was based on facts within the condemned in- structions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is one thing to say that an isolated omitted ele- ment can be harmless in the face of \"uncontroverted\" and \"incontrovertible\" evidence. 527 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
		"context": "330 U.S. 395. It is one thing to say that an isolated omitted ele- ment can be harmless in the face of \"uncontroverted\" and \"incontrovertible\" evidence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is quite different from a sit- uation where both the act and intent necessary to con-vict were incorrectly defined. Harmless error does not permit an appellate court to \"become in effect a second jury.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
		"context": "Petitioner's testimony provided an explanation for each of Respondent's cited facts. The problem is that, under the instructions issued, the jury was not necessarily called upon to evaluate the truth of these explanations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Petitioner's view of what medical practice standards allowed was objectively wrong, the jury instructions compelled a finding of guilt regardless of whether the jury believed his explanations. Under these facts, a finding of harmless error is not possible.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A \"modified categorical approach\" applies to divisible statutes.",
		"context": "Both the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eighth Circuit found Nebraska 's identify -theft statute divisible ( that is, it contains multiple crimes, some — such as fraud — evincing moral turpitude and others not) and used the modified categorical approach to find that the petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving his eligibility for cancellation of removal . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1130 -31 (8th Cir. ), cert. granted140 S. Ct. 680.",
		"citation_value_orig": "916 F.3d 1128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "As discussed above, the imperfect analogy that equates an agency decision with a court judgment turns on whether the agency proceeding provided no- tice and opportunity sufficient to satisfy due process. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At its most basic, due process guarantees litigants the right to present evidence to support their claims. 395 U.S. 411.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "530 U.S. 103. At its most basic, due process guarantees litigants the right to present evidence to support their claims. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly held that plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations must be allowed to introduce facts to support those allega- tions. See Hamdi , 542 U.S. at 537; Shalala, 529 U.S. at 23–24; McNary , 498 U.S. at 483– 84, 493; Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly held that plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations must be allowed to introduce facts to support those allega- tions. See Hamdi , 542 U.S. at 537; Shalala, 529 U.S. at 23–24; McNary , 498 U.S. at 483– 84, 493; Am. Trucking Ass'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This due process guarantee is essential to the protection of constitutional rights because, to vindicate those rights, a plaintiff must be able to in-troduce evidence to prove a violation and to rebut fact - based defenses. See Crawford 523 U.S. 574.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "Trucking Ass'ns, 344 U.S. 298. This due process guarantee is essential to the protection of constitutional rights because, to vindicate those rights, a plaintiff must be able to in-troduce evidence to prove a violation and to rebut fact - based defenses. See Crawford [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with this guarantee, this Court, in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, re- jected an argument that judicial review of a facial con- stitutional claim should be limited to the agency's findings and based on the agency record. 522 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "In similar 16 fashion, the D.C. Circuit has noted that \"courts and legal scholars routinely assume that there is a due process right to have the scope of constitutional rights determined b y some independent judicial body —and the Supreme Court has never held or hinted other- wise.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Certainly, the right to present evidence in support of constitutional claims does not alwa ys require that the facts be initially adjudicated in a court. Thus, this Court has upheld administrative procedures that guarantee the parties a \"full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.2d 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "Certainly, the right to present evidence in support of constitutional claims does not alwa ys require that the facts be initially adjudicated in a court. Thus, this Court has upheld administrative procedures that guarantee the parties a \"full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such circumstances, the responsibil- ity for finding facts relating to constitutional claims may be delegated to administrative agencies, \"assum- ing due notice, proper opportunity to be heard, and that findings are based upon evidence.\" Crowell , 285 U.S. at 47; see also R.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "In such circumstances, the responsibil- ity for finding facts relating to constitutional claims may be delegated to administrative agencies, \"assum- ing due notice, proper opportunity to be heard, and that findings are based upon evidence.\" Crowell , 285 U.S. at 47; see also R.R. Comm'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; N. Pipeline Constr. 458 U.S. 50. 17 But, even in that cir cumstance, the ultimate re- sponsibility for determining constitutional claims re- mains with the court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "Crowell , 285 U.S. at 47; see also R.R. Comm'n of 311 U.S. 570; N. Pipeline Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 But, even in that cir cumstance, the ultimate re- sponsibility for determining constitutional claims re- mains with the court. Califano , 430 U.S. at 109 (Con- stitutional questions are \"unsuited to resolution in ad-ministrative hearing procedures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "17 But, even in that cir cumstance, the ultimate re- sponsibility for determining constitutional claims re- mains with the court. Califano , 430 U.S. at 109 (Con- stitutional questions are \"unsuited to resolution in ad-ministrative hearing procedures. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, many federal and state court have avoided the serious separation of powers and due process problems by rec- ognizi ng that agencies are outright barred from re- solving constitutional issues. See, e.g., Shalala, 529 U.S. at 23; 422 U.S. 749; Olympic Stewardship 166 Wash. App. 172913 S.W.2d 446257 N.W.2d 366.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 F.3d 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "\"); see also 462 F.3d 294. Thus, many federal and state court have avoided the serious separation of powers and due process problems by rec- ognizi ng that agencies are outright barred from re- solving constitutional issues. See, e.g., Shalala, 529 U.S. at 23; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Olympic Stewardship 166 Wash. App. 172913 S.W.2d 446257 N.W.2d 366. 18",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "\"); see also 462 F.3d 294. Thus, many federal and state court have avoided the serious separation of powers and due process problems by rec- ognizi ng that agencies are outright barred from re- solving constitutional issues. See, e.g., Shalala, 529 U.S. at 23; 422 U.S. 749; Olympic Stewardship 166 Wash. App. 172[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]257 N.W.2d 366. 18",
		"citation_value_orig": "913 S.W.2d 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims",
		"context": "\"); see also 462 F.3d 294. Thus, many federal and state court have avoided the serious separation of powers and due process problems by rec- ognizi ng that agencies are outright barred from re- solving constitutional issues. See, e.g., Shalala, 529 U.S. at 23; 422 U.S. 749; Olympic Stewardship 166 Wash. App. 172913 S.W.2d 446[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 N.W.2d 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)",
		"context": "Stoneridge , 552 U.S. at 162 (collecting cases).3 Indeed, in a case cited by the SEC, then-Judge Alito found that Section 10(b) cases do not \"provide reliable guidance\" as to what the common law would hold. MBIA Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] cause of action draws on some common lawdoctrines, the SEC's reliance on common law does notanswer the question before the Court. In fact, the common law authorities cited by the SEC only underline the fact that the common lawwould not treat the SEC's theory as one of primaryfraud. All of the preceden ts cited by the SEC involved common law conspiracy claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)",
		"context": "8 declaration alleges a conspiracy between the defendant and Cox to defraud certain banks and trustcompanies\"); 15 S.E. 750. This Court'sdecision in Central Bank , however, forecloses conspiracy liability in Section 10(b) civil cases for thesame reasons it forecloses aiding and abetting. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And unlike aiding and abetting, the SEC (in contrast to theDepartment of Justice) is given no separate statutoryauthority to pursue conspiracy claims. Moreover, even in the conspiracy context, the SEC cites no common law authority for primary liabilitymerely for disseminating the statements of others .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 F.3d 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)",
		"context": "at 792 (defendantobtained loans on the basis of bonds he did not own, tobuild a false \"reputation of financial responsibility\"aided by another's representations); Cheney , 15 S.E. at 750 (representations were made by another based onbehind-the-scenes conduct by defendant). Instead, asthe Court noted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and the Commission itself noted inCady, Roberts & Co ., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 n.13, 31 (1961)( citing 213 U.S. 419, and 308 U.S. 295) this Court's common law decisions focused onthe presence of a fiduciary duty of disclosure to supply 9 liability in those instances where the defendant did not himself make a statement. 128 U.S. 383.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)",
		"context": "at 750 (representations were made by another based onbehind-the-scenes conduct by defendant). Instead, asthe Court noted in 445 U.S. 222 and the Commission itself noted inCady, Roberts & Co ., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 n.13, 31 (1961)( citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 308 U.S. 295) this Court's common law decisions focused onthe presence of a fiduciary duty of disclosure to supply 9 liability in those instances where the defendant did not himself make a statement. 128 U.S. 383. See Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)",
		"context": "at 750 (representations were made by another based onbehind-the-scenes conduct by defendant). Instead, asthe Court noted in 445 U.S. 222 and the Commission itself noted inCady, Roberts & Co ., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 n.13, 31 (1961)( citing 213 U.S. 419, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) this Court's common law decisions focused onthe presence of a fiduciary duty of disclosure to supply 9 liability in those instances where the defendant did not himself make a statement. 128 U.S. 383. See Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "308 U.S. 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)",
		"context": "Instead, asthe Court noted in 445 U.S. 222 and the Commission itself noted inCady, Roberts & Co ., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 n.13, 31 (1961)( citing 213 U.S. 419, and 308 U.S. 295) this Court's common law decisions focused onthe presence of a fiduciary duty of disclosure to supply 9 liability in those instances where the defendant did not himself make a statement. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Sec. Indus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This case raises no \"pressing national problem\"",
		"context": "§ 80:88(II)(d). In another case, although New Mexico offers a pe- riod for former owners to collect a surplus, see N.M. Code R. § 3.6.7.80(B)(1), it provides no right of redemp- tion after a property is so ld for delinquent taxes. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pre- sumably some delinquent taxpayers might take issue with a policy that only allows them to make a claim for the surplus without any opportunity to redeem the real estate itself. The list of idiosyncrasies continues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 P.3d 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This case raises no \"pressing national problem\"",
		"context": "This Court should resist Petitioner's invitation to rewrite state laws defining property interests. Moreover, \"[t]he fed- eral structure allows local policies 'more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society,' permits 'innovation and experimentation,' enables greater citi- zen 'involvement in democratic processes,' and makes government 'more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No \"pressing national problem\" exists here that would re- quire this Court to depart from these important prin- ciples of federalism.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "That changed in 1976, when Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immun- ities Act . The FSIA is a \"comprehensive statute containing a 'set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies , or instrumentalities.' \" Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "And personal jurisdiction over the foreign state exists only where the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met and \"service has been made under section 1608.\" 28 U.S.C . 1330(b); see Argentine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Re-647 F.2d 300 provides four exclusive, hierar- chical means for serving \"a foreign state or political sub- division of a fore ign state\" in civil litigation. 28 U.S.C. 1608(a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "And personal jurisdiction over the foreign state exists only where the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met and \"service has been made under section 1608.\" 28 U.S.C . 1330(b); see Argentine 488 U.S. 428 ; Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] provides four exclusive, hierar- chical means for serving \"a foreign state or political sub- division of a fore ign state\" in civil litigation. 28 U.S.C. 1608(a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "647 F.2d 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "1608( a)(3). The clerk of court therefore must both \"address\" the service pa- pers to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs and \"dispatch\" the service package to that individual by sending it to him. See Webster's Third New Interna- tiona l Dictionary 24, 653 (1966) (defining \"address\" as \"to write or otherwise mark directions for delivery on,\" and \"dispatch\" as \"to send off or away with promptness or speed often as a matter of official busi- ness\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], petition for cert. pending, No. 17 -1269 (filed Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "880 F.3d 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "The best reading of the statutory text is therefore that delivery must be made to the minister of foreign affairs at his principal place of business —the ministry of foreign affairs in the foreign state's seat of govern- ment. And indeed, that is precisely how courts have in- terpreted the statute, albeit in cases that did not involve respondents' particular method of service. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Transaero, 30 F.3d 148 by addressing service to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), cert. denied,565 U.S. 945. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "The best reading of the statutory text is therefore that delivery must be made to the minister of foreign affairs at his principal place of business —the ministry of foreign affairs in the foreign state's seat of govern- ment. And indeed, that is precisely how courts have in- terpreted the statute, albeit in cases that did not involve respondents' particular method of service. See 785 F.3d 26; Transaero, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] by addressing service to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), cert. denied,565 U.S. 945. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 F.3d 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "See J.A. 222 ; Autotech Techs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Kumar , 880 F.3d at 159 n.11 . The neighboring provision of the FSIA, Section 1608(b) — which governs service on an agency or instrumentalit y of a foreign state —expressly provides for service by delivery to an \"officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law 16 to receive service of process in the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 F.3d 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "1608(b)(2). Congress's failure to include similar language in Section 1608(a) underscores that Congress did not envision that service would be sent to a foreign state's embassy for forwarding to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 529 U.S. 120.2 2. The court of appeals was thus wrong to suggest that Section 1608(a)(3) \"is s ilent as to a specific location 2 Section 1608(c), which governs the time when service shall be deemed to have been made, further supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for service to be made \"via\" the foreign state's embassy in the United States. Section 1608(c)(2) deems ser- vice to have been made under Section 1608(a)(3) on the date of receipt of the signed and return ed postal receipt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "1608(b)(2). Congress's failure to include similar language in Section 1608(a) underscores that Congress did not envision that service would be sent to a foreign state's embassy for forwarding to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs. See, e.g., 464 U.S. 16; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 2. The court of appeals was thus wrong to suggest that Section 1608(a)(3) \"is s ilent as to a specific location 2 Section 1608(c), which governs the time when service shall be deemed to have been made, further supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for service to be made \"via\" the foreign state's embassy in the United States. Section 1608(c)(2) deems ser- vice to have been made under Section 1608(a)(3) on the date of receipt of the signed and return ed postal receipt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "Section 1608(b) is therefore \"con- cerned with substance rather than form,\" Transaero , 30 F.3d at 154 , and the courts of appeals have \"generally h[e]ld \" that it \" may be satisfied by technically faulty service that gives adequate notice to the foreign state.\" Id. at 153; see, e.g., First Ci ty, Texas -Houston, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. ), cert. denied537 U.S. 813; 247 F.3d 609 (5th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 F.3d 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "at 153; see, e.g., First Ci ty, Texas -Houston, 281 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 247 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied,534 U.S. 892; 38 F.3d 448; 987 F.2d 1246 , 1250 (6th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "at 153; see, e.g., First Ci ty, Texas -Houston, 281 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied537 U.S. 813; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (5th Cir. ), cert. denied,534 U.S. 892; 38 F.3d 448; 987 F.2d 1246 , 1250 (6th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "247 F.3d 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "denied537 U.S. 813; 247 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied,534 U.S. 892; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 987 F.2d 1246 , 1250 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied510 U.S. 818; Harris 691 F.2d 1344; 653 F.2d 812455 U.S. 929 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 F.3d 448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "denied537 U.S. 813; 247 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied,534 U.S. 892; 38 F.3d 448; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 1250 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied510 U.S. 818; Harris 691 F.2d 1344; 653 F.2d 812455 U.S. 929 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "987 F.2d 1246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "denied,534 U.S. 892; 38 F.3d 448; 987 F.2d 1246 , 1250 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Harris 691 F.2d 1344; 653 F.2d 812455 U.S. 929 . But Section 1608(a ) con- tains no similar \"catchall, \" Kumar , 880 F.3d at 154, and courts generally have interpreted it to require \"strict compliance,\" ibid. ; Magness , 247 F.3d at 615; Transaero , 30 F.3d at 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 818",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "denied,534 U.S. 892; 38 F.3d 448; 987 F.2d 1246 , 1250 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied510 U.S. 818; Harris [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 653 F.2d 812455 U.S. 929 . But Section 1608(a ) con- tains no similar \"catchall, \" Kumar , 880 F.3d at 154, and courts generally have interpreted it to require \"strict compliance,\" ibid. ; Magness , 247 F.3d at 615; Transaero , 30 F.3d at 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "691 F.2d 1344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "denied,534 U.S. 892; 38 F.3d 448; 987 F.2d 1246 , 1250 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied510 U.S. 818; Harris 691 F.2d 1344; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]455 U.S. 929 . But Section 1608(a ) con- tains no similar \"catchall, \" Kumar , 880 F.3d at 154, and courts generally have interpreted it to require \"strict compliance,\" ibid. ; Magness , 247 F.3d at 615; Transaero , 30 F.3d at 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "653 F.2d 812",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned",
		"context": "But Section 1608(a ) con- tains no similar \"catchall, \" Kumar , 880 F.3d at 154, and courts generally have interpreted it to require \"strict compliance,\" ibid. ; Magness , 247 F.3d at 615; Transaero , 30 F.3d at 154. But see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir. 20 10) (upholding de- fective service based on substantial co mpliance with Section 1608(a)(3) where plaintiffs' counsel , rather than the clerk of court, mailed a copy of the de fault judgment to the minister of foreign affairs ). Thus, while service reasonably calculated to provide actual notice might suffice under Section 1608(b), it is plainly insufficient under Section 1608(a), unless it specifically complies 19 with one of the enumerated methods of service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "627 F.3d 1117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President Is an \"officer of the United States\"",
		"context": "\" If the presidency was an \"office ... under the United States\" at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, as Petitioner does not meaningfully dispute, see Pet'r Br. 25 -26, it follows that the president was an \"officer of the United States ,\" see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (report of Select Committee noting that \"'officers of' and 'officers under' the United States are ... indiscriminately used in the Constitution\" when interpreting a statutory reference to \"office under the government of the United States\"). That interpretation is consistent with the ordinary public meaning of the phrase in 1868, and none of Petitioner's arguments about the meaning of the phrase at the Founding compel an alternative interpretation . 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President Is an \"officer of the United States\"",
		"context": "An officer was someone \"commissioned or authorized to perform any public duty,\" see Officer, Webster 's Dictionary, supra, at 769. And the president clearly undertook \"official duties.\" State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Dictionaries of the time make clear that presidents were considered officers. A \"president\" was \"the chief officer or magistrate of a republic .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "71 U.S. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The President Is an \"officer of the United States\"",
		"context": "Courts, too, referred to the p resident as an officer. In an 1868 case, this Court observed that \"[w]e have no officers in this government, from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority.\" The Floyd Acceptances, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see United States ex rel. 26 F. Cas. 702 . 11 Similarly, many prominent treatise -writers of the era referred to the president as an \"officer.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In The Absence Of Adequate Detention Space, Contiguous Return Is Necessary To Effectuate Congress's Statutory Scheme",
		"context": "at 31. The problem for Petitioners is that suchdifficulties do not absolve them of their more generalstatutory obligations. In Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the D.C. Circuit perspicaciously held that whencompliance with a statutory mandate is not possibledue to lack of funding, \"the agency administering thestatute is required to effectuate the original statutoryscheme as much as possible, within the limits of theadded constraint.\" Under this standard, Petitioners'refusal to utilize their contiguous-return authority, andinstead to release asylum claimants en masse into the United States, was properly enjoined as a refusal toeffectuate the INA as much as possible given practicalconstraints.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.2d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Giving \"and\" its plain, ordinary meaning comports with the First Step Act.",
		"context": "BP 141 S. Ct. 1532. Courts \"as- sume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed 'accurately expresses the legisla- tive purpose.'\" Mills Music, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If \"a rational Con- gress could reach the policy judgment the statutory text suggests it did,\" then courts must \"give the law's terms their ordinary meaning,\" even if they think an- other approach is good policy. Niz-Chavez , 141 S. Ct. at 1486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Giving \"and\" its plain, ordinary meaning comports with the First Step Act.",
		"context": "But \"safety valve eligibility does not guarantee [a defendant] a below-statutory minimum sentence.\" 38 F.4th 1. \"[A] court compelled to disregard a manda- tory minimum sentence … may vary upward to and even past the mandatory minimum,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as courts regularly do, see National Association of Fed- eral Defenders Br. 7-8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 F.3d 1273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis for Replacing the Reynolds Doctrine with a Standard of Blind Deference, as the Government Seems to Suggest.",
		"context": "25 F.Cas. 187 (No. 14694) (C .C.D. Va. 1807); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Almost a century -and-a-half later, th e Court , citing Burr , reaffirmed that \"[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.\" Reynolds , 345 U.S. at 9-10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 2412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis for Replacing the Reynolds Doctrine with a Standard of Blind Deference, as the Government Seems to Suggest.",
		"context": "Even in cases involving the military authority entrusted to the Executive, th e Court has rejected argume nts that executive action should entirely escape judicial oversight. As far back as Ex parte Milligan , the Court rejected the proposition that civilian courts had no role in reviewing the Executive's commitment of a prisoner to trial by a military commission. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court observed that even in time of war , when \" the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law are weakened, if not discarded[,] these safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those entrusted wit h the guardianship of the Constitution and the laws .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "71 U.S. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis for Replacing the Reynolds Doctrine with a Standard of Blind Deference, as the Government Seems to Suggest.",
		"context": "at 124. And, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , the Court again rejected the contention that courts' limited institutional capabilities in military matters required judicial acquiescence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government argued 44 that \"courts should review [the Executive's] determination that a citizen is an enemy combatant under a very deferential 'some evidence' standard.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis for Replacing the Reynolds Doctrine with a Standard of Blind Deference, as the Government Seems to Suggest.",
		"context": "Reynolds , 345 U.S. at 8.54 This very case arises from the Executive's attempt to evade judicial oversight : the Government establish ed foreign black sites to evad e \"U.S. court jurisdiction\" and public scrutiny. SSCI Report at 22. This led to conduct the Founders would have recognized as an abuse of power ,55 which 53 Accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]472 U.S. 511 (\"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. … [B]ut experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Basis for Replacing the Reynolds Doctrine with a Standard of Blind Deference, as the Government Seems to Suggest.",
		"context": "Reynolds , 345 U.S. at 8.54 This very case arises from the Executive's attempt to evade judicial oversight : the Government establish ed foreign black sites to evad e \"U.S. court jurisdiction\" and public scrutiny. SSCI Report at 22. This led to conduct the Founders would have recognized as an abuse of power ,55 which 53 Accord 553 U.S. 723[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. … [B]ut experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Bakke, Grutter, And Fisher Correctly Applied Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "SFFA's scattered argument (Br.55-57) that Bakke , Grutter, and Fisher require something less than strict scrutiny is wrong. Grutter \"carefully examin[ed] the importance and the sincerity\" of Michigan's explanation that it pursues the educatio nal benefits of diversity by considering race as one factor in admissions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court then examined purported race-neutral alternatives and found them unworkable because they \"would require a dramatic sacrifice of di- versity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or both.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Bakke, Grutter, And Fisher Correctly Applied Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "To the extent SFFA objects to the limited defer- ence Grutter extends to universities in defining their educational missions, that deference is supported by a long line of precedents, none of which SFFA challeng- es. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-325; see also, e.g., Dart- mouth 17 U.S. 518. That deference is patently unlike the specter SFFA invokes (Br.55) of schools defending segregation of students based solely on race in Brown , or a department of corrections requesting a \"deferen-tial standard of review\" to ju stify racial classifications in prison, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, deferring to a university's judgment in defining its educational mission does not affect the level of scrutiny. As Grutter cautioned, its scrutiny \"is no less strict for taking into account complex educa- tional judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university,\" 539 U.S. at 328-329, and Fisher I confirmed that no deference tempers the searching scrutiny courts apply in determining whether consideration of race remains necessary, 570 U.S. 297.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Bakke, Grutter, And Fisher Correctly Applied Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "That deference is patently unlike the specter SFFA invokes (Br.55) of schools defending segregation of students based solely on race in Brown , or a department of corrections requesting a \"deferen-tial standard of review\" to ju stify racial classifications in prison, 543 U.S. 499. Moreover, deferring to a university's judgment in defining its educational mission does not affect the level of scrutiny. As Grutter cautioned, its scrutiny \"is no less strict for taking into account complex educa- tional judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university,\" 539 U.S. at 328-329, and Fisher I confirmed that no deference tempers the searching scrutiny courts apply in determining whether consideration of race remains necessary, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 36 SFFA's criticism of Grutter's approach to race- neutral alternatives likewise fails. SFFA insists on proof that \"the marginal diff erence in racial diversity between\" race-conscious and race-neutral admissions is necessary to achieve the benefits of diversity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The anti-injunction clause bars the shareholders' claim because the claim challenges the exercise of conservatorship powers granted by the Recovery Act",
		"context": "That modification, which safeguarded the remaining commitment, fell well within FHFA's power as conservator to take actions that may be appropriate to preserve and conserve the enter- prises' assets a nd necessary to put the enterprises in a sound and solvent financial condition. As every court of appeals to consider the issue apart from the court below has held, the anti-injunction clause therefore bars the shareholders' statutory claims. 34 F.3d 884; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Roberts , 889 F.3d at 402; Rob- 876 F.3d 220; Perry Capital , 864 F.3d at 606.",
		"citation_value_orig": "901 F.3d 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The anti-injunction clause bars the shareholders' claim because the claim challenges the exercise of conservatorship powers granted by the Recovery Act",
		"context": "That modification, which safeguarded the remaining commitment, fell well within FHFA's power as conservator to take actions that may be appropriate to preserve and conserve the enter- prises' assets a nd necessary to put the enterprises in a sound and solvent financial condition. As every court of appeals to consider the issue apart from the court below has held, the anti-injunction clause therefore bars the shareholders' statutory claims. 34 F.3d 884; 901 F.3d 954; Roberts , 889 F.3d at 402; Rob- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Perry Capital , 864 F.3d at 606.",
		"citation_value_orig": "876 F.3d 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Any judgment\" sweeps broadly",
		"context": "§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Tied together in this way, (B)(ii) reveals that \"judgment\" in subparagraph (B)(i) is most naturally understood to be a \"decision\" too. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].22 Understanding \"judgment\" as a \"judicial decision or order in court\"23 or \"a formal decision or determina- tion … by a court of law or other tribunal \"24 is also consistent with the nature of the five forms of discre- tionary relief covered by section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Those five forms of relief—waivers of inadmissibility after the commission of certain crimes or fraud, 8 U.S.C. §1182(h) & (i), cancellation of removal, id., §1229b, voluntary departure from the country, id., §1229c, and adjustment of status, id., §1255—share a common thread.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Any judgment\" sweeps broadly",
		"context": "This is confirmed by the bar on \"any judgment,\" not \"the ultimate judgment\" or \"the second-step judg- ment.\" The modifier \"'any' has an expansive mean-ing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Any \" expands \"judgment\" to all judgments, \"selected 25 As Petitioners note, USCIS may also consider applications for certain forms of discretionary relief outside of removal pro- ceedings. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Any judgment\" sweeps broadly",
		"context": "While \"judgment\" is sometimes used interchangeably with \"opinion,\" a \"judgment\" is more properly understood as the \"decision\" while the reasons for that decision are \"more properly denomi- nated\" as the \"opinion. \"27 See, e.g. , 574 U.S. 271[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]hough I agree with the plurality as to the 26 Webster 's Second at 121. 27 Black's Sixth at 842 ; see also id. at 407 (\"A decision of the court is i ts judgment; the opinion is the reasons given for that judgment, or the expression of the views of the judge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "To comply with these requirements, railroads generally require employees who are injured on the job to report their injury to the company. See BNSF R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An employee's compliance with such reporting requirements is itself a form of protected activity under the FRSA. See § 20109(a)(4) (protecting reports of \"a work -related personal injury\" to the \"railroad carrier\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.3d 628",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "See § 20109(a)(4) (protecting reports of \"a work -related personal injury\" to the \"railroad carrier\"). Once a railroad receives such a report, it typically investigates the circumstances around the injury \" to uncover facts that can prompt corrective action that will reduce the likelihood of a future injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sometimes the investigation finds that employee's own misconduct —say, violation of a railroad safety rule —led to the injury. See Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "840 F.3d 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii), (iv); see, e.g. , BNSF , 816 F.3d at 636 (ALJ deemed accident report that led to discovery of a safety violation by the employee a \"contributing factor\" to discipline for the violation); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, because railroad policy typically requires employees to file reports after accidents and injuries, reckless employees responsible for the 9 incidents could count on shi fting the burden to their employer wherever DeFrancesco reigned. This result conflicts with a commonsense reading of the burden -shifting provision of Section 42121.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "That the injury report \"was a ne cessary link in a chain of events leading to the adverse activity\" was enough: on the ALJ's telling, plaintiff proved his case because the injury led to the injury report, which led to the FELA suit, which led to fact discovery, which led to a discovery of dishonesty, which led to dismissal. BNSF Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of 11 appeals sensibly repudiated this decision on appeal, holding the ALJ erred by \"ruling that [the railroad]'s motive was irrelevant to the contributing factor inquiry.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "It is thus unsurprising that DeFrancesco quickly became the subject of widespread and forceful disapprova l in the courts of appeals. As the Eighth Circuit explained, the \"FRSA provides that a rail carrier may not discharge 'or in any other way discriminate against' an employee for engaging in protected activity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he essence of this intentional tort is 'discriminatory animus.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "); accord Lemon , 958 F.3d at 420 (6th Cir.) (rejecting a \"chain -of-events theory of causation\").3 Even the cases some cite4 as rejecting an intent requirement did not go so far. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Third Circuit simply held that the employer was not entitled to summary judgment where there was evidence that (i) the employer had all relevant information to charge the employee with a rule violation before the employee's injury report, but only pursued the charge after the report, and (ii) the employer had never before enforced the rule at issue. This is the kind of evidence from which a jury could have inferred retaliatory intent, making the court's factbound decision unremark able for present purposes. And 914 F.3d 1189, itself recognized that \"intent or animus is part of an FRSA plaintiff's case.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.3d 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "In 708 F.3d 152, the Third Circuit simply held that the employer was not entitled to summary judgment where there was evidence that (i) the employer had all relevant information to charge the employee with a rule violation before the employee's injury report, but only pursued the charge after the report, and (ii) the employer had never before enforced the rule at issue. This is the kind of evidence from which a jury could have inferred retaliatory intent, making the court's factbound decision unremark able for present purposes. And [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], itself recognized that \"intent or animus is part of an FRSA plaintiff's case.\" Id. at 1196.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 F.3d 1189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "Id. at 1196. Whatever the court meant by further suggesting that a plaintiff could show in tent by proving the contributing factor element, it did not purport to overrule its earlier decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which was unambiguous: \"'The contributing factor that an 3 Appropriately, none of these decisions even considered ex- tending deference under Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837, to DeFrancesco . The FRSA gives the Secretary of Transportation, not the ARB or the Department of Labor gen-erally, \"the authority … to make rules carrying the force of law,\" which is a necessary prerequisite for Chevron deference. 533 U.S. 218; see 49 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "908 F.3d 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "Id. at 1196. Whatever the court meant by further suggesting that a plaintiff could show in tent by proving the contributing factor element, it did not purport to overrule its earlier decision in 908 F.3d 451, which was unambiguous: \"'The contributing factor that an 3 Appropriately, none of these decisions even considered ex- tending deference under Chevron U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to DeFrancesco . The FRSA gives the Secretary of Transportation, not the ARB or the Department of Labor gen-erally, \"the authority … to make rules carrying the force of law,\" which is a necessary prerequisite for Chevron deference. 533 U.S. 218; see 49 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "Whatever the court meant by further suggesting that a plaintiff could show in tent by proving the contributing factor element, it did not purport to overrule its earlier decision in 908 F.3d 451, which was unambiguous: \"'The contributing factor that an 3 Appropriately, none of these decisions even considered ex- tending deference under Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837, to DeFrancesco . The FRSA gives the Secretary of Transportation, not the ARB or the Department of Labor gen-erally, \"the authority … to make rules carrying the force of law,\" which is a necessary prerequisite for Chevron deference. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a); cf. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
		"context": "\"Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic.\" N.Y. Tr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner's reading has already been tried in the context of the FSRA, and it has proven disastrous. The lack of an intent requirement improperly shielded employees from the consequences of misconduct, undermining the very safety aims of the anti -discrimination provision and the railroads' legitimate interest in enforcing employee- conduct rules.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Lanham Act Rebuts the General Presumption Against Extraterritorial Applications of United States Law (Page 3)",
		"context": "long recognized a presumption against the extraterritorial application of United States law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281. Consistent with that presumption, the Court acknowledged in 344 U.S. 280, that \"the legislation of Con- gress will not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent ap- pears.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Lanham Act Rebuts the General Presumption Against Extraterritorial Applications of United States Law (Page 3)",
		"context": "long recognized a presumption against the extraterritorial application of United States law. See 284 U.S. 421; Foley Bros., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with that presumption, the Court acknowledged in 344 U.S. 280, that \"the legislation of Con- gress will not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent ap- pears.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Lanham Act Rebuts the General Presumption Against Extraterritorial Applications of United States Law (Page 3)",
		"context": "long recognized a presumption against the extraterritorial application of United States law. See 284 U.S. 421; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281. Consistent with that presumption, the Court acknowledged in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that \"the legislation of Con- gress will not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent ap- pears.\" Id. at 285.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Lanham Act Rebuts the General Presumption Against Extraterritorial Applications of United States Law (Page 3)",
		"context": "The jury's accounting apparently also included profits arising from the Pe-titioners' sales directly in to the United States, which IPO does consider appropriate. 6 IPO acknowledges that the multiple goals of the accounting remedy do not necessitate a direct nexus between losses suffered by a plaintiff, on the one hand, and profits enjoye d by a defendant, on the other. See generally W. E. Bass ett [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nevertheless, much of the accounting in this case appears to have an attenuated connection to the direct effects of the Petitioners' misconduct in the United States. The eq- uitable nature of the accounting remedy means that \"[i]f the court shall find th at the amount of the recov- ery based on profits is ... excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circum-stances of the case,\" 15 U.S. C. § 1117, and it is possi- ble equity was not achieved here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 F.2d 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems",
		"context": ". This Court applies the major questions doctrine only when it reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute that is reflected in a broad exercise of agency authority. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has thus held in a series of excep- tional cases that Congress had not, through \"vague terms or ancillary provisions,\" conferred on an agency the authority to \"alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme.\" 531 U. S. 457.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems",
		"context": "See 576 U.S. 473. The Court has thus held in a series of excep- tional cases that Congress had not, through \"vague terms or ancillary provisions,\" conferred on an agency the authority to \"alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Critically, in these cases the Court reviewed actual action taken by the respective agency that was chal- lenged as in excess of the agency's claim of authority. For example, in King , the Court reviewed an Internal Revenue Service regulation authorizing availability of billions of dollars in tax credits on federal exchanges affecting health insurance under the Affordable Care Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U. S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems",
		"context": "576 U.S. at 485-86. In other cases, the Court similarly reviewed actual agency action that relied on the agency's claim of particular statutory authority. See 2022 WL 120952573 U.S. 22[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Whitman , 531 U.S. at 468- 71 (reviewing EPA published implementation policy determining whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards); Food & Drug 529 U.S. 120. Petitioners seek to apply the major questions doc- trine in a far more expansive way. Rather than considering whether an agency's actual exercise of power falls within the authority Congress vested in the agency, Petitioners ask this Court to speculate and indulge implausible imagining about how an agency might try to abuse its authority at some un- known time in the future.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems",
		"context": "576 U.S. at 485-86. In other cases, the Court similarly reviewed actual agency action that relied on the agency's claim of particular statutory authority. See 2022 WL 120952573 U.S. 22546 U.S. 243; Whitman , 531 U.S. at 468- 71 (reviewing EPA published implementation policy determining whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards); Food & Drug [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners seek to apply the major questions doc- trine in a far more expansive way. Rather than considering whether an agency's actual exercise of power falls within the authority Congress vested in the agency, Petitioners ask this Court to speculate and indulge implausible imagining about how an agency might try to abuse its authority at some un- known time in the future.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems",
		"context": "Application of the major questions doctrine in this manner would expand that doctrine far beyond this Court's precedents. It would conflict with this Court's longstanding principle of \"avoid[ing] premature adju- dication, from entangling [itself] in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging 23 parties.\" Abbott [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even when final agency action has been taken, the Court refrains from reviewing an agency rule if \"further factual development would signifi- cantly advance [the Court's] ability to deal with the legal issues presented.\" Nat'l Park Hospitality 538 U.S. 803.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems",
		"context": "Abbott 387 U.S. 136. Even when final agency action has been taken, the Court refrains from reviewing an agency rule if \"further factual development would signifi- cantly advance [the Court's] ability to deal with the legal issues presented.\" Nat'l Park Hospitality [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Application of the major questions doctrine in these circumstances would create the sort of admin- istrability problems that have bedeviled the Court in other contexts. For example, this Court has repeat- edly grappled with the inartfully worded Armed Career Criminal Act, which enlists federal courts to determine whether various state criminal laws \"ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another\" or \"otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. Even assuming arguendo that legislative intent may properly be considered in interpreting a regulation, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on agency \"special insight into its intent when\" it exercised its delegated legislative power to promulgate a regulation",
		"context": "8 Pet. App. 15a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. - 4 - intent,10 and even where agency intent appears to have changed.11 T h i s i s a l s o t h e c a s e b e c a u s e subsequent agency views regarding a prior regulation enacted with delegated legislative power should be given no more deference than subsequent congressional views regarding a prior statute enacted with that same legislative power. 12 \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 10 See Perez , 135 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"This Court has afforded Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations even when the agency was not the original drafter.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 F.3d 831",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. Even assuming arguendo that legislative intent may properly be considered in interpreting a regulation, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on agency \"special insight into its intent when\" it exercised its delegated legislative power to promulgate a regulation",
		"context": "- 4 - intent,10 and even where agency intent appears to have changed.11 T h i s i s a l s o t h e c a s e b e c a u s e subsequent agency views regarding a prior regulation enacted with delegated legislative power should be given no more deference than subsequent congressional views regarding a prior statute enacted with that same legislative power. 12 \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 10 See Perez , 135 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"This Court has afforded Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations even when the agency was not the original drafter.\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). 11 See Perez , 135 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"[This Court] has likewise granted Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations that are inconsistent with interpretations adopted closer in time to the promulgation of the regulations.\" (citing Long Island Care at Home, 551 U. S. 158)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. Even assuming arguendo that legislative intent may properly be considered in interpreting a regulation, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on agency \"special insight into its intent when\" it exercised its delegated legislative power to promulgate a regulation",
		"context": "(citing 501 U.S. 680)). 11 See Perez , 135 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"[This Court] has likewise granted Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations that are inconsistent with interpretations adopted closer in time to the promulgation of the regulations.\" (citing Long Island Care at Home, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). 12 See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement System of 492 U.S. 158 - 5 - Further, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on subsequent agency \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers… [to] lawmak[e] by interpretation,\" 13 as it allows post hoc agency interpretations proffered during adjudication to have retroactive effect even where they cannot represent an \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers\" 14 \"consistent with the authority granted by Congress\"15 because Congress did not delegate legislative \"power to promulgate retroactive rules.\" 16 Accordingly, if broad Auer deference cannot be justified simply as a judicial choice to defer to agency expertise, and cannot be justified based on agency exercise of judicial or legislative power, Amicus would urge that this Court overrule the current doctrine of broad Auer deference under which the Federal Circuit felt compelled to \"defer to [the VA's] interpretation of its own regulation 'as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is neither \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 13 499 U.S. 144.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U. S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. Even assuming arguendo that legislative intent may properly be considered in interpreting a regulation, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on agency \"special insight into its intent when\" it exercised its delegated legislative power to promulgate a regulation",
		"context": "11 See Perez , 135 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"[This Court] has likewise granted Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations that are inconsistent with interpretations adopted closer in time to the promulgation of the regulations.\" (citing Long Island Care at Home, 551 U. S. 158)). 12 See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement System of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] - 5 - Further, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on subsequent agency \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers… [to] lawmak[e] by interpretation,\" 13 as it allows post hoc agency interpretations proffered during adjudication to have retroactive effect even where they cannot represent an \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers\" 14 \"consistent with the authority granted by Congress\"15 because Congress did not delegate legislative \"power to promulgate retroactive rules.\" 16 Accordingly, if broad Auer deference cannot be justified simply as a judicial choice to defer to agency expertise, and cannot be justified based on agency exercise of judicial or legislative power, Amicus would urge that this Court overrule the current doctrine of broad Auer deference under which the Federal Circuit felt compelled to \"defer to [the VA's] interpretation of its own regulation 'as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is neither \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 13 499 U.S. 144. - 6 - plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. Even assuming arguendo that legislative intent may properly be considered in interpreting a regulation, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on agency \"special insight into its intent when\" it exercised its delegated legislative power to promulgate a regulation",
		"context": "(citing Long Island Care at Home, 551 U. S. 158)). 12 See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement System of 492 U.S. 158 - 5 - Further, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on subsequent agency \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers… [to] lawmak[e] by interpretation,\" 13 as it allows post hoc agency interpretations proffered during adjudication to have retroactive effect even where they cannot represent an \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers\" 14 \"consistent with the authority granted by Congress\"15 because Congress did not delegate legislative \"power to promulgate retroactive rules.\" 16 Accordingly, if broad Auer deference cannot be justified simply as a judicial choice to defer to agency expertise, and cannot be justified based on agency exercise of judicial or legislative power, Amicus would urge that this Court overrule the current doctrine of broad Auer deference under which the Federal Circuit felt compelled to \"defer to [the VA's] interpretation of its own regulation 'as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is neither \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. - 6 - plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation. '\"17 ARGUMENT",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement",
		"context": "Although a request for a lower sentence does not preserve a defendant's objection to any procedural er- ror, it does generally preserve a substantive objection to any higher sentence that he receives . The decision 21 below, which holds that a defendant preserves a substantive -reasonableness claim only by expressly ob- jecting to the reasonableness of a term of imprisonment after it is ordered, see J.A. 2; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]554 U.S. 921, cannot be squared with the text or purposes of Rules 51 and 52 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "Trademark law contains a number of doctrines to deal with and reflect that reality. A descriptive term might \"acquire[] 43 distinctiveness\" (and thus trademark protection) \"by gaining secondary meaning over time in the marketplace.\" Times Mirror Magazines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By contrast, a mark that was once protectable \"may become generic over time through common usage.\" BellSouth 60 F.3d 1565 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 F.3d 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d 157 . By contrast, a mark that was once protectable \"may become generic over time through common usage.\" BellSouth [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A mark may even become \"incontestable\" ( i.e., unable to be challenged for mere descriptiveness or lack of secondary meaning) after five years of continuous use if the owner of a registered trademark can show that certain statutory requirements have been met. 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 F.3d 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "The likelihood of confusion between two marks also inherently may change over time. In the Second Circuit, courts evaluate the likelihood of confusion using eight factors: (1) strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2) similarity of the marks, (3) proximity o f the products, (4) likelihood the plaintiff will bridge the gap between the two products, (5) actual confusion, (6) the defendant's good or bad faith, (7) quality of the products, (8) sophistication of consumers. Polaroid [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In looking at the factors, one can easily see how time and intervening events could impact the analysi s. 10 10 Polaroid was very influential. Other circuits have adopted substantially similar test s. See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:30 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 F.2d 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "44 The strength of a mark in identifying the source of a product (factor one) may wax and wane, as a brand that was widely known fifty years ago may have far less consumer recognition today, or vice versa. The similarity of marks (factor two) may change over time as well, especially because the analysis focuses not just on the words themselves, but on marketplace conditions and the \"context\" in which the marks are found, which might change as parties adopt new logos, typefaces, or other branding. See Star Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also J.T. Colby & 2013 WL 1903883 , aff'd,586 F. App'x 8. Proximity of the products (factor three) also can shift as parties open new product lines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 F.3d 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "The similarity of marks (factor two) may change over time as well, especially because the analysis focuses not just on the words themselves, but on marketplace conditions and the \"context\" in which the marks are found, which might change as parties adopt new logos, typefaces, or other branding. See Star Indus., 412 F.3d 373 ; see also J.T. Colby & 2013 WL 1903883 , aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Proximity of the products (factor three) also can shift as parties open new product lines. And new instances of actual confusion (factor five) may occur in response to changes in branding or the products offered, just as the quality of products (factor seven) and sophistication of consumers (factor eight) can ebb and flow.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F. App'x 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "It should come as no surprise, then, that courts confronting preclusion arguments in trademark cases typically pay close attention to the facts on the ground at the time of both suits and the substance of the issues 45 presented. See, e.g. , Jim Beam Brands [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Tex. Pig Stands, 951 F.2d 684 ; B & B Hardware, 569 F.3d 383. The facts of this case illustrate the point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "937 F.2d 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Jim Beam Brands 937 F.2d 729 ; Tex. Pig Stands, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; B & B Hardware, 569 F.3d 383. The facts of this case illustrate the point. The district court denied Lucky's motion to dismiss in the 2005 Action on the specific ground that it was unclear whether the Settlement Agreement actually resolved all of Marcel's claims (because some of them involved marks registered after May 2003).",
		"citation_value_orig": "951 F.2d 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Jim Beam Brands 937 F.2d 729 ; Tex. Pig Stands, 951 F.2d 684 ; B & B Hardware, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The facts of this case illustrate the point. The district court denied Lucky's motion to dismiss in the 2005 Action on the specific ground that it was unclear whether the Settlement Agreement actually resolved all of Marcel's claims (because some of them involved marks registered after May 2003).",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
		"context": "a. Like other procedural rules, this aspect of claim preclusion channels the parties' rights to assert claims and defenses based on the default expectation that a controversy will be adjudicated only once. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But it has no application where, as here, the first proceeding 47 involved a different claim. When a different claim is at issue, it is fundamentally unfair to strip defendants of the constitutional protection provided by the \"actually decided\" rule in this context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
		"context": "Women alone at night sometimes feel safer interacting with officers from inside their homes . Cf. 2015 WL 13239104, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And i n some communities, flight \"might just as easily be mot ivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to 9 hide criminal activity.\" 58 N.E.3d 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "841 F.3d 895",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
		"context": "2015 WL 13239104, aff'd,841 F.3d 895. And i n some communities, flight \"might just as easily be mot ivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to 9 hide criminal activity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if Amicus's probabilistic assessment were accurate , it would be immaterial . Proxies do not justify categorical rules when core Fourth Amendment interests are at stake.",
		"citation_value_orig": "58 N.E.3d 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
		"context": "Even if Amicus's probabilistic assessment were accurate , it would be immaterial . Proxies do not justify categorical rules when core Fourth Amendment interests are at stake. For instance, the Court recognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that knocking and announcing in felony drug investigations \"frequently\" present s \"special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence. \" Id. at 393-94.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
		"context": "are implicated in a particular case.\" Br. 27 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Yet each of the \"rules\" Amicus identifies applies only when \"an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant.\" Birchfield , 136 S. Ct. at 2173.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
		"context": "Amicus's categorical misdemeanor -pursuit rule does not. 10 3. Apparently perceiving the incompatibility of Amicus's proposed rule with precedent , the Solicitor General urg es the Court to adopt a \"general rule, \" or rebuttable \"presumption ,\" like the one endorsed by the plurality in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Br. 4 -5, 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "North Carolina's codification of the UTC would not permit a North Carolina court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a trustee administering the Kaestner Trust in New York so lon g as no other basis for personal jurisdiction existed. This statutory scheme is not merely a result of legislative policy, but also a recognition of the Due Process Clause limits on the exercise of state power over nonresident trusts and their trustees – a principle well-recognized by North Carolina's courts. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether the State had specific juris diction over a nonresident mortgage loan trust defendant when (1) the trust held 5 The UTC \"does not preclude other methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a trustee, beneficiary, or other person receiving property from the trust.\" N.C. Ge n. Stat. § 36C-2-202(c) (2005).",
		"citation_value_orig": "638 S.E.2d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "Id. at 213, applying Int'l. Shoe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The evidence presented in Skinner failed to estab- lish minimum contacts because (1) the Trust was created outside the State, had its day-to-day opera- tions in New York, and only 3% of its loan assets had ties to North Carolina; (2) the North Carolina interest held by the Trust was \"simpl y a beneficial interest\" in North Carolina property – the trust did not hold title to any North Carolina property; and (3) the trust served as a depository for income received by the loan servicer from North Carolina, among other states. The court explained that its cases analyzing minimum contacts \"rarely have dealt with so 'passive' a defend-ant.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "The court held such contacts were also insufficient for the non-resident guarantor on the no te to be made a defendant in a North Carolina action. Even though \"the defend- ant signed a note that created a relationship with North Carolina residents, [the court] could not auto- matically exercise personal jurisdiction.\" Id., citing United Buying Group, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The trustee's \"relation ship\" with Ms. Kaestner 8 is similarly insufficient for North Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction over the trust. The goals of \"minimum contacts\" jurisprudence are to \"safeguard[] the defendant from being required to defend an action in a distant or inconvenient forum\" and to \"prevent[] a state from escaping the restraints imposed upon it by its status as a coequal sovereign in a federal system.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "251 S.E.2d 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "The trustee's \"relation ship\" with Ms. Kaestner 8 is similarly insufficient for North Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction over the trust. The goals of \"minimum contacts\" jurisprudence are to \"safeguard[] the defendant from being required to defend an action in a distant or inconvenient forum\" and to \"prevent[] a state from escaping the restraints imposed upon it by its status as a coequal sovereign in a federal system.\" Skinner, 638 S.E.2d at 210 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Part and parcel of the minimum contacts principle is that the contacts at issue must be those of the \"person, property or transaction,\" Quill, 504 U.S. at 306, being subjected to the tax. The contacts of related entities are not attributed to the party over whom the State seeks to exert its power. 277 U.S. 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 S.E.2d 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "Skinner, 638 S.E.2d at 210 (citing 329 S.E.2d 663 Part and parcel of the minimum contacts principle is that the contacts at issue must be those of the \"person, property or transaction,\" Quill, 504 U.S. at 306, being subjected to the tax. The contacts of related entities are not attributed to the party over whom the State seeks to exert its power. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the context of a nongrantor discretionary trust with contingent 6 beneficiaries, it is particularly inap- propriate to attribute the contacts of the beneficiary to the trust or the trustee. The beneficiary has no author- ity to direct the actions of the trustee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "§1.2(a), JA at 47, further discussed at Section II.D., infra and Amicus Brief of American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (\"ACTEC\") at 8. 9 the actions of the trustee or the control, disposition, or deployment of the Family Trust assets.7 Receiving a distribution is certainly a taxable event in the State in which the recipient beneficiary resides. For example, the power of Virginia to tax a trust distribution received by a Virginia resident from a New York trust, after the trust's income had already been taxed by New York, was recognized in Guaranty Trust Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and was based on Virginia's power under the Due Process Clause \"to tax something done within her borders.\" Id. at 23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "Here, the thing taxed was receipt of [nonresident trust] income within Virginia by a citizen residing there.\") Of course, unlike the benefi-ciary in Guaranty Trust , Ms. Kaestner received no distributions during the tax years at issue. 7 Attributional nexus cases, such as Tyler Pipe Ind., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and Scripto, 362 U.S. 207, rely on in-state activities by employees or agents of companies to create nexus to an otherwise out-of-state company. Since Ms. Kaestner took no actions in North Carolina that could be attr ibuted to the Trust or trustee, the State cannot rely on attributional nexus. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE",
		"context": "Here, the thing taxed was receipt of [nonresident trust] income within Virginia by a citizen residing there.\") Of course, unlike the benefi-ciary in Guaranty Trust , Ms. Kaestner received no distributions during the tax years at issue. 7 Attributional nexus cases, such as Tyler Pipe Ind., 483 U.S. 232 and Scripto, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rely on in-state activities by employees or agents of companies to create nexus to an otherwise out-of-state company. Since Ms. Kaestner took no actions in North Carolina that could be attr ibuted to the Trust or trustee, the State cannot rely on attributional nexus. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": ". A state's taxation of undistributed income earned by a trust that is administered in another state, based solely on the presence of a trust beneficiary within the taxing state, is hardly a novel concept. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, for the past 80 years, this Court has rejected states' efforts to tax undistributed trust income earned in another state where the taxing state's sole connection to the trust is the residence of a trust beneficiary in that state. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "Id. ; Safe Deposit & Tr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has reasoned that a trust and its beneficiaries, though related, are not one and the same. Safe Deposit , 280 U.S. at 92 (explaining that, where the trustee of a trust owned legal title to trust securities in Maryland, and none of the trust beneficiaries located in Virginia had a \"present right to their enjoyment or power to remove them,\" the \"securities did not and could not follow any person domiciled in Virginia\"); cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "The holding the New York courts reached in Mercantile- Safe Deposit & Trust Co. is consistent with the one that this Court articulated in Hanson v. Denckla . In Hanson , this Court found that the presence of trust beneficiaries in Florida did not confer on that state jurisdiction over the trustee of a trust who had no other Florida connections. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While North Carolina argues that Hanson has no application here because personal jurisdiction in litigation and tax jurisdiction are distinct concepts, this Court has recognized that adjudicative jurisdiction and tax jurisdiction are comparable with each other. Quill , 504 U.S. at 307-08.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, cmt. d.; but cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recognizing that the presence of discretionary trust beneficiaries within North Carolina was the only connection that the trust had to that state, the court below correctly concluded that the trust lacked sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to justify its tax on all of the income the trust earned during the 2005 to 2008 tax years. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family 814 S.E.2d 43.",
		"citation_value_orig": "672 N.W.2d 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "672 N.W.2d 643. Recognizing that the presence of discretionary trust beneficiaries within North Carolina was the only connection that the trust had to that state, the court below correctly concluded that the trust lacked sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to justify its tax on all of the income the trust earned during the 2005 to 2008 tax years. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The trustee resided in Connecticut. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 S.E.2d 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "What is more, because the trust's discretionary beneficiaries did not have a right to access or control the trust's assets or income, and those beneficiaries did not receive any trust distributions during the relevant tax years, the mere presence of Respondent's discretionary beneficiaries in North Carolina during those years is insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts to justify that state's tax on Respondent's undistributed trust income during the relevant tax years. Putting aside, for argument's sake only, that the mere presence of a discretionary beneficiary of a trust in a particular state is insufficient to establish minimum contacts to justify that state's taxation of undistributed trust income that is earned outside of the state, such undistributed trust income also bears no relationship, rational or otherwise, to the values that the state in which the discretionary trust beneficiary resides provides to the trust. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since none of the trustee, the trust's assets or the trust's income is located within North Carolina, the state provides \"no ongoing protection or benefit to the trust.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 N.W.2d 762",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "The state is essentially a stranger to the trust, regardless of the state's relationship to a discretionary trust beneficiary. Cf. Allied-Signal, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, the Due Process Clause does not permit North Carolina to tax the trust on undistributed income that the trust earned outside of North Carolina's borders. 14 North Carolina's reliance upon Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport for the proposition that \"a trust constituent's residency in a state connects the trust to the state\" is misplaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "at 30. Although Greenough established that a state could constitutionally tax income earned by a trust based upon a trustee's presence within that state, Greenough does not support North Carolina's argument that a beneficiary's presence within the state provides the same jurisdictional basis. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. North Carolina's claim that Greenough is at odds with Safe Deposit is incorrect. First, it is worthy of note that the Court cited to Safe Deposit in Greenough , recognizing that the two cases involved different jurisdictional issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "Finally, Petitioner's reference to District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank , Chase Manhattan Bank 15 v. Gavin , and McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Board is misplaced. All but one of the trusts in question in District of Columbia and Gavin were testamentary trusts, which were created pursuant to decrees that issued from courts in the jurisdictions that imposed tax. District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chase Manhattan 733 A.2d 782. Although Gavin also concerned an inter vivos trust, the beneficiary thereof – whose presence in Connecticut was found to justify that state's taxation of the trust's undistributed income – had more significant vested rights in the Gavin inter vivos trust (including the right to receive the trust's corpus at age forty-five, and to direct how the trust's corpus would be distributed, if she died before attaining forty-five years of age) than Respondent's discretionary beneficiaries did in the trust established for their benefit. Gavin , 733 A.2d at 802.",
		"citation_value_orig": "689 A.2d 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State",
		"context": "Gavin , 733 A.2d at 802. In McCulloch , California taxed the California-resident beneficiary of a Missouri testamentary trust for income earned during the last five years of the trust's administration, at a point when the trust already had terminated and its assets had been distributed to the beneficiary, which is readily-distinguishable from the present matter (in which Respondent's assets remained in trust during, and after, the relevant tax years). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In light of the foregoing, the Due Process Clause does not permit a state to tax the undistributed income that a trust earns in another state, based solely upon the presence of a discretionary trust beneficiary within the taxing state. The court below correctly concluded as much in ruling for Respondent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 P.2d 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Conclusion",
		"context": "I. Under this Court's precedents, t here are some forms of speech that are not protected under the First Amendment , such as fighting words. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fighting words are defined as speech that \"by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Conclusion",
		"context": "at 90a. 3 It should also be remembered that the government's first job in such a situation is attempt to control the crowd, not silence the speaker. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 The message of the love and salvation Christ offers is not offensive to a person of common intelligence. This message has been preached for at least two thousand years and has never been condemned as \"fighting words. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Conclusion",
		"context": "It would o pen up a floodgate of litigation against all religions as proselytizing is a key part of religion. If the Court corrects this theory now, it can avoid having to address it down the road. C. Recent Supreme Court decisions cast severe doubt on whether the fighting words doctrine remains legitimate In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court held that prohibiting offensive speech is a form of viewpoint discrimination because \"[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.\" Likewise, in Masterpiece Cakeshop , the Court held that the government cannot abridge free exercise of religion because it finds religious content offensive . Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Conclusion",
		"context": "Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S.Ct. at 1731. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court stated that speech involving \"sensitive political topics ... occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and merits special protection.\" See also 505 U.S. 337. It is difficult to see how the fighting words doctrine can con tinue to be justified in light of these precedents .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Conclusion",
		"context": "at 1731. And in 138 S.Ct. 2448, the Court stated that speech involving \"sensitive political topics ... occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and merits special protection.\" See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is difficult to see how the fighting words doctrine can con tinue to be justified in light of these precedents . Though the culture is becoming more sensitive, this Court has affirmed again and again that free speech means protecting someone's right to speak even when another takes offense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The TDRA's \"noncommercial use\" exception does not automatically immunize humorous uses of a trademark",
		"context": "This Court has consistently eschewed interpreta- tions of statutes that render superfluous other portions of the same act. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 542 U.S. 88. The Ninth Circuit's approach violates this rule of statut ory construction. It also impermissibly deploys a more general provision of a statute to negate the boundar ies of a sister provision that more specifically addresses the subject matter at hand.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The TDRA's \"noncommercial use\" exception does not automatically immunize humorous uses of a trademark",
		"context": "This Court has consistently eschewed interpreta- tions of statutes that render superfluous other portions of the same act. See, e.g. , 556 U.S. 303; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit's approach violates this rule of statut ory construction. It also impermissibly deploys a more general provision of a statute to negate the boundar ies of a sister provision that more specifically addresses the subject matter at hand.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The TDRA's \"noncommercial use\" exception does not automatically immunize humorous uses of a trademark",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit's approach violates this rule of statut ory construction. It also impermissibly deploys a more general provision of a statute to negate the boundar ies of a sister provision that more specifically addresses the subject matter at hand. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a capaciou s approach to the noncom- mercial use exception of the TDRA erodes, without warrant, the rights that Congress has conferred on owners of famous trademarks. It therefore should be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The TDRA's \"noncommercial use\" exception does not automatically immunize humorous uses of a trademark",
		"context": "Such a capaciou s approach to the noncom- mercial use exception of the TDRA erodes, without warrant, the rights that Congress has conferred on owners of famous trademarks. It therefore should be rejected. This Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], illustrates a better approach. By referring to 2 Live Crew's song as a \"commercial parody,\" the Court confirmed that 15 commerciality and parody are distinct concepts. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Giving \"Money Remuneration\" Its Plain Meaning Respects The Textual Differences With FICA, And Is Consistent With The RRTA's History And Purpose",
		"context": "In the RRTA, Congress intended to tax only a subset of all the remuneration railroad employees received— and it omitted the critical language it included in FICA extending the tax base to encompass remuneration \"paid in any medium other than cash.\" This Court ordinarily \"presume[s] differences in language like this convey differences in meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But after spendi ng 48 pages urging the Court to appreciate the similarities between the RRTA and FICA, at the end of its brief the government switches gears and argues that the Court should disregard the critical textual differences in the tax bases because the RRTA and FICA are not \"the same statute or statutes that were derived from one another.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. No Vehicle Issues Prevent This Court From Granting Review.",
		"context": "In sum, there is a high likelihood that this Court could grant certiorari in this case and issue a decision this Term before either the state court proceedings or underlying federal proceedings exhaust all appellate review. Moreover, regardless of what happens below this case would nevertheless qualify for the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception to mootness. See Kingdomware Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Petitioners' motion to intervene cannot be fully litigated before the case is resolved, it is a near certainty that Petitioners will seek to intervene alongside the Executive Branch in the future, especially if North Carolina's government remains divided. 3 3 Petitioners (in their official capacity) have sought intervention in numerous cases rece ntly, and it is likely that they will continue to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. No Vehicle Issues Prevent This Court From Granting Review.",
		"context": "And North Carolina is not the only state to adopt laws designating certain entities as state agents to represent the state's interests in court in certain situations. See, e.g. , Va. House of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, while one of the dissents below suggests that the relevant part of the majority's analysis was dicta, the en banc majority expressly rejected that charge. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Multifactor tests are indeterminate and unpredictable.",
		"context": "The fundamental problem s with general -purpose multifactor tests are that they are indeterminate in nature, expensive and time -consuming to li tigate, and unpredictable in result. \"These factors imply no mathematical precision, but are simply a guide to help determine whether confusion is likely … and not all of these factors may be particularly helpful in any given case.\" Homeowners Grp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As this Court noted in another Lanham Act context, \"experience has shown that … open -ended balancing tests[] can yield unpredictable and at times arbitrary results.\" Lexmark Int 'l, 572 U.S. 118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "931 F.2d 1100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Multifactor tests are indeterminate and unpredictable.",
		"context": "Homeowners Grp., 931 F.2d 1100 . As this Court noted in another Lanham Act context, \"experience has shown that … open -ended balancing tests[] can yield unpredictable and at times arbitrary results.\" Lexmark Int 'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result of this indeterminacy , parties litigating the multifactor test must develop and present evidence on all of the factors, without knowing which ones the court or jury will find more or less significant in the particul ar case. If the facts relevant to the applicable factors are contested, factual findings must be made with respect to each of these factors, and these findings are subject to review only for clear error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Multifactor tests are indeterminate and unpredictable.",
		"context": "As a result of this indeterminacy , parties litigating the multifactor test must develop and present evidence on all of the factors, without knowing which ones the court or jury will find more or less significant in the particul ar case. If the facts relevant to the applicable factors are contested, factual findings must be made with respect to each of these factors, and these findings are subject to review only for clear error. Little Caesar Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a lack of 37 clarity in Lanham Act standards promotes use of litigation in and of itself as a weapon. See Wal -Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205 (criticizing trademark test for its \"indeterminacy problem\" and warning that \"certainty is especially important in an area like this one where even the prospect of liability has the effect of chilling constitutionally protected speech\") (citing Glynn Lunney, Trademark's Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get Tradema rk Cases Wrong Repeatedly , 106 CAL.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.2d 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Multifactor tests are indeterminate and unpredictable.",
		"context": "Little Caesar Enters., 834 F.2d 568. Such a lack of 37 clarity in Lanham Act standards promotes use of litigation in and of itself as a weapon. See Wal -Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (criticizing trademark test for its \"indeterminacy problem\" and warning that \"certainty is especially important in an area like this one where even the prospect of liability has the effect of chilling constitutionally protected speech\") (citing Glynn Lunney, Trademark's Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get Tradema rk Cases Wrong Repeatedly , 106 CAL. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2018)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Multifactor tests are indeterminate and unpredictable.",
		"context": "As discussed below, infra pp. 41−45, in the Rogers context, \"[a]dding survey evidence changes nothing.\" MGFB , 54 F.4th at 682 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 1235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. CARCO's Arguments About Incentives Are Wrong",
		"context": "49 C. CARCO Is Wrong That Adhering To The Industry's Standard Interpretation Of An Unqualified Safe-Port Clause Will Harm Maritime Commerce. As this Court has held, the overriding purpose of federal maritime jurisdiction is to protect maritime commerce. Exxon Corp. , 500 U.S. at 608; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The shipping industry is a global market of sophisticated actors where free-dom of contract promotes efficient bargains and allo-cations of risk. For more than a century, charterers and ship owners around the world have bargained with the understanding that an unqualified safe-port clause is a warranty by the charterer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. CARCO's Arguments About Incentives Are Wrong",
		"context": "38), for example, ma ritime tort law imposes a strict-liability standard in certain products-liability contexts, E. River S.S. Co., 476 U.S. at 865, and with 51 respect to a ship owner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship, Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 208. Strict li- ability also applies to a ship owner's duty to provide his shipboard employees with \"maintenance and cure.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Signatories to a charter party need not adopt a strict-liability standard with respect to the safety of a port designated by the charterer—but they certainly may if they wish to. Finally, CARCO errs in contending (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since 1975, this Court has made clear that private rights of action may not be inferred without an indication of Congressional intent",
		"context": "\"In the mid-20th century, ... the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to 'provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective' a statute's purpose,\" and so, \"as a routine matter with respect to 6 statutes, the Court would im ply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself.\" Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (quoting J.I. Case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the Court has taken far \"more restric- tive views on private rights of action in recent decades.\" Unite Here Local 571 U.S. 83.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since 1975, this Court has made clear that private rights of action may not be inferred without an indication of Congressional intent",
		"context": "Case 377 U.S. 426). But the Court has taken far \"more restric- tive views on private rights of action in recent decades.\" Unite Here Local [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The high-water mark for implied causes of action came in the period before [this] Court's 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash\"—but ever since then, the \"Court has been very hostile to implied causes of action.\" 849 F.3d 1093.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since 1975, this Court has made clear that private rights of action may not be inferred without an indication of Congressional intent",
		"context": "Unite Here Local 571 U.S. 83. \"The high-water mark for implied causes of action came in the period before [this] Court's 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash\"—but ever since then, the \"Court has been very hostile to implied causes of action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The reason for this hostility is that \"a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases\"—a point that this Court has \"'recently and repeatedly'\" emphasized in numerous \"precedents [that] cast doubt on the authority of courts to extend or create private causes of action.\" 138 S. Ct. 1386.",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 1093",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since 1975, this Court has made clear that private rights of action may not be inferred without an indication of Congressional intent",
		"context": "849 F.3d 1093. The reason for this hostility is that \"a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases\"—a point that this Court has \"'recently and repeatedly'\" emphasized in numerous \"precedents [that] cast doubt on the authority of courts to extend or create private causes of action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, \"when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under a federal statute, separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the analysis.\" Abassi , 137 S. Ct. at 1857.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Since 1975, this Court has made clear that private rights of action may not be inferred without an indication of Congressional intent",
		"context": "Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 286. Thus, \"what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, as [the Court's] decisions have made clear.\" Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Statutory intent on this latter point is deter-minative,\" for \"[w]ithout it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter.\" Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 286–87.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position",
		"context": "As the Third Circuit correctly held, M/S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], also support Raiders' position that Pennsylvania public policy could preclude application of the insurance policy's New York choice-of-law provision to necessitate the dismissal of Raiders' extra-contractual Pennsylvania- law counterclaims in the context of this case. The Bremen recognized that the forum's public policy can preclude enforcement of a forum selection clause, which also served as a choice-of-law provision, in a dispute between which of two nation's laws to apply. See M/S Bremen , 407 U.S. at 13-15 & n.15.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
		"context": "The judgment below vacated the embedded radio markets policy along wi th the rest of the Reconsideration Order , even though Respondents did not mention it in the underlying rulemaking proceedings or appellate briefing, let alone demonstrate that the policy was unlawful. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, Respon dents failed to mention the TV Joint Sales Agreement Attribution Rule in their opening briefs in the Third Circuit, and on reply 48 advanced only the incorrect argument that the FCC's decision to eliminate that rule had been based on the same data as the remainder of the rules. See Pet.App.184a-99a (determining that TV joint sales agreements do not provide stations selling advertising time on other stations with sufficient indicia of control to warrant attribution and that non-attribution is otherwise in the public interest).",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
		"context": "14 2. The judgment below is also improper because even if the Third Circuit were correct on the merits, it should have remanded the challenged rules without vacating them, thus providing the Commission an opportunity to provide the purportedly necessary data and analysis. Remand without vacatur is warranted where: (i) the agency \"can redress its failure of explanation on remand while reaching the same result,\" Black Oak Energy, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and (i i) vacatur would result in significant \"disruptive consequences,\" Allied- Signal, 988 F.2d 146; see also 33 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 14 The FCC's decisions regarding the embedded radio markets provision and the TV Joint Sales Agreement Attribution Rule are severable because there is no indication that they could not function independently of the Reconsideration Order's other provisions. See K Mart 486 U.S. 281. 49 § 8382 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.3d 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
		"context": "14 2. The judgment below is also improper because even if the Third Circuit were correct on the merits, it should have remanded the challenged rules without vacating them, thus providing the Commission an opportunity to provide the purportedly necessary data and analysis. Remand without vacatur is warranted where: (i) the agency \"can redress its failure of explanation on remand while reaching the same result,\" Black Oak Energy, 725 F.3d 230; and (i i) vacatur would result in significant \"disruptive consequences,\" Allied- Signal, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 33 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 14 The FCC's decisions regarding the embedded radio markets provision and the TV Joint Sales Agreement Attribution Rule are severable because there is no indication that they could not function independently of the Reconsideration Order's other provisions. See K Mart 486 U.S. 281. 49 § 8382 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "988 F.2d 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
		"context": "The judgment below is also improper because even if the Third Circuit were correct on the merits, it should have remanded the challenged rules without vacating them, thus providing the Commission an opportunity to provide the purportedly necessary data and analysis. Remand without vacatur is warranted where: (i) the agency \"can redress its failure of explanation on remand while reaching the same result,\" Black Oak Energy, 725 F.3d 230; and (i i) vacatur would result in significant \"disruptive consequences,\" Allied- Signal, 988 F.2d 146; see also 33 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 14 The FCC's decisions regarding the embedded radio markets provision and the TV Joint Sales Agreement Attribution Rule are severable because there is no indication that they could not function independently of the Reconsideration Order's other provisions. See K Mart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 § 8382 (2d ed. supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
		"context": "§ 2343. That approach reflects a conscious choice by Congress not to restrict cases like this one to a single tribunal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Despite that clear congressional command, the same panel of the Third Circuit has retained jurisdiction over challenges to every one of the Commission's Section 202(h) reviews since 2002. See Prometheus III, 824 F.3d at 60; Prometheus II , 652 F.3d at 472; Prometheus I , 373 F.3d at 435.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Accepting the City of Austin's arguments would require this Court to overturn Reed",
		"context": "Such a decision should not be taken lightly. \"Stare de- cisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and c onsistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci- sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived in- tegrity of the judicial process.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U. S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unit 1 Is Not \"Essential\" for Species Conservation Because It Is Not Even Adequate for Species Conservation",
		"context": "The balance of the Service and Intervenors' arguments on essentiality boils down to the proposition that absent areas that actually qualify as unoccupied critical habitat, the Service should be able to designate what it considers the next best thing, even if it falls far short of being minimally adequate. But the good intentions of an agency to supply what Congress has not provided do not amount to legal authority to do so. Mexichem Fluor, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 15",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government And Amici's Policy Concerns Are For Congress To Consider, Overstated, And Outweighed By Countervailing Concerns",
		"context": "If the law is to be changed, that is a task for Congress. While a court should exercise remedial discretion wisely , it is no t for the courts to override Congress's judgment and decide that relief Congress has author- ized is categorically improper in all cases. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Substantial negative effects would anyway follow if the cou rts were denied the power to set aside and enjoin regulations entirely.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government And Amici's Policy Concerns Are For Congress To Consider, Overstated, And Outweighed By Countervailing Concerns",
		"context": "As for the government and amici 's policy argu- ments for eliminating the relief authorized by the APA , they are wrong . The government's \"running the 18 table\" problem (at 45 ), to the extent such a problem exists, still r emains even if requests for broad relief are channeled into Rule 23 suits as amici would like to see happen. For example, the government had to run the table in the cases underlying [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , in which the Third Circuit grant ed re- lief to a nationwide class in a case involving regula- tions earlier deemed valid or enforceable by four other circuits . (This Court sided with the Third Circuit and affirmed.) But in the end, whether injunctions are broad or nar- row, the nation's sys tem of appellate review will bring any important question that divides the circuits before this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government And Amici's Policy Concerns Are For Congress To Consider, Overstated, And Outweighed By Countervailing Concerns",
		"context": "18, and injunctions issuing without a \"developed factual record ,\" see id. at 19, are overblown. The former is an inevitable byproduct of all litigation in a multi -district system that b roadly permits plain- tiffs to lay venue, and the latter ignores that in APA cases the record is ready -made by the agency , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .12 12 Despite alleged concerns about percolation , the government notes (at 43) that other courts have opined on the rules at issue here. Amici 's concerns about \"conflicting\" injunctions, see Bagley - Bray Br. 23 -24 (citing 393 F. Supp. 3d 490), are similarly misplaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government And Amici's Policy Concerns Are For Congress To Consider, Overstated, And Outweighed By Countervailing Concerns",
		"context": "The difference is c ritical . When a court sets aside an adjudication —say, a Social Security disability claim — that decision may implicate an agency's generally ap- plied standards for conducting adjudications, but all that is formally being set aside by the reviewing court is the final agency action at issue in the case. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a rule is under review, there is only one agency action for the court to review —the rule itself . If that rule is set aside, an agency that c arried on as if the rule still existed would not be \"refusing to acquiesce\"; it would be disobeying the mandate of the court that set aside the rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.2d 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Question Presented Does Not Fairly Include the Retroactivity of Punitive Damages Under Petitioners' State-Law Claims",
		"context": ", U.S. Br. 27-33 (presenting discrete argument on state-law issue)). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.\"). Petitioners and the United States assert that Sudan addressed retroactivity for state-law punitive damages in its Brief in Opposition to the Petition (Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACCA's structure, history, and purpose confirm that different \"occasions\" are separate criminal opportunities",
		"context": "As its name suggests, th e Armed Career Criminal Act targets those who make a pr ofession of lawbreaking. This title is \"not merely decorative.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Florida Dep't of 554 U.S. 33. The \"occasions\" clause should accordingly be given its plain meaning: A career crim inal is one who demonstrates a pattern of exploiting distinct criminal opportunities. The law's target is not the o ffender whose bad judgment in a single situation leads to multiple charges, but the sea- soned professional whose extensive \"criminal history\" shows that he cannot be deterre d from his chosen vocation by regular punishment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACCA's structure, history, and purpose confirm that different \"occasions\" are separate criminal opportunities",
		"context": "As its name suggests, th e Armed Career Criminal Act targets those who make a pr ofession of lawbreaking. This title is \"not merely decorative.\" 553 U.S. 137; see Florida Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"occasions\" clause should accordingly be given its plain meaning: A career crim inal is one who demonstrates a pattern of exploiting distinct criminal opportunities. The law's target is not the o ffender whose bad judgment in a single situation leads to multiple charges, but the sea- soned professional whose extensive \"criminal history\" shows that he cannot be deterre d from his chosen vocation by regular punishment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACCA's structure, history, and purpose confirm that different \"occasions\" are separate criminal opportunities",
		"context": "As originally enacted, the ACCA did not expressly distinguish a defendant whose prior offenses were com-mitted on separate occasions from one who had committed multiple crimes on the same occasion. Federal prosecutors accordingly argued that even a multi-count conviction arising from a single criminal episode should qualify as multiple predicates for ACCA purposes. Most notable is 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the Government secured an enhanced ACCA sen- tence against the defendant, Samuel Petty, based on his prior conviction under \"a sing le indictment of six counts of robbery stemming from an incident during which he robbed six different people.\" Id. at 1159.",
		"citation_value_orig": "798 F.2d 1157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACCA's structure, history, and purpose confirm that different \"occasions\" are separate criminal opportunities",
		"context": "481 U.S. 1034. On remand, the Eighth Circuit vacated Petty's sentence, agreeing with the Solicitor General that the ACCA \"was intended to re ach multiple criminal epi- sodes that were distinct in time, not multiple felony con- victions arising out of a si ngle criminal episode.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. Congress responded to Petty by amending the ACCA to add language from the Organized Crime Control Act requiring that predicate convictions be for offenses \"committed on occasions different from one another.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "828 F.2d 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Key Role Of The First Amendment In Safeguarding Democratic Governance By Protecting Political Speech And Association Has Been Recognized Since The Founding Era",
		"context": ". first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.\" New York Times 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act made it a federal crime to defame \"the government of the United States, or either house of the Congr ess . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Key Role Of The First Amendment In Safeguarding Democratic Governance By Protecting Political Speech And Association Has Been Recognized Since The Founding Era",
		"context": "at 345. \"Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.\" Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 276 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By the close of the founding era, there was a broad consensus that Madison's attack on the Act's constitutionality was correct. See Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 276 (quoting an 1836 Senate report stating that the Act's \"invalidity was a matter 'which no one now doubts'\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "250 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Key Role Of The First Amendment In Safeguarding Democratic Governance By Protecting Political Speech And Association Has Been Recognized Since The Founding Era",
		"context": "See Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 276 (quoting an 1836 Senate report stating that the Act's \"invalidity was a matter 'which no one now doubts'\"). Other leading founders , including Chief Justice Marshall , shared Madison's belief that free government depends on the ability of the people effectively to control their government through the electoral process. See 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (the legislators' \"identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should reverse the Roe-Casey-Hellerstedt line of cases",
		"context": "We have always understood that even where [the federal government] has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. [The federal 30 government] may not simply commandee r the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . While Murphy concerned congressional commandeering, the Tenth Amendment applies equally to all three federal branches: \" The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. \" U.S. CONST .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should reverse the Roe-Casey-Hellerstedt line of cases",
		"context": "X (emphasis added). Of course, \"the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a … power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of [another] clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As such, having something as potentially subjective as substantive due process, 521 U.S. 702 , prevail over the Tenth Amendment would signal the need for this Court to reassess its Roe-Casey holdings. Specifically, if Providers would prevail under Roe- Casey , this Court should revisit and re affirm its own occasional reluctance to premis e unenumerated rights on substantive due process: [W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision - making in this unchartered area are scarce and open -ended.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should reverse the Roe-Casey-Hellerstedt line of cases",
		"context": "Of course, \"the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a … power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of [another] clause.\" 240 U.S. 1. As such, having something as potentially subjective as substantive due process, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , prevail over the Tenth Amendment would signal the need for this Court to reassess its Roe-Casey holdings. Specifically, if Providers would prevail under Roe- Casey , this Court should revisit and re affirm its own occasional reluctance to premis e unenumerated rights on substantive due process: [W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision - making in this unchartered area are scarce and open -ended. … We must … exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break 31 new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court, Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text And Applicable Canons Of Construction Dictate That \"Using A Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce\"",
		"context": "For example, he invokes the last - antecedent canon —i.e. , that a \"'limiting clause or phrase … should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows ,' unless context dictates otherwise.\" Resp.Br.20 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But that canon is inapplicable here by its terms, because w hat \"using a random or sequential number generator, \" \"immediately follows\" is not \"produce\" but \"numbers to be called. \" Even respondent does not argue that \"using a random or sequential number generator\" modifies how numbers must be \"called\" (presumably because that reading would doom his claim).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text And Applicable Canons Of Construction Dictate That \"Using A Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce\"",
		"context": "It concededly does not apply when, as here, there are two antecedents but only one subsequent modifier. Cf. Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While respondent's example \"[m]en and women are eligible to become members of fraternities and sororities\" feature s two pairs of terms that naturally distribute or \"pair up,\" Resp.Br.20, the ATDS definition contain s two antecedents and only one subsequent modifier. It is more analogous to a reference to \" fraternities or sororities hosting formal s,\" which does not implicate the distributive - phrasing canon at all and plainly does not cover every fraternity , without reg ard to its party plans , but only a subset of sororities .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text And Applicable Canons Of Construction Dictate That \"Using A Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce\"",
		"context": "Addressing the principal evil at which the statute was 11 directed with a belt -and-suspenders approach does not create superfluity th at justifies rewriting the statute. \"It is no superfluity for Congress to clarify what\" would have otherwise been \"at best unclear\" or to ensure that it weeds out all use of a disfavored technology. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation , 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2161-62 (2016) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text And Applicable Canons Of Construction Dictate That \"Using A Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce\"",
		"context": "Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1307 . In all events , \"the canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute.\" Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent's reading fails that test and creates a far more serious superfluity problem . Respondent has not identif ied any equipment that has the specialized capacity to \"produce telephone number s to be called, using a random or sequential number generator ,\" but lacks the ubiquitous capacity to store and dial telephone numbers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text And Applicable Canons Of Construction Dictate That \"Using A Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce\"",
		"context": "But t hat language constitutes the heart of the definition and includes the only phrase that describes anythin g automatic . Reading that language to lack practical effect \" in all but the most unusual circumstances\" does not create a mere superfluity problem ; it fundamentally repurposes the statute. TRW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . At bottom, respondent would parlay a perceived natural affinity between \"to produce\" and \"using a random and sequential number generator\" to read both words out of the statute as a practical matter. That would truly make nonsense of the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception needs to be properly cabined",
		"context": "A constitutionally protected lecture does not become unprotected when it becomes a lecture series. Advocacy of a political boycott does not become unpro-tected just because it consists of a \"course of conduct\" that includes speaking, gathering names of people who are not complyin g with the boycott, and publicizing those names. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 In all t hese cases, including in the professional-cli- ent speech case, there is no \"course of conduct\" to which the speech is \"integral\" or \"incidental\" apart from a course of speech. We can call the speech \"pro- fessional consultation\" or \"psychotherapy,\" but speech is all that it is.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception needs to be properly cabined",
		"context": "13 In all t hese cases, including in the professional-cli- ent speech case, there is no \"course of conduct\" to which the speech is \"integral\" or \"incidental\" apart from a course of speech. We can call the speech \"pro- fessional consultation\" or \"psychotherapy,\" but speech is all that it is. Just as the proposed offering of advice to terrorist groups about their international legal op- tions was treated as speech in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , so the proposed offering of advice to a patient should be treated as speech as well. Perhaps, as in Holder , the speech could still be regulated, whether because the restriction passes strict scrutiny or because there is some special rule for professional- client speech (or such speech to minors). But the \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception sheds no light on the situation, precisely be- cause there is no criminal conduct to which the speech is integral.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception needs to be properly cabined",
		"context": "But the \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception sheds no light on the situation, precisely be- cause there is no criminal conduct to which the speech is integral. As the Third Circuit pointed out in dealing with such a ban in King v. Governor , Given that the Supreme Court had no difficulty characterizing legal co unseling as \"speech,\" we see no reason here to reach the counter -intuitive conclusion that the verbal communications that occur during SOCE counseling are \"conduct.\" Defendants' citation to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Volokh, supra , 101 Cornell L. Rev. at 1043 -49 (discussing the misapplica- tion of the \"speech integral to criminal con duct\" excep- tion in Pickup , and the criticism of that misapplication in King ). See also 981 F.3d 854 (likewise rejecting the argu- ment that regulations of sexual orientation change 14 efforts were merely \"incidental [regulations of speech] swept up in the regulation of professional conduct\"; \"the ordinances are direct, not incidental, regulations of speech\" and \" are not connected to any regulation of separately identifiable conduct \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "767 F.3d 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception needs to be properly cabined",
		"context": "147, 184- 89 (2022) (noting such cases, and other cases that have criticized such misapplications). Yet \"[t]here is no categorical 'harassment exception' to the First Amendment's free speech clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the combination of a criminal harassment statute and t he \"speech integral to crimi- nal conduct\" exception cannot create such an excep- tion: Such a justification for a criminal harassment statute \"is circular—the speech covered by the statute is integral to criminal conduct because the statute it- self makes the conduct illegal. That is not the test for speech integral to criminal conduc t.\" Matter of Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 F.3d 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. No Government Program Exception Applies",
		"context": "Govt. 6 Even if trademark registration were a government subsidy, the Government is seeking to improperly \"leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of su bjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.\" Nat'l Endowment for the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 357 U.S. 513, and 551 U.S. 177. The Court of Appeals had dis-cussed these cases in Tam, 808 F.3d at 1351.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. No Government Program Exception Applies",
		"context": "6 Even if trademark registration were a government subsidy, the Government is seeking to improperly \"leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of su bjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.\" Nat'l Endowment for the 524 U.S. 569. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 551 U.S. 177. The Court of Appeals had dis-cussed these cases in Tam, 808 F.3d at 1351. However, the Government chose not to cite these cases in this case until its petition for a rehearing en banc , which was denied without opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. No Government Program Exception Applies",
		"context": "6 Even if trademark registration were a government subsidy, the Government is seeking to improperly \"leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of su bjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.\" Nat'l Endowment for the 524 U.S. 569. See also 357 U.S. 513, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court of Appeals had dis-cussed these cases in Tam, 808 F.3d at 1351. However, the Government chose not to cite these cases in this case until its petition for a rehearing en banc , which was denied without opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment required race neutrality",
		"context": ". 19 See Croson , 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\"[I]t is important not to lose sight of the fact that even 'benign' racial quotas have individual victims, whose very real injustice we ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of race.\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A",
		"context": "None of those alleged harms can provide stand- ing to challenge Section 5000A. This Court has made clear that an injury resulting from one portion of a statute does not support standing to challenge another portion. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, Article III's requirements must be met with respect to \"each claim\" a plaintiff \"seeks to press.\" DaimlerChrysler 547 U.S. 332; see 518 U.S. 343.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A",
		"context": "See, e.g., 554 U.S. 724. Rather, Article III's requirements must be met with respect to \"each claim\" a plaintiff \"seeks to press.\" DaimlerChrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 518 U.S. 343. The result is no different here simply because plaintiffs' untenable severability arguments could the- oretically lead to invalidation of the provisions of the ACA on which the state plaintiffs' assertions of injury are premised. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adle r, How Do the States Have Standing to Challenge an Unenforced and Unenforceable Mandate?",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A",
		"context": "See, e.g., 554 U.S. 724. Rather, Article III's requirements must be met with respect to \"each claim\" a plaintiff \"seeks to press.\" DaimlerChrysler 547 U.S. 332; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The result is no different here simply because plaintiffs' untenable severability arguments could the- oretically lead to invalidation of the provisions of the ACA on which the state plaintiffs' assertions of injury are premised. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adle r, How Do the States Have Standing to Challenge an Unenforced and Unenforceable Mandate?",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A",
		"context": "See Ayotte , 546 U.S. at 329. Without t he predicate of such court action, there is no \" absence\" in the statute that would justify an inquiry into whether Congress would have enacted the statute in that new form. Alaska Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, Section 5000A cannot be enjoined as to any of the plaintiffs, or even declared unconstitutional at their behest, because it has no effect on them. Without 33 the possibility of such an order, Section 5000A remains part of the Act, regardless of whether a co urt might abstractly question the provision's constitutionality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Varela has no persuasive response to the Agreement's text clearly contemplating bilateral arbitration",
		"context": "Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.All- state Ins. Co. ,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "When identifying the elements of a constitutional tort, this Court also considers \" the common law of torts. \" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 920; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For good rea- son. First, the Constitution itself \" must be inter- preted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "For good rea- son. First, the Constitution itself \" must be inter- preted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the framing, \" the only way to en- force \" the B ill of Rights \" was through private law remedies, such as trespass and false imprisonment \"; as a result, the elements of those causes of action served as \" threshold test[s], \" \"necessary … condi- tion[s] for hauling an officer into court. \" William Baude & Jame s Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment , 129 Harv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "169 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "1821, 1840– 41 (2016). Second, \"Congress intended [§ 1983] to be construed in the light of common -law principles that were well settled at the time of its enactment, \" and it accordingly makes sense to \"ex- amin[e] common -law doctrine when identifying … 16 the elements of the cause of action. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, the com- mon law reflects wisdom accumulated \" over the cen- turies. \" 435 U.S. 247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "522 U.S. 118. Finally, the com- mon law reflects wisdom accumulated \" over the cen- turies. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1. Two common -law tort theories address improp- erly motivated arrests: malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "Probable cause defeats each type of claim. Malicious prosecution is the tort of \" put[ting] the criminal law in force \"—incl uding by making an ar- rest—because of an \" evil motive. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. False imprisonment is the tort of confining someone against his will. 549 U.S. 384.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 How. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "24 How. 544. False imprisonment is the tort of confining someone against his will. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs can use these two tort theories to sue over arrests made in retaliation for speech. For example, a plaintiff may bring a malicious -prosecution claim against an of- ficer who arrests him for being \" too mouthy, \" 98 N.W. 1061, for the purpose of \" knock[ing] him out of a po- litical appointment, \" id., or \" for the purpose of … ad- ministering to [the officer 's] vanity, \" 11 P. 302.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "Probable cause defeats claims for malicious pros- ecution and false imprisonment . The \"want of prob- able cause \" is an element of malicious prosecution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, 17 if the arresting officer \" had probable cause, \" \"the mo- tives by which he was actuated … are not material. \" Crescent City Livestock Co 120 U.S. 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "98 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "98 U.S. 187. Thus, 17 if the arresting officer \" had probable cause, \" \"the mo- tives by which he was actuated … are not material. \" Crescent City Livestock Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Malice alone, however great, … is insufficient to maintain an action in damages. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "120 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "See Farmer v. Darling , 4 Burr. 1971, 1974 (K.B. 1766); Professional Real Estate Investors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, since \" time immemorial, \" probable cause has defeated a claim for false imprisonment. 54 Barb. 490; see Director General of 263 U.S. 25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "1766); Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. 49. Similarly, since \" time immemorial, \" probable cause has defeated a claim for false imprisonment. 54 Barb. 490; see Director General of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether the officer had an \"ulterior motive \" has never mattered. First Restate- ment § 127, comment a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort principles support a probable-cause element",
		"context": "Id. Thanks to this probable -cause safe harbor, a police officer can do his work without having to \"choose between being charged with dere- liction of duty if he does not arrest when he has prob-able cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, common -law courts recognized that the probable -cause element protects officers from im- proper lawsuits. They appreciated that improper motive is easy to allege, but hard to disprove—par- ticularly because \"malice might easily be inferred sometimes from idle and loose declarations. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. 35 U.S.C. section 112(A) REQUIRES A DISCLOSURE SUFFICIENT \"TO ENABLE ANY PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART\" TO \"MAKE AND USE\" THE \"INVENTION.\"",
		"context": "35 U.S.C. § 112(a); see, e.g. , Festo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T]he patent laws require inventors to describe their work in 'full, clear, concise, and exact terms,' 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights. \"); Minerals Separation, 242 U.S. 261; Nautilus, 572 U.S. 898.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. 35 U.S.C. section 112(A) REQUIRES A DISCLOSURE SUFFICIENT \"TO ENABLE ANY PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART\" TO \"MAKE AND USE\" THE \"INVENTION.\"",
		"context": ", Festo 535 U.S. 722 (\"[T]he patent laws require inventors to describe their work in 'full, clear, concise, and exact terms,' 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights. \"); Minerals Separation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nautilus, 572 U.S. 898. But nowhere in the text of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or this Court's precedent is ther e a requirement that the specification equip a person of ordinary skill in the art (\"POSA\") to be capable of readily making and using every conceivable embodiment of a patent claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "242 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. 35 U.S.C. section 112(A) REQUIRES A DISCLOSURE SUFFICIENT \"TO ENABLE ANY PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART\" TO \"MAKE AND USE\" THE \"INVENTION.\"",
		"context": ", Festo 535 U.S. 722 (\"[T]he patent laws require inventors to describe their work in 'full, clear, concise, and exact terms,' 35 U.S.C. § 112, as part of the delicate balance the law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights. \"); Minerals Separation, 242 U.S. 261; Nautilus, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But nowhere in the text of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or this Court's precedent is ther e a requirement that the specification equip a person of ordinary skill in the art (\"POSA\") to be capable of readily making and using every conceivable embodiment of a patent claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. 35 U.S.C. section 112(A) REQUIRES A DISCLOSURE SUFFICIENT \"TO ENABLE ANY PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART\" TO \"MAKE AND USE\" THE \"INVENTION.\"",
		"context": "§ 112(a). And implicitly, Congress endorsed the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the statute up through that recodification in 2011. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the qu antity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state 8 of the prior art, (6) the relati ve skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unp redictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.\"). But any different standard asserted after the passage of the AIA has not been endorsed by Congress and is not supported by the statute as Congress intended.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "at 312 & n.48 (cit - ing William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, Princeton Alumni Wkly ., Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9). Embracing this diversity rationale for race -con- scious admissions, the Grutter Court similarly described the \"educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce\" as \"promot[ing] 'cross -racial understanding'\" and \"break[ing] down racial stereo - types. \" 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( E.D. Mich. 2001 ), rev'd in 5 part and vacated in part , 288 F.3d 732, aff'd539 U.S. 306) . \" '[C]lassroom discussion is live - lier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have ' the great est pos - sible variety of backgrounds ',\" the Court stated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 F. Supp. 2d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "Embracing this diversity rationale for race -con- scious admissions, the Grutter Court similarly described the \"educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce\" as \"promot[ing] 'cross -racial understanding'\" and \"break[ing] down racial stereo - types. \" 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 ( E.D. Mich. 2001 ), rev'd in 5 part and vacated in part , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd539 U.S. 306) . \" '[C]lassroom discussion is live - lier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have ' the great est pos - sible variety of backgrounds ',\" the Court stated. 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting 137 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 F.3d 732",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "Embracing this diversity rationale for race -con- scious admissions, the Grutter Court similarly described the \"educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce\" as \"promot[ing] 'cross -racial understanding'\" and \"break[ing] down racial stereo - types. \" 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 ( E.D. Mich. 2001 ), rev'd in 5 part and vacated in part , 288 F.3d 732, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . \" '[C]lassroom discussion is live - lier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students have ' the great est pos - sible variety of backgrounds ',\" the Court stated. 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting 137 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "438 U.S. at 316- 17, 321-24 (quoting and re print - ing Brief of Columbia University, Harvard University et al. as Amici Curiae , Regents of the Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] The rest of the Har vard amicus brief described diversity in the same vein , argu ing that racial diver - sity, like diver sity of experi ence and interests, \" pro- vides the most stimulating intellectual environment,\" and that \"[m]inority students\" expose others to \"new and pro vocat ive points of view \" and \" new intellectual experi ences .\" Brief of Columbia, Harvard et al. at 8, 13, 1977 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS at 6, 14 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "The Grutter Court also favorably cited the Harvard program, 506 U.S. at 335- 39, and in an amicus brief in that case Harvard again spoke of 6 racial diversity as fostering the \" wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection. \" Brief of Harvard Univer- sity et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]539 U.S. 330, as does UNC, UNC Br. Opp'n Cert. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "415 -8. This preference for more affluent minority stu - dents is not exclusive to Harvard. As Justice Alito noted in his dissent in Fisher II , supra, the Univer sity of Texas had been particularly blunt about it in its earlier brief to the Cou rt in the first Fisher case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and in so doing had laid bare an inherent conflict underlying the diversity rationale: UT has . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
		"context": "that the race - based component of its plan is needed because the [already exist ing program admitting the t op ten percent of each 11 high school class] admits the wrong kind of African -American and Hispanic students, namely, students from poor families who attend schools in which the student body is predominantly African - American or His panic. As UT put it in its brief in Fisher I , the race -based com - ponent of its adm issions plan is needed to admit \"[t]he African -American or His - panic child of successful profes sionals in Dallas.\" 579 U.S. at 391 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Brief for Respondents, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But: UT's argument that it needs racial pref - erences to admit privileged minorities turns the concept of affirmative action on its head . When affirmative - action programs were first adopted, it was for the purpose of helping the disad - vantaged.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "Grasping for some legal support for its desired automatic stay, Coinbase relies heavily on the Court's unremarkable observation in Griggs that the filing of a notice of appeal \"divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.\" 459 U.S. at 58 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Coinbase repeatedly characterizes this statement from Griggs as a jurisdictional \"divestiture rule.\" But this incessant incantation is insufficient to conjure up a jurisdictional rule out of whole cloth.",
		"citation_value_orig": "587 F.2d 1357",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "But this incessant incantation is insufficient to conjure up a jurisdictional rule out of whole cloth. The Court has clarified that the term \"jurisdictional\" in Griggs and other contemporary cases \"is a characterization left over from days\" when the Court was \"less than meticulous\" in its \"use of the term 'jurisdictional.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Griggs simply referenced the commonsense and long- understood case-management principle that a district court must refrain from taking action if that action would result in the district court and the appeals court \"simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.\" 459 U.S. at 59.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "Arbitration is an alternative place to resolve legal claims. Agreements to arbitrate allow prospective litigants \"a broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes.\" Rodriguez de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They do not eliminate plaintiffs' rights to pursue their causes of action, and they do not immunize defendants from suit or limit the type of claims that may be brought against them. See Mitsubishi Motors 473 U.S. 614.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "Rodriguez de 490 U.S. 477. They do not eliminate plaintiffs' rights to pursue their causes of action, and they do not immunize defendants from suit or limit the type of claims that may be brought against them. See Mitsubishi Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Arbitration is thus not a substantive right that undermines the right to sue or eliminates the burden of being sued. It is a procedural right that specifies the tribunal in which a party's claim will be resolved.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "2019). Indeed, this Court has \"repeatedly recognized that contractually required arbitration of claims satisfies the statutory prescription of civil liability in court.\" CompuCredit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And while these proceedings may vary in their nature depending on the specific arbitration agreement at issue, so too will they vary from court to court. Just as a party may wish to contract to bring claims in arbitration because of perceived efficiencies or the specialization of the arbitrator, they may likewise wish to contract to bring their claims in a particular judicial forum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "Just as a party may wish to contract to bring claims in arbitration because of perceived efficiencies or the specialization of the arbitrator, they may likewise wish to contract to bring their claims in a particular judicial forum. See, e.g. , The [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, as this Court has recognized repeatedly, an arbitration agreement is \"a specialized kind of forum- selection clause.\" Viking River , 142 S. Ct. at 1919 (internal quotation marks omitted); 417 U.S. 506.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": ", The 407 U.S. 1. Thus, as this Court has recognized repeatedly, an arbitration agreement is \"a specialized kind of forum- selection clause.\" Viking River , 142 S. Ct. at 1919 (internal quotation marks omitted); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, when a district court denies a motion to compel arbitration and the moving party files an interlocutory appeal under Section 16(a), the only question for the court of appeals is where the dispute should be processed. There are no merits questions involved in such an appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "-32- Moses H. Cone 's rationale applies with equal force in the Griggs analysis. The circuit courts have long understood that piecemeal litigation \"occurs when different tribunals consider the same issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.\" Gannett Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is the same concern animating Griggs , which recognized the common understanding that dual-track litigation in the district and circuit courts is proper where there is \"little danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.\" 459 U.S. at 59.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 F.3d 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "Thus, lower courts retain the discretion to proceed on the merits—or to stay the case—during appeals of orders over forum-selection clauses, forum non conveniens , personal jurisdiction, and CAFA jurisdiction. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2017 WL 4953905253 F. Supp. 3d 842012 WL 1190894 appeals are no different. In each of these contexts, the question \"Is this the right place for the dispute?\" is severable from the merits of the dispute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 F.3d 708",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.",
		"context": "Thus, lower courts retain the discretion to proceed on the merits—or to stay the case—during appeals of orders over forum-selection clauses, forum non conveniens , personal jurisdiction, and CAFA jurisdiction. See, e.g. , 94 F.3d 7082017 WL 4953905[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2012 WL 1190894 appeals are no different. In each of these contexts, the question \"Is this the right place for the dispute?\" is severable from the merits of the dispute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 F. Supp. 3d 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "City of Los 576 U.S. 409. Reason- able searches may be conducted if supported either by warrants based on probable cause or, in the case of \"brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest,\" by reasonable suspi- cion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although \"a search or seizure is ordinarily unrea- sonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,\" this Court's decisions recognize \"limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.\" Edmond , 531 U.S. at 37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "Camara , 387 U.S. at 538 (collecting citations). In ad- dition, however, the government may conduct \"searches for certain administrative purposes without particularized suspicion of misconduct, provided that those searches are appropriately limited\"—including searches of business properties in closely regulated in- dustries. Edmond , 531 U.S. at 37 (discussing New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Two lines of this Court's precedent address when the Fourth Amendment allows the government to search private commercial property. The first line, summarized in Burger , outlines the conditions under which the government may require a \"closely regu- lated\" business to submit to a warrantless search.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "Id. at 700 (citation omitted). For instance, the Court in Colonnade Catering Corp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], disapproved of a warrantless search of a catering business operating under federal revenue statutes authorizing inspection of the premises of liq- uor dealers (in part because the statute imposed sanc- tions when entry was refused, and in part because it 26 did not authorize entry without a warrant as an alter- native in this situation), but recognized that \"the liq- uor industry [was] long subject to close supervision and inspection.\" Likewise, the Court in 406 U.S. 311, upheld the warrantless inspec- tion of a pawnshop federally licensed to sell guns un- der the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "at 700 (citation omitted). For instance, the Court in Colonnade Catering Corp 397 U.S. 72, disapproved of a warrantless search of a catering business operating under federal revenue statutes authorizing inspection of the premises of liq- uor dealers (in part because the statute imposed sanc- tions when entry was refused, and in part because it 26 did not authorize entry without a warrant as an alter- native in this situation), but recognized that \"the liq- uor industry [was] long subject to close supervision and inspection.\" Likewise, the Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], upheld the warrantless inspec- tion of a pawnshop federally licensed to sell guns un- der the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. Noting that the inspection \"pose[d] only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of pri- vacy,\" the Court stated: \"When a dealer chooses to en- gage in this pervasively regulated business and to ac- cept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "And if the Court rules for petitioners, this line of cases, dubbed the \" Colonnade-Biswell \" doctrine in Burger (482 U.S. at 700), will continue to govern warrantless inspections of closely regulated industries.12 In a second line of cases, this Court has held that Colonnade-Biswell addresses \"exceptions\" arising in \"relatively unique circumstances,\" and that warrants 12 The Colonnade-Biswell doctrine is not strictly lim- ited to liquor or gun sales. For example, in Donovan v. Dewey this Court upheld \"warrantless inspections made pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,\" rea- soning that coal mining was a \"'closely regulated' industry.\" Burger , 482 U.S. at 700 (quoting Donovan , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 27 (or their equivalent) may be required before the gov- ernment may inspect entities that are not closely reg- ulated. 436 U.S. 307.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "Burger , 482 U.S. at 700 (quoting Donovan , 452 U.S. 594). 27 (or their equivalent) may be required before the gov- ernment may inspect entities that are not closely reg- ulated. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even then, however, where \"considerations of health and safety are involved,\" \"the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an in- spection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investiga- tion has been undertaken.\" Camara , 387 U.S. at 538.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "3912, 3912–3913 28 (Jan. 25, 2012)). If OSHA \"determines upon investi- gation that an employer is failing to comply,\" it may \"issue a citation\" and assess \"a monetary penalty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But as this Court recognized in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc ., one of the leading decisions in this area, \"the probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant\" to conduct OSHA inspections \"may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative stand- ards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'\" 436 U.S. 307.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "499 U.S. 144. But as this Court recognized in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc ., one of the leading decisions in this area, \"the probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant\" to conduct OSHA inspections \"may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative stand- ards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a similar vein, the Toxic Substances Control Act authorizes EPA to \"inspect any establishment, facility, or other premises in which chemical substances, mix- tures, or products are manufactured, processed, stored, or held before or after their distribution in commerce.\" 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "§ 2610(a). Applying Marshall , the lower courts have held that administrative war- rants under the statute may be based on \"a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative stand- ards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.\" E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FDA's exercise of authority over food, drugs, and tobacco products is similar. For example, the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act contains both civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms that FDA may invoke in en- 29 forcing the Act's prohibitions on introducing adulter- ated food or drugs into interstate commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 F.3d 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "§ 374. And lower-court precedent confirms that the reasonable exercise of that authority will likely be upheld under the rationale of either Mar- shall or the \" Colonnade-Biswell exception\" for \"war- rantless searches and seizures\" in \"'closely regulated' industries.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Indeed, this Court's precedents suggest that reasonable inspection regimes will sometimes be law- ful under both the Fourth Amendment and the uncon- stitutional conditions doctrine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "93 F.3d 572",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
		"context": "3. Indeed, this Court's precedents suggest that reasonable inspection regimes will sometimes be law- ful under both the Fourth Amendment and the uncon- stitutional conditions doctrine. For example, in Wy- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not prevent New York from conditioning certain family aid benefits on the beneficiary's agreement to allow case-workers to conduct home visits. The Court began by explaining that the program served the public interest in \"protec- tion and aid for the dependent child.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 U.S. 309",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. County-level discrimination against Navajos",
		"context": "After literacy tests were banned, numerous efforts to dilute the Navajo vote and to prevent Navajos from participating in state and fed- eral elections evolved. In 1971, the Arizona Legislature divided the Nation into three separate state legislative districts \"in order to destro y the possibility that the Navajos, if kept within a single legislative district, might be successful in electing one or more of their own choices to the Legislature.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A three-judge panel held that this scheme v iolated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 F. Supp. 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. County-level discrimination against Navajos",
		"context": "Id. In 1973, the Arizona Supreme Court quashed a permanent injunction of a lo wer court barring the seat- ing of Tom Shirley, a Navajo living on the Nation, who had been elected to the Apache County Board of Super- visors. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Arizona Court reaf-firmed the right of Native Americans to vote, vacated the injunction, and directed the Apache County Board of Supervisors to certify Shirley as the elected super-visor. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 P.2d 939",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. County-level discrimination against Navajos",
		"context": "In response, Apache County realigned the County Board of Supervisor districts, overpopulating one district with Navajos in order to dilute the Navajo vote. When Navajo voters challenged the reapportion- ment, Apache County challenged the constitutionality of the Indian Citizenship Act and claimed that Native 9 Americans were not citizens of the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff 'd per curiam , 429 U.S. 876. A three- judge federal court rejected these arguments and found that the county supervis or districts must be re- apportioned according to population. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F. Supp. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice",
		"context": "at 346. That \"his- torical practice\" establishes standing here: Injury-in-fact depends on whether the plaintiff asserts a \" harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.\" Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] err in equating an Article III injury-in- fact with the ability to state a claim—to establish the elements—for 20th-century torts, such as public disclo- sure of private facts. Article III standing is rooted in the \"operations of the English judicial system and its mani-festations on this side of the ocean.\" 307 U.S. 433.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice",
		"context": "Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 err in equating an Article III injury-in- fact with the ability to state a claim—to establish the elements—for 20th-century torts, such as public disclo- sure of private facts. Article III standing is rooted in the \"operations of the English judicial system and its mani-festations on this side of the ocean.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Identifying the \"cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider\" requires looking back centuries, not decades. Sprint , 554 U.S. at 274.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice",
		"context": "Whether modern courts impose additional elements on newer (and broader) caus- es of action , such as privacy torts arising from a \"right to be let alone,\" is beside the point. The scope of a cause of action is a merits issue, not a standing issue. Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the unauthorized disclosure of a communication was itself sufficient injury to support a lawsuit and injunctive relief at the Framing—and it was—it is constitutionally suffi- cient injury today. The Restatement (Second) of Torts can no more rewrite history than it can revise the scope of the judicial power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice",
		"context": "Rep. 608, 608 (Ch. ), 1 Common-law copyright protected unpublished communications, while post-publication protections for literary works was statutory copyright's domain. Harper & Row, Publishers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1976, Congress extended sta- tutory copyright to unpublished works, extinguishing common-law copyright, to conform to the Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice",
		"context": "They are the content of a communication—an inquiry—transmitted from one device (the users') to an-other (Google's), through the same legally protected net- works that carry phone calls. A government \"wiretap\" to 7 identify what citizens search for is as intrusive as tapping their phones or opening their mail. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ex Parte96 U.S. 727. Google has resisted subpoenas be-cause its users expect that \"Google will keep private whatever information users communicate.\" Compl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice",
		"context": "They are the content of a communication—an inquiry—transmitted from one device (the users') to an-other (Google's), through the same legally protected net- works that carry phone calls. A government \"wiretap\" to 7 identify what citizens search for is as intrusive as tapping their phones or opening their mail. See 389 U.S. 347; Ex Parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Google has resisted subpoenas be-cause its users expect that \"Google will keep private whatever information users communicate.\" Compl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate",
		"context": "10 Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited , supra , at 264. 7 Most of the religious autonomy cases that have made their way to the Supreme Court involve church schismsand property disputes. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 280 U.S. 1; 344 U.S. 94; 363 U.S. 190; Presbyterian Church in the 393 U.S. 440; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & 426 U.S. 696. As summarized by ProfessorMichael McConnell and Luke Goodrich, \"[t]hesedecisions constitutionalized two related principles:first, that civil courts should not decide ecclesiasticalquestions; and second, that churches have a FirstAmendment right to be free from state interference intheir internal affairs.\" 11 When courts decide ecclesiastical questions, it violates the EstablishmentClause by entangling the government in religiousmatters; and the Free Exercise Clause protects theconverse right to be free government interference ininternal affairs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate",
		"context": "10 Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited , supra , at 264. 7 Most of the religious autonomy cases that have made their way to the Supreme Court involve church schismsand property disputes. See 80 U.S. 679; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 344 U.S. 94; 363 U.S. 190; Presbyterian Church in the 393 U.S. 440; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & 426 U.S. 696. As summarized by ProfessorMichael McConnell and Luke Goodrich, \"[t]hesedecisions constitutionalized two related principles:first, that civil courts should not decide ecclesiasticalquestions; and second, that churches have a FirstAmendment right to be free from state interference intheir internal affairs.\" 11 When courts decide ecclesiastical questions, it violates the EstablishmentClause by entangling the government in religiousmatters; and the Free Exercise Clause protects theconverse right to be free government interference ininternal affairs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate",
		"context": "10 Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited , supra , at 264. 7 Most of the religious autonomy cases that have made their way to the Supreme Court involve church schismsand property disputes. See 80 U.S. 679; 280 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 363 U.S. 190; Presbyterian Church in the 393 U.S. 440; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & 426 U.S. 696. As summarized by ProfessorMichael McConnell and Luke Goodrich, \"[t]hesedecisions constitutionalized two related principles:first, that civil courts should not decide ecclesiasticalquestions; and second, that churches have a FirstAmendment right to be free from state interference intheir internal affairs.\" 11 When courts decide ecclesiastical questions, it violates the EstablishmentClause by entangling the government in religiousmatters; and the Free Exercise Clause protects theconverse right to be free government interference ininternal affairs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate",
		"context": "10 Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited , supra , at 264. 7 Most of the religious autonomy cases that have made their way to the Supreme Court involve church schismsand property disputes. See 80 U.S. 679; 280 U.S. 1; 344 U.S. 94; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Presbyterian Church in the 393 U.S. 440; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & 426 U.S. 696. As summarized by ProfessorMichael McConnell and Luke Goodrich, \"[t]hesedecisions constitutionalized two related principles:first, that civil courts should not decide ecclesiasticalquestions; and second, that churches have a FirstAmendment right to be free from state interference intheir internal affairs.\" 11 When courts decide ecclesiastical questions, it violates the EstablishmentClause by entangling the government in religiousmatters; and the Free Exercise Clause protects theconverse right to be free government interference ininternal affairs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate",
		"context": "10 Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited , supra , at 264. 7 Most of the religious autonomy cases that have made their way to the Supreme Court involve church schismsand property disputes. See 80 U.S. 679; 280 U.S. 1; 344 U.S. 94; 363 U.S. 190; Presbyterian Church in the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & 426 U.S. 696. As summarized by ProfessorMichael McConnell and Luke Goodrich, \"[t]hesedecisions constitutionalized two related principles:first, that civil courts should not decide ecclesiasticalquestions; and second, that churches have a FirstAmendment right to be free from state interference intheir internal affairs.\" 11 When courts decide ecclesiastical questions, it violates the EstablishmentClause by entangling the government in religiousmatters; and the Free Exercise Clause protects theconverse right to be free government interference ininternal affairs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate",
		"context": "10 Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited , supra , at 264. 7 Most of the religious autonomy cases that have made their way to the Supreme Court involve church schismsand property disputes. See 80 U.S. 679; 280 U.S. 1; 344 U.S. 94; 363 U.S. 190; Presbyterian Church in the 393 U.S. 440; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As summarized by ProfessorMichael McConnell and Luke Goodrich, \"[t]hesedecisions constitutionalized two related principles:first, that civil courts should not decide ecclesiasticalquestions; and second, that churches have a FirstAmendment right to be free from state interference intheir internal affairs.\" 11 When courts decide ecclesiastical questions, it violates the EstablishmentClause by entangling the government in religiousmatters; and the Free Exercise Clause protects theconverse right to be free government interference ininternal affairs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 696",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "32 -39) to evade the presumpti on that excludes the government from the term \"person ,\" see Vermont Agency , 529 U.S. at 780-81, by suggesting that the presumption does not 9 apply where the statute in question would grant a benefit to the government . Precedent provides no basis for that one -sided ap- proach. For example, in International Primate Protection [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court applied the presumption to exclude a federal agency from a bene- ficial procedural mechanism . The National Institutes of Health (NIH) argued that it was authorized to re- move an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) , as a \"person acting under\" a federal officer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "Id. at 82. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , likewise applied the presumpti ve meaning of \"person\" to bar the federal government from invoking a benefi- cial statutory procedure . There the United States sought authority to bring suit for treble damages un- der the Sherman Act , which authorized such suits to be brought by \"[a]ny person\" injured by a violation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "App. 23 (discussin g this Court's opinions describing AIA petitioners as \"private par- ties\"). The Court also interpreted \"person\" to exclude the government from a beneficial statutory provision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rejecting the United States ' argu ment that certain of its claims were entitled to priority because it was a \"person\" as used in a Bankruptcy Act provision governing \"debts owing to any person .\" Id. at 317.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "Id. at 318. Indeed, as early as 1876, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court construed \"person\" to exclude the United St ates from a statutory benefi t, ruling that 11 it was not a \"person capable by law of holding real es- tate\" because there was no \"express definition\" in the statute that would have extended \"person\" to include the United States . Id. at 321.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 U.S. 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "The English rule was considered relevant in the American context only to the extent that \"the royal prerogatives as be- longed to the King in his capacity of parens patriae, or universal trustee ,\" also entered \"into our political 12 state.\" Dollar Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 147 U.S. 508 . As distinguished from the English mon- arch, a federal agency lacks any preexisting \"prerogatives,\" and \"has no power to act . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "86 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "The English rule was considered relevant in the American context only to the extent that \"the royal prerogatives as be- longed to the King in his capacity of parens patriae, or universal trustee ,\" also entered \"into our political 12 state.\" Dollar Sav. 86 U.S. 227 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As distinguished from the English mon- arch, a federal agency lacks any preexisting \"prerogatives,\" and \"has no power to act . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "147 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "Louisiana Pub. Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For this reason , the Court should \"tak[e] seriously, and apply[] rigorously\" all \"statutory limits on agen- cies' authority ,\" City of 569 U.S. 290 —rather tha n adopt a rule that would enhance such power even when in conflict with a stat- ute's ordinary meaning. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "Serv. 476 U.S. 355 . For this reason , the Court should \"tak[e] seriously, and apply[] rigorously\" all \"statutory limits on agen- cies' authority ,\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —rather tha n adopt a rule that would enhance such power even when in conflict with a stat- ute's ordinary meaning. 3. The two cases cited by the government (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "Both cases considered the right to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws, and both rested on a distinct concern that the sovereign entity in ques- tion would be stripped of the sole remedy for its injuries. There is no such concern a t play here . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered whether \"person\" as used in the Sherman Act's treble -damages provision might include the States, even though under Cooper the term did not in- clude the federal government. Whereas in Cooper the federal government had other remedies exclusively provided to it by the statute , the issue in Evans was \"whether no remedy whatever is open to a State when it is the immediate victim of a [Sherman Act] viola- tion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "Having thus framed the issue , the Court extend ed the term \"person\" to include the 13 States in that context , reasoning that otherwise they would be denied \"all redress.\" Id. The Court applied similar reasoning in Pfizer, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , holding that foreign nations were \"person[s]\" who may sue for treble damages under the Clayton Act. Relying on Ev- ans, the Court emphasiz ed that \"[t]he antitrust laws provide no alternative remedies for foreign nations as they do for the United States .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit",
		"context": "For these reason s, Cooper is operative here , not Evans or Pfizer . 4. The government devotes considerable discus- sion to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the Court there did not address whether \"person\" in- cluded the federal government. The United States' 14 authority to bring an ICC complaint in the first in- stance under 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1946) —including as a \"person or persons\" within that provision —was not challenged.",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. McGirt Has Confused Basic Jurisdictional Questions",
		"context": "Determining tribal status does not end the analy - sis. Municipalities must then determine if the alleged perpetrator is considered \"Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction even if he or she is not formally enrolled in any tribe.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further complicating the issue is the lack of any recognized factors for deter- mining whether a person is recognized as an Indian under McGirt. See id., at ¶ 40 (detailing four possible approaches).",
		"citation_value_orig": "2021 OK CR 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Appeals Court Improperly Truncated Its Statutory Analysis after Concluding that the Constructions Offered by Both Sides Raised Interpretive Dilemmas",
		"context": "Moreover, a statutory construction is not necessarily to be avoided simply because it creates redundancy. Congress regularly inserts redundantlanguage in a statute to ensure that its intent is not misunderstood. Thus, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court rejected a \"rule against superfluities\" objection to its construction of a federal statute, ruling that \"Congress may havesimply intended to remove any doubt that [certainofficials] were included in 'law enforcement officer[s]'\" by saying so twice. See also Microsoft 564 U.S. 91. More importantly, the appeals court's competing-interpretive-dilemmas holding improperlyassumes that all such dilemmas should be assignedequal weight when determining whether a statute is too ambiguous to permit resolution at Chevron step one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Appeals Court Improperly Truncated Its Statutory Analysis after Concluding that the Constructions Offered by Both Sides Raised Interpretive Dilemmas",
		"context": "Congress regularly inserts redundantlanguage in a statute to ensure that its intent is not misunderstood. Thus, in 552 U.S. 214, the Court rejected a \"rule against superfluities\" objection to its construction of a federal statute, ruling that \"Congress may havesimply intended to remove any doubt that [certainofficials] were included in 'law enforcement officer[s]'\" by saying so twice. See also Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More importantly, the appeals court's competing-interpretive-dilemmas holding improperlyassumes that all such dilemmas should be assignedequal weight when determining whether a statute is too ambiguous to permit resolution at Chevron step one. That assumption is demonstrably incorrect with respect to the parties' competing interpretations ofSubclause II.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Appeals Court Improperly Truncated Its Statutory Analysis after Concluding that the Constructions Offered by Both Sides Raised Interpretive Dilemmas",
		"context": "When attempting to ascertain the proper construction of Subclause II at Chevron step one, much more weight should be assigned to those factors than to HHS's evidence of the supposedsuperfluity created by the Hospitals' construction. To support its novel competing-interpretive- dilemmas holding, the D.C. Circuit cited this Court's decision in Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders [\"NAHB [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. NAHB is wholly inapposite. It involved a provision of the Endangered Species Act that, if read broadly, wouldhave implicitly abrogated or repealed numerous otherfederal statutes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "(b) \"Full Scope\"",
		"context": "– At least since 1993, the Fed- eral Circuit has held that a patent's specification must enable a skilled artisan to pra ctice the \"full scope\" of the claimed invention. See AK Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's precedents, although not using the \"full scope\" terminology, similarly hold that the \"whole domain\" of the claimed invention must be enabled. See Consol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 1234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. From Roe on, Courts Have Relied on a Deliberately Distorted History of Abortion",
		"context": "This enables the advocates to discount attitudes that do appear in the historical record and that contradict their preferred theories , regarding them as aberration al, rather than representative . Recovering \"lost voices \" allows one to infer at will what the \"true\" attitudes were. Yet, if the public attitudes of formal, legal institutions did not represent the true values of society, why did those institutions express themselves in such terms, and why did those supposedly unrepresentative terms 9 J. Mohr, Abortion in America (1978) (\"Mohr\"); see also Amicus Brief of 281 American Historians, filed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 continue despite majo r changes in social and political structures spanning more than seven centuries? The \"lost voices \" project also fails to recognize that the Constitution is a legal document.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Surrounding History and Missouri Railway",
		"context": "See Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 47 Ct. Cl. at 85-89 (Howry, J., concurring). The grants would vest \"whenever the Indian title shall be extinguished\" and \"said lands become a part of the public lands of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The RLUIPA claim",
		"context": ". generally available or acting in a way that is not otherwise generally allowed.\" Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Even if an inmate proves a policy substantially burdens his religious practice, it does not violate RLUIPA if it is the \"least restrictive means\" of furthering a compelling security interest. See 544 U.S. 709.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The RLUIPA claim",
		"context": "Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570 (citing 485 U.S. 439). Even if an inmate proves a policy substantially burdens his religious practice, it does not violate RLUIPA if it is the \"least restrictive means\" of furthering a compelling security interest. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Though its exacting language suggests otherwise, this standard is particularly sensitive to prison security concerns. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Section 1782 Does Not Conflict With The Federal Arbitration Act",
		"context": "SAS, emphasize the elasticity of tribunal as a general term. 17 It is true that the FAA incorporates both the New York and Panama Conventions, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, 301-307, but those international conventions concern only the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the resulting awards, not the use of 32 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners admit this, stating only that \"[i]t would be passing strange\" for Congress to allow more expansive discovery in one forum than the other. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Section 1782 Does Not Conflict With The Federal Arbitration Act",
		"context": "at 265. 18 Because the plain language of the statute comfortably encompasses the tribunal in this case, the discovery within the arbitral proceedings. See BCB Holdings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 I t i s w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t , i n r e c e n t y e a r s , b o t h s o v e r e i g n respondents and individual investor claimants in bilateral investment treaty disputes have sought to invoke the assistance of the United States courts pursuant to Section 1782. See, e.g., Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 F. Supp. 3d 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "1. \"The fundamental interest giving rise to mari- time jurisdiction is 'the protection of maritime com- merce.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has recognized, that fundamental interest \"can be fully vindicated only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters,\" even pleas- ure boats, \"are subject to uniform rules of conduct.\" Foremost Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": ", 457 U.S. a t 675 (emphasis in original). The \"need for uniformity\" is therefore \"an overriding value in admiralty law.\" Schoenbaum, supra , § 4:1 (em- phasis omitted); see Jerome B. Grubart, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Dating back to the early 1800s, American courts \"re- peated over and over again\" the \"paramount im- port ance to merchants and underwriters that rules be 35 clear, settled, and uniform.\" Fletcher, supra , at 1563.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly expressed its \"concern for the uniform meaning of maritime contracts,\" reasoning that admiralty law should \"operat[e] unifo rmly in[] the whole country,\" in order to achieve \"the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all sub- jects of a commercial character affecting the inter- course of the States with each other or with foreign states.\" Norfolk S. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Allowing the public policy of a forum State to over- ride contractual choice -of-law provisions would defeat the overarching goal of uniformity in maritime law. The same contractual provision might be consistent with the public policy of one State, but contravene the public policy of another —meaning that the controlling legal rules would depend on where the suit is filed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "g (\"No detailed statement can be made of the situations where a 'fundamental' policy of the state of the otherwise a pplicable law will be found to exist.\"). 3 The result would be the opposite of uni- form: a supposed federal presumption of enforceabil- ity that is subject to 50 sets of exceptions. 3 Compare, e.g., Cherry, Bekaert & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with Intermetro Indus. 2007 WL 36. Holding the parties to their bargained -for choice of law would also prom ote the core maritime values of certainty and predictability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 So. 2d 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "'the interest of justice' is served by holding parties to their bargain.\" Atlantic Marine Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A forum -selection clause \"may have figured centrally in the parties' negotiations,\" \"affected how they set 518345, at 4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2007) (Texas policy against covenants not to compete is not fundamental); compare Cottman Transmission Sys., 536 F. Supp. 2d 543.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "571 U.S. 49. A forum -selection clause \"may have figured centrally in the parties' negotiations,\" \"affected how they set 518345, at 4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2007) (Texas policy against covenants not to compete is not fundamental); compare Cottman Transmission Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37 monetary and other contractual terms,\" or even been \"a critical factor in their agreement to do business to- gether in the first place.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 F. Supp. 2d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "Enforcing the clause thus \"protects [the parties'] legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system.\" Id. at 63 (quoting Stewart Org., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Restatement § 187, cmt. e (noting that enforcement of choice -of-law pr ovisions promotes the \"[p]rime objec- tives of contract law\"). By advancing the twin goals of uniformity and pre- dictability, choice- of-law clauses generate considerable cost savings, particularly in a marine insurance indus- try that can \"traverse the waters of many jurisdic- tions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": ". a legal no -man's -land would surely damage the fab- ric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such pro- visions are \"an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability es- sential t o any international business transaction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "And in Alabama, \"absent a con- tractual provision to the contrary, the insured may not recov er its attorneys' fees from the insurer if the fees were incurred in a declaratory judgment action to de-termine coverage under a liability policy.\" Prime Ins. Syndicate, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any one o f those States might deem another State's fees policy to violate its own public policy, and substitute its preferred rule instead. As another example, state law also determines whether the failure to give prompt notice of a loss can bar coverage under a marine insurance policy's \"notice of loss\" provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 F.3d 1089",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "Co. , 418 Fed. 42 Appx. at 309- 310 (applying Louisiana law); see Healy Tibbitts Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In New York, by contrast, \"the insurer need not show that i t was prejudiced\" by a failure to comply with a notice- of- loss provision because \"[t]he giving of the required no- tice affords the insurer an opportunity to protect itself, and is a condition precedent to liability.\" Big Lift Ship- ping Co.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 F. Supp. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law",
		"context": "Big Lift Ship- ping Co. (N.A.) [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Again, one State might reject a choice -of-law clause if the chosen State follows a dif- ferent approach to notice -of-loss provisions. The upshot is that if this Court were to allow state policy preferences to negate maritime choice- of-law clauses, parties would have incentives to bring claims in a friendly forum and seek to strike the choice -of-law clauses that they agreed to.",
		"citation_value_orig": "594 F. Supp. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The 4-1 Circuit Split On The Standard For Establishing An Infant's Habitual Residence Also Warrants Review Now",
		"context": "9 Consistent with the Hague Convention's language and purpose, see Pet. 23–25, every court of appeals to address the issue, other than the Sixth Circuit, has held that mutual agreement is required to establish shared parental intent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 765 F.3d 456. Taglieri's attempt to focus on the type of evidence that can be used to est ablish mutual agreement ig- nores the Sixth Circuit's critical holding in this case that the \"absence of a s ubjective agreement between the parents\" is not a barrier to a finding of shared pa- rental intent. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The 4-1 Circuit Split On The Standard For Establishing An Infant's Habitual Residence Also Warrants Review Now",
		"context": "9 Consistent with the Hague Convention's language and purpose, see Pet. 23–25, every court of appeals to address the issue, other than the Sixth Circuit, has held that mutual agreement is required to establish shared parental intent. See 396 F.3d 124; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Taglieri's attempt to focus on the type of evidence that can be used to est ablish mutual agreement ig- nores the Sixth Circuit's critical holding in this case that the \"absence of a s ubjective agreement between the parents\" is not a barrier to a finding of shared pa- rental intent. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 31 U.S.C. section 3731(b) AFFIRMS THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING",
		"context": "§ 3731(b)(2). This Court has stated that, \"[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.\"' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The efforts of Petitioner and the Chamber Amici to distort the statute should be viewed with the same skepticism that the Court has applied in the past to previous efforts of statutory misinterpretation. Escondido Mut.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 31 U.S.C. section 3731(b) AFFIRMS THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING",
		"context": "The efforts of Petitioner and the Chamber Amici to distort the statute should be viewed with the same skepticism that the Court has applied in the past to previous efforts of statutory misinterpretation. Escondido Mut. Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The language clearly states that the ten-year statute of limitations applies equally to both relators and government officials and to any civil action brought under section 3730.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "Even if the saving clause were ambiguous in isola- tion, it is clear in context. This Court constru es statu- tory terms \"in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"one of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.\" 556 U.S. 303.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "489 U.S. 803. And \"one of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is true even if, as here, the different subsections of a statute were enacted at dif- ferent times. This Court still \"interpret[s] a statutory text in light of surrounding texts that happen to have 26 been subsequently enacted\" in order to \"reconcil[e] many laws enacted over time, and get[] them to 'make sense' in combination.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "That is true even if, as here, the different subsections of a statute were enacted at dif- ferent times. This Court still \"interpret[s] a statutory text in light of surrounding texts that happen to have 26 been subsequently enacted\" in order to \"reconcil[e] many laws enacted over time, and get[] them to 'make sense' in combination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012) (describing \"[t]he imperative of har- mony among provisions\" as \"more categorical than most other canons of construction\"). Here, both Sec- tion 2255(h) and AEDPA's overarching hierarchy con- firm the court of appeals' interpretation of the saving clause. a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "Taylor , 314 F.3d at 835. Because Congress has directly answered that question in one subsection, this Court should not construe another subsection to obliquely provide a different answer. See R.J. Reyn- olds Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to two categories was just that —a conscious choice. Con- gress did not forget about new statutory - interpretation decisions; it merely declined to disturb the finality of a conviction in those circumstances. 28 The scope of Section 2255(a) is the first indication.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "2255(h)(2). This Court ordinarily presumes that such differences are intentional. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the best inference from those differently worded provisions is 29 that Congress was aware of the possibility that inter- vening Supreme Court decisions could affect both statutory interpretations and constitutional rights. It accounted for both sets of decisions in the limitations period but elected to aut horize second or successive motions only for new constitutional rules.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "2255(f ). That limitations period can be \"harsh.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, because of the usual delay in de-claring a constitutional right retroactive, inmates who \"file[] a second or successive motion seeking to take advant age of a new rule of constitutional law\" —as ex- pressly permitted in Section 2255(h)(2) —will be time- barred in all but \"rare case[s].\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "By co n- 31 trast, some courts of appeals have extended the sav- ing clause to statutory claims based on new court of appeals decisions —meaning that a prisoner needs on- ly an intervening court of appeals decision to bring an unenumerated statutory claim, but needs an in terven- ing decision of this Court to bring an enumerated con-stitutional claim. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 886 F.3d 415. The upshot is that extending the saving claus e to second or successive statutory claims would afford a far \" superior remedy\" to the very claims that Con- gress elected not to prioritize, and for which Congress apparently did not believe that additional error cor- rection trumped finality. McCarthan , 851 F.3d at 1091.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity",
		"context": "That is not a mere \"policy concern,\" as the government suggests (at 39); it is a fundamental statutory -interpretation problem. This Court gener- ally \"resist[s] attributing to Congress an intention to render a statute so internally inconsi stent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights Cannot Be a Condition of Doing Business",
		"context": ". freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no question here that Colorado could not gratuitously compel 303 Creative to speak. Accordingly, it cannot use its licensing power to indirectly compel it to do so, for \"government cannot accomplish through threats of adverse government action what the Constitution prohibits it from doing directly.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights Cannot Be a Condition of Doing Business",
		"context": ". . services will be available,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], here, the compelled speech is neither \"purely factual\" and \"uncontroversial,\" nor \"terms under which services will be available.\" Rather, the compulsion applies to bespoke services resulting from a creative process engaged afresh for each client. No compulsive law could ever be narrowly tailored to speech that has not yet been conceived.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 626",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights Cannot Be a Condition of Doing Business",
		"context": "Instead, the 10 law acts as a waiver of future right to decline, not just delivery of any message, but also the private creative thought process necessary to craft a message promoting beliefs the artist disavows. In that sense the waiver goes further than the compulsory salutation of the American flag deemed unconstitutional in Barnette , by first compelling thought before downstream speech even comes into play. Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If the City chose to do its own foster care placement, any arrangement that targeted and disadvantaged same-sex couples plainly would be unconstitutional",
		"context": "And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Bob Jones Uni- 461 U.S. 574 (upholding rev- ocation of religious institution's tax-exempt status for maintain- ing a discriminatory anti-miscegenation policy, noting that \"[a]lthough a ban on intermarriage or interracial dating applies 10 serve interracial couples. That arrangement would surely be unconstitutional. So too would be the ar- rangement considered here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If the City chose to do its own foster care placement, any arrangement that targeted and disadvantaged same-sex couples plainly would be unconstitutional",
		"context": "And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. 388 U.S. 1; see also Bob Jones Uni- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (upholding rev- ocation of religious institution's tax-exempt status for maintain- ing a discriminatory anti-miscegenation policy, noting that \"[a]lthough a ban on intermarriage or interracial dating applies 10 serve interracial couples. That arrangement would surely be unconstitutional. So too would be the ar- rangement considered here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "§ 1055, permit the owner to allow a nother party , a \"related company,\" to use the mark. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The use by that \"related company, i.e., a li- censee, will inure to the licensor's benefit if the licen- sor has controlled the licensee's use of the mark. 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 F.2d 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "In extreme cases , the mark may lose all sig- nificance as a trademark. At tha t point, the parties' agreement will be- come a \"naked\" license that may work a forfeiture of the licensor's rights. See generally Sheila's Shine Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Dawn Donut 267 F.2d 358. Whether 16 abandonment actually occurs is a fact-specific in- quiry, and the legal standards for finding a naked li- cense vary among the various courts of appeal. See, e.g., Patsy's Italian Rest., 658 F.3d 254; Sheila's Shine, 486 F.2d at 125 ( \"[A] trademark owner has an appropriate time, or grace period, for the exer- cise of control over a licensee' s use of a mark.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 F.2d 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "In extreme cases , the mark may lose all sig- nificance as a trademark. At tha t point, the parties' agreement will be- come a \"naked\" license that may work a forfeiture of the licensor's rights. See generally Sheila's Shine Prods., 486 F.2d 114 ; Dawn Donut [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether 16 abandonment actually occurs is a fact-specific in- quiry, and the legal standards for finding a naked li- cense vary among the various courts of appeal. See, e.g., Patsy's Italian Rest., 658 F.3d 254; Sheila's Shine, 486 F.2d at 125 ( \"[A] trademark owner has an appropriate time, or grace period, for the exer- cise of control over a licensee' s use of a mark.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 F.2d 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "See generally Sheila's Shine Prods., 486 F.2d 114 ; Dawn Donut 267 F.2d 358. Whether 16 abandonment actually occurs is a fact-specific in- quiry, and the legal standards for finding a naked li- cense vary among the various courts of appeal. See, e.g., Patsy's Italian Rest., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sheila's Shine, 486 F.2d at 125 ( \"[A] trademark owner has an appropriate time, or grace period, for the exer- cise of control over a licensee' s use of a mark. Of ne- cessity, this period varies according to the peculiar facts of each individual case.\" ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.3d 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "Specifically, a li- censor need not require a particular level of quality so long as it has the ability to enforce whatever level of quality it sets. \"'[Q]uality control' does not necessarily mean that the licensed goods or services must be of 'high' quality, but merely of equal quality, whether that quality is high, low or middle.\" Barcamerica Int' l USA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, control, not the actual quality subject to that control, is the issue in the in- quiry into whether a naked license exists. Although a trademark licensor may wish to es- cape a license for myriad reasons, two in particular merit consideration in this proceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 F.3d 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "As a general rule, a trademark licensee is es- topped from challenging the validity of the licensor's title because the licensee has recognized the validity of the licensor's ownership by agreeing to the license. 19 See, e.g. , John C. Flood of Va., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; S even–Up Bot tling 561 F.2d 1275 . But see Idaho Potato 335 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "642 F.3d 1105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "As a general rule, a trademark licensee is es- topped from challenging the validity of the licensor's title because the licensee has recognized the validity of the licensor's ownership by agreeing to the license. 19 See, e.g. , John C. Flood of Va., 642 F.3d 1105 ; S even–Up Bot tling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But see Idaho Potato 335 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 F.2d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract",
		"context": "19 See, e.g. , John C. Flood of Va., 642 F.3d 1105 ; S even–Up Bot tling 561 F.2d 1275 . But see Idaho Potato [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 F.3d 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioner's remaining arguments are wrong",
		"context": "b. Petitioner also invokes cases involving federal at- tempts to abrogate state-law property rights. Those cases are even further afield. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the government purported to extinguish a security interest under Maine law. See id. at 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Specified that Federal Election Rules Would Be Written by State \"Legislatures\" to Prohibit Unilateral, Unchecked Executive Control over Elections.",
		"context": "4 (directing that the writ \"shall issue\"); id. amend. XVII (same); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Framers' distrust of executive authority fully explains why they specified that federal elections regulations should be enacted by state \"Legislatures\" through leg- islation. But the Framers were also concerned with legisla- tive abuses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 F.2d 1333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Pet. App. 23a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). It further recognized that punitive damages were not available, because this Court held that they \"are not compensatory\" for the \"loss caused by that failure\" to comport conduct to the federal grant's anti- discrimination requirements. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Pet. App. 24a (quo ting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The court then made an unsupport ed leap that the compensatory damages anticipated by Congress in th e statute and described by this Court in Barnes meant only compensation for pecuniary losses, a holding consistent with only a handful of outlier district courts. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": ". serve distinct purposes. \" Cooper Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Whil e punitive damages are intended to punish and deter, State Farm Mut. Auto.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 424",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Auto. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , emotional distress damages comprise a \"species of ordinary compensatory damages ,\" Exxon Shipping 554 U.S. 471 , that compensat e for the \"suffering of the injured person.\" St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Auto. Ins. 538 U.S. 408 , emotional distress damages comprise a \"species of ordinary compensatory damages ,\" Exxon Shipping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that compensat e for the \"suffering of the injured person.\" St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": "St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . They serve no punitive purpose , just an entirely compensatory one . In further describing the difference between punitive damages and compensatio n for pain and suffering in Cooper Indus ., this Court highlighted the differen ces in how a jury's constitutionally protected factfind ing function operates on them .",
		"citation_value_orig": "237 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
		"context": "In further describing the difference between punitive damages and compensatio n for pain and suffering in Cooper Indus ., this Court highlighted the differen ces in how a jury's constitutionally protected factfind ing function operates on them . The Court mandated de novo review of punitive damages because t he amount of \"punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury.\" Cooper Indus ., 532 U.S. at 437 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While t his Court found that punitive damages in the 19th century may have once \"compensate[d] for intangible injuries, compensation which was not otherwise available under the narrow conception of compensatory damages prevalent at the time,\" it had 8 \"evolved\" since then \"[a]s the types of compensatory damages available to plaintiffs have broadened.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Patent Statute Distinguishes \"Expenses\" From \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "Accordingly, an award of expenses cannot encompass attorneys' fees, nor can attorneys' fees be synonymous with expenses. The distinction between expenses and attorneys' fees has consistently been observed in patent cases . In Amsted Industries [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Federal Circuit held that the term \"attorney fees\" under section 285 does not include fees for expert witnesses . Id. at 377 (finding that \"[t]he trial court incorrectly awarded expert witness fees under section 285\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 F.3d 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Patent Statute Distinguishes \"Expenses\" From \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "at 377 (finding that \"[t]he trial court incorrectly awarded expert witness fees under section 285\"). Relying on the principle of statutory construction concerning expert -witness fees previously announced by this Court , the Federal Circuit found that an \"explicit statutory reference to expert witness fees\" is needed to make such fees awardable . Amsted Indus ., 23 F.3d at 3772 (citing West Virginia University Hospitals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the absence of statutory language that expressly authorizes awards of expenses , a court can require a party to pay expenses only as a sanction for an abuse of judicial process . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED",
		"context": "Consistent with this principle, courts have temporally circumscribed the scope of VRA analyses. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder , this Court noted that Section 5 of the VRA raised federali sm concerns due to the scope of its historical an alysis. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, the Court stated that the VRA \"imposes current burdens [on states] and must be justified by current needs ,\" concluding that \"a departure from the fundam ental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED",
		"context": "at 206. 6 In the seminal case Shelby County v. Holder , this Court invalidated the preclearance requirements of Section 4 of the VRA due to its historical relevance. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, the Court so ruled because the preclearance requirements were no longer justified by the same concerns that were relevant a half- century earlier, when the VRA was passed. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED",
		"context": "This is especially true in circumstances where the VRA \"authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.\" Id. at 545 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). These circumstances are clearly present in the case at hand. The rationale of Northwest Austin and Shelby County, that current burdens imposed on states must be justified by current needs or conditions, applies across VRA and constitutional analyses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED",
		"context": "These circumstances are clearly present in the case at hand. The rationale of Northwest Austin and Shelby County, that current burdens imposed on states must be justified by current needs or conditions, applies across VRA and constitutional analyses. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]750 F.3d 492574 U.S. 1029570 U.S. 536 (holding that a statute requiring a state to maintain Medicaid coverage of low-income 19- and 20-year-olds for nine years did not violate the spending clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.3d 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED",
		"context": "These circumstances are clearly present in the case at hand. The rationale of Northwest Austin and Shelby County, that current burdens imposed on states must be justified by current needs or conditions, applies across VRA and constitutional analyses. See, e.g., 830 F.3d 216[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]574 U.S. 1029570 U.S. 536 (holding that a statute requiring a state to maintain Medicaid coverage of low-income 19- and 20-year-olds for nine years did not violate the spending clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "This nation has alway s had laws facilitating orderly transfer of title, such as recording statutes. Those statutes prevent conflicting claims and give stability to title, preventing and settling disputes between private parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are not confiscatory statutes transferring private property to government. Adverse possession rules are based on statutes of limitation, 30 U.S. 457, and the theory that the original owner consented for a long duration to an obvious and unambiguous adverse claim of another.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "440 U.S. 715. They are not confiscatory statutes transferring private property to government. Adverse possession rules are based on statutes of limitation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the theory that the original owner consented for a long duration to an obvious and unambiguous adverse claim of another. 124 Minn. 393 . Adverse possession allows one private party who uses the property to supplant another private party as the owner of real pro perty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "Abandonment at common law occurs when the owner inten ds to relinquish all claims to it . See, e.g ., 17 Melco Inv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Tyler failed to pay taxes on her property; she did not abandon it. In Minnesota , \"legal title to real property cannot be lost by abandonment .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 Minn. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "Tyler failed to pay taxes on her property; she did not abandon it. In Minnesota , \"legal title to real property cannot be lost by abandonment .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Minn. App. ), review denied (Minn. 2000) (emphasis added) , even when the owner has not paid taxes for 30 years .",
		"citation_value_orig": "607 N.W.2d 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "; see generally Housing and Redev. Auth. in and for the City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 That is not what happened here, and the County's and amici's 10 Minnesota even provides for recovery of escheated real property. Minn. Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 N.W.2d 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "§ 525.84. 11 Minnesota law also distinguishes between taxes imposed for repairs to damaged or dangerous infrastructure and fees charged to individual private property owners to ab ate nuisances and dangers created by their own property . First Baptist Church of St. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under limited circumstances, when a nuisance presents a present danger to the public, the state may invoke its police power to remove the danger without being liable for a taking . State Fire 201 Minn. 594.",
		"citation_value_orig": "884 N.W.2d 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "State Fire 201 Minn. 594. 18 discussion of abandonment and derelict property is a distraction. Relatedly, t he County relies heavily on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which held that an Indiana statute did not effect a taking when it extinguished a property owner's mineral interest after 20 years of non-use where the owner failed to file a free claim with a local recorder during a two -year grace period. Id. at 518 –19, 521 , 530.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "The Texaco statute was merely a \"self-executing statute of limitations ,\" providing \"repose for potential defendant [ landowner] s and ... avoiding stale claims . The State ha[d] no role to play beyond enactment of the limitations period .\" Tulsa Professional Collection Services, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, the County affirmative ly pursued and took Tyler's property . Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "at 487. Moreover, t his Court has limited Texaco to situations that involve only \"minimal paperwork burdens \" on owners. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Locke, 471 U.S. at 86–88 (requiring holders of statutorily -created unpatented mining interests to file a form, for free, to maintain their contingent property interests).12 A closer equivalent to Texaco might exist if Minnesota required property owners to file a claim for their surplus proceeds after foreclosure and then, if no claim is filed after 20 years, retained the surplus . But in fact, the County has no mechanism whatsoever for property owners to recover their equity and the requirements to avoid for eclosure —far from 12 Owners could pay a nominal sum and fulfil l certain statutory requirements to obtain full title.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1815",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "An owner's inability to pay property taxes does not eliminate the County's responsibility to refrain from taking more than it is owed. See Mennonite Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States will still be able to seize and sell property to collect taxes without paying for the difference up front, provided that they take it subject to the traditional \"implied contract in law\" to sell it and return the surplus. Pet.Br.14 –16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "22. Allowing plaintiffs to \"[i]nvok [e] [] federal protection in the face of state action violating the Fifth Amendment cannot properly be regarded as a betrayal of federalism.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.\" Pennsylvania Coal 260 U.S. 393.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis",
		"context": "139 S.Ct. 2162. And \"a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.\" Pennsylvania Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The nature of Reed's claim shows that the trial court's denial of testing is the wrong accrual date.",
		"context": "See Goertz Br. 21; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That makes se nse. State trial courts are courts of first re- sort, not last , and in Texas, the law -of-the-case doctrine applies to \"questions of law decided on appeal 18 to a court of last resort.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 S.W.3d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's supervisory power",
		"context": "As used here, it means \"the power of an appellate court to supervise lower courts by prescribing procedures for them above and beyond those required by statutory and constitutional provisions,\" Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 330 (2006), and, we would add, rules of court estab- lished under the Rules Enabling Act.10 This power was asserted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with remarkably little to back it up. See Barrett, supra, at 329. McNabb was \"a self-conscious exercise of supervisory rulemaking in the context of adjudication rather than in the process of promulgating court rules.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U. S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's supervisory power",
		"context": "Ibid. McNabb established a rule excluding confessions that resulted from prolonged detention, 318 U. S., at 341-342, long before this Court invoked the Bill of Rights to establish detailed rules regarding custody and questioning. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether the supervisory power has any constitu- tional justification is debatable. Compare Barrett, 10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U. S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's supervisory power",
		"context": "Most important of all, use of the Rules Enabling Act allows for prospective-only application, avoiding the injustices that follow from retroactive application of new rules announced in caselaw. A rule must apply to the case in which it is announced. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reversing judgments in criminal cases that were tried correctly under all applicable statutes and consti- tutional provisions as interpreted at the time because the interpretation changes later is a heavy cost to society. Retrying cases is not only a cost in time and money, but justice may be defeated altogether if the staleness of the case results in the wrongful acquittal of a guilty criminal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U. S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Cockrum Is More Instructive Here Than English Or Duke",
		"context": "See, e .g., Br. in Opp. 22 –23; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]577 U.S. 411; Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, State Right to Bear Arms in Texas , giffords.org/ lawcenter/state -laws/state -right -to-bear-arms -in-texas/ . They suggest that the constitutional text could not grant such a protection , when even Texans have not read it that way . This rhetorical ploy misses the mark because it ignores Texas 's antebellum recognition of an \"absolute\" right of armed self -defense for law -abiding citizens —though not for homicidal horse thieves —in 24 Tex. 394.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Cockrum Is More Instructive Here Than English Or Duke",
		"context": ". because each of them assumed that the [Second] Amendment was only about mil itias and not personal self -defense,\" 8 whereas Heller \"rejects their crucial premise.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Pet'rs Br. 9, 34 –35; Young , 992 F.3d at 836–38 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ; 105 A.3d 165 . Even on its own terms , militia -based as they are , English is a head -scratcher .",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The argument that \"reliance interests\" require adherence to Roe and Casey",
		"context": "When deciding to overrule precedent, the Court often considers whether its prior decision has engendered \"re- liance interests\" —and whether it would be unjust or un- desirable to pull the rug from under those who have taken actions in reasonable reliance on this Court's previous ex- position of the law. See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1406; id. at 1414–15 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Franchise Tax Board of 139 S. Ct. 1485. The issue of reliance interests featured promi- nently in the Casey plurality opinion,20 and one can expect the respondents and their amici to appeal to \"reliance in- terests\" in their efforts to save Roe and Casey from repu- diation. But there are no reliance interests that warrant the retention of Roe and Casey, and there is no argument that has been advanced that shows otherwise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The argument that \"reliance interests\" require adherence to Roe and Casey",
		"context": "When deciding to overrule precedent, the Court often considers whether its prior decision has engendered \"re- liance interests\" —and whether it would be unjust or un- desirable to pull the rug from under those who have taken actions in reasonable reliance on this Court's previous ex- position of the law. See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1406; id. at 1414–15 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); 139 S. Ct. 2162; Franchise Tax Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue of reliance interests featured promi- nently in the Casey plurality opinion,20 and one can expect the respondents and their amici to appeal to \"reliance in- terests\" in their efforts to save Roe and Casey from repu- diation. But there are no reliance interests that warrant the retention of Roe and Casey, and there is no argument that has been advanced that shows otherwise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' focus on legislative failures under the Major Questions Doctrine disregards this Court's clear precedent and does not meaningfully differentiate the Clean Power Plan",
		"context": "Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the argument for ignoring subsequent inaction is even stronger in this case than it was in Bostock . See Revesz, supra , at 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Claimants can submit rebuttal evidence, including from a vocational expert",
		"context": "Gi ven that ALJs found claim- ants to be disabled in 47% of the cases that they decide d in FY2017 ,10 such delays can have a significant adverse effect on the timing of the benefit payments needed by disabled claimants . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting this Court's \"sensitiv[ity] to the spe- cial difficulties presented by the mass administration of the social security system,\" which, given the \"magnitude of that task,\" \"is not amenable to the full trappings of the adversa ry process lest again benefit levels be threat- ened by the costs of administration\").11 Finally, petitioner contends (Br. 5 -6, 55) that SSA's experience within the Seventh Circuit after that court's 2002 decision in Donahue shows that requiring voca- tional ex perts to furnish documentary materials upon request is a \"rule [that] works\" and will not \"delay or disrupt social security disability hearings.\" That is incorrect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Claimants can submit rebuttal evidence, including from a vocational expert",
		"context": "at 6-7; see id. at 36; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to find ou t whether the purported expert's conclusions are reliable.\" Dona - hue, 279 F.3d at 446. But t hat statement was dicta be- cause the court held that \"ALJ was entitled to reach the conclusion she did\" because the claimant's counsel ques- tioned the expert's test imony \" only after the hearing .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Claimants can submit rebuttal evidence, including from a vocational expert",
		"context": "at 447. After Donahue , the Seventh Circuit has ren- dered only one precedential decision finding error in an ALJ's failure to direct a vocational expert to produc e supporting materials . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And McKinnie 's fact-bound reasoning based on the expert's \"vague\" re- sponses that were \"insufficient to establish a foundation for her testimony,\" ibid., did not itself conflict with SSA policy. Since then, the Seventh Circuit has encouraged claimants' counsel to \"cooperate\" with ALJs to allow in- formation underlying an expert's testimony to be con- sidered but has \"refuse [d] to endorse a system that drags out every Social Security hearing to an intermi- nable len gth.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 F. 3d 907",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Claimants can submit rebuttal evidence, including from a vocational expert",
		"context": "And McKinnie 's fact-bound reasoning based on the expert's \"vague\" re- sponses that were \"insufficient to establish a foundation for her testimony,\" ibid., did not itself conflict with SSA policy. Since then, the Seventh Circuit has encouraged claimants' counsel to \"cooperate\" with ALJs to allow in- formation underlying an expert's testimony to be con- sidered but has \"refuse [d] to endorse a system that drags out every Social Security hearing to an intermi- nable len gth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result, the significance of the Donahue line of cases even in the Seventh Circuit remains unclear. 55 CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "This Court has applied different tes ts in considering the constitutionality of passive displays challenged un- der the Establishment Clause. In some cases, the Cou rt has applied the three- pronged test outlined in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g., McCreary 545 U.S. 844; County of 492 U.S. 573. \"Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or 11 practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be per- missi ble under the Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit re-ligion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "This Court has applied different tes ts in considering the constitutionality of passive displays challenged un- der the Establishment Clause. In some cases, the Cou rt has applied the three- pronged test outlined in 403 U.S. 602. See, e.g., McCreary [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; County of 492 U.S. 573. \"Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or 11 practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be per- missi ble under the Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit re-ligion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.\" County of Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 592 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "This Court has applied different tes ts in considering the constitutionality of passive displays challenged un- der the Establishment Clause. In some cases, the Cou rt has applied the three- pronged test outlined in 403 U.S. 602. See, e.g., McCreary 545 U.S. 844; County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or 11 practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be per- missi ble under the Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit re-ligion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.\" County of Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 592 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "County of Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 592 . In assessing Lemon 's second prong, the Court has asked whether a \"reasonable observer\" would view the challenged action as an \"endorsement\" of religion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Van 545 U.S. 677, however, a majority of the Court expressly declined to apply the Lemon framework, including the endorsement test, in reviewing the constitutionality of a Ten Command-ments display on public grounds. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "In assessing Lemon 's second prong, the Court has asked whether a \"reasonable observer\" would view the challenged action as an \"endorsement\" of religion. 536 U.S. 639 . In Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], however, a majority of the Court expressly declined to apply the Lemon framework, including the endorsement test, in reviewing the constitutionality of a Ten Command-ments display on public grounds. See id. at 686 (plural- ity opinion) (\"[W]e think [ Lemon ] not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "15a. Other courts, by contrast, have adhered exclusively to the Lemon test in dec iding challenges to 12 passive displays. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; American Civi l Liberties Union of 432 F.3d 624. And still others have under stood Van Orden as creating an exception to Lemon in some cases. See, e.g., Red River 764 F.3d 948 ; 520 F.3d 1009.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 1169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "15a. Other courts, by contrast, have adhered exclusively to the Lemon test in dec iding challenges to 12 passive displays. See, e.g., 903 F.3d 1169; American Civi l Liberties Union of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And still others have under stood Van Orden as creating an exception to Lemon in some cases. See, e.g., Red River 764 F.3d 948 ; 520 F.3d 1009.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 F.3d 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "See, e.g., 903 F.3d 1169; American Civi l Liberties Union of 432 F.3d 624. And still others have under stood Van Orden as creating an exception to Lemon in some cases. See, e.g., Red River [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 520 F.3d 1009. The resulting uncertainty in the lower courts has been compounded by the indeterminacy of the Lemon and Van Orden tests themselves. Both tests require a fact-intensive inquiry into a variety of circumstances, including the history of a particular religious symbol, the way the symbol appears as part of the display, the display's proximity to other displays, and the context surrounding the display's placement on public grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 948",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "See, e.g., 903 F.3d 1169; American Civi l Liberties Union of 432 F.3d 624. And still others have under stood Van Orden as creating an exception to Lemon in some cases. See, e.g., Red River 764 F.3d 948 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The resulting uncertainty in the lower courts has been compounded by the indeterminacy of the Lemon and Van Orden tests themselves. Both tests require a fact-intensive inquiry into a variety of circumstances, including the history of a particular religious symbol, the way the symbol appears as part of the display, the display's proximity to other displays, and the context surrounding the display's placement on public grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 F.3d 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life",
		"context": "at 698. This case is an excellent ex- ample: The removal or destruction of a 93- year -old war memorial would be viewed by many as the action of a government \"that is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our country's religious heritage.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cases like these cannot help but divide those with sincerely held beliefs on both sides. This case pre- sents an opportunity for the Court to adopt a standard for Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays that will reduce factious litigation , provide clarity to lower courts, and promote consistency across cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. To Determine Whether an Administrative Agency Engages in Arbitrary and Capricious Decisionmaking, a Reviewing Court Must Focus on the Clear Text of the Statute",
		"context": "Instead, this inquiry is simply one of many (and dis- c retionary) policy considerations which the agency has sometimes utilized in the past to make a \"public interest\" determination. Cf. generally Federal Com- munications [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But what exactly is the \"public interest\"? While there is an old joke among telecom lawyers that the \"public interest\" means whatever gets you three votes on the Eighth Floor at the Commission, over the years the courts have provided some important guidance to the agency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. To Determine Whether an Administrative Agency Engages in Arbitrary and Capricious Decisionmaking, a Reviewing Court Must Focus on the Clear Text of the Statute",
		"context": "This is not to say that promoti ng diversity is not a worthy social goal or that the Commission may not consider ownership diversity — along with of host of other public interest factors — when carrying out its mandate required by 202(h). As this Court recognized over forty years ago, \"'[d]iversification of control of the media of mass communications' has been viewed by the Commission 'as a factor of primary significance'\" as part of its public interest inquiry. That said, this Court also made it clear that diversification of owner- ship is not \"the sole consideration thought relevant to the public interest…\" Federal Communications Com- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The problem in this case is that the Third Circuit vacated both the FCC's Order on Reconsideration and the Incubator Order on the specific ground that the FCC failed to demonstrate adequately how its pro- posed deregulatory efforts would affect one type of di- versity ( i.e., fema le and minority ownership ) . Prometheus IV, 39 F.3d at 584 - 588.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. TXDPS has protocols for accepting and testing unsealed evidence",
		"context": "15 If evidence is submitted without a proper seal TXDPS either asks the customer to apply a proper seal at the time of submission, or TXDPS will apply a proper seal if the 12Noora R. Al-Snan & Najib M. Alraimi, Comparison between various DNA sterilization procedures applied in forensic analysis , 12 Egyptian J. of Forensic Scis. 5, 5 (2022). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14Id. at 767.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 S.W.3d 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "1. Federal employment laws—including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrim- ination in Employment Act—have \"undoubtedly im-portant\" objectives. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu- theran Church & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And there is no dispute that these statutes apply, by their terms, to religious employers like the Schools. They cannot be en forced, however, in viola- tion of the First Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "7; see also Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 195-96. For instance, even if a church has no tenet speaking to such a matter, a religious organization can refuse to employ a ministerial employee because she is a black person, cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; because she is pregnant, cf. 173 F.3d 343; or because the em- ployer believes that having a person in the workplace who is fighting cancer would somehow be unsettling. When the employment of \"ministers\" is at stake, no governmental interest is strong enough to overcome 20 the religious organization's exclusive prerogative \"to choose those who will guide it on its way.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.2d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "For instance, even if a church has no tenet speaking to such a matter, a religious organization can refuse to employ a ministerial employee because she is a black person, cf. 772 F.2d 1164; because she is pregnant, cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; or because the em- ployer believes that having a person in the workplace who is fighting cancer would somehow be unsettling. When the employment of \"ministers\" is at stake, no governmental interest is strong enough to overcome 20 the religious organization's exclusive prerogative \"to choose those who will guide it on its way.\" Hosanna- Tabor , 565 U.S. at 196.",
		"citation_value_orig": "173 F.3d 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "at 188. But that absolute im- munity also creates \"the potential for abuse.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An unduly broad conception of the ministerial exception \"may invite . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "929 F.2d 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "For one thing, looking first and foremost to formal designations can provide clarity in an area in which 21 line-drawing is a highly fraught exercise. Under the Establishment Clause, courts must avoid \"excessive entanglement\" in religious matters. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such entanglement re- sults when legal tests require courts to resolve \"con-troversies over religious do ctrine and practice,\" lack- ing any \"neutral principles of law\" to govern the dis-putes. Presbyterian 393 U.S. 440.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "521 U.S. 203. Such entanglement re- sults when legal tests require courts to resolve \"con-troversies over religious do ctrine and practice,\" lack- ing any \"neutral principles of law\" to govern the dis-putes. Presbyterian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Against this backdrop, Hosanna-Tabor 's first three considerations allow courts in the vast majority of cases essentially to defer to religious institutions' ex ante decisions as to who their ministers are. For example, all can readily agree that pastors, rabbis, and nuns are \"minist ers.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "Put another way, whether a religious organization requires a certain position to be filled by a member of the faith is a strong, object ive indication of how im- portant the organization believes that position is to its \"faith and mission.\" Id. at 188; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Hosanna-Tabor Court similarly explained that the second factor—the training reflected in the employee's title—reveals whether \"significant reli- gious training and a recognized religious mission un- derlie the description of th e employee's position.\" 565 U.S. at 193.",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F. Supp. 2d 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "at 192; see also id. at 198-99 (Alito, J., concurring). The Fourth Circuit's foundational opinion in Ray- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], demonstrates the importance of this type of cross-check. There, a fe- male member of the Seve nth-day Adventist Church sued after being denied a position that was typically held by \"ordained minister[s].\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.2d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test",
		"context": "In such a case, the court explained, the ministerial exception should \"not depend upon ordi-nation but upon the function of the position.\" Id. at 1168; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "651 F.2d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 102(b) Does Not Preclude Copyright Protection For Oracle's Code",
		"context": "§ 102 (b). This provision clarifies the scope of protection in a given copyrightable work by codifying the idea/expression dichotomy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That doctrine holds that, for any work of authorship, copyright protection only applies to the author's original expression of an idea, not to the idea itself. As noted in Section I.A supra , this distinction reflects the natural -law origins of copyright pr otection in that only the author's original contribution and his or her labor in executing the idea is protected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 102(b) Does Not Preclude Copyright Protection For Oracle's Code",
		"context": "26 –27. 16 the author's originality.\" Harper & Row Publishers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Just as Section 102(b)'s foreclosure of copyright protection for an \"idea\" r equires a court to distinguish the expressive aspects of a work from the unprotectable idea, Section 102(b)'s preclusion of copyright protection for any \"process, system, [or] method of operation\" requires that a court differentiate between the expressive aspects and the unprotecta ble process, system, or method. See Atari , 975 F.2d at 839.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 102(b) Does Not Preclude Copyright Protection For Oracle's Code",
		"context": "See Atari , 975 F.2d at 839. It does not mean that any work that can be characterized as a \"system\" or \"method of operation\" is not copyrightable. Mitel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not preclude copyright protection for either Oracle's declaring code or the structure and organization of Java SE . Oracle claims copyright protection only for its particular declaring code and for its particular way of choosing, connecting , and organizing the various components of Java SE. Those aspects are expressive .",
		"citation_value_orig": "124 F.3d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Examples from the 300,000 regulatory crimes show agencies criminalize harmless, garden-variety private conduct",
		"context": "§§ 333, 343 and 21 C.F.R. § 133.190(a)(3). 15 One might be inclined to call these regulatory food crimes \"pure applesauce,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://twitter.com/ CrimeADay/status/962517407456784384. 13 @CrimeADay, Twitter (Oct. 14, 2017), https://twitter.com/ CrimeADay/status/919369010030006272. 14 @CrimeADay, Twitter (Nov. 17, 2017), https://twitter.com/ CrimeADay/status/931695361651036160.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Examples from the 300,000 regulatory crimes show agencies criminalize harmless, garden-variety private conduct",
		"context": "2, 2017), https://twitter.com/ CrimeADay/status/881693280207077376. 21 One would hope that no prosecutor would have the poor judgment to bring char ges under any of these reg- ulations. But then, poorly-conceived criminal laws \"give prosecutors too much leverage,\" see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (describing the federal prosecution of a fisherman who faced 60 years in prison for tossing three under-sized fish back into the ocean).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The \"Discovery Rule\"",
		"context": "It does not appear the distinction matters for purposes of this case, but Petitioner submits the better view is that the discovery rule precludes a limitations clock from starting to run at all, rather than \"tolling\" or pausing an already -running clock. Cf. Merck & Co. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For that reason, this brief has removed the word \"toll\" from the Question Presented as it appeared in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari . 16 Respect for the distinct roles assigned to Congress and the federal courts by th e Constitution warrants a statute -specific determination of whether Congress intended for the discovery rule to apply.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. History Confirms That the Contracts Clause Does Not Restrict a State's Ability to Determine the Effect of a Divorce Decree",
		"context": ". belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying that principle, this Court has long indicated that divorce legislation should be reviewed through a deferential lens. This Court's seminal decision in Trustees of Dartmouth 17 U.S. 518, is most famous for Chief Justice Marshall's expansive interpretation of the Contracts Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. History Confirms That the Contracts Clause Does Not Restrict a State's Ability to Determine the Effect of a Divorce Decree",
		"context": "But their broad declarations of a State's power over divorce comfortably encompass statutes that prescribe one consequence of a divorce decree— i.e., the revocation of a beneficiary designation. Indeed, if States have the power to enact legislation severing spouses' legal relationship altogether, they surely have the lesser power to enact statutes that merely define one particular respect in which divorce decrees sever that relationship. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], similarly supports Petitioners' position. In Maynard , the Court confirmed that a divorce co nferred by the legislature 25 did not violate the Contracts Clause, because marriage is not a \"contract\" within the meaning of the Clause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "125 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Professional Speech is Protected.",
		"context": "Although the notion of \"professional speech\"— speech uttered within a professional relationship or based on expert knowledge or judgment—has been floated as a rationale for excepting speech from full First Amendment protection, \"this Court has not recognized 'professional speech' as a separate category of speech.\" National Institute of Family & Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And speech does not lose its protection merely because it is uttered by professionals. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Professional Speech is Protected.",
		"context": "Neither of these two lines of precedent applies here. The first category would apply where, for example, a professional such as a lawyer were required to disclose circumstances in which a client might be required to pay certain fees. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This requirement, when applied to a professional, would be merely a subcategory of generally applicable compelled 8 disclosures in commercial advertising. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 626",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Professional Speech is Protected.",
		"context": "The second category would apply to regulation of conduct that incidentally burdens speech. For example, \"nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses—so that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While in other contexts, CADA could apply to non- nonverbal expressive activity, here there is no such regulated behavior. Opinion, 6 F.4th at 1176 (\"Appellants' creation of wedding websites is pure speech.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire",
		"context": "Government stands inside the democratic arena, and wh ether to mandate the dis- closure of X as opposed to Y is a question legislators will answer based on their own biases and agendas— including subconscious ones—which will inevitably affect that debate. See Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform , National Affairs, Winter 23 201012 (\"If the problem is t hat venal legislators are betraying the public trust in exchange for campaign contributions, why would we expect them not to be equally motivated by base impulses when passing campaign-finance legislation?\"). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is a perfect example. That case involved a Missouri law that forced candidates to specify on the ballot, in all caps, that they had \"DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire",
		"context": "This information was true, but by \" 'directing the citizen's attention to [that] single consideration,' \" the requirement inherently \"impl[ied] that the issue 'is an important—perhaps paramount— consideration in the citizen's choice, which may deci- sively influence the citizen to cast his ballot,' \" and thus inherently biased the political debate. Id. at 525 (quot- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The same phenomenon can be found in the very first federal campaign finance regulation, the Tillman Act of 1907 (34 Stat. 664).",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire",
		"context": "His view of legitimate de- liberation was inevitably influenced by his preconcep- tion of the \"right\" results. The assumption that government can impartially decide what information will educate the public is problematic even outside the realm of politics—for in- stance, in the realm of verifiable information about goods and services. Consider the rule of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which allows government to compel businesses to disclose \"purely factual and un-controversial information\" about a product or service. Courts of appeals have found that these categories are not always clear, and that the very fact that govern-ment forces disclosure can give some information un- due weight, leading to a false impression. Thus in American Beverage 871 F.3d 884, the city required beverage companies to say on their highway billboards that \"[d]rinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 626",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Failure To Heed A Client's Decision To Maintain His Innocence Violates Fundamental Rights",
		"context": "A.Failure To Heed A Client's Decision To Maintain His Innocence Violates Fundamental Rights A criminal defendant's express refusal to concede guilt is safeguarded by core constitutional protections. A defendant retains the \"ultimate 4 authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions are grounded in inherently personal rights, and fundamental fairness requires that the accused retain the autonomy to decide them. See 553 U.S. 242.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Failure To Heed A Client's Decision To Maintain His Innocence Violates Fundamental Rights",
		"context": "463 U.S. 745. These decisions are grounded in inherently personal rights, and fundamental fairness requires that the accused retain the autonomy to decide them. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A concession of guilt by the defense lawyer where the defendant's clear and unequivocally expressed decision is to maintain his innocence necessarily injures these constitutional protections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components",
		"context": "On the contrary, trademarks serve many functions , and Mr. Brunetti is using \"FUCT\" to express a message. See J. Th omas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:2 (4th ed. Westlaw) ; see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . While that message may be crude and discomfiting to some, the First Amendment is designed to protect expressi ve speech . See 403 U.S. 15.",
		"citation_value_orig": "808 F.3d 1321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components",
		"context": "Westlaw) ; see also In re808 F.3d 1321 . While that message may be crude and discomfiting to some, the First Amendment is designed to protect expressi ve speech . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When expressive speech is \"inextricably intertwined\" with commercial comp onents —like the \"FUCT\" trademark —the Court \"cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase.\" 487 U.S. 781 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components",
		"context": "See 403 U.S. 15. When expressive speech is \"inextricably intertwined\" with commercial comp onents —like the \"FUCT\" trademark —the Court \"cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, the government acknowledges that Mr. Brunetti's mark is expressive. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components",
		"context": "Therefore, b ecause of its function and purpose, \"FUCT\" cannot be categorized solely as commercial speech under even the broadest def inition. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
		"context": "2, administrative patent judges of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the Senate's advice 8 and consent, or \"inferior Officers\" whose appointment Congress has permissibly vested in a department head. The government itself has recognized that there is a \"functional resemblance between inter partes review and litigation,\" and that the Board uses \"trial-type procedures in inter partes review.\" 2017 WL 4805230[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Supreme Court held that SEC administrative law judges (\"ALJs\") are inferior officers of the United States and not mere employees. Based on this status, the Court held that the process of appointing SEC ALJs was unconstitutional because the appointments were not done by a method approved in the Appointments Clause. The Appointments Clause requires inferior officers to be appointed by one of four methods: (1) by the President with advice and consent of the Senate; (2) by the President alone; (3) by the \"courts of law\"; or (4) by the \"heads of departments.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
		"context": "Lucia , 138 S.Ct. at 2051. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Supreme Court held that \"generally\" inferior officers are those who are directed and supervised by others who have been appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. In view of Edmond, officers that issue final executive decisions, subject only to Presidential review, are likely to be considered principal officers. In 424 U.S. 1, this court held the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \"etiquette or protocol\"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
		"context": "In 520 U.S. 651, the Supreme Court held that \"generally\" inferior officers are those who are directed and supervised by others who have been appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. In view of Edmond, officers that issue final executive decisions, subject only to Presidential review, are likely to be considered principal officers. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this court held the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \"etiquette or protocol\"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128-131; 510 U.S. 163 (Souter, J., concurring); 501 U.S. 868 were mere employees because their duties were \"occasional or temporary\" rather than \"continuing and permanent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
		"context": "In 424 U.S. 1, this court held the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \"etiquette or protocol\"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128-131; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Souter, J., concurring); 501 U.S. 868 were mere employees because their duties were \"occasional or temporary\" rather than \"continuing and permanent.\" Id., at 511–512. Stressing \"ideas of tenure [and] duration,\" the Court there made clear that an individual must occupy a \"continuing\" position established by law to qualify as an officer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
		"context": "In 424 U.S. 1, this court held the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \"etiquette or protocol\"; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128-131; 510 U.S. 163 (Souter, J., concurring); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] were mere employees because their duties were \"occasional or temporary\" rather than \"continuing and permanent.\" Id., at 511–512. Stressing \"ideas of tenure [and] duration,\" the Court there made clear that an individual must occupy a \"continuing\" position established by law to qualify as an officer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court correctly held that the ACA is unenforceable nationwide",
		"context": "Longstanding severability precedent allow s plaintiffs to assert that an unconstitutional provision is inseverable from the rest of the law , and that the whole law must fall as a result . The Court's \"cases do not support\" an argument otherwise. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It 2 would be particularly destructive of sound government to apply such a rule with regard to a multifaceted piece of legislation like the ACA\" because \"[i]t would take years, perhaps decades, for each of its provisions to be adju dicated separately.\" NFIB , 567 U.S. at 697 (joint dissent) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court correctly held that the ACA is unenforceable nationwide",
		"context": "T he United States' position, l ike the Court's traditional analysis , allow s the Court to decide whether the entire ACA must fall if the mandate is unconstitutional . And if it must , \"executive respect in its enforcement policies for controlling decisional law, plus vertical and horizontal stare decisis in the courts, will mean that the [ACA] will not and cannot be lawfully enforced against 3 others .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, the United States and Hurley and Nantz \"take different analytical paths, but … the differen t paths lead to the same place.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court correctly held that the ACA is unenforceable nationwide",
		"context": "Id. Presumably that's at least one reason why the United States acknowledged in District Court that a declaration \"would be adequate relief against the government.\" JA337; see also Sanchez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that test requires affirming the District Court's declaratory judgment because —as shown below —it faithfully followed the principles reiterated in this Cou rt's most recent severability cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F.2d 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 284 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the damages petitioner seeks are foreign in nature",
		"context": "RJR Nabisco , 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (identifying a clear indication of extra- territorial application in stat utory language expressly en- compassing acts that \"tak[e] place outside the United States\"). Nor does Section 284 address the double-recov- ery issues that would arise if extraterritorial damages could be collected in the United States and collected again by suing the foreign entities for the foreign activity in the country in which it occurred. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, Section 284 merely provides for damages \"ad- equate to compensate for the infringement.\" That lan- guage is far too generic to supply the \"clear, affirmative indication\" of extraterritori al application required to overcome the presumption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 284 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the damages petitioner seeks are foreign in nature",
		"context": "Petitioner cites (Br. 23-25) the \"general rule\" at com- mon law that compensatory damages should place the in- jured party \"in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, \"Congress is un- derstood to legislate agains t a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.\" Astoria Federal Savings & Loan 501 U.S. 104.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 284 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the damages petitioner seeks are foreign in nature",
		"context": "73 U.S. 94. To be sure, \"Congress is un- derstood to legislate agains t a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.\" Astoria Federal Savings & Loan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the full-compensation principle typically applies in cases with no extraterritorial component, and petitioner presents no evidence that the principle wa s developed with extraterri- torial considerations in mind. In any event, a background principle does not suffice to provide the \"clear, affirmative indication\" of congres- sional intent required to re but the presumption against extraterritoriality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 284 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the damages petitioner seeks are foreign in nature",
		"context": "at 2100. 6 Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 In determining whether a statutory provision affords relief for extraterritorial injuries, the \"relevant back-ground principle\" is the presumption against extraterri-toriality, RJR Nabisco , 136 S. Ct. at 2109, and the related rule that courts should interpret a statute to \" avoid unrea- sonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations,\" F. Hoffmann-La Roche 542 U.S. 155. Ot her nations have indicated time and again that the size and scope of American dam-ages awards can create inter national friction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 284 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the damages petitioner seeks are foreign in nature",
		"context": "6 Cf. 501 U.S. 775. 22 In determining whether a statutory provision affords relief for extraterritorial injuries, the \"relevant back-ground principle\" is the presumption against extraterri-toriality, RJR Nabisco , 136 S. Ct. at 2109, and the related rule that courts should interpret a statute to \" avoid unrea- sonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations,\" F. Hoffmann-La Roche [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ot her nations have indicated time and again that the size and scope of American dam-ages awards can create inter national friction. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco , 136 S. Ct. at 2107 n.9 (citing other nations' amicus briefs).",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "767 Third Ave. 988 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Article 22 of the VCDR sets out certain obligations of the United States with respect to foreign diplomats and diplomatic missions in this country . 485 U.S. 312 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "denied,510 U.S. 819 . Article 22 of the VCDR sets out certain obligations of the United States with respect to foreign diplomats and diplomatic missions in this country . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Article 22 (1) provides that \"[t]he premises of \" a foreign state's \"mission shall be inviolable,\" and \"[t]he agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.\" VCDR art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": ", 988 F.2d at 300 (The VCDR \"recognize[s] no exceptions to mission inviolability.\"). Section 1608(a)(3) should be interpreted in a manner that is consis tent with the United States' obligations un- der the VCDR . See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Where fai rly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with an interna- tional agreement of the United States.\" ). Construing Section 1608(a)(3) to require that process be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the forei gn state protects the inviolability of foreign embassies within the United States .",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 U.S. 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "The Executive Branch has long interpreted Article 22 and the customar y international law it codifies to preclude serving a foreign state with process by mail or personal delivery to the state's embassy . In 1964, the State Department took the view that \"[t]he establishment by one country of a diplomatic mission in the territory of another does not em power that mission to act as agent of the sending st ate for the purpose of accepting service of process.\" Hellenic Lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The United States has consistently adhered to that position, including in the court of appeals in this case . See Gov't C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 F.2d 978",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "16-2267) . As the Fourth Circuit recognized, that \"longstanding policy and interpretation\" of Article 22 is \"authoritative, reasoned, and entitled to great weight .\" Kumar , 880 F.3d at 158; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see generally U.S. Const. A rt. II, § 2, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "\"). The Convention's drafting history also supports the United States' view . See Water Splash, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he drafters of the Vienna Convention consid- ered and rejected exceptions\" to mission inviolability, \"opting instead for broad mission inviolability.\" 767 Third Avenue Assocs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "Cf. Kumar , 880 F.3d at 160 (remanding to t he district court \"with instructions to allow Kumar to perfect service of process in a manner consistent with this opinion\"); Barot , 785 F.3d at 29 -30 (noting that \"there is no statutory deadline for service under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act\" and instructing the district court to \"afford\" the plaintiff \"the opportunity to effect service pursuant to\" Section 25 The decision below also threate ns the United States ' treatment as a litigant in courts abroad. \"[T]he concept of reciprocity governs much of international law ,\" Boos , 485 U.S. at 323; and \"some foreign states base their sovereign immunity decisions on reciprocity ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir . ), cert. denied,469 U.S. 881.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.2d 835",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "), cert. denied,469 U.S. 881. See National City [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is therefore appropriate to construe the FSIA in light of the United States' interest in reciprocal treatment in foreign courts . Persinger , 729 F.2d at 841 (the United States' interest in re ciprocity \"throw[s] light on con - gressional intent\"); see a lso Boos , 485 U.S. at 323 (re - specting the diplomatic immunity of foreign states \"ensures that similar protections will be accorded\" to the United States); 372 U.S. 10 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "See National City 348 U.S. 356 . It is therefore appropriate to construe the FSIA in light of the United States' interest in reciprocal treatment in foreign courts . Persinger , 729 F.2d at 841 (the United States' interest in re ciprocity \"throw[s] light on con - gressional intent\"); see a lso Boos , 485 U.S. at 323 (re - specting the diplomatic immunity of foreign states \"ensures that similar protections will be accorded\" to the United States); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The United States' reciprocal interests strongly support interpret ing the FSIA not to permit service by mail to a foreign state's embassy in the United States. The United States engages in exte nsive activities over - seas in support of its worldwide diplomatic, security, and law enforcement missions, and it is not infrequently sued in foreign courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "182 -183, a suit against an embassy is a suit against the foreign state. S ee 28 U.S.C. 1603(a); El- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that permanent mission of foreign count ry to the United Na- tions is a \"foreign state\" under the FSIA), aff 'd, 580 F.3d 1044. Thus , regardless of whether service is made \"on\" or \"via\" an embassy , mailing service to the embassy treats it as the state's \"de facto agent for ser- vice of process,\" in violation of the VCDR's principle of mission inviolability. Kumar , 880 F.3d at 159 n.11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "216 F.3d 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "1. Under this Court's precedents, requirements to report information about an organization' s supporters to government regulators, or to disclose such infor- mation to the public at large, are revie wed under \"ex- acting scrutiny.\" As the Foundation notes (at 22), t his Court's artic- ulation of the constitutional principles applicable to state disclosure and reporting requirements traces to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That case considered Alabama's demand for the names and addresses of rank -and-file m embers of the NAACP, for the claimed purpose of enforcing a state law regarding the registration of corporations . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. at 464. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], two cities required that the NAACP publicly disclose its member rolls. The Court rejected those require- ments in light of evidence that public identification of members had been followed by harassment, threats of bodily harm, and a substantial drop- off in member- ships. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. Subsequent cases applied a similar analysis. 9 In Buckley v. Valeo , the Court synthesized the prin- ciples articulated in these cases and explained that \"[s]ince NAACP v. Alabama\" the Court has subjected 9 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (state statute conferring subpoena power on local prosecutors was unconstitutional as applied to demand for political party con- tributors' identities, because requested information was not rele-vant to the local investigation and because public interest in disclosure was not sufficient \"to outweigh\" interests of party and its contributors). 21 requirements to provide membership or donor infor- mation to \"exa cting scrutiny.\" 424 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "9 In Buckley v. Valeo , the Court synthesized the prin- ciples articulated in these cases and explained that \"[s]ince NAACP v. Alabama\" the Court has subjected 9 See 372 U.S. 539 (state statute conferring subpoena power on local prosecutors was unconstitutional as applied to demand for political party con- tributors' identities, because requested information was not rele-vant to the local investigation and because public interest in disclosure was not sufficient \"to outweigh\" interests of party and its contributors). 21 requirements to provide membership or donor infor- mation to \"exa cting scrutiny.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The governmen- tal interests must be sufficient to justify the extent of the burden on First Amendment rights. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "at 68. Since Buckley , the Court has repeatedly applied ex- acting scrutiny to government reporting or disclosure requirements. See Doe, 561 U.S. at 196; Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 554 U.S. 724. And it has expressly recog-nized that exacting scr utiny is different from —and less stringent than —strict scrutiny. See Doe, 561 U.S. at 199 n.2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "at 68. Since Buckley , the Court has repeatedly applied ex- acting scrutiny to government reporting or disclosure requirements. See Doe, 561 U.S. at 196; Citizens 558 U.S. 310; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it has expressly recog-nized that exacting scr utiny is different from —and less stringent than —strict scrutiny. See Doe, 561 U.S. at 199 n.2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "3. The Foundation (at 20) agrees with the State that exacting scruti ny is the applicable standard. It contends, however, that the standard requires \"nar- row tailoring ,\" by which it appears to mean that the 10 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 State must choose the least restrictive means to achieve its ends. Foundation Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "Instead, the State's interests must be \"sufficient to justify\" the ex- tent of any demonstrated deterrent effect. NAACP , 357 U.S. at 461, 463. The Foundation (at 24 -25) seeks to locate a more stringent tailoring requirement in this Court's deci- sions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Louisiana ex rel. 366 U.S. 293 . In Shelton , the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute requiring every teacher to file an annual affi- davit listing every organization to which the teacher belonged or regularly contributed within the last five years.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "NAACP , 357 U.S. at 461, 463. The Foundation (at 24 -25) seeks to locate a more stringent tailoring requirement in this Court's deci- sions in 364 U.S. 479, and Louisiana ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Shelton , the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute requiring every teacher to file an annual affi- davit listing every organization to which the teacher belonged or regularly contributed within the last five years. Shelton , 364 U.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": ", Gibson , 372 U.S. at 546 (constitutionality of demand for identity of NAACP members depended on whether the State had shown \"a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest\"). In Gremillion , the Court observed that States may regulate the time and ma nner of literature distribu- tion so long as such regulations are \"'narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil.'\" 366 U.S. at 297 (quot- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 26 The Court explained that Shelton exemplified applica- tion of the \"narrowly drawn\" principle by invalidating \"a detailed disclosure o f\" teachers' \"every conceivable kind of associational tie\" that had \"no possible bear- ing\" on the teacher's occupational fitness. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
		"context": "Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Buckley also did not impose a least -restrictive - means test , as petitioners suggest . See Foundation Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics",
		"context": ". Blaine Amendments were \"born of bigotry.\" Mitch- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are the lasting legacy of a period of rabid anti -Catholic political activity cou- pled with an effort to coerce cultural and religious uni- formity throug h the schools. Although just a tiny minority at the founding, the Catholic population —fueled by large- scale immigra- tion throughout the 19th Century —boomed, such that there were millions of Catholics in the U nited States by the latter half of the century.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics",
		"context": "493, 512 (2003). Eventually over 30 states adopted Blaine Amend- ments in one form or another. See Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A Closer Look at the Blaine Amend- ments and Their Modern Application , 12 Engage: J. Federalist Soc'y Practice Groups 111, 111 n.1 (2011) (listing 40 state Blaine provisions as well as Blaine Amendments in American Samoa, the District of Co- lumbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
		"context": "That standard asks whether th e right at issue \"is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty\" or \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition .\" Id. at 767 ( citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 521 U.S. 702) (emphasis omitted). To answer those questions , this Court has looked to ancient legal codes, the 1689 Eng- lish Bill of Rights, the common law and its pro minent expounders such as Blackstone, the views of the Amer- ican colonists in the Revolutionary era, early American state constitutions, records of the drafting and ratify- ing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and evidence surrounding the adoption of t he Fourteenth Amend- ment. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
		"context": "That standard asks whether th e right at issue \"is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty\" or \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition .\" Id. at 767 ( citing 391 U.S. 145, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis omitted). To answer those questions , this Court has looked to ancient legal codes, the 1689 Eng- lish Bill of Rights, the common law and its pro minent expounders such as Blackstone, the views of the Amer- ican colonists in the Revolutionary era, early American state constitutions, records of the drafting and ratify- ing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and evidence surrounding the adoption of t he Fourteenth Amend- ment. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
		"context": "By th ose metrics, as Timbs has demonstrate d, freedom from excessive fines is \"fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty ,\" Pet'r Br. 8 (quoting McDon- ald, 561 U.S. at 7 67), a vital protection against \"the potential for governmental abuse of its prosecutorial power,\" Browning -Ferris Indus. of Vt., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Pet'r Br. 8-25. Treating freedom from excessive fines as a second - class right would be particularly inexcusable given that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopt ed, at least in part, in response to the Southern states' use of fines to suppress African Americans and force them to serve their forme r masters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
		"context": "Treating freedom from excessive fines as a second - class right would be particularly inexcusable given that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopt ed, at least in part, in response to the Southern states' use of fines to suppress African Americans and force them to serve their forme r masters. See supra , Part I. Flouting the lessons of that history, t he Indiana Supreme Court's distorted view of th e Fourteenth Amendment would allow states to impose any fines they wish, no matter 23 how excessive and out of line with fundamental prin- ciples of justice . This history also illustrates why it would be anom- alous to require states to obey the Eighth Amend- ment's bans on excessive bail and on cruel and unusual punishment s—see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 370 U.S. 660 —while permitting those states to violate the same Amendment's ban on excessive fines. As the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were aware, oppressive fines were used in tandem with imprisonment and corporal punishment as part of an overarching effort \"to restore slavery in fact \" throughout the post–Civil War South. Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 357",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
		"context": "Treating freedom from excessive fines as a second - class right would be particularly inexcusable given that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopt ed, at least in part, in response to the Southern states' use of fines to suppress African Americans and force them to serve their forme r masters. See supra , Part I. Flouting the lessons of that history, t he Indiana Supreme Court's distorted view of th e Fourteenth Amendment would allow states to impose any fines they wish, no matter 23 how excessive and out of line with fundamental prin- ciples of justice . This history also illustrates why it would be anom- alous to require states to obey the Eighth Amend- ment's bans on excessive bail and on cruel and unusual punishment s—see 404 U.S. 357 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —while permitting those states to violate the same Amendment's ban on excessive fines. As the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were aware, oppressive fines were used in tandem with imprisonment and corporal punishment as part of an overarching effort \"to restore slavery in fact \" throughout the post–Civil War South. Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
		"context": "McDonald , 561 U.S. at 790 (quoting Heller , 554 U.S. at 636). While \"the right of a State to regulate the con- duct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and 24 extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted ,\" there \"are certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation cannot infringe.\" The Slaughter -House Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "83 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Tribes retain inherent authority to reasonably protect persons and property within reservation boundaries from Indian or non-Indian suspects",
		"context": "As preexisting sovereigns, Indian tribes inherently possessed t he authority to investigate and detain non - Indian suspects within their borders for delivery to other sovereigns. The tribes' \"incorporation within the territory of the United States ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , did not counterpro- ductively divest them of their ability to protect people on the reservation from crime by facilitating the en- forcement of federal and state law, and Congress has never eliminated that authority .",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Statutory purposes confirm that Section 1231(a), not Section 1226, governs respondents' detention",
		"context": "Congress adopted the current reinstatement statute in 1996 in reaction to serious practical problems that arose under the previous regime. Fernandez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before 1996, an al- ien who was deported after deportation proceedings — which could have included bond hearings, consideration of applications for relief, depor tation hearings, admin- istrative appeals, and judicial review —could, simply by reentering the country i llegally, force the government to go back to square one and start all over again. \"An objective observer would have asked, and Congress did, just what was the purpose of all of that procedure, all of those punctilious niceties, which can take years to com- plete, if the person could just step back into the country a few days later and have the roundelay go on?\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Statutory purposes confirm that Section 1231(a), not Section 1226, governs respondents' detention",
		"context": "Before 1996, an al- ien who was deported after deportation proceedings — which could have included bond hearings, consideration of applications for relief, depor tation hearings, admin- istrative appeals, and judicial review —could, simply by reentering the country i llegally, force the government to go back to square one and start all over again. \"An objective observer would have asked, and Congress did, just what was the purpose of all of that procedure, all of those punctilious niceties, which can take years to com- plete, if the person could just step back into the country a few days later and have the roundelay go on?\" Castro - [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Against that backdrop, Congress sought to achieve two main objectives through its adoption of the current reinstatement statute in 1996. First, by providing for reinstatement of prior removal orders and preventing reinstated orders from \"being reopened or reviewed,\" 20 Congress sought to streamline the procedure for re- moving illegal reentrants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "239 F.3d 1037",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Modifying Quill and Allowing States to Apply the Decision Retroactively Would Raise Significant Due Process Concerns",
		"context": "McKesson Corp. v. Div. 16 of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regulation of Fla. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1990). Procedural due process \"protect[s] persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.\" 435 U.S. 247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Modifying Quill and Allowing States to Apply the Decision Retroactively Would Raise Significant Due Process Concerns",
		"context": "Regulation of Fla. , 496 U.S. 18 ( 1990). Procedural due process \"protect[s] persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At its core, the Constitutional requirement of due process exists to prohibit st ates from exercising their authority in ways that \"offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\" Int'l Shoe 326 U.S. 310.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Modifying Quill and Allowing States to Apply the Decision Retroactively Would Raise Significant Due Process Concerns",
		"context": "435 U.S. 247. At its core, the Constitutional requirement of due process exists to prohibit st ates from exercising their authority in ways that \"offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\" Int'l Shoe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Requiring out-of-state retailers to bear the financial burden of a tax never intended to be borne by retailers—years after making sales to their consumers— patently offends \"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\" Int'l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "As this Court has emphasized, \"[t]he categories of substance and procedure are distinct.\" Cleveland Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There exists a basic distinction between procedural rules that govern the means through which an evidentiary record is created, and substantive evidentiary standards through which the content of a record is assessed. The basic requirement of procedural due process is \"the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "There exists a basic distinction between procedural rules that govern the means through which an evidentiary record is created, and substantive evidentiary standards through which the content of a record is assessed. The basic requirement of procedural due process is \"the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because a constitutionally mandated procedural right exists by definition in every case, the basis for a procedural due process challenge does not depend on the substantive evidence upon which an underlying decision rests. See, e.g., 501 U.S. 1137 S. Ct. 1249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "407 U.S. 67. And because a constitutionally mandated procedural right exists by definition in every case, the basis for a procedural due process challenge does not depend on the substantive evidence upon which an underlying decision rests. See, e.g., 501 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 2 The same distinction between a substantive challenge and a procedural due process claim exists in cases brought by social 14 As the government acknowledges, Petitioner is not making a procedural due process argument, and the foregoing examples demonstrate why. If the only evidence in the record regarding the other work available to an applicant is the testimony of a vocational expert who refuses to provide the private data that form the basis for her testimony, the substantial evidence standard is not met.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "If a vocational expert \"identif[ies] the specific publicly available data security applicants in this Court. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 that she used to create any particular written analysis that may actually have formed the basis for her testimony,\" id. (emphasis added), both an applicant and the ALJ can access that data source to probe and confirm the reliability of the expert's testimony.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "The government's principal response is to focus not on the facts as presented by this case, but on an alternate, hypothetical, scenario. The Seventh Circuit has held that if an applicant \"d[oes] not question the basis for the vocational expert's testimony, purely conclusory though that testimony [is]\" during the hearing before the ALJ, the applicant \"forfeit[s]\" a subsequent challenge to the expert's job estimates. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government claims that when \"a claimant in SSA proceedings stays silent\" and does not request the data upon which the expert's conclusions are based, \"the state of the evidentiary record will be exactly the same\" as when the data is requested and the expert refuses to produce it. Gov't Br .",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 F.3d 1065",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "First , the government's argument rests on the premise that there is no difference between a record when an expert is asked for the basis of unsupported conclusions and withholds that information, as compared 16 with when an expert is not asked for the basis of her testimony at all. But this Court has long recognized that when a party claims that evidence buttresses the testimony provided, but refuses to present that evidence for examination, both the te stimony and facts that would be proved by the missing evidence are cast into doubt. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (a party's presentation of less reliable evidence at trial, notwithstanding the party's \"possession or power\" over \"greater\" proof, suggests \"if the more perfect exposition had been given it would have laid open deficiencies and objecti ons which the more obscure and uncertain testimony was intended to conceal\"); see also Interstate 306 U.S. 208. 3 This principle applies with full force here. The expert identified her \"private labor market surveys\" as supporting her testimony and then refused to provide them even in a redacted form.",
		"citation_value_orig": "45 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "First , the government's argument rests on the premise that there is no difference between a record when an expert is asked for the basis of unsupported conclusions and withholds that information, as compared 16 with when an expert is not asked for the basis of her testimony at all. But this Court has long recognized that when a party claims that evidence buttresses the testimony provided, but refuses to present that evidence for examination, both the te stimony and facts that would be proved by the missing evidence are cast into doubt. See 45 U.S. 242 (a party's presentation of less reliable evidence at trial, notwithstanding the party's \"possession or power\" over \"greater\" proof, suggests \"if the more perfect exposition had been given it would have laid open deficiencies and objecti ons which the more obscure and uncertain testimony was intended to conceal\"); see also Interstate [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 This principle applies with full force here. The expert identified her \"private labor market surveys\" as supporting her testimony and then refused to provide them even in a redacted form.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "The expert identified her \"private labor market surveys\" as supporting her testimony and then refused to provide them even in a redacted form. By relying on the testimony of the expert, while not even attempting to justify her claim that confidentiality precluded the disclosure of her data, the government attempts to satisfy its evidentiary burden through testimony 3 This principle applies no less in the context of judicial review of administrative decisions. See Ala. Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 without demonstrating that the testimony has \"a basis in evidence having rational probative force,\" Consol. Edison , 305 U.S. at 230.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 F.2d 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "Shaibi , 883 F.3d at 1109; see also Barrett, 355 F.3d at 1067. Whether characterized as forfeiture of an objection, acquiescence in testimony's reliability, or a refusal to allow applicants to raise belatedly a challenge that could have been resolved during the hearing itself, these cases reflect the normal rule that \"courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred, but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government itself analogizes the substantial evidence standard to the standard for summary judgment in civil litigation. See Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "That standard specifically distinguishes between situations where material facts are challenged by an opposing party—rendering summary judgment improper—and situations where material facts are undisputed. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The summary judgment standard only reinforces the distinction between a record in which an applicant challenges the basis for a vocational expert's conclusions on an issue for which the agency bears the bur den of proof, and a record in which an applicant does not. 18 Third , the rule that a vocational expert's testimony alone can constitute substantial evidence if unchallenged, but not if challenged, is entirely consistent with the agency's own policies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement",
		"context": "This policy reflects the reality of the ALJ's role: \"Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than a dversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government never explains why it has embraced that rule as a matter of policy since 2004 while rejecting it as a matter of law now.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public colleges and universities selectively enforce trademark policies against registered student organizations",
		"context": ". Administrators at public colleges and universities often selectively enforce their trademark policies based on viewpoint. The FIRE case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, Iowa State University broadly granted registered student organizations permission to use its trademarks, includi ng logos and words like \"ISU,\" if certain conditions were met. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.3d 697",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public colleges and universities selectively enforce trademark policies against registered student organizations",
		"context": "Id. The school's finding that ARS was in violation of its trademark policy could 12 Br. of Amici Curiae Students for Life of America, Young America's Foundation, Young Americas for Liberty, Ratio Christi, and Christian Legal Society in Support of Appellees and Affirmance, Gerlich , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , No. 16 -1518, 2016 WL 3157519 at 15–22. 15 have triggered civil and c riminal penalties under California law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.3d 697",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Blanket Waiver of Representative Rights Is Not a Written Provision to Settle by Arbitration a Future Controversy",
		"context": "§ 10(a)(4). An arbitra l award is the parties' bargained- for resolution of a con- troversy. Eastern Associated Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is a contract. An arbitrator exceeds his powers (or disregards the law) when he issues an award that vio- lates the law because c ourts will not enforce illegal contracts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Blanket Waiver of Representative Rights Is Not a Written Provision to Settle by Arbitration a Future Controversy",
		"context": "Id. at 63; United Paperworkers Intern. Un- ion, AFL [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Surely, the Court would not enforce an arbitra l award under the FAA that concluded an employee prospec- tively waived all his state law claims . This would del- egate to private parties \"the power to exempt them- selves from whatever state labor standards they disfa-vored. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Blanket Waiver of Representative Rights Is Not a Written Provision to Settle by Arbitration a Future Controversy",
		"context": "Surely, the Court would not enforce an arbitra l award under the FAA that concluded an employee prospec- tively waived all his state law claims . This would del- egate to private parties \"the power to exempt them- selves from whatever state labor standards they disfa-vored. \" See Allis -Chalmers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet th is is precisely what Viking seeks with respect to PAGA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The IRS's Collection of Schedule B Does Not Render the California Attorney General's Collection Constitutional",
		"context": "47 The logic of the Ninth Circuit 's decision also extends far beyond collecting Schedule Bs. If law enforcement can compel disclosure of information presumptively protected by the First Amendment in the name of investigative ef ficiency without narrow tailoring, the First Amendment may no longer protect peaceful protest groups from having to hand over lists of all their supporters, cf. Familias Unidas , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,345 U.S. 41. Nor is the Ninth Circuit 's reasoning confined to Schedule B and the subset of donors listed on it. The fewer the number of donors listed on a Schedule B, the less information law enforcement can glean from it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "619 F.2d 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The IRS's Collection of Schedule B Does Not Render the California Attorney General's Collection Constitutional",
		"context": "47 The logic of the Ninth Circuit 's decision also extends far beyond collecting Schedule Bs. If law enforcement can compel disclosure of information presumptively protected by the First Amendment in the name of investigative ef ficiency without narrow tailoring, the First Amendment may no longer protect peaceful protest groups from having to hand over lists of all their supporters, cf. Familias Unidas , 619 F.2d 391, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is the Ninth Circuit 's reasoning confined to Schedule B and the subset of donors listed on it. The fewer the number of donors listed on a Schedule B, the less information law enforcement can glean from it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons",
		"context": "Rev. 177 (2007). It was not until after the Court's decision in Dis- trict of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that scholars began seriously examining the history of weapons laws in detail. Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights , 80 Law & Contemp. Probs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons",
		"context": "Some have interpreted Heller as significantly narrow- ing the scope of any historical inquiry. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 702 F.3d 933. Others have interpreted Heller to permit an examination of the historical record and sources with more scholarly vigor. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons",
		"context": "Some have interpreted Heller as significantly narrow- ing the scope of any historical inquiry. See, e.g. , 864 F.3d 650; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Others have interpreted Heller to permit an examination of the historical record and sources with more scholarly vigor. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.3d 933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons",
		"context": "Others have interpreted Heller to permit an examination of the historical record and sources with more scholarly vigor. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 701 F.3d 81. There is also considerable debate among scholars as to which historical eras and bodies of law are rele- vant. Compare, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.3d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons",
		"context": "Others have interpreted Heller to permit an examination of the historical record and sources with more scholarly vigor. See, e.g. , 824 F.3d 919; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is also considerable debate among scholars as to which historical eras and bodies of law are rele- vant. Compare, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "701 F.3d 81",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important And The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Wrong",
		"context": "7-8.4 Indeed, although the government suggests (at 18) the \"constitutional venue right\" was concerned only with tainted convictions and does not \"directly protect[] against the possibility of prosecution in an inconvenient location,\" the history demonstrates the opposite. As this Court observed in United States v. Johnson , the \"Framers wrote into the Constitution\" the venue protections in light of \"the unfairness and hardship to which trial in an environment alien to the accused exposes him.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 In other words, the venue right is concerned not just with fair convictions, but also with the government- inflicted harms from the trial itself . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Extending \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Liability to Breaches of Contracts Violates Due Process for Failure to Give Fair Notice",
		"context": "Statement of Orin S. Kerr at 9. 18 another reason: extending the statute to criminalize violations of private computer-related contractual agreements fails the Fifth Amendment's test for constitutionally adequate notice. To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit panel below believed itself bound by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].15 See Pet. App. 26a– 28a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.3d 1258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Extending \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Liability to Breaches of Contracts Violates Due Process for Failure to Give Fair Notice",
		"context": ". We are, of course, bound by Rodriguez , but note its lack of acceptance. EarthCam, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 And if the CFAA is construed to criminalize innocuous conduct technically violating the fine print in website terms of service and company policies, it would violate due process for failure to give fair notice. \"In our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "703 F. App'x 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Extending \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Liability to Breaches of Contracts Violates Due Process for Failure to Give Fair Notice",
		"context": "Only the people's elected representatives in Congress have the power to write new federal criminal laws. And when Congress exercises that power, it has to write stat utes that give ordinary people fair warning about what the law demands of them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Holmes has explained: Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Extending \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Liability to Breaches of Contracts Violates Due Process for Failure to Give Fair Notice",
		"context": "As Justice Holmes has explained: Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessar ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.\" 269 U.S. 385.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Extending \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Liability to Breaches of Contracts Violates Due Process for Failure to Give Fair Notice",
		"context": "283 U.S. 25. \"[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessar ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These basic propositions hold true a fortiori here if the Government's proposed construction is accepted, thereby allowing private parties to surreptitiously 20 create crimes through dense, confusingly worded fine print legalese contained in documents people— including those trained in the law—will not think to consult, let alone carefully read and understand.16 \"[W]ebsites' terms of se rvice provide inadequate notice for purposes of criminal liability.\" 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53631.",
		"citation_value_orig": "269 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "First , principles of constitutional avoidance sup- port that conclusion. As numerous courts have recog- nized, not every breach of fiduciary duty will cause ERISA plan participants to suffer concrete injuries satisfying Article III. E.g., Soehnlen , 844 F.3d at 582; 24 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 704 F.3d 327. And as Spokeo held, Congress cannot enable plaintiffs who suffer no concrete injury to bring suit in federal court. 136 S. Ct. at 1549.",
		"citation_value_orig": "837 F.3d 523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "First , principles of constitutional avoidance sup- port that conclusion. As numerous courts have recog- nized, not every breach of fiduciary duty will cause ERISA plan participants to suffer concrete injuries satisfying Article III. E.g., Soehnlen , 844 F.3d at 582; 24 837 F.3d 523; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And as Spokeo held, Congress cannot enable plaintiffs who suffer no concrete injury to bring suit in federal court. 136 S. Ct. at 1549.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F.3d 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "Pet. App. 21a; see Edward J. DeBartolo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , allowing injury-free lawsuits would be inconsistent with ERISA's \"primary purpose,\" which is \"the protection of individual pension rights.\" H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "Ra ther than negate that 25 presumption, Congress expressly contemplated that the equitable remedies authorized by Section 1132(a)(3) would be limited to \"appropriate\" relief. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B); see Varity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Eighth Circuit recognized, relief sought by plan partici- pants who suffer no \"actual injury\" is not \"appropriate\" given Article III's requirements and ERISA's aims. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "19-20. Indeed, courts have consistently rejected that proposi- tion. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; David , 704 F.3d at 336. That is because even at common law, only a \"beneficiary whose rights are or may be adversely affected by the matter(s) at issue\" may bring \"suit to enforce a private trust.\" Restate-ment (Third) of Trusts § 94 cmt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "21a. That limitation is consistent wi th this Court's admonish- ment that threatened future injury must be \"immi-nent\" to \"constitute injury in fact.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plan partici- pants who confront a potential loss of pension benefits may satisfy this requirement. Plaintiffs here did not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "They go so 4 Scanlan v. Eisenberg , on which Plaintiffs rely (Pet. 19-20), supports this understanding: the individual plaintiffs were the sole trust beneficiaries and \"currently eligible to receive all of the [t]rusts' corpus,\" so they necessarily had an interest in the trusts' assets. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 far as to assert this Cou rt should summarily reverse on that ground. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "669 F.3d 838",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "23 n.5 (quoting Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 101). This Court has made clear that \"a federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.\" Sinochem Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 544 U.S. 1, this Court did not sub silentio overrule these holdings in Lexmark . Lexmark observed only that the phrase \"statutory standing\" may be \"misleading\" because the issue \"does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case.\" 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "23 n.5 (quoting Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 101). This Court has made clear that \"a federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.\" Sinochem Int'l 549 U.S. 422; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court did not sub silentio overrule these holdings in Lexmark . Lexmark observed only that the phrase \"statutory standing\" may be \"misleading\" because the issue \"does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case.\" 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
		"context": "Lexmark does not speak to that sequencing question. After Lexmark , courts have thus continued to hold that statutory-standing questions may be resolved before difficult jurisdictional questions. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re797 F.3d 148. In any event, even if the Eighth Circuit erred in not addressing constitutional standing, reversal would serve little purpose. The court on remand would and should reach the same resu lt on Article III grounds (just as the Soehnlen decision on which it relied did).",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.3d 976",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees",
		"context": "290, 316, 335 (2011) —was satisfied with the agencies' historical understanding and application of the statutes, which did not include the award of the government's attorneys' fees. \"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re -enacts a statute without change.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Issue Is Important",
		"context": "Not so. The Federal Circuit's enablement test involves balancing a host of \"factual considerations.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By treating enablement as a question of law, the Federal Circuit lib- erates itself to pick and choose facts and \"weigh[] each\" as it sees fit. Idenix Pharms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "858 F.2d 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": ". This Court has \"consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for an offense continues after an acquittal, whether that acquittal is express or implied by a conviction on a lesser included offense when the jury was given a full 5 opportunity to return a verdict on the greater charge.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]o try a man after a verdict of acquittal is to put him twice in jeopardy[.]\" 195 U.S. 100.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "398 U.S. 323. \"[T]o try a man after a verdict of acquittal is to put him twice in jeopardy[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[W]here the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds which are not open to judicial examination.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "\"[W]here the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds which are not open to judicial examination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though \"the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.\" If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though \"the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.\" If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By vacating the jury's verdict of not guilty of malice murder by reason of insanity and permitting Georgia to retry McElrath notwithstanding his acquittal, the Georgia Supreme Court wholly disregarded this Court's longstanding jurisprudence on the issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal. Decided in 1896, Ball v. United States is one of this Court's earliest double jeopardy cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "\"In ascertaining the meaning of the phrase taken from the Bill of Rights it must be construed with reference to the common law from which it is taken.\" Kepner , 195 U.S. at 125. In Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court acknowledged that \"[t]he common law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same offence, but it went further and forbid a second trial for the same offence, whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted.\" Kepner , decided in 1904, found At the common law, protection from second jeopardy for the same offense clearly included immunity from second prosecution where the court having jurisdiction had acquitted the accused of the offense. The rule is thus stated by Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, quoted by Mr. Justice Story in 2 Sumn. 392 Sumn. 39 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "85 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "From whence it is generally taken by all our books, as an undoubted consequence, that where a man is once found not guilty, on an indictment or appeal, free from error, and well commenced before any court which hath jurisdiction of the cause , he may, by the common law, in all cases, plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent indictment or appeal for the same crime .' Kepner, 195 U.S. at 126 (emphasis added). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court again reaffirmed the notion that no man is to be tried more than once for the same offense. In accordance with this philosophy it has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final , ending a defendant's jeopardy , and even when 'not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence .' Thus it is one of the elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "\"A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course, absolutely final. … Having received 'one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble,' the State is not entitled to another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal—no matter how erroneous its decision—it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty.\" Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 (emphasis in original).",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 430",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 (emphasis in original). \"'[T]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.'\" Fong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him[.]\" 420 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "Fong 369 U.S. 141. \"When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A] defendant once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" 437 U.S. 82.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "420 U.S. 332. \"[A] defendant once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.\" 469 U.S. 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "437 U.S. 82. \"[T]he Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that '(a) verdict of acquittal . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "\"'[A]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy .' Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A] writ of error cannot be sued out in a criminal case after a final judgment in favor of the defendant, whether that judgment has been rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon a determination by the court of an issue of law.\" 144 U.S. 310.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "476 U.S. 140. \"[A] writ of error cannot be sued out in a criminal case after a final judgment in favor of the defendant, whether that judgment has been rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon a determination by the court of an issue of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is true regardless of whether the acquittal was entered in error. \"It has been half a century since [this Court] first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is 'based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "144 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "\"It has been half a century since [this Court] first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is 'based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.' A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Evans addressed the many ways Fong Foo has been applied, noting that acquittals have been deemed unreviewable in the following circumstances: • when a judge directs the jury to return a verdict of acquittal as it did in Fong Foo ; • when the judgement of acquittal was entered by the judge, 543 U.S. 462; 10 • where there was an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, 437 U.S. 54; • where there was a mistaken understanding of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, Smith , 543 U.S. at 473; • where there was a \"misconstruction of the statute\" defining the requirements to convict, 467 U.S. 203; • where the trial judge granted a demurrer which amounted to an acquittal, Smalis , 476 U.S. at 144–145; • and, as in Evans, where the trial judge entered a midtrial directed verdict and dismissal based on the court's erroneous requirement of an extra element for the charged offense. \"In all these circumstances, 'the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" 568 U.S. 313. Evans addressed the many ways Fong Foo has been applied, noting that acquittals have been deemed unreviewable in the following circumstances: • when a judge directs the jury to return a verdict of acquittal as it did in Fong Foo ; • when the judgement of acquittal was entered by the judge, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 10 • where there was an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, 437 U.S. 54; • where there was a mistaken understanding of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, Smith , 543 U.S. at 473; • where there was a \"misconstruction of the statute\" defining the requirements to convict, 467 U.S. 203; • where the trial judge granted a demurrer which amounted to an acquittal, Smalis , 476 U.S. at 144–145; • and, as in Evans, where the trial judge entered a midtrial directed verdict and dismissal based on the court's erroneous requirement of an extra element for the charged offense. \"In all these circumstances, 'the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.'\" Evans , 568 U.S. at 319 (citing437 U.S. 82).",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" 568 U.S. 313. Evans addressed the many ways Fong Foo has been applied, noting that acquittals have been deemed unreviewable in the following circumstances: • when a judge directs the jury to return a verdict of acquittal as it did in Fong Foo ; • when the judgement of acquittal was entered by the judge, 543 U.S. 462; 10 • where there was an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; • where there was a mistaken understanding of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, Smith , 543 U.S. at 473; • where there was a \"misconstruction of the statute\" defining the requirements to convict, 467 U.S. 203; • where the trial judge granted a demurrer which amounted to an acquittal, Smalis , 476 U.S. at 144–145; • and, as in Evans, where the trial judge entered a midtrial directed verdict and dismissal based on the court's erroneous requirement of an extra element for the charged offense. \"In all these circumstances, 'the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.'\" Evans , 568 U.S. at 319 (citing437 U.S. 82).",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" 568 U.S. 313. Evans addressed the many ways Fong Foo has been applied, noting that acquittals have been deemed unreviewable in the following circumstances: • when a judge directs the jury to return a verdict of acquittal as it did in Fong Foo ; • when the judgement of acquittal was entered by the judge, 543 U.S. 462; 10 • where there was an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, 437 U.S. 54; • where there was a mistaken understanding of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, Smith , 543 U.S. at 473; • where there was a \"misconstruction of the statute\" defining the requirements to convict, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; • where the trial judge granted a demurrer which amounted to an acquittal, Smalis , 476 U.S. at 144–145; • and, as in Evans, where the trial judge entered a midtrial directed verdict and dismissal based on the court's erroneous requirement of an extra element for the charged offense. \"In all these circumstances, 'the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.'\" Evans , 568 U.S. at 319 (citing437 U.S. 82).",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal",
		"context": "Evans addressed the many ways Fong Foo has been applied, noting that acquittals have been deemed unreviewable in the following circumstances: • when a judge directs the jury to return a verdict of acquittal as it did in Fong Foo ; • when the judgement of acquittal was entered by the judge, 543 U.S. 462; 10 • where there was an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, 437 U.S. 54; • where there was a mistaken understanding of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, Smith , 543 U.S. at 473; • where there was a \"misconstruction of the statute\" defining the requirements to convict, 467 U.S. 203; • where the trial judge granted a demurrer which amounted to an acquittal, Smalis , 476 U.S. at 144–145; • and, as in Evans, where the trial judge entered a midtrial directed verdict and dismissal based on the court's erroneous requirement of an extra element for the charged offense. \"In all these circumstances, 'the fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.'\" Evans , 568 U.S. at 319 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). An acquittal has been defined as encompassing \"any ruling that the prosecution's proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. Thus an 'acquittal' includes 'a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict,' a 'factual finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal defendant's lack of 11 criminal culpability,' and any other 'rulin[g] which relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Section 633a(a) Embodied The Prevailing Understanding Of Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Set Forth In Binding Regulations",
		"context": "Congress ratified the Commission's prevailing understanding when it enacted Section 633a(a) in 1974. It is well-settled that \"Congress' repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g. , 476 U.S. 426; 434 U.S. 575. That principle of construction is directly applicable here: When Congress adopted the Title VII federal-sector provision's precise formul ation for purposes of Section 633a(a), it thereb y ratified the meaning reflected in the Civil Service Commission regulations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Section 633a(a) Embodied The Prevailing Understanding Of Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Set Forth In Binding Regulations",
		"context": "It is well-settled that \"Congress' repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.\" 524 U.S. 624; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 434 U.S. 575. That principle of construction is directly applicable here: When Congress adopted the Title VII federal-sector provision's precise formul ation for purposes of Section 633a(a), it thereb y ratified the meaning reflected in the Civil Service Commission regulations. Congress thus ensured that any discrimination in personnel actions is prohibited, whether or not that discrimination is the but-for cause of an adverse personnel action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Section 633a(a) Embodied The Prevailing Understanding Of Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Set Forth In Binding Regulations",
		"context": "It is well-settled that \"Congress' repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.\" 524 U.S. 624; see also, e.g. , 476 U.S. 426; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That principle of construction is directly applicable here: When Congress adopted the Title VII federal-sector provision's precise formul ation for purposes of Section 633a(a), it thereb y ratified the meaning reflected in the Civil Service Commission regulations. Congress thus ensured that any discrimination in personnel actions is prohibited, whether or not that discrimination is the but-for cause of an adverse personnel action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Circuit Conflict Exists Under ISDA",
		"context": "1543, 1598. The Ninth Circuit has accordingly held that disputes about CIRI-administered contracts akin to the one resolved in Bowen are now moot. See Cook Inlet Treaty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The ANCs latch onto Bowen 's deference to the Soller memorandum, 810 F.2d at 1476, claiming 18 that the decision anointed a privilege to ANCs (immunity from th e strictures of the recognition clause) unavailable to any other group claiming tribal status.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 F.3d 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "................................ .............. 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], petition for cert. pending, No. 17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.3d 1168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "................................ .............. 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 844 F.3d 1168, petition for cert. pending, No. 17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "................................ .............. 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 844 F.3d 1168, petition for cert. pending, No. 17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "pending, No. 17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "pending, No. 17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F.3d 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "pending, No. 17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "17- 475 (filed Sept. 29, 2017) ........................................................... 11 424 U.S. 1 .............................. 1, 3, 15 819 F.3d 1179 , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "denied,137 S. Ct. 2291 ............... 20, 21 520 U.S. 65 ............... 7, 20 75 F.3d 704 ........ 20 513 U.S. 88 .................................................................................... 19 Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 .................................... 20 501 U.S. 868 ......... passim 462 U.S. 919 ................................ ..... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.2d 975",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................................................... 21 206 U.S. 370 ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Sys., 796 F.3d 111 ................ 17, 20 5 U.S. 137 ........... 21 272 U.S. 52 ........................ 16 539 U.S. 69 ...................... 17 515 U.S. 177 ....................... 17 Samuels, Kramer & 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 .............................................................. 12 49 N.W. 259 (Minn. 1879 ) ........................ 21 267 U.S. 505 .......................... 8 99 U.S. 508 .................... 8 73 U.S. 385 .................................................................................... 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....... 19 Constitution, statutes, and regulations : U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, because they are not ma- terially distinguishable from the special trial judges of the Tax Court, who were held to be inferior officers in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Commission's ALJs preside over formal hearings, c re- ate administrative records, make factual findings, draw legal conclusions, and determine liability and sanctions in the course of adjudicating disputes invol ving the pri- mary conduct of private individuals. They then issue initial decisions interpreting and applying the law that, if not further reviewed, are \"deemed the action of the Commission.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "78d -1(c). As in Freytag , these important powers constitute \"significant authority pur- suant to the laws of the United States .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fram- ing that test and applying it here, amicus commits two independent errors. First, although t he power to bind the government or third parties on significant matters is sufficient for officer status when the official occupies a continuing position , see Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause , 31 Op. O.L.C. 73 , the Commiss ion's ALJs possess that power when they issue decisions in their own name and the Commission de-clines to review their decisions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "3 -5, supra . The fact that the Commission retains the right of dis- cretionary review does not mean that ALJs lack im- portant authority in their own right. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Amicus is therefore wrong to suggest that an ALJ has \"no power in his own office. \" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Amicus is correct that those deputy positions are not necessarily ap-pointed by Department Heads, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 561(f ) (Director of the Marshals Service may appoint \"such employees as are necessary\"), and this Court has stated that deputy marshals are not constituti onal offic- ers. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But amicus does not argue that —like ALJs —those deputies had their own statutory and regulator y grants of authority; could per- form their functions without direction by their superi- ors; or could make decisions that would become final and binding absent discretionary review by those supe- riors. Amicus similarly relies (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Amicus similarly relies (Br. 33 -34) on various Ex- ecutive Branch opinions concluding that certain subor- dinate officials or contractors are not constitutional of-ficers, or decisions of this Court holding that particular officials were not officers as a statutory matter . See Steele, 267 U.S. at 507 (general prohi bition agent); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But amicus does not attempt to show that those officials had authority equivalent to the Commis- sion's ALJs. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "556(c)(3); 17 C.F.R. 200.14(a)(3), 201.111(c), 201.326; enforce compliance with discovery orders, 17 C.F.R. 201.180(a); and perform all other du- ties necessary to preside over complex adjudications, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Freytag 's listing of these four important functions did not even mention the contempt power expressly . At most, that was implicit in th e fourth function of \"enforc[ ing] compliance with discovery orders.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.3d 1168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Freytag , 501 U.S. at 882. For example, a special trial judge also had the power to \" require the produc- tion before him of evidence upon all matters em braced within his assignment ,\" as well as to \" order[ ] the issu- ance of subpoenas, as may be necessary, \" under Tax Court Rule 181 ( 1979 ). See Samuels, Kramer & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir.) (finding spe- cial trial judges to be officers based on their \" power to enforce compliance with discov ery orders, \" but not mentioning contempt ), cert. denied,502 U.S. 957 ; see also Freytag , 501 U.S. at 881 (\"We agree with the Second Circuit.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.2d 975",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
		"context": "Amicus offers no reason to 13 believe that the Court's reference to the \"power to en- force compliance with discovery orders \" was limited to the contempt power.1 c. There is no conflict between Freytag and other decisions of this Court. Amicus argues (Br. 25) that un- der [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a constitutional officer must take \"action that ha[s] the purpose and ef- fect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons.\" Id. at 952.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. LOWER COURTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY IGNORED HELLER AND MCDONALD",
		"context": "2011 IL App (1st) 091667 . Kansas echoed th at holding , saying that th e Court \"was drawing a narrow line regarding the violations related solely to use of a handgun in the home for self -defense purposes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And finally, Maryland's high court asserted that \"[i]f the Supreme Court . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 P.3d 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. LOWER COURTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY IGNORED HELLER AND MCDONALD",
		"context": ". meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Some federal courts have shown a similar resistance to building on Heller . They see the Second Amendment as \"a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 A.3d 1167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. LOWER COURTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY IGNORED HELLER AND MCDONALD",
		"context": "Some federal courts have shown a similar resistance to building on Heller . They see the Second Amendment as \"a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Addressing a ban on firearms in national parks, the Fourth Circuit explained that it is \"prudent to await direction from the Court itself.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "638 F.3d 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. LOWER COURTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY IGNORED HELLER AND MCDONALD",
		"context": "Id. Other courts have voiced similar reservations in resolving Heller 's unresolved questions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]784 F.3d 412; Skoien , 614 F.3d at 640 (\"We do not think it profitable to parse . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.3d 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. These Principles Make The Extension Of McBratney And Bracker Particularly Inappropriate In This Context",
		"context": "Neither of thes e lines of cases helps it. 1. First, Oklahoma cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 164 U.S. 240, for the proposition that States may \"exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. These Principles Make The Extension Of McBratney And Bracker Particularly Inappropriate In This Context",
		"context": "Neither of thes e lines of cases helps it. 1. First, Oklahoma cites 104 U.S. 621, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that States may \"exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 U.S. 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. These Principles Make The Extension Of McBratney And Bracker Particularly Inappropriate In This Context",
		"context": "McBrat- ney, 104 U.S. at 621, 624 (emphasizing that both the perpetrator and victim were non-Indians, and that the case \"present[ed] no qu estion … as to … the pro- tection of the Indians in their improvements\"); see also Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 9.03(1). This reasoning in no way extends to cases involving crimes committed against Indians—which inherently affect Indians. Indeed, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—in a passage the State quotes—this Court reiterated that \"offenses committed by or against Indians are not within the principle of the McBratney and Draper cases.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "228 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. These Principles Make The Extension Of McBratney And Bracker Particularly Inappropriate In This Context",
		"context": "2. Second, these same animating principles make it particularly inappropriate for the Court to extend the Bracker test to this context. In an alternative ar- gument to its claim of inherent territorial authority, Oklahoma relies on White Mountain Apache [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and related cases for the proposition that the Court has \"bless[ed] state regu- lation of conduct by non-Indians in Indian country\" based on a judicial balancing test. Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Act regulates speech based on viewpoint, the most egregious form of speech regulation",
		"context": "Viewpoint discrimination is the most egregious form of speech regulation. \"[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.\" Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional, \"[w]hen the government targets … particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.\" 515 U.S. 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Act regulates speech based on viewpoint, the most egregious form of speech regulation",
		"context": "Lamb's 508 U.S. 384. While content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional, \"[w]hen the government targets … particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recently reiterated that its cases \"use the term 'viewpoint' discrimination in a broad sense\" and that, outside the context of government speech, inapplicable here, \"viewpoint discrimination is forbidden.\" 137 S. Ct. 1744.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Act regulates speech based on viewpoint, the most egregious form of speech regulation",
		"context": "515 U.S. 819. This Court has recently reiterated that its cases \"use the term 'viewpoint' discrimination in a broad sense\" and that, outside the context of government speech, inapplicable here, \"viewpoint discrimination is forbidden.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts Are Incompetent to Determine What Roles Are Central to a Religious Organization's Mission",
		"context": "Judges are incompetent to determine which employees are \"sufficiently religious. \" The First Amendment prohibits courts from ques- tioning the centrality of a religious belief or practice and contradicting a litigants ' interpretation of its faith. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that constitu- tional decree. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts Are Incompetent to Determine What Roles Are Central to a Religious Organization's Mission",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that constitu- tional decree. See, e.g. , Emp 't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court read the National Labor Rela- tions Act narrowly and determined that it did not ap- ply to religious schools. The Court based its decision on concerns that the \"very process \" of dispute resolu- tion would implicate religious matters and impermis- sibly entangle the government with religion. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Courts Are Incompetent to Determine What Roles Are Central to a Religious Organization's Mission",
		"context": "After Catholic Bishop , the Board proclaimed juris- diction over religious schools that lacked a \"substan- tial religious character. \" Univ. of Grea t [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Board's standard . It reasoned that the standard demanded intrusive in- quiry into religious matters , because it entailed sifting through a school 's religious beliefs and determining the centrality of those beliefs to the school.",
		"citation_value_orig": "278 F.3d 1335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "of Indep., 1 Stat. 1 (July 4, 1776). While this country long violated that principle in practice, e.g., Dred [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, those violations did not alter or diminish the principle itself. As Justice Harlan recognized in Ples- sy, \"Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.\" 163 U.S. at 559.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "of Indep., 1 Stat. 1 (July 4, 1776). While this country long violated that principle in practice, e.g., Dred 60 U.S. 393; Plessy, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], those violations did not alter or diminish the principle itself. As Justice Harlan recognized in Ples- sy, \"Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.\" 163 U.S. at 559.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "But the Court has rejected many interests as not compelling enough to justify racial classifications—interests that are often more compelling than \"student body diversity.\" Pro- tecting a child's best interests isn't compelling enough. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neither is remedying societal discrimination. 517 U.S. 899.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U. S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "517 U.S. 899. Nor is providing \"role models\" for minority students. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Grutter does not explain how these inter- ests are not compelling, yet \"'cross-racial understand- ing'\" and \" 'livelier'\" classroom discussion are. 539 U.S. at 330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "539 U.S. at 333; see Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids \"the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how [individuals] act or think.\" Metro Broad., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], then it can evaluate whether individual applicants have that experience. It cannot simply use \"race as a proxy\" for their experiences or views. 515 U.S. 900.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547, then it can evaluate whether individual applicants have that experience. It cannot simply use \"race as a proxy\" for their experiences or views. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Grutter 's crude stereotyping makes even less sense today, \"in a society in which [racial] lines are becoming more blurred.\" 572 U.S. 291, bit.ly/37LJWyG (\"The Multiracial population … was measured at 9 million people in 2010 and is now 33.8 million people in 2020, a 276% increase.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "515 U.S. 900. Grutter 's crude stereotyping makes even less sense today, \"in a society in which [racial] lines are becoming more blurred.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], bit.ly/37LJWyG (\"The Multiracial population … was measured at 9 million people in 2010 and is now 33.8 million people in 2020, a 276% increase.\"). Applicants who check the box for African American at Harvard and UNC, for example, receive a preference because of their race whether they grew up in poverty 53 and went to failing schools, have parents who were multimillionaire executives, spent their formative years in Europe, are the direct descendants of slaves, or are second-generation immigrants from Africa. What experiences and views do these wildly different individuals share?",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "But the Brown Court rightly refused. \"[S]uch deference is fundamentally at odds\" with the strict scrutiny that governs \"race-based policies.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Grutter 's reference to the \"First Amendment\" does not 56 justify a different approach. 539 U.S. at 324.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "As the government, state universities themselves have no First Amendment rights. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943 n.25; Columbia Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Grutter 's narrow-tailoring reasoning cannot \"'withstand careful analysis'\" either. 138 S.Ct. 2448.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "Sys., 412 U.S. 94. Grutter 's narrow-tailoring reasoning cannot \"'withstand careful analysis'\" either. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Narrow tailoring normally demands proof that racial classifi- cations are \"necessary\" to achieve the compelling interest—that race was a \"'last resort.'\" Parents In- volved, 551 U.S. at 734 -35.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "Mere awareness of racially dis-parate impacts is not evidence of racially discrimina-tory intent. Pers. Adm'r of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. UNC.Pet.App.136-37 (noting that UNC would just \"'be choosing more white students'\" under a system based on socioeconomic preferences because \"the majority of low-income students are white\"). And universities have perfectly valid, race-neutral reasons for supporting race-neutral alterna-tives that focus on actual disadva ntage, rather than using race as a proxy for it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "UNC.Pet.App.136-37 (noting that UNC would just \"'be choosing more white students'\" under a system based on socioeconomic preferences because \"the majority of low-income students are white\"). And universities have perfectly valid, race-neutral reasons for supporting race-neutral alterna-tives that focus on actual disadva ntage, rather than using race as a proxy for it. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Legally speaking, Grutter has no foundations, \"[g]iven how unmoored it was from the start.\" Ramos, 140 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Grutter is grievously wrong",
		"context": "at 2178. But they are not entitled to do so while also claiming the mantle of stare decisis. Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA",
		"context": "23 (citation omitted) . In a stat- ute, however, the word \"is not a term of art with a fixed meaning wher ever it is used.\" Pfizer [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (19 78). In particular, the \"qualification of a sovereign as a 'person' who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not upon a bare analysis of the word 'person, ' but on the legisla- tive environment in which the word appears.\" Inyo Cnty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA",
		"context": "Inyo Cnty. v. Paiute -Shosho ne Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, t he statu- tory context in which the term appears, the history of fed- eral agencies' participation in the patent syste m, and the purpose s of the AIA's post -issuance review procedures all support the conclusion that the Postal Service is a \"per- son\" authorized to see k AIA review of an issued patent . Petitioner's contrary arguments are unpersuasive .",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA",
		"context": "252, 307(b), 318(c) , and 328(c) should likewise be construed to encompass federal agencies . Each of those so-called \"intervening rights\" provisions protects a third party from the 21 \" 'gross injustice ' \" of, \"having already begun to make, use, or sell a given article, find[ing] its previously lawful activities rendered newly infringing under a modified patent.\" Marine Polymer Tech s., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like private parties, the United States is subject to suit, and to potential monetary liability, if a federal agency makes or uses a patented invention without the patent owner's authorization. See 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "672 F.3d 1350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA",
		"context": "If federal agencies are properly viewed as \"per- son[s]\" with in the meaning of these disparate Patent Act provis ions, they should likewise be treat ed as \"per- son[s]\" under the AIA's post -issuance review provi- sions. \"[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same statute\" are generally \"presumed to have the same meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the AIA includes new versions of 35 U.S.C. 102 (2012 & Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1854",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA",
		"context": "1 . In stating that the term \"person\" \"include[s]\" such entities, that definition does not rule out the possibility that other en- tities may be covered. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The evident primary purpose of that definition is to \"make [] clear \" that the term \"pers on\" ordinarily extends beyond natural persons and encompasses arti ficial legal entities, 134 S. Ct. 2751, not to limit the range of artificial entities that may be covered. In any event, Dictionary Act definitions do not apply when \" the context indicates otherwise. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA",
		"context": "In stating that the term \"person\" \"include[s]\" such entities, that definition does not rule out the possibility that other en- tities may be covered. See 560 U.S. 305. The evident primary purpose of that definition is to \"make [] clear \" that the term \"pers on\" ordinarily extends beyond natural persons and encompasses arti ficial legal entities, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], not to limit the range of artificial entities that may be covered. In any event, Dictionary Act definitions do not apply when \" the context indicates otherwise. \" 1 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Power of Government to State Its Own Views and to Disagree with Private Actors Is a Cornerstone Component of Free Expression",
		"context": ". This Court has long recognized the authority of a government entity \"to 'speak for itself.'\" Pleasant Grove [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 5 (quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 529 U.S. 217). \"[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Power of Government to State Its Own Views and to Disagree with Private Actors Is a Cornerstone Component of Free Expression",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the authority of a government entity \"to 'speak for itself.'\" Pleasant Grove 555 U.S. 460 5 (quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Power of Government to State Its Own Views and to Disagree with Private Actors Is a Cornerstone Component of Free Expression",
		"context": "\"[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes.\" Id. at 467-68 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The government, no less than a private actor, is free to select the views it wants to express. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Power of Government to State Its Own Views and to Disagree with Private Actors Is a Cornerstone Component of Free Expression",
		"context": "The government, no less than a private actor, is free to select the views it wants to express. Id. at 468 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The overarchin g principle is that gov- ernment \"may interject its own voice into public discourse.\" 235 F.3d 1243.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Power of Government to State Its Own Views and to Disagree with Private Actors Is a Cornerstone Component of Free Expression",
		"context": "Because government speech is simply another form of expressive conduct, the government's own expres-sive conduct is distinct from the regulation of private speech prohibited by the Free Speech Clause. See Summum , 555 U.S. at 467 (\"If petitioners were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech\") (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Meaningful free expression requires that government actors and entities must be free to express their own thoughts and idea s with the same force, vigor, and conviction as any private speaker. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The TVA Mishandles Burr",
		"context": "\"6 To impliedly reduce a \"sue and be sued\" clause's waiver of immunity, \"it must be clearly shown\" that one of Burr's three criteria is satisfied.7 Absent that showing, sue -and-be-sued entities \"are presumed to have fully waived immunity. '\"8 Against this, the TVA simply insists on the Eleventh Circuit's analytical approach. Which is to say, the TVA forces discretionary -function cases to the front of the analysis, while relegating sue -and-be- sued doctrine (under Burr ) by silent fiat to a vague, subordinate role as somehow \"consistent with\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .9 This is question -begging. The TVA assumes (or asserts) what it is supposed to be proving. Exactly what is in question is whether a discretionary - function exception (obliquely referenced in Smith and tested under Gaubert10) displaces the long -governing sue-and-be-sued framework of Burr .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The TVA Mishandles Burr",
		"context": "Opp. 8. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 See Cert. Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The TVA Mishandles Burr",
		"context": "13 Peoples Nat. Bank of Huntsville, 812 F.2d 68. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Id. at 9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "689 F.2d 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": ". \"A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To ensure that federal regulations comply with this fundame ntal principle, the APA generally requires agencies to engage in notice -and-comment rulemaking before issuing substantive, binding regu-lations. See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "\"). Notice - and-comment rulemaking is grounded in \"notions of fairness\" because it promotes \"informed administr a- tive decisionmaking\" by allowing an agency to enact regulations \"only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Notice -and-comment rulemaking provides busi- nesses with an important opportunity to help shape the adm inistrative decisions that govern their indus- tries. E very decision that a business makes —from hiring employees and opening new facilities to mar- keting and selling its products —requires an assess- ment of the legal implications of th at decision .",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "Auer and Seminole Rock undermine the important role played by notice-and -comment rulemaking. As the Court has explained, Auer deference encourages agencies to \"promulgate vague and open -ended regu- lations that they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby 'frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The temptation for the agency to side -step formal rulemaking makes sense from the agency's perspective: issuing \"vague regulations . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": ". maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through ad- judication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking p rocess.\" Thomas Jefferson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this incentive comes at the expense of clarity and predictability. Seminole Rock and Auer also harm regulated com- panies by making it difficult to keep track of an agency's shifting views.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "But tracking an agency's interpretations of vague regulations is considerably more challenging because those interpretations could appear almost anywhere. For example, in Auer , the Court deferred to an agency interpretation advanced for the first time in an amicus brief. 519 U.S. at 461; accord Chase Bank USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 The Court also has deferred to one agency's interpretation of another agency's regula-tion. See 501 U.S. 680 . And the Ninth Circuit recently deferred to an interpretation set forth in an agency field manual that claimed not to be \"a device for es- tablishing interpretive policy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "For example, in Auer , the Court deferred to an agency interpretation advanced for the first time in an amicus brief. 519 U.S. at 461; accord Chase Bank USA, 562 U.S. 195.2 The Court also has deferred to one agency's interpretation of another agency's regula-tion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the Ninth Circuit recently deferred to an interpretation set forth in an agency field manual that claimed not to be \"a device for es- tablishing interpretive policy.\" 905 F.3d 610 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "See 501 U.S. 680 . And the Ninth Circuit recently deferred to an interpretation set forth in an agency field manual that claimed not to be \"a device for es- tablishing interpretive policy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Auer doctrine has created a world in which businesses must scour court dockets, amicus briefs, agency websites, internal field manuals, letters sent to other compa- nies, and other agencies' policies to fully understand the regulatory regime in which they operate . The business community suffers from this ap- proach to regulation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "Id. This approach is incon- sistent with the fundamental due process notion that regulated parties must be \"free to steer between law-ful and unlawful conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Christopher, the Court too k an important step to limit Auer and Seminole Rock by refusing to defer to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous regula- tions that \"impose [d] potentially massive liability … for conduct that occurred well before that interpreta-tion was announced.\" 567 U.S. at 155– 56.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
		"context": "But Chris- topher has not eliminated Auer 's adverse effects on businesses. On the contrary, Auer deference has con- tinued to \" metastisiz[e] \" in the intervening years. United Student Aid Funds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. bear arms",
		"context": "726 (2020) ................................................... 24 Robert VerBruggen, Gun Groups Take Concealed Carry to the Supreme Court , National Review Online (Dec. 18, 2020), bit.ly/VerBruggen2Am Carry .................................................................... 5, 20 E. Gregory Wallace, Legal Corpus Linguistics and the Meaning of \"Bear Arms ,\" Second Thoughts Blog (July 16, 2021), bit.ly/WallaceSecondThoughts ............................................................................. 5, 20 Interest of Amicus1 Amicus Neal Goldfarb is an attorney with an in- terest and expertise in linguistics, and in applying the insights and methodologies of linguistics to legal inter- pretation. Amicus 's interest in this case stems from his hav- ing conducted an in-depth textual analysis of the Sec- ond Amendment, based primarily on corpus data re- garding 18th-century usage. 2 That data, which is much more extensive than what the Court considered in Dis- trict of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], shows Heller to have been mistaken about the Second Amend- ment's original meaning. Amicus submits this brief in order (1) to inform the Court of his analysis, an d (2) to urge the Court to call for supplemental briefing on the issues his analysis raises and to hold the case over to next Term for argu- ment on those issues. In addition, the brief responds to 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines",
		"context": "The Fourth Circuit's decision allows website owners to exploit trademark law to obtain competitive advantages the law is not meant to provide. As the dissent observed, Respondent benefits from using the generic domain name booking.com regardless of trademark protection: it is simple and easy to remember, and it clearly identifies the services Respondent offers. Booking.com [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the same time, awarding Respondent a trademark registration for the string BOOKING. COM would significantly disadvantage Respondents' competitors, as explained in this section.",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines",
		"context": "COM would significantly disadvantage Respondents' competitors, as explained in this section. Both the genericness and functionality doctrines are intended to limit anti-competitive misuse of trademarks— that is, uses of trademark law that would \"serve[] to limit 9 competition in the manufacture and sales of a product.\" Anti-Monopoly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit's decision subverts both doctrines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "611 F.2d 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "XV, § 2. Congress may enforce them \"by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]512 U.S. 874 sweeps far beyond the consti tutional prohibition on intentional discrimination. As originally enacted in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Section 2 mirrored the Fifteenth Amendment: No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 6 citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pu b. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "XV, § 2. Congress may enforce them \"by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations.\" 546 U.S. 151[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] sweeps far beyond the consti tutional prohibition on intentional discrimination. As originally enacted in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Section 2 mirrored the Fifteenth Amendment: No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 6 citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pu b. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 874",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "XV, § 1. Under this Court's precedents, \"racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A few years after Section 2's enactment, the Court made clear that because \"the lang uage of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment,\" Section 2 claims equally required a showing of intentional discrimination. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "De Grandy , 512 U.S. at 1009 n.8. Instead, \"a violation could be proved by showin g discriminatory effect alone.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The new Section 2 focused on whether the challenged practice \" results in a denial or abridgement\" of the right to vote and added a new subsection: (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the 7 State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "This rewriting moved the substantive scope of Section 2 beyond its constitutional underpinnings. Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, a discriminatory effect might be relevant to a showing of discriminatory intent, but it is not enough to prove \"invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"the Constitution requires a showing of intent that [the new] § 2 does not, a violation of § 2 is no longer a fortiori a violation of the Constitution.\" 520 U.S. 471.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "426 U.S. 229. Because \"the Constitution requires a showing of intent that [the new] § 2 does not, a violation of § 2 is no longer a fortiori a violation of the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment cannot provide a basis for Section 2 to the extent that the statute reaches beyond intentional discrimination. Absent other authority for the new Section 2, it is unconstitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "I, § 8; id. amend. X; see generally Shelby [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 This Court has held that \"[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enfo rcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 2 It is also unclear whether Section 2 could constitutionally extend to vote dilutions claims at all, given that \"[t]his Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote- dilution claims.\" 507 U.S. 146.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "X; see generally Shelby 570 U.S. 529. 2 This Court has held that \"[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enfo rcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 2 It is also unclear whether Section 2 could constitutionally extend to vote dilutions claims at all, given that \"[t]his Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote- dilution claims.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has never \"held an y legislative apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "Ibid. 8 unconstitutional.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even under that dubious rule, see 541 U.S. 509. As this Court has explained: Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "8 unconstitutional.\" City of 521 U.S. 507. Even under that dubious rule, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has explained: Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power \"to enforce,\" not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 509",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "And it is neither congruent nor proportional to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. When enforcement legislation extends to constitutional conduct, the Court has required \"a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"On the one hand, courts are to consider the constitutional problem Congress faced—both the nature and the extent of state conduct violating the [Constitution]. That assessment usually .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "At first, the Act \"could be justified by 'exceptional conditions.'\" Ibid. (quoting South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the law's \"current burdens . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "Section 2's \"indiscriminate scope offends th[ese] principle[s].\" Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The language of Section 2 is as broad as broad can be.\" Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2372 (Kagan , J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "It has no limits in time, space, or scope. It applies to water districts and county councils, state legislatures and school boards. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has no expiration date. And even Section 2's defenders have conceded that a \"disparate impact test for representational impairment—measured against a baseline of proportionality—[is] a very clumsy device for capturing instances of intentional discrimination.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "To the extent that Section 2 focuses on proportional representation, its mandate for segregation will never end, requiring an \"indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture\" \"and then to ensure that the [map] continues to reflect that mixture.\" Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 557 U.S. 557. Finally, the substantive \"uncertainty at the heart of [S]ection 2\"—detailed next—reinforces that the new Section 2's results test is not a \"congruent and proportional response to constitutional violations.\" C. Elmendorf & D. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 Colum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.",
		"context": "To the extent that Section 2 focuses on proportional representation, its mandate for segregation will never end, requiring an \"indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture\" \"and then to ensure that the [map] continues to reflect that mixture.\" Parents Involved in Cmty. 551 U.S. 701; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, the substantive \"uncertainty at the heart of [S]ection 2\"—detailed next—reinforces that the new Section 2's results test is not a \"congruent and proportional response to constitutional violations.\" C. Elmendorf & D. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 Colum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "S Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of contesting peti- tioner's argument that National Parks & Conservation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is irreconcilable with Exemption 4's plain text,1 respond- ent makes little effort to defend the test on that basis. It instead urges inertia: that this Court should defer to the D.C. Circuit because other lower courts have widely adopted National Parks .",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 F.2d 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "BIO 13. But this Court grants certiorari to correct erroneous, although wide- spread, interpretations of important federal statutes. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Widespread adoption of a test does not make it cor- rect. Respondent does not dispute that the Circuits have \"fallen in line behind\" the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Respondent attempts to bolster National Parks by suggesting that the D.C. Circuit unequivocally reaf- firmed it. BIO 14 (discussing Critical Mass Energy Pro- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, the en banc D.C. Circuit retained its test based on stare decisis —not because it believed National Parks correctly interpreted FOIA Ex- emption 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "975 F.2d 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Circuit precedent poses no stare de- cisis obstacle for this Court. The opposite is true: \"It is this Court's responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, as amici supporting peti- tioner demonstrated, National Parks is not even set- 4 tled—it has caused pernicious and unpredictable effects.2 Whatever the D.C. Circuit may have thought a genera- tion ago, experience has proven National Parks unwork- able.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "BIO 30. This Court re- cently rejected a strikingly similar argument under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"narrow- construction principle relies on the flawed premise that the FLSA pursued its remedial purpose at all costs.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Instead, exemptions must be given a \"fair reading,\" as they \"are as much a part of FLSA's purpose\" as its other provisions. Ibid. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FOIA is no different: each exemption is part of the statute, and a plain-meaning interpretation \"gives the exemption the [meaning] Congress intended.\" Milner, 562 U.S. at 572 (giving \"personnel\" in FOIA Exemption 2 its plain meaning); see also Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Instead, it replaces that term with an atextual test fabricated using an especially objectionable form of legis- lative history: selective excerpts of witness testimony during hearings on a predecessor bill. Pet. 12-14; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (declining 3 As theRetail Litigation Center explains, the narrow-construction canon has a dubious provenance. Retail Litigation Center Amicus Br. 5-16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "b. Respondent next protests that giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning would generate a subjective rather than objective test.4 But parties would have to make the ob- jective and verifiable showing that, for example, the in- formation at issue was in fact considered and kept secret rather than publicly disseminated. Cases would turn on whether the record reflects satisfaction of an objective, matter-of-law standard defining \"confidential,\" and the courts would always be the final arbiters of whether the agency or submitters met that standard. Respondent unsuccessfully tries to turn United States Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],to its advantage on this point. BIO 33. In Landano , this Court held that \"confidential\" in FOIA Exemption 7—which protects records that could reason- ably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential law-enforcement source—should be given its plain mean- ing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Id. at 384 (discussing N.H. Right to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; McDonnell Douglas 375 F.3d 1182; GC Micro 33 F.3d 1109); Pet. 26 (discussing State of 256 F.3d 967). Respondent denies that the D.C. and Ninth Circuits demand \"more certainty and specificity\" than other Cir- 8 cuits—by noting that their opinions faithfully recite the National Parks standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "778 F.3d 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Id. at 384 (discussing N.H. Right to 778 F.3d 43; McDonnell Douglas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; GC Micro 33 F.3d 1109); Pet. 26 (discussing State of 256 F.3d 967). Respondent denies that the D.C. and Ninth Circuits demand \"more certainty and specificity\" than other Cir- 8 cuits—by noting that their opinions faithfully recite the National Parks standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "Id. at 384 (discussing N.H. Right to 778 F.3d 43; McDonnell Douglas 375 F.3d 1182; GC Micro [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Pet. 26 (discussing State of 256 F.3d 967). Respondent denies that the D.C. and Ninth Circuits demand \"more certainty and specificity\" than other Cir- 8 cuits—by noting that their opinions faithfully recite the National Parks standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "33 F.3d 1109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases",
		"context": "at 384 (discussing N.H. Right to 778 F.3d 43; McDonnell Douglas 375 F.3d 1182; GC Micro 33 F.3d 1109); Pet. 26 (discussing State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Respondent denies that the D.C. and Ninth Circuits demand \"more certainty and specificity\" than other Cir- 8 cuits—by noting that their opinions faithfully recite the National Parks standard. BIO 19.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 F.3d 967",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of stare decisis do not foreclose review and reassessment of Roe; Casey recognizes that evaluation of changes in fact and law require revaluation of prior precedent",
		"context": ". In Casey , the Court addressed the issue of stare decisis as it related to the precedential strength of Roe, acknowledging that stare decisis is not an \"inexorable command.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 854, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it acknowledged that applying the rule of stare decisis would be unjustified if the circumstances underpinning Roe's jurisprudence changed: \"[I]n constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations.\" Id. at 864.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U. S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Principles of stare decisis do not foreclose review and reassessment of Roe; Casey recognizes that evaluation of changes in fact and law require revaluation of prior precedent",
		"context": "87, No. 4, 2020, https://perma.cc/6U4A- BUP9. 9 Relevant stare decisis factors laid out by the Court include \"whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) and \"whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 855. In the decades since Roe, scientific understanding of human development has advanced significantly, and corresponding changes in the law have occurred, requiring a reexamination of the continued viability of the considerations that drove the Roe decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U. S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "California does not dispute that its intrusion on First Amendment rights triggers heightened scrutiny, but it insists nonetheless (Br. 23 -26) that it need not show that its m eans are narrowly tailored to its ends . 3 This Court 's decisions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Louisiana ex rel. 366 U.S. 293 , hold otherwise, and with good reason. Government can always invoke an end like law enforcement in the abstract, but it is far harder to show, as the First Amendment requires, that the end cannot be served by less intrusive means.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "23 -26) that it need not show that its m eans are narrowly tailored to its ends . 3 This Court 's decisions in 364 U.S. 479, and Louisiana ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , hold otherwise, and with good reason. Government can always invoke an end like law enforcement in the abstract, but it is far harder to show, as the First Amendment requires, that the end cannot be served by less intrusive means. California fails to make that showing here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "That is incorrect. The substantial -relation inquiry examin es whether a disclosure demand sufficiently advances the government 's asserted interest. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 361 U.S. 516 . The narrow -tailoring inquiry examines whether the state 's interest could be accomplish ed through a less intrusive disclos ure demand . E.g., 393 U.S. 14283 F. Supp. 248 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "That is incorrect. The substantial -relation inquiry examin es whether a disclosure demand sufficiently advances the government 's asserted interest. E.g., 357 U.S. 449 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The narrow -tailoring inquiry examines whether the state 's interest could be accomplish ed through a less intrusive disclos ure demand . E.g., 393 U.S. 14283 F. Supp. 248 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "E.g., 357 U.S. 449 ; 361 U.S. 516 . The narrow -tailoring inquiry examines whether the state 's interest could be accomplish ed through a less intrusive disclos ure demand . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]283 F. Supp. 248 . Shelton makes this distinction clear. There, this Court held that \"there can be no question of the relevance of a State 's inquiry into the fitness and compet ence of its teachers, \" and thus that Arkansas 's disclosure statute stood in \"contrast \" to disclosure demands in NAACP v. Alabama and Bates , where the State had failed to show any such substantial relation at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "E.g., 357 U.S. 449 ; 361 U.S. 516 . The narrow -tailoring inquiry examines whether the state 's interest could be accomplish ed through a less intrusive disclos ure demand . E.g., 393 U.S. 14[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Shelton makes this distinction clear. There, this Court held that \"there can be no question of the relevance of a State 's inquiry into the fitness and compet ence of its teachers, \" and thus that Arkansas 's disclosure statute stood in \"contrast \" to disclosure demands in NAACP v. Alabama and Bates , where the State had failed to show any such substantial relation at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 F. Supp. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "In other words, the mere fact that the State 's demand on aggregate does something to advance its ends would suffice to satisfy the inquiry, no matter how grossly dis proportionate or how easily avoided the burden on First Amendment rights. Any such watered -down version of exacting scrutiny would be more like rational -basis review, where narrow tailoring is not required. See Fla. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But California 's conception is misconceived. Under this Court 's precedents, California 's demand must be narrowly tailored, and the State —not AFPF —bears the burden of \"affirmatively establish[ing] \" such tailoring .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "Under this Court 's precedents, California 's demand must be narrowly tailored, and the State —not AFPF —bears the burden of \"affirmatively establish[ing] \" such tailoring . Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord In re436 U.S. 412 . California likewise errs in suggesting (Br. 23 -26) that a requirement of narrow tailoring would necessitate that California employ the \"least restrictive means \" of pursuing its interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "Under this Court 's precedents, California 's demand must be narrowly tailored, and the State —not AFPF —bears the burden of \"affirmatively establish[ing] \" such tailoring . Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New 492 U.S. 469 ; accord In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . California likewise errs in suggesting (Br. 23 -26) that a requirement of narrow tailoring would necessitate that California employ the \"least restrictive means \" of pursuing its interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
		"context": "While \"least restrictive means \" demands a perfect fit between means and ends, and is seldom possible for government to demonstrate, narrow tailori ng requires only a close fit, which government may be able to 5 satisfy on an adequate record. This Court has repeatedly recognized the distinction: \"Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require 'a fit … that employs not necessaril y the least restrictive means but … a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that Shelton and Louisiana v . NAACP require \"compelled disclosures to be narrowly tailored to the asserted governmental interest. \" The United States has since \"reconsidered \" (Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Consequently, State Regulators Have Had to Do More to Protect the Public",
		"context": "Deterrence of fraud cannot be overlooked, discounted, or reduced to numbers. It is a weighty factor for this Court to consider . 27 New State Ice [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Every Class Member Was Falsely Labeled a Terrorist",
		"context": "at 1549. Lower courts have allowed claims arising from statutory violations based on analogies to the common law, even when the underly- ing conduct would not have been precisely recognized at common law. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re846 F.3d 625. 5 5 Congress well understood the close proximity to the common law: FCRA preempts \"any action … in the nature of defamation\" absent \"malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.\" 25 But unlike the inconsequential errors in Spokeo , TransUnion's conduct here amounts to a fully realized injury as to every class member under traditional common law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Every Class Member Was Falsely Labeled a Terrorist",
		"context": "at 1549. Lower courts have allowed claims arising from statutory violations based on analogies to the common law, even when the underly- ing conduct would not have been precisely recognized at common law. See, e.g., 867 F.3d 1108; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 5 Congress well understood the close proximity to the common law: FCRA preempts \"any action … in the nature of defamation\" absent \"malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.\" 25 But unlike the inconsequential errors in Spokeo , TransUnion's conduct here amounts to a fully realized injury as to every class member under traditional common law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Every Class Member Was Falsely Labeled a Terrorist",
		"context": "25 But unlike the inconsequential errors in Spokeo , TransUnion's conduct here amounts to a fully realized injury as to every class member under traditional common law. The common law has recognized a cause of action \"for damage to a person's reputation by the publication of false and defamatory statements\" since the 16th century. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation , 3 Colum. L. Rev. 546, 555–58 (1903).",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Every Class Member Was Falsely Labeled a Terrorist",
		"context": "Restatement (First) of Torts §569 (Am. Law Inst. 1938); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The class members' injuries—being labeled as OFAC- designated criminals—are paradigmatic of this long-recognized common law tort, the polar opposite of an \"incorrect zip code\" that presents no material risk of harm. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should continue its history of extending protection to speech some dub worthless to ensure that we protect the worthwhile.",
		"context": "at 487–88. When discussing defamation, this Court observed that false factual statements have \"no constitutional value,\" but ruled that the \"First Amendment requires that we protect some fals ehood in order to protect speech that matters.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, it limits defamation claims, even for private figures. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should continue its history of extending protection to speech some dub worthless to ensure that we protect the worthwhile.",
		"context": ". of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. True threats are no different. The First Amend- ment protects even the \"vituperative, abusive, and in- exact,\" especially without any evidence the speaker meant to communicate a serious threat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court should continue its history of extending protection to speech some dub worthless to ensure that we protect the worthwhile.",
		"context": "Watts , 394 U.S. at 708. Cross-burning, given its abominable his- tory, ranks high in the loathsome speech category. 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this Court parsed that expression with care, noting different possible messages. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Disclosing AFPF's Schedule B Would Expose AFPF And Its Donors To Threats, Harassment, and Reprisals",
		"context": "Louisiana v. NAACP , 366 U.S. at 296. Even in election cases, where disclosure interests are at their zenith, this Court has held that a facially constitutional disclosure requirement is unconstitutional as applied to a particular group if the group \"can show a 'reasonable probability ' that the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to 'threats, harassment, or reprisals. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord, e.g. , Doe, 561 U.S. at 201. To demonst rate a reasonable probability of threats and harassment, it suffices for an organization to submit \"specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "157. That right includes the right to strike —that is, to engage in a concerted stoppage of work . See Bus [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A separate provision of the Act expressly refers to \" the right to strike.\" 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "The threat of those losses in turn pres- sures the employ er to make concessions or accede to the employees' demands . That is what makes the strike \"the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that str ikes inherently cause economic harm in order to improve wages or working conditions , the Board has repeatedly determined that a concerted work stoppage to achieve lawful objectives does not become unlawful simply because it leads or threatens to lead to the spoilage of perishable products. For example, in Central Oklahoma Milk Producers Ass'n , 125 N .L.R.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "Given that str ikes inherently cause economic harm in order to improve wages or working conditions , the Board has repeatedly determined that a concerted work stoppage to achieve lawful objectives does not become unlawful simply because it leads or threatens to lead to the spoilage of perishable products. For example, in Central Oklahoma Milk Producers Ass'n , 125 N .L.R.B. 419 (1959), enforced, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], milk - truck drivers refused to make further deliveries until their employer raised their wages and s hortened their working hours. See id. at 420.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 F.2d 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "497, 506 -507 (1987) (poultry), enforced, 85 0 F.2d 689 , cert. denied,488 U.S. 1010 ; Leprino Cheese Co. , 170 N .L.R.B. 601, 604- 605 (1968) (cheese), enforced, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir.) , cert. denied,400 U.S. 915 ; Morris Fishman & Sons, Inc. , 122 N .L.R.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.2d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": ", cert. denied,400 U.S. 915 ; Morris Fishman & Sons, Inc. , 122 N .L.R.B. 1436, 1445 -1447 (1959) (per- ishable leather), enforced, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The right to strike is, however, subject to certain \"limitations\" and \"qualifications.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "278 F.2d 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "163. The right to strike does not include the right to use violence. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It does not include the right to violate other federal laws. See Southern S.S. 316 U.S. 31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "See 306 U.S. 240. It does not include the right to violate other federal laws. See Southern S.S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It does not include the right to breach a val id agreement not to strike. See Boys Mar- kets, 398 U.S. 235.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "See Southern S.S. 316 U.S. 31. It does not include the right to breach a val id agreement not to strike. See Boys Mar- kets, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it does not include the right to strike in pursuit of an unlawful objective. See 362 U.S. 274.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "See Boys Mar- kets, 398 U.S. 235. And it does not include the right to strike in pursuit of an unlawful objective. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Board has recognized an additional limitation on the right to strike: In various conte xts, it has held that Section 7 does not protect workers' conduct to the ex- tent the workers fail to take \"reasonable precautions to protect the employer's plant, equipment, or products from foreseeable imminent danger due to sudden cessa- tion of work ,\" Beth any Medical Center , 328 N .L.R.B. 14 1094, 1094 (1999) , at least when the damage to the prop- erty is sufficiently substantial or \"aggravated,\" Central Oklahoma , 125 N.L.R.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "at 435. For example, in Mar- shall Car Wheel & Foundry Co. , 107 N .L.R.B. 314 (1953), enf orcement denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], workers walked out of a foundry during preparations to pour molten iron out of a fur- nace. See 218 F.2d 409. The furnace had to be \"emptied immediately,\" or else there would have been \"severe damage to plant and equipment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "218 F.2d 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "For example, in Mar- shall Car Wheel & Foundry Co. , 107 N .L.R.B. 314 (1953), enf orcement denied218 F.2d 409, workers walked out of a foundry during preparations to pour molten iron out of a fur- nace. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The furnace had to be \"emptied immediately,\" or else there would have been \"severe damage to plant and equipment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "218 F.2d 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "at 315. Applying the same approach in other cases, the Board has found that strikers have engaged in unprotected conduct by ab an- doning company equipment without securing it with a lock, see M&M Backhoe Service, Inc. , 345 N .L.R.B. 462, 470- 471 (2005) , enf orced, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; or walking out of a chemical plant without shutting down their equipment, see290 N.L.R.B. 76 . The Board's reasonable -precautions doctrine is con- sistent with the text of Section 7, w hich protects the right to engage in concerted activities \"for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec- tion.\" 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 F.3d 1047",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "Under that scheme, employers have various tools a t their disposal to avoid or resist the economic pressure of a strike. They may, for instance, forestall a strike altogether by locking workers out. See American Ship Building [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They may also hire new workers to replace strikers . See 304 U.S. 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "See American Ship Building 380 U.S. 300. They may also hire new workers to replace strikers . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And they may use existing workers who have not gone on strike to fill in for those who have. See Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law , 51 U. Chi.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "701, 702 (2003) ; Bethany Med- ical Center , 328 N .L.R.B. at 1094; Johnnie Johnson Tire Co. , 271 N .L.R.B. 293, 295 (1984) , aff 'd, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 212 F.2d 155; Columbia Portland Cement 915 F.2d 253 ; East Chicago Reha- bilitation Center , 710 F.2d 39 . The Board's longstanding views deserve significant deference. Because Congress entrusted the Board with the task of applying the Act's general language to par- ticular circumstances , the Board \"necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "767 F.2d 916",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "701, 702 (2003) ; Bethany Med- ical Center , 328 N .L.R.B. at 1094; Johnnie Johnson Tire Co. , 271 N .L.R.B. 293, 295 (1984) , aff 'd, 767 F.2d 916; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Columbia Portland Cement 915 F.2d 253 ; East Chicago Reha- bilitation Center , 710 F.2d 39 . The Board's longstanding views deserve significant deference. Because Congress entrusted the Board with the task of applying the Act's general language to par- ticular circumstances , the Board \"necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 F.2d 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "701, 702 (2003) ; Bethany Med- ical Center , 328 N .L.R.B. at 1094; Johnnie Johnson Tire Co. , 271 N .L.R.B. 293, 295 (1984) , aff 'd, 767 F.2d 916; 212 F.2d 155; Columbia Portland Cement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; East Chicago Reha- bilitation Center , 710 F.2d 39 . The Board's longstanding views deserve significant deference. Because Congress entrusted the Board with the task of applying the Act's general language to par- ticular circumstances , the Board \"necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.2d 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "The Board's longstanding views deserve significant deference. Because Congress entrusted the Board with the task of applying the Act's general language to par- ticular circumstances , the Board \"necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.\" Beth Israel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, the Board has experience and expertise in the \"complexities of industrial life,\" in the \" 'actualities of industrial rela- tions ,' \" and in balancing \" 'the conflicting legitimate in- terests' \" of employers and employees. 373 U.S. 221.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "Beth Israel 437 U.S. 483. In addition, the Board has experience and expertise in the \"complexities of industrial life,\" in the \" 'actualities of industrial rela- tions ,' \" and in balancing \" 'the conflicting legitimate in- terests' \" of employers and employees. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying the Act's broad language in light of its expertise, the Board has recognized for more than 70 years that, notwithstanding the general rule that eco- nomic losses caused by a strike do not render the strik-ers' conduct unprotected, strikers in some circum- stances have an obligation to take precautions to avoid 17 imminent damage to property. The Board's standard directly addresses the property -damage issue pre- sented here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "Glacier's focus on the strikers' intent is misplaced. The whole point of a strike to secure a collective bar- gaining agreement is to threaten the employer with eco- nomic losses in order to pressure it to accept the strik- ers' terms. See American Steel Found [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It fol- lows that strikers inherently intend to cause a degree of economic harm through the ir refusal to work. That in- tent does not become objectionable simply because the economic harm in question includes the eventual loss of a perishable product in the employer's possession .",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "Glacier also errs in focusing (Br. 1) on whether the union has \"deliberately\" timed the work stoppage to 18 maximize the harm to the employer . It is entirely lawfu l for a union to time a strike to put \"maximum pressure on the employer ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —just as it is lawful for an employer to time a lockout to put maximum pressure on the union and the employees , see American Ship Building , 380 U.S. at 310 . A union may, for example, \"threaten a strike at a department store two weeks before Easter\"; it has no obligation to \"postpon[e] the strike until after Easter when the employer will feel it less severely.\" In- surance Agents , 361 U.S. at 496 n.27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "at 435. Yet Glacier's rule would seemingly have allow ed the dairy producers to sue the drivers or the union for intentionally spoiling any milk that may have been lost because of the strike . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other respects, Glac ier's test would appear to pro- tect conduct that the Act does not . In M&M Backhoe Service , for example, a n employee walked out of work 19 without properly locking up his excavating equipment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 U.S. 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property",
		"context": "Finally, although Glacier's test might seem easy to apply to the facts alleged in the complaint in this case , it may prove harder to administer in other cases. A \"probe of an employee's subjective motivations\" tends to involve \"an endless and unreliable inqu iry.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An ob- jective reasonableness standard does not raise the same concerns. Indeed, \"[r]easonableness, as a standard, is prescribed in several places\" in labor law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The AIA's \"First Inventor to File\" System Replaced Forfeiture as the Incentive for Prompt Filing",
		"context": "In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the 11 invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practi ce it and profit by its use.\" 489 U.S. at 150- 51 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Metallizing Eng'g 153 F.2d 516, is the seminal decision on the effect of a secret sale on patent validity under the pre-AIA §102. In that case, the issue was the secret use of a process before the grace period and the sale of the unpatented products of that process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The AIA's \"First Inventor to File\" System Replaced Forfeiture as the Incentive for Prompt Filing",
		"context": "An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the 11 invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practi ce it and profit by its use.\" 489 U.S. at 150- 51 (quoting 289 U.S. 178 ). Metallizing Eng'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is the seminal decision on the effect of a secret sale on patent validity under the pre-AIA §102. In that case, the issue was the secret use of a process before the grace period and the sale of the unpatented products of that process. The on-sale bar applied because the patent owner was benefitting simultaneously from both trade secret and patent protection.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 F.2d 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The AIA's \"First Inventor to File\" System Replaced Forfeiture as the Incentive for Prompt Filing",
		"context": "And the current on-sale bar [of pre-AIA §102(b)] imposes penalties not d emanded by any legitimate public interest. There is no reason to fear \"commercialization\" that merely consists of a secret sale or offer for sale but that does not operate to disclose the invention to the public. 9 As examples, the Congressional Record cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]191 Fed. Appx. 926. 10 See also cases discussed at note 20 infra . 13 Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The AIA's \"First Inventor to File\" System Replaced Forfeiture as the Incentive for Prompt Filing",
		"context": "The Court recognized that \"'[t]r ade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law. '\" Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . The Court elaborated: T he public at large remained free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering of products in the public domain or by independent creation. Thus, the possibility that trade secret protection would divert inventors from the creative effort necessary to satisfy the rigorous demands of patent protection was remote indeed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "............................................................... 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................... 11 A.S. v. P.S. (Child A bduction) [1998] 2 IR 244 (Ir.) .......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "............................................................... 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 560 U.S. 1 ...................................... 11 A.S. v. P.S. (Child A bduction) [1998] 2 IR 244 (Ir.) .......... 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 F.3d 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "............................................................... 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 560 U.S. 1 ...................................... 11 A.S. v. P.S. (Child A bduction) [1998] 2 IR 244 (Ir.) .......... 14 189 F.3d 240[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "238 F.3d 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "............................................................... 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 560 U.S. 1 ...................................... 11 A.S. v. P.S. (Child A bduction) [1998] 2 IR 244 (Ir.) .......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "(Child A bduction) [1998] 2 IR 244 (Ir.) .......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": ".......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art. 13 ................................................................................ 3 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": ".......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art. 13 ................................................................................ 3 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": ".......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]19 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art. 13 ................................................................................ 3 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": ".......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art. 13 ................................................................................ 3 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "19 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": ".......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 14 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. 1504 : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art. 13 ................................................................................ 3 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": ".......... 14 189 F.3d 240238 F.3d 153 ........................................... 10 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ........................................................... 4 II Page Cases —continued: E, In re, [2011] UKSC 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) ....................... 11, 13 135 S. Ct. 2419 ................... 7 LRR v. COL [2020] NZCA 209 (N.Z.) ................................ 14 138 S. Ct. 1500559 U.S. 542 ......................................................... 16 430 U.S. 119 U.S. 1 ........... 15 Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243 .............. 14 Water Splash, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] : art. 11 .............................................................................. 19 art. 13 ................................................................................ 3 art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "21 -23. Respondent cannot over- come th e plain text, and this Co urt need go no further to determine that the Convention does not mandate consid- eration of ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Water Splash, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. a. Respondent argues (Br. 16 -17) that , because the grave -risk exception is \"forward -looking ,\" it is not just \"appropriate\" but \"necessary\" to consider ameliorative measures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "19 ; rather , it suggests that those other factors are left to the court's discretion. The court of appeals erred by \"in-sert[ing] an amendment\" mandating consideration of an 4 additional factor. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Respondent's suggestion (Br. 11, 15) that a court must consider ameliorative measures \"as part of \" the grave -risk inquiry is affirmatively incompatible with IC- ARA's text.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "See p. 19, infra . Even if the issues of grave risk and ameliorative measures were considered simultaneously, t he court of appeals' rule requires a court to assess the \"full panoply\" of ameliorative measures an d order return of the child \"if at all possible.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By its terms, therefore, the rule demands an exhaustive assessment of the efficacy of all possible ameliorative measures before a court can exercise its dis-cretion to decline to return a child. That process is incom- patible with Article 11 of the Convention , which \"pre- scrib[es] six weeks as [the] normal time for return -order decisions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 F.3d 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "By its terms, therefore, the rule demands an exhaustive assessment of the efficacy of all possible ameliorative measures before a court can exercise its dis-cretion to decline to return a child. That process is incom- patible with Article 11 of the Convention , which \"pre- scrib[es] six weeks as [the] normal time for return -order decisions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. While conceding that \"some measures may intrude too far into custody -related matters, \" respondent claims (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "20-21, 26. But even if the grave -risk exception is narrow, the Convention \"does not pursue\" the return of the child \"at any cost.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And none of the sources cited by respond ent sug- gests that the Convention require s consider ation of ame- liorative measures in every case . 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "10 ii. Respondent next pivots (Br. 31) to the views ex- pressed by the government in an amicus brief filed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But , con- trary to respondent's suggestion, the government did not adopt his position in that case. The disputed issue in Blondin was whether \"a likeli- hood of post -traumatic stress disorder constitutes a 'grave risk of psychological harm' within the meaning of Article 13(b).\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "238 F.3d 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "See p. 8, supra . Accordingly, the Department's position that ameliorative measures are 11 not \"necessary\" to the Convention should be afforded due weight. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5. The Practices Of Other Signatories Confirm That The Convention Does Not Mandate Consideration Of Ameliorative Measures The practices of other signatories support the conclu- sion that the Convention does not mandate consideration of ameliorative measures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "), take s an even narrower ap- proach , noting only that it is \" possible \" that \"conditions may be imposed by the court where an exception has been made out, \" but \"the court considers that it would be in the best interests of the child to return to the requesting State if certain conditions are satisfied .\" That hardly rises to the level of a consistent international practice interpret- ing the Convention's text as mandating consideration of protective measures. See Trans World Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, the text, purposes, and drafting history of the Convention , the views of the State Department, and the 15 practices of ot her signatories all support the conclusion that consideration of ameliorative measures is discretion- ary. In the face of that overwhelming authority, respond- ent's request that this Court \"alter, amend, or add to \" the Convention by \"inserting\" a requirement to consider ame- liorative measures in all cases invites \" an usurpation of power , and not an exercise of judicial functions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "In short, the text, purposes, and drafting history of the Convention , the views of the State Department, and the 15 practices of ot her signatories all support the conclusion that consideration of ameliorative measures is discretion- ary. In the face of that overwhelming authority, respond- ent's request that this Court \"alter, amend, or add to \" the Convention by \"inserting\" a requirement to consider ame- liorative measures in all cases invites \" an usurpation of power , and not an exercise of judicial functions.\" The Amiable Isabella , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court should decline that invitation . B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "19 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "The Court has the discretion to apply the legal stand- ard it adopts, and it would be entirely appropriate for it to do so her e. If the Court agrees with petitioner on the question presented, the appropriate disposition —reversa l or vacatur —turns on whether the ameliorative measures adopted could have been imposed consistent with the Con-vention. The Court has often decided remedial issues be- yond the question presented in order to determine the correct disposition of a case . For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court resolved the 16 Sixth Amendment question presented and proceeded to decide whether the trial court's error was structural , in order to determine whether a new trial was required on remand. Id . at 1510- 1512 & n.4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "Other cases are to the same effect. See, e.g. , Bristol -Myers Squibb [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 135 S. Ct. 2419; 559 U.S. 542 ; 430 U.S. 1 . Respondent 's suggest ion (Br. 36) that petitioner waived any claim to reversal at the certiorari stage is in- correct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "Other cases are to the same effect. See, e.g. , Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 559 U.S. 542 ; 430 U.S. 1 . Respondent 's suggest ion (Br. 36) that petitioner waived any claim to reversal at the certiorari stage is in- correct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "Other cases are to the same effect. See, e.g. , Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ; 135 S. Ct. 2419; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 430 U.S. 1 . Respondent 's suggest ion (Br. 36) that petitioner waived any claim to reversal at the certiorari stage is in- correct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
		"context": "Other cases are to the same effect. See, e.g. , Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ; 135 S. Ct. 2419; 559 U.S. 542 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent 's suggest ion (Br. 36) that petitioner waived any claim to reversal at the certiorari stage is in- correct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "There can be no doubt that the lower courts are divided. In Lubrizol Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fourth Circuit held that, when a debtor-licensor rejects an executory license agreement, the rejection terminates the license. Because the license was treated as terminated, it required that the licensee discontinue all use of the licensed intellectual property, leaving the licensee with only a pre- petition damages claim for the value of the now- terminated license. In 1987, Congress expressly abrogated Lubrizol's result with respect to licen ses of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, see 11 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "756 F.2d 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "§ 365(n), but expressly left open the question of the impact of 9 rejection on trademark licenses. With respect to trademark licenses, Lubrizol remains good law in the Fourth Circuit and courts in other circuits continue to rely on Lubrizol in holding that a licensee's rights are terminated upon rejection. See, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re109 B.R. 557; In re281 B.R. 660. In Sunbeam Prods., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. ), cert denied568 U.S. 1076, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 B.R. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "§ 365(n), but expressly left open the question of the impact of 9 rejection on trademark licenses. With respect to trademark licenses, Lubrizol remains good law in the Fourth Circuit and courts in other circuits continue to rely on Lubrizol in holding that a licensee's rights are terminated upon rejection. See, e.g., In re290 B.R. 507; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re281 B.R. 660. In Sunbeam Prods., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. ), cert denied568 U.S. 1076, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 B.R. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "§ 365(n), but expressly left open the question of the impact of 9 rejection on trademark licenses. With respect to trademark licenses, Lubrizol remains good law in the Fourth Circuit and courts in other circuits continue to rely on Lubrizol in holding that a licensee's rights are terminated upon rejection. See, e.g., In re290 B.R. 507; In re109 B.R. 557; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Sunbeam Prods., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. ), cert denied568 U.S. 1076, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 B.R. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "With respect to trademark licenses, Lubrizol remains good law in the Fourth Circuit and courts in other circuits continue to rely on Lubrizol in holding that a licensee's rights are terminated upon rejection. See, e.g., In re290 B.R. 507; In re109 B.R. 557; In re281 B.R. 660. In Sunbeam Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir. ), cert denied568 U.S. 1076, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the court held that the rejection of a debtor-licensor's obligations under a trademark license agreement is a breach but not a termination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "686 F.3d 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "The split extends beyond the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. Even before Lubrizol , the Ninth Circuit had offered reasoning in line with the Seventh Circuit, 10 indicating that rejection does not impair a licensee's ability to use licensed intellectual property pursuant to the contract. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the court below had erred in determining that the rejection terminated the licensee's rights. The majority opinion in Exide did not reach the second issue 4 because it concluded that 3 Congress subseque ntly abrogated Select-A-Seat 's holding that rejection of a contract can vo id an exclusivity agreement. See 11 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "625 F.2d 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
		"context": "See Joint Press Statement of Senators Cornyn and Warren concerning Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2018 (Jan. 8, 2018), available at https://www.cornyn. senate.gov/content/news/cornyn-warren-introduce- bill-prevent-%E2%80%98forum-shopping%E2%80% 99-bankruptcy-cases (\"Closing the loophole that allows corporations to 'forum shop' for districts sympathetic to their interests will strengthen the integrity of the bankruptcy system and build public confidence. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As set 14 forth below, INTA asks this Court to grant the petition for certiorari and to adopt the Sunbeam rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Permitting Relators to Invoke section 3731(b)(2) According to Its Plain Terms Is Not \"Impossible\" to Square with Congressional Intent",
		"context": "(Kennedy, J., concurring). Regardless of whether it serves as a subs et of absurdity or an inde- pendent basis on which to depart from unambiguous statutory language, the stri ctures are the same: the contrary intent must have been \"clearly expressed\" by the legislative body. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, if the legislative history and surrounding provisions are anything but clear—if they are incon- clusive—then the Court shou ld not override the unam- biguous language. 26 Here, at worst, the legislative history and sur- rounding provisions are inconclusive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Permitting Relators to Invoke section 3731(b)(2) According to Its Plain Terms Is Not \"Impossible\" to Square with Congressional Intent",
		"context": "Either way, Petitioners cannot meet their burden of showing the \"impossibil- ity\" required to overturn the unambiguous language. Congressional arbitrariness is not enough. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We do not, and should not, make it our business to second-guess the Legislature's judgment when it comes to [matters of congressional line-draw- ing]. Line-drawing, after all, frequently requires arbi-trary decisions that cannot sensibly be subjected to judicial review.\"). Even mistake and inadvertence do not warrant this Court's intervention into otherwise unambiguous statutory language.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 615",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "Rather, \"qui tam relators are different in kind than the Gov- ernment. They are motivate d primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.\" Hughes Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Courts that have upheld the qui tam provisions against separation-of-powers challenges have done so \"[p]recisely because of the United States' significant control over FCA qui tam actions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 939",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "§ 3730(b)(2). But Petitioner ignores the fact that the Ex ecutive's prosecutorial dis- cretion remains relevant throughout a proceeding, and includes discretion \"to dismiss a proceeding once brought.\" Newman , 382 F.2d at 480; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner's reading of the Government's dismissal authority also ignores the many circumstances in which the Government could reasonably decide to dis- miss a previously declined qui tam action well after the initial 60-day period. As in this case, discovery may reveal facts that change the Government's as- sessment of the case's merits or the burdens the case imposes on agency resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "818 F.3d 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "At a minimum, when interpreted as Petitioner proposes, the same cannot be said about the FCA. Under Petitioner's interpretation, its qui tam provisions would \"impair [the Executive Branch] in the performance of its constitutional duties.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. EHR \"need show no more than this to establish a . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "Requiring searching judicial review of the Government's reasons for dismissing a qui tam action would give courts primary authority to decide whether to maintain or discontinue enforce- ment actions on behalf of the United States. In so do- ing, it would deprive the Pr esident of \"[o]ne of the greatest unilateral powers a President possesses un- der the Constitution\"—\"the power to protect individ-ual liberty by essentially under-enforcing federal statutes regulating private behavior.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id. at 265 n.9. And it would foist on courts the responsibility of reviewing non-enforcement deci-sions, a task for which co urts are \"general[ly] un- suit[ed].\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "B. Petitioner's Interpretation Also Raises Con- stitutional Concerns Under the Appoint- ments Clause. The FCA's vesting of executive power in private re- lators also raises concerns under the Appointments Clause, which \"lays out the permissible methods of ap- pointing 'Officers of the United States.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but if Peti- tioner is correct that relato rs have exclusive litigation authority in declined cases, then they must be ap- pointed pursuant to that Clause, see Buckley , 424 U.S. at 138. In applying the Appointments Clause, the Court has looked to two factors: First, whether the individ- ual wields \"significant auth ority pursuant to the laws of the United States,\" and second, whether the indi-vidual occupies a position that is \"continuing,\" not \"temporary or episodic.\" Lucia , 138 S. Ct. at 2051-52 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "Some courts have rejected Appointments Clause challenges to the qui tam provisions based in signifi- cant part on the Government's substantial control over qui tam actions. See United States ex rel. Tax- payers Against [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the 37 Government's ability to control a qui tam action de- pends on its authority to dismiss the suit at any point. If Petitioner were correct that the Government cannot remove a relator by dismissing the qui tam action, the relator would wield \"significant authority\" without be- ing \"subordinate to\" anyone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "41 F.3d 1032",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "If Petitioner were correct that the Government cannot remove a relator by dismissing the qui tam action, the relator would wield \"significant authority\" without be- ing \"subordinate to\" anyone. A relator, so empowered, must be an \"officer\" subject to the Appointments Clause. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. A relator also occupies a position that is \"con- tinuing\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "The distinction between principal and inferior officers is irrelevant here, because relators are not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause regardless of how they are classified. Like the prosecutor in Morrison , a relator does not provide only \"occasional and intermittent services\" on an ad hoc basis \"w hen called on.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 99 U.S. 508. Rather, a rela- tor's position is \"continuous\" because it is not neces- sarily personal to the individual who brings the 38 action. See, e.g., United States ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "The distinction between principal and inferior officers is irrelevant here, because relators are not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause regardless of how they are classified. Like the prosecutor in Morrison , a relator does not provide only \"occasional and intermittent services\" on an ad hoc basis \"w hen called on.\" See 137 U.S. 310; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, a rela- tor's position is \"continuous\" because it is not neces- sarily personal to the individual who brings the 38 action. See, e.g., United States ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.",
		"context": "Rather, a rela- tor's position is \"continuous\" because it is not neces- sarily personal to the individual who brings the 38 action. See, e.g., United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 The relator's role is continuing notwithstanding the absence of a formal employment relationship with the Government. That is because \"the Appointments Clause protects against power improperly granted, whether to federal employees or private citizens.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 F.3d 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Here, the Montana Legislature has done precisely that by conditioning access to a valuable tax benefit on the requirement that—as a practical matter—taxpayers fund reli- gious instruction that is inimical to their own faiths. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine \"re- flect[s] an overarching principle that vindicates the Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people to give them up.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A State engages in such co- ercion when it obligates individuals to forgo constitu- tionally protected rights so as to receive a benefit 22 from the State. The Court has held \"in a variety of contexts that 'the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "The Court has held \"in a variety of contexts that 'the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.'\" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). See, e.g., 539 U.S. 194. The Court has \"repeatedly rejected the argument that if the government need not confer a benefit at all, it can withhold the benefit because someone re- fuses to give up constitutional rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Ibid. (quoting 461 U.S. 540). See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has \"repeatedly rejected the argument that if the government need not confer a benefit at all, it can withhold the benefit because someone re- fuses to give up constitutional rights.\" Koontz , 570 U.S. at 608.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Koontz , 570 U.S. at 608. It would be a \"palpable incongruity\" to strike down legislation that expressly denies a per- son's constitutional rights, but to uphold legislation \"by which the same result is accomplished under surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The doctrine applies even when the benefit is gratuitous. Indeed, \"virtually all of [the Court's] un- constitutional conditions cases involve a gratuitous governmental benefit of some kind.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Indeed, \"virtually all of [the Court's] un- constitutional conditions cases involve a gratuitous governmental benefit of some kind.\" Koontz , 570 U.S. at 608. See, e.g., Memorial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]740 F.3d 176208 F.3d 702. 23 If governments had the power to so condition the exercise of rights, the \"guarantees embedded in the Constitution\" could be \"manipulated out of exist- ence.\" Frost , 271 U.S. at 594.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Indeed, \"virtually all of [the Court's] un- constitutional conditions cases involve a gratuitous governmental benefit of some kind.\" Koontz , 570 U.S. at 608. See, e.g., Memorial 415 U.S. 250[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]208 F.3d 702. 23 If governments had the power to so condition the exercise of rights, the \"guarantees embedded in the Constitution\" could be \"manipulated out of exist- ence.\" Frost , 271 U.S. at 594.",
		"citation_value_orig": "740 F.3d 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Indeed, \"virtually all of [the Court's] un- constitutional conditions cases involve a gratuitous governmental benefit of some kind.\" Koontz , 570 U.S. at 608. See, e.g., Memorial 415 U.S. 250740 F.3d 176[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 If governments had the power to so condition the exercise of rights, the \"guarantees embedded in the Constitution\" could be \"manipulated out of exist- ence.\" Frost , 271 U.S. at 594.",
		"citation_value_orig": "208 F.3d 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Frost , 271 U.S. at 594. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine thus gives effect to this funda- mental insight, holding that what the Constitution \"precludes the government from commanding direct- ly, it also precludes the government from accomplish- ing indirectly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This principle applies with full force here. The Court has held that, \"[w]here the state conditions re- ceipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro- scribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious be- lief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an ad- herent to modify his behavior and to violate his be- liefs, a burden upon religion exists.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "The Court has held that, \"[w]here the state conditions re- ceipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro- scribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious be- lief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an ad- herent to modify his behavior and to violate his be- liefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the com- pulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 374 U.S. 398. If applied as petitioners and the United States demand, Montana's tax-credit scheme runs afoul of this principle because the State could not directly mandate the conduct required of taxpayers to receive the tax credit—the financing of Christian religious education. Such a mandate plainly would violate the First Amendment, which \"forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "The Court has held that, \"[w]here the state conditions re- ceipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro- scribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious be- lief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an ad- herent to modify his behavior and to violate his be- liefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the com- pulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.\" 450 U.S. 707; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If applied as petitioners and the United States demand, Montana's tax-credit scheme runs afoul of this principle because the State could not directly mandate the conduct required of taxpayers to receive the tax credit—the financing of Christian religious education. Such a mandate plainly would violate the First Amendment, which \"forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "If applied as petitioners and the United States demand, Montana's tax-credit scheme runs afoul of this principle because the State could not directly mandate the conduct required of taxpayers to receive the tax credit—the financing of Christian religious education. Such a mandate plainly would violate the First Amendment, which \"forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Sch. Dist. of Ab- ingdon 374 U.S. 203.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "310 U.S. 296; see also Sch. Dist. of Ab- ingdon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 And although Montana's program does not re- quire that taxpayers themselves embrace Christiani- ty to benefit from the program, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is triggered by the practical re- quirement that program beneficiaries support anoth- er faith's religious teachings. The State surely could not, for example, provide that individuals are eligible for state employment only if they provide funds to a Muslim congregation for its construction of a mosque, or to a Jewish congregation to support To- rah studies, or to Jehovah's Witnesses to assist in proselytizing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "Against this background, the United States' submission in this case offers an oddly distorted ar- gument. The United States correctly explains \"that a State 'cannot exclude individual Catholics, Luther- ans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation'\" (U.S. Br. 9 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])); and that \"the government may not 'impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.'\" U.S. Br. 10 (quoting Emp't 494 U.S. 872).",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "9 (quoting 330 U.S. 1)); and that \"the government may not 'impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.'\" U.S. Br. 10 (quoting Emp't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But that is precisely why the United States' proposed applica- tion of the tax-credit program is unconstitutional : so far as minority religions are concerned, it is the gov- ernment's application of Montana's program that ef- fectively excludes adherents of those religions from receiving benefits \"because of their faith\" and that fails to \"'protect[] religious observers against unequal treatment.'\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit",
		"context": "But that is precisely why the United States' proposed applica- tion of the tax-credit program is unconstitutional : so far as minority religions are concerned, it is the gov- ernment's application of Montana's program that ef- fectively excludes adherents of those religions from receiving benefits \"because of their faith\" and that fails to \"'protect[] religious observers against unequal treatment.'\" U.S. Br. 10 (quoting Church of the 25 Lukumi Babalu Aye, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "1. Petitioner has not shown the \"irreducible constitutional minimum\" to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court: an \"injury in fact,\" which is both \"concrete and particularized,\" and \"actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the time it filed suit, petit ioner was using Unit 1 to harvest timber under a lease that is in effect until 2043, and petitioner has expressly represented its intention to continue doing so for the \"foreseeable future.\" C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "But Article III limitations do not permit plaintiffs to transform conjectural future harms into actionable, concrete injuries simply by positing that a hypothetical purchaser would pay more for a property were there no risk of future regulation. This Court rejected such an attempt in Nat'l Park Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the petitioner contended that uncertainty as to the applicability of the Contract Disputes Act, see 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "Id. Petitioner's claims—that a hypothetical purchaser would incorporate the uncertainty arising from a critical habitat designation into an offer to buy Unit 6 As courts regularly recognize, there is no substantive difference in these circumstances between Article III's \"hardship\" (ripeness) and \"concrete injury\" (standing) requirements. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 1—are no different. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "617 F.3d 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "To be sure, the regulation here, unlike the one challenged in NPHA , is directed at Unit 1, and this Court has said that injury is more readily established when the plaintiff itself is \"an object of the [challenged] action,\" Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561-62. But that observation bears only on particularity, and the Court has \"made it clear time and time again that an injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized.\" Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even where a plaintiff can show violations of \"his [own] stat utory rights,\" dismissal is required if the violations \"result in no harm.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "That does not mean that a property owner need allege an intent to sell in o rder to challenge an actual land use restriction—or that decreased market value is not a permissible measure of damages. But in such cases, the government action has directly—and definitively—impaired a significant component of the plaintiff's ownership rights. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the Service has not asserted \"jur isdiction\" over Unit 1, Markle Br. 37; the landowners have the same rights of use and exclusion they enjoyed before designation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "37; the landowners have the same rights of use and exclusion they enjoyed before designation. Were petitioner's actuarial approach to prevail here, the uncontroversial justiciability rules for property regulation cases would be a dead letter: The \"market\" 23 can always be expected to value a parcel that might (but might not) be developable with a zoning variance less than one that may be developed as of right. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Even if petitioner's showings satisfied the minimum injury requirements for standing, dismissal, on Article III ripeness grounds, would be warranted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "And there are clear benefits to withholding consideration here. It is entirely possible that the various contingencies on which petitioner's claim depends will never materialize. At the very least, a court's consideration of petitioner's claims of millions of dollars in losses— not to mention its intimations of \"constitutional doubt\"—will \"stand on a much surer footing,\" Toilet Goods [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], if it occurs in the context of an actual permit application or consultation. Cf. MacDonald, Sommer & 477 U.S. 340.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
		"context": "At the very least, a court's consideration of petitioner's claims of millions of dollars in losses— not to mention its intimations of \"constitutional doubt\"—will \"stand on a much surer footing,\" Toilet Goods 387 U.S. 158, if it occurs in the context of an actual permit application or consultation. Cf. MacDonald, Sommer & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. II. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Bradford-Scott Rule Is \"Arbitration-Specific\"",
		"context": "R. App. P. 4(a)(4). See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Griggs , a district court had entered a final, summary judgment on the merits against a defendant. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Bradford-Scott Rule Is \"Arbitration-Specific\"",
		"context": "The Tenth Circuit, which currently requires automatic stays pending arbitrability appeals, acknowledges that this Court \"has never explicitly extended\" Griggs to require stays pending arbitrability appeals. McCauley , 413 F.3d at 1160. Therefore, the judicial policy of imposing stays pending arbitrability appeals—which originated sua sponte , in Bradford-Scott , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—consti - 30 tutes a \"novel,\" material \"variant\" of Griggs . Morgan , 142 S.Ct. at 1710 -13.4 The Bradford-Scott rule is also impermissibly \"arbitration-specific,\" as it judicially \"favor[s] arbitra - tion over litigation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 F.3d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Bradford-Scott Rule Is \"Arbitration-Specific\"",
		"context": "Moreover, in the preliminary injunction context (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)), both courts are simultaneously reviewing the same merits issues to decide whether th e challenged conduct will continue to be enjoined or allowed. E.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To apply Bradford-Scott 's reasoning to simultaneous reviews of arbitrability and merits issues, respectively—but not to simultaneous review of the same standing injunction and the same merits issues—is to clearly favor arbitrability appeals over injunction appeals. Morgan , 142 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Eighth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent",
		"context": ". Below, the Eighth Circuit held that ERISA pre- empted four provisions of Arkansas's PBM-reimburse- ment law, each implementi ng Arkansas's policy of setting a pharmacy-acquisition-cost floor for PBM reimbursements. It held that under its earlier decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], those provisions were preempted because they both referred to and had \"a connection with\" ERISA. App. 7a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Eighth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The trigger for that law's application, neces- sarily, was the existence of an approved apprenticeship program. Some of those programs were ERISA plans, but not all were.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Eighth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "Therefore, this Court concluded that the law \" 'function[ed] irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan' \" and did not refer to them, even though a plan's existence was one possible trigger for the law's application. Id. at 328 (alteration omitted) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The relationship between Ar- kansas's law and ERISA plans is the same. No less outlandish is resp ondent's novel connection- with theory, which concedes that states can set pharmacies' reimbursement rates but would forbid states from enforcing them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Eighth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "In other words, whatever state law says the rates are, pharmacies must accept whatever rates respondent's memb ers are willing to pay. This theory too flouts precedent. This Court has held that \"ERISA was not meant to pre-empt basic rate regulation,\" New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or \"intended to squelch\" it. Id. at 665.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": ". Denying qualified immunity when officers violate \"clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable [officer] would have known,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is just as im- portant to law enforcement as granting qualified im- munity when a right is unclear. See 137 S. Ct. 1277 (\"The erroneous grant of summary judgment in qualified-im- munity cases imposes no less harm on society as a whole, than does the erroneous denial of summary judgment in such cases.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": "This Court's review is needed to correct the error, re- solve the conflict with this Court's cases, and restore the proper relationship between law enforcement and the public. As an initial matter, this Court has firmly rejected any \"rigid gloss on the qualified immunity standard\" that would require \"the facts of previous cases [to] be 'materially similar' to\" the case at hand. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 134 S. Ct. 1861. But th at is precisely what the Tenth Circuit required here. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": "This Court's review is needed to correct the error, re- solve the conflict with this Court's cases, and restore the proper relationship between law enforcement and the public. As an initial matter, this Court has firmly rejected any \"rigid gloss on the qualified immunity standard\" that would require \"the facts of previous cases [to] be 'materially similar' to\" the case at hand. 536 U.S. 730; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But th at is precisely what the Tenth Circuit required here. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1861",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": "9a. But this Court has held that \"general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning,\" and there are \"general consti- tutional rule[s] [that can] apply with obvious clar-ity to the specific conduct in question.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Hope , 536 U.S. at 741 (\"[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances[.]\"). Cases involving \"fundamentally 6 similar\" or \"materially similar\" facts are \"not neces- sary\" for every reasonable officer to know of certain constitutional rights. Hope , 536 U.S. at 741.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": "Lanier , 520 U.S. at 271 (explaining that \"[t]he easiest cases don't even arise,\" but \"it does not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune\" (citation omitted)). This Court thus holds that the \"very action in question\" need not have \"been held unlawful\" previously for an officer to be held liable. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any other rule would threaten to im- munize the very worst violations. Regrettably, that is what the Tenth Circuit has done here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": "And in such cases, granting qualified immunity disserves citizens and law enforcement alike. The holding below upsets the balance this Court has struck in its qualified immunity jurisprudence, which \"is important to 'society as a whole.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Qualified immunity balances the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction , and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.\" Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The behavior descri bed in petitioner's com- plaint is a perfect exampl e. As Chief Judge Tym- kovich's concurrence recognized, that behavior is nothing short of \"reprehensible\" and demonstrates \"ex- traordinary contempt of a law abiding citizen.\" App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contrary \"evidence\" cannot support their novel theory",
		"context": "At bottom, Petitioners' case depends on an inference that is so out of tune with the tenor of the f ounding era as to be utterly implausible. \"The Framers of the Federal Constitution … viewed the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet Petitioners ask this Court to infer that when it came to the manner in which federal elections would be conducted — an area the founding generation surely knew created enormous opportunities for mischief, partisan and otherwise — the Framers deliberately chose to cut state legislatures loose from the core separation - of - powers constraints that the constitutions of every founding - era State had in place. One would ne ed the clearest of clear statements before accepting such an ahistorical and dangerous reading of the Elections Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide",
		"context": ". Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress enumerated powers, and among them is the power \"[t]o 71 Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 48 regulate commerce . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide",
		"context": ". .\" NW States Portland Cement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has ex- pressed that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause \"is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce.\" 301 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide",
		"context": "NW States Portland Cement 358 U.S. 450. This Court has ex- pressed that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause \"is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, \"[t]he fundamental principal\" of this power is to \"enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection or advance-ment;' to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and ensure its safety;' to foster, protect, control and re- strain.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide",
		"context": "Most important, that this power is plenary \"and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce no matter what the source of d angers which threatens it.\" Id. (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As a matter of fact, \"[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to in-terstate commerce that their control is essential or ap- propriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "223 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Williamson County Court's Reliance On Monsanto's Nonjudicial \"Process\" Does Not Support A Role For Courts In Ripening Takings Claims",
		"context": "Williamson County's state litigation ripening requirement rests on a few broad brushstrokes of reasoning. In the first, the Court wrote: If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process \"yield[s] just compensation,\" then the property owner \"has no claim against the Government\" for a taking. Williamson County Regional Planning [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Monsanto , a decision which Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote only twelve months before he wrote theWilliamson County opinion, was a singularly bad 2 Transcript of Oral Argument, Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning 473 U.S. 172.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Williamson County Court's Reliance On Monsanto's Nonjudicial \"Process\" Does Not Support A Role For Courts In Ripening Takings Claims",
		"context": "Williamson County Regional Planning 473 U.S. 172. Monsanto , a decision which Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote only twelve months before he wrote theWilliamson County opinion, was a singularly bad 2 Transcript of Oral Argument, Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5place for him to look for support for a state litigation ripening requirement, for in Monsanto the \"adequate process\" was not judicial. In fact, that process was created by Congress specifically to eliminate, to the extent possible, the need for litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Williamson County Court's Reliance On Monsanto's Nonjudicial \"Process\" Does Not Support A Role For Courts In Ripening Takings Claims",
		"context": "See 5 We note that, on the facts of Williamson County itself, the bank had no need for variances from the new regulations because it had prevailed in the lower courts on its argument that it had only ever been lawfully subject to the old regulations. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 182–84. 6 In a footnote the Court justified this inconsistency on the grounds that takings claims are unique, an explanation that rests on the erroneous assumption that just compensation is denied, and the associated takings claim becomes ripe, only —continued on next page — 13also City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, the state litigation requirement gives to a state court's remedial proceedings the same power to ripen a federal takings claim as that possessed by the final agency decision that \"in icts [the] actual, concrete injury\" by taking without just compensation. Essentially, the Williamson County Court treated a state court's final judgment denying money damages as if it were simply the judicial analog of the local government's failing to pay just compensation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Williamson County Court's Reliance On Monsanto's Nonjudicial \"Process\" Does Not Support A Role For Courts In Ripening Takings Claims",
		"context": "That fact should have raised a red flag alerting the Court that it was not laying down a procedure for ripening a takings claim for federal litigation, but rather for extinguishing it. A state court judgment denying a plaintiff relief on a state takings claim adds nothing to the ripeness of a federal claim, and in fact, under Williamson County , it imperils such a claim. During oral argument in San Remo Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said: [F]rankly, it isn't clear to me that the Court ever contemplated just cutting off any determination in Federal court of takings claims in the way that it seems to work out by application of Williamson County . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The fair use defense plays an important role by allowing copyrighted works to be used when the circumstances indicate that market forces might fail to reach socially desirable results",
		"context": "Congress has used this power to pass a series of copy- right statutes, which, this Court repeatedly explained, establish an incentive scheme that encourages authors to create by providing them exclusive rights that can be utilized in obtaining remuneration. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1954 ). Authors' remunera- tion, in turn, promotes the progress of science by advancing the production and dissemination of crea- tive works. See 537 U.S. 186.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The fair use defense plays an important role by allowing copyrighted works to be used when the circumstances indicate that market forces might fail to reach socially desirable results",
		"context": ", 347 U.S. 201 (1954 ). Authors' remunera- tion, in turn, promotes the progress of science by advancing the production and dissemination of crea- tive works. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There are, however, situations in which the author's interest in compensation might defeat rather than serve the progress of science. Various copyright law doctrines have evolved to mitigate such concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The fair use defense plays an important role by allowing copyrighted works to be used when the circumstances indicate that market forces might fail to reach socially desirable results",
		"context": "It thus might harm the market share of copyright owners and reduce the authors' remuneration. Such a result is, however, justified when there are circum-stances, some of them common, that cast doubt on the effective operation of the market for authorized use. Ty, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gordon, at 1613–14. Multiple circumstances and factors may indicate that market forces might fa il to reach desirable results. A common condition that migh t cause a market to fail is the existence of significant costs in reaching volun-tary licenses (transaction costs).",
		"citation_value_orig": "292 F.3d 512",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": "448, 448-49 (1990); see also Servotronics , 975 F.3d at 695-96. 44 \"foreign or international tribunals\" under Section 1782, and the first judicial decision addressing the prospect did not appear until 1994. See Rothstein at 1; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By the end of the 1990s, however, the only two courts of appeals to have decisively weighed in on th at proposition had rejected it. See168 F.3d 880; NBC , 165 F.3d 184.",
		"citation_value_orig": "853 F. Supp. 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": "See Rothstein at 1; In re853 F. Supp. 695. By the end of the 1990s, however, the only two courts of appeals to have decisively weighed in on th at proposition had rejected it. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; NBC , 165 F.3d 184. That understanding remained in force, largely undisturbed, until the Sixth Circuit's decision in Abdul Latif twenty years later.15 During that period, this Court's only decision interpreting the scope of Section 1782 is consistent with that decades-long view. In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. , the Court addressed whether Section 1782 auth orized district court assistance for a proceeding before the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition— an agency of the executive branch of the European Union.",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 F.3d 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": "See Rothstein at 1; In re853 F. Supp. 695. By the end of the 1990s, however, the only two courts of appeals to have decisively weighed in on th at proposition had rejected it. See168 F.3d 880; NBC , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That understanding remained in force, largely undisturbed, until the Sixth Circuit's decision in Abdul Latif twenty years later.15 During that period, this Court's only decision interpreting the scope of Section 1782 is consistent with that decades-long view. In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. , the Court addressed whether Section 1782 auth orized district court assistance for a proceeding before the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition— an agency of the executive branch of the European Union.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": "at 247-49, 257-63 (discussing 1855 Act, history of amendments to Section 1782, legislation authorizing Rules Commission, 1963 Report, and 1964 Act's legislative history). Notably, the Court emphasized that Congress's decision to expand Section 1782 to cover \"foreign or 15 The Eleventh Circuit briefly held that Section 1782 could encompass private arbitration, but the panel sua sponte granted reconsideration and decided the case on other grounds. See Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 45 international tribunal[s]\" in 1964 was meant \"to ensure that 'assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts ,' but extends also to 'administrative and quas i-judicial proceedings.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "747 F.3d 1262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": "Do ing so does nothing to advance the government-centric comity interests that motivated Section 1782's passage. To the contrary, comity considerations have long been understood to act \"as a canon of construction, [to] shorten the reach of a statute,\" in situations like this in which \"a court [should] presume that Cong ress, out of respect for foreign sovereigns, limited the application of domestic law.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 49 (citation omitted); see also Hartford Fire Ins. 509 U.S. 764. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": "To the contrary, comity considerations have long been understood to act \"as a canon of construction, [to] shorten the reach of a statute,\" in situations like this in which \"a court [should] presume that Cong ress, out of respect for foreign sovereigns, limited the application of domestic law.\" In re917 F.3d 85 49 (citation omitted); see also Hartford Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Allowing Section 1782 discovery in private foreign arbitrations would also inflict direct—and asymmetric—harm on U.S. residents and businesses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding",
		"context": ", 138 S. Ct. at 1621. \"[I]t is typically a desire to keep the effort and expense required to resolve a dispute within manageable bounds that prompts [litig ants] mutually to forgo access to judicial remedies.\" Mitsubishi Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Arbitration achieves those benefits by streamlining the dispute resolution process, ensuring a clear set of procedural rules agreed by the parties in advance, and eliminating the need for lengthy collateral litigation and appeals. Extending Section 1782 to private arbitration would undercut these benefits .",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": ". Administrative issue exhaustion is often described \"as a general rule\" of administrative law, under which parties cannot raise claims for the first time in federal court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But, when it comes to constitutional claims, the \"general rule\" is the opposite: This Court has declined to require issue exhaustion for constitutional claims. 6 Most notably, in Mathews v. Eldridge , the Court held that failure to raise a constitutional challenge to agency procedures before the Social Security Administration would not stop the petitioner from raising the claim for the first time in federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "But, when it comes to constitutional claims, the \"general rule\" is the opposite: This Court has declined to require issue exhaustion for constitutional claims. 6 Most notably, in Mathews v. Eldridge , the Court held that failure to raise a constitutional challenge to agency procedures before the Social Security Administration would not stop the petitioner from raising the claim for the first time in federal court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that the agency would not have been required to consider a constitutional challenge if one was raised and, even if it had considered the challenge, \"[i]t is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an adjudicatory context.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "at 330. Other decisions involving the Social Security Administration are in accord. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that, once it was clear that the only question left concerned the \"constitutionality of a statutory requirement,\" the agency had no \"jurisdiction to determine\" the constitutional claims and the justification for exhaustion (remedy exhaustion and by extension issue exhaustion) had expired. And in 426 U.S. 67, the Court likewise declined to require exhaustion on the ground that a \"constitutional question is beyond the Secretary's competence.\" Other cases, arising in distinct contexts, also follow in the same line.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "Other decisions involving the Social Security Administration are in accord. In 422 U.S. 749, the Court held that, once it was clear that the only question left concerned the \"constitutionality of a statutory requirement,\" the agency had no \"jurisdiction to determine\" the constitutional claims and the justification for exhaustion (remedy exhaustion and by extension issue exhaustion) had expired. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court likewise declined to require exhaustion on the ground that a \"constitutional question is beyond the Secretary's competence.\" Other cases, arising in distinct contexts, also follow in the same line. For instance, in Public Utilities Commission of the State of 355 U.S. 534, the Court explained that \"where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative 7 procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency may be defied and judicial relief sought as the only effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "And in 426 U.S. 67, the Court likewise declined to require exhaustion on the ground that a \"constitutional question is beyond the Secretary's competence.\" Other cases, arising in distinct contexts, also follow in the same line. For instance, in Public Utilities Commission of the State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explained that \"where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative 7 procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency may be defied and judicial relief sought as the only effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right.\" In 573 U.S. 513, the Court addressed an Appointments Clause challenge although it was not raised before the agency, despite an express statutory exhaustion requirement, and in doing so implicitly adopted the D.C. Circuit's reasoning that \"both this court and the Supreme Court have considered objections to the authority of the decisionmaker whose decision is under review even when those objections were not raised below.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 534",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "Circuit's reasoning that \"both this court and the Supreme Court have considered objections to the authority of the decisionmaker whose decision is under review even when those objections were not raised below.\" 705 F.3d at 497. And in Free Enterprise [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a litigant could raise a constitutional challenge without following typical procedures for agency adjudication in part because \"constitutional claims are also outside the Commission's competence and expertise.\" Summarizing the case law in 430 U.S. 99, the Court explained that decisions do not require issue exhaustion for constitutional claims because \"[c]onstitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.\" The Court observed that application of issue exhaustion doctrine to constitutional claims would \"effectively have closed the federal forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "705 F.3d at 497. And in Free Enterprise 561 U.S. 477, the Court held that a litigant could raise a constitutional challenge without following typical procedures for agency adjudication in part because \"constitutional claims are also outside the Commission's competence and expertise.\" Summarizing the case law in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explained that decisions do not require issue exhaustion for constitutional claims because \"[c]onstitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.\" The Court observed that application of issue exhaustion doctrine to constitutional claims would \"effectively have closed the federal forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "Most cases requiring issue 8 exhaustion are easily distinguished on the grounds that they involve statutory or regulatory issues; for instance, United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 US. 33, 36–37 (1952), addressed the argument that an appointment did not comport with the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than the Appointments Clause. This Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], did not involve agency adjudication at all, and instead involved application of a statutory exhaustion requirement in the unique context of prisoner litigation. And, meanwhile, cases like 567 U.S. 1, and 529 U.S. 1, hold that litigants must exhaust their remedies by proceeding before an administrative body when required to do so by statute, but they do not address the separate question of issue exhaustion. These cases are consistent with a rule under which issue exhaustion is not required for constitutional claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 81",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "33, 36–37 (1952), addressed the argument that an appointment did not comport with the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than the Appointments Clause. This Court's decision in 548 U.S. 81, did not involve agency adjudication at all, and instead involved application of a statutory exhaustion requirement in the unique context of prisoner litigation. And, meanwhile, cases like [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 529 U.S. 1, hold that litigants must exhaust their remedies by proceeding before an administrative body when required to do so by statute, but they do not address the separate question of issue exhaustion. These cases are consistent with a rule under which issue exhaustion is not required for constitutional claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "33, 36–37 (1952), addressed the argument that an appointment did not comport with the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than the Appointments Clause. This Court's decision in 548 U.S. 81, did not involve agency adjudication at all, and instead involved application of a statutory exhaustion requirement in the unique context of prisoner litigation. And, meanwhile, cases like 567 U.S. 1, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], hold that litigants must exhaust their remedies by proceeding before an administrative body when required to do so by statute, but they do not address the separate question of issue exhaustion. These cases are consistent with a rule under which issue exhaustion is not required for constitutional claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Private reliance interests favor overruling Seminole Rock and Auer",
		"context": "Stare decisis also protects the reliance interests of private parties. As one example, \"when a court is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitu- tional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions with particu- lar strength against reversing course.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, where there are no \"legitimate reliance interest[s]\" at stake, stare decisis has less force. Wayfair , 138 S. Ct. at 2098.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's ERISA Preemption Precedents Resolve This Case",
		"context": "This Court has interpreted this phrase to require preemption of two categories of state laws. First, \"ERISA pre-empts a state law if it has a 'refer ence to' ERISA plans.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"To be more precise, where a State's law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation, that 'reference' will result in pre-emption.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's ERISA Preemption Precedents Resolve This Case",
		"context": "Cal. Div. of Labor Standards [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shields 5 514 U.S. 645 (\"The surcharges are imposed upon patients and HMO's, regardless of whether the commercial coverage or membership, respectively, is ultimately secured by an ERISA plan, private purchase, or otherwise, with the consequence that the surcharge statutes cannot be said to make 'reference to' ERISA plans in any manner.\"). Second, ERISA preempts \"a state law that has an impermissible 'connection with' ERISA plans.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's ERISA Preemption Precedents Resolve This Case",
		"context": "Div. of Labor Standards 519 U.S. 316; accord N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shields 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The surcharges are imposed upon patients and HMO's, regardless of whether the commercial coverage or membership, respectively, is ultimately secured by an ERISA plan, private purchase, or otherwise, with the consequence that the surcharge statutes cannot be said to make 'reference to' ERISA plans in any manner.\"). Second, ERISA preempts \"a state law that has an impermissible 'connection with' ERISA plans.\" Gobeille , 136 S. Ct. at 943.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's ERISA Preemption Precedents Resolve This Case",
		"context": "at 660. The Court adhered to Travelers in Dillingham , finding that a statute that \"alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans\" was not preempted. 519 U.S. at 334; accord De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those precedents establish that Arkansas's law is not preempted. As in Travelers and Dillingham , Arkansas's law does not impose any legal obligations on ERISA plans.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": ". This Court \"will not consider a petitioner's federal claim unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision 16 [the Court has] been asked to review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is a long-established rule that \"due regard for th e appropriate relationship of this Court to state cou rts requires [it] to decline to consider and decide qu estions affecting the valid- ity of state statutes not urged or considered there.\" 309 U.S. 430.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": "520 U.S. 83. It is a long-established rule that \"due regard for th e appropriate relationship of this Court to state cou rts requires [it] to decline to consider and decide qu estions affecting the valid- ity of state statutes not urged or considered there.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather than setting out \"when the federal ques- tions sought to be reviewed were raised,\" Sup. Ct. R. 14(1)(g)(i), Petitioners' st atement confirms they \"Chal- lenged the Rule as Unconstitutional,\" alongside other state law claims, from the start.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 430",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": "\"When the highest state court fails or re- fuses to pass expressly upon a federal question, the party invoking the Supreme Court's jurisdiction has the high burden of showing that the federal question was in fact properly raised, so that the state court's failure to deal with it was not for want of proper presentation.\" Shapiro, et al. , S UPREME COURT PRAC- TICE, § 3.18 (p. 188) (10th Edition 2013); see Exxon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners have fallen far short of meeting that high burden here. Because the question prese nted was not raised be- low, neither the Department nor other interested par-ties were able to litigate other potentially dispositive factual issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": "P. 56(c)(1)(B). For example, Montana's ru- ral geography may mean the va st majority of students would enjoy no genuine choice in schools under the scholarship program. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with Committee for Public Ed. & Religious 413 U.S. 756. The lack of a re cord on the question pre- sented is an additional reason to deny review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": "For example, Montana's ru- ral geography may mean the va st majority of students would enjoy no genuine choice in schools under the scholarship program. Compare 536 U.S. 639 with Committee for Public Ed. & Religious [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The lack of a re cord on the question pre- sented is an additional reason to deny review. See Mor- ris County Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": "The lack of a re cord on the question pre- sented is an additional reason to deny review. See Mor- ris County Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, notwithstanding Petitioners' repeated invocation of \"Blaine Amendments,\" there is no such amendment at issue here. 1 Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": ". review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 1972 Constitution presents a uniquely unfit provision on which to test a challenge to provisions in other states' constitutions from a century earlier. Whatever the merits of the \"Blaine Amendment\" epithet as a his-torical matter, the framers of the 1972 Constitution, in- cluding leaders of diverse faiths, adopted the provision out of broader concerns to protect public education funds from diversion to priva te schools, and it was rat- ified by the people of Montana on that basis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it",
		"context": "Finally, and contrary to Petitioners' assertion of a long and deep split of authorities on the question, \"this Court decided Trinity Lutheran only recently, and there is not yet a robust post- Trinity Lutheran body of case law in the lower courts \" on state exclusions of pub- lic aid for religious uses. See Morris County Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Kavanaugh, J., stat ement respecting the de- nial of certiorari). If this issue were as important and widespread as Petitioners' assert, there will be cleaner vehicles in which to presen t it. Legislation around the issue arises dozens of times every biennium.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE STATES' SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT",
		"context": ". The dual sovereignty of the States and the federal government is a fundamental feature of ou r constitutional design : the Constitution \"specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities.\" Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Immunity from suit is an important aspect of the States' sovereignty. See 134 U.S. 1 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE STATES' SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT",
		"context": "Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44. Immunity from suit is an important aspect of the States' sovereignty. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Where it applies, that immunity bars courts from hearing a private suit against a State absent the State's consent , 140 S. Ct. 2 , both in state and federal court. 527 U.S. 706.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE STATES' SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT",
		"context": "Immunity from suit is an important aspect of the States' sovereignty. See 134 U.S. 1 . Where it applies, that immunity bars courts from hearing a private suit against a State absent the State's consent , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , both in state and federal court. 527 U.S. 706. Sovereign immunity does not derive from the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE STATES' SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT",
		"context": "See 134 U.S. 1 . Where it applies, that immunity bars courts from hearing a private suit against a State absent the State's consent , 140 S. Ct. 2 , both in state and federal court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sovereign immunity does not derive from the Constitution. See Alden , 527 U.S. at 741.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "As the Nation's Response concedes, any affirma- tive fiduciary duty of the Government to an Indian tribe exists only when specifically imposed by Con-gress. Navajo Br. 29; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, any such duty must originate from and be specifically im-posed by the 1849 and 1868 Treaties, ultimately rati- fied by Congress. The 1849 Treaty merely placed the Navajo Indians under the protection of the Government, without 11 making any specific promises to reserve lands or water for the reservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "138-39. Irrespective of a tribe's wishes or the Govern- ment's knowledge of thos e wishes, \"Indian treaties cannot be rewritten or expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted understanding of the parties.\" Choctaw Na- tion of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor can reasonable treaty interpretations be ig- nored \"upon the ground of mere justice or fairness[.]\" 179 U.S. 494.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "Choctaw Na- tion of 318 U.S. 423. Nor can reasonable treaty interpretations be ig- nored \"upon the ground of mere justice or fairness[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 And even under the more generous rules of 5 As discussed in Section 2, infra , the existence of a \" Winters right\" for the reservation does no t impose an affirmative duty on the Government to assess, develop a plan for, protect and mitigate for the effects on any such right. As this Court's past decisions recognize, and consistent with th e Doctrine of Separation of Pow- ers, only Congress may impose th e duty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "179 U.S. 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "As this Court's past decisions recognize, and consistent with th e Doctrine of Separation of Pow- ers, only Congress may impose th e duty. Congress ha s not done so here. 6 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]124 F.3d 904, aff 'd sub nom. 526 U.S. 172119 S. Ct. 1187, 143 13 construction afforded to tre aties with tribes, the 1868 Treaty cannot reasonably be interpreted as imposing the duties alleged in the TAC.",
		"citation_value_orig": "222 F.3d 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "As this Court's past decisions recognize, and consistent with th e Doctrine of Separation of Pow- ers, only Congress may impose th e duty. Congress ha s not done so here. 6 See also 222 F.3d 506[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff 'd sub nom. 526 U.S. 172119 S. Ct. 1187, 143 13 construction afforded to tre aties with tribes, the 1868 Treaty cannot reasonably be interpreted as imposing the duties alleged in the TAC.",
		"citation_value_orig": "124 F.3d 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "Congress ha s not done so here. 6 See also 222 F.3d 506124 F.3d 904, aff 'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]119 S. Ct. 1187, 143 13 construction afforded to tre aties with tribes, the 1868 Treaty cannot reasonably be interpreted as imposing the duties alleged in the TAC.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM",
		"context": "Congress ha s not done so here. 6 See also 222 F.3d 506124 F.3d 904, aff 'd sub nom. 526 U.S. 172[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 143 13 construction afforded to tre aties with tribes, the 1868 Treaty cannot reasonably be interpreted as imposing the duties alleged in the TAC.",
		"citation_value_orig": "119 S. Ct. 1187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The stage at which a claim is dismissed arbitrarily determines whether the claimant may obtain review of the dismissal",
		"context": "However, the collective experience of amicus cu-riae has been that such orders vacating dismissals happen with some frequency. And published judicial opinions in Social Security cases occasionally mention 20 that the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of the claimant's request for a hearing had been vacated by the Appeals Council. 2010 WL 1416884[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Cases from Courts within the Eleventh Circuit show that the Appeals Council makes similar errors, yet the majority of claimants across the country have no op- portunity for review of Appeals Council dismissals, ab-sent a Constitutional claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 F.Supp.2d 955",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "§ 1983. The law contemplated, and was passed in part to provide, federal recourse for state official s' abuses of the criminal legal process. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting Ex Parte100 U.S. 339 ). In the aftermath of the Civil War, t here was a \"campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "§ 1983. The law contemplated, and was passed in part to provide, federal recourse for state official s' abuses of the criminal legal process. See 407 U.S. 225 (quoting Ex Parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). In the aftermath of the Civil War, t here was a \"campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "denying decent citizens their civil and political rights. \"2 This problem was exacerbated by state officials who themselves participated in the violence and not only failed to punish the perpetrators, but also used the power of their offices to launch criminal prosecutions against Black people and their supporters. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 In 18 71, Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, with the primary goal of \"overrid[ing] the corrupting influence of the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers on the governments and law enforcement agencies of the 2 Esther M. Schonfeld, Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort: Continued Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 Touro L. Rev. 1, 7 (1999). 3 See also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, The Review Essay and Comments: Reconstruct ing Reconstruction , 98 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "565, 580 (1988) (discussing how state officials initiated civil actions and criminal prosecutions against Black people and their white supporters in the years immediately following the Civil War). 7 Southern States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, Section 1983 provided individuals deprived of their federal rights by state actors with a private right of action in federal court to seek redress for their injuries, including the loss of liberty pursuant to criminal legal process.4 Today, claims for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process —commonly known as malicious prosecution claims —flow from the kinds of official abuses of power and the legal process by state actors that Section 1983 was passed to address. The specific official action s underlying these claims are wide - ranging.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "The specific official action s underlying these claims are wide - ranging. Examples include situations in which law enforcement officers initiate an unsupported criminal prosecution by giving false testimony, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; arrest and charge an individual solely to cover up police misconduct, see, e.g. , 794 F. App'x 140, (alleging officers used excessive force in course of arrest and filed frivolous charges to cover u p physical abuse of arrestee); or use criminal proceedings to harass or retaliate against a person, see, e.g. , 782 F.3d 93.",
		"citation_value_orig": "625 F.3d 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": ", 625 F.3d 294; arrest and charge an individual solely to cover up police misconduct, see, e.g. , 794 F. App'x 140, (alleging officers used excessive force in course of arrest and filed frivolous charges to cover u p physical abuse of arrestee); or use criminal proceedings to harass or retaliate against a person, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 See id. at 581 (discussi ng that provision for federal remedies for violations of federal law was intended, in part, to eliminate racial and political prejudice in the administration of criminal justice).",
		"citation_value_orig": "782 F.3d 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "8 Regardless of the specific official conduct at issue, Section 1983's broad remedial purpose is to address the problem of unjustified seizure by state officials . Federal remedies for unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process seek to redress significant harms. Fundamentally, t he underlying abuses and indignities interfere with individuals' \"right to be let alone,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , an interference that has the effect of \"crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.\" 338 U.S. 160 ; cf. 136 S. Ct. 2056 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
		"context": "Federal remedies for unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process seek to redress significant harms. Fundamentally, t he underlying abuses and indignities interfere with individuals' \"right to be let alone,\" 277 U.S. 438 , an interference that has the effect of \"crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. 136 S. Ct. 2056 . In practice, u nwarranted seizures by police can result in criminal arrest records and pretrial detention that disrupts housing, employment , and myriad other aspects of life —especially for Black people and other people of color.5 In the worst cases, 5 See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "(emphasis added); id. at 213 (\"That is not to say that every element of our discussion in Summum is relevant here. \"); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, this Court has said \"that the government speech doctrine [should] not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.\" Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "To be faithful to that objective, a more realistic assessment of the government speech doctrine would, at a minimum, require examination of whether it is being a sserted as a pretext to exclude certain disfavor ed speakers from an otherwise available forum befo re it could be used as a successful defense to a First Amendment challenge. Courts, of course, are no strangers to evaluating the issue of pretext or to consideration of the broad range of facts that may be indicative of when pretext is present. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of 561 U.S. 661. Based on other contexts in which pretext is judged, circumstances relevant to the question of pretext here would include whether the policies relied upon by the government appear to be a post hoc litigating 10 position.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "Courts, of course, are no strangers to evaluating the issue of pretext or to consideration of the broad range of facts that may be indicative of when pretext is present. See, e.g., 546 U.S. 454; see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Based on other contexts in which pretext is judged, circumstances relevant to the question of pretext here would include whether the policies relied upon by the government appear to be a post hoc litigating 10 position. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "Based on other contexts in which pretext is judged, circumstances relevant to the question of pretext here would include whether the policies relied upon by the government appear to be a post hoc litigating 10 position. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"As is recognized in the employment discrimination context, where issues of pretext regularly arise, substantial changes over time in [an] employer's proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of pretext.\") (i nternal quotation marks and citations omitted). The presence or absence of practical limitations related to how the medium at issue is used, see555 U.S. 479 (\"Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to the end of their remarks; .",
		"citation_value_orig": "232 F.3d 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "Tex. Dep't of Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]508 U.S. 520 (\"The design of these laws accomplishes instead a 'religious gerrymander', an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.\") (quoting 397 U.S. 664. 11 The facts here present a straightforward example of anti-religious animus by the City.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "Tex. Dep't of Cmty. 450 U.S. 248[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The design of these laws accomplishes instead a 'religious gerrymander', an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.\") (quoting 397 U.S. 664. 11 The facts here present a straightforward example of anti-religious animus by the City.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "Dep't of Cmty. 450 U.S. 248508 U.S. 520 (\"The design of these laws accomplishes instead a 'religious gerrymander', an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.\") (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 The facts here present a straightforward example of anti-religious animus by the City. By the City's own admission, the flag was rejected not because of its extrinsic features but simply because it was religious.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "By the City's own admission, the flag was rejected not because of its extrinsic features but simply because it was religious. With such facts, it should be beyond cavil the City's actions contravened the principle established by this Court that \"once the government allows a subject to be discussed, it cannot silence religious views on that topic.\" Archdiocese of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, the First Circuit legitimized the City's invidious discrimination through an expansive and unprecedented interpretation of the government speech doctrine. Therefore, the First Circuit's \" Summum/Walker test\" should be rejected as not only unfaithful to this Court's own decisions but also as tending to permit the exercise of wanton governmental animus toward religious speakers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. DACA is a permissible class-based deferred action policy",
		"context": "819, but it does afford recipients a measure of stability and the opportunity to seek authorization to work le- gally in the country they know as home. Like past class -based policies, DACA is grounded in important pa rt in \"immediate human concerns.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those who meet the minimum criteria have, by defini- tion, \"long ties to the community.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Party Membership Is the Best Available Proxy for Achieving These Compelling Ends",
		"context": "But this principle does not prevent a state from identifying candidates as members of a party on a ballot or in office. Rather, a state's \"legitimate interest in fostering an informed electorate\" allows it to identify candidates as members of a party. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Party is a helpful indicator of what a candidate is likely to view as conducive to the good of the whole. Likewise, a judicial candidate's party membership is a good indicator of the candidate's judicial philosophy and likely views on matters of constitutional and common law in future cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Party Membership Is the Best Available Proxy for Achieving These Compelling Ends",
		"context": "An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 10 (2006) (\"In most of the areas investigated here, the political party of the appointing president is a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote.\") Thus, states, for example, may legitimately \"require that precincts be supervised by two election judges of different parties\" precisely because of the valid concern that the judges will be biased towards their own parties and perspectives. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is a compelling interest even though—actually, because —the election judges should rule on the basis of the law and the facts. The neutrality expectation is precisely why a State is justified in pursuing balance and viewpoint diversity; 18 the court of appeals' rationale that judicial non- partisanship defeats the State's goal of balance is exactly backwards.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Party Membership Is the Best Available Proxy for Achieving These Compelling Ends",
		"context": "Sugarman , 413 U.S. at 647. Delaware does not have to view its judges how the federal Constitution views judges (or, for that matter, how the American Bar Association views them, see Pet.App.24a). By comparison, many states require judges to stand for election and campaign for office,4 see Republican Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and they routinely raise money for supporters for that purpose, see 575 U.S. 433. State courts also engage in highly partisan adjudications, like redistricting cases. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Party Membership Is the Best Available Proxy for Achieving These Compelling Ends",
		"context": "State courts also engage in highly partisan adjudications, like redistricting cases. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In opining that party membership is unrelated to the concerns of judging in Delaware, the court of appeals improperly rendered a value judgment that is Delaware's to make. 4 A recent survey found that 29 states conduct elections for their trial-court seats, and nine employ partisan elections; meanwhile, 21 states conduct elections for their state supreme court seats, and six employ partisan elections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Party Membership Is the Best Available Proxy for Achieving These Compelling Ends",
		"context": "Cf., generally , Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plaintiff has identified no other means to achieve the State's ends, and it is not even in dispute that this means does meet the State's ends. The court of appeals found that \"the constitutional provisions which we today invalidate have resulted in a political and legal culture\" of \"bipartisan excellence.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Casey Has Failed to Provide Consistency and Stability.",
		"context": "Stenberg , 530 U.S. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the partisan gerrymandering context, this Court overruled Davis v. Bandemer after 18 years of litigation produced no standards to evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (overruling Bandemer sub silentio ); 541 U.S. 267. Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 365. The Court overruled Austin after four justices of the Court in McConnell v. FEC initially called for Austin to be overruled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Casey Has Failed to Provide Consistency and Stability.",
		"context": "Stenberg , 530 U.S. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the partisan gerrymandering context, this Court overruled Davis v. Bandemer after 18 years of litigation produced no standards to evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims. See generally 139 S. Ct. 2484 (overruling Bandemer sub silentio ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 365. The Court overruled Austin after four justices of the Court in McConnell v. FEC initially called for Austin to be overruled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Austin's Sign Ordinance Prevents Speakers from Remaining Anonymous, and Thus Unconstitutionally Chills Speech",
		"context": "pewforum.org /religious -landscape -study /state /texas/. 11 up digital signs and still remain anonymous : Under Austin's sign code, any legal digitized ideological sign implicitly signals that activities re lated to this ideol- ogy are taking place at that very location. Such a \"ban on anonymous speech violate[s] the First Amend- ment,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this respect, Austin's code is lik e the require- ment that petition circulators wear identification badges, which was struck down in Buckley v. Am. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
		"context": "a. The governmen t primarily asks (at 36 -37) that the agen cy be gi ven a second shot a t adjudicat ing 7 Notably, courts of appea ls regularly recognize that Ventura and Thomas do not prevent appellate court s from reversin g, not remanding , when the rec ord comp els a conclusion c ontrary to the one the agency reached . E.g., Ghebremedhi 392 F.3d 241 ; Alvarez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Castenada-Cast 488 F.3d 1; 404 F.3d 295 ; 650 F.3d 9 ; cf. also Wats 569 F.3d 115. 48 Dai's credibility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.3d 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
		"context": "a. The governmen t primarily asks (at 36 -37) that the agen cy be gi ven a second shot a t adjudicat ing 7 Notably, courts of appea ls regularly recognize that Ventura and Thomas do not prevent appellate court s from reversin g, not remanding , when the rec ord comp els a conclusion c ontrary to the one the agency reached . E.g., Ghebremedhi 392 F.3d 241 ; Alvarez 927 F.3d 236; Castenada-Cast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 404 F.3d 295 ; 650 F.3d 9 ; cf. also Wats 569 F.3d 115. 48 Dai's credibility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
		"context": "a. The governmen t primarily asks (at 36 -37) that the agen cy be gi ven a second shot a t adjudicat ing 7 Notably, courts of appea ls regularly recognize that Ventura and Thomas do not prevent appellate court s from reversin g, not remanding , when the rec ord comp els a conclusion c ontrary to the one the agency reached . E.g., Ghebremedhi 392 F.3d 241 ; Alvarez 927 F.3d 236; Castenada-Cast 488 F.3d 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 650 F.3d 9 ; cf. also Wats 569 F.3d 115. 48 Dai's credibility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 F.3d 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
		"context": "a. The governmen t primarily asks (at 36 -37) that the agen cy be gi ven a second shot a t adjudicat ing 7 Notably, courts of appea ls regularly recognize that Ventura and Thomas do not prevent appellate court s from reversin g, not remanding , when the rec ord comp els a conclusion c ontrary to the one the agency reached . E.g., Ghebremedhi 392 F.3d 241 ; Alvarez 927 F.3d 236; Castenada-Cast 488 F.3d 1; 404 F.3d 295 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. also Wats 569 F.3d 115. 48 Dai's credibility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
		"context": "The governmen t primarily asks (at 36 -37) that the agen cy be gi ven a second shot a t adjudicat ing 7 Notably, courts of appea ls regularly recognize that Ventura and Thomas do not prevent appellate court s from reversin g, not remanding , when the rec ord comp els a conclusion c ontrary to the one the agency reached . E.g., Ghebremedhi 392 F.3d 241 ; Alvarez 927 F.3d 236; Castenada-Cast 488 F.3d 1; 404 F.3d 295 ; 650 F.3d 9 ; cf. also Wats [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 48 Dai's credibility. But, given the way th e statute i s structured, the agency has already adjudi cated cred- ibility in Dai 's favor.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
		"context": "15-16, supra (describing 2011 Hu man Rights Report and 2011 news art icle). If the agency should ha ve grante d asy- lum and withhold ing at th at time on that r ecord, then the fac t that country conditions cha nged later 8 Unsu rpris ingly, courts re gularly decli ne to remand for the governm ent to pr esent a changed -country -conditions argument it never made before the agency. E.g., 956 F.3d 135 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 50 canno t strip Dai of his righ t to relief that the agency should have granted in his initial proceeding. Ventura is not to the contrary because, i n Ventu- ra, the gover nment had introduce d changed -country- conditions evidenc e before the agency , but the agency had not a ddressed it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 F.3d 588",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"information-sharing\" due-process claims fail to state a claim",
		"context": "While basing a claim against the federal government on community standards in California would raise federalism issues, this Court need not reach that issue. Creating rights based on substantive due-process requires a more rigorous and more 6 Although the Fourteenth Amendment 's Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the Federal Government, this Court has found an equivalent equal -protection component in the Fifth Amendment 's Due Process Clause . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 347 U.S. 497. 24 national approach under 521 U.S. 702. Plaintiffs ' information - sharing claims cannot meet that test and s hould be dismissed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"information-sharing\" due-process claims fail to state a claim",
		"context": "While basing a claim against the federal government on community standards in California would raise federalism issues, this Court need not reach that issue. Creating rights based on substantive due-process requires a more rigorous and more 6 Although the Fourteenth Amendment 's Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the Federal Government, this Court has found an equivalent equal -protection component in the Fifth Amendment 's Due Process Clause . 424 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 national approach under 521 U.S. 702. Plaintiffs ' information - sharing claims cannot meet that test and s hould be dismissed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"information-sharing\" due-process claims fail to state a claim",
		"context": "Creating rights based on substantive due-process requires a more rigorous and more 6 Although the Fourteenth Amendment 's Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the Federal Government, this Court has found an equivalent equal -protection component in the Fifth Amendment 's Due Process Clause . 424 U.S. 1; 347 U.S. 497. 24 national approach under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs ' information - sharing claims cannot meet that test and s hould be dismissed. Given \"[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic, \" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Barring faith-based schools from participation in scholarship programs perpetuates discrimination by ignoring the historical connection between religious persecution and the makeup of today's private school sector",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. of Abingto n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For these parents, the ability to access schools that better align with their value and belief systems—and that inte- grate these systems into their educational models—is a significant factor when choosing an education pro- vider. Among ACE parents in Montana, for instance, 76 percent cited satisfaction wi th their chosen schools' faith-based curriculum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The decision below departs from the historical consensus",
		"context": "App. 8a (quot- ing Schoenbaum, supra , § 19:6). The court neverthe- less concluded that, under The Bremen and Carnival Cruise Lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a choice -of-law clause is \"unreasonable or unjust\" if it contravenes state policy. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The decision below departs from the historical consensus",
		"context": "at 9. Several aspects of the decision make that clear —all of which the court of ap- peals overlooked. First, in support of its public -policy exception, The Brem en cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See The Bremen , 407 U.S. at 15. Boyd held that a forum -selection clause was invalid be- cause it violated a federal statute, the Federal Employ- ers' Liability Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The decision below departs from the historical consensus",
		"context": "Second, The Bremen considered only fe deral policy —not forum -state policy —in deciding that the forum -selection clause there was presumptively en- forceable. The court of appeals in The Bremen had held that enforcing the forum -selection clause \"would be contrary to the public policy of the forum\" (the United States) because the parties' chosen forum (England) would allow a release -from -liability clause, which U.S. policy forbids. 407 U.S. at 15 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court disagreed, explaining that the public -policy consideration s it had outlined in Bisso ap- plied \"strictly in American waters\" and were \"not con-trolling in an international commercial agreement.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The decision below departs from the historical consensus",
		"context": "565, 566 (1921) (\"The federal courts have generally applied the law of the state or country intended by the parties. \"); see also p. 18, supra . Judge Hand's opinion in Wood & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], exemplifies U.S. courts' historically di-vergent approaches toward choice- of-law and forum - selection clauses. In that case, the Second Circuit de-clined to enforce a maritime forum -selection clause re- quiring that disputes be brought in France, but never-theless endeavored to apply French statutory law un- der a parallel choice- of-law clause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "43 F.2d 941",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ex Parte Reexamination",
		"context": "Oil States , 138 S. Ct. at 1371 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012 ed. )); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and the existing statute for ex parte reexamination (35 U.S.C. § 302 ), neither the AIA nor any other provisions of Patent Act define the term \"per son.\" Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ex Parte Reexamination",
		"context": "See Case No. 90/008,470. At issue here be fore the PTAB and the Federal Circuit in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service was whether the USPS, admittedly a \"government entity\" as recognized by this Court in United States Postal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (20 04), has standing to petition for CBM under the AIA. Under AIA § 18(a)(1)(B): A person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person's real party in interest or pri vy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.5 5CBM proceedings are considered a type of PGR that is in effect for a limited time period . Unlike IPRs and PGRs, the governing statutory provisions for CBMs are only 10 Before the USPS filed a petition for a CBM of Return Mail's patent, Return Mail had brought a suit against the United States in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for unlicensed use of its patent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 736",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ex Parte Reexamination",
		"context": "See United States Postal Service v. Return Mail, Inc ., CBM 2014 -00116, Paper 41, Final Written Decision at 12 (PTAB Oct. 15, 2015); see also id., Paper 11, Institution Decision at 1 5-18 (PTAB Oct. 16, 2014). The majority of the Federal Circuit panel affirmed the PTAB's holding on CBM standing. Return Mail, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, Judge Newman vigorously dissented from t he majority opinion. Judge Newman relied on a point of statutory interpretation that neither party had previously raised or discussed: An important threshold issue before the court is whether the United States and its agency the United States Postal Service are within the definition of \"person\" in § 18(a)(1)(B) of the America Invents Act , and thus entitled to proceed under that Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 1350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ex Parte Reexamination",
		"context": "Although the Court has accepted a government for any positions it argue s in post -issuance review proceeding s under the AIA that result in a final written decision. Cf. MaxLinear, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, the PTAB has applied such principles between inter partes review proceedings. See, e.g., Google LLC v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., IPR2017 -00818, Paper 25 at 44 n.7 (PTAB Sept. 7, 2018) (\"Patent Owner is therefore collaterally estopped from challenging our prior determination related to the traffic jam limitation – as admitted by Patent Owner's counsel during oral hearing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "880 F. 3d 1373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is No Conflict Between the Decision Below and RLUIPA's \"Least Restrictive Alternative\" Analysis",
		"context": "573 U.S. 682. It is the \"most demanding test known to constitutional law.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] superseded by statute , RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. , as recognized in Holt , 574 U.S. at 357.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry",
		"context": "24-25 & n.6. The Ninth Circuit and other circuits all account for this concern by uniformly requiring a nexus between the proposed cy pres recipients and the interests of the class, in order to ensure that the class receives some form of benefit for their claims. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Baby Products, 708 F.3d at 180 n.16 (\"[c]ourts generally require the parties to identify 'a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class'\"); Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1036 ( cy pres remedy \"must account for the nature of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members\"); Powell, 119 F.3d at 707 (approving cy pres local scholarship remedy that served class members' objectives and would directly benefit their descendants); Six Mexican Workers , 904 F.2d at 1308 (reversing where cy pres remedy benefited a group \"far too remote from the plaintiff class\"); In re818 F.2d 179. Third , petitioners simply speculate that class counsel will pursue cy pres awards in lieu of compen- sating class members. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 1071",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry",
		"context": "24-25 & n.6. The Ninth Circuit and other circuits all account for this concern by uniformly requiring a nexus between the proposed cy pres recipients and the interests of the class, in order to ensure that the class receives some form of benefit for their claims. See 846 F.3d 1071; Baby Products, 708 F.3d at 180 n.16 (\"[c]ourts generally require the parties to identify 'a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class'\"); Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1036 ( cy pres remedy \"must account for the nature of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members\"); Powell, 119 F.3d at 707 (approving cy pres local scholarship remedy that served class members' objectives and would directly benefit their descendants); Six Mexican Workers , 904 F.2d at 1308 (reversing where cy pres remedy benefited a group \"far too remote from the plaintiff class\"); In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third , petitioners simply speculate that class counsel will pursue cy pres awards in lieu of compen- sating class members. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "818 F.2d 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry",
		"context": "Pet. App. 7; accord Hanlon v.Chrysler Corp. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And petitioners have no genuine quarrel with the district court's findings that the Hanlon factors were satisfied here. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry",
		"context": "But that is true of anyset- tlement, not just one involving cy pres relief. This Court has held that manageability does not matter in a settlement class. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.Wind- sor, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal is that there be no trial.\" Id.at 620.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry",
		"context": "Id.at 620. Pe- titioners also offer no alternative means by which de- fendants can settle putative class actions when indi- vidual class members cannot feasibly be identified— short of overturning decisions from the Ninth Circuit and other courts holding that Rule 23 does not re- quire an \"'administratively feasible way to determine who is in the class'\" (Pet. 29 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])), which goes well beyond the scope of the question presented in the petition. Finally , petitioners fret over the possibility that district judges will approve of cy pres settlements that direct funds to organizations with a connection to the judge, creating \"the appearance or reality of judicial conflicts of interest.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.3d 1121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Service Advisors Are \"Salesmen\"",
		"context": "That confirms there is simply no three-to-three correspondence between OOH job titles and occupations exempted by the broader text of §213(b)(10)(A). 4 confirm that §213(b)(10)(A) exempts salespeople beyond those who sell automobiles and that efforts to limit the exemption to salespeople selling automobiles are \"flatly contrary to the statutory text.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , are not \"salesmen.\" Resp.Br.14-15. Even the Ninth Circuit did not go that far.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 F.3d 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Service Advisors Are \"Salesmen\"",
		"context": "Those statements were not mere 2 Respondents deny that \"any\" is a term of breadth. Resp.Br.18. But this Court has repeatedly held the opposite, including in the FLSA context, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Respondents' own authority recognized \"any\" as a \"broad term[],\" albeit one that did not modify the critical word at issue there, BP Am. Prod. 549 U.S. 84.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Service Advisors Are \"Salesmen\"",
		"context": "While context may sometimes qualify the term's inherent breadth, Respondents identify no such \"context\" here. 3 Respondents' \"not-even-a-sale sman\" argument was not raised at any previous point in these proceedings, including Encino I . See OBB Personenverkehr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 commentary: the Court faulted DOL's 2011 regulation for failing, inter alia , to adequately explain its distinction between \"dealership employees who sell vehicles\" and \"dealership employees who sell services (that is, service advisors).\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "Carriers and Employ- ees Tax Act (CETA), c h. 813, § 1(d), 49 Stat. 974; see Railroad Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That legislation consisted of taxation and benefits stat-utes paralleling the RRTA and RRA. Early versions of the 1935 railroad -benefits statute reflected an understanding that the term \"any form of money remuneration\" could encompass non -cash com- pensatio n. Those bills defined \"compensation\" as \"any form of money remuneration for active service received by an employee from a carrier, including salaries, com- missions, and the reasonable value of board, rents, 36 lodging, and other similar advantages furnished for subsistence to an employee while in service,\" while ex- cluding \"the value of such boards, rents, housing, lodg-ing, and other similar advantages combined which is less than $10 for any calendar month,\" and further ex-cluding \"free transportation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "38 3 F. Stroud, The Judicial Dictionary 1802 ( 2d ed. 1903) (\"a [c]ertificate, transferable by delivery, entitling its holder to become a Shareholder or Bondholder in re- spect of the shares or bonds therein mentioned\") (em- phasis omitted) (primary definition) ; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners assert that the term \"scrip \" in that regu- lation is best understood as a reference to \" 'private cur- rency issued by corporations . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "252 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "231(h)(1), is identical to the RRTA's in pertinent part , see 26 U.S.C. 3231(e) (1), and because RRTA tax es are used to fund RRA benef its, courts have long held that the statutes' definitions \"should be identically construed and ap-plied,\" Universal Carloading & Distrib. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,340 U.S. 905 ; see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 F.2d 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "), cert. denied,340 U.S. 905 ; see, e.g. , Atlantic Land & Improvement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 39 The Board 's 1938 regulation s treated th e term \"any form of money remuneration\" as reaching in-kind com- pensation that could be assigned a definite cash value. In particular, th ose regulations, whic h remain in effect today, provide d that \"amounts to be paid in the form of a commodity, service, or privilege\" qualif ied as \"com- pensation \" so long as the employer and employee had agreed in advance that part of the employee's compen- sation would be paid \"in the form of such commodity, service, or privilege,\" and had also agreed \"upon the value of such commodity, service, or privilege.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.2d 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "L- 41-576 ( Nov. 10, 1941) (same) ; compare Board G.C.M. L-39-69, at 3 (Feb. 9, 1 939) (housing for certain employees was not \" money remuneration \" be- cause the parties had not agreed on a \"definite value in terms of dollars and cents\" for the benefit and the Board would not \"under- take to assign any value thereto\"); Board G.C.M. L- 39-727, at 1 (Nov. 13, 1939) ( room and board were not \"compensation\" when they were provided \"as a matter of company convenience, not as partial compensation\"); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (housing accom- modations furnished to employee are compensation \"[i] f an em- ployer and employee have agreed that housing accommodations of an appropriate fixed value are a part of the employee's total remu- neration\"). 41 \"money remuneration \" for services rendered under the RRTA. Board G.C.M.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 C.B. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "The manner in which the responsible federal agencies construed and applied the RRTA and RRA immediately after enactment are evidence of the original public meaning of the statutory language . See, e.g. , Edwards' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. 288 U.S. 294. In the ensuing years , moreover, Congress has en- acted numerous amendments to the statutes without al- tering or calling i nto question the agenc ies' determina- tion that non -cash benefi ts like stock can constitute a \"form of money remuneration.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Edwards' 25 U.S. 206; see also Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the ensuing years , moreover, Congress has en- acted numerous amendments to the statutes without al- tering or calling i nto question the agenc ies' determina- tion that non -cash benefi ts like stock can constitute a \"form of money remuneration.\" \"[W]hen Congress re- visits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administra- 10 A 1997 Board opinion concluded that a stock award for \"perfect attendance and superior performance\" that was solely in the em- ployer's discretion and not part of the employment agreement was not \"money remuneration \" under the RRA while distinguishing cases in which \"it [was] agreed upon in advance that the perfor-mance of certain services, e.g., perfect attendance, would result in an award\" of stock.",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "L-2005- 25, at 5- 7. 42 tive interpretation without pertinent change, the con- gres sional failure to revise or repeal the agency's inter- pretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he inference that Congress has approv ed the agencies' interpretation of the term \"money remuneration\" is particularly strong because Congre ss has added numerous exclusions to the defini- tion of \"compensation\" that would make little sense un- der petitioners' contrary reading of that term . See Texas Dep't of Hous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "T he inference that Congress has approv ed the agencies' interpretation of the term \"money remuneration\" is particularly strong because Congre ss has added numerous exclusions to the defini- tion of \"compensation\" that would make little sense un- der petitioners' contrary reading of that term . See Texas Dep't of Hous. & Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. C. Treating An Employer's Provision Of Publicly Traded Stock As Taxable \"Compensation\" Furthers The RRTA's Objectives 1. The RRTA and RRA were enacted to replace inadequately funded private pension plans with a finan- cially stable and self -sustaining system of pension ben- efits for railroad workers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "Whitman 41; Joint Commit-tee Print 15 -17. As this Court has explained in the con- text of social security, the interest in providing a finan-cially stable, self -sustaining pension system counsels against \"constricted interpretation of the phrasing\" of 43 the taxing statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An unduly narrow interpretation \"would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit schemes by some employers and em- ployees to avoid the immediat e burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits",
		"context": "Ibid. Construing \"any form of money remuneration\" to ex- clude highly liquid cash substitutes would enable em-ployers to \"avoid the immediate burdens\" of RRTA tax- ation, at the expense of adequately funding the benefits that the RRA guarantees. Silk, 331 U.S. at 712; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Publicly traded stock , like a saving s bond or a Bitcoin, is a highly liquid asset that functions as a near -cash -equivalent and could easily be substituted for cash compensation without sig-nificantly inconveniencing employees. The recipient can simply direct his broker to exercise the option and sell th e stock, depositing the proceeds in his bank account —as more than 90% of employees exercising op- tions at several railroads do.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 572",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "But even if the speech were commercial, that still would not save it from strict scrutiny. Even in the context of commercial speech, view- point discrimination is still forbidden. 44 Liquormart, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that commercial speech regulations discriminating based on viewpoint are egregious forms of content-based restrictions that are almost per se unconstitutional); Wandering Dago, 2018 WL 265383. 10 In finding the law viewpoint-neutral, the First Re- sort court refused to consider the government's pur- pose. First Resort , 860 F.3d at 1278 (\"To the extent 10 The panel was wrong to think such discrimination irrel- evant simply because the government claimed to be regu-lating \"false and misleading commercial speech.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "505 U.S. at 383. 18 First Resort argues that the Ordinance is a viewpoint- based regulation of speech on the grounds that the City had an illicit motive, that argument also fails.\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Instead, it focused on the speaker's purpose, holding that speakers could have different reasons for not providing or referring for abortions, which might \"have nothing to do with their views on abortion.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "at 1277 (citing Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Con- cerns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This holding that speaker purpose controls, and that governmental purpose is irrelevant, is rich with irony; again, before Reed , the Ninth Circuit had held that only a discriminatory governmental purpose could trigger strict scrutiny. 707 F.3d 1057135 S. Ct. 2218.",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.3d 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "for Pregnancy Con- cerns, 721 F.3d 264. This holding that speaker purpose controls, and that governmental purpose is irrelevant, is rich with irony; again, before Reed , the Ninth Circuit had held that only a discriminatory governmental purpose could trigger strict scrutiny. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]135 S. Ct. 2218. Further, to hold that the govern- ment's purpose for regulating doesn't matter while the speaker's purpose for speaking does is, again, to turn this Court's cases on their head. Under Reed and Sor- rell, the government's purpose for regulating may be relevant to determining if a law discriminates on the basis of content or viewpoint.",
		"citation_value_orig": "707 F.3d 1057",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "for Pregnancy Con- cerns, 721 F.3d 264. This holding that speaker purpose controls, and that governmental purpose is irrelevant, is rich with irony; again, before Reed , the Ninth Circuit had held that only a discriminatory governmental purpose could trigger strict scrutiny. 707 F.3d 1057[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further, to hold that the govern- ment's purpose for regulating doesn't matter while the speaker's purpose for speaking does is, again, to turn this Court's cases on their head. Under Reed and Sor- rell, the government's purpose for regulating may be relevant to determining if a law discriminates on the basis of content or viewpoint.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "Matal , 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J. ).11 11 Outside of pregnancy-center cases, most courts have correctly recognized that under Reed a law is subject to strict scrutiny if it either is content- or viewpoint-discrimi- natory on its face or it was passed for the purpose of dis- criminating on the basis of content or viewpoint. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] pet. for cert. filed , Nov. 9, 2017 (No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "for cert. filed , Nov. 9, 2017 (No. 17-689) (under Reed , \"[t]here are two distinct ways in which a regulation may be deemed to be content based,\" facial content discrimination, and a con- tent-discriminatory purpose); Time Warner Cable [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]867 F.3d 883, the Eighth Circuit, echoing the Ninth Cir- cuit in NIFLA and First Resort , held that \"[r]egardless of any evidence\" that the legislature had a viewpoint-discrim- inatory purpose in passing the law at issue, the law was \"neutral on its face\" and thus not viewpoint discriminatory. Id. at 892.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "for cert. filed , Nov. 9, 2017 (No. 17-689) (under Reed , \"[t]here are two distinct ways in which a regulation may be deemed to be content based,\" facial content discrimination, and a con- tent-discriminatory purpose); Time Warner Cable 729 F.3d 137[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Eighth Circuit, echoing the Ninth Cir- cuit in NIFLA and First Resort , held that \"[r]egardless of any evidence\" that the legislature had a viewpoint-discrim- inatory purpose in passing the law at issue, the law was \"neutral on its face\" and thus not viewpoint discriminatory. Id. at 892.",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "21 that a pregnancy center speech regulation was con- tent-based. There, the court explained that because the regulation at issue \"require[d] [pregnancy centers] to say something [they] mi ght not otherwise say,\" it was content-based and triggered strict scrutiny. Cen- tro [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd722 F.3d 184. The court correctly found it \"unneces- sary to address\" the pregnancy center's additional con- tention that the regulation also was viewpoint-based, because content-based laws trigger strict scrutiny. 779 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "779 F. Supp. 2d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too",
		"context": "21 that a pregnancy center speech regulation was con- tent-based. There, the court explained that because the regulation at issue \"require[d] [pregnancy centers] to say something [they] mi ght not otherwise say,\" it was content-based and triggered strict scrutiny. Cen- tro 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court correctly found it \"unneces- sary to address\" the pregnancy center's additional con- tention that the regulation also was viewpoint-based, because content-based laws trigger strict scrutiny. 779 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "722 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's Reasoning in Lemon Was Based on Minimal Precedent and Little Historical Analysis",
		"context": "Lemon , 403 U.S. at 612. But the precedents the Court looked to can hardly be considered criteria de- veloped over \"many\" years. The Court based the bulk of its analysis on then -recent cases , focusing on two that were no more than three years old , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and Bd. of Educ 392 U.S. 236 . But neither Waltz nor Allen fo- cused on original source material .",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's Reasoning in Lemon Was Based on Minimal Precedent and Little Historical Analysis",
		"context": "But the precedents the Court looked to can hardly be considered criteria de- veloped over \"many\" years. The Court based the bulk of its analysis on then -recent cases , focusing on two that were no more than three years old , 397 U.S. 664 and Bd. of Educ [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But neither Waltz nor Allen fo- cused on original source material . Waltz zig-zagged be- tween examples of what violated the prohibition on es- tablishment of religion and the difficulty of wrestling with what that term meant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. RESPONDENT'S FAULTY ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS CONFIRM THAT REVIEW IS WARRANTED",
		"context": "15.) The case that he cites – Norfolk & W. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] – deals only with federal income taxes. RRTA taxes are separate taxes and fundamentally diffe rent than federal income taxes. See CSX Transp., 46 So.3d 434.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. RESPONDENT'S FAULTY ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS CONFIRM THAT REVIEW IS WARRANTED",
		"context": "444 U.S. 490 – deals only with federal income taxes. RRTA taxes are separate taxes and fundamentally diffe rent than federal income taxes. See CSX Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the jury's instruction in this case was specifically limited to income taxes: \"The Respondent will not be required to pay any federal or state income taxes on an amount that you award.\" (Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 So.3d 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. RESPONDENT'S FAULTY ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS CONFIRM THAT REVIEW IS WARRANTED",
		"context": "There is no basis to conclude that the jury deducted RRTA taxes from the 2 See IRS Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) 8115012; 1980 WL 137627. While TAMs have no precedential force, they are a u seful as an indication of the IRS's position and may be viewed as substantial authority by a court. See, e.g., Rowan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 award in this case . The jury awarded $30,000 in past lost wages for a 5 -month period in 2011.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. RESPONDENT'S FAULTY ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS CONFIRM THAT REVIEW IS WARRANTED",
		"context": "There is no requirement that the employment relationship still exist a t the time the judgment is entered or the payment is made. See 26 U.S.C. §3231(e)(1); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is undisputed that the jury awarded lost damages to Respondent for the period of tim e in which he was employed by BNSF – December 19, 2010 to May 16, 2011. (App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "736 F.2d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. RESPONDENT'S FAULTY ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS CONFIRM THAT REVIEW IS WARRANTED",
		"context": "\"4 Giving the same meaning to \"compensation\" under the RRTA and the RRA provides harmony and stability by ensuring adequate funding for the very retirement benefits the employees will receive. See Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry. C o., 571 F.3d at 542 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent seeks to discourage certiorari by mentioning a statutory provision that the court of appeals did not invoke. He argues that , even if lost damages fi t within the definition of compensation, 3 When BNSF reported the payment of lost wages in this case to the federal agencies, the Railroad Retirement Board gave Respondent additional credit towards his retirement benefits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 A.3d 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court's Decisions About Tribes Confirm That They Are \"Domestic Government[s]\" in the Ordinary Sense",
		"context": "9a- 10a & nn.5-6; see supra pp. 21-22. The Band asserts (at 33) that this Court described tribes as \" quasi domestic 41 nations\" in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the quot e is from counsel's argument, not the Court's opinion.20 Other than that, the Band points to no case in which this Court has ever questioned the domestic character of tribes since resolving that issue in Cherokee Nation . To the contrary, \"Indian Tribes have never historically been classified as 'foreign' governments in federal courts even when they asked to be.\" Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 805 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court's Decisions About Tribes Confirm That They Are \"Domestic Government[s]\" in the Ordinary Sense",
		"context": "What is \"unique\" about tribes, as the cases the Band cites explain, is their historical transition from \"exercis[ing] virtually unlimited power over their own members as well as those who were permitted to join their communities,\" to being subject to the \"plenary\" power of the federal gove rnment, with their self- governing status protected by but subject to federal law. National Farmers Union Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 That is, tribes are unique not because they are somehow less than fully domestic, but because they possess only a 20 Westlaw's online version of Holliday contains a header incorrectly suggesting that the Court's opinion starts at page 410. In fact, it starts later.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 845",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court's Decisions About Tribes Confirm That They Are \"Domestic Government[s]\" in the Ordinary Sense",
		"context": "(internal quo- tations omitted), quoted in Pet. Br. 32; Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], quoted in Pet. Br. 35.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Locke does not justify Montana's categorical exclusion of religious schools .. 25",
		"context": ". State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Locke is a narrow decision. The exclusion there was justified by one of the central concerns animating the Establishment Clause: the direct use of taxpayer funds to support the clergy, \"one of the hallmarks of an 'established' religion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Locke does not justify Montana's categorical exclusion of religious schools .. 25",
		"context": ". genuine and independent private choices,\" backed by tax credits for contributors to the program. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The program easily passes Establishment Clause muster. In invalidating the program, the Montana Supreme Court invoked Locke to justify its no-aid rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The College Sports Cases: Board of Regents and Alston",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court was faced with an antitrust case that had nothing to do with players' rights. The question was whether the NCAA's television plan, which limited the number of games that any school could televise and prohibited schools from selling the rights t o televise their games outside the plan, vio- lated the antitrust laws. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": ". where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplish- ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That type of preem ption plainly applies to re- spondents' restoration reme dy, which would undermine CERCLA's comprehensive fe deral scheme and would eject EPA from the driver's se at in managing cleanups. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "1. This Court has repeatedly found state law preempted when it interferes with an overlapping federal scheme. For instance, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held th at federal law preempted an alleged state tort-law duty to equip cars with airbags where a federal safety standard instead provided for a gradual phase-in for airbags. Id. at 874-75, 8 79.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 861",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "Id. at 881. Likewise, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that federal laws sanctioning Burma preempted Massachus etts' Burma sanctions. Congress had delegated to the President the power to de- cide what level of sanctions to impose, and Massachusetts' 48 law impaired the President's leverage in calibrating the appropriate degree of pressure. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "Id. at 376-80. More recently, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that federal immigration law preempted pro-visions of an Arizona immigrat ion statute, including a sec- tion authorizing state officers to arrest removable aliens. Id. at 407, 410.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "at 409. In all of these cases, state laws were preempted where they deprived federal agen-cies of flexibility to administer comprehensive federal laws. By contrast, Virginia Uranium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a Virginia law ba nning uranium mining. The petitioner had failed to iden tify any provision of federal law that would be thwarted, and argued only that the state statute threatened the abstract \"balance\" struck under the act. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "Am. Elec. Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job\" than individual juries on a case-by-case basis, acting only on the record the parties present. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "Geier , 529 U.S. at 872. Followi ng this reasoning, the Court has \"decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even broader savings clauses do not shield state laws that conflict with federal law. For example, section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 declared: \"[N]othing in this act contai ned shall in any way abridge 53 or alter the remedies now exis ting at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "& Pac. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court later held that this same savings cl ause did not preserve state- law claims that impeded the Interstate Commerce Act. See Chi.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "& Nw. Transp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An d where Congress has copied materially identical savings-clause language into other statutes, the Court has re ad it the same way. 504 U.S. 374 make clear that CER- CLA does not preempt the whole field of state environ- mental regulation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives",
		"context": "450 U.S. 311. An d where Congress has copied materially identical savings-clause language into other statutes, the Court has re ad it the same way. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] make clear that CER- CLA does not preempt the whole field of state environ- mental regulation. And, like those other provisions, § 114(a) and § 302(d) contain no indication that Congress preserved state laws that wou ld require a party to violate federal law or destroy the integrity of the federal regula- tory scheme. There is \"no reason to believe\" that those two provisions wrought a major realignment of the fed- eral-state balance and authorized state laws to supersede conflicting federal obligations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "In Champion and Dickason v. Casey (1792), the U.S. Circuit Court, including Chief Justice John Jay, struck down a Rhode Island debt-re- lief measure. See Ely, The Contract Clause 22–27; Vanhorne's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 Moreover, many states included a Contract Clause based on the federal model as they either revised or adopted their constitutions. This development signaled broad acceptance of the constitutional norm protecting agreements from state inte rference.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "As is well known, Chief Justice John Marshall rec- ognized that the Contract Clause was intended to be a secure base for the protection of both private and pub- lic contracts against retroactive state infringement. In-deed, the Contract Clause was the centerpiece of Marshall Court jurisprudence. This was exemplified by a series of landmark cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]17 U.S. 122. In these cases, Marshall established two cardinal principles – that the Contra ct Clause embraced both contracts by states and agreements between private parties, and that the reach of the Contract Clause was not confined to those controversies existing at the time of the framing. Indeed, he broadly observed: \"The 12 convention appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolate.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "As is well known, Chief Justice John Marshall rec- ognized that the Contract Clause was intended to be a secure base for the protection of both private and pub- lic contracts against retroactive state infringement. In-deed, the Contract Clause was the centerpiece of Marshall Court jurisprudence. This was exemplified by a series of landmark cases: 10 U.S. 87[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In these cases, Marshall established two cardinal principles – that the Contra ct Clause embraced both contracts by states and agreements between private parties, and that the reach of the Contract Clause was not confined to those controversies existing at the time of the framing. Indeed, he broadly observed: \"The 12 convention appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolate.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 U.S. 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "Ely, The Contract Clause , 30–58. In the antebellum years after Marshall left the bench, the Court continued to vigorously enforce the Clause. For example, in the leading case of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court invalidated Illi- nois debt relief measures which altered the remedies available to a mortgagee to foreclose on property in de-fault. The Court pointed out that these laws imposed new and onerous conditions on the mortgagee. More importantly, the Court endorsed the purpose behind adoption of the Contract Clause in sweeping language: It was undoubtedly adopted as a part of the Constitution for a great and useful purpose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "42 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "at 318. Bronson guided subsequent decisions re- garding debt-relief laws until the 1930s. Although the Court ruled in the famous case of Charles River [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that corporate charters should be strictly con-strued to bar claims of implied privilege, the Court never questioned the fundam ental premise that state- granted charters were contracts within the purview of 13 the Constitution. The Court, for instance, invalidated state laws regulating banks as violative of the Con- tract Clause. Even more significant was a line of deci- sions upholding tax exemption s contained in charters as protected by the provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "This Court firmly insisted that such laws, as applied to prior obligations, ran afoul of the Con- tract Clause. Justice Noah Swayne explained: \"No com-munity can have any higher public interest than in the faithful performance of contracts and the honest ad- ministration of justice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reaching this conclusion the Court not only implicitly rejected financial hardship as a jus- tification for abridging agreements, but also stressed the significance of contractual stability for society at large. In the late nineteenth century the Court invoked the Contract Clause to uphold tax exemptions, to bar legislative schemes to repudiate municipal debts, and to prevent lawmakers from changing foreclosure pro- cedures for preexisting mortgages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "Promi- nent jurists celebrated the importance of the provision. 14 Justice William Strong, speaking for the Court in Mur- ray v. Charleston , proclaimed: There is no more important provision in the Federal Constitution than the one which pro- hibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frit- tered away. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even jurists who sometimes disputed the applica- bility of the Contract Clause in particular cases none- theless went out of their way to express their respect for the provision. Justice Samuel F. Miller expressed this attitude in his dissent in The Washington Univer- sity v. Rouse : We are also free to admit that one of the most beneficial provisions of the Federal Constitu-tion, intended to secure private rights, is the one which protects contracts from the inva- sion of State legislation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts",
		"context": "Justice Samuel F. Miller expressed this attitude in his dissent in The Washington Univer- sity v. Rouse : We are also free to admit that one of the most beneficial provisions of the Federal Constitu-tion, intended to secure private rights, is the one which protects contracts from the inva- sion of State legislation. And that the manner in which this court has sustained the con- tracts of individuals has done much to re- strain the State legislatures, when urged by the pressure of popular discontent under the sufferings of great financial disturbances, from unwise, as well as unjust legislation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Throughout the first hundred years of the Con- tract Clause, this Court's dedication to the inviolability 15 of contracts was unwavering. The only difficult ques- tions concerned whether certain kinds of legislative enactments could be regarded as contracts and whether modifying breach-of-contract remedies consti-tuted an impermissible impairment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Text of the FSIA Can Only Be Amended by Congress",
		"context": "Petitioners have not identified a single other use of that phrase before or since the FSIA was passed. See Int'l Bhd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"That this natural and usual signification of plain terms is to be adopted as the legislative mean- ing in the absence of clea r showing that something else was meant, is an elementa ry rule of construction frequently recognized and followed in this court.\" 234 U.S. 245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Text of the FSIA Can Only Be Amended by Congress",
		"context": "of 431 U.S. 324. \"That this natural and usual signification of plain terms is to be adopted as the legislative mean- ing in the absence of clea r showing that something else was meant, is an elementa ry rule of construction frequently recognized and followed in this court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Congress had inte nded to incorporate a 29 certain understanding, \"by a few simple words it could have effected that purpose.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Text of the FSIA Can Only Be Amended by Congress",
		"context": "Petitioners' argument depends on the idea of \"a specialized common law meaning [that] congress hasn't itself invoked\" and \"the common law terms of art associated with that meaning.\" Food Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pe- titioners discuss the phrase \"takings in violation of the customary international law of expropriation\" (Peti- tioners' Brief, 22; 25; see also id. at 17, 26, 28), which does not appear in the statute, and then they purport to define that term as limited to claims by aliens .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Text of the FSIA Can Only Be Amended by Congress",
		"context": "Not even the legislative history pro- vides the words that Petition ers wish to insert into the statute: \"of aliens.\" 2. Petitioners suggest that the Court's opinion in Banco Nacional De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and the subsequent Second Hickenlooper Amendment (22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)) establish the phrase \"property taken in violation of international law\" as limited to the expropriation from aliens. Yet neither the Court nor the statute used that phrase or defined the scope of international law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Text of the FSIA Can Only Be Amended by Congress",
		"context": "In fact, the FSIA legislative history references 22 U.S.C. § 2370 only to say that existing law on the 32 language from § 2370(e)(2), cannot be read to incorpo- rate a lower court's interpretation of § 2370(e)(2). See Petitioners' Brief, 26 (citing F. Palicio y Compania, S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 F. Supp. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. HABITUAL RESIDENCE IS AN IMPORTANT AND FREQUENTLY RECURRING ISSUE",
		"context": "And his argument (at 22) that habitual-residence determinations do not arise with sufficient frequency to warrant review is misplaced. Taglieri ignores that the Court has granted certi- orari in three Hague Convention cases in the past dec- ade—each time on an issue that arises far less fre- quently than habitual-residence determinations. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because habitual residence is a 11 threshold issue that is \"the central—often outcome- determinative—concept on which the entire system is founded,\" Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1072, the questions pre- sented here are more than sufficiently important to warrant this Court's review. Taglieri also ignores that allowing the procedural and substantive standards that govern habitual-resi- dence determinations to turn on the fortuity of venue threatens to undermine the efficacy of the Hague Con-vention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The access regulation does not fall within any category of per se takings",
		"context": "For example, the Sixth Circuit refused to give per se treatment to an ordinance requiring scrap metal dealers to allow theft victims to inspect their premises, emphasiz ing that the law \"authorizes a small class of individuals to temporarily enter the scrap dealers' premises during normal business hours for a single enumerated purpose.\" Tenn. Scrap Recy- clers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise , the Federal Circuit held that tempo- rary but recurring entries onto property by federal of- ficials to survey owls did not result in a per se taking in light of the \"limited and transient nature of the in- trusion .\" Boise Cascade 296 F.3d 1339.11 That does not mean that a government access reg- ulation must \"a llow for access ' 24 hours a day, 365 days a year '\" to qualif y as a per se taking , Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.3d 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The access regulation does not fall within any category of per se takings",
		"context": "Scrap Recy- clers 556 F.3d 442. Likewise , the Federal Circuit held that tempo- rary but recurring entries onto property by federal of- ficials to survey owls did not result in a per se taking in light of the \"limited and transient nature of the in- trusion .\" Boise Cascade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].11 That does not mean that a government access reg- ulation must \"a llow for access ' 24 hours a day, 365 days a year '\" to qualif y as a per se taking , Pet. Br. 22, or that the facts of Loretto or Nollan define the uni- verse of regulations that authorize \"permanent physi- cal occupations .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 F.3d 1339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The access regulation does not fall within any category of per se takings",
		"context": "Br. 27 ), might very well qualify 11 See also, e.g. , John R. Sand & Gravel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26 as \"a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.\" Loretto , 458 U.S. at 432; see also U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 F.3d 1345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The access regulation does not fall within any category of per se takings",
		"context": "Loretto , 458 U.S. at 432; see also U.S. Br. 22; cf. Surfside Colony, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But there is no basis in precedent for ex- tending per se treatment to a business regulation like the one here, which authorizes only limited and inter- mittent access for a narrow purpose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "226 Cal. App. 3d 1260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker",
		"context": "The avoidance canon, moreover, has long played a key role in this Court's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in the immigration context. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The answer is yes. Zadvydas interpreted the scope of Section 1231(a)(6)'s detention authority to coincide with bond- like considerations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker",
		"context": "First , two of the grounds that Section 1231(a)(6) enumerates for continued detention beyond the initial 90-day removal period—if the individual is \"a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,\" 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)—echo precisely the historical inquiry into community safety and flight risk at bond hearings. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Jennings , 138 S. Ct. at 863 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, DHS's regulations implementing Section 1231(a)(6)'s text make flight 30 risk and dangerousness the dispositive factors for discretionary release eligibility. See 8 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker",
		"context": "Custody redeterminations under Section 1231(a)(6) fit comfortably within the Attorney General's (and immigration judges') retained functions. And if there were any question whether Congress intended to eliminate that key due process protection of a neutral adjudicator, constitutional avoidance would compel the conclusion that Congress did not. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, nothing precludes the Third Circuit's adoption of a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for the bond hearing. The degree of proof required in a particular proceeding is traditionally a question \"left to the judiciary to resolve.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker",
		"context": "Finally, nothing precludes the Third Circuit's adoption of a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for the bond hearing. The degree of proof required in a particular proceeding is traditionally a question \"left to the judiciary to resolve.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 33 Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 701 (providing for a burden- shifting approach on the question whether removal is reasonably foreseeable); 385 U.S. 276. And because prolonged civil detention implicates a core due process interest—the protection of liberty—the clear- and-convincing evidence standard is appropriate. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (explaining that the clear and convincing standard is \"necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government- initiated proceedings that threaten the individual with a significant deprivation of liberty\") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding pretrial detention where the government bore the burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, on dangerousness); 441 U.S. 418.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker",
		"context": "Finally, nothing precludes the Third Circuit's adoption of a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for the bond hearing. The degree of proof required in a particular proceeding is traditionally a question \"left to the judiciary to resolve.\" 455 U.S. 745; see also 33 Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 701 (providing for a burden- shifting approach on the question whether removal is reasonably foreseeable); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because prolonged civil detention implicates a core due process interest—the protection of liberty—the clear- and-convincing evidence standard is appropriate. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (explaining that the clear and convincing standard is \"necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government- initiated proceedings that threaten the individual with a significant deprivation of liberty\") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding pretrial detention where the government bore the burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, on dangerousness); 441 U.S. 418.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker",
		"context": "455 U.S. 745; see also 33 Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 701 (providing for a burden- shifting approach on the question whether removal is reasonably foreseeable); 385 U.S. 276. And because prolonged civil detention implicates a core due process interest—the protection of liberty—the clear- and-convincing evidence standard is appropriate. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (explaining that the clear and convincing standard is \"necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government- initiated proceedings that threaten the individual with a significant deprivation of liberty\") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding pretrial detention where the government bore the burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, on dangerousness); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the government itself has adopted the same clear-and-convincing standard for noncitizens who are provided custody hearings before immigration judges at six months— i.e., those the government has deemed specially dangerous. See 8 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "a. \"Part of a fair reading of statutory text is recognizing that Congress legislates against the backdrop of certain unexpressed presumptions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , against which Congress enacted the CSA is the well -settled principle that \"a 'vicious will'\" is required \"to establ ish a crime,\" 511 U.S. 600. To effectuate this \"firmly embedded\" requirement , Staples , 511 U.S at 605 , this Court presumes that a statute's mens rea requirement (whether it is express or unstated) extends to \"each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.\" 139 S. Ct. 2191 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "a. \"Part of a fair reading of statutory text is recognizing that Congress legislates against the backdrop of certain unexpressed presumptions.\" 572 U.S. 844 , against which Congress enacted the CSA is the well -settled principle that \"a 'vicious will'\" is required \"to establ ish a crime,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To effectuate this \"firmly embedded\" requirement , Staples , 511 U.S at 605 , this Court presumes that a statute's mens rea requirement (whether it is express or unstated) extends to \"each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.\" 139 S. Ct. 2191 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "572 U.S. 844 , against which Congress enacted the CSA is the well -settled principle that \"a 'vicious will'\" is required \"to establ ish a crime,\" 511 U.S. 600. To effectuate this \"firmly embedded\" requirement , Staples , 511 U.S at 605 , this Court presumes that a statute's mens rea requirement (whether it is express or unstated) extends to \"each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See 513 U.S. 64 ; 342 U.S. 246 . This mens rea presumptio n is \"a sturdy background principle against which Congress legisl ates\" —and it governs \"unless Congress has plainly indicated otherwise .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "To effectuate this \"firmly embedded\" requirement , Staples , 511 U.S at 605 , this Court presumes that a statute's mens rea requirement (whether it is express or unstated) extends to \"each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.\" 139 S. Ct. 2191 . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 342 U.S. 246 . This mens rea presumptio n is \"a sturdy background principle against which Congress legisl ates\" —and it governs \"unless Congress has plainly indicated otherwise .\" 690 F.3d 500.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "To effectuate this \"firmly embedded\" requirement , Staples , 511 U.S at 605 , this Court presumes that a statute's mens rea requirement (whether it is express or unstated) extends to \"each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.\" 139 S. Ct. 2191 . See 513 U.S. 64 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This mens rea presumptio n is \"a sturdy background principle against which Congress legisl ates\" —and it governs \"unless Congress has plainly indicated otherwise .\" 690 F.3d 500.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "See 513 U.S. 64 ; 342 U.S. 246 . This mens rea presumptio n is \"a sturdy background principle against which Congress legisl ates\" —and it governs \"unless Congress has plainly indicated otherwise .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Honoring this mens rea presumption is all the more essential when a statute uses imprecise standards to impose criminal liability on activity that is often entirely innocuous . The Court addressed such a statute in Gypsum .",
		"citation_value_orig": "690 F.3d 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "See BIO 11. 10 That distinguishes United States v. Yermian , which addressed the question whether a mens rea requirement applied to the statutory section's preceding jurisdictiona l hook. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, a food-stamp fraud statute provided that \"whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations\" would be subject to fine and imprisonment. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "upon the person claiming its benefit.\" That prov ision merely assigns a prima facie burden to the defendant; \"[o]nce a defendant presents a c laim that he falls within the exemption, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused does not fall within it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See 659 F.2d 1306; 618 F.2d 892; 22 And under the text of the CSA, only a prescription lacking a good faith medical purpose is unauthorized. As the CSA expressly finds, \"[m]any of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 F.2d 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "That prov ision merely assigns a prima facie burden to the defendant; \"[o]nce a defendant presents a c laim that he falls within the exemption, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused does not fall within it.\" 515 F.2d 190. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 618 F.2d 892; 22 And under the text of the CSA, only a prescription lacking a good faith medical purpose is unauthorized. As the CSA expressly finds, \"[m]any of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.\" 21 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.2d 1306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "That prov ision merely assigns a prima facie burden to the defendant; \"[o]nce a defendant presents a c laim that he falls within the exemption, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused does not fall within it.\" 515 F.2d 190. See 659 F.2d 1306; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 22 And under the text of the CSA, only a prescription lacking a good faith medical purpose is unauthorized. As the CSA expressly finds, \"[m]any of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.\" 21 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "618 F.2d 892",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": ". . bars [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also, e.g., 459 F.3d 463147 F.3d 1316. To hold ot herwise would impermissibly shift to physician -defendants the burden of proof on a defense t hat \"negate[s] an element of the crime\" —mens rea .",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 F.2d 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": ". bars 541 F.2d 300. See also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]147 F.3d 1316. To hold ot herwise would impermissibly shift to physician -defendants the burden of proof on a defense t hat \"negate[s] an element of the crime\" —mens rea . 568 U.S. 106.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 F.3d 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": ". bars 541 F.2d 300. See also, e.g., 459 F.3d 463[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To hold ot herwise would impermissibly shift to physician -defendants the burden of proof on a defense t hat \"negate[s] an element of the crime\" —mens rea . 568 U.S. 106.",
		"citation_value_orig": "147 F.3d 1316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "See also, e.g., 459 F.3d 463147 F.3d 1316. To hold ot herwise would impermissibly shift to physician -defendants the burden of proof on a defense t hat \"negate[s] an element of the crime\" —mens rea . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Outler , 659 F.2d at 1309 (the \"lack of a legitimate medical reason\" \"embodies the culpability of the offense\"). 23 doctors from peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "See Outler , 659 F.2d at 1309 (the \"lack of a legitimate medical reason\" \"embodies the culpability of the offense\"). 23 doctors from peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. Nearby provisions confirm that Congress granted physicians robust mens rea protection when the government prosecutes them as drug dealers . For example, the relatively modest administrative penalties in Section 842 lack any mens rea elem ent, except in narro w enumerated circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": ". regularly registered under this act in the course o f his professional practice only.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's precedents construing the Harrison Act underscore that physicians may not be convicted as fede ral felons unless they act without a medical purpose. Soon after the Harrison Act's passage in 1914, this Court interpreted Section 2's general prohibition to apply to phys icians who prescribed without a medical purpose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "Soon after the Harrison Act's passage in 1914, this Court interpreted Section 2's general prohibition to apply to phys icians who prescribed without a medical purpose. In assessing one physician's suff iciency -of-the-evidence challenge, the Court explained that a physician could be convicted if he prescribed to addicts \"for the mere purpose, as the jury might find, of enabling such persons to continue the use of the drug, or to sell it to others.\" Jin F uey [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court also rejected as a \"perversion of [the] meaning\" of \"a physician's prescription\" (and therefore outside Section 2(a)'s exemption) a prescription issued not \"in the course of professional treatm ent in the attempted cure of the habit, but . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": ". for the purpose of providing the user with morp hine sufficient to keep him 27 comfortable by maintaining his customary use.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Five years later, in 268 U.S. 5 , the Court reinforced the point. Although the \" [m]ere pretense \" of bona fide medical purpose c ould not insulate a physician from prosecution , id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 U.S. 96",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "for the purpose of providing the user with morp hine sufficient to keep him 27 comfortable by maintaining his customary use.\" 249 U.S. 96 . Five years later, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court reinforced the point. Although the \" [m]ere pretense \" of bona fide medical purpose c ould not insulate a physician from prosecution , id. at 18 , the Court vacated Dr. Linder's conviction because a physician who presc ribes \"in good faith\" and without a \"conscious design to violate the law\" may not be convicted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "That distinction did not deter the Court from applying a robust good faith standard in Dr. Linder's favor. Second, the Court had previously held that Section 2's general prohibiti on was a strict - liability offense. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That, too, did not dissuade the Court from setting aside Dr. Linder 's drug trafficking conviction because he lacked a \"conscious design to violate the law. \"13 b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": ". . existing law enforcement 13 Linder 's holding was reinforced in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which \"[t]he disputed question was whether the defendan t issued the prescriptions in good faith.\" Id. at 105 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
		"context": "This good faith defense must look only to the physician's subjective belief —eschewing both constructive knowledge and reference to ge neral professional norms. No other standard is up to the task of \"separat[ing] wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct.\" Elonis , 575 U.S. at 736 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2000 )). Requiring a physician's good faith bel ief to be \"reasonable\" imposes negligence liability — criminalizing and federalizing malpractice. See infra Part I.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities",
		"context": "The same constitutional restrictions that promote free speech when they apply to the govern- ment may curb speech rights if they are applied to private entities by narrowing their ability to choose the speech that occurs within their own spaces. The state action doctrine generally prevents that harm by dictating that courts may not impose the First Amendment's restrictions on any private actor unless the \"seemingly private\" conduct at the heart of the suit \"may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.\" Brentwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By applying state action analysis in First Amendment suits, courts ensure that they do not impermissibly limit a private de- fendant's speech rights in the name of vindicating the plaintiff's. That is a particular danger in the context of public forum analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities",
		"context": "That is a particular danger in the context of public forum analysis. Forum analysis is used in First Amendment cases to \"assess[ ] restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property .\" Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this approach, a court subjects government restrictions on speech to strict scrutiny when the court deter- 8 mines that the government property in question is a \"traditional public forum\"—that is, a space \"that has traditionally been available for public expression.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities",
		"context": "\"[M]embers of the public\" simply do not \"have the same right of free speech\" on private property \"as they would have on the similar public facilities in the streets of a city or town.\" Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also, Krishna , 505 U.S. at 681 (\"The practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the gov- ernment's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport[,]\" just as \"[t]he development of privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not change the public fora status of publicly held parks.\"). Indeed, the Constitution forecloses the application of forum analysis to private entities: Traditional public fora require content and viewpoint neutrality. See, e.g., Hudgens , 424 U.S. at 520 (citing 422 U.S. 205).",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities",
		"context": "at 519 (quoting Lloyd 407 U.S. 551); see also, Krishna , 505 U.S. at 681 (\"The practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the gov- ernment's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport[,]\" just as \"[t]he development of privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not change the public fora status of publicly held parks.\"). Indeed, the Constitution forecloses the application of forum analysis to private entities: Traditional public fora require content and viewpoint neutrality. See, e.g., Hudgens , 424 U.S. at 520 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). If these neutrality requirements are applied to private enti- ties that open spaces for public speech, companies will be deprived of their ability to monitor content shared in their privately owned spaces. That, in turn, will compel businesses to associate with and 9 even facilitate ideas and speakers they find objec- tionable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities",
		"context": "That, in turn, will compel businesses to associate with and 9 even facilitate ideas and speakers they find objec- tionable. But, as this Court has recognized, a com- pany's First Amendment rights are violated where it is forced \"to be publicly identified or associated with another's message.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Miami Herald Publ'g 418 U.S. 241. Like all speakers, \"business corpora- tions generally\" have a First Amendment right to choose whether \"to propound a particular point of view.\" Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-575.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities",
		"context": "That, in turn, will compel businesses to associate with and 9 even facilitate ideas and speakers they find objec- tionable. But, as this Court has recognized, a com- pany's First Amendment rights are violated where it is forced \"to be publicly identified or associated with another's message.\" 521 U.S. 457; see also Miami Herald Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like all speakers, \"business corpora- tions generally\" have a First Amendment right to choose whether \"to propound a particular point of view.\" Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-575.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SB 8 does not conflict with laws governing federal programs",
		"context": "US.ROA.1836- 40. The United States failed to demon- strate that \"compliance with both federal and stat e reg- ulations is a physical impossibility,\" and or that SB 8 \"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.\" Ar- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \" [P]os- sibility of impossibility is not enough.\" Merck Sharp & 60 Dohme 139 S. Ct. 1668.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SB 8 does not conflict with laws governing federal programs",
		"context": "As an initial matter, it is far from clear that many of these documents, which represent internal agency guidance can preempt state law. While \"an agency regu- lation with the force of law can pre -empt conflicting state requirements ,\" Wyeth , 555 U.S. at 576, preemption is less ce rtain when it comes to policies. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. It is highly speculative that the se policies will con- flict with —and therefore preempt —state law: the United States does not seem to claim that federal em- ployees themselves are performing post -heartbeat abor- tions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. SB 8 does not conflict with laws governing federal programs",
		"context": "US.ROA.523 (BOP), 539 (USMS), 1002 (Job Corps), 2435 (ORR). As the Court has explained, \"the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It cannot be that the United States intended to preempt all state abortion laws through these programs when the programs themselves mandate compliance with state law. The district court brushed this off by con- cluding that the policies assume state laws are constitu- tional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Like many local governments, Pittsylvania County has opened its meetings with legislator-led prayer for centuries",
		"context": ". This Nation has long observed \" [a] custom of open- ing sessions of all deliberative bodies with prayer.\" Holy Trinity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pittsylvania County 's Board of Supervisors —like petitioner—is no different. Before it was enjoined, the Board had been opening its meetings with a n invocation for well over two hundred years.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Like many local governments, Pittsylvania County has opened its meetings with legislator-led prayer for centuries",
		"context": "The court thus \"enjoined [the 8 Board] from repeatedly openings its meetings with prayers associated with any one religion, which prac-tice has the unconstitutional 'effect of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or belief.'\" Id. at 15 (quoting County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The district court determined that the Board could con- tinue opening its meetings with prayer provided that it \"'strive to be nondenominational so long as that is reasonably possible —it should send a signal of wel- come rather than exclusion. It should not r eject the tenets of other faith s in favor of just one.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Same-sex couples and LGBTQ children are constitutionally entitled to equal treatment, free of disadvantage or stigma",
		"context": "tigma. This Court has made clear that members of the LGBTQ community are entitled to \"equal dignity in the eyes of the law,\" Obergefell , 576 U.S. at 681, and that the Constitution insists that \"exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others be given great weight and respect.\" Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are entitled to be free from unequal bur- dens and from the stigma of official acts that signal disapproval, Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 575–76—to be free, that is, from provisions of law that \"impose a dis- advantage, a separate status, and so a stigma.\" Wind- sor, 570 U.S. at 770.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals",
		"context": "See Robert H. Jackson, Justice Jackson's Final Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, reprinted in 20 T EMP. L.Q. 338, 342 (1946); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These extensions of international law into the area of personal responsibility, however, are not viewed as potentially undermining national sovereign interests in the same way as are proposals to extend international law status to corporations. Many of the precedents for individual liability involve cases where the individual, in some fashion, was exercising sovereign power, including powers triggered by the laws of war; these cases can be viewed as an extension of sovereign responsibility under even the \"classic\" international law model.",
		"citation_value_orig": "726 F.2d 774",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals",
		"context": "See David Wallach, The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of Individual Accountability in International Law, 46 S TAN.J.INT'L L. 121, 137-138 (2010) (\"Under th[e] 'classical' view of international law, individuals do not hold direct rights or duties. The majority of exceptions [to this rule] applied to conduct occurring on the high seas, which is considered the shared territory of all nations. \"); The Malek Adhel , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "43 U.S. 210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "....... 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Capital Network Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................... 12 436 U.S. 775 .................................................. 2, 4, 8, 17 450 U.S. 582 .... 6, 17 549 U.S. 497 ....................... 12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 ............. 2, 17 National Broad . 319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 F.3d 1526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "....... 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Capital Network Sys., 3 F.3d 1526 ................................................................... 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................. 2, 4, 8, 17 450 U.S. 582 .... 6, 17 549 U.S. 497 ....................... 12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 ............. 2, 17 National Broad . 319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "....... 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Capital Network Sys., 3 F.3d 1526 ................................................................... 12 436 U.S. 775 .................................................. 2, 4, 8, 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .... 6, 17 549 U.S. 497 ....................... 12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 ............. 2, 17 National Broad . 319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "....... 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Capital Network Sys., 3 F.3d 1526 ................................................................... 12 436 U.S. 775 .................................................. 2, 4, 8, 17 450 U.S. 582 .... 6, 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 ............. 2, 17 National Broad . 319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "....... 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Capital Network Sys., 3 F.3d 1526 ................................................................... 12 436 U.S. 775 .................................................. 2, 4, 8, 17 450 U.S. 582 .... 6, 17 549 U.S. 497 ....................... 12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............. 2, 17 National Broad . 319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert. denied,545 U.S. 1123 ..................................... 22 Prometheus Radio 652 F.3d 431, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "....... 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Capital Network Sys., 3 F.3d 1526 ................................................................... 12 436 U.S. 775 .................................................. 2, 4, 8, 17 450 U.S. 582 .... 6, 17 549 U.S. 497 ....................... 12 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 ............. 2, 17 National Broad . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert. denied,545 U.S. 1123 ..................................... 22 Prometheus Radio 652 F.3d 431, cert. denied,567 U.S. 951 .............. 23 569 F.3d 514 ............................................... 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ....................... 6 Statutes : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 ............. 2, 17 National Broad . 319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert. denied,545 U.S. 1123 ..................................... 22 Prometheus Radio [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,567 U.S. 951 .............. 23 569 F.3d 514 ............................................... 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ....................... 6 Statutes : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "652 F.3d 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert. denied,545 U.S. 1123 ..................................... 22 Prometheus Radio 652 F.3d 431, cert. denied,567 U.S. 951 .............. 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................... 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ....................... 6 Statutes : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ............. 2 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "319 U.S. 190 .................................................................................... 17 II Cases —Continued: Page Prometheus Radio 373 F.3d 372, as amended (June 3, 2016), cert. denied,545 U.S. 1123 ..................................... 22 Prometheus Radio 652 F.3d 431, cert. denied,567 U.S. 951 .............. 23 569 F.3d 514 ............................................... 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 6 Statutes : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ............. 2 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "THE FCC POSSESSES BROAD DISCRETION TO REGU- LATE M EDIA OWNERSHIP IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST \"The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capri- cious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. \" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Consistent with that principle , this Court has repeatedly affirmed the FCC's broad discretion to regulate in the public interest and to make predictive judgments based on imperfect infor- mation . See, e.g., 436 U.S. 775 of the 3 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "Ass'n of the U.S., 463 U.S. 29 . Consistent with that principle , this Court has repeatedly affirmed the FCC's broad discretion to regulate in the public interest and to make predictive judgments based on imperfect infor- mation . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of the 3 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 303 note , which establishes a n \"iterative process \" through which the FCC keep s pace with market developments by tak- ing \"a fresh look at its rules every four years \" and reas- sessing \"how its rules function in the marketplace. \" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "303 note. That language vests the FCC with \"broad discretion in determining how much weight should be given to\" goals like racial and gender diversity, \"and what policies should be pur sued in promoting\" those goals. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The court of appeals did not question the reasonableness of the FCC's competition -based affirmative rationales for overhauling its ownership rules. The court neverthe-less vacated the challenged agency orders and held that \"[o]n r emand the Commission must ascertain on record evidence the likely effect of any rule changes it proposes on ownership by women and minorities, whether through new empirical research or an in -depth theoret- ical analysis.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "App. 34a. That holdin g displaces the Commission's wide -ranging public -interest analysis and imposes an extra -statutory obligation in violation of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents make no serious effort to defend this remand instruction . Instead, they contend that the de- cision below permits the Commission to \"transparently re-weigh competing public -interest considerations,\" thus \"obviating the need for extensive analysis of own- 7 ership diversity, should the Commission decide to ex- plicitly abandon the goal.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "Proposing new ration- ales for an old rule that no longer serves its original pur- pose is analogous to proposing a new rule. And in that context, the burden is plainly on the submitter to offer evidence in support of its proposal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Capital Ne twork Sys., 3 F.3d 1526; Gov't Br. 30 -31. Rather than dispute this point, re- spondents contend that \"it is the Commission's burden to determine whether its rules are necessary for the public interest.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
		"context": "Proposing new ration- ales for an old rule that no longer serves its original pur- pose is analogous to proposing a new rule. And in that context, the burden is plainly on the submitter to offer evidence in support of its proposal. See 549 U.S. 497; Capital Ne twork Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gov't Br. 30 -31. Rather than dispute this point, re- spondents contend that \"it is the Commission's burden to determine whether its rules are necessary for the public interest.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 F.3d 1526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Elevating Certain \"Traditional\" Redistricting Principles over Others and over any Consideration of Race Uniquely Burdens Native American Communities",
		"context": "Petitioners urge that certain redistricting principles, specifically those honoring political boundaries and protecting prior district shapes (\"core retention\"), be given priority over other redistricting principles (including respecting communities of interest), to the complete exclusion of any consideration of race. This scheme would be devastating to Native Americans. And, while the preservation of communities of interest has long been recognized as a critical redistricting principle, and one that considers race (at least to some extent), see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Petitioners would suppress this important principle to preference \"core retention\" of existing districts. 30 But \"core retention\" is not among the longstanding traditional redistricting criteria. See 509 U.S. 630.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Elevating Certain \"Traditional\" Redistricting Principles over Others and over any Consideration of Race Uniquely Burdens Native American Communities",
		"context": "And, while the preservation of communities of interest has long been recognized as a critical redistricting principle, and one that considers race (at least to some extent), see 515 U.S. 900, Petitioners would suppress this important principle to preference \"core retention\" of existing districts. 30 But \"core retention\" is not among the longstanding traditional redistricting criteria. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It can perpetuate continued discrimination. See, e.g., North 585 U. S. None.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Elevating Certain \"Traditional\" Redistricting Principles over Others and over any Consideration of Race Uniquely Burdens Native American Communities",
		"context": "The unique history of Native Americans illustrates that district drawing based on political boundaries is not \"race neutral\". In Fremont County, Wyoming, for example, the Arapaho and Shoshone tribes were historically distinct and even adverse tribes with different territories. See 32 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When members of the two tribes sued the county, alleging that the at-large method of voting violated the VRA, the tribes sought recognition as a politically cohesive group. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "709 F. Supp. 2d 1176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Below Engaged in Impermissible Lawmaking, which the Recent Precedents It Purported to Rely Upon Do Not Support.",
		"context": "Each of the foregoing cases presented disputes confined to actors operating within the political branches of state government or otherwise exercising fundamentally lawmaking power (as in AIRC, where the people of Arizona lawfully chose to vest an independent commission with legislative redistricting power in accordance with the State Constitution, see 576 U.S., at 824). In most states, the legislative and executive branches each play some role in the lawmaking process. 6 The state judiciary, by contrast, plays a different role entirely—it does not enjoy lawmaking authority in any state, because while \"[i]t is emphatically the province and authority of the judicial department to say what the law is,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"Whether the Governor of the State, through the veto power, shall have a part in the making of state laws is a matter of state policy.\" Smiley , 285 U.S. at 368. In North Carolina, unlike most other States, the State Constitution gives the Governor no role in the redistricting process, but the people of North Carolina could easily alter this scheme if they so desired.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 Cranch 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Significant-Nexus Test Does Not Raise Commerce Clause Concerns, as It Ensures Any Regulation of Wetlands Fits Within Congress's Traditional Authority to Regulate Problems with Genuine Spillover Effects",
		"context": ". Drawing on the text and history described above, this Court has recognized three categories of regula- tions permissible under the Commerce Clause : \"Con- gress may regulate the use of t he channels of inter- state commerce,\" \"persons or things in interstate com- merce,\" and \"those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.\" Lopez , 514 U.S. at 558-59; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Justice Kennedy's significant -nexus test from Ra- panos permits federal regulation of wetlands that fit squarely within the first category , \"the channels of in- terstate commerce ,\" Lopez , 514 U.S. at 558 . And fed- eral regulation of those wetlands is justified under the third Lopez category as well .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "Rather, each of this Court's decision s cited merely held that the official in question was an \"inferior\" officer. The touchstone of whether an officer is a \"principal\" officer rather than an \"inferior officer\" is whether the officer 's \"work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1997 ). Rather than follow Edmond ''s admonition that \"[o] ur cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointment Clause purposes ,\" Arthrex I cherry -picked the facts from Edmond to establish a three -factor test to be ta llied and mechanically appl ied. This is clear error, and needs to be addressed by this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "284 (2011) (\"AIA\"). Significantly, while each of the Supreme Court cases on which the Federal Circuit panel relied supported the proposition that APJs are \"officers\" of the United States, every single one of those cases, in what could be characterized as analogous statutory frameworks, has concluded that the officers in question were \"inferior officers\" and not merely employees under the Appointments Clause . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (SEC Administrative Law Judges are inferior officers); Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477487 U.S. 65438 U.S. 230. Arthrex I' s analysis failed to pay heed to Edmond 's warning that \" [t]he exercise of 'significant autho rity pursuant to the laws of the United States ' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but rather, as we said in Buckley, the line between officer and non-officer. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "Significantly, while each of the Supreme Court cases on which the Federal Circuit panel relied supported the proposition that APJs are \"officers\" of the United States, every single one of those cases, in what could be characterized as analogous statutory frameworks, has concluded that the officers in question were \"inferior officers\" and not merely employees under the Appointments Clause . See 138 S. Ct. 2044 (SEC Administrative Law Judges are inferior officers); Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]487 U.S. 65438 U.S. 230. Arthrex I' s analysis failed to pay heed to Edmond 's warning that \" [t]he exercise of 'significant autho rity pursuant to the laws of the United States ' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but rather, as we said in Buckley, the line between officer and non-officer. \" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 662 (citing Buckl 424 U.S. 1) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "Significantly, while each of the Supreme Court cases on which the Federal Circuit panel relied supported the proposition that APJs are \"officers\" of the United States, every single one of those cases, in what could be characterized as analogous statutory frameworks, has concluded that the officers in question were \"inferior officers\" and not merely employees under the Appointments Clause . See 138 S. Ct. 2044 (SEC Administrative Law Judges are inferior officers); Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]38 U.S. 230. Arthrex I' s analysis failed to pay heed to Edmond 's warning that \" [t]he exercise of 'significant autho rity pursuant to the laws of the United States ' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but rather, as we said in Buckley, the line between officer and non-officer. \" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 662 (citing Buckl 424 U.S. 1) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "Significantly, while each of the Supreme Court cases on which the Federal Circuit panel relied supported the proposition that APJs are \"officers\" of the United States, every single one of those cases, in what could be characterized as analogous statutory frameworks, has concluded that the officers in question were \"inferior officers\" and not merely employees under the Appointments Clause . See 138 S. Ct. 2044 (SEC Administrative Law Judges are inferior officers); Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477487 U.S. 654[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Arthrex I' s analysis failed to pay heed to Edmond 's warning that \" [t]he exercise of 'significant autho rity pursuant to the laws of the United States ' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but rather, as we said in Buckley, the line between officer and non-officer. \" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 662 (citing Buckl 424 U.S. 1) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "561 U.S. 477487 U.S. 65438 U.S. 230. Arthrex I' s analysis failed to pay heed to Edmond 's warning that \" [t]he exercise of 'significant autho rity pursuant to the laws of the United States ' marks, not the line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but rather, as we said in Buckley, the line between officer and non-officer. \" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 662 (citing Buckl [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Purporting to r ely upon th is Court's guidance in Edmond , the panel first correctly stated that \"[t]here is no 'exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointment Clause purposes.'\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "§§ 1(a), 3(b)(6), 6(a)). Cf. Oil States [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To begin with, the PTO , which includes the PTAB , in general , is \"subject to the policy direction of the Secretary of Commerce .\" 35 U .S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "Reg. 9497 (Mar. 15, 2019); • Replac ing the broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction standard with the standard used by Article III federal courts —the standard applied in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 83 Fed. Reg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 F.3d 1303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "In addition, the Director (not the PTAB APJs , to whom he delegates his authority) has the unfettered authority to determine whether to institute an IPR proceeding . 35 U.S.C. § 314 ; see Thryv, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Director's authority extends beyond the institution 12 decision and can even be exercised to terminate a proceeding before a final written decision , or on remand after a final written decision is reversed. See BioDelivery Scis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "The Director's authority extends beyond the institution 12 decision and can even be exercised to terminate a proceeding before a final written decision , or on remand after a final written decision is reversed. See BioDelivery Scis. Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further, w hile PTAB APJs may participate in panels of three (which the Director controls and designates , see 35 U.S.C. § 6(c)) and issue orders in a particular proceeding th at govern the parties to that proceeding, they have no ability to set policy for the PTO , or even designate a decision as precedential or informative \" without the approval of the Director .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "935 F.3d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause",
		"context": "14 more members to the panel —including himself —and order the case reheard. \" Oil States , 138 S. Ct. at 1381 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), (c); In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Given the Director's power to define and enforce such binding agency policy and guidance, and ability to out -vote any particular APJ, the Director's power over a PTAB APJ is sufficiently substantial to meet this Court's test . In short, Askeladden respectfully submits that the Federal Cir cuit p anel below erred in focusing too narrowly on the three factors it plucked from Edmond , in addition to improperly evaluating their cumulative effect in determining whether PTAB APJs work is sufficiently \"directed and supervised\" by superior officers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "33 F.3d 1526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "This Court has long declined to priori tize certain First Amendment rights over others. For example, this Court has treated the Free Speech Clause and the Peti- tion Clause \"with equal force ,\" even though these rights may differ \"in their mandate or their purpose and ef- fect.\" Borough of Duryea, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such equal treatment is based in part on the fact that the United States' different First Amendment rights were \"inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy,\" which ha ve made these rights \"inseparable\" from one another. See 472 U.S. 479 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "Borough of Duryea, 564 U.S. 379. Such equal treatment is based in part on the fact that the United States' different First Amendment rights were \"inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy,\" which ha ve made these rights \"inseparable\" from one another. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . These rights include \"[t]he Free Exercise Clause[ , which] embraces a free- dom of conscience and worship parallel[ed by] the speech provisions of the First Amendment.\" See 505 U.S. 577 (1992 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "See 472 U.S. 479 . These rights include \"[t]he Free Exercise Clause[ , which] embraces a free- dom of conscience and worship parallel[ed by] the speech provisions of the First Amendment.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1992 ). Accordingly, as this Court has recognized time and time again, \"there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protec-tion\" to certain First Amendment clauses than \"other 12 First A mendment expressions.\" See McDonald , 472 U.S. at 485.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "See McDonald , 472 U.S. at 485. A different approach would establish, \"among first amendment expression rights, a hierarchy of labels,\" something which \"[t]he Supreme Court [has] emphatically eschewed establishing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 Protecting religious speech more than other speech, such as political speech, would contradict the longstand- ing understanding of this Court that political speech is at the core of the First Amendment , and thus entitled to the highest level of protection. As this Court observed in 393 U.S. 23, political de- bate \"is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms .\" And just this term, this Court reiterated that , \" '[w]hatever differences may ex- ist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement' that it was adopted in part to 'protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "929 F.2d 1210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "A different approach would establish, \"among first amendment expression rights, a hierarchy of labels,\" something which \"[t]he Supreme Court [has] emphatically eschewed establishing.\" 929 F.2d 1210.3 Protecting religious speech more than other speech, such as political speech, would contradict the longstand- ing understanding of this Court that political speech is at the core of the First Amendment , and thus entitled to the highest level of protection. As this Court observed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], political de- bate \"is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms .\" And just this term, this Court reiterated that , \" '[w]hatever differences may ex- ist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement' that it was adopted in part to 'protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.' \" Houston Cmty .",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "But there is no basis for 3 Contrary to petitioner's claims, a majority of this Court has never hel d that religious speech should receive more protection than all non- religious speech —even speech, such as political speech, calling for the highest level of First Amendment protection. Com- pare Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with id. at 767 (plurality opinion remarking that private religious expression may \"r eceive preferential treat- ment under the Free Exercise Clause\"). 13 such a holding in the Constitution, this Court's case law, or even the understanding of the framers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech",
		"context": "Relevant here , requiring publi c employers to delineate between different First Amendment claims, tests, and types of speech would overburden public school districts, which are already struggling to manage daily operations and fulfill a multitude of public missions. School administra- tors are not \"lawyers\" and \"the law should not demand that they fully understand the intricacies of our First Amendment jurisprudence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 As discussed further below, such a distinction would not be administrable given that a speaker's position on almost any political topic can be informed or motivated by religious belief. See p. 17, infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Properly understood, section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does not pose a risk of chilling speech protected by the First Amendment.",
		"context": "Hicks , 539 U.S. at 119-20. As narrowed above by its legislative context and a narrowing interpretation, all the Ninth Circuit 's bases for facial invalidation must fail . First, because §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) not only targets conduct more than speech , Hicks, 539 U.S. at 122-23, but also targets the solicitation of illegal activity, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the overbreadth doctrine is inapposite. Second, properly construed, §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does not reach the hypothetical protected speech that the Ninth Circuit imagines . See Section III.A , infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "29 –31, the Court's modern cases have in fact left this question precisely as they found it . In describing the requirements of \"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus- tice,'\" International Shoe explicitly limited its discus- sion to cases in which \"no consent to be sued or au- thorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.\" 326 U.S. at 316–17 (quoting Milli- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . 8 Later case s have reemphasized the legitimacy of \"express or implied consent \" as a ground for personal jurisdiction . Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "8 Later case s have reemphasized the legitimacy of \"express or implied consent \" as a ground for personal jurisdiction . Ins. Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . They have authorized parties to \"stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction .\" Burger King 471 U.S. 462 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "Corp. of 456 U.S. 694 . They have authorized parties to \"stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction .\" Burger King [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And they have distin- guished \"explicit consent,\" which \"support [s] exercise of the general jurisdiction of the State's courts\" as to matters \"based on activities and events elsewhere, \" from the \"more limited form of submission\" repre-sented by contact -based specific jurisdiction. J. McIn- tyre Mach., 564 U.S. 873 , dis- cussed only \"general jurisdiction appropriately exer-cised over a foreign corporation that has not consent-ed to suit in the forum.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "Burger King 471 U.S. 462 . And they have distin- guished \"explicit consent,\" which \"support [s] exercise of the general jurisdiction of the State's courts\" as to matters \"based on activities and events elsewhere, \" from the \"more limited form of submission\" repre-sented by contact -based specific jurisdiction. J. McIn- tyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , dis- cussed only \"general jurisdiction appropriately exer-cised over a foreign corporation that has not consent-ed to suit in the forum.\" Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129 (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 928). Thus, in applying Daimler's standard, BNSF Railwa y Co. v. Tyrrell explicitly declined to consider the alternative argument that the defendant had \"consented to personal jurisdiction in Montana.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129 (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 928). Thus, in applying Daimler's standard, BNSF Railwa y Co. v. Tyrrell explicitly declined to consider the alternative argument that the defendant had \"consented to personal jurisdiction in Montana.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . B. In the absence of any explicit erosion , Norfolk Southern suggests (see BIO 18) that Pennsylvania Fire was implicitly overruled in 433 U.S. 186 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 1549 . B. In the absence of any explicit erosion , Norfolk Southern suggests (see BIO 18) that Pennsylvania Fire was implicitly overruled in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There the Court required \"all 9 assertio ns of state -court jurisdiction [to] be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny ,\" and it \"overruled\" any \"prior decisions [which] are inconsistent with this stand-ard.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "Id. at 212 & n.39 . In candor, Shaffer 's holding has itself proved something of an \"anomaly ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , more hon- ored in the breach than the observance . Most famous- ly, the Court in Burnham v. Superior Court upheld jurisdiction based on in -state service of process , pri- marily on the ground of its traditional acceptance in American jurisprudence , see495 U.S. 604, despite the obvious incompatibility of tag jurisdiction with the standards of International Shoe, see id. at 622–27 (opinion of Scalia, J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
		"context": "at 212 & n.39 . In candor, Shaffer 's holding has itself proved something of an \"anomaly ,\" 138 S. Ct. 2448 , more hon- ored in the breach than the observance . Most famous- ly, the Court in Burnham v. Superior Court upheld jurisdiction based on in -state service of process , pri- marily on the ground of its traditional acceptance in American jurisprudence , see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], despite the obvious incompatibility of tag jurisdiction with the standards of International Shoe, see id. at 622–27 (opinion of Scalia, J.). More importantly, however, \" the standards set forth in International Shoe\" cannot be construed in isolation from what the Court in International Shoe actually said.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing",
		"context": ". Plaintiffs wrongly assert that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that abortion providers are appro- priate plaintiffs to bring suit on behalf of their patients. June Med. BIO 17 -18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing",
		"context": "Doe does not hold that abortion pro- viders have third -party standing. 10 The Court has wrongly cited Doe for the proposition that abortion provid ers have third -party standing in two other cases, but neither actually applies the third -party standing doctrine. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Planned Parenthood of Cent. 428 U.S. 52. The remainder of the Court's abortion cases fail to address standing at all, which means they have \"no precedential effect\" with respect to standing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing",
		"context": "10 The Court has wrongly cited Doe for the proposition that abortion provid ers have third -party standing in two other cases, but neither actually applies the third -party standing doctrine. See City of 462 U.S. 416; Planned Parenthood of Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The remainder of the Court's abortion cases fail to address standing at all, which means they have \"no precedential effect\" with respect to standing. See 518 U.S. 343.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing",
		"context": "428 U.S. 52. The remainder of the Court's abortion cases fail to address standing at all, which means they have \"no precedential effect\" with respect to standing. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other non -abortion cases relied on by Plaintiffs have been undermined by Kowalski , which controls the anal- ysis here. June Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing",
		"context": "June Med. BIO 24. For example, the ven- dor/customer relationships that supported th ird-party standing in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 431 U.S. 678, would likely no longer withstand scrutiny as they concerned only potential customers. Moreover, in neither case did the Court discuss the hin- drance prong of the third -party -standing analysis, Carey , 431 U.S. at 683- 84; Craig , 429 U.S. at 193- 97, nor can a genuine obstacle to such lawsuits be imagined.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing",
		"context": "June Med. BIO 24. For example, the ven- dor/customer relationships that supported th ird-party standing in 429 U.S. 190, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], would likely no longer withstand scrutiny as they concerned only potential customers. Moreover, in neither case did the Court discuss the hin- drance prong of the third -party -standing analysis, Carey , 431 U.S. at 683- 84; Craig , 429 U.S. at 193- 97, nor can a genuine obstacle to such lawsuits be imagined.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Applying forum analysis to private companies will lead to fewer outlets for speech",
		"context": "That hesitance will ultimately lead to \"less speech, not more.\" Arkansas Educ. Television [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Many companies will stop operating fora where users post content if they cannot retain some control over what appears on them. Likewise, businesses will shrink from opening new fora for sharing con- tent because of the costs associated with potential First Amendment challenges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Defendants' conduct satisfies each of the requirements for wire fraud",
		"context": "(per curiam) , cert . denied,138 S. Ct. 367 (employee diverted employer's payroll funds and used them to start his own charter airline company) ; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]638 F.3d 962 . The same p rinciples apply in this context. Kelly's and Baroni's own affirmative examples of fraud include scenarios, involving public officials and public -employee labor, that are legally identical to the fraudulent acqui- sition of the company jet .",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.3d 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Defendants' conduct satisfies each of the requirements for wire fraud",
		"context": "(per curiam) , cert . denied,138 S. Ct. 367 (employee diverted employer's payroll funds and used them to start his own charter airline company) ; see, e.g. , 772 F.3d 554[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The same p rinciples apply in this context. Kelly's and Baroni's own affirmative examples of fraud include scenarios, involving public officials and public -employee labor, that are legally identical to the fraudulent acqui- sition of the company jet .",
		"citation_value_orig": "638 F.3d 962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Defendants' conduct satisfies each of the requirements for wire fraud",
		"context": "And Kelly cites a case in which a \"park s commissioner used city staff to perform ' work on pri- vate homes' \" as an exa mple of criminally \"misappropri- ating property over which [an official] exercises control\" —a species of fraud. Kelly Br. 46 ( quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) ; see Carpenter , 484 U.S. at 27 (\"The concept of 'fraud' in- cludes the act of embezzlement, which is the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by another.\") ( citation and inter- nal quotation marks omitted). 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 F.3d 720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Defendants' conduct satisfies each of the requirements for wire fraud",
		"context": "878-879. Second, the falsehood about the traffic study was \"material [],\" Neder , 527 U.S. at 25, because a reasona- ble person would have \"attach[ed] importance to [it] in determining his choice of action, ' \" Universal Health Servs. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The jury instructions explicitly required the jury to find that the false representation regarding the traffic study was \" one that a reasonable person might have considered important in making his or her decision to commit Port Authority resources for that endeavor, including the services of Port Authority personnel. \" J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Defendants' conduct satisfies each of the requirements for wire fraud",
		"context": ", 1 William Blackstone, Com- mentaries 134 (1765); see also 2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 305 (1839) ( \"When things are fully our own, it is plain that no person besides the proprietor can have any claim either to use them, or to hinder 32 him f rom disposing of them as he pleases . \"); cf. The Pro- prietors of the Charles River [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 3. Kelly's and Baroni's scheme was therefore fraud in precisely the same way as \"[u]sing Port Authority re- sources to renovate or do work on a private residence,\" Baroni Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Individual Petitioners Have Standing To Maintain Their APA Claim",
		"context": "2a -3a, 180a, 223a n.19. Individual Petitioners are plainly \"an object of \" those regulations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Tex. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "Courts around the country have applied it not just to takings claims, but to land -use disputes more generally —including claims under RLUIPA. The Williamson County doctrine is about the mean- ing of the Takings Clause , not other constitu tional pro- visions, and not federal statutes . In Williamson (same) with Roman Catholic Bishop of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]697 F.3d 279. 6 County , the Court set out \"two independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory takings claim brought against a state entity in federal court.\" 520 U.S. 725.",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "Courts around the country have applied it not just to takings claims, but to land -use disputes more generally —including claims under RLUIPA. The Williamson County doctrine is about the mean- ing of the Takings Clause , not other constitu tional pro- visions, and not federal statutes . In Williamson (same) with Roman Catholic Bishop of 724 F.3d 78[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 County , the Court set out \"two independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory takings claim brought against a state entity in federal court.\" 520 U.S. 725.",
		"citation_value_orig": "697 F.3d 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "In Williamson (same) with Roman Catholic Bishop of 724 F.3d 78697 F.3d 279. 6 County , the Court set out \"two independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory takings claim brought against a state entity in federal court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First, \"a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has re- ceived a 'final decision regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue' from 'the government entity charged with implementing the regulations.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "Id. at 734 (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This hurdle requires that the plain- tiff \"follow the procedures for requesting the applica- ble zoning relief, and have its request denied, before bringing a claim in court.\" Roman Catholic Bishop of Sprin gfield , 724 F.3d at 91 (Lynch, J.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "And these injuries may become manifest even before the plaintiff has cleared the Williamson County hurdles. Regarding discrimination, this Court explained just last Term that religious discrimination is an in- jury in itself, one which occurs at the point when a re- ligious organization is prohibited from being treated on equal grounds with secular organizations . Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Term, the Court explained that Free Exercise Clause violations may occ ur during 9 the administrative review process itself, when reli- gious entities are deprived of \"full and fair considera- tion\" of their claims. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd 584 U.S. None ( June 4, 2018 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "To apply Williamson County in these circumstances —and thus to dismiss a plain- tiff's RL UIPA claim unless she complies with the very procedures alleged to be substantially burdensome — is to nullify Congress's handiwork. Several cases illustrate the point. In Miles Christi Religious [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Sixth Cir- cuit applied Williamson County to dismiss a religious order's Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims. There , zon- ing authorities determined that a small religious or- der's longstanding use of a home had \"intensified\" to the level of \"a small church o r place of worship,\" and thus that the order would have to \"go through the town's site review process, beginning by submitting a site plan, to ensure\" that the property met the height- ened requirements. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "629 F.3d 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "Id. at 537 -42. Another example is Guatay Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, the plaintiff church held services on its prop- erty for 22 years without incident, but was then in- formed it must undergo a burdensome and cost -pro- hibitive permitting process to continue using the building as a church. Specifically, i n 2008, a fter more than two decades of unchanged land use, zoning au- thorities warned the church that its \"continued opera- tion\" on the property was \"illegal,\" and threatened to \"cut all electrical power to the Church complex\" if the church continued meeting there without obtaining a special -use permit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.3d 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "See Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2022. 12 And in substantial -burden cases, there are many situations in which requiring the plaintiff to comply with Williamson County could itself substantial ly bur- den the plaintiff's religious ex ercise. A burden may be \"substantial\" if it \"places considerable pressure on the plaintiff to\" forgo the exercise, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]504 F.3d 338. To the extent that complying with Williamson County 's finality requirement by following local proce- dures for seeking the applicable zoning relief would it- self place considerable pressure on the plaintiff to simply forego the religious exercise altoget her, apply- ing Williamson County to RLUIPA claims is incon- sistent with RLUIPA. This is not to say that every court has extended Williamson County to religious land -use claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.3d 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "See Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2022. 12 And in substantial -burden cases, there are many situations in which requiring the plaintiff to comply with Williamson County could itself substantial ly bur- den the plaintiff's religious ex ercise. A burden may be \"substantial\" if it \"places considerable pressure on the plaintiff to\" forgo the exercise, 741 F.3d 48[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent that complying with Williamson County 's finality requirement by following local proce- dures for seeking the applicable zoning relief would it- self place considerable pressure on the plaintiff to simply forego the religious exercise altoget her, apply- ing Williamson County to RLUIPA claims is incon- sistent with RLUIPA. This is not to say that every court has extended Williamson County to religious land -use claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 F.3d 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims",
		"context": "This is not to say that every court has extended Williamson County to religious land -use claims. In fact, there is a circuit split over the issu e, as several courts have recogniz ed that Williamson County is \"an inappropriate tool for\" RLUIPA claims. Temple B'Nai Zion , 727 F.3d at 1357; see also Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield , 724 F.3d at 92; Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. Israelite Church of 13 God in Jesus Christ, 2012 WL 3284054. For instance, in Roman Catholic Bishop of Spring- field , the First Circuit refused to apply Williamson County 's \"specialized Takings Clause ripeness doc- trine\" to a RLUIPA claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 F. Supp. 2d 1032",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "Express governmental discrimination, in a secular benefits program, against an otherwise qualifiedentity, solely because of that entity's religious identityor activities, is generally unconstitutional. Yet theMontana Supreme Court ordered precisely suchdiscriminatory exclusion. The Constitution \"forbids hostility\" toward \"all religions,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 \"State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.\" 330 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "The Constitution \"forbids hostility\" toward \"all religions,\" 465 U.S. 668. 3 \"State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Establishment Clause \"commands that . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "at 16. This Court has therefore held that it violates the First Amendment (specifically, the Free ExerciseClause) to target clergy for special political disabilities. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has likewise held, in the context of a speech forum, that it violates the First Amendment to exclude an entity because of its religious message, e.g., Lamb's 508 U.S. 384; Good News 533 U.S. 98, including when a funding program is at issue, 515 U.S. 819. Most recently, this Court heldthat the exclusion of an otherwise eligible recipientfrom a government grant program, solely because thatentity is religious in nature, violates the Free Exercise Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "This Court has therefore held that it violates the First Amendment (specifically, the Free ExerciseClause) to target clergy for special political disabilities. 435 U.S. 618. This Court has likewise held, in the context of a speech forum, that it violates the First Amendment to exclude an entity because of its religious message, e.g., Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Good News 533 U.S. 98, including when a funding program is at issue, 515 U.S. 819. Most recently, this Court heldthat the exclusion of an otherwise eligible recipientfrom a government grant program, solely because thatentity is religious in nature, violates the Free Exercise Clause. Trinity Lutheran 137 S. Ct. 2012 , and that discrimination triggered by the exercise of afundamental right – here, the religious educationalchoices of parents in need of scholarship funds –triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "This Court has therefore held that it violates the First Amendment (specifically, the Free ExerciseClause) to target clergy for special political disabilities. 435 U.S. 618. This Court has likewise held, in the context of a speech forum, that it violates the First Amendment to exclude an entity because of its religious message, e.g., Lamb's 508 U.S. 384; Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], including when a funding program is at issue, 515 U.S. 819. Most recently, this Court heldthat the exclusion of an otherwise eligible recipientfrom a government grant program, solely because thatentity is religious in nature, violates the Free Exercise Clause. Trinity Lutheran 137 S. Ct. 2012 , and that discrimination triggered by the exercise of afundamental right – here, the religious educationalchoices of parents in need of scholarship funds –triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "This Court has therefore held that it violates the First Amendment (specifically, the Free ExerciseClause) to target clergy for special political disabilities. 435 U.S. 618. This Court has likewise held, in the context of a speech forum, that it violates the First Amendment to exclude an entity because of its religious message, e.g., Lamb's 508 U.S. 384; Good News 533 U.S. 98, including when a funding program is at issue, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Most recently, this Court heldthat the exclusion of an otherwise eligible recipientfrom a government grant program, solely because thatentity is religious in nature, violates the Free Exercise Clause. Trinity Lutheran 137 S. Ct. 2012 , and that discrimination triggered by the exercise of afundamental right – here, the religious educationalchoices of parents in need of scholarship funds –triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "This Court has likewise held, in the context of a speech forum, that it violates the First Amendment to exclude an entity because of its religious message, e.g., Lamb's 508 U.S. 384; Good News 533 U.S. 98, including when a funding program is at issue, 515 U.S. 819. Most recently, this Court heldthat the exclusion of an otherwise eligible recipientfrom a government grant program, solely because thatentity is religious in nature, violates the Free Exercise Clause. Trinity Lutheran [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and that discrimination triggered by the exercise of afundamental right – here, the religious educationalchoices of parents in need of scholarship funds –triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 486 U.S. 456 4 (classifications affecting fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny). A fortiori , restrictions that rest on no more than \"a bare desire to harm\" – or exclude – a particular group are impermissible, Cleburne , 473 U.S. at 446-47 (citing United States Dept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "Most recently, this Court heldthat the exclusion of an otherwise eligible recipientfrom a government grant program, solely because thatentity is religious in nature, violates the Free Exercise Clause. Trinity Lutheran 137 S. Ct. 2012 , and that discrimination triggered by the exercise of afundamental right – here, the religious educationalchoices of parents in need of scholarship funds –triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 4 (classifications affecting fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny). A fortiori , restrictions that rest on no more than \"a bare desire to harm\" – or exclude – a particular group are impermissible, Cleburne , 473 U.S. at 446-47 (citing United States Dept. of 413 U.S. 528).",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "486 U.S. 456 4 (classifications affecting fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny). A fortiori , restrictions that rest on no more than \"a bare desire to harm\" – or exclude – a particular group are impermissible, Cleburne , 473 U.S. at 446-47 (citing United States Dept. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It follows that a government's posting of a \"no religious choices or entities allowed\" sign, whetherliteral or figurative, would run afoul of both the EqualProtection Clause and the religion and speech 2 clauses of the First Amendment. See also 268 U.S. 510.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "of 413 U.S. 528). It follows that a government's posting of a \"no religious choices or entities allowed\" sign, whetherliteral or figurative, would run afoul of both the EqualProtection Clause and the religion and speech 2 clauses of the First Amendment. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A contrary ruling would authorize gratuitous hostility against those who choose religious entities fordonations, education, services, etc. A state or federalgovernment could disallow deductions for charitablecontributions only to religious charities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "Tours ofmuseums and state capitols could be free for allstudent groups except those from religious schools. Agovernment transportation agency could allow free(and thus subsidized) use of express lanes by HOVvehicles except for buses carrying children to or fromreligious schools. Such a rule is a massive overreaction to establish- ment concerns, see Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"theFirst Amendment does not prohibit practices which by 2The standards for reviewing discrimination against a religious message or viewpoint are the same under the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses. E.g. , 447 U.S. 455; 505 U.S. 377.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "Such a rule is a massive overreaction to establish- ment concerns, see Van 545 U.S. 677 (\"theFirst Amendment does not prohibit practices which by 2The standards for reviewing discrimination against a religious message or viewpoint are the same under the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses. E.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 505 U.S. 377. 5 any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent\") (internal quotation marksomitted), and, in a land settled by believers seekingreligious freedom, is ahistorical, ironic, and \"odious,\" Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2025. The Montana Supreme Court's ruling in this case required precisely what the Constitution forbids .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES",
		"context": "Such a rule is a massive overreaction to establish- ment concerns, see Van 545 U.S. 677 (\"theFirst Amendment does not prohibit practices which by 2The standards for reviewing discrimination against a religious message or viewpoint are the same under the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses. E.g. , 447 U.S. 455; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent\") (internal quotation marksomitted), and, in a land settled by believers seekingreligious freedom, is ahistorical, ironic, and \"odious,\" Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2025. The Montana Supreme Court's ruling in this case required precisely what the Constitution forbids .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "In arguing that damages for emotional distress are available, p etitioner heavily relies (Br. 16 -30) on the pre- sumption , most closely associated with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that a federal court has the power to award \"appropriate relief \" when a \"c ause of action ex- ist[s]\" under federal law. Franklin , 503 U.S. at 66. For its part, the government treats the Bell presumption as an afterthought, relegating it to a short discussion toward the back of its brief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "563 U.S. at 290. Ev en before Sossamon , the only court of appeals to have squarely ad- dressed the question presented here interpreted this Court's \" concern with notice in awarding remedies for vi- olations of Spending Clause legislation\" to \"operate[] as a constraint on the Bell v. Hood presumption.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals in this case correctly did the same. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 1173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "And the right -remedy principle is hardly an inexorable command in any event. To the con- trary, \" courts often conclude that there is no remedy to vindicate the violation of a right. \" Oneida Indian Nation of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated on other grounds, 562 U.S. 42 . Accordingly, the Court has made clear that, when determining whether to permit private enforcement of a federal statute, \" [t]he judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has 33 passed to determine whether it displays an intent to cre- ate not just a private right but also a private remedy\"; \"courts may not create\" a right of act ion for damages that is not supported by the statute, \"no matter how desirable that might be as a polic y matter.\" Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 286-287.",
		"citation_value_orig": "605 F.3d 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "And the right -remedy principle is hardly an inexorable command in any event. To the con- trary, \" courts often conclude that there is no remedy to vindicate the violation of a right. \" Oneida Indian Nation of New 605 F.3d 149, vacated on other grounds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Accordingly, the Court has made clear that, when determining whether to permit private enforcement of a federal statute, \" [t]he judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has 33 passed to determine whether it displays an intent to cre- ate not just a private right but also a private remedy\"; \"courts may not create\" a right of act ion for damages that is not supported by the statute, \"no matter how desirable that might be as a polic y matter.\" Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 286-287.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 286-287. And where the injured party lacks standing to obtain prospective relief, cf. City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the absence of a damages remedy may effectively leave the party with no available relief un- der federal law. See also, e.g., 555 U.S. 223. Petitioner admits that \" federal c ourts are not com- mon -law courts\" and that \" Congress sometimes enacts statutes while withholding any means of private enforce- ment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "And where the injured party lacks standing to obtain prospective relief, cf. City of Los 461 U.S. 95 , the absence of a damages remedy may effectively leave the party with no available relief un- der federal law. See also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner admits that \" federal c ourts are not com- mon -law courts\" and that \" Congress sometimes enacts statutes while withholding any means of private enforce- ment.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "But it does not follow that, once a right of action exists to enforce federal law , all remedies are necessarily available. To give one common example, a party may have a cause of action to obtain injunctive relief against an official who is violating the party's constitu- tional right s, while at the same time lacking the ability to seek damages for such a violation . See , e.g., Correctional Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To the extent that such an approach is in tension with the principle that there is a legal remedy for the violation of every legal right, the Court has made clear that it does not view that principle as controlling in all circumstances. For example, in 403 U.S. 388, the Court relied on the Bell presumption to imply a damages remedy against fed- eral officials for the violation of a constitutional right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "See , e.g., Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61 . To the extent that such an approach is in tension with the principle that there is a legal remedy for the violation of every legal right, the Court has made clear that it does not view that principle as controlling in all circumstances. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court relied on the Bell presumption to imply a damages remedy against fed- eral officials for the violation of a constitutional right. See 34 id. at 392, 396.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "22. But the statutes petitioner cites differ from Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Section 1557 of the ACA in an obvious way: they were not enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]422 U.S. 1042 . The \"contractual framework\" applicable to Spending Clause legislation \"distinguishes\" the s tatutes at issue here from those cited by petitioner. Gebser , 524 U. S. at 286.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2",
		"context": "Id. \"[E]quitable estoppel precludes a party from enjoying rights and benefits under a contract while at the same time avoiding its burdens and obligations.\" InterGen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On this basis, \"a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's 8 arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.\" Int'l Paper 206 F.3d 411.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2",
		"context": "InterGen 344 F.3d 134. On this basis, \"a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's 8 arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.\" Int'l Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Generally, federal courts \"have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.\" 914 F.3d 34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 F.3d 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2",
		"context": "Int'l Paper 206 F.3d 411. Generally, federal courts \"have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As explained above, these same principles apply in the context of international arbitration agreements, unless Chapter 2 of the FAA or the Convention provides otherwise. Thus, equitable estoppel may be applied to allow an arbitration agreement \"to be enforced by or against nonparties,\" Arthur Andersen , 556 U.S. at 630, unless specifically barred by the text of Chapter 2 of the FAA or the Convention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2",
		"context": "Id. \"[E]quitable estoppel precludes a party from enjoying rights and benefits under a contract while at the same time avoiding its burdens and obligations.\" InterGen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On this basis, \"a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.\" Int'l Paper 206 F.3d 411.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2",
		"context": "InterGen 344 F.3d 134. On this basis, \"a party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.\" Int'l Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Generally, federal courts \"have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.\" 914 F.3d 34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 F.3d 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2",
		"context": "Int'l Paper 206 F.3d 411. Generally, federal courts \"have been willing to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a nonsignatory when the issues to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As explained above, these same principles apply in the context of international arbitration agreements, unless Chapter 2 of the FAA or the Convention provides otherwise. Thus, equitable estoppel may be applied to allow an arbitration agreement \"to be enforced by or against nonparties,\" Arthur Andersen , 556 U.S. at 630, unless specifically barred by the text of Chapter 2 of the FAA or the Convention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Incitement, unlike true threats, does not cause harm by its mere utterance",
		"context": ". . likely to incite or produce such action,\" Bran [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , where proof of the defendant's subjec- tive intent is generally required , see, e.g. , 414 U.S. 105 . Unlike threats, incitement does not cause harm by its mere utterance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Incitement, unlike true threats, does not cause harm by its mere utterance",
		"context": ". likely to incite or produce such action,\" Bran 395 U.S. 444 , where proof of the defendant's subjec- tive intent is generally required , see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Unlike threats, incitement does not cause harm by its mere utterance. Rather, incitement creates a risk of harm that only takes place if its listeners en- gage in violent or other illegal action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": "A persistent question is whether to read those statutes as declaratory of common law nondiscrimination norms, incorporating 18 them into the existing framework of property licenses, or to interpret them in some wholly novel way. Under a traditional, common -l aw interpretation of housing discrimination statutes, landlords who refuse to lease to unmarried, cohabitating couples are not discriminating against prospective tenants because of their marital status when the landlords' intention is simply to avoid being complicit in what they understood to be immoral conduct. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; N.D. Fair Hous. Council, 625 N.W.2d 551; 613 P.2d 146; City of 497 N.W.2d 714. The conscientious landlords i n those cases followed traditional religious teachings that marital sexual intimacy and non- marital sexual intimacy are two different acts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 N.E.2d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": "Under a traditional, common -l aw interpretation of housing discrimination statutes, landlords who refuse to lease to unmarried, cohabitating couples are not discriminating against prospective tenants because of their marital status when the landlords' intention is simply to avoid being complicit in what they understood to be immoral conduct. 553 N.E.2d 1152; N.D. Fair Hous. Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 613 P.2d 146; City of 497 N.W.2d 714. The conscientious landlords i n those cases followed traditional religious teachings that marital sexual intimacy and non- marital sexual intimacy are two different acts. Of course, marital status is derivatively relevant for discerning what kind of conduct a couple is engaged in.",
		"citation_value_orig": "625 N.W.2d 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": "Under a traditional, common -l aw interpretation of housing discrimination statutes, landlords who refuse to lease to unmarried, cohabitating couples are not discriminating against prospective tenants because of their marital status when the landlords' intention is simply to avoid being complicit in what they understood to be immoral conduct. 553 N.E.2d 1152; N.D. Fair Hous. Council, 625 N.W.2d 551; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; City of 497 N.W.2d 714. The conscientious landlords i n those cases followed traditional religious teachings that marital sexual intimacy and non- marital sexual intimacy are two different acts. Of course, marital status is derivatively relevant for discerning what kind of conduct a couple is engaged in.",
		"citation_value_orig": "613 P.2d 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": "Under a traditional, common -l aw interpretation of housing discrimination statutes, landlords who refuse to lease to unmarried, cohabitating couples are not discriminating against prospective tenants because of their marital status when the landlords' intention is simply to avoid being complicit in what they understood to be immoral conduct. 553 N.E.2d 1152; N.D. Fair Hous. Council, 625 N.W.2d 551; 613 P.2d 146; City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The conscientious landlords i n those cases followed traditional religious teachings that marital sexual intimacy and non- marital sexual intimacy are two different acts. Of course, marital status is derivatively relevant for discerning what kind of conduct a couple is engaged in.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 N.W.2d 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": ". marital status\" within the meaning of a nondiscrimination statute; his reason for refusing 19 the lease was his belief that \" having sexual relations outside of marriage is sinful ,\" a convicti on reinforced by state law rendering \"fornication\" unlawful. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The landlord did not refuse to lease to the potential tenant because she was unmarried, but because of the conduct in which she intended to engage. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 N.W.2d 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": "at 6 -7. Other courts have employed the newer, effect - focused interpretation and ruled that a landlord who refuses to lease to cohabitating couples who are not married is discriminating because of marital status. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied513 U.S. 979; 586 N.W.2d 723, vacated and remanded593 N.W.2d 545. These courts reason that the effect of a landlord's refusal to lease to cohabitating couples is to deny housing to the unmarried where the married would be permitted to lease.",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 P.2d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.",
		"context": "Other courts have employed the newer, effect - focused interpretation and ruled that a landlord who refuses to lease to cohabitating couples who are not married is discriminating because of marital status. 874 P.2d 274, cert. denied513 U.S. 979; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated and remanded593 N.W.2d 545. These courts reason that the effect of a landlord's refusal to lease to cohabitating couples is to deny housing to the unmarried where the married would be permitted to lease. The landlord's actual motivation is irrelevant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 N.W.2d 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "Lawyers' professional and ethical obligations inform the operation of the Sixth Amendment. Although the\"breach of an ethical standard does not necessarilymake out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guaranteeof assistance of counsel,\" counsel's professional andethical duties invariably shape what conduct is\"acceptable under the Sixth Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as the \"presumption in favor of counsel of choice\" gives way tocourts' \"independent interest in ensuring that criminaltrials are conducted within the ethical standard of theprofession,\" 486 U.S. 153, so too must clients' interest in decidingimportant strategic matters. Applicable ethical standards barred English from pursuing McCoy's \"objective\" of asserting a defense 36 based on false testimony and commanded that he zealously attempt to keep McCoy off death row.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "Although the\"breach of an ethical standard does not necessarilymake out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guaranteeof assistance of counsel,\" counsel's professional andethical duties invariably shape what conduct is\"acceptable under the Sixth Amendment.\" 475 U.S. 157. Just as the \"presumption in favor of counsel of choice\" gives way tocourts' \"independent interest in ensuring that criminaltrials are conducted within the ethical standard of theprofession,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], so too must clients' interest in decidingimportant strategic matters. Applicable ethical standards barred English from pursuing McCoy's \"objective\" of asserting a defense 36 based on false testimony and commanded that he zealously attempt to keep McCoy off death row. TheSixth Amendment permitted English to take the courseconsistent with both obligations—namely, concedingthat McCoy killed the three victims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "36n.6; see also ABA Br. 16-17. The Louisiana Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of the State's rules ofprofessional conduct, see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], disagreed with thatinterpretation of the Rule 1.2(d), ruling that it barred 37 English from presenting McCoy's testimony. See JA80. That conclusion was eminently reasonable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "574 So.2d 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "It would also have destroyed anycredibility he had with the jury. Further limitingEnglish's options, this Court has cautioned that \"[i]fthere is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel 39 cannot create one and may disserve the interests of the client by attempting a useless charade.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. English therefore had two basic choices. One choice, which McCoy now claims was constitutionallycompelled (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "\"Cato Institute Amicus Br. at 11, 582 U.S. None, requiringjurors to accept the law given to them by the court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the LouisianaSupreme Court found that English's closing \"gave thejury three options for a verdict: first degree murder,second degree murder, or manslaughter.\" JA95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "49 So.3d 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "All told, English's trial strategy was eminently reasonable, indeed commend able, and conformed to—in large part was compelled by—ethical guidelines, andwas in all ways \"consistent with the lawyer'sconscience, the law, and his duties to the court. \"Allowing McCoy, who plainly suffered from mental andemotional deficits, to override that strategy \"will not'affirm the dignity' of a defendant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, \"insofar as [McCoy's] lack of capacity threatens an improper . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "Id. at 176-77. \"While Faretta allows a defendant to have a fool for a client, 422 U.S. at 852, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Blackmun, J., dissenting), there is nothing in its logic that commandsthat the defendant may also have a fool for anattorney.\" 572 F.2d 1071. 5 5 McCoy asserts that the deprivation of his \"right to make basic decisions regarding the objectives of his defense,\" Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 S. Ct. 2525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In the rare case—such as this one—where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection",
		"context": "at 176-77. \"While Faretta allows a defendant to have a fool for a client, 422 U.S. at 852, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), there is nothing in its logic that commandsthat the defendant may also have a fool for anattorney.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 5 McCoy asserts that the deprivation of his \"right to make basic decisions regarding the objectives of his defense,\" Pet'r Br. 19, is structural error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F.2d 1071",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
		"context": "The Circuit Courts Have Held For Dec- ades That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On Th e Basis Of Sexual Orientation As Petitioner acknowledges (Pet. 13), most of the circuit courts have held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and this has been the consensus of the circuit courts for decades. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]534 U.S. 1155 (\"Title VII does not pro hibit conduct based on the employee's sexual orientation \" as opposed to \"the fact that the employee is a man or a woman. \"), cert. denied519 U.S. 818; 597 F.2d 936453 F.3d 757305 F.3d 1061538 U.S. 922850 F.3d 1248 (re-affirming Blum as binding circuit prec- edent and holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientat ion do not state a claim un- der Title VII), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 F.3d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
		"context": "See, e.g., 194 F.3d 252534 U.S. 1155 (\"Title VII does not pro hibit conduct based on the employee's sexual orientation \" as opposed to \"the fact that the employee is a man or a woman. \"), cert. denied519 U.S. 818; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]453 F.3d 757305 F.3d 1061538 U.S. 922850 F.3d 1248 (re-affirming Blum as binding circuit prec- edent and holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientat ion do not state a claim un- der Title VII), cert. denied138 S. Ct. 557.1",
		"citation_value_orig": "597 F.2d 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
		"context": "See, e.g., 194 F.3d 252534 U.S. 1155 (\"Title VII does not pro hibit conduct based on the employee's sexual orientation \" as opposed to \"the fact that the employee is a man or a woman. \"), cert. denied519 U.S. 818; 597 F.2d 936[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]305 F.3d 1061538 U.S. 922850 F.3d 1248 (re-affirming Blum as binding circuit prec- edent and holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientat ion do not state a claim un- der Title VII), cert. denied138 S. Ct. 557.1",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 F.3d 757",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
		"context": "See, e.g., 194 F.3d 252534 U.S. 1155 (\"Title VII does not pro hibit conduct based on the employee's sexual orientation \" as opposed to \"the fact that the employee is a man or a woman. \"), cert. denied519 U.S. 818; 597 F.2d 936453 F.3d 757[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]538 U.S. 922850 F.3d 1248 (re-affirming Blum as binding circuit prec- edent and holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientat ion do not state a claim un- der Title VII), cert. denied138 S. Ct. 557.1",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 F.3d 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
		"context": "See, e.g., 194 F.3d 252534 U.S. 1155 (\"Title VII does not pro hibit conduct based on the employee's sexual orientation \" as opposed to \"the fact that the employee is a man or a woman. \"), cert. denied519 U.S. 818; 597 F.2d 936453 F.3d 757305 F.3d 1061[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]850 F.3d 1248 (re-affirming Blum as binding circuit prec- edent and holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientat ion do not state a claim un- der Title VII), cert. denied138 S. Ct. 557.1",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
		"context": "See, e.g., 194 F.3d 252534 U.S. 1155 (\"Title VII does not pro hibit conduct based on the employee's sexual orientation \" as opposed to \"the fact that the employee is a man or a woman. \"), cert. denied519 U.S. 818; 597 F.2d 936453 F.3d 757305 F.3d 1061538 U.S. 922[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (re-affirming Blum as binding circuit prec- edent and holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientat ion do not state a claim un- der Title VII), cert. denied138 S. Ct. 557.1",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F.3d 1248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Sorrell , 564 U.S. at 563 (law restricting speech among professional pharmacists, physicians, and pharmaceutical representatives subject to heightened scrutiny); Legal Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Button , 371 U.S. at 437 (lawyers' communications soliciting clients involved \"advocacy\" and \"freedom[ ] of expression\" 43 protected under the First Amendment). This Court has never inquired whether professionals have \"positioned themselves in the marketplace\" or \"in a professional context,\" Pet.App.33a, in free speech cases. Nor does this Court need to create a new speech category now.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"",
		"context": "This is because, in the Ninth Circuit's view, \"[w]hen professionals, by means of their state-issued licenses, form relationships with clients, the purpose of those relationships is to advance the welfare of the clients, rather than to contribute to public debate.\" Id. at 28a–29a (quoting 740 F.3d 1208); but see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44 How the status of a professional-client relationship could transform speech into conduct is unclear. But even if professional speech as conduct were a constitutionally meaningful concept, it would not turn on the fact that the Act compels speech \"within the clinics' walls,\" as the Ninth Circuit concluded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 1293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"",
		"context": "But even if professional speech as conduct were a constitutionally meaningful concept, it would not turn on the fact that the Act compels speech \"within the clinics' walls,\" as the Ninth Circuit concluded. Pet.App.31a. In fact, the speech mandated by the Act occurs at the same point in the relationship as the communications from the lawyers for the NAACP in Button , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the lawyer for the ACLU in In re436 U.S. 412, both cases where this Court applied strict scrutiny. Likewise, Petitioners here are seeking to provide pregnant women with free information, to offer them pro bono services, and to advocate pro-life causes. Yet the Compelled Abortion Referral requires licensed pregnancy centers to inform women entering the clinic of government-endorsed alternatives—before any professional relationship has begun.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"",
		"context": "But even if professional speech as conduct were a constitutionally meaningful concept, it would not turn on the fact that the Act compels speech \"within the clinics' walls,\" as the Ninth Circuit concluded. Pet.App.31a. In fact, the speech mandated by the Act occurs at the same point in the relationship as the communications from the lawyers for the NAACP in Button , 371 U.S. 415, and the lawyer for the ACLU in In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], both cases where this Court applied strict scrutiny. Likewise, Petitioners here are seeking to provide pregnant women with free information, to offer them pro bono services, and to advocate pro-life causes. Yet the Compelled Abortion Referral requires licensed pregnancy centers to inform women entering the clinic of government-endorsed alternatives—before any professional relationship has begun.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"",
		"context": "As a result, the Act does not ensure exchange of truthful information on a particular topic within an ongoing professional relationship; the Act deters women from ever seeking any information from pro-life pregnancy centers in the first place. Even the few lower courts that have employed a separate \"professional speech\" analysis do not suggest that the doctrine applies at this early stage of a medical professional's interaction with a potential patient. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger , 848 F.3d at 1308 45 (reduced protection for professional speech only applies when speaking with a \"particular client\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, this doctrine has been invoked only upon a showing that \"the speaker is providing personalized advice in a private setting to a paying client.\" 708 F.3d 560.",
		"citation_value_orig": "767 F.3d 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"",
		"context": "See, e.g., Wollschlaeger , 848 F.3d at 1308 45 (reduced protection for professional speech only applies when speaking with a \"particular client\"); 767 F.3d 216. Rather, this doctrine has been invoked only upon a showing that \"the speaker is providing personalized advice in a private setting to a paying client.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Act interferes with speech at the First Amendment's core: advocacy for a cause. As Petitioners seek to speak public messages about an ideological cause, their invitation \"is characteristically intertwined with informative and … persuasive speech.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.3d 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Title VII's Detailed Administrative Enforcement Scheme Is Designed To Promote Prompt And Informal Resolution Of Discrimination Claims . 20",
		"context": "However, this Court has said on numerous occasions that Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the \"preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.\" See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Congress \"strongly encouraged employers … to act on a voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity, without awaiting litigation or formal government action\"). In the employment discrimination context, volun- tary compliance often is best achieved when victims act promptly to raise their concerns and employers take swift action to investigate and resolve problems. This is true even within the confines of Title VII's administrative scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Title VII's Detailed Administrative Enforcement Scheme Is Designed To Promote Prompt And Informal Resolution Of Discrimination Claims . 20",
		"context": "This is true even within the confines of Title VII's administrative scheme. This Court has recognized, for instance, that Title VII's relatively brief limitations periods were chosen consciously to encourage prompt processing of all charges of discrimination. See Mohasco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, promptly filed claims yield the benefit of provid- ing early notice to an employer of alleged workplace discrimination, thereby offering an opportunity for informal and cooperative resolution of the issue, in 22 accordance with the well-recognized objectives of Title VII. Title VII's administrative scheme also benefits charging parties, who often appear before the EEOC unrepresented by counsel and are unlikely to have extensive knowledge of federal EEO law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Title VII's Detailed Administrative Enforcement Scheme Is Designed To Promote Prompt And Informal Resolution Of Discrimination Claims . 20",
		"context": "Indeed, unlike direct litigation in federal court, the EEOC's administrative charge procedures are designed for ease of access by those who do not wish, or cannot afford, to engage a lawyer to represent them. Moreover, although the EEOC – unlike private litigants – can pursue enforcement actions that are \"not limited to the claims presented by the charging parties, \" Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and is unencumbered by federal procedural rules governing class actions, the agency cannot act without first having attempted to resolve the matter informally through conciliation. This Court has described the EEOC's duty to conciliate as a \"key component of the statutory scheme.\" Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. 1645.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Title VII's Detailed Administrative Enforcement Scheme Is Designed To Promote Prompt And Informal Resolution Of Discrimination Claims . 20",
		"context": "Co. of the Northwest, 446 U.S. 318, and is unencumbered by federal procedural rules governing class actions, the agency cannot act without first having attempted to resolve the matter informally through conciliation. This Court has described the EEOC's duty to conciliate as a \"key component of the statutory scheme.\" Mach Mining, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress's focus on informal resolution of Title VII discrimination claims reinforces the value and importance of the administrative charge resolu- tion process, which simply is unavailable to Section 1981 plaintiffs. See Railway Express , 421 U.S. at 460 (\"the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's administrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 action\") (citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "\"Statutory interpretation begins with the text.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"And where the statutory language provides a clear answer\" to a par- ticular question, the inquiry \"ends there as well.\" Harris Trust & Sav.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "\"And where the statutory language provides a clear answer\" to a par- ticular question, the inquiry \"ends there as well.\" Harris Trust & Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The ordinary mean ing of the FDCPA's text is dispositive here. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "Because t he Act does not define \"violation\" or \"occurs ,\" courts must \"ask what th[ose] term[s'] 'ordinary, contemporary, com- mon meaning' was when Congress enacted\" the FDCPA in 1977. Food Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1977, as today, \"violation\" meant the \"[a]ct or instance of violating, or state of being violated\" —spe cifically, \"[i]nfringement; transgression, nonob servance; as, the violation of law, covenants, promises, etc.\" Webster's New International Dictionary 2846 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "And, as this Court held in construing a limitation s period enacted not long before the FDCPA, an unlawful act \" 'occur[s]' on the day that it 'happen[s].' \" National R.R. Passenger [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 109- 110 & n.5 (practice occurred when it \"took place or happened\"); accord Black's Fourth 1231; Webster's Second 1684. Taken together, the words \"violation \" and \"occurs\" establish that Section 1692k(d)'s one -year period for fil- ing suit begins to run on the date of the act or omission that is alleged to have violated the FDCPA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "1658(b)(1)). If Congress had intended to incorporate a similar \"discov- ery\" trigger in the FDCPA, it \"knew how\" to do so. Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress also eschewed other commonplace formu- lation s that would have delayed the start of the FDCPA's limitations period until a plaintiff has a com- plete cause of action , and that would at least have pre- served the possibility of a discovery rule. In 1977 as today, many federal statutes contain ed limitatio ns peri- ods that ran from the date when a plaintiff 's cause of action \"arises\" or \"accrues,\" sometimes in combination with a period running from the date of discovery.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "7217 (c) (1976) (same). \" [T]he 'standard rule' \"—which has \"governed since the 1830's\" —\"is that a claim accrues 'when the plaintiff has a com- plete and present cause of action.' \" Gabelli , 568 U.S. at 448 (citation omitted) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A limitations period that runs \"from 'the date on which the cause of action arose' \" similarly \"incorporates th[at] standard rule.\" Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust 522 U.S. 192 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "\" Gabelli , 568 U.S. at 448 (citation omitted) ; see 572 U.S. 663 . A limitations period that runs \"from 'the date on which the cause of action arose' \" similarly \"incorporates th[at] standard rule.\" Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A limitations period that runs from the date a claim \"accrues\" or \"arises\" would not necessarily incorporate a discovery rul e, but those formulations would at least leave the door ajar. Unless the statute specifies other- wise, a cause of action is \" 'complete and present' for lim- itations purposes\" when \"the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief,\" Bay Area Laundry , 522 U.S. at 201 — that is, when the plaintiff \"has the right to apply to the court for relief,\" 1 H. G. Wood , A Treatise on the Limi- tation of Actions at Law and in Equity § 122a, at 684 (Dewitt C. Moore ed., 4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
		"context": "1916) (Wood) . And a cause of action may be complete in that sense even if the plain- tiff is un aware of it. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], at 1411) ). But the context of a particular limitations period might show that Con- gress d id not intend a claim to \"accrue\" until the plaintiff discovered his injury or other facts . See, e.g., Urie , 337 U.S. at 168- 171 (concluding , in light of the statutory purpose, that a claim based on a latent disease \"accru ed\" only when the plaintiff discovered the disease).",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A \"Clear Majority\" Of States Has Not Adopted Plaintiff's Proposed Rule",
		"context": "That is wrong. Respondents cite only three state high court decisions allegedly supporting their rule. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if Respondents' lower state-court decisions and federal-court Erie predictions are included, the num- ber of states would expand to seven. See Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 N.E.3d 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A \"Clear Majority\" Of States Has Not Adopted Plaintiff's Proposed Rule",
		"context": "That is a far cry from a \"clear majority of the states.\" Moreover, a number of these decisions would not support liability in this case. For example, Respond-ents emphasize that in Braaten v. Saberhagen Hold- ings—which declined to hold manufacturers of equipment installed on Navy ships liable for \"asbes-tos insulation that was [lat er] applied by the [N]avy,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—the Washington Supreme Court did not decide whether a duty to warn arises where a manufacturer specifies or incor- porates a harmful part. Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 P.3d 493",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1395hh(a)(2) requires notice and comment for agency issuances that otherwise lack the \"force of law\"",
		"context": "The Medicare Act requires the agency to give these issuances that legal force before they can \"take effect.\" The words \"force and effect of law\" —which the Government borrows from inapposite APA decisions — are nowhere found in the Medicare Act. The Government 's \"force of law\" argument relies on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But in that case , this Court explained that the reason interpretive rules lack the force of law is that they have not gone through notice -and- comment rulemaking. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1395hh(a)(2) requires notice and comment for agency issuances that otherwise lack the \"force of law\"",
		"context": "That deliberate omission leaves no doubt as to Congress's intent . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is no answer to claim, as the Government does that \"[t] here is no need for an express exception from that requirement for interpretive rules, because interpretive rules already are excluded from the scope of notice- and-comment rulemaking in the first place.\" Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1395hh(a)(2) requires notice and comment for agency issuances that otherwise lack the \"force of law\"",
		"context": "Those courts largely assumed, in footnotes without analysis (and not explicitly deciding), that the Medicare Act incorporated the APA's exceptions. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 371 F.3d 625 . None adopted the new reasoning th e Government offers this Court: that \"substantive legal standard\" should be read to exclude instruments that lack the force of law. Indeed, at the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 F.3d 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1395hh(a)(2) requires notice and comment for agency issuances that otherwise lack the \"force of law\"",
		"context": "Those courts largely assumed, in footnotes without analysis (and not explicitly deciding), that the Medicare Act incorporated the APA's exceptions. See, e.g. , 149 F.3d 73 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . None adopted the new reasoning th e Government offers this Court: that \"substantive legal standard\" should be read to exclude instruments that lack the force of law. Indeed, at the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States",
		"context": "1. \"It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 10 appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial ju- risdiction of the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, \"unless there is the affirmative intention of the Con- gress clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect,\" courts \"must presume it is pri marily concerned with domestic conditions.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States",
		"context": "Accordingly, \"unless there is the affirmative intention of the Con- gress clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect,\" courts \"must presume it is pri marily concerned with domestic conditions.\" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It also \"protect[s] against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international dis- cord .\" Aramco , 499 U.S. at 248; see RJR Nabisco , 579 U.S. at 347 (observing that the presumption avoids \"creat[ing] a potential for international friction\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States",
		"context": "RJR Nabisco , 579 U.S. at 337. A statute's focus \"is the object of its 11 solicitude, which can include the conduct it seeks to reg- ulate, as well as the parties and interests it seeks to pro- tect or vindicate.\" WesternGeco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of the Lanham Act are best construed to make actionable those uses of a trademark in com- merce, whether in the United States or abroad, that are likely to have the ultimate effect of confusing or deceiv- ing consumers in the United States. a. At step one of the two -step framework, the Court asks \"whether the presumption against extraterritori- ality has been rebutted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States",
		"context": "Those provisions do not categor- ically prohibit all uses of another's mark, but instead bar only those uses that are likely to cause the specified ill effects. Even when a trademark registrant has ac- quired an \"incontestable\" and \" 'exclusiv e right to use the mark in commerce, ' the plaintiff's success\" in an in- fringement suit \"requires a showing that the defend- ant's actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or 14 services in question.\" KP Permanent Make -Up, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Congress viewed use of infringing trademarks as objectionable because of its adverse effects both on consumers (whose ability to make informed purchasing decisions is hin- dered) and on trademark ow ners (whose ability to capi- talize on the goodwill associated with their marks is im-paired). Given the background understanding that \"Congress is primarily concerned with domestic condi- tions ,\" Foley Bros. , 336 U.S. at 285, and in the absence of clear textual evidence to the contrary, it is appropri- ate to infer that Congress sought to prevent those ill ef- fects from occurring in the United States . For both con- sumers and trademark owners, the most likely location of those harms is the location where consumers are con- fused or deceived.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States",
		"context": "at 286, that is a type of domestic injury (both to the con- sumers and to the trademark owner) that the Lanham Act is intended to prevent . Cf. Qualitex [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, the Steele Court also relied in part on two additional connections to the U nited States —the U.S. citizenship of the defendant, and the defendant's impor-tation of watch parts from the United States in prepar- ing to affix the infringing mark . See 344 U.S. at 285- 286.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States",
		"context": "Because the Lanham Act prohibits only those uses that have a likelihood of confusing or 18 deceiving U.S. consumers, a plaintiff can recover dam- ages and infringers' profits only with respect to such uses. To award greater relief would be t o provide a remedy for uses of a plaintiff's trademark that do not violate the Act. C f. Microsoft Corp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , the court of appeals endorsed respondent's \"diversion -of-sales theory —the idea that [petitioners] stole sales from [respondent] abroad, which in turn af-fected [respondent's] cash flows in the United S tates.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROTECT SMALL INVENTORS DURING THE POST-GRANT REVIEW PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "In the short time since the PTAB was inaugurated , several instances of procedural \"shenanigans\" by the PTAB concerned the federal judiciary sufficiently to merit mention in oral argument and decisions . In Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. , for example, Circuit Judges Dyk and Wallach w rote separately to note their concerns of the Board and incorporated the PTO's admission of its potentially unconstitutional purpose to add additional APJs in its own brief when : [T]he PTO expands administrative panels to decide requests for rehearing in order to ' secure and maintain uniformity of the Board's decisions .' Nidec Motor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government reasserted that position, during oral argument in Oil States Energy Servs., LLC , explain ing that the Chief Judge of the PTAB 14 increased the number of APJs during an adjudication, stating it was : [C]oncerned that the panel as initially composed was likely to diverge from general PTAB precedent with respect to a matter that bore on the institution decision . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROTECT SMALL INVENTORS DURING THE POST-GRANT REVIEW PROCEEDINGS",
		"context": "See Tr. of Oral Arg. p. 47 ln 20 to p. 48 l n. 4 In Oil States Energy Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16- 712_7kh7.pdf) (argument of Mr. Stewart on behalf of the Government) . In response to those concerns , J. Gorsuch raised the issue of whether the PTAB appeared to be stating that it will \"stack the deck with judges who we like.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Moral justification",
		"context": "Petitioner reconsidered and stated the question differently in the merits brief, without \"mere.\" 6 between recklessness and ordinary negligence. For example, the academic amici quote a passage from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that expressly refers to accidents. Then they blithely assert that it applies as well to reckless conduct, see Brief for Leah Litman et al . as Amici Curiae 5-6 (\"Litman Brief\"), repeating an argument that this Court rejected in 579 U. S. None.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U. S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Moral justification",
		"context": "Those actions might be negligent, but few would consider them reckless on the standard required for criminal culpabil- ity. The principle that crime is \"generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand ... took deep and early root in American soil.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 The mental element was often described as \"intent,\" and an \"intent\" element could be inferred where a statute made no mention of a mental element. See id., at 263. But the actual requirement was more complicated than the simple word implied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U. S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Moral justification",
		"context": "Recklessness is very often an alternative mental state for the same crime and even the same degree as causing the same harm intentionally. See, e.g., 1 B. Witkin & N. Epstein, California Crimes, Crimes Against the Person §§ 105, 120 (4th ed. 2012) (intentional but unpremeditated murder and \"wanton and wilful disregard\" murder are both second degree in California); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No, it is not absurd to include crimes that may be committed either recklessly or intentionally in the definition of violent crimes. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 F. 3d 1230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The unanimity requirement applies to the states",
		"context": "of Inst. for Justice 4-10. And the straightforward dictates of the Due Process Clause itself could be treated as a \"threshold inquiry,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to be addressed before turning to whether the Clause requires adherence to another provision of the Constitution. Furthermore, \"[o]nce a federal claim is properly presented . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The unanimity requirement applies to the states",
		"context": "Harris Tr. & Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner also has adequately briefed these alternative theories. His opening brief set forth the doctrinal footing for each and explained how arguments recited at length elsewhere in his briefing support these theories.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The unanimity requirement applies to the states",
		"context": "Br. 2-3, 8-9, 18-27, and 15-33). Any further exposition would have been needlessly duplicative.3 3 The State's citations to District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], do not refute petitioner's freestanding due process argument. The issue there was whether to create a new due process right unheard of at the Founding or when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The issue here is whether to recognize a core component of due process firmly entrenched in Anglo-American law for hundreds of years before the Founding and universally followed in this country in 1868.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "1. a. T he court of appeals correctly determined that the rescission is likely arbitrary , capricious, and contrary to law, because Petitioners' stated reason for terminating DACA—its purported illegality —is incor- rect. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (courts \"shall\" set aside agency action that is \"not in accordance with law\"); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532- 34 (setting aside EPA decision premised on misinterpretation of its leg al au- thority); Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516 (remanding for agency to \"confront the same question free of [its] mis-taken legal premise\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. DACA, like other deferred action programs dating back more than 60 years , is a lawful exercise of DHS's broad statutory authority to \"[e]stablish[] national im-migration enforcement policies and priorities.\" 6 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "Moreover, t his purported justification is not in the administrative record, rendering it a post -hoc ration- alization that cannot justify the agency's action in re- scinding DACA. Id. at 35a; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. Even taking the \"litigation risk\" rationale at face value, the rescission would likely fail arbitrary - and-capricious review. The rescission memo randum does not contain any reasoned assessment of the \"liti-gation risk\" from the Texas case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "For example, it does not explain how Texas and other states could obtain an immediate injunction terminating DACA, despite their waiting nearly six years to sue. See Motor Vehi- cle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed , the Texas court denied an injunction of DACA based on plain- tiffs' delay . 328 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 (\"At the very least this alternative way of achieving the objec tives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons given for its abandonment.\"). Apart from these shortcomings of \"litigation risk\" as a ju stification for agency action , it could be invoked in virtually any circumstance, and this would allow an 34 agency to evade meaningful APA review merely by la- beling an otherwise reviewable legal conclusion as a \"litigation risk\" assessment. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. d. The rescission is likely to fail arbitrary -and-ca- pricious review for the separate reason that it re- versed a \"prior policy [that] has engendered serious reliance interests,\" without giving \"a reasoned expla- nation for disregarding facts and circumstances engendered by the prior policy.\" F 556 U.S. 502.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 F.3d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of 358 F.3d 40. d. The rescission is likely to fail arbitrary -and-ca- pricious review for the separate reason that it re- versed a \"prior policy [that] has engendered serious reliance interests,\" without giving \"a reasoned expla- nation for disregarding facts and circumstances engendered by the prior policy.\" F [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For over six years, DACA recipients have embarked on ca-reers, enrolled in degree programs, started busi- nesses, purchased homes, and even married and had children, all in reliance on DACA's fundamental promise: that they could re main in the United States if they followed the rules. See, e.g., SER1470 -72, Top- ics 1, 2, 4, 5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "V irtually every agency decision is subject to revocation, so long as it is done in accordance with law. But those decisions create reliance interests all the same. See Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government was required to consider those interests here. e. Secretary Nielsen's memorandum, published more than nine months after t he rescission and never submitted to the district court in this case, consists of post- hoc rationalizations that cannot overcome the in- adequacies of the rescission memorandum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
		"context": "The government was required to consider those interests here. e. Secretary Nielsen's memorandum, published more than nine months after t he rescission and never submitted to the district court in this case, consists of post- hoc rationalizations that cannot overcome the in- adequacies of the rescission memorandum. See Bur- lington Truck Lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, the memorandum's references to enforcement policy and reliance inter- ests advance justifications that appear neither in the rescission memorandum nor in the administrative record, and thus cannot justify the decision. See ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "Rogers filed suit under Section 43(a) of Lanham Act, alleging the title was likely to confuse consumers into believing she endorsed the film or was otherwise associated with it . The district court ruled against her, reasoning that Fellini's title was not \"intended primar- ily to serve a commercial purpose\" and, thus, beyond the Lanham Act's scope as part of an \"artistic work .\" See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's bright -line rule. While films are \"indis- putably works of artistic expression,\" 875 F.2d at 997, free speech principles \"do not insulate titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims ,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "695 F. Supp. 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "The Rogers' court's reasoning rests on two threshold conditions that have tightly cabined its subsequent application . First , the \"product\" identified and described by film titles ( i.e., the film) must be protected speech . While the First Amendment broadly protects artistic works in the realm of \"entertainment,\" see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the vast majority of utilitarian products sold in the commercial marketplace do not qualify for this protection . Rogers is not meant for cases involving commercial products lacking artistic expre ssion , and courts have overwhelmingly recognized this limita- tion. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "Rogers is not meant for cases involving commercial products lacking artistic expre ssion , and courts have overwhelmingly recognized this limita- tion. See, e.g. , Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 In contrast, t he Ninth Circuit's decision in the pre- sent case substantially expands the holding in Rogers to a utilitarian dog toy . This is the first time any court has expanded Rogers to a product that is not inher- ently protected speec h. The Second Circuit itself spe- cifically rejected expanding Rogers unde r similar cir- cumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 F. Supp. 2d 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "The inherent link be- tween a title's expressive and identifying functions is not analogous to all uses of marks that relate in some tangential way to protected speech. Courts have long imposed trademark liability on unauthor ized users en- gaged in political speech who \" furnis h[] a wide variety of non -commercial public and civic benefits .\" United We Stand Am., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The same is true about uses of misleading marks that implicate speec h relating to the exercise of religion . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 F.3d 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "The same is true about uses of misleading marks that implicate speec h relating to the exercise of religion . See, e.g. , TE- TA-MA Truth Foundation —Family of URI, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This second threshold condition ensures Rogers does not displace the Lanham Act's likelihood-of- con- fusion standard simply because a dispute involves some allegedly protected speech unless that expression is part -and-parcel with any commercial purpose . Few circumstances beyond titles of artistic works fulfill this conditio n. Compare Stop the Olympic 489 F. Supp. 1112.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 F.3d 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": ", TE- TA-MA Truth Foundation —Family of URI, 297 F.3d 662 . This second threshold condition ensures Rogers does not displace the Lanham Act's likelihood-of- con- fusion standard simply because a dispute involves some allegedly protected speech unless that expression is part -and-parcel with any commercial purpose . Few circumstances beyond titles of artistic works fulfill this conditio n. Compare Stop the Olympic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result, only a small subset of trademark disputes involving pro- tected speech is subject to Rogers. Although the Second Circuit subsequently ex- panded the reach of Rogers beyond film titles , it has not altered these two threshold conditions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 F. Supp. 1112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "Nor has the Second Circuit extended the Rogers framework beyond artistic works, literary works, and other protected en- tertainment. Less than a year after Rogers, the Second Circuit considered an infringement action involving a parody of Cliffs Notes study guides called Spy Notes that mimicked visual elements of the familiar Cliff s Notes cover. Cliffs Notes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Recognizing that the film title in Rogers in- volved somewhat different considerations than a pa-rodic book cover, the court nevertheless applied Rogers because books (i.e., literary works) also qualif y as pro- tected artistic works. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "at 495 . Several years later in a case involving a book title, the court further clarified that a \"finding of likelihood of confusion must be particularly compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interest recognized in Rogers.\" Twin Peaks Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . At least five circuits have adopted the Rogers framework , all of which have maintained its two threshold limitations . See Radiance Found., 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "996 F.2d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d 1366 . At least five circuits have adopted the Rogers framework , all of which have maintained its two threshold limitations . See Radiance Found., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr 683 F.3d 1266 ; ETW 332 F.3d 915 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "See Radiance Found., 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; ETW 332 F.3d 915 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 . Those courts have applied Rogers to disputes involving artistic works like song s, paint- ings, books, magazines, and video games. See J. Thomas , 6 McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Compe- tition § 31:139 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 1266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "See Radiance Found., 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr 683 F.3d 1266 ; ETW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 . Those courts have applied Rogers to disputes involving artistic works like song s, paint- ings, books, magazines, and video games. See J. Thomas , 6 McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Compe- tition § 31:139 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 F.3d 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "See Radiance Found., 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr 683 F.3d 1266 ; ETW 332 F.3d 915 ; Mattel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 . Those courts have applied Rogers to disputes involving artistic works like song s, paint- ings, books, magazines, and video games. See J. Thomas , 6 McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Compe- tition § 31:139 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 F.3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works",
		"context": "See Radiance Found., 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr 683 F.3d 1266 ; ETW 332 F.3d 915 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those courts have applied Rogers to disputes involving artistic works like song s, paint- ings, books, magazines, and video games. See J. Thomas , 6 McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Compe- tition § 31:139 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for application of the good-faith exception",
		"context": "But these arguments were not pressed or passed on below, fall beyond the scope of the question presented, and do not appear to be meritorious in any event.13 Amicus is correct, however, that \"Officer Weikert arrested Lange in good -faith reliance on 'binding ap- pellate precedent.'\" Br. 49 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see Br. of Sonoma County District Attorney's Office et al. 36 (same).",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for application of the good-faith exception",
		"context": "49- 50) and suggests that it was therefore a \"public place\" under Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. But the doorway in Santana was a \"public place\" —allowing officers to in- itiate a warrantless arrest there —because there is a well- recog- nized \"implicit license\" permitting a \"visitor to approach the home by the front path\" and speak with a resident at the door- way. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No such license allows visitors to enter someone's garage uninvited, at nighttime, when the garage door is closing. 22",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Fails To Engage How The CRCA's Legislative Record Implicates Congress's Enforcement Power Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "The State is similarly unpersuasive in contending Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5. As a threshold matter, the State errs by treating (BIO 15, 17) the absence of express reliance by Congress on \"Section 5\"aspreclusive. This Court has made clear that \"Congress need [not] anywhere recite the words 'section 5'or 'Fourteenth Amendment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 528 U.S. 62 . Moreover, although the State summarily argues (BIO 18-19) the congressional record underlying the CRCA is \"analogous \"to the record in Florida Prepaid , the State does not grapple with key distinctions between the different legislative record s. Principal among them is the comprehensive , 50- state , 150-page report Mr. Oman compiled at Congress 's request, documenting mounting copyrigh t infringement by S tates and recommending the CRCA as the appropriate, tailored remedy . See Oman Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Fails To Engage How The CRCA's Legislative Record Implicates Congress's Enforcement Power Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "The State is similarly unpersuasive in contending Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5. As a threshold matter, the State errs by treating (BIO 15, 17) the absence of express reliance by Congress on \"Section 5\"aspreclusive. This Court has made clear that \"Congress need [not] anywhere recite the words 'section 5'or 'Fourteenth Amendment 460 U.S. 226 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, although the State summarily argues (BIO 18-19) the congressional record underlying the CRCA is \"analogous \"to the record in Florida Prepaid , the State does not grapple with key distinctions between the different legislative record s. Principal among them is the comprehensive , 50- state , 150-page report Mr. Oman compiled at Congress 's request, documenting mounting copyrigh t infringement by S tates and recommending the CRCA as the appropriate, tailored remedy . See Oman Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Fails To Engage How The CRCA's Legislative Record Implicates Congress's Enforcement Power Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "2015) (noting that fair use applies to use of copyrighted works by governmental entities ); see also Ass'nof Am. Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] from a sound conception of congruence and proportionality. Contrary to the State 's premise, no particular \"magnitude \"(BIO 19) of violations should be prerequisite to Congress exercising itslegislative prerogative . This Court has never imposed such shackles on its coordinate branch .",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Fails To Engage How The CRCA's Legislative Record Implicates Congress's Enforcement Power Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "Contrary to the State 's premise, no particular \"magnitude \"(BIO 19) of violations should be prerequisite to Congress exercising itslegislative prerogative . This Court has never imposed such shackles on its coordinate branch . See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Judicial inquiry properly focuses on congruence and proportionality , not on absolute numbers, viewed in a vacuum. Instead of demanding that Congress satisfy some arbitrary numer ical threshold, courts should simply compar ethe nature and scope of the statutory remedy against the constitutional problem identified.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The plaintiffs lack Article III standing",
		"context": "Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 95 (interior quotation marks omitted) . Here, the plaintiffs lack standing for at least some of the claims. Moreover, the party asserting a claim bears the burden of proof on it, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 501 U.S. 312. Under the circumstances here, it is unclear that Plaintiffs ever had standing for interim relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The plaintiffs lack Article III standing",
		"context": "Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 95 (interior quotation marks omitted) . Here, the plaintiffs lack standing for at least some of the claims. Moreover, the party asserting a claim bears the burden of proof on it, 511 U.S. 375 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the circumstances here, it is unclear that Plaintiffs ever had standing for interim relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. McCarthy Regularly Engages in Direct and Indirect Collection of Debts for Others — the Beneficiaries of Mortgage Notes",
		"context": "However, 14 the trustee acts at the firm's direction and relies on McCarthy for all of its information about the loan. The fact that an attorney uses officials such as a public trustee, a sheriff , a judge, and other c ourt personnel as it regularly collects debts does not alter the status of the law firm as a \"debt collector\" under the FDCPA. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Specified the Types of Relief Available under the Securities Laws",
		"context": "Pub. Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 476 U.S. 926. Thus, whether the SEC may obtain disgorgement in federal court turns on whether Congress has statutorily granted it the power to seek such relief. Congress has not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Specified the Types of Relief Available under the Securities Laws",
		"context": "Pub. Serv. 476 U.S. 355; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, whether the SEC may obtain disgorgement in federal court turns on whether Congress has statutorily granted it the power to seek such relief. Congress has not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 926",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Elected Officials to Determine the Scope of the Constitution's Application is Inappropriate",
		"context": "Previously, when examining whether the right to trial by jury applied to American Samoa, the D.C. Circuit had emphasized that the Insular Cases and the ter ritorial incorporation doctrine were \"controlled by their respective contexts. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Adopting Justice Harlan 's narrow approach in Reid , it had ruled that \"the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant \" when examining constitutional questions in the Territories. Id., quoting Reid , 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 F.2d 1140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Elected Officials to Determine the Scope of the Constitution's Application is Inappropriate",
		"context": "Id., quoting Reid , 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring). On remand, after extensive fact -finding, the district court reached the \"inescapable conclusion that trial by jury in American Samoa \" was not \"impractical and anomalous, \" striking down laws that denied the right of trial by jury in criminal cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It reached this conclusion despite opposition from the United States and officials in American Samoa, who argued that \"these questions should be resolved by American Samoans themselves. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 F. Supp. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing Elected Officials to Determine the Scope of the Constitution's Application is Inappropriate",
		"context": "553 U.S. at 765. As this Court explained in Boumediene , this level of deference \"would permit a striking anomaly in our … system of government, leading to a r egime in which [political actors], not this Court, say 'what the law is. '\" Id., quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the present case, it should be of no moment whether Congress or elected officials in Puerto Rico support or oppose the application of the Appointments Clause to the FOMB. While the legal questions in this case are complicated , the parties appear to agree that this Court must look to the C onstitution for answers, not the views of elected officials or Congress .",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
		"context": "§ 1257 . \"[A] state - court judgment must be final in two senses: it must be subject to no further review or correction in any other state tribunal; it must also be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not of mere ly interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In other words, the judgment must be \"the final word of a final court.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
		"context": "This range of possible outcomes counsels strongly against granting certiorari , whether or not the decisions below technically constitute final judgments under section 1257. S ee Cox Broad . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; s ee also Seattle's Union Gospel 142 S. Ct. 1094516 U.S. 981 . Denying certiorari now, meanwhile, would not necessarily impair this Court's ability to later review the Elections Clause iss ues Petitioners raise. If the 38 state supreme court affirms the trial court's order, Petitioners could again seek this Court's review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners' reading would frustrate the purpose of the tolling provision",
		"context": "20,536 (1986) (the \"tolling provision [shou ld] be liberally construed because the conduct addressed here is so in- herently deceptive and carefully concealed\" (statement of Sen. Grassley) ). Like other discovery rules, Section 3731(b)(2) thus serves to prevent the limitations period from becoming \"the means by which [the defendant's fraud] is made successful and secure.\" Merck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners' reading would contravene the purpose of the tolling provision by making it inapplicable to many civil FCA suit s. For a variety of reasons, the United States intervene s in only about one -quarter of qui tam ac- tions , which in turn significantly outnumber the actions broug ht by the government . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "The Act specifies no quantum or quota of confusion required for infringement. It does not establish what makes a use \"likely\" to cause confusion. See Int'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It does not specify th e nature of the confusion required, e.g., factual or legal. See 1 - 800 Contacts, 722 F.3d 1229.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 F.3d 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "See Int'l Ass'n of 103 F.3d 196. It does not specify th e nature of the confusion required, e.g., factual or legal. See 1 - 800 Contacts, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While JDPI and some of its amici deride the Rogers test as \"judge -made requ irements,\" JDPI Br. 4 –5, the law of trademark infringement has always been \"largely judge -made.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "722 F.3d 1229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "4 –5, the law of trademark infringement has always been \"largely judge -made.\" A.J. Canfield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 299 n.9 (3d Cir. 1986 ). Courts have developed doctrines using different confusion tests where the public has an interest in fostering fair competition or truthful commercial speech, including 29 comparative advertising, 402 F.2d 562, and nominative (referential ) fair use , Century 21 Real Est.",
		"citation_value_orig": "808 F.2d 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "Canfield 808 F.2d 291, 299 n.9 (3d Cir. 1986 ). Courts have developed doctrines using different confusion tests where the public has an interest in fostering fair competition or truthful commercial speech, including 29 comparative advertising, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and nominative (referential ) fair use , Century 21 Real Est. 425 F.3d 211; New Kids on the 971 F.2d 302 . Such tests both recognize the countervailing speech interests at stake and avoid the multifactor test's use of poorly fitting factors .",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.2d 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "1986 ). Courts have developed doctrines using different confusion tests where the public has an interest in fostering fair competition or truthful commercial speech, including 29 comparative advertising, 402 F.2d 562, and nominative (referential ) fair use , Century 21 Real Est. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New Kids on the 971 F.2d 302 . Such tests both recognize the countervailing speech interests at stake and avoid the multifactor test's use of poorly fitting factors . Indeed, there is no single multifactor test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 F.3d 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "1986 ). Courts have developed doctrines using different confusion tests where the public has an interest in fostering fair competition or truthful commercial speech, including 29 comparative advertising, 402 F.2d 562, and nominative (referential ) fair use , Century 21 Real Est. 425 F.3d 211; New Kids on the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Such tests both recognize the countervailing speech interests at stake and avoid the multifactor test's use of poorly fitting factors . Indeed, there is no single multifactor test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "971 F.2d 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. 4 See, e.g. , Polaroid [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Frisch's Rests., 670 F.2d 642. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de 657 F.2d 482; Interpace 721 F.2d 460; Pizzeria Uno 747 F.2d 1522. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , 34 F.3d 410.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 F.2d 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. 4 See, e.g. , Polaroid 287 F.2d 492; AMF, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Frisch's Rests., 670 F.2d 642. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de 657 F.2d 482; Interpace 721 F.2d 460; Pizzeria Uno 747 F.2d 1522. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , 34 F.3d 410.",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F.2d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. 4 See, e.g. , Polaroid 287 F.2d 492; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Frisch's Rests., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de 657 F.2d 482; Interpace 721 F.2d 460; Pizzeria Uno 747 F.2d 1522. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , 34 F.3d 410.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.2d 642",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "4 See, e.g. , Polaroid 287 F.2d 492; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Frisch's Rests., 670 F.2d 642. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Interpace 721 F.2d 460; Pizzeria Uno 747 F.2d 1522. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , 34 F.3d 410. But the situations for which these multifactor tests were designed, and t o which they are best suited, involve an ordinary use of trademarks solely as commercial speech: proposing a transaction to consumers .",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.2d 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "4 See, e.g. , Polaroid 287 F.2d 492; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Frisch's Rests., 670 F.2d 642. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de 657 F.2d 482; Interpace [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pizzeria Uno 747 F.2d 1522. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , 34 F.3d 410. But the situations for which these multifactor tests were designed, and t o which they are best suited, involve an ordinary use of trademarks solely as commercial speech: proposing a transaction to consumers .",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.2d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "4 See, e.g. , Polaroid 287 F.2d 492; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Frisch's Rests., 670 F.2d 642. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de 657 F.2d 482; Interpace 721 F.2d 460; Pizzeria Uno [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , 34 F.3d 410. But the situations for which these multifactor tests were designed, and t o which they are best suited, involve an ordinary use of trademarks solely as commercial speech: proposing a transaction to consumers .",
		"citation_value_orig": "747 F.2d 1522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": ", Polaroid 287 F.2d 492; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Frisch's Rests., 670 F.2d 642. Pignons S.A. de Macan ique de 657 F.2d 482; Interpace 721 F.2d 460; Pizzeria Uno 747 F.2d 1522. 30 Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the situations for which these multifactor tests were designed, and t o which they are best suited, involve an ordinary use of trademarks solely as commercial speech: proposing a transaction to consumers . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 F.3d 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "But the situations for which these multifactor tests were designed, and t o which they are best suited, involve an ordinary use of trademarks solely as commercial speech: proposing a transaction to consumers . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Concerns over infringement of trademarks originated in issues of counterfeiting or palming off of competitive or at least complementary goods o r services. See generally Restatement (First) of Torts § 730 cmt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "The various factors, acting in combination, seek to determine whether the defendant's use causes confusion among a substantial number of reasonable consumers in a way that harms the plaintiff . As the Lanham Act broadened from \"confusion of source\" to \"confusion of sponsorship,\"5 there arose an increasing likelihood that a court or jury might find actionable confusion despite clarity that the junior user's goods actually came from t he junior user. E.g., Amstar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This might not pose a ny problem in purely commercial contexts, where both parties sold goods under marks that functioned entirely as marks, i.e., source identifiers. But some third -party uses of established marks need to refer legitimately to those marks in order to speak to t he public: indications tha t products may be used together or substitute for each other; sale of used goods; comparative advertising; evaluative reviews ; and parodies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "615 F.2d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "These include calendars showing Alabama football, Univ. of Ala. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; paintings of Tiger Woods on envelopes bearing his name, ETW 332 F.3d 915; a billboard's use of the mark \"NAACP\" in a pro -life message, Radiance Found. , 786 F.3d 316; greeting cards, 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018 ); and political speech, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 1266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "These include calendars showing Alabama football, Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266; paintings of Tiger Woods on envelopes bearing his name, ETW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; a billboard's use of the mark \"NAACP\" in a pro -life message, Radiance Found. , 786 F.3d 316; greeting cards, 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018 ); and political speech, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 F.3d 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266; paintings of Tiger Woods on envelopes bearing his name, ETW 332 F.3d 915; a billboard's use of the mark \"NAACP\" in a pro -life message, Radiance Found. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; greeting cards, 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018 ); and political speech, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225. Parody is no different.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266; paintings of Tiger Woods on envelopes bearing his name, ETW 332 F.3d 915; a billboard's use of the mark \"NAACP\" in a pro -life message, Radiance Found. , 786 F.3d 316; greeting cards, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir. 2018 ); and political speech, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225. Parody is no different.",
		"citation_value_orig": "909 F.3d 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "of 683 F.3d 1266; paintings of Tiger Woods on envelopes bearing his name, ETW 332 F.3d 915; a billboard's use of the mark \"NAACP\" in a pro -life message, Radiance Found. , 786 F.3d 316; greeting cards, 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018 ); and political speech, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Parody is no different. See My Other Bag , 674 F. App 'x at 18–19 (holding that a parody tote bag did more than merely identify the mark's source).",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F. Supp. 2d 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.",
		"context": "The Rogers test thus continues a tradition of adjusting existing causes of action to accommodate free-speech concerns. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": ".\" ). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on this issue, a detective had testified that there was no penalty for use of another person's identity if there was no economic benefit. See Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee of March 15, 2005 concerning Substitute for House Bill 2087.",
		"citation_value_orig": "42 Kan. App. 2d 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "At a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on this issue, a detective had testified that there was no penalty for use of another person's identity if there was no economic benefit. See Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee of March 15, 2005 concerning Substitute for House Bill 2087. This legislative change was perhaps in response to the primary case upon which Garcia relies, City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Vargas court did not believe the identity theft statute applied to the situation where Vargas, who used a false identifica- tion to secure employment, intentionally defrauded 31a anyone in order to receive a monetary benefit. Vargas bought identification under a false name so that he could work in Kansas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 Kan.App.2d 867",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Her ar-gument that the alleged presence of that so- cial security number on her federal employ- ment verification form prevents the State from prosecuting her for identity theft ignores the purpose of IRCA to ensure \"that system- atic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General.\" Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], re-132 S. Ct. 2492. Here, 39a the State was not enforcing immigration; it was enforcing the identity theft statute. By its plain text, IRCA preempts prosecution for falsely or fraudulently completing the I-9 form itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Her ar-gument that the alleged presence of that so- cial security number on her federal employ- ment verification form prevents the State from prosecuting her for identity theft ignores the purpose of IRCA to ensure \"that system- atic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General.\" Cf. 641 F.3d 339, re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, 39a the State was not enforcing immigration; it was enforcing the identity theft statute. By its plain text, IRCA preempts prosecution for falsely or fraudulently completing the I-9 form itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 2492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "When a question of juror unanimity is raised, the court's first task is to determine whether the case is indeed a multiple-acts case . If not, there's no unanim- ity problem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The core que stion is whether the de- fendant's conduct related to each charge is part of one overall act or represents mu ltiple acts that are sepa- rate and distinct, such as when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times or when a later criminal act is motivated by a fresh impulse. 285 Kan. 307.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 Kan. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "284 Kan. 239. The core que stion is whether the de- fendant's conduct related to each charge is part of one overall act or represents mu ltiple acts that are sepa- rate and distinct, such as when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times or when a later criminal act is motivated by a fresh impulse. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An example of when a multiple acts instruction was required is set forth in 988 P.2d 250, abrogated by 271 Kan. 929. Bar- ber, a convicted felon, possessed a gun during a dis-turbance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 Kan. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "The core que stion is whether the de- fendant's conduct related to each charge is part of one overall act or represents mu ltiple acts that are sepa- rate and distinct, such as when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times or when a later criminal act is motivated by a fresh impulse. 285 Kan. 307. An example of when a multiple acts instruction was required is set forth in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated by 271 Kan. 929. Bar- ber, a convicted felon, possessed a gun during a dis-turbance. Barber later returned with another gun in his possession.",
		"citation_value_orig": "988 P.2d 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "The core que stion is whether the de- fendant's conduct related to each charge is part of one overall act or represents mu ltiple acts that are sepa- rate and distinct, such as when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times or when a later criminal act is motivated by a fresh impulse. 285 Kan. 307. An example of when a multiple acts instruction was required is set forth in 988 P.2d 250, abrogated by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bar- ber, a convicted felon, possessed a gun during a dis-turbance. Barber later returned with another gun in his possession.",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 Kan. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "26 Kan.App.2d at 331. However, when the factual circumstances of a crime involve a short, continuous, single incident com-prised of several acts individually sufficient for con- viction, jury unanimity requires only that the jury agree to an act of the crime charged, not which partic-ular act. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Staggs, the defendant was con- victed of one count of aggravated battery. He argued a multiple acts instruction should have been given be- cause some jurors may have found that he kicked the victim, and others may have found that he punched the victim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "27 Kan. App. 2d 865",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Staggs, 27 Kan.App.2d at 867. When determining whether convictions arise from the same conduct, courts consider: (1) whether the acts occurred at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occurred at the same location; (3) whether 43a there is a causal relationship between the acts, partic- ularly whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there was a fresh impulse motivating some of the conduct. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 38 Kan. App. 2d 781, convictions on three counts of identity theft based on defendant's uses of one person's iden- tity was not multiplicitous. Green used stolen identity at three different retailers over a two-day period by opening a credit account at two retailers and applying for credit at third retailer, and each retailer gave a fresh impulse for defendant to use stolen identity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 Kan. 453",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "When determining whether convictions arise from the same conduct, courts consider: (1) whether the acts occurred at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occurred at the same location; (3) whether 43a there is a causal relationship between the acts, partic- ularly whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there was a fresh impulse motivating some of the conduct. 281 Kan. 453. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], convictions on three counts of identity theft based on defendant's uses of one person's iden- tity was not multiplicitous. Green used stolen identity at three different retailers over a two-day period by opening a credit account at two retailers and applying for credit at third retailer, and each retailer gave a fresh impulse for defendant to use stolen identity. In this case, Garcia applied for a job at the Bone- fish Grill in May of 2012.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 Kan. App. 2d 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Morales cites an identity theft case, Vargas, infra , and argues that intent to defraud is not evinced by \"merely obtaining employment and then collecting a check for work actually done.\" B RIEF OF APPELLANT at 5. In City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], police stopped Vargas, who confessed that he was not au- thorized to work in the United States. Vargas had pur- chased papers identifying himself as Guillermo Her- nandez so that he could ob tain employment. Vargas pled guilty in municipal court and appealed to the dis- trict court judge, who acquitted him on the identity theft count.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 Kan.App.2d 867",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "28 Kan.App.2d at 869. In this case, Morales had used Melara's social security number and obtained employ- ment for which he was not eligible. Following the amendment of the identity theft statute, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court up- held a conviction for identity theft in a situation al- most identical to the situation in Vargas . Meza, an il- legal alien, bought an ID and social security card of a woman who had changed her name. Meza used the ID and social security card to gain employment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 Kan.App.2d 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Meza , 38 Kan. App. 2d at 249. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev denied290 Kan. 1098. The Meza court also held that \"the crime of iden- tity theft does not require proof economic loss to the victim but only proof of the defendant's intent to de-fraud for his or her own economic benefit.\" 38 Kan. App. 2d 245, the court cited Meza , among other cases, in concluding that employment was a thing of value under the identity theft statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "42 Kan. App. 2d 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "See also 42 Kan. App. 2d 431, rev denied290 Kan. 1098. The Meza court also held that \"the crime of iden- tity theft does not require proof economic loss to the victim but only proof of the defendant's intent to de-fraud for his or her own economic benefit.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court cited Meza , among other cases, in concluding that employment was a thing of value under the identity theft statute. \"Had Campos not 57a used S.A.'s name and social security number to obtain a job at ABM, she would not have been in a position to receive financial benefits that flowed from her em- ployment.\" 2015 WL 1844352.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 Kan. App. 2d 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "13, 65). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"A jury is not bound to accept the defendant's ver- sion of the incident in question and, having convicted the defendant, it is presumed to have believed the State's evidence and to hav e drawn from it all infer- ences favorable to the State.\" 13 Kan.App.2d 384.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 Kan. 1098",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "286 Kan. 1098. \"A jury is not bound to accept the defendant's ver- sion of the incident in question and, having convicted the defendant, it is presumed to have believed the State's evidence and to hav e drawn from it all infer- ences favorable to the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 261 Kan. 346. An appellate court does \"not weigh conflicting de- batable evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses or redetermine questions of fact.",
		"citation_value_orig": "13 Kan.App.2d 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "\"A jury is not bound to accept the defendant's ver- sion of the incident in question and, having convicted the defendant, it is presumed to have believed the State's evidence and to hav e drawn from it all infer- ences favorable to the State.\" 13 Kan.App.2d 384. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An appellate court does \"not weigh conflicting de- batable evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses or redetermine questions of fact. Our only concern is with evidence that supports the district court's find- ings, not with evidence that arguably might have sup- ported contrary findings.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 Kan. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "An appellate court does \"not weigh conflicting de- batable evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses or redetermine questions of fact. Our only concern is with evidence that supports the district court's find- ings, not with evidence that arguably might have sup- ported contrary findings.\" St. Francis Mercantile Eq- uity Exchange, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also State ex rel. 275 Kan. 763.",
		"citation_value_orig": "27 Kan.App.2d 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "St. Francis Mercantile Eq- uity Exchange, 27 Kan.App.2d 18. See also State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It is not a defense that the person did not know that such personal identifying information belongs to another person....\" K.S.A. 2010 Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "275 Kan. 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "13, 14; Vol. 18, State's Exhibit 3). The 2010 legislative change may have been in re- sponse to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A federal statute criminalized identity theft as \"know- ingly transfers . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "21-4018(d)'s language that \"It is not a defense that the person did not know that such personal identifying in- formation belongs to another person....\" See L. 2010, ch 88, § 2 (adds the language contained in subsection (d)). When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 291 Kan. 554 (The 2000 and the 200 5 amendments to the Kansas identity theft stat ute, K.S.A. 21-4018, altered substantive rights by modifying the severity of the punishment for a conviction by reclassifying the crimes as person and nonperson respectively.",
		"citation_value_orig": "275 Kan. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. 275 Kan. 393. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (The 2000 and the 200 5 amendments to the Kansas identity theft stat ute, K.S.A. 21-4018, altered substantive rights by modifying the severity of the punishment for a conviction by reclassifying the crimes as person and nonperson respectively. There- fore, each amendment operat es prospectively only.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 Kan. 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "21-4018, altered substantive rights by modifying the severity of the punishment for a conviction by reclassifying the crimes as person and nonperson respectively. There- fore, each amendment operat es prospectively only. ); 61a and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the evidence is viewed in the light most fa- vorable to the State, a rational fact finder could have found Morales committed the crime of identity theft. III.",
		"citation_value_orig": "228 Kan. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Her ar- gument that the alleged presence of that so-cial security number on her federal employ- ment verification form prevents the State from prosecuting her for identity theft ignores the purpose of IRCA to ensure \"that system- atic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General.\" Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], re-132 S. Ct. 2492. Here, the State was not enforcing immigration; it was enforcing the identity theft statute. By its plain text, IRCA preempts prosecution for falsely or fraudulently completing the I-9 form itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
		"context": "Her ar- gument that the alleged presence of that so-cial security number on her federal employ- ment verification form prevents the State from prosecuting her for identity theft ignores the purpose of IRCA to ensure \"that system- atic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General.\" Cf. 641 F.3d 339, re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the State was not enforcing immigration; it was enforcing the identity theft statute. By its plain text, IRCA preempts prosecution for falsely or fraudulently completing the I-9 form itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 2492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
		"context": "That history demonstrates that the Court can prohibit TDCJ from conducting the execution unless it affords Ramirez audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution . \"The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction over all suits in equity.\" Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Although \"equity is flexible,\" \"that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional equitable relief.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
		"context": "at 322. Accordingly, across many domains this Court routinely looks to \"traditional principles of equity practice\" to determine the scope of its equitable powers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Conditional decrees fall squarely within the federal courts' jurisdiction. They are a centuries -old feature of 31 equity and provide a useful way for the courts to fashion relief that balance s competing equities .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
		"context": "Bray, 38 Oxford J. of Legal Studies at 77 -78 (quoting Heydon et al., § 3-050–§ 3-070 at 74- 77). Importantly , however, courts of equity may also impose conditions on defendants in equity who seek to defeat a n equitable claim . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , discussed in Ames, Chafee & Re on Remedies: Cases and Materials 609-611 (Emily Sherwin & Samuel L. Bray, eds. , 3d ed. 2019) (upholding decree imposing conditions on both plaintiff and defendant) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "69 S.E.2d 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
		"context": "That said , it is worth reemphasizing that the principle of \"do[ing] equity\" operates on both plaintiffs and defendants. That means that plaintiffs under a sentence of death who seek equitable relief with respect to clergy access must do so with clean hands, and not for the purpose of delay or manipulation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A court can therefore deny conditional relief with respect to clergy access if it finds that the timing of the motion seeking relief was designed to delay or manipulate. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A non-debtor's sole remedy for a rejected contract is a pre-petition claim for damages",
		"context": "S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This undercut the rehabil- itative purpose of bankruptcy law. The counterparty's matured debts were discharged, but the original agree- ment remained effective, allowing the counterparty to \"haunt the bankrupt\" by \"harass[ing] the discharged bankrupt by successive actions for accruing rent and so retard or prevent the debtor's financial rehabilitation which the statute was intended to aid.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No \"compelling interest\" justifies Plaintiffs' proposed racial gerrymanders.",
		"context": "Thus, any race-based remedial measures for redistricting must target \"identified discrimination\" in redistricting ; \"generalized\" claims of \"past discrimination\" will not do. Shaw II ,517 U.S. at 909-10; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs fail to show how drawing an additional majority-black district constitutes a \"narrowly tai- lored\" remedy for the various harms they allege. And more fundamentally, they fail to demonstrate a harm warranting such drastic remedy in the first place.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No \"compelling interest\" justifies Plaintiffs' proposed racial gerrymanders.",
		"context": "Gonzalez , 535 F.3d at 598. \"[B]ut under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.\" Adarand Constructors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs further assert that HB1 \"perpetu- ates … discrimination\" by resembling the last dec- ade's congressional map. Milligan Br.36; see also Caster Br.25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No \"compelling interest\" justifies Plaintiffs' proposed racial gerrymanders.",
		"context": "Plaintiffs further assert that HB1 \"perpetu- ates … discrimination\" by resembling the last dec- ade's congressional map. Milligan Br.36; see also Caster Br.25. This argument ignores that Alabama's current congressional plan is a product of a 1992 fed- eral court order, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd sub nom. , 504 U.S. 902, and subsequent plans that were pre- cleared by the Department of Justice under §5 of the VRA. Alabama has retained the general arrangement of these districts without incident.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F. Supp. 1491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Slave Trade Was Abolished After 20 Years, But The Diversity Trade Still Remains After 50 Years.",
		"context": "20 It was , thereafter, promptly abolished by Congress in 1807 . Yet , the Supreme Court has judicially legislated 50 years of racial preferences (25 years from Bakke and 25 years from Grutter ) promising that someday, when \"practical \" and \"no longer necessary, \" a university could possibly be persuaded of the \"need\" to eliminate its racial inequality in university programs . 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 states: \"The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. \" 19 Indeed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "4 Melville B. Nim- mer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A][1][b] (2019) (citation omitted). In some cases, lower courts have erroneously expanded the concept of transformative use to cover a range of derivative—and thus infringing—works and ev en to complete, unaltered copies of works. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some courts have also found that when a use is deemed transformative, they need not consider the cop- yright owner's harm from lost opportunities to license derivative uses of their works, even where the type of use involved is one where such licensing is commonplace. See, e.g., Bill Graham 448 F.3d 605918 F.3d 723140 S. Ct. 122.",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F.3d 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "See, e.g., 714 F.3d 694. Some courts have also found that when a use is deemed transformative, they need not consider the cop- yright owner's harm from lost opportunities to license derivative uses of their works, even where the type of use involved is one where such licensing is commonplace. See, e.g., Bill Graham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]918 F.3d 723140 S. Ct. 122. Google seeks to capitaliz e on the muddied caselaw— starting with the most expansiv e notion of \"transforma- tive\" and then stretching the concept even further. This Court should reject Google's arguments, and provide clarity to both creators and a ppellate courts as to what does and (critically) does not make a use \"transforma-tive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 F.3d 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "See, e.g., 714 F.3d 694. Some courts have also found that when a use is deemed transformative, they need not consider the cop- yright owner's harm from lost opportunities to license derivative uses of their works, even where the type of use involved is one where such licensing is commonplace. See, e.g., Bill Graham 448 F.3d 605[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 S. Ct. 122. Google seeks to capitaliz e on the muddied caselaw— starting with the most expansiv e notion of \"transforma- tive\" and then stretching the concept even further. This Court should reject Google's arguments, and provide clarity to both creators and a ppellate courts as to what does and (critically) does not make a use \"transforma-tive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 F.3d 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "§ 106(2). As the Second Circu it has explained, \"[p]ara- digmatic examples of derivative works include the trans- lation of a novel into another language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-book or an audiobook.\" Authors Guild, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It should thus 16 be infringement—and not fair use—when works are merely converted from one form to another, such as the copying of a photograph into sculpture, 751 F. Supp. 474777 F. Supp. 1, aff'd960 F.2d 301, the copying of comic book characters into toys, King Features 299 F. 533, copying of CDs into MP3s, UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, and the retransmission of radio broadcasts by telephone, Infinity Broadcast Corp. , 150 F.3d at 106. While such changes can, in some sense, \"be described as transformations,\" they generally involve mere \"changes of form,\" and thus lack \"the kind of transform- ative purpose that favors a fair use finding.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "As the Second Circu it has explained, \"[p]ara- digmatic examples of derivative works include the trans- lation of a novel into another language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-book or an audiobook.\" Authors Guild, 755 F.3d 87. It should thus 16 be infringement—and not fair use—when works are merely converted from one form to another, such as the copying of a photograph into sculpture, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]777 F. Supp. 1, aff'd960 F.2d 301, the copying of comic book characters into toys, King Features 299 F. 533, copying of CDs into MP3s, UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, and the retransmission of radio broadcasts by telephone, Infinity Broadcast Corp. , 150 F.3d at 106. While such changes can, in some sense, \"be described as transformations,\" they generally involve mere \"changes of form,\" and thus lack \"the kind of transform- ative purpose that favors a fair use finding.\" Authors 804 F.3d 202, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "751 F. Supp. 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "As the Second Circu it has explained, \"[p]ara- digmatic examples of derivative works include the trans- lation of a novel into another language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-book or an audiobook.\" Authors Guild, 755 F.3d 87. It should thus 16 be infringement—and not fair use—when works are merely converted from one form to another, such as the copying of a photograph into sculpture, 751 F. Supp. 474[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd960 F.2d 301, the copying of comic book characters into toys, King Features 299 F. 533, copying of CDs into MP3s, UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, and the retransmission of radio broadcasts by telephone, Infinity Broadcast Corp. , 150 F.3d at 106. While such changes can, in some sense, \"be described as transformations,\" they generally involve mere \"changes of form,\" and thus lack \"the kind of transform- ative purpose that favors a fair use finding.\" Authors 804 F.3d 202, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F. Supp. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "As the Second Circu it has explained, \"[p]ara- digmatic examples of derivative works include the trans- lation of a novel into another language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-book or an audiobook.\" Authors Guild, 755 F.3d 87. It should thus 16 be infringement—and not fair use—when works are merely converted from one form to another, such as the copying of a photograph into sculpture, 751 F. Supp. 474777 F. Supp. 1, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the copying of comic book characters into toys, King Features 299 F. 533, copying of CDs into MP3s, UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, and the retransmission of radio broadcasts by telephone, Infinity Broadcast Corp. , 150 F.3d at 106. While such changes can, in some sense, \"be described as transformations,\" they generally involve mere \"changes of form,\" and thus lack \"the kind of transform- ative purpose that favors a fair use finding.\" Authors 804 F.3d 202, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "960 F.2d 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "It should thus 16 be infringement—and not fair use—when works are merely converted from one form to another, such as the copying of a photograph into sculpture, 751 F. Supp. 474777 F. Supp. 1, aff'd960 F.2d 301, the copying of comic book characters into toys, King Features 299 F. 533, copying of CDs into MP3s, UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, and the retransmission of radio broadcasts by telephone, Infinity Broadcast Corp. , 150 F.3d at 106. While such changes can, in some sense, \"be described as transformations,\" they generally involve mere \"changes of form,\" and thus lack \"the kind of transform- ative purpose that favors a fair use finding.\" Authors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied136 S. Ct. 1658; cf. Harper & Row , 471 U.S. 539 (use of book excerpts in magazine found infringing).",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "Authors 804 F.3d 202, cert. denied136 S. Ct. 1658; cf. Harper & Row , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (use of book excerpts in magazine found infringing). Indeed, it has to be that way. If every \"transforma- tive\" use were a fair use, then fair use would negate Con- gress's express grant to copyright owners of the exclu-sive right to create derivative works.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
		"context": "Indeed, it has to be that way. If every \"transforma- tive\" use were a fair use, then fair use would negate Con- gress's express grant to copyright owners of the exclu-sive right to create derivative works. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet some lower courts have not gotten the message: One study found that, of all the fair use cases decided in 2006 through 2010, 95% of them considered whether a use was transformative, and when the court found the subject use to be trans- formative, the defendant won 100% of the time. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Right-To-Control Theory Runs Counter To The Statute's Limited Protection Of Intangible Rights",
		"context": "When Congre ss enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346 in 1988 in response to McNally and Carpenter , it amended the fraud statutes to cover \"just one\" intangible right from among the \"universe of intangible-right[s]\" previously recognized: the right of honest services. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congress's reverberating silence about other intangible interests tells us all we need to know\" about what the wire fraud statutes criminalize. Sadler , 750 F.3d at 591.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture",
		"context": "This is a puzzling contention. It is true that defendants can forfeit their right to confrontation by failing to object in a timely manner. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that axiom has no bearing here. As noted above, petitioner expressly objected from the beginning that introducing Morris's allocution would be \"a Crawford violation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture",
		"context": "16 Insofar as the State's analogy to \"waiver\" is really meant to invoke the concept of equitable forfeiture, that contention falls flat as well. The \"only\" historically recognized way to forfeit the right to confrontation is to \"engage[] in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner did nothing of the sort here. Nor did he do anything that had even the effect of frustrating the State's ability to put Morris on the stand—or that was otherwise inconsistent with asserting his right to co nfrontation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture",
		"context": "Even if the purpose of admitting Morris's allocution had been to counter an \"improper\" invitation by petitioner for the jury to \"speculat[e] about what had happened to Morris's case,\" Resp. Br. 39, 42, 46, any \"remedy\" for improper actions that would otherwise violate a constitutional right must be tailored to the problem it is intended to address, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That means a court should consider \"alternatives\" before allowing the introduction of otherwise inadmissible testimonial evidence. 471 U.S. 409.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture",
		"context": "39, 42, 46, any \"remedy\" for improper actions that would otherwise violate a constitutional right must be tailored to the problem it is intended to address, see 397 U.S. 337. That means a court should consider \"alternatives\" before allowing the introduction of otherwise inadmissible testimonial evidence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 The State contends that Morris was \"unavailable\" to testify. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture",
		"context": "First, the trial court could have struck the purportedly improper comments by petitioner's counsel and ordered the jury to disregard them. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 654 N.Y.S.2d 279, aff'd,692 N.Y.S.2d 92. Second, the trial court could have allowed the jury to learn that the State \"ultimately dropped th[e murder] charge []\" against Morris. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": ". normally creates an obligation impervious to ju- dicial discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], requiring sentencing court s to consider the listed factors when impos ing a sentence. 552 U.S. 38. Section 404(b)'s authorization for district courts to \"impose a re- duced sentence \" invoke s this mandate .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": "normally creates an obligation impervious to ju- dicial discretion.\" 136 S. Ct. 450, requiring sentencing court s to consider the listed factors when impos ing a sentence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 404(b)'s authorization for district courts to \"impose a re- duced sentence \" invoke s this mandate . Thus, \"[w]hen a court 'imposes' a sentence [under section 404(b)] , the text of § 3553(a) —i.e., 'Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence'—mandates that a district court 'shall consider' the factors set forth therein.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": "There is no dispute that the first use of the term \"impos e\" refers to the initial sentencing at which the 20 district court considered the full panoply of section 3553(a) factors. Interpreting the second use of the word \"impose\" to mean something different would violate the \"normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The most obvious conclusion, therefore, is that both times Congress used th e word \"impose,\" it meant the act of imposing a sentence consistent with section 3553 (a). Section 3553(a) , in turn, requires a district court to consider current facts and law when i mposing a sentence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": "Section 3553(a) , in turn, requires a district court to consider current facts and law when i mposing a sentence. As to current facts: \"[A] court's duty is always to sen- tence the defendant as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recognized that \"highly relevant —if not essenti al—to the selection of an appropri- ate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteris-tics.\" 562 U.S. 476.",
		"citation_value_orig": "229 F.3d 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": "229 F.3d 425. This Court has recognized that \"highly relevant —if not essenti al—to the selection of an appropri- ate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteris-tics.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a resentencing proceeding, a jud ge can- not accurately account for the defendant 's \"history and characteristics\" without considering \"evidence of post - sentencing rehabilitation,\" which this Court in Pepper rec- ognized is crucial to determining the \"most up- to-date pic- ture\" of a defendant's life. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": ". additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] factors because cur- rent Guidelines \"may reflect updated views about the se- riousness of a defendant's offense or criminal history.\" 998 F.3d 549.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": "See U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Quick Facts— Ca- reer Offenders FY 2020 , at 2 (reporting that just 19.6% of career offenders received a within -Guidelines sentence). Or take the case of a defendant who was originally sentenced before this Court held in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that the Guidelines are advi- sory. Mandatory Guidelines were certainly part of the \"applicable legal landscape\" at pre -Booker sentencings. Pet.App.18a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law",
		"context": "For example, many defendants were subject to mandatory -minimum sentences, which in turn substan- tially inflated the applicable Guidelines ranges. The an-choring effect that th ese increased Guidelines would have had is \"real and pervasive.\" Molina [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. I n Molina -Martinez, the Court recognized that when a district court \"mistak- enly [applies] an incorrect, higher Guidelines ran ge,\" there will be, \"[i]n most cases,\" \"a reasonable probability of a different outcome\" under the correct Guidelines range. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ATHLETES NEED ASSURANCE THEY CAN ENGAGE IN SAFETY-MOTIVATED WHISTLEBLOWING WITHOUT FEAR OF RETRIBUTION",
		"context": "It was missing 74 convicted sex offenders , USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/ 2020/09/18/cheerleading-cheer- investigation-sexual-misconduct-sex-offender-banned- list/3377622001/. 15 exponentially worse, cutting off the only viable source of rescue. To borrow the Court's iconic phrase from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], whistleblowing needs \"breathing space to survive.\" The Court should not lose sigh t of the fact that it is dealing with young and vulnerable speakers in a position of extreme power differential. 10 The culture of enforced silence within sports is well-documented, as Amici can attest from years of both playing college sports and working on behalf of those who play today.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis",
		"context": "In other contexts, citizens are permitted to challenge laws, regulations, and other administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis, especially where civil and criminal penalties are imposed for noncompliance. See, e.g. , U.S. Army Corps of Eng SLs v. Hawkes Co. (,.1I:f,3+2(,3,0%-+,1&%p8eiW have long held, parties need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final agency action iZWdWegUZbdaUWWV[`YeUSddkfZWd[e]aXreWd[age criminal and civil bW`S^f[Wesq%cgaf[`YAbbott [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). The law does not dWcg[dWSU[f[lW`fapTWffZWXSd_qfaZShWfZW[d challenge to the law addressed. Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis",
		"context": "The law does not dWcg[dWSU[f[lW`fapTWffZWXSd_qfaZShWfZW[d challenge to the law addressed. Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. C.The decision below conflicts with the (=C@BIA@4942B8=<=5.0F Exceptionalism. The Court firmly rejected Tax Exceptionalism in the context of administrative deference in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and 562 U.S. 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis",
		"context": "561 U.S. 477. C.The decision below conflicts with the (=C@BIA@4942B8=<=5.0F Exceptionalism. The Court firmly rejected Tax Exceptionalism in the context of administrative deference in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Mayo , the parties argued over whether Treasury Department regulations were entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837, or whether they were subject to the less deferential standard announced in National Muffler Dealers 440 U.S. 472. The Court held that the Chevron standard applied and expressly rejected the view that Treasury Department regulations issued under general authority are owed p^WeeVWXWdW`UWqfZS`fZaeWp[eegWVg`VWdSebWU[X[U grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory bdah[e[a`qMayo , 562 U.S. at 56 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis",
		"context": "C.The decision below conflicts with the (=C@BIA@4942B8=<=5.0F Exceptionalism. The Court firmly rejected Tax Exceptionalism in the context of administrative deference in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and 562 U.S. 44. In Mayo , the parties argued over whether Treasury Department regulations were entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or whether they were subject to the less deferential standard announced in National Muffler Dealers 440 U.S. 472. The Court held that the Chevron standard applied and expressly rejected the view that Treasury Department regulations issued under general authority are owed p^WeeVWXWdW`UWqfZS`fZaeWp[eegWVg`VWdSebWU[X[U grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory bdah[e[a`qMayo , 562 U.S. at 56 (citation omitted). JZW:agdfefdWeeWVpfZW[_badfS`UWaX_S[`fS[`[`Y a uniform approach to judicial review of SV_[`[efdSf[hWSUf[a`qId.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis",
		"context": "C.The decision below conflicts with the (=C@BIA@4942B8=<=5.0F Exceptionalism. The Court firmly rejected Tax Exceptionalism in the context of administrative deference in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and 562 U.S. 44. In Mayo , the parties argued over whether Treasury Department regulations were entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837, or whether they were subject to the less deferential standard announced in National Muffler Dealers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court held that the Chevron standard applied and expressly rejected the view that Treasury Department regulations issued under general authority are owed p^WeeVWXWdW`UWqfZS`fZaeWp[eegWVg`VWdSebWU[X[U grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory bdah[e[a`qMayo , 562 U.S. at 56 (citation omitted). JZW:agdfefdWeeWVpfZW[_badfS`UWaX_S[`fS[`[`Y a uniform approach to judicial review of SV_[`[efdSf[hWSUf[a`qId.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis",
		"context": "The Court held that the Chevron standard applied and expressly rejected the view that Treasury Department regulations issued under general authority are owed p^WeeVWXWdW`UWqfZS`fZaeWp[eegWVg`VWdSebWU[X[U grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory bdah[e[a`qMayo , 562 U.S. at 56 (citation omitted). JZW:agdfefdWeeWVpfZW[_badfS`UWaX_S[`fS[`[`Y a uniform approach to judicial review of SV_[`[efdSf[hWSUf[a`qId. at 55 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). pMWeWW`a reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other dWYg^Sf[a`eqId. at 56.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule",
		"context": "15-153 (\" [H]e must register his 9 claim before he can enforce his rights in the courts. \").5 Opinions from this Court have similarly referred to copyright owners registering their works. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given all of the foregoing, the better reading of the phrase \"has been made\" is \"has been made by the applicant.\" After paying the fee, filing a proper registration form, and providing a deposit copy to the Copyright Office, there are no further actions an applicant can take to obtain a registration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule",
		"context": "After paying the fee, filing a proper registration form, and providing a deposit copy to the Copyright Office, there are no further actions an applicant can take to obtain a registration. Therefore, under the best application of the statute, the registration requirement is satisfied by filing a complete application. Moreover, as discussed further below, the Application Rule is consistent with Congress' intent and policy objectives relating to the 5 The fact that Congress was acting to overturn the Second Circuit's Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coutre Watches, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], decision, which prevented plaintiffs from suing infringers after the Register's denial of an application, is further evidence that Congress did not want the actions of the Register to determine when, and whether, a plaintiff had access to the courts. See H.R. REP. NO.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 F.2d 637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The ESA May Provide No \"Meaningful\" or \"Substantive\" Standard by Which To Measure a Decision Not To Exclude, But Both the Constitution and the APA Do",
		"context": "an agency formulates and consistently follows a particular enforcement policy, courts should be extremely deferential in reviewing the discretionary aspects of that policy regarding such matters as limited resources, as well as in reviewing the application of such discretionary factors to particu lar enforcement decisions.\"). But the agencies cannot depart from these guideposts on whim or fancy. See Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If they do, then courts should be allowed to step in —indeed, the y should step in if they are going to fill the role our Founding Fathers gave them in the Constitution and Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury . See Marbury 5 U.S. 137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The ESA May Provide No \"Meaningful\" or \"Substantive\" Standard by Which To Measure a Decision Not To Exclude, But Both the Constitution and the APA Do",
		"context": "See Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. 2117. If they do, then courts should be allowed to step in —indeed, the y should step in if they are going to fill the role our Founding Fathers gave them in the Constitution and Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury . See Marbury [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the Service declined to exclude an area the designation of which would impose $34 million in costs. See 77 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The ESA May Provide No \"Meaningful\" or \"Substantive\" Standard by Which To Measure a Decision Not To Exclude, But Both the Constitution and the APA Do",
		"context": ". . rational\"); Federal Communications [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] must articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the decision made, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n , 463 U.S . at 43 and (ii) must explain how its methodology rationally relates to the reality intended to be depicted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The ESA May Provide No \"Meaningful\" or \"Substantive\" Standard by Which To Measure a Decision Not To Exclude, But Both the Constitution and the APA Do",
		"context": "Ass'n , 463 U.S . at 43 and (ii) must explain how its methodology rationally relates to the reality intended to be depicted. Columbia Falls Alum inum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These standards can be applied even in the context of an entirely \"discretionary\" action — for example, assuming the Service truly had otherwise unfettered discretion to exclude or not to exclude a given parcel, surely it could not decline to exclude a parcel because of the race or religion of its owner? Here, the Service irrationally declared Unit 1 critical habitat for a fro g that biologically cannot benefit from the designation, regardless o f the economic impact upon the Family L andowners and Weyerhaeuser.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 F.3d 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Habeas cases similarly inform the analysis and demonstrate why CUE must be found here",
		"context": "art. I, § 9, cl. 2; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The purpose of habeas corpus is, as Justice Black once de- scribed it, to protect \"the individual against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.\" 371 U.S. 236.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Habeas cases similarly inform the analysis and demonstrate why CUE must be found here",
		"context": "2; In re135 U.S. 1. The purpose of habeas corpus is, as Justice Black once de- scribed it, to protect \"the individual against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A successful petition for writ of habeas corpus \"may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.\" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Habeas cases similarly inform the analysis and demonstrate why CUE must be found here",
		"context": "§ 2255(a) (2020). Habeas relief is appropriate where a subsequent judicial clarification of a statute's plain meaning re-moves the defendant's cond uct from the statute's scope. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As discussed above, this Court acknowledges that a \"judicial construction . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 F.3d 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Habeas cases similarly inform the analysis and demonstrate why CUE must be found here",
		"context": "Rivers , 511 U.S. at 312-13; see Bous- ley, 523 U.S. at 625-26. In the habeas context, this Court recognizes that a judicial decision that \" 'merely clarifie[s]' a statute can be given effect in collateral proceedings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Fiore , this Court granted habeas after finding that the conviction was based on conduct that the state statute, as it was subsequently clarified , did not pro- hibit. 531 U.S. at 228-29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "Completeness. If an accused introduces all or part of a statement by a person, then in some circumstances a prosecution may be allowed to introduce the remainder of that statement, or another statement by that person , even though the statement is testimonial and the accused has not had an opportunity to be confronted by the person. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied544 U.S. 931; 596 F.3d 716 ;7 114 P.3d 828 , cert. denied546 U.S. 1098.",
		"citation_value_orig": "382 F.3d 453",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "If an accused introduces all or part of a statement by a person, then in some circumstances a prosecution may be allowed to introduce the remainder of that statement, or another statement by that person , even though the statement is testimonial and the accused has not had an opportunity to be confronted by the person. E.g., 382 F.3d 453, cert. denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 596 F.3d 716 ;7 114 P.3d 828 , cert. denied546 U.S. 1098. This is a simple application of the rule of completeness, which has common -law roots going back long before adoption of the Confrontation Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 931",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "If an accused introduces all or part of a statement by a person, then in some circumstances a prosecution may be allowed to introduce the remainder of that statement, or another statement by that person , even though the statement is testimonial and the accused has not had an opportunity to be confronted by the person. E.g., 382 F.3d 453, cert. denied544 U.S. 931; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ;7 114 P.3d 828 , cert. denied546 U.S. 1098. This is a simple application of the rule of completeness, which has common -law roots going back long before adoption of the Confrontation Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "596 F.3d 716",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "If an accused introduces all or part of a statement by a person, then in some circumstances a prosecution may be allowed to introduce the remainder of that statement, or another statement by that person , even though the statement is testimonial and the accused has not had an opportunity to be confronted by the person. E.g., 382 F.3d 453, cert. denied544 U.S. 931; 596 F.3d 716 ;7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied546 U.S. 1098. This is a simple application of the rule of completeness, which has common -law roots going back long before adoption of the Confrontation Clause .",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 P.3d 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "R. Evid. 106. Beech Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Fed. R. Evid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": ". an immunity from cross -examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 The rule of completeness could be limited further when the result is to defeat a claim of the confrontation right . It could be that in that context the rule should only apply: (1) T o statements of the same person that are closely associated not only in su bject 21 court, in determining that the completeness principle ought to apply, need not determine that the portion introduced by the accused would be misleading; it is enough for the doctrine to apply if it is plausible that the portion alone would be misleading , so that in fairness the jury ought to hear the second part as well.12 matter but in time and context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "11 The rule of completeness could be limited further when the result is to defeat a claim of the confrontation right . It could be that in that context the rule should only apply: (1) T o statements of the same person that are closely associated not only in su bject 21 court, in determining that the completeness principle ought to apply, need not determine that the portion introduced by the accused would be misleading; it is enough for the doctrine to apply if it is plausible that the portion alone would be misleading , so that in fairness the jury ought to hear the second part as well.12 matter but in time and context. ( Amicus does not believe that attempts to determine what should be deemed one statement rather than a series of statements, as in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], are likely to be fruitful.) (2) If th e portion of the statement that the accused introduced was also testimonial in nature. (2) If the prosecution cannot, with reasonable effort, secure the witness's live testimony.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
		"context": "That cannot be the law. An accused, of course, has a \" fundamental constituti onal right to a fair opportunity to present a defense .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He cannot be placed in a position of having to elect between that right and his equally fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Thus, as the Petitioner's Brief has shown amply, pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "In the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, which Senator Grassley sponsored, Congress created one of the most detailed definitions of scienter in the federal code. The unmistakable goal of that careful design was to assure that the FCA would be applied liberally and expansively as the government's primary tool to combat fraud. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (the FCA \"is . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The majority sought to ease this obvious incongruity by reasoning that a defendant could not \"actually\" know whether information was true if there were any theoretical 2. The majority's analysis mainly relies on this Court's prior decision in Safeco Ins. Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which construed the intent requirement in a different federal statute. Safeco critically observed that the Fair Credit Reporting Act contained \"no indication that Congress had something different in mind\" from the definition of \"willful\" that this Court construed. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The phrase \"deliberate ignorance\" unquestionably focuses on a person's subjective mental state. Congress used the phrase to reach defendants 8 who consciously avoid steps that might reveal the truth.3 Deliberate ignorance has been widely interpreted both before and after Congress inserted that language into the FCA to refer to a subjective state of mind. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]732 F.3d 1113532 F.2d 697939 F.2d 140543 F.3d 794503 U.S. 258 (\"We may fairly credit . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F.2d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The phrase \"deliberate ignorance\" unquestionably focuses on a person's subjective mental state. Congress used the phrase to reach defendants 8 who consciously avoid steps that might reveal the truth.3 Deliberate ignorance has been widely interpreted both before and after Congress inserted that language into the FCA to refer to a subjective state of mind. See, e.g., 770 F.2d 361[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]532 F.2d 697939 F.2d 140543 F.3d 794503 U.S. 258 (\"We may fairly credit . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "732 F.3d 1113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The phrase \"deliberate ignorance\" unquestionably focuses on a person's subjective mental state. Congress used the phrase to reach defendants 8 who consciously avoid steps that might reveal the truth.3 Deliberate ignorance has been widely interpreted both before and after Congress inserted that language into the FCA to refer to a subjective state of mind. See, e.g., 770 F.2d 361732 F.3d 1113[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]939 F.2d 140543 F.3d 794503 U.S. 258 (\"We may fairly credit . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 F.2d 697",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The phrase \"deliberate ignorance\" unquestionably focuses on a person's subjective mental state. Congress used the phrase to reach defendants 8 who consciously avoid steps that might reveal the truth.3 Deliberate ignorance has been widely interpreted both before and after Congress inserted that language into the FCA to refer to a subjective state of mind. See, e.g., 770 F.2d 361732 F.3d 1113532 F.2d 697[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]43 F.3d 794503 U.S. 258 (\"We may fairly credit . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "939 F.2d 1405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The phrase \"deliberate ignorance\" unquestionably focuses on a person's subjective mental state. Congress used the phrase to reach defendants 8 who consciously avoid steps that might reveal the truth.3 Deliberate ignorance has been widely interpreted both before and after Congress inserted that language into the FCA to refer to a subjective state of mind. See, e.g., 770 F.2d 361732 F.3d 1113532 F.2d 697939 F.2d 1405[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]503 U.S. 258 (\"We may fairly credit . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "43 F.3d 794",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.",
		"context": "The phrase \"deliberate ignorance\" unquestionably focuses on a person's subjective mental state. Congress used the phrase to reach defendants 8 who consciously avoid steps that might reveal the truth.3 Deliberate ignorance has been widely interpreted both before and after Congress inserted that language into the FCA to refer to a subjective state of mind. See, e.g., 770 F.2d 361732 F.3d 1113532 F.2d 697939 F.2d 140543 F.3d 794[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We may fairly credit . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Fill Up the Details\"",
		"context": "The scope of executive branch authority to implement legislation was addressed by Chief JusticeJohn Marshall in 1825, declaring \"[i]t will not becontended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, orto any other tribunals, powers which are strictly andexclusively legislative,\" but other branches are allowed to \"act under such general provisions to fill up the details .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] a law, but no more, thereby protecting theConstitution's vesting of \" [a]ll legislative Powers herein granted\" to Congress. Art. I, sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court May Decide This Case Without Addressing the General Justiciability of Partisan Gerrymandering",
		"context": "The law challenged here thus cannot survive even the most deferential review under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because of the openly discriminatory intent with which it was passed. \"[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 49\u0003 \u0003 \u0003a legitimate governmental interest.\" United States Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 517 U.S. 620364 U.S. 339, decided in an era when line-drawing challenges were still nonjusticiable and decades before the Court adopted a standard for racial- gerrymandering claims. The Court nevertheless held that when Alabama transformed a square municipal boundary into \"an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure\" excising every African-American neighborhood, \"the conclusion [was] irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration,\" that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court May Decide This Case Without Addressing the General Justiciability of Partisan Gerrymandering",
		"context": "The law challenged here thus cannot survive even the most deferential review under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because of the openly discriminatory intent with which it was passed. \"[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 49\u0003 \u0003 \u0003a legitimate governmental interest.\" United States Dep't of 413 U.S. 528; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]364 U.S. 339, decided in an era when line-drawing challenges were still nonjusticiable and decades before the Court adopted a standard for racial- gerrymandering claims. The Court nevertheless held that when Alabama transformed a square municipal boundary into \"an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure\" excising every African-American neighborhood, \"the conclusion [was] irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration,\" that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court May Decide This Case Without Addressing the General Justiciability of Partisan Gerrymandering",
		"context": "The law challenged here thus cannot survive even the most deferential review under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because of the openly discriminatory intent with which it was passed. \"[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 49\u0003 \u0003 \u0003a legitimate governmental interest.\" United States Dep't of 413 U.S. 528; see also 517 U.S. 620[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], decided in an era when line-drawing challenges were still nonjusticiable and decades before the Court adopted a standard for racial- gerrymandering claims. The Court nevertheless held that when Alabama transformed a square municipal boundary into \"an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure\" excising every African-American neighborhood, \"the conclusion [was] irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration,\" that the Fifteenth Amendment had been violated. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TEST DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TRADEMARK OWNER'S OR THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN FREE SPEECH",
		"context": "§§ 1117(a), (c)), but these are not requirements for infringement under the plain text of the statute. This Court's McConnell and Citizen's United decisions upheld regulations that, beyond merely forbidding misleading statements, required the source of important political speech to be affirmatively disclosed. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Citizens United , 558 U.S. 310. These decisions are impossible to square with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Congress may not stop the source confusion caused by VIP Products' misleading expressions. The same public interest is at stake: preventing speakers from \"hid[ing] behind dubious and misleading names….\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TEST DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TRADEMARK OWNER'S OR THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN FREE SPEECH",
		"context": "§§ 1117(a), (c)), but these are not requirements for infringement under the plain text of the statute. This Court's McConnell and Citizen's United decisions upheld regulations that, beyond merely forbidding misleading statements, required the source of important political speech to be affirmatively disclosed. See 540 U.S. 93; Citizens United , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions are impossible to square with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Congress may not stop the source confusion caused by VIP Products' misleading expressions. The same public interest is at stake: preventing speakers from \"hid[ing] behind dubious and misleading names….\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TEST DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TRADEMARK OWNER'S OR THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN FREE SPEECH",
		"context": "McConnell , 540 U.S. at 196-97; Citizen's United , 558 U.S. at 367. In validating these rules against a constitutional challenge, the Court relied on \" the competing First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed 19 choices in the political marketplace.\" McConnell , 540 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added); see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (where \"the possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious\" and petitioner had \"sought to exploit the 'commercial magnetism' of the term, \"Congress' decision to grant the USOC a limited property right in the word 'Olympic' falls within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus certainly within constitutional bounds.\"). The Court's conclusion that Congress legitimately may regulate even the most important speech against efforts to disguise or hide its source speaks directly to the Ninth Circuit's overreach in immunizing commercial, if expressive, use of marks that confuse consumers. The Ninth Circuit should have recognized the constitutional rights in trademark owners and the public, and \"rigidly adhered\" to the tenet \"never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TEST DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TRADEMARK OWNER'S OR THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN FREE SPEECH",
		"context": "The Court's conclusion that Congress legitimately may regulate even the most important speech against efforts to disguise or hide its source speaks directly to the Ninth Circuit's overreach in immunizing commercial, if expressive, use of marks that confuse consumers. The Ninth Circuit should have recognized the constitutional rights in trademark owners and the public, and \"rigidly adhered\" to the tenet \"never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cited in McConnell , 540 U.S. at 192.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Right-To-Control Theory Offends Principles Of Federalism By Upending The Federal-State Balance",
		"context": "The right-to-control theory upsets the constitutional balance of federal and state regulation by vastly expanding the re ach of the federal fraud laws. \"From the beginning of our country, criminal law enforcement has been primarily a responsibility of the States, and that remains true today.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, in the mail and wire fraud context, this Court has cautioned against \"a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction\" into an area \"traditionally regulated by state and local authorities,\" absent \"a clear statement by Congress.\" 531 U.S. 12, 25 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1) , 18 Duquesne L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Right-To-Control Theory Offends Principles Of Federalism By Upending The Federal-State Balance",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 791. Accordingly, in the mail and wire fraud context, this Court has cautioned against \"a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction\" into an area \"traditionally regulated by state and local authorities,\" absent \"a clear statement by Congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 25 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1) , 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 771, 771 (1980). 48 24 (2000); accord 483 U.S. 350.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Right-To-Control Theory Offends Principles Of Federalism By Upending The Federal-State Balance",
		"context": "531 U.S. 12, 25 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1) , 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 771, 771 (1980). 48 24 (2000); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The right-to-control theory gives federal prosecutors a weapon to criminalize a broad array of corporate, pers onal, and professional relationships ordinarily left to state regulation. Before federal prosecutors are empowered to substitute their judgment for that of state regulators on how to address deceptions that may affect a person's economic calculus, even those that contemplated no financial harm, Congress must make its intention clear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Right-To-Control Theory Offends Principles Of Federalism By Upending The Federal-State Balance",
		"context": "It has not done so here. The principle that Congress \"will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal- state balance\" unless it \"conveys its purpose clearly\" thus confirms the invalidity of the right-to-control theory. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It Would Be Profoundly Unfair To Make A Defendant's Right To Appeal Dependent On His Ability To Articulate A Viable Issue For Appeal",
		"context": "The ve ry factors that might make a defendant's plea agreement unknowing or involun- 15 tary—language difficulties, mental handicaps, or incompetence of trial counsel, to name a few—may similarly make it hard for the defendant to recognize or articulate claims that are preserved despite the appeal waiver. And appeal waivers themselves are often difficult to interpret, requiring a review of the \"entire record\" that indigent clients are ill-suited to perform themselves. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Pet'r Br. 31. 4 The State and the Solicitor General ignore all of this.",
		"citation_value_orig": "888 F.3d 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It Would Be Profoundly Unfair To Make A Defendant's Right To Appeal Dependent On His Ability To Articulate A Viable Issue For Appeal",
		"context": "Courts consistently hold that prospective waiver of sentencing issues \"must be explicit; it will not be deemed implicit in a general waiver.\" E.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 226 P.3d 535. 16 nized the inequity in requiring a defendant to \"speci- fy the points he would raise,\" and to do so \"before any advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds.\" 528 U.S. at 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 F.3d 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It Would Be Profoundly Unfair To Make A Defendant's Right To Appeal Dependent On His Ability To Articulate A Viable Issue For Appeal",
		"context": "Courts consistently hold that prospective waiver of sentencing issues \"must be explicit; it will not be deemed implicit in a general waiver.\" E.g. 134 F.3d 307; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 nized the inequity in requiring a defendant to \"speci- fy the points he would raise,\" and to do so \"before any advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds.\" 528 U.S. at 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "226 P.3d 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It Would Be Profoundly Unfair To Make A Defendant's Right To Appeal Dependent On His Ability To Articulate A Viable Issue For Appeal",
		"context": "27. In fact, however, courts typically find those claims procedurally defaulted if they have not been brought first on direct appeal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even if a defendant tries to bring his claims on postconviction, he will face obstacles he would not have faced on appeal. He will have no 17 right to counsel, and his claims will be subject to the stringent procedures and standards that govern habeas proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "Id. In analyzing extraterritoriality, the court must also consider \"the extent of the statutory exception. \" Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] provides clear indication that Congress intended for the provision to apply extraterritorially. Congress added § 271(f) to the Patent Act in response to Deeps outh Packing 406 U.S. 518 , in which the Supreme Court h eld that § 271(a) was not infringed by extraterritorial activity. See S. REP. NO.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "In analyzing extraterritoriality, the court must also consider \"the extent of the statutory exception. \" Microsoft 550 U.S. 437 provides clear indication that Congress intended for the provision to apply extraterritorially. Congress added § 271(f) to the Patent Act in response to Deeps outh Packing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , in which the Supreme Court h eld that § 271(a) was not infringed by extraterritorial activity. See S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 2–3 (1984) (extending the Patent Act \"so that when components are supplied for assembly abroad to circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same as when the invention is 'made' or 'sold' in the United States \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "See S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 2–3 (1984) (extending the Patent Act \"so that when components are supplied for assembly abroad to circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same as when the invention is 'made' or 'sold' in the United States \"). The Federal Circuit erroneously maintained that § 271(f) was a \"limited exception,\" observing that in Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (20 07), this Court interpreted § 271(f) narrowly. WesternGeco 791 F.3d 1340 ; vacated , 136 S. Ct. 2486 . This case , however, can be distinguished from Microsoft .",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "98-663, at 2–3 (1984) (extending the Patent Act \"so that when components are supplied for assembly abroad to circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same as when the invention is 'made' or 'sold' in the United States \"). The Federal Circuit erroneously maintained that § 271(f) was a \"limited exception,\" observing that in Microsoft 550 U.S. 437 (20 07), this Court interpreted § 271(f) narrowly. WesternGeco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; vacated , 136 S. Ct. 2486 . This case , however, can be distinguished from Microsoft . In Microsoft , when the Court was faced with a choice of a broad interpretation of \"component\" that extended the 7 extraterritorial reach of § 271(f) versus a narrow one that did not, it chose the narrow reading.",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.3d 1340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "Consequently, the \"limited exception\" concerns expressed in Microsoft for § 271(f) are not applicable to this case. The Federal Circuit's reliance on § 271(a) is also misplaced. It held that under Power Integrations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , extraterritorial damages are prohibited. WesternGeco L.L.C. , 791 F.3d at 1351 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "711 F.3d 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "Courts should not artificially restrict damages under the Patent Act. In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp. , this Court observed that \"[w]hen Congress wished to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement action, it said so explicitly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court also recently emphasized in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. , in the context of enhanced damages , that the Federal Circuit should not \"unduly confine[] the ability of district courts to exercise the discretion conferred on them.\" 136 S. Ct. 1923 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "461 U.S. 648. The Court also recently emphasized in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. , in the context of enhanced damages , that the Federal Circuit should not \"unduly confine[] the ability of district courts to exercise the discretion conferred on them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In passing § 284 , \"Congress sought to ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full compensation for 'any damages' he suffered as a result of the infringement.\" General Motors Corp. , 461 U.S. at 654 –55.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1923",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially",
		"context": "§ 102(a) (2012) . Likewise, this Court has held that the sale of patented goods exhausts a patentee's domestic patent rights. See Impression [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 10 C. The Two -Step Test for § 284 In RJR Nabisco , the unanimous Court noted that the two -step test applies \"regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.\" RJR Nabisco , 136 S. Ct. at 2101.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations",
		"context": "First, reservation status does not affect jurisdic- tion over the vast majority of non-Indian activities on reservation fee land. On fee land—the only land af- fected by reservation status —tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is \"presumptively invalid.\" Plains Com- merce [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]490 U.S. 163447 U.S. 134502 U.S. 251. This jurisprudence has been accompanied by an \"increasing trend\" toward intergovernmental agree- ments between tribes, states, and local governments. See Conference of Western Attorneys General, Ameri- can Indian Law Deskbook § 14.1 (2018).",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations",
		"context": "First, reservation status does not affect jurisdic- tion over the vast majority of non-Indian activities on reservation fee land. On fee land—the only land af- fected by reservation status —tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is \"presumptively invalid.\" Plains Com- merce 554 U.S. 316[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]447 U.S. 134502 U.S. 251. This jurisprudence has been accompanied by an \"increasing trend\" toward intergovernmental agree- ments between tribes, states, and local governments. See Conference of Western Attorneys General, Ameri- can Indian Law Deskbook § 14.1 (2018).",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations",
		"context": "First, reservation status does not affect jurisdic- tion over the vast majority of non-Indian activities on reservation fee land. On fee land—the only land af- fected by reservation status —tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is \"presumptively invalid.\" Plains Com- merce 554 U.S. 316490 U.S. 163[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]502 U.S. 251. This jurisprudence has been accompanied by an \"increasing trend\" toward intergovernmental agree- ments between tribes, states, and local governments. See Conference of Western Attorneys General, Ameri- can Indian Law Deskbook § 14.1 (2018).",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations",
		"context": "First, reservation status does not affect jurisdic- tion over the vast majority of non-Indian activities on reservation fee land. On fee land—the only land af- fected by reservation status —tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is \"presumptively invalid.\" Plains Com- merce 554 U.S. 316490 U.S. 163447 U.S. 134[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This jurisprudence has been accompanied by an \"increasing trend\" toward intergovernmental agree- ments between tribes, states, and local governments. See Conference of Western Attorneys General, Ameri- can Indian Law Deskbook § 14.1 (2018).",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations",
		"context": "According to the Conference of Western Attorneys General, such agreements not only \"resolve the core uncertainties\" on jurisdiction, but also result in more effective service delivery. Id. § 14 Introduction; see also Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The National 24 Conference of State Legislat ures similarly reports that intergovernmental agreements are often \"the best way to provide services to thes e unique populations without wasting valuable resources on ineffective programs.\" Susan Johnson, et al., Nat'l Conference of State Legis- latures, Government to Government: Models of Cooper- ation between States and Tribes 3 (2009).",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations",
		"context": "In 2016, this Court affirmed that Pender and its surroundings were within the boundaries of the Omaha Reservation. In 29 its briefs, Nebraska vociferously argued that affir- mance would \"seriously disrupt\" the community, and \"the practical consequences will be profound.\" Brief for Petitioner at 20, 23, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 14-1406). But news from the area reveals no such disruption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1072",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Washington Supreme Court misapplied and unwisely expanded this Court's preemption principles",
		"context": ". This Court in San Diego Building Trades [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that the Na- tional Labor Relations Act (\"Act\"), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., impliedly preempts many state regulations of conduct \"arguably\" encompassed by the Act. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Washington Supreme Court misapplied and unwisely expanded this Court's preemption principles",
		"context": "at 246. But this Court's preemption cases also recognized that states' interest in protecting life, limb and private 4 property must be respected under principles of feder- alism, and that victims of union misdeeds must have a state court remedy because they generally have no federal remedy. See, e.g., Lodge [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]347 U.S. 656306 U.S. 240. Yet the Washington Supreme Court erroneously limited Washington's power to pro- tect its citizens when it immunized unions from tort liability for intentional destruction of an employer's private property. State jurisdiction over tort claims against unions is not simply an \"employer versus union\" issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Washington Supreme Court misapplied and unwisely expanded this Court's preemption principles",
		"context": "at 246. But this Court's preemption cases also recognized that states' interest in protecting life, limb and private 4 property must be respected under principles of feder- alism, and that victims of union misdeeds must have a state court remedy because they generally have no federal remedy. See, e.g., Lodge 427 U.S. 132[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]306 U.S. 240. Yet the Washington Supreme Court erroneously limited Washington's power to pro- tect its citizens when it immunized unions from tort liability for intentional destruction of an employer's private property. State jurisdiction over tort claims against unions is not simply an \"employer versus union\" issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Washington Supreme Court misapplied and unwisely expanded this Court's preemption principles",
		"context": "at 246. But this Court's preemption cases also recognized that states' interest in protecting life, limb and private 4 property must be respected under principles of feder- alism, and that victims of union misdeeds must have a state court remedy because they generally have no federal remedy. See, e.g., Lodge 427 U.S. 132347 U.S. 656[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet the Washington Supreme Court erroneously limited Washington's power to pro- tect its citizens when it immunized unions from tort liability for intentional destruction of an employer's private property. State jurisdiction over tort claims against unions is not simply an \"employer versus union\" issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Washington Supreme Court misapplied and unwisely expanded this Court's preemption principles",
		"context": "State jurisdiction over tort claims against unions is not simply an \"employer versus union\" issue. Ra- ther, state courts provide the primary forum for em- ployees seeking compensation when injured by tor- tious union activity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unions faced with employees' state tort claims of- ten raise exaggerated preemption defenses to try to 5 avoid liability. For example, in Clegg v. Powers , em- ployees sought damages in state court for union vio- lence and property damage during a strike.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Traditional navigable waters should include only channels of interstate commerce",
		"context": "The term \"navigable waters of the United States\" did not originate with the CWA but was borne out of a long history with origins in the British legal system, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and a chain of judicial decisions. See, e.g., id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Agencies cannot interpret this term as if it were an undefined, malleable construct. Congress deliberately selecte d a term that had already been well-defined by federal courts when it could have chosen any other word or phrase to express its inten-tions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Traditional navigable waters should include only channels of interstate commerce",
		"context": "It was held early in our history that the power to regulate commerce necessarily included power over navigation.\"). Indeed, \"[t]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been fre- quently sustained, and is no longer open to question.\" Id., quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To remain true to the navigability intent of the CWA and the \"channels of co mmerce\" limitation of the 28 Commerce Clause, a water must have utility for com- mercial trade and deliberate travel, not merely water- borne recreation. As this Court has explained: It is not .",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Traditional navigable waters should include only channels of interstate commerce",
		"context": ". every sm all creek in which a fish- ing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See also North American Dredging Co. of 245 F. 297: Mere depth of water, without profitable utility, will not render a water course navigable in the legal sense . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "174 U.S. 690",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Home builders are an important example of how businesses themselves depend on the stream-of-commerce rule",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Evanston Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such costs will, at the least, ul timately be passed on to homeowners in pricing homes. And when smaller builders are simply unable to shoulder the costs of re-pairs, homeowners will be left without any recourse altogether.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 F. App'x 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Home builders are an important example of how businesses themselves depend on the stream-of-commerce rule",
		"context": "A flaw in the design re-sulted in water getting tra pped within, resulting in damage to the substrate and other interior wall mate-rials. Predictably, this led to a slew of class actions against the manufacturers, di stributers, builders, and trade contractors (among others), resulting in multi-million-dollar nationwide settlements with the manu-facturers. E.g., In re1999 WL 33563728; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Had the manufacturers been able to avoid personal jurisdiction under Ford's rule, that enormous cost might have been borne by homebuilders alone, even though they were not actu-ally responsible (and could not have prevented) the harm. The same thing happened with polybutylene pipe, which had been installed in single-family homes and other residential structures across the country from the early '70s through the '90s.",
		"citation_value_orig": "953 A.2d 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Other decisions finding dismissal warranted rest on in camera review of privileged information to ascertain whether the government's defense is meritorious",
		"context": "Courts have sometimes found dismissal appropri- ate even where the plaintiff could make out a prima facie case. I n such instances, however, court s some- times rely not on the mere invocation of state -secrets privilege, but instead on independent review of privi- leged materials, to find a meritorious defense . The leading decision is Molerio , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, in an opinion by then -Judge Scalia, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Daniel Molerio's First Amendment claim only after review ing privi- leged materials in camera to independently determine the real reason the FBI had failed to hire Moler io.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.2d 815",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Other decisions finding dismissal warranted rest on in camera review of privileged information to ascertain whether the government's defense is meritorious",
		"context": "Id. ; see id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir. 1 998), and 372 F.3d 776 , as adopting the \"valid defense\" standard) . Determining whether \"the defendant will be deprived of a valid de- fense based on … privileged materials\" requires \"appropriately tailored in camera review of the privi- leged record.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 1159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Other decisions finding dismissal warranted rest on in camera review of privileged information to ascertain whether the government's defense is meritorious",
		"context": "; see id. (citing 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1 998), and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as adopting the \"valid defense\" standard) . Determining whether \"the defendant will be deprived of a valid de- fense based on … privileged materials\" requires \"appropriately tailored in camera review of the privi- leged record.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 F.3d 776",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Other decisions finding dismissal warranted rest on in camera review of privileged information to ascertain whether the government's defense is meritorious",
		"context": "This approach need not burden courts much be- yond Reynolds ' require ment s for ensuring that claims of privilege are well -founded in the first place . They must be evaluated to determine \"whether each chal- lenged document's disclosure would threaten national security,\" often requiring \"examin[ation of] the privi- leged materials in camera .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Freedom of Information Act cases , by comparison, courts often review sensitive materials in camera , even when those materials implicate national security, to determine whether those materials properly are being withheld. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Other decisions finding dismissal warranted rest on in camera review of privileged information to ascertain whether the government's defense is meritorious",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 90 F. Supp. 3d 201; Elec. Frontier [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Elec. Frontie r 2014 WL 3945646; 2011 WL 5563520 . The result is often to narrow the scope of what remains classified .",
		"citation_value_orig": "57 F. Supp. 3d 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Access Regulation effects a per se Takings Clause violation",
		"context": "782, 787–788 & n.28 (1995) (calling compensation \"the norm\" but noting exceptions). Building on that understanding, early cases such as VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance described the prin- ciple of just compensation as fundamental to \"reason, justice and moral rectitude.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 4 Mass. 361, is particularly instructive. The statute there appeared to authorize the courts to define prison yards in a manner that gave those imprisoned for debts the right to enter \"every man's house, and gar- den\" to socialize or transact business—all \"without be- ing a trespasser.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Access Regulation effects a per se Takings Clause violation",
		"context": "R. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). But see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Because the federal government did not exercise the power of eminent domain until after the Civil War and state constitutions only rarely contained takings clauses, few early decisions interpret the scope of the just compensation principle. In particular, scholars disagree about whether use restrictions that \"went too far\" and vitiated the value of property should be re- garded as Fifth Amendment takings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "32 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Access Regulation effects a per se Takings Clause violation",
		"context": "In Portsmouth Harbor , for example, this Court found that an unconstitutional taking would re- sult if the United States repeatedly (though not con- tinuously) fired gunshots over private property with- out providing compensation. 260 U.S. at 229–230. 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 328 U.S. 256. 7 Portsmouth Harbor , 260 U.S. at 330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Access Regulation effects a per se Takings Clause violation",
		"context": "260 U.S. at 229–230. 5 80 U.S. 166. 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Portsmouth Harbor , 260 U.S. at 330. 8 Loretto , 458 U.S. at 419.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Access Regulation effects a per se Takings Clause violation",
		"context": "8 Loretto , 458 U.S. at 419. 9 Kaiser Aetna , 444 U.S. at 164. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 Nollan , 483 U.S. at 825. 14 Likewise, in Causby the Court held that the govern- ment, in making \"frequent and regular flights\" over private property \"at low altitudes,\" took an \"easement\" —a \"direct invasion\" of the land requiring compensa- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "§ 411(a). The issue before this Court is the meaning of the term \"registration\" in this Subsection. When confronted with a question of statutory interpretati on such as this, this Court \"begin[s] by examining the text,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], including both \"the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole,\" K Mart 486 U.S. 281. The Copyright Act defines the term \"registration\" to mean \"a registration of a claim in the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.\" 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "§ 411(a). The issue before this Court is the meaning of the term \"registration\" in this Subsection. When confronted with a question of statutory interpretati on such as this, this Court \"begin[s] by examining the text,\" 530 U.S. 255, including both \"the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole,\" K Mart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Copyright Act defines the term \"registration\" to mean \"a registration of a claim in the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.\" 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "This Court already implicitly has read the text of Subsection 411(a) as providing that registration occurs when the copyright holder acts by delivering her application, deposit copy, and fee to the Copyright Office. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick , this Court found that Subsection 411(a)'s registration requirement was a precondition to filing rather than a limitation on a cou rt's subject -matter jurisdictional prerequisite. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In so holding, this Court highlighted the \"incentives to encourage copyright holders to register their works.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "This language makes clear that copyright protection is contingent upon the author's acts, not Copyright Office action. Reading Subsection 411(a) to increase arbitrarily the burden on authors to enforce their copyrights is inconsistent with this \"broader context of the [Copyright Act] as a whole.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 copyright holder's conduct, not that of the Copyright Office. Possibly most critically, Subsection 410(d) expressly states that the effective date of a registration is the \"day on which an application , deposit, and fee\" are submitted to the Copyright Office.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "Possibly most critically, Subsection 410(d) expressly states that the effective date of a registration is the \"day on which an application , deposit, and fee\" are submitted to the Copyright Office. Id. § 410(d); see also Cosmetic Ideas , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, registration is deemed to have occurred when the copyright holder submitted the registration materials, not when the Copyright Office issued a certificate memorializing that registration. It would be inconsistent with the statute's text to interp ret Subsection 411(a) as saying that registration does not occur until the Copyright Office acts, because that would suggest that the date of the Copyright Office's action is the date of registration, which the plain language of Subsection 410(d) refutes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "606 F.3d 612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "Id. §§ 408(a), 410(a). This 8 In interpreting this portion of Subse ction 411(a), some certificate -approach courts have found that because the provision contemplates that one may submit the \"deposit, application, and fee required for registration\" yet registration may still be refused, the submission of registration materi als cannot constitute registration, see La Resolana Architects, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fourth Estate Public Benefit 856 F.3d 1338. But again, the plain text undermines this argument, as it construes registration and acceptance or refusal of the registration as different things. 12 makes sense under the application approach as the act of registration (filing the application, deposit copy, and fee with the Copyright Office) is di fferent from the issuance of a certificate of registration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 F.3d 1195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "Id. §§ 408(a), 410(a). This 8 In interpreting this portion of Subse ction 411(a), some certificate -approach courts have found that because the provision contemplates that one may submit the \"deposit, application, and fee required for registration\" yet registration may still be refused, the submission of registration materi als cannot constitute registration, see La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195; Fourth Estate Public Benefit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But again, the plain text undermines this argument, as it construes registration and acceptance or refusal of the registration as different things. 12 makes sense under the application approach as the act of registration (filing the application, deposit copy, and fee with the Copyright Office) is di fferent from the issuance of a certificate of registration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 1338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "By contrast, the certificate approach would require treating two different terms used by Congress —\"registration\" and \"certificate of registration\" —as defining the same conduct. This is contrary to the standard rules of statutory interpretation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].9 As a result, \"only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.\" United Sav. Ass'n of 484 U.S. 365.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
		"context": "See 543 U.S. 335.9 As a result, \"only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.\" United Sav. Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Submitting an application, deposit copy, and fee to the Copyri ght Office constitutes \"registration\" under Subsection 411(a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Principles Of Stare Decisis Strongly Weigh Against Granting The Petition",
		"context": ". The doctrine of stare decisis is \"a foundation stone of the rule of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where precedent concerns a substantive rule of law that dictates how companies order their affairs, consid-erations of stare decisis are \"at their acme.\" 555 U.S. 223.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Principles Of Stare Decisis Strongly Weigh Against Granting The Petition",
		"context": "135 S.Ct. 2401. Where precedent concerns a substantive rule of law that dictates how companies order their affairs, consid-erations of stare decisis are \"at their acme.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, as Justice Scalia noted in Quill , stare decisis applies with enhanced force with respect 6 The ordinary procedure for developing a record in a tax case is to pursue an assessment and appeal process. This is the stand- ard means by which the State, and every other state that has sales and use taxes, pursues tax administration and enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Principles Of Stare Decisis Strongly Weigh Against Granting The Petition",
		"context": "10-59. 19 to the Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions, be- cause Congress \"remains free to alter what we have done.\" Quill , 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (cit- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Just as when a decision of the Court interprets a federal statute, \"critics of our ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees.\" Kimble , 135 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Chief Justice Roberts' concurring opinion listed a number of questions related to the use of cy pres that the Court has never addressed. CJRI believes that the rules, as now amended, are sufficient to address many of these concerns when courts diligently review cy pres pro- posals. However, if this court is intending to provide guidance to the courts below, CJRI makes the following suggestions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The TCPA Violates the First Amendment",
		"context": "The TCPA prohibits them from using such technology to promote their messages, thereby inherently limiting core political speech. Given Respondents' communicative intentions, the TCPA's limitation s \"operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, \"[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The TCPA Violates the First Amendment",
		"context": "\"The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order ' to assure [ the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. '\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Although First Amendment protections are not confined to the exposition of ideas, th ere is practically 4 universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, of course including discussions of candidates.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The interplay between CERCLA and other federal regulatory schemes does not support Guam's reading",
		"context": "Guam argues (Br. 27) that Section 113(f )(3)(B) should be construed as limited to CERCLA settlemen ts so as not to \"disrupt other regulatory regimes.\" But federal statutes often overlap with each other , see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and w hen the y do, a court should ordinari ly give 32 effect to both , reading one to preclude the other only if the two are \"clearly incompatible, \" Credit Suisse Secu- rities (USA) 551 U.S. 264. No such incompatibility is present here. Guam and its amici also express concern that, if Sec- tion 113(f )(3)(B) applies to state -law settlements, it might preempt the States' own contribution remedies with respect to those settlements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The interplay between CERCLA and other federal regulatory schemes does not support Guam's reading",
		"context": "Guam argues (Br. 27) that Section 113(f )(3)(B) should be construed as limited to CERCLA settlemen ts so as not to \"disrupt other regulatory regimes.\" But federal statutes often overlap with each other , see, e.g., 415 U.S. 36, and w hen the y do, a court should ordinari ly give 32 effect to both , reading one to preclude the other only if the two are \"clearly incompatible, \" Credit Suisse Secu- rities (USA) [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No such incompatibility is present here. Guam and its amici also express concern that, if Sec- tion 113(f )(3)(B) applies to state -law settlements, it might preempt the States' own contribution remedies with respect to those settlements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The interplay between CERCLA and other federal regulatory schemes does not support Guam's reading",
		"context": "2. Courts t herefore must give the federal statute \"its nat- ural meaning \" and \"let the chips fall where they may.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The \"Last Antecedent\" Canon Is Inapplicable",
		"context": "at 77 (emphasis added). 29 \"reflects the basic intuition that when a modifier appears at the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to the item directly before it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The concurring opinion suggests that \"the doctrine implies that 'to the public' limits only 'otherwise available.'\" Slip op.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The \"Last Antecedent\" Canon Is Inapplicable",
		"context": "The structure of § 102(a) does not invite application of the \"last antecedent rule,\" because the type of \"limiting clause or phrase\" that calls for application of this doctrine is not present in the statute. Application of that canon also results in a cramped reading that is true neither to the provision's actual language nor to its legislative history. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"last antecedent rule\" is not a good linguistic fit, and does not apply here. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Bad Faith Laws and Extra Contractual Remedies Are Strong Public Policies of Pennsylvania to Provide Redress Against the Imbalance Between Insurance Companies and Policyholders",
		"context": "Conversely, this is likely the underlying rationale of Respondent in invoking Pennsylvania statutory protections to combat alleged bad faith claims misconduct of Petitioner under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371. As the Pennsylvania Supreme C ourt described in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"the legislature apparently determined the protections afforded by the Unfair Insurance Practices Act were insufficient to curtail certain bad faith acts by insurers and that it w as in the public interest to enact § 8371 as an additional protection.\" Id. at 885.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 A.2d 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Bad Faith Laws and Extra Contractual Remedies Are Strong Public Policies of Pennsylvania to Provide Redress Against the Imbalance Between Insurance Companies and Policyholders",
		"context": "The court explained that \"it is for the Legislature to announce and implement the Commonwealth's public policy governing the regulation of insurance carriers.\" Id. (quot ing 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The court found that the legislature implemented just such a public policy in enacting section 8371: The legislature did precisely this when it enacted § 8371, thereby formally imposing a duty of good faith on insurers based on its apparent determination that such a provision was necessary to deter bad faith. Therefore, the duty under § 8371 is one imposed by law as a matter of social policy, rather than one imposed by m utual consensus .",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 A.2d 966",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Bad Faith Laws and Extra Contractual Remedies Are Strong Public Policies of Pennsylvania to Provide Redress Against the Imbalance Between Insurance Companies and Policyholders",
		"context": "This feature of insurance contr acts distinguishes them from other contracts and justifies the availability of punitive damages for breach in limited circumstances. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 The implications for reversing the Third Circuit 's decision have serious and unwelcome consequences for policyholders. Reversal of the Third Circuit's decision would exacerbate the imbalance policyholders already endure and would undermine this Court's ruling in Wilborn Boat expressing the majority's concern with the \"harsh\" consequences of strict adherence to breach of warranty defenses that play no part in the insured loss.",
		"citation_value_orig": "679 A.2d 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "In A Case Where The Jury W ill Have Significant Discre- tion To Consider Plaintiff -Specific Facts When Select- ing An Appropri ate Statutory -Damages Award, A Court Must Carefully Consider Whether The Typicality Re- quirement Is Satisfied 1. Rule 23's typicality requirement \"serve[s] as [a] guidepost[] for determining whether the named plaintiff 's claim and the class claims\" are appropriately \"interrelated.\" Wal-Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While \"mi- nor factual differences between the claim of the putative representative \" and the claims of the class members \"ordinarily will not defeat a finding of typicality ,\" a \"plaintiff 's claims are atypical when his or her ' factual or legal stance is not characteristic o f that of other class 28 members. ' \" 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice § 4:17 (17th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "Id. § 4:17; 29 cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 155 F.3d 331 . A court sometimes may need to determine whether \"the claim requires individualized proof to es- tablish liability.\" 1 McLaughlin § 4:16 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "655 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "Id. § 4:17; 29 cf. 655 F.3d 1013; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A court sometimes may need to determine whether \"the claim requires individualized proof to es- tablish liability.\" 1 McLaughlin § 4:16 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 F.3d 331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "1 McLaughlin § 4:16 . And even if the class representative is typical for liability purposes, a court must consider whether calculation of damages will \"require too much individualized proof to render the named representatives ' claims typical of those of the class.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]540 U.S. 614 ; see 1 McLaughlin § 4:19 (explaining that courts have decline d to certify a class where the damages calculation \" is dependent on the unique or complex circumstances of each class mem- ber\"). 2. A court should take th e foregoing considerations into account not only when determining whether to cer- tify a class seeki ng compe nsatory damages, but also when a putative class seeks statutory damages under a law like FCRA, which gives the jury substantial discre-tion to select a n appropriate d amages amount within a prescribed range .",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 F.3d 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "1 McLaughlin § 4:16 . And even if the class representative is typical for liability purposes, a court must consider whether calculation of damages will \"require too much individualized proof to render the named representatives ' claims typical of those of the class.\" 306 F.3d 170[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 1 McLaughlin § 4:19 (explaining that courts have decline d to certify a class where the damages calculation \" is dependent on the unique or complex circumstances of each class mem- ber\"). 2. A court should take th e foregoing considerations into account not only when determining whether to cer- tify a class seeki ng compe nsatory damages, but also when a putative class seeks statutory damages under a law like FCRA, which gives the jury substantial discre-tion to select a n appropriate d amages amount within a prescribed range .",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "To obtain statutory damages under FCRA and many similar statutes, a plaintiff need not prove that conse- quential harms actually materialized in a particular case. Rather, statutory damages may properly be awarded to plaintiffs who establish a deprivation of the statutory right itself but do not prove any further con- sequential injury. 15 U. S.C. 1681n(a); see, e.g., Llewel- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But while such proof is not required, a factfinder may take into account the nature and extent of a plaintiff 's injury when determining the appropriate 31 statutory -damages award. See Stillmock v. Weis Mar- kets, Inc. , 385 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "711 F.3d 1173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "267, 276 –277 (4th Cir. 2010) (Wilkinson, J., co ncurring specially) (indicating that the experiences of individual plaintiffs may be relevant in determining the amount of a FCRA statutory -damages award) ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir.) (jury determining the proper amount of statutory damages under the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "603 F.3d 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
		"context": "In a case like 32 this one, for example, a plaintiff who has suffered atyp- ical harms may still be able to serve as an appropriate class representative if the evidence and arguments he presents at trial focus on aspects of his experience that are common to all class members. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A district court might make class certification contingent on the named plaintiff 's agreement to limit his evid ence and arguments in that manner . Such an approach would help to obviate the risk that the jury might award ex- cessive damages to unnamed class members based on harms they did not suffer , while ensuring that FCRA class actions can effectively vindicate the substantial public interest in the \"[a]ccuracy and fairness of credit reporting ,\" 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 F.3d 948",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Does an adjudication of a qualification that Congress might alleviate in the future constitute an additional (and impermissible) qualification for federal office?",
		"context": "at 2324 n.4 ; cf. U.S. Term Limits, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 3 20 provides that \"Congress may by a vote of two -thirds of each House, remove such disability.\" A candidate who is ineligible today could be eligible by January 20, 2025.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Upon a Showing of an Arguable First Amendment Infringement, the Government Must Establish that Coerced Disclosure Is the Least Restrictive Means of Advancing a Compelling Interest",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit's eschewal of a \"narrowly tailored\" criterion from its putative \"exacting scrutiny\"analysis not only departs from this Court's precedentsbut also the Ninth Circuit's own articulation of theexacting scrutiny standard in similar contexts. Joining other courts nationwide, the Ninth Circuit has forgedan evidentiary \"First Amendment privilege\" thatcurtails compelled discovery—whether by agovernmental entity or a private party—into anorganization's sensitive internal associationalinformation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this rubric, a partyinvoking the privilege \"must demonstrate . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 F.3d 1147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Upon a Showing of an Arguable First Amendment Infringement, the Government Must Establish that Coerced Disclosure Is the Least Restrictive Means of Advancing a Compelling Interest",
		"context": ". . is lacking in pa rticularity, it is consistent with the self-evident conclusion that important FirstAmendment interests are implicated by the plaintiffs'discovery requests\"); Democratic Nat'l 2017 WL 3149914 (sworn 13 averment that \"\"[d]isclosure of [the requested] communication [by political party] risks revealing theviewpoints, political associations, and strategy of suchpartners,' and might chill such partners fromassociating with the [the party] in the future\"constituted prima facie showing of First Amendment infringement); Adolph Coors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; The Ohio Org. 2015 WL 7008530 (holding thatpolitical party satisfied threshold showing of potentialFirst Amendment infringement, even absent specificevidence of harassment or re taliation risks, adding that \"the compelled disclosure of such sensitive [financialand communications] information in the context ofhighly charged litigation involving issues of greatpolitical controversy would have a chilling effect onplaintiffs' freedom of association by adverselyimpacting their ability to organize, promote theirmessage(s), and conduct their affairs.\"). Second, Perry and other First Amendment privilege cases maintain fidelity to this Court's requirement thatcompelled disclosures must be not only premised on acompelling government interest, but also the \"leastrestrictive means\" of obtaining information that is\"highly relevant\" to a specific legal claim or defense.See Perry , 591 F.3d at 1161 (noting that, upon a prima facie showing of potential First Amendment 14 infringement, party seeking disclosure must demonstrate that the demand is \"carefully tailored toavoid unnecessary interfer ence with protected activities\"); Montanans for Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 F. Supp. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Upon a Showing of an Arguable First Amendment Infringement, the Government Must Establish that Coerced Disclosure Is the Least Restrictive Means of Advancing a Compelling Interest",
		"context": "Second, Perry and other First Amendment privilege cases maintain fidelity to this Court's requirement thatcompelled disclosures must be not only premised on acompelling government interest, but also the \"leastrestrictive means\" of obtaining information that is\"highly relevant\" to a specific legal claim or defense.See Perry , 591 F.3d at 1161 (noting that, upon a prima facie showing of potential First Amendment 14 infringement, party seeking disclosure must demonstrate that the demand is \"carefully tailored toavoid unnecessary interfer ence with protected activities\"); Montanans for Cmty. 2015 WL 13716091; cf. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As distilled in this context, exacting scrutiny thus directs that the Respondent may compel disclosure ofthe Petitioner's internal associational information onlyif he can establish that such information is highlyrelevant to a specific underlying investigation orinquiry, and that compulsory disclosure is the onlyeffective means of furthering this valid investigatoryobjective. Indeed, if anything, the First Amendmentperils that inhere in the California regulation at issuehere— i.e., an indiscriminate demand by the government for sensitive donor information from allregistered charities operating in the state, irrespectiveof whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing—aremore acute than those presented in the typical FirstAmendment privilege case, which generally features adiscrete demand by a private party for information that 15 has some articulable relevance to a live legal claim or defense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F. Supp. 2d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Upon a Showing of an Arguable First Amendment Infringement, the Government Must Establish that Coerced Disclosure Is the Least Restrictive Means of Advancing a Compelling Interest",
		"context": "Indeed, if anything, the First Amendmentperils that inhere in the California regulation at issuehere— i.e., an indiscriminate demand by the government for sensitive donor information from allregistered charities operating in the state, irrespectiveof whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing—aremore acute than those presented in the typical FirstAmendment privilege case, which generally features adiscrete demand by a private party for information that 15 has some articulable relevance to a live legal claim or defense. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In devising a novelformulation of \"exacting scrutiny\" that affords less protection to organizations such as the Petitioner, theNinth Circuit has inverted a foundational premise ofthis Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "trine. The Ninth Circuit concluded that in enacting ANILCA Congress did not intend to preempt state au-thority over navigable waters under its navigable ser- vitude or Commerce Clause authority. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, it went on to conclude that the Park Service regulations nevertheless preempt state law in waters in which the United States owns an implied federally-reserved wa-ter right. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 F.3d 927",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its decisions in Katie John I and Katie John III , where the court gave com- plete deference to administrative agencies' interpreta- tion of \"public lands\" to include navigable waters in which those agencies decided the United States owned a reserved water right. Id. at 933-34; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]720 F.3d 1214. The amici States disagree with the approach applied by the Ninth Circuit and believe that the court erred in 5 deferring to the administrative agencies' interpreta- tion of \"public lands.\" \"Congress should make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "72 F.3d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its decisions in Katie John I and Katie John III , where the court gave com- plete deference to administrative agencies' interpreta- tion of \"public lands\" to include navigable waters in which those agencies decided the United States owned a reserved water right. Id. at 933-34; 72 F.3d 698[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The amici States disagree with the approach applied by the Ninth Circuit and believe that the court erred in 5 deferring to the administrative agencies' interpreta- tion of \"public lands.\" \"Congress should make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.3d 1214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "The amici States disagree with the approach applied by the Ninth Circuit and believe that the court erred in 5 deferring to the administrative agencies' interpreta- tion of \"public lands.\" \"Congress should make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In traditionally sen- sitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the ju- dicial decision.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": ". carries with it the power to con-trol navigation, fishing, and other public uses of water.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The tradi- tional authority of the States to regulate activity occur-ring on navigable waters arises from the States' ownership of submerged lands—not from ownership of the water itself. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, under the Sub- merged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "§ 1311(a)). Those rights were also conferred under the equal- footing doctrine, whereby \"[ u]pon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable.\" PPL Montana, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States are entitled to \"allocate and 7 govern those lands according to state law subject only to 'the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "Oregon , 295 U.S. at 14. The Park Service relies on this Court's decision in Fed. Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where this Court stated that \"[n]either sovereign nor subject can acquire any- thing more than a mere usufructuary right\" in water because water can never become \"the subject of fixed appropriation or exclusive dominion.\" Br. for the Resp'ts in Opp'n at 14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "This Court has stated that \"it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these 8 creatures until they are reduced to possession by skill- ful capture.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although this Court concluded that States do not \"own\" wildlife in an exclusive or absolute sense, it still recognized \"the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "Moreover, the Court continued to recognize the States' police power over wildlife even though wildlife was subject to federal regulation in some circumstances. \"The fact that the State's control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal regulation and cer- tain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their absence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, water is a critical resource, and this Court has long recognized the States' authority to reg-ulate the use of water with in their borders. \"The history of the relationship between the Federal Gov- ernment and the States in th e reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consis tent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Con-gress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "Likewise, water is a critical resource, and this Court has long recognized the States' authority to reg-ulate the use of water with in their borders. \"The history of the relationship between the Federal Gov- ernment and the States in th e reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consis tent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Con-gress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This deference is ce mented in the Submerged Lands Act, stating that the Act shall not be construed as in \"any way interfer[ing] with or modify[ing] the laws of the States . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine",
		"context": "Ad- ditionally, the Ninth Circuit's decision is out of line with this Court's recognition of the States' primary au- thority over water management and use. SWANCC , 531 U.S.C. at 174; California , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interpreting \"public lands\" to include navigable waters in which the United States owns an implied federally-reserved water right would result in a signif- icant impingement of the States' traditional authority over navigable waters within their borders. Such a re-sult should not be reached unless Congress clearly manifested an intent to exercise its authority under the navigable servitude and the Commerce Clause to preempt state law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CAAF's Rulings Are Limited to the UCMJ",
		"context": "The Petition begins by invok ing four prior examples of petitions this Court granted because the questions presented were \" 'of central importance for military courts. '\" Pet. 24 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), and argues that the same is true here. This argument misses the central distinction between those cases and this one—the presence ( vel non ) of legal questions transcending the unique context of courts -martial. As the government has previously noted , when Congress first gave this Court appellate jurisdiction over CAAF's predecessor in 1983, that statutory grant \"was 'not intend[ed] to displace [that court] as the primary interpreter of military law. '\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CAAF's Rulings Are Limited to the UCMJ",
		"context": "§ 1651, to militar y cou rts—and whether military appellate courts had the authority, under that statute of general applicability, to issue writs of error coram nobis. See Denedo , 556 U.S. at 910– 17. The Petition also cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1999 ), which presented two questions —one about CAAF's power under the All Writs Act, and one about whether a specific exercise of authority by the President was unconstitutional. See id . at 533 & n.4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CAAF's Rulings Are Limited to the UCMJ",
		"context": "See id . at 533 & n.4. In the third example the Petition cites, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the governme nt's peti tion asked whether Military Rule of Evidence 707 ( which provides that evidence of a polygraph examination is not admissible in court - martial proceedings ) \" is an unconstitutional abridgment of military defendants ' right to present a defense.\" Petit ion for a Writ of Certiorari at I, 520 U.S. 1227 , raised a series of constitutional quest ions about the military death penalty. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "in order to dissi- pate the possibility of consumer confusion or decep-tion.' \" Id. at 651 (brackets in original) (quoting In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). An advertiser's First Amendment \"rights are adequately protected,\" the Court explained, \"as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in pre- venting deception of consu mers.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "; see id. at 651- 652 n.14. This Court reaffirmed the Zauderer standard in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court \"agree[d]\" with the government that, because the law there targeted misleading commercial speech and 15 \"impose [d] a disclosure requirement rather than an af- firmative limitation on speech, the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer govern[ed] .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "2. This Court also has held that the government may regulate speech by members of re gulated professions related to their services in certain circumstances with-out satisfying strict scrutiny. The States have \"broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and have done so \"from time immemorial .\" Dent v. West Va., 7 Although Zauderer and Milavetz involved laws based on the gov- ernment's interest in preventing deception, Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651; Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249, courts of appeals have held that Zau- derer also extends to other interests. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Dent v. West Va., 7 Although Zauderer and Milavetz involved laws based on the gov- ernment's interest in preventing deception, Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651; Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249, courts of appeals have held that Zau- derer also extends to other interests. See, e.g. , CTIA -The Wireless [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ameri- can Meat 760 F.3d 18 ; see Barsky v. Board of Re-347 U.S. 442. And just as \"the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial act ivity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a com- ponent of that activity,\" Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456, so too \"[t]he power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech ,\" 472 U.S. 181. Accordingly, the Court has upheld restrictions on professionals' speech related to their services without requiring that they satisfy strict scrutiny .",
		"citation_value_orig": "854 F.3d 1105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Dent v. West Va., 7 Although Zauderer and Milavetz involved laws based on the gov- ernment's interest in preventing deception, Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651; Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249, courts of appeals have held that Zau- derer also extends to other interests. See, e.g. , CTIA -The Wireless 854 F.3d 1105; Ameri- can Meat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Barsky v. Board of Re-347 U.S. 442. And just as \"the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial act ivity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a com- ponent of that activity,\" Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456, so too \"[t]he power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech ,\" 472 U.S. 181. Accordingly, the Court has upheld restrictions on professionals' speech related to their services without requiring that they satisfy strict scrutiny .",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Dent v. West Va., 7 Although Zauderer and Milavetz involved laws based on the gov- ernment's interest in preventing deception, Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651; Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249, courts of appeals have held that Zau- derer also extends to other interests. See, e.g. , CTIA -The Wireless 854 F.3d 1105; Ameri- can Meat 760 F.3d 18 ; see Barsky v. Board of Re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And just as \"the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial act ivity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a com- ponent of that activity,\" Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456, so too \"[t]he power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech ,\" 472 U.S. 181. Accordingly, the Court has upheld restrictions on professionals' speech related to their services without requiring that they satisfy strict scrutiny .",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See, e.g. , CTIA -The Wireless 854 F.3d 1105; Ameri- can Meat 760 F.3d 18 ; see Barsky v. Board of Re-347 U.S. 442. And just as \"the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial act ivity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a com- ponent of that activity,\" Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456, so too \"[t]he power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the Court has upheld restrictions on professionals' speech related to their services without requiring that they satisfy strict scrutiny . See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 505 U.S. 833; id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "And just as \"the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial act ivity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a com- ponent of that activity,\" Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456, so too \"[t]he power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech ,\" 472 U.S. 181. Accordingly, the Court has upheld restrictions on professionals' speech related to their services without requiring that they satisfy strict scrutiny . See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 968 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ohral ik, 436 U.S. at 460 (upholding State's ban on in -person solicitation by lawyers and noting its \"spe- cial responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions\"). The Court's de- cisions indicate that, in general, heightened rather than strict scrutiny is appropriate for disclosure require- ments that pertain to services provided by the profes- sional who is subject to the regulation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "See P 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir.) , cert. denied,134 S. Ct. 2871[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2048.8 This heightened scrutiny differs from both rational - basis review and strict scrutiny. Whereas rational -basis review requires only that a \"law could be thought to fur- ther a legitimate governmental goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost,\" heightened scrutiny \"require[s] the government goal to be substan- tial,\" requires \"the cost to be carefully ca lculated,\" and requires that the government \" affirmatively establish [a] reasonable fit\" between the restriction and the govern- ment's interest .",
		"citation_value_orig": "767 F.3d 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "denied,135 S. Ct. 2048.8 This heightened scrutiny differs from both rational - basis review and strict scrutiny. Whereas rational -basis review requires only that a \"law could be thought to fur- ther a legitimate governmental goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost,\" heightened scrutiny \"require[s] the government goal to be substan- tial,\" requires \"the cost to be carefully ca lculated,\" and requires that the government \" affirmatively establish [a] reasonable fit\" between the restriction and the govern- ment's interest . Board of Trs [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 480 8 In some circumstances, a law may not be subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all because it proscribes unlawful conduct that is merely \"initiated, evidenced, or carried out\" through speech. Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456 ( citation omitted); e.g., 553 U.S. 285. Unlike strict scrutiny , however, heightened scru- tiny does not impose \"a least -restrictive -means require- ment\"; it requires a \"fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Whereas rational -basis review requires only that a \"law could be thought to fur- ther a legitimate governmental goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost,\" heightened scrutiny \"require[s] the government goal to be substan- tial,\" requires \"the cost to be carefully ca lculated,\" and requires that the government \" affirmatively establish [a] reasonable fit\" between the restriction and the govern- ment's interest . Board of Trs 492 U.S. 469, 480 8 In some circumstances, a law may not be subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all because it proscribes unlawful conduct that is merely \"initiated, evidenced, or carried out\" through speech. Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 456 ( citation omitted); e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike strict scrutiny , however, heightened scru- tiny does not impose \"a least -restrictive -means require- ment\"; it requires a \"fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Ibid. Under this standard, the govern- ment may not ignore obvious, available, and effective al-ternatives. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This heighte ned-scrutiny standard \"take [s] account of the difficulty of establishing with precision the point at which restrictions become more extensive than their objective requires, and provide [s] the Legislative and Executive Branches ,\" as well as the States, \"nee ded lee- way in a field\" such as the professions \" 'traditionally subject to governmental regulation.' \" Fox, 492 U.S. at 480- 481 (quoting Ohralik , 436 U.S. at 455 -456).",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Constitution's plain text demonstrates that the President is not an \"officer.\"",
		"context": "But most importantly, he only ever referred to the President as an officer, and never as an officer of the United States. The difference may sound inconsequential to the unpracticed ear, but this Court has counseled that \"two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The President may very well be an \"officer\" in that he occupies a particular office, but the mere \"creation of an office . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U. S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Constitution's plain text demonstrates that the President is not an \"officer.\"",
		"context": "Financial Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in any event, these references come from one of the foremost defenders of robust executive power. See generally Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Construction Would Enlist the Courts in a Partisan Project of Maximizing Minority Voting Rates",
		"context": "Different political affiliation among racial groups is a reality across the country. See N.C. State Conf. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result, virtually any change in voting rules that increases Democratic turnout will increase minority turnout as a byproduct, and vice versa. Construing § 2 to require changes in voting rules that increase minority participation would thus effectively mandate any change that would h elp Democrats—and ban any change that would help Republicans.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Reading Would Raise Significant Doubts About The Constitutionality Of The Statute",
		"context": "Interpreting the statute to d istinguish between noncitizens who have had a period of release and those who have not thus avoids serious constitutional concerns. This Court has long recognized that immigration detention may not be use d for penal purposes. See Wong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court upheld the provision on the basis of its non -punitive purposes, i.e. , ensuring that noncitizens would appear for their removal hearings and protecting the community from dangerous criminals. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 518- 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Discrimination Based on Race is Prevalent Throughout Indian Country",
		"context": "Petitioners' proposed scheme not only impedes the ability to identify or provide meaningful relief to address Section 2 violations, it also ignores the fact that maps with disparate impacts may exist because of ongoing racial discrimination. impossible position of having to choose between\" VRA compliance and \"compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Native Americans face racial discrimination in their everyday interactions, including when they exercise their voting rights. Specifically, racial discrimination dilutes Native Americans' voting power through the continued use of at-large districts and gerrymandered single and multimember districts.5 What follows is a narrative of vote dilution in single- member districts in South Dakota, New Mexico, and North Dakota.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rule Established In Ramos Was Not Apparent To \"All Reasonable Jurists\" When The State Courts Considered Edwards' Unanimity Claim.",
		"context": "Even i f this Court concludes that Apodaca was not binding precedent , that does not end the inquiry . Indeed, even if this Court believes Ramos fits \" within the logical compass \" of its earlier decision s, or the result of Ramos was \"controlled by a prior decision, \" that is not \"conclusive \" of whether Ramos issued a new rule under Teague. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, the \"principal task is to survey the legal landscape\" when the state court upheld the conviction and determine whether it would be \"apparent to all reas onable jurists\" that the later- announced rule was dictated by then -existing precedent. Lambrix v. Singletary , 520 U.S. at 527– 28; accord 542 U.S. 406 ; Chaidez , 568 U.S. at 347.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rule Established In Ramos Was Not Apparent To \"All Reasonable Jurists\" When The State Courts Considered Edwards' Unanimity Claim.",
		"context": "494 U.S. 407 . Instead, the \"principal task is to survey the legal landscape\" when the state court upheld the conviction and determine whether it would be \"apparent to all reas onable jurists\" that the later- announced rule was dictated by then -existing precedent. Lambrix v. Singletary , 520 U.S. at 527– 28; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Chaidez , 568 U.S. at 347. When the state post -conviction court considered Edwards' challenge to his non- unanimous verdict , it was not apparent to all reasonable jurists that Apodaca either was not good law or did not control in non-unanimous jury cases. This Court never expressly repudiated Apodaca until it issued its opinion in Ramos, despite numerous opportunities to do so .",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Rule Established In Ramos Was Not Apparent To \"All Reasonable Jurists\" When The State Courts Considered Edwards' Unanimity Claim.",
		"context": "These results were surely not beyond the realm of what any reasonable jurist could have concluded. At bottom, \" [t]he rule of Teague serves to 'validat[e] reasonable, good -faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Beard , 542 U.S. at 413 . This Court instituted the \" new rule \" framework to address situations exactly like the one here. As the Ramos plurality explained, \" Teague frees [the Court] to say what [it] know[s] to be true about the rights of the accused under our Constitution today, while leaving questions about the reliance interest States possess in their final judgments for later proceedings crafted to account for them.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits",
		"context": "Adopting petitioners' standard would also have significant adverse practical consequences. For one thing, a rule that classifies anyone who performs \"important,\" \"significant,\" or \"non-ministerial\" tasks as an officer could result in sub- jecting, for example, every government attorney, in- vestigator, and law-enforcement officer to the Ap- 11 Special trial judges arguably also have power to bind the government in another respect: the Tax Court must accept their findings of fact unless \"clearly erroneous.\" See Tax Ct. R. 183(d) (\"the findings of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be correct\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 39 pointments Clause. Petitioners' rule could cast doubt on the constitutionality of the method of ap- pointment of many thousand s of civil servants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "865 F.2d 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits",
		"context": "Likewise, when an employee acts solely in the name of a superior officer, that superior will be blamed or praised for acts done in his name—regardless of the method by which the employee was hired—and the President is accountable for the superior's appoint- ment. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. Finally, construing \"Officer of the United States\" to turn on the authority to bind the govern- ment or alter private rights in the officer's own name—rather than on an amorphous standard based on a subjective assessmen t of the perceived im- portance or significance of the appointee's authority —would provide an administrable rule for Congress and the Executive Branch to determine which posi- tions require compliance with the Appointments Clause and other constitutional provisions applicable to officers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.2d 1253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The \"Loss of Authority\" Cases Are Inapplicable to Determining the Scope of Mandatory Detention Under Section 1226(c)",
		"context": "See Pet. Br. 27 -30 (citing, inter alia , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that even where the government fails to comply with a statutory mandate that a judicial o fficer \"shall\" hold a bail hearing \"immediately\" upon a criminal defendant's first appearance, the government may still detain that person before trial, as holding otherwise would \"bestow upon the defendant a windfall\" and impose \"a severe penalty [on the public] by mandating release of possibly dangerous defendants\")).20 The \"loss of authority\" principle does not apply to this case for several reasons . First, the government does not in fact lose its authority to detain under the court of appeals' interpretation. The government still enjoys a presumption of detention, and the noncitizen will be released only if he can prove that he poses neith er a flight risk nor a danger under Section 1226(a) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 711",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The \"Loss of Authority\" Cases Are Inapplicable to Determining the Scope of Mandatory Detention Under Section 1226(c)",
		"context": "The government still enjoys a presumption of detention, and the noncitizen will be released only if he can prove that he poses neith er a flight risk nor a danger under Section 1226(a) . Neither the government nor the public suffer s the \"severe penalty\" of the release of dangerous persons , because the only individuals who will be released are those an immigration judge determines do not pose a fligh t risk or danger . See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] curtails rather than expands the government's discretion over detention, 20 See also Regions 522 U.S. 448 ; 476 U.S. 253 . 50 the effect of the Ninth Circuit's ruling is simply to reinstate the government's general authority under Section 1226(a) to detain or release individuals who are not timely detained under Section 1226(c). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 I. & N. Dec. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The \"Loss of Authority\" Cases Are Inapplicable to Determining the Scope of Mandatory Detention Under Section 1226(c)",
		"context": "The government still enjoys a presumption of detention, and the noncitizen will be released only if he can prove that he poses neith er a flight risk nor a danger under Section 1226(a) . Neither the government nor the public suffer s the \"severe penalty\" of the release of dangerous persons , because the only individuals who will be released are those an immigration judge determines do not pose a fligh t risk or danger . See25 I. & N. Dec. 140 curtails rather than expands the government's discretion over detention, 20 See also Regions [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 476 U.S. 253 . 50 the effect of the Ninth Circuit's ruling is simply to reinstate the government's general authority under Section 1226(a) to detain or release individuals who are not timely detained under Section 1226(c). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The \"Loss of Authority\" Cases Are Inapplicable to Determining the Scope of Mandatory Detention Under Section 1226(c)",
		"context": "The government still enjoys a presumption of detention, and the noncitizen will be released only if he can prove that he poses neith er a flight risk nor a danger under Section 1226(a) . Neither the government nor the public suffer s the \"severe penalty\" of the release of dangerous persons , because the only individuals who will be released are those an immigration judge determines do not pose a fligh t risk or danger . See25 I. & N. Dec. 140 curtails rather than expands the government's discretion over detention, 20 See also Regions 522 U.S. 448 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 50 the effect of the Ninth Circuit's ruling is simply to reinstate the government's general authority under Section 1226(a) to detain or release individuals who are not timely detained under Section 1226(c). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "Seeking to avoid the lenient standard applicable in a nonpublic forum, petition ers argue that the Court should instead apply strict scrutiny because Section 211B.11(1) is a content-base d restriction on political 17 See Marlin , 236 F.3d at 719; PG Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United Food & Commercial Workers Local 364 F.3d 738; Mansky , 708 F.3d at 1057. 32 speech. This Court, howeve r, has repeatedly upheld such restrictions in nonpubli c forums if they are reason- able and viewpoint-neutral.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "Seeking to avoid the lenient standard applicable in a nonpublic forum, petition ers argue that the Court should instead apply strict scrutiny because Section 211B.11(1) is a content-base d restriction on political 17 See Marlin , 236 F.3d at 719; PG Publ'g 705 F.3d 91; United Food & Commercial Workers Local [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mansky , 708 F.3d at 1057. 32 speech. This Court, howeve r, has repeatedly upheld such restrictions in nonpubli c forums if they are reason- able and viewpoint-neutral.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 F.3d 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "That is true, but only insofar as not all speech takes place on govern-ment-operated property. When the speech at issue oc-curs on government proper ty dedicated to a purpose other than speech—in other words, a nonpublic forum— the Court has invariably ap plied a reason ableness test. See, e.g., Lee , 505 U.S. at 679; Kokinda , 497 U.S. at 725; Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 805-806; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Greer , 424 U.S. at 838; 385 U.S. 39. Speech that occurs in a nonpublic forum is afforded less robust First Amendment protection because the government has the right, as proprietor of \"property in its charge,\" \"to pr eserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated\"—and to pro-tect the ability of other citizens to use that property for its intended purpose. Christian Legal 561 U.S. 661; Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 800; Burson , 504 U.S. at 213-214 (K ennedy, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "That is true, but only insofar as not all speech takes place on govern-ment-operated property. When the speech at issue oc-curs on government proper ty dedicated to a purpose other than speech—in other words, a nonpublic forum— the Court has invariably ap plied a reason ableness test. See, e.g., Lee , 505 U.S. at 679; Kokinda , 497 U.S. at 725; Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 805-806; 453 U.S. 114; Greer , 424 U.S. at 838; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Speech that occurs in a nonpublic forum is afforded less robust First Amendment protection because the government has the right, as proprietor of \"property in its charge,\" \"to pr eserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated\"—and to pro-tect the ability of other citizens to use that property for its intended purpose. Christian Legal 561 U.S. 661; Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 800; Burson , 504 U.S. at 213-214 (K ennedy, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 39",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "See, e.g., Lee , 505 U.S. at 679; Kokinda , 497 U.S. at 725; Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 805-806; 453 U.S. 114; Greer , 424 U.S. at 838; 385 U.S. 39. Speech that occurs in a nonpublic forum is afforded less robust First Amendment protection because the government has the right, as proprietor of \"property in its charge,\" \"to pr eserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated\"—and to pro-tect the ability of other citizens to use that property for its intended purpose. Christian Legal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 800; Burson , 504 U.S. at 213-214 (K ennedy, J., concurring). When the government restricts speech in a nonpublic forum, it acts in its managerial capacity to safeguard the purposes of the property. As a result, contrary to peti- 33 tioners' arguments (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "Rather, forum analysis turns on the purpose for which the government uses the property. See Kokinda , 497 U.S. at 725. The sole decision on which the ACLU relies— [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—does not suggest that forum analysis may turn on the intent of the speaker. Cohen was convicted un- der a statute prohibiting \"offensive conduct\" in any location, for wearing a jacket displaying a vu lgar expression in a courtroom. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "19 Although petitioners suggest that content-based pro- hibitions on political speech ar e especially suspect, that is not so when the regulation pertains to nonpublic fo- rums. \"Implicit in the conce pt of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter\"; such distinctions \"are inherent and in-escapable in the process of li miting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property.\" Perry , 460 U.S. at 49 (uphol ding rule limiting access to school mail system to bargaining union while excluding rival unions); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1995). As a result, 19 By contrast, petitioners rely on cases that did not involve nonpublic forums for their contenti on that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on political speech. See , e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "As a result, 19 By contrast, petitioners rely on cases that did not involve nonpublic forums for their contenti on that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on political speech. See , e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Citizens 558 U.S. 310. 35 content-based, viewpoint-neutral distinctions in the context of a nonpublic forum do not ordinarily raise any inference that the government is attempting to suppress disfavored speech. See Burson , 504 U.S. at 213-214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "As a result, 19 By contrast, petitioners rely on cases that did not involve nonpublic forums for their contenti on that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on political speech. See , e.g. , 135 S. Ct. 2218; Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 35 content-based, viewpoint-neutral distinctions in the context of a nonpublic forum do not ordinarily raise any inference that the government is attempting to suppress disfavored speech. See Burson , 504 U.S. at 213-214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "Even \"passive\" political speech, in peti- tioners' phrasing, may threaten important government interests. For instance, permitting the display of politi-cal slogans in cour trooms could undermine public confi- dence in the courts' po litical neutrality. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 799 F.3d 1145. Subjecting these sorts of restrictions to strict scru- tiny, as petitioners urge, would hamstring the govern- ment's ability to use a wide ra nge of public facilities for 36 their designated purposes. Numerous political-speech restrictions—from the Hatch Act's regulation of political displays in government buil dings, to this Court's re- strictions on protesting wi thin its courtroom—would be subject to strict scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent",
		"context": "Even \"passive\" political speech, in peti- tioners' phrasing, may threaten important government interests. For instance, permitting the display of politi-cal slogans in cour trooms could undermine public confi- dence in the courts' po litical neutrality. See 461 U.S. 171; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Subjecting these sorts of restrictions to strict scru- tiny, as petitioners urge, would hamstring the govern- ment's ability to use a wide ra nge of public facilities for 36 their designated purposes. Numerous political-speech restrictions—from the Hatch Act's regulation of political displays in government buil dings, to this Court's re- strictions on protesting wi thin its courtroom—would be subject to strict scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 1145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.",
		"context": "Campaign Legal 31 F.4th 781. Requiring more would upend dec- ades of settled practice under FOIA and similar stat- utes, and would sharply limit the efficacy of FOIA as \"a means for citizens to know what their government 15 is up to,\" \"a structural necessity in a real democracy\" and one incompatible with imposing on citizens a re- quirement \"to explain why they seek the information.\" Nat'l Archives & Records [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in this Court's ruling in TransUnion sug- gests that denial of access to information to which a plaintiff claims some substa ntive entitlement is not it- self an injury that can support Article III standing. The relevant discussion in TransUnion stands instead for a much narrower proposition: that where a poten-tial \"informational injury\" does not stem from the de- nial of information to which a plaintiff claims a sub-stantive entitlement, but rather from the provision of that information in an allegedly improper format , the plaintiff must identify some harmful consequence of the claimed error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.",
		"context": "That a denial of information itself can give rise to standing does not, however, mean that all claims in- volving withholding of information (or provision of misinformation) involve cognizable informational in- juries for purposes of Arti cle III. When a plaintiff al- leges a violation of a requirement that information be provided as a part of a set of procedures aimed at pro- tecting some other interest—for example, when notice is required as a step in an administrative decisional process—this Court's holdings that \" 'bare procedural violation[s], divorced from any concrete harm,' … do[ ] not suffice for Article III standing\" require a showing that the procedural default threatens some other con-crete interest. TransUnion , 141 S. Ct. at 2313 (quoting Spokeo , 568 U.S. at 341); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, when a plain- tiff claims an interest in substantive information, the denial of that information is itself an Article III injury. 18 See 926 F.3d 329.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.",
		"context": "TransUnion , 141 S. Ct. at 2313 (quoting Spokeo , 568 U.S. at 341); see also 555 U.S. 488. However, when a plain- tiff claims an interest in substantive information, the denial of that information is itself an Article III injury. 18 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, claims invoking interests protected by the common-law tort of fr aud and its statutory ana- logs, while requiring proof of misrepresentation or breach of a duty to disclose material information, gen- erally do not rest on an interest in information as such or seek to remedy informational injuries. Rather, such claims typically exist to vindicate pecuniary interests, and standing to assert them rests on harms to those interests rather than informational injury.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.",
		"context": "Similarly, claims invoking interests protected by the common-law tort of fr aud and its statutory ana- logs, while requiring proof of misrepresentation or breach of a duty to disclose material information, gen- erally do not rest on an interest in information as such or seek to remedy informational injuries. Rather, such claims typically exist to vindicate pecuniary interests, and standing to assert them rests on harms to those interests rather than informational injury. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in conform- ity with a claimed legal requirement, the fact that a remedy would incidentally provide the plaintiff with information does not by itself create informational standing for a plaintiff who otherwise has no legal en- titlement to receive information or other concrete –––––––––––––––––––––––– 8 Analytically, the insufficiency of informational standing in such cases is likely better viewed not as an Article III issue but as a matter of the scope of the interests protected by the relevant statutory or common-law right of action. Although the Court for- merly referred to the latter issue as \"prudential standing,\" it now recognizes that the issue poses a merits rather than standing in- quiry—that is, \"whether [the plaintiff] has a cause of action un-der the statute.\" Lexmark Int'l, 572 U.S. 118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.",
		"context": "See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, 563 U.S. 27 in conform- ity with a claimed legal requirement, the fact that a remedy would incidentally provide the plaintiff with information does not by itself create informational standing for a plaintiff who otherwise has no legal en- titlement to receive information or other concrete –––––––––––––––––––––––– 8 Analytically, the insufficiency of informational standing in such cases is likely better viewed not as an Article III issue but as a matter of the scope of the interests protected by the relevant statutory or common-law right of action. Although the Court for- merly referred to the latter issue as \"prudential standing,\" it now recognizes that the issue poses a merits rather than standing in- quiry—that is, \"whether [the plaintiff] has a cause of action un-der the statute.\" Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in this category of cases, if a source of law created a substantive entitlement to the information in question and a right of action to enforce that enti- tlement that did not require proof of pecuniary loss, Article III would not stand as a barrier to claims resting on informational injury. 19 interest at stake.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.",
		"context": "For example, a plaintiff does not have informational standing to compel an agency to issue a rule merely because the resulting rulemaking notice would provide information about the contents of the rule, or to compel an agency to enforce the law merely because doing so would provide information that the law was being enfo rced. Put another way, a plaintiff cannot avoid this Court's holdings that there is no individual Article III interest in \"general compli-ance with regulatory law,\" Spokeo , 578 U.S. at 345 (Thomas, J., concurring); TransUnion , 141 S. Ct. at 2207 & n.3, by reframing that interest as one in re- ceiving information by compelling general compliance with regulatory law. See, e.g., Common [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lawsuits brought to vindicate a specific legally protected interest in receiving infor- mation, however, do not present a similar Article III problem. See Akins , 524 U.S. at 23–24.",
		"citation_value_orig": "108 F.3d 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Union's Activities Here Do Not Qualify as a \"Public Use\" under Kelo v. New London",
		"context": "In the case of a fundamental right, the government bears the burden of persuasion on is power to take away that right. See, e.g., Dolan , 512 U.S. at 392 n.8, 395; Nollan , 483 U.S. at 840-41; see also 517 U.S. 899 ; Con- sol. Edison Co. of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 15 There is no basis for concluding that this confis- cation of an easement across petitioners' property served a public use. Indeed, finding a public use here would extend Kelo beyond its already expansive view of public use .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Extension Of Tribal Sovereign Immunity To Off Reservation Commercial Activities Does Not Provide A Basis To Extend Immunity To In Rem Proceedings To Determine Rights In Freely Alienable, Fee-Titled Land",
		"context": "See Kiowa , 523 U.S. at 758, 760 (\"[t]ribes enjoy immunity from suits oncontracts, whether those contracts involvegovernmental or commercial activities and whetherthey were made on or off a reservation\"); Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2028-29 (applying sovereign immunity to bar a suit to enjoin gaming \"off a reservation or otherIndian lands\"). These cases are distinguishable from,and do not support extending, tribal sovereign 22 immunity to bar an in rem proceeding concerning off reservation or other Indian lands. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court precluded the State of California from exercising its jurisdiction toenforce state gambling laws on tribal bingo enterprises. Id. at 216.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Extension Of Tribal Sovereign Immunity To Off Reservation Commercial Activities Does Not Provide A Basis To Extend Immunity To In Rem Proceedings To Determine Rights In Freely Alienable, Fee-Titled Land",
		"context": "It held that allowing this state regulation would impermissibly burden \"traditional notions ofIndian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indianself-government, including its 'overriding goal' ofencouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economicdevelopment.\" Id. (quoting New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Similarly, in Kiowa, while noting that \"[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the [tribalsovereign immunity] doctrine,\" this Court noted thatthe doctrine had been retained \"on the theory thatCongress had failed to abrogate it in order to promoteeconomic development and tribal self-sufficiency.\" Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757 (citing Potawatomi , 498 U.S. at 510); see also Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2041 (basing the \"continued recognition of tribal sovereign immunity,including for off-reservation commercial conduct\" uponthe notion that \"[i]f Tribes are ever to become moreself-sufficient, and fund a more substantial portion oftheir own governmental functions, commercialenterprises will likely be a central means of achievingthat goal\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints",
		"context": ". It has been suggested that the common law doctrine on which the court of appeals focused, which bars the use of physical restraints on prisoners in courtroom proceedings in the absence of a compelling individualized justification, should be relaxed or limited on two grounds: modern restraints are more humane, and there is no jury to be prejudiced by the sight of a shackled defendant until the time of trial. see, e.g., Deck , 544 U.S. at 640 5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that belly chain and handcuffs do not \"cause pain or suffering\"); united s [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amicus respectfully submits that these suggestions should be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 F.3d 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lukumi provides the proper framework for using the Free Exercise Clause to combat claimed religious targeting",
		"context": "\"); Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2021 (in Lukumi , \"despite their facial neutrality, the ordi- nances had a discriminatory purpose easy to ferret out\"). These carefully calibrated techniques for un- covering \"masked,\" \"covert,\" or \"disguised\" hostility toward religion stand in stark contrast to the ineffec- tive Lemon test, which focuses on inherently subjec- tive perceptions of the lawmaker's intent. See County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].7 In contrast, Lukumi illustrates at least seven ways a plaintiff can prove that a law is not \"neutral and of general applicability\" with respect to religion under the Free Exercise Clause. See Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 531-32 (citing Emp't 494 U.S. 872). This elaboration of neutrality and gen- eral applicability, not the Lemon test, should deter- mine the constitutionality of the Proclamation here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lukumi provides the proper framework for using the Free Exercise Clause to combat claimed religious targeting",
		"context": "These carefully calibrated techniques for un- covering \"masked,\" \"covert,\" or \"disguised\" hostility toward religion stand in stark contrast to the ineffec- tive Lemon test, which focuses on inherently subjec- tive perceptions of the lawmaker's intent. See County of 492 U.S. 573.7 In contrast, Lukumi illustrates at least seven ways a plaintiff can prove that a law is not \"neutral and of general applicability\" with respect to religion under the Free Exercise Clause. See Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 531-32 (citing Emp't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This elaboration of neutrality and gen- eral applicability, not the Lemon test, should deter- mine the constitutionality of the Proclamation here. The Court should therefore reject Respondents' Es- tablishment Clause claim and remand so that Re- spondents can litigate their Free Exercise claim in the first instance, and so that the lower courts can consider whether any of the following paths to strict scrutiny is satisfied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sequential Analysis Using Baker's Second Prong Dispels Any Implied Commitment to a Political Branch",
		"context": "Baker , 369 U.S. at 217. Davis v. Bandemer restated the standards prong in Baker as the lack of 34 \" judicially discernible and manageable standards.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Vieth v. Jubelirer refined \"judicially discernible\" as \"being relevant to some constitutional violation.\" Vieth , 541 U.S. at 288.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "Most fundamentally, the sentencing court may no longer exist at the time a 2255 motion would be f iled. Dissolution was a particu- lar risk with territorial courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With courts martial, too, \"the sentencing court literally dissolves after sen- tencing and is no longer available to test a prisoner's collateral attack.\" Prost , 636 F.3d at 588.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 F.2d 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "Prost , 636 F.3d at 588. A sentencing court might also be inaccessible if, as the Judicial Conference feared, an inmate's presence is required at a hearing and the inmate cannot safely or reasonably be transported to a distant court. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sec- tion 2255 was enacted, after all, in 1948— eight years before President Eisenhower signed legislation fund-ing the Interstate Highway System —and transporta- tion difficulties were the central concern of both the Judicial Conference and legislators. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "82 F. Supp. 931",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "For example, the saving clause permits resort to habeas when no single sentencing court could fully resolve a prisoner's claim. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], even if he does not challenge the \"sentence . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "593 F.2d 766",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "2255(a). Because the \" 'deten- tion' of a prisoner encompasses much more than a criminal 'sentence,' \" the saving clause guarantees a judicial forum for detention -based claims that are not cognizable in the 2255 process. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Or he might con- test the execution of his sentence, including the com- putation of good -time credits, location of imprison- ment, administration of parole, or imposition of deten- tion conditions. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 1271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "Or he might con- test the execution of his sentence, including the com- putation of good -time credits, location of imprison- ment, administration of parole, or imposition of deten- tion conditions. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 911 F.2d 1111; 764 F.2d 795 is not construed to bar them.2 Congress's decision to exclude detention -focused claims from Section 2255 makes sense, because a ha-beas petition is a more natural fit to address challeng- es to the execution (rather than the imposition) of a sentence. The place of confinement is where the chal- lenged executive behavior occurs. And the sentencing court has no stake in or specialized knowledge of the matter because the inmate is not seeking to disturb the sentence that the court imposed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.2d 889",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "Or he might con- test the execution of his sentence, including the com- putation of good -time credits, location of imprison- ment, administration of parole, or imposition of deten- tion conditions. See, e.g. , 925 F.2d 889; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 764 F.2d 795 is not construed to bar them.2 Congress's decision to exclude detention -focused claims from Section 2255 makes sense, because a ha-beas petition is a more natural fit to address challeng- es to the execution (rather than the imposition) of a sentence. The place of confinement is where the chal- lenged executive behavior occurs. And the sentencing court has no stake in or specialized knowledge of the matter because the inmate is not seeking to disturb the sentence that the court imposed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.2d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "Or he might con- test the execution of his sentence, including the com- putation of good -time credits, location of imprison- ment, administration of parole, or imposition of deten- tion conditions. See, e.g. , 925 F.2d 889; 911 F.2d 1111; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is not construed to bar them.2 Congress's decision to exclude detention -focused claims from Section 2255 makes sense, because a ha-beas petition is a more natural fit to address challeng- es to the execution (rather than the imposition) of a sentence. The place of confinement is where the chal- lenged executive behavior occurs. And the sentencing court has no stake in or specialized knowledge of the matter because the inmate is not seeking to disturb the sentence that the court imposed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.2d 795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "2241(c)(3). See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 that common feature: the court in the district of con- finement was a more logical forum than the sentenc- ing court to hear the prisoner's challenge. iii.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 F.3d 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "See id. at 223 -224. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reflects the same understanding of the saving clause as a back- stop for a sentencing court's deficiencies. In that case, the Court consid ered a statute establishing a District of Columbia motion procedure that was \"de-liberately patterned after\" Section 2255. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "38. Such infeasibility may be rare in the modern world, but that \"does not imply that we should give [the saving clause] new work to do.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Disagreement exists about how broadly the saving clause applies in other contexts. Although the Court need not resolve those disputes to give the clause con- tent, they illustrate that it remains a limited but im- portant backstop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "784 F.3d 1123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "A military court, however, would seem to be \"a court es- tablished by Act of Congress\" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2255(a) and thus covered by the saving clause. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s reference to a \"prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by mo- tion pursuant to this section\" might otherwise be read to foreclose any claim by a federal prisoner. Compare 21 851 F.3d 1076. Second, however much content the saving clause has, any accusation of superfluity suffers from a fatal logical flaw: for nearly 50 years, the saving clause op- erated exactly as it does under the decision below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim",
		"context": "2255(a) and thus covered by the saving clause. See 483 U.S. 435's reference to a \"prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by mo- tion pursuant to this section\" might otherwise be read to foreclose any claim by a federal prisoner. Compare 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, however much content the saving clause has, any accusation of superfluity suffers from a fatal logical flaw: for nearly 50 years, the saving clause op- erated exactly as it does under the decision below. Petitioner asserts (at 32 n.2) that the court of appeals' reading would unduly limit the saving clause to \"unu- sual occurrences,\" but neither he nor the government identifies any broa der application of the saving clause from Section 2255(e)'s enactment in 1948 to AEDPA's enactment in 1996.",
		"citation_value_orig": "851 F.3d 1076",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded",
		"context": "Dep't of Commerce , 139 S. Ct. at 2573. That rule does have an exception—but it does not help the Government. In particular, if \"there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frus- trate effective judicial review,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a court may \"remand to the agency for a fuller explanation of the agency's reasoning at the time of the agency action ,\" LTV , 496 U.S. at 654 (empha- sis added). Such a remand allows after-the-fact explanation of the agency's original reasons, but it does not afford an opportunity to propose new reasons. Whether new material is obtained from the agency via in-court affidavits or via a \"remand … for a fuller expla- nation,\" it must \"shed light on the Secretary's reasoning at the time [s]he made the decision .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded",
		"context": "Whether new material is obtained from the agency via in-court affidavits or via a \"remand … for a fuller expla- nation,\" it must \"shed light on the Secretary's reasoning at the time [s]he made the decision .\" Id. at 654 (empha- sis added); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has already explained how these princi- ples apply to a case like this one. If an agency gives a \"contemporaneous explanation\" of its action that, how- ever \"curt,\" \"indicate[s] the determinative reason for the final action taken,\" then any subsequent attempt to better explain that prior agency action may not venture 51 beyond the \"determinative reason\" already given.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded",
		"context": "Camp , 411 U.S. at 143; see id. (applying this rule to the Comptroller of Currency's \"finding that a new bank was an uneconomic venture\"). The Court has thus made it \"abundantly clear\" that \"when there is a contemporane- ous explanation of the agency decision, the validity of that action must 'stand or fall on the propriety of that finding,'\" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], not some other finding devised later. 2. This rule is not only well-settled, but well-justi- fied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded",
		"context": "a. First, the rule serves \"the principle of agency ac- countability.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That core objective would be frustrated if the agency could act on one basis and present that rationale to the public, only to have the action upheld based on dif-ferent reasons it articulates in a court filing months or years later. This case is a perfect example.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded",
		"context": "This Court has recog- nized that agencies (not just their lawyers) will naturally be drawn to rationalize their prior actions. The fact that a position is \"'advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack'\" is thus a \"reason to suspect that [it] 'does not reflect the agency's fair and 53 considered judgment.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By requiring that the agency make a new decision if it wishes to rest on a new reason, the traditional rule mitigates the gravita- tional pull of the existing decision on the agency's thinking. Once again, this case exemplifies the logic of the rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded",
		"context": "As the court explained, insofar as Secretary Nielsen had recast the agency's decision as a \"policy\" choice, she had impermissibly \"al- ter[ed],\" rather than \"elaborat[ed] on,\" Secretary Duke's reasoning. 56 To be sure, even when a prior agency action was ar- bitrary, this Court has occasionally found it unnecessary to remand because the outcome of future proceedings was wholly foreordained. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is not so here. As explained above, DHS still has not yet reckoned with the range of options for remedying the as- serted legal problem that has so far driven its decision- making.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Liberty Is A Bedrock American Principle",
		"context": ". The freedom to practice one's religion is among \"the cherished rights of mind and spirit\" protected by the Constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As Justice Murphy noted, \"nothin g enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right given by the 4 First and Fourteenth Amendments freely to practice and proclaim one's religious convictions.\" 319 U.S. 141 ( citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution , 100 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Liberty Is A Bedrock American Principle",
		"context": "378 U.S. 1 . As Justice Murphy noted, \"nothin g enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right given by the 4 First and Fourteenth Amendments freely to practice and proclaim one's religious convictions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution , 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1159 (1991) ); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 . The framers' goal was to protect \"members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar,\" Goldma 475 U.S. 503.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Liberty Is A Bedrock American Principle",
		"context": "As Justice Murphy noted, \"nothin g enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right given by the 4 First and Fourteenth Amendments freely to practice and proclaim one's religious convictions.\" 319 U.S. 141 ( citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution , 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1159 (1991) ); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The framers' goal was to protect \"members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar,\" Goldma 475 U.S. 503.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Religious Liberty Is A Bedrock American Principle",
		"context": "319 U.S. 141 ( citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution , 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1159 (1991) ); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 . The framers' goal was to protect \"members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar,\" Goldma [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court has the Opportunity to Provide Needed Clarity to States for Section 2 Map Drawing",
		"context": "By disregarding the totality of th e circumstances analysis, l ower courts have too often disregarded the threats to Equal Protection rights when approving racially gerrymandered maps. • The Court should give States substantial leeway to rely on traditional redistricting criteria while prope rly assigning plaintiffs the burden of proving either that States engaged in intentional discrimination or that the results are so manifestly \"uncouth\" as to operate as a denial of opportunity for minority citizens to participate in the political process. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The focus on opportunities to participate in the political process provides breathing room for States to draw maps. Providing clarity as described above would have the practical effect of returning the burden to plaintiffs to show that district lines have actually abridged their right to vote and participate in the political process, not just show that there is a plausible 20 alternative map that might enhance their relative elector al power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "a. At the time this Court decided North Dakota and Mottaz, it was well -accepted that the United States, \" as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and [that] the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court 's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. \" Sherwood , 312 U.S. at 586; see Lehman , 453 U.S. at 160-161; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In both cases, therefore, the government contended that the plaintiffs' failure to sue within the 12 -year period specified by Congress meant that \"the district court[s] 23 lacked jurisdiction\" to consider the plaintiffs' claims. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "Id. at 840.5 b. The Court's jurisdictional determinations in North Dakota and Mottaz are not comparable to the prior passing statements that the Court declined to give precedential significance in Fort Bend [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2019 ), and 546 U.S. 12 . See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "Id. at 840.5 b. The Court's jurisdictional determinations in North Dakota and Mottaz are not comparable to the prior passing statements that the Court declined to give precedential significance in Fort Bend 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019 ), and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "476 U.S. at 841. The Court's lengthy explanation that the suit was barred under the Quiet Title Act because of the plaintiff 's failure to comply with the Act's 12-year limitations period was accordingly necessary to resolution of the case. 25 that it had previously referred to the charge -filing re- quirement as \"jurisdictional\" in its decision in McDon- nell Douglas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See Fort Bend County , 139 S. Ct. at 1848 n.4 . But that ref- erence to the \"jurisdictional prerequisites\" of a Title VII suit had come in passing as part of a background description of the respondent's case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. ; the charge -filing requirement was not at issue there and had no material relevance to the ques- tion that the Court actually decided .",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "Eberhart , 546 U.S. at 19 -20. The Court recog- nized (id. at 16) that the court of appeals had decided otherwise based on \"confusion\" caused by earlier state- ments in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 331 U.S. 469 . But the Court explained that neither Robinson nor Smith had \"h[e] ld the limits of the Rules to be jurisdic- tional in the proper sense.\" Eberhart , 546 U.S. at 16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "Eberhart , 546 U.S. at 19 -20. The Court recog- nized (id. at 16) that the court of appeals had decided otherwise based on \"confusion\" caused by earlier state- ments in 361 U.S. 220, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Court explained that neither Robinson nor Smith had \"h[e] ld the limits of the Rules to be jurisdic- tional in the proper sense.\" Eberhart , 546 U.S. at 16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "A6 -A8. Indeed, this Court has itself treated North Dakota and Mottaz as authoritative decisions on the question relevant here. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , a taxpayer contended that in certain circum- stances, district courts had jurisdiction to consider gift - tax refund suits filed against the United States even though the statutory limitations period had already run. See id. at 608-610.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to en-tertain the suit. ' \" Id. at 608 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The Court then ex- plained that \"[a] statute of limitations requiring th at a suit against the Government be brought within a certain time period is one of those terms\" —i.e., one of the terms that defines the court's jurisdiction. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "That treatment demonstrates that this Court has previously understood Mottaz and North Da- kota as precedential decisions on the jurisdictional is- sue. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citing, inter alia, North Dakota , 461 U.S. at 287) . c. Petitioners argue that this Court \"cannot\" have attached genuine jurisdictional significance to the fact that the Quiet Title Act's 12 -year bar condition s a waiver of sovereign immunity , because \"whether 'a time bar conditions a waiver of sovereign immunity' does not determine whether the statute of limitations is jurisdic- tional.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "c. Petitioners argue that this Court \"cannot\" have attached genuine jurisdictional significance to the fact that the Quiet Title Act's 12 -year bar condition s a waiver of sovereign immunity , because \"whether 'a time bar conditions a waiver of sovereign immunity' does not determine whether the statute of limitations is jurisdic- tional.\" Br. 37 (quoting Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. at 420, in turn quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But that argument ignores the governing law at the time North Dakota and Mottaz were decide d, and relies instead on subsequent decisions that this Court has already confirmed had 28 only \"prospective\" effect. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. , 552 U.S. at 137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "It is true that the Court has consistently ap- plied Irwin 's presumption when deciding whether limi- tations periods not previously considered by the Court are jurisdictional and non -extendable. See, e.g. , Scar- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fran- conia Assoc 536 U.S. 129 ; see also Pet. Br. 37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "It is true that the Court has consistently ap- plied Irwin 's presumption when deciding whether limi- tations periods not previously considered by the Court are jurisdictional and non -extendable. See, e.g. , Scar- 541 U.S. 401; Fran- conia Assoc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Pet. Br. 37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court",
		"context": "In fact, the statement supports the opposite under- standing . This Cour t has recognized that there is \"no basis for imposing on the plaintiff an obligation to antic- ipate [an affirmative] defense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ( defendant bears the burden to \"affirmatively state any avoid ance or affirmative defense\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Policy Arguments Provide No Reason To Depart From Precedent",
		"context": "Burger King , 471 U.S. at 474. What this means, in practice, is that \"the operative facts of the controversy arise from the defendant's contacts with the state.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Once again, this proximate-cause requirement best serves the federalism and predictability principles that underlie due-process limits on personal jurisdic- tion. As for federalism, a proximate-cause standard en- sures that States will not \"reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Policy Arguments Provide No Reason To Depart From Precedent",
		"context": "A but-for standard alone cannot serve this important limiting function. See, e.g. , uBID, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gullett Br. in Opp. 27 (acknowledging that \"[a] but-for causation require- ment has no limiting principle\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "623 F.3d 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Policy Arguments Provide No Reason To Depart From Precedent",
		"context": "Under a proximate- cause standard, a defendant must answer for its conduct in any forum where that conduct is material to the plaintiff's proofs. By tying jurisdiction to an action the defendant itself took in the forum in this way, \"the proximate cause standard easily correlates to foreseeability.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here again, a but-for standard would not provide the same degree of predictability because it would allow jurisdiction based on \"attenuated and indirect\" connections between a defendant's in-forum conduct and the plaintiff's claims. United Elec., Radio & Mach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 F.3d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Policy Arguments Provide No Reason To Depart From Precedent",
		"context": "27– 28. \"[C]ourts have a great deal of experience apply- ing\" causal standards, \"and there is a wealth of precedent for them to draw upon in doing so.\" Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is true in the personal-jurisdiction context, too. A majority of the courts of appeals and state high courts that have addressed this issue already require a causal connection between a de- 45 fendant's in-forum conduct and a plaintiff's claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' Policy Arguments Provide No Reason To Depart From Precedent",
		"context": "26–27. But their problem is with Rush v. Savchuk 's 40-year-old holding that personal jurisdic- tion must be established \"as to each defendant,\" not a causal rule. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because personal jurisdiction is a defendant-by-defendant inquiry, a plaintiff sometimes cannot establish personal jurisdiction in the same forum over every defendant he wants to sue. See Bristol-Myers Squibb , 137 S. Ct. at 1783 (citing Rush to explain why nonresidents' ability to sue a California- headquartered Plavix distributor did not allow them to bootstrap personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb).",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The First Amendment Forbids Governments From Disfavoring Religious Viewpoints Or Excluding Them From The Public Square",
		"context": "Those clause s protect the fundamental right s of religious expression and religious exercise 8 both in private and in the public square . They do not merely promise believers the simple right to \"whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their own homes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Alito, J., dissenting). Dating back to the Founding , our country has long welcomed religious speakers from all sects and denominations . I ndeed, for many Founders, our fundamental rights and conceptions of justice were predicated on the \"self -evident\" belief in \" their Creator.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fighting words",
		"context": "\"Fighting words\" fall outside the First Amend- ment's protection regardles s of the speaker's subjec- tive intent because of the likelihood that they will provoke imminent violence and thus threaten the pub-lic's safety. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Court's objective listener -centered ap- proach for identifying unprotected fighting words, the First Amendment poses no bar to punishing \"'those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reac- tion.'\" Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting 403 U.S. 15 ); see also 310 U.S. 296.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fighting words",
		"context": "See 315 U.S. 568. Under the Court's objective listener -centered ap- proach for identifying unprotected fighting words, the First Amendment poses no bar to punishing \"'those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reac- tion.'\" Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); see also 310 U.S. 296. In Chaplinsky, for example, this Court up- held the defendant's punishment for use of \"epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.\" 315 U.S. at 574.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fighting words",
		"context": "See 315 U.S. 568. Under the Court's objective listener -centered ap- proach for identifying unprotected fighting words, the First Amendment poses no bar to punishing \"'those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reac- tion.'\" Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (quoting 403 U.S. 15 ); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Chaplinsky, for example, this Court up- held the defendant's punishment for use of \"epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.\" 315 U.S. at 574.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fighting words",
		"context": "See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. In Texas v. Johnson, this Court applied an objec- tive listener- centered standard to hold that flag -burn- ing, by itself, did not constitute unprotected fighting words. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There it explained that \"[n]o reasonable onlooker would have regarded [his] generalized expres sion of dissatisfaction with the pol- icies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "Pet . Br. 23 -24; see Chevron, U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This conclusion is dictated by \"the fundamental constitutional principle that the power to make the necessary laws is in Congress.\" Medell 552 U.S. 491.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "23 -24; see Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837. This conclusion is dictated by \"the fundamental constitutional principle that the power to make the necessary laws is in Congress.\" Medell [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government is 4 correct th at \"[t]he term 'law'\" can include \"regula- tions. \" Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "30 . But a regulation has the \"force and effect of law\" only when it is \"rooted in a grant of … power by the Congress\" and abides by the \"limi- tations which that body imposes.\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If an agency \"cre- ate[s] a rule out of harmony with the statute ,\" that regulation is a \"mere nullity.\" Manhattan Gen. Equip.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "If an agency \"cre- ate[s] a rule out of harmony with the statute ,\" that regulation is a \"mere nullity.\" Manhattan Gen. Equip. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Pet. Br. 23 -24.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "24 . The interpretation of an unambiguous statute is not something about which \"reasonable minds may differ.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An \"agency interpretation contra- dicting what Congress has said\" therefore is \"unrea- sonable.\" Entergy 556 U.S. 208.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "502 U.S. 491. An \"agency interpretation contra- dicting what Congress has said\" therefore is \"unrea- sonable.\" Entergy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By holding 38 U.S.C. § 1111 so clear as to not warrant Chevron deference, the Fed- eral Circuit determined that reasonable minds could not disagree that the regulation contradicted the plain statute .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "By holding 38 U.S.C. § 1111 so clear as to not warrant Chevron deference, the Fed- eral Circuit determined that reasonable minds could not disagree that the regulation contradicted the plain statute . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The Government does not seriously grapple with this prevailing understanding of CUE.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 F.3d 1089",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "370 F.3d at 1093. A judicial determination that a statute is \"not ambiguous\" means that there is \"'only [one] possible int erpretation.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is irrelevant t hat \"'discerning the only possible interpretation [might] require[] a taxing in- quiry .'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
		"context": "c. Finally, t he Government mistakenly suggests (at 27) that it is not \"clear and unmistakable error\" for an agency to misapply an unambiguous statute because , under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EA- JA), the Government 's position can be legally incor- rect but still \"substantially justified .\" The Government identifies nothing in this Court's precedent suggesting that an agency's ad- herence to a regulatory misinterpretation would be \"substantially jus tified\" under EAJA. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does the Government adduce any consensus among the lower courts on that question. Indeed, in evaluating the propriety of E AJA fees with respect to VA's adher- ence to the same faulty regulation at issue here, the Federal Circuit opined that, \"[w]here … the govern- ment interprets a statute in a manner that is contra- ry to its plain language and unsupported by its legislative history, it will prove difficult to establish substantial justification.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": ". Courts have recognized that a third party's rights are not necessarily affected when there is a breach of contract between the original parties . See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 752 A.2d 138. Especially , the context of subleasing and assignment expands on this principle. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a sublease as \"a transfer of a non -record title interest in a lease, i.e., a transfer of operating rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 So.3d 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": ". Courts have recognized that a third party's rights are not necessarily affected when there is a breach of contract between the original parties . See generally 195 So.3d 234; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Especially , the context of subleasing and assignment expands on this principle. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a sublease as \"a transfer of a non -record title interest in a lease, i.e., a transfer of operating rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 A.2d 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": "Even if the agreement between the landlord and t he tenant prohibits assigning or subleasing , the tenant can still choose to do so . However, the landlord may be able to sue the original tenant for breach and recover damages. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Food Pantry, 58 Haw. 606; Theatre Row Phase II Assoc 739 N.Y.S.2d 671 (2002 ). Some courts have found in such scenarios that the restriction on subleasing or assigning with or without the landlord's consent does not automatically void the sublease or assignment . See 104 Ill. 160 ( 1882 ) (stating that a clause in the lease prohibiting assignment without the written consent of the lessors does not render the assignment absolutely void but merely voidable at the option of the lessors or their representatives); 64 Iowa 125; Weisman , 232 Cal.App.2d at 768 (noting that an assignment in violation of a prohibition on assigning remains 23 valid until the landlord elects to take action based on the breach); see752 A.2d 138 (noting that \"[r]estrictions in original lease against subletting do not affect, as between lessee and sublessee, the validity of the sublease\"); Kleyle , 195 So.3d 234 ( breach of landlord consent provision in the lease did not excuse subtenant from paying rent due under sublease) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "232 Cal.App.2d 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": "Even if the agreement between the landlord and t he tenant prohibits assigning or subleasing , the tenant can still choose to do so . However, the landlord may be able to sue the original tenant for breach and recover damages. 232 Cal.App.2d 764; Food Pantry, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Theatre Row Phase II Assoc 739 N.Y.S.2d 671 (2002 ). Some courts have found in such scenarios that the restriction on subleasing or assigning with or without the landlord's consent does not automatically void the sublease or assignment . See 104 Ill. 160 ( 1882 ) (stating that a clause in the lease prohibiting assignment without the written consent of the lessors does not render the assignment absolutely void but merely voidable at the option of the lessors or their representatives); 64 Iowa 125; Weisman , 232 Cal.App.2d at 768 (noting that an assignment in violation of a prohibition on assigning remains 23 valid until the landlord elects to take action based on the breach); see752 A.2d 138 (noting that \"[r]estrictions in original lease against subletting do not affect, as between lessee and sublessee, the validity of the sublease\"); Kleyle , 195 So.3d 234 ( breach of landlord consent provision in the lease did not excuse subtenant from paying rent due under sublease) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "58 Haw. 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": "232 Cal.App.2d 764; Food Pantry, 58 Haw. 606; Theatre Row Phase II Assoc 739 N.Y.S.2d 671 (2002 ). Some courts have found in such scenarios that the restriction on subleasing or assigning with or without the landlord's consent does not automatically void the sublease or assignment . See 104 Ill. 160 ( 1882 ) (stating that a clause in the lease prohibiting assignment without the written consent of the lessors does not render the assignment absolutely void but merely voidable at the option of the lessors or their representatives); 64 Iowa 125; Weisman , 232 Cal.App.2d at 768 (noting that an assignment in violation of a prohibition on assigning remains 23 valid until the landlord elects to take action based on the breach); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that \"[r]estrictions in original lease against subletting do not affect, as between lessee and sublessee, the validity of the sublease\"); Kleyle , 195 So.3d 234 ( breach of landlord consent provision in the lease did not excuse subtenant from paying rent due under sublease) . According to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits , when there is a breach of the prohibition on subleasing or assigning in a lease between the landlord and the original tenant, the third -party subtenant may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place subleased or assigned . 86 Fed. Appx. 92; 53 F.2d 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 A.2d 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": "232 Cal.App.2d 764; Food Pantry, 58 Haw. 606; Theatre Row Phase II Assoc 739 N.Y.S.2d 671 (2002 ). Some courts have found in such scenarios that the restriction on subleasing or assigning with or without the landlord's consent does not automatically void the sublease or assignment . See 104 Ill. 160 ( 1882 ) (stating that a clause in the lease prohibiting assignment without the written consent of the lessors does not render the assignment absolutely void but merely voidable at the option of the lessors or their representatives); 64 Iowa 125; Weisman , 232 Cal.App.2d at 768 (noting that an assignment in violation of a prohibition on assigning remains 23 valid until the landlord elects to take action based on the breach); see752 A.2d 138 (noting that \"[r]estrictions in original lease against subletting do not affect, as between lessee and sublessee, the validity of the sublease\"); Kleyle , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( breach of landlord consent provision in the lease did not excuse subtenant from paying rent due under sublease) . According to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits , when there is a breach of the prohibition on subleasing or assigning in a lease between the landlord and the original tenant, the third -party subtenant may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place subleased or assigned . 86 Fed. Appx. 92; 53 F.2d 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 So.3d 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party",
		"context": "See 104 Ill. 160 ( 1882 ) (stating that a clause in the lease prohibiting assignment without the written consent of the lessors does not render the assignment absolutely void but merely voidable at the option of the lessors or their representatives); 64 Iowa 125; Weisman , 232 Cal.App.2d at 768 (noting that an assignment in violation of a prohibition on assigning remains 23 valid until the landlord elects to take action based on the breach); see752 A.2d 138 (noting that \"[r]estrictions in original lease against subletting do not affect, as between lessee and sublessee, the validity of the sublease\"); Kleyle , 195 So.3d 234 ( breach of landlord consent provision in the lease did not excuse subtenant from paying rent due under sublease) . According to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits , when there is a breach of the prohibition on subleasing or assigning in a lease between the landlord and the original tenant, the third -party subtenant may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place subleased or assigned . 86 Fed. Appx. 92; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In McClendon , the tenant of an apartment was the only person authorized to live at the residence. However, the tenant sublet the bedroom of the apartment to the defendant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "53 F.2d 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Rule Of Presumptive Finality Respects The Role Of Bankruptcy Courts And Appellate Courts Alike",
		"context": "The court of appeals' rule allows bankruptcy courts the flexibility to resolve stay-relief disputes as the cir- cumstances require, through either a final or an inter-locutory order. The court can finally deny a motion for stay relief, in which case the movant must appeal im-mediately and the issue will be resolved expeditiously, or the bankruptcy court can deny a stay-relief motion without prejudice, for example, \"because the record [is] incomplete, discovery [is] ongoing, or the court re-quire[s] further research on the issue before it.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such cases, the bankruptcy court can retain its ability to manage the process without interference or second-guessing from the appellate courts until it has finally disposed of the stay-relief motion. Furthermore, a rule that orders denying stay relief are presumed final unless expressly made without prejudice would benefit all parties and appellate courts by making clear when the time to appeal begins to run.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.2d 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Rule Of Presumptive Finality Respects The Role Of Bankruptcy Courts And Appellate Courts Alike",
		"context": "In such cases, the bankruptcy court can retain its ability to manage the process without interference or second-guessing from the appellate courts until it has finally disposed of the stay-relief motion. Furthermore, a rule that orders denying stay relief are presumed final unless expressly made without prejudice would benefit all parties and appellate courts by making clear when the time to appeal begins to run. See Sears, Roebuck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the same time, a presumptive finality rule would promote the development of binding appellate prece-dent in the bankruptcy context. Bankruptcy appeals have an unusual two-tier structure: Normally, a liti-gant must appeal first to a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) and only afterwards to the court of appeals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Rule Of Presumptive Finality Respects The Role Of Bankruptcy Courts And Appellate Courts Alike",
		"context": "Bankruptcy appeals have an unusual two-tier structure: Normally, a liti-gant must appeal first to a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) and only afterwards to the court of appeals. But decisions by the district courts and 30 BAPs are not generally considered binding on other courts. See, e.g , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and has been described (by this Court) as \"unruly,\" RadLAX Gate-way Hotel, 566 U.S. 639. Indeed, in 2005 Congress added some ave-nues for direct appeal to th e court of appeals (at the court of appeals' discretion) due to \"widespread unhap-piness at the paucity of settled bankruptcy-law prece-dent.\" 484 F.3d 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Rule Of Presumptive Finality Respects The Role Of Bankruptcy Courts And Appellate Courts Alike",
		"context": "Bankruptcy appeals have an unusual two-tier structure: Normally, a liti-gant must appeal first to a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) and only afterwards to the court of appeals. But decisions by the district courts and 30 BAPs are not generally considered binding on other courts. See, e.g , 928 F.2d 1366, and has been described (by this Court) as \"unruly,\" RadLAX Gate-way Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in 2005 Congress added some ave-nues for direct appeal to th e court of appeals (at the court of appeals' discretion) due to \"widespread unhap-piness at the paucity of settled bankruptcy-law prece-dent.\" 484 F.3d 154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Rule Of Presumptive Finality Respects The Role Of Bankruptcy Courts And Appellate Courts Alike",
		"context": "See, e.g , 928 F.2d 1366, and has been described (by this Court) as \"unruly,\" RadLAX Gate-way Hotel, 566 U.S. 639. Indeed, in 2005 Congress added some ave-nues for direct appeal to th e court of appeals (at the court of appeals' discretion) due to \"widespread unhap-piness at the paucity of settled bankruptcy-law prece-dent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although appeals can be taken from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts (whether through the two-tier structure or by direct appeal to the circuit), such review is discretionary and cannot substitute for an ap-peal as of right. A clear rule that orders denying stay relief are presumptively final would permit timely ap-peals (before they become practically or legally moot) and thereby promote the development of uniform bank-ruptcy precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 F.3d 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "The Court has emphasized the \"fundamental at- tributes\" of arbitration as conceived by the FAA: its \" 'simplicity, informality, and expedition.' \" 14 Penn Plaza [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The observation was made in a case concern- ing the ADEA claim of night watchmen reassigned to other work under a collective bargaining agreement. As the Court recognized, labor arbitration has long been looked to as a model of expedition, flexibility, and informality: the timing and location of the hearing is consensual, the latter usually located near the work site to accommodate the ava ilability of witnesses; the parties need not be represe nted by legal counsel and often are not; there need be no stenographic record; the rules of evidence need not be applied; there need be no written opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "All of these arguments could equally be directed to representational labor arbitration, yet all would fail. First, as to entertaining facts specific to numerous em- ployees, we have already seen unions efficiently repre-sent the grievances of hun dreds, even thousands of employees in a single arbitration, employees who may not even have grieved the action arbitrated and in which the remedy, unlike a PAGA civil penalty claim, may have to be tailored individually according to the wrong the arbitrator finds to have occurred. 9 Such rep- resentational labor arbitrat ion has had a deep history before the Court: in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], arbitration was compelled over the layoff of dozens of shipyard workers (on remand the union prevailed, Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 36 LA 694; in 363 U.S. 593, the arbitrator's remedy, including back pay and the reinstatement of employees who were fired as a group was affirmed; in John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; that the disallowance of religious exemption from Sunday work violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Avis Rent-a-Car Sys ., 107 LA 197; that the requirement of a commercial driver's license discriminated against older workers, The Lion, Inc ., 109 LA 19. 21 (1964), arbitration was compelled to determine the un- ion's right to pursue rights vested for dozens of employ- ees under a collective bargaining agreement after a company merger with successor employer; and in Nolde Bros. 430 U.S. 243, arbitration was compelled to determine the right of the entire complement of employees to severance pay.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "First, as to entertaining facts specific to numerous em- ployees, we have already seen unions efficiently repre-sent the grievances of hun dreds, even thousands of employees in a single arbitration, employees who may not even have grieved the action arbitrated and in which the remedy, unlike a PAGA civil penalty claim, may have to be tailored individually according to the wrong the arbitrator finds to have occurred. 9 Such rep- resentational labor arbitrat ion has had a deep history before the Court: in 363 U.S. 574, arbitration was compelled over the layoff of dozens of shipyard workers (on remand the union prevailed, Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 36 LA 694; in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the arbitrator's remedy, including back pay and the reinstatement of employees who were fired as a group was affirmed; in John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; that the disallowance of religious exemption from Sunday work violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Avis Rent-a-Car Sys ., 107 LA 197; that the requirement of a commercial driver's license discriminated against older workers, The Lion, Inc ., 109 LA 19. 21 (1964), arbitration was compelled to determine the un- ion's right to pursue rights vested for dozens of employ- ees under a collective bargaining agreement after a company merger with successor employer; and in Nolde Bros. 430 U.S. 243, arbitration was compelled to determine the right of the entire complement of employees to severance pay. See e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "First, as to entertaining facts specific to numerous em- ployees, we have already seen unions efficiently repre-sent the grievances of hun dreds, even thousands of employees in a single arbitration, employees who may not even have grieved the action arbitrated and in which the remedy, unlike a PAGA civil penalty claim, may have to be tailored individually according to the wrong the arbitrator finds to have occurred. 9 Such rep- resentational labor arbitrat ion has had a deep history before the Court: in 363 U.S. 574, arbitration was compelled over the layoff of dozens of shipyard workers (on remand the union prevailed, Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 36 LA 694; in 363 U.S. 593, the arbitrator's remedy, including back pay and the reinstatement of employees who were fired as a group was affirmed; in John Wiley & Sons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; that the disallowance of religious exemption from Sunday work violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Avis Rent-a-Car Sys ., 107 LA 197; that the requirement of a commercial driver's license discriminated against older workers, The Lion, Inc ., 109 LA 19. 21 (1964), arbitration was compelled to determine the un- ion's right to pursue rights vested for dozens of employ- ees under a collective bargaining agreement after a company merger with successor employer; and in Nolde Bros. 430 U.S. 243, arbitration was compelled to determine the right of the entire complement of employees to severance pay. See e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "9 Such rep- resentational labor arbitrat ion has had a deep history before the Court: in 363 U.S. 574, arbitration was compelled over the layoff of dozens of shipyard workers (on remand the union prevailed, Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 36 LA 694; in 363 U.S. 593, the arbitrator's remedy, including back pay and the reinstatement of employees who were fired as a group was affirmed; in John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; that the disallowance of religious exemption from Sunday work violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Avis Rent-a-Car Sys ., 107 LA 197; that the requirement of a commercial driver's license discriminated against older workers, The Lion, Inc ., 109 LA 19. 21 (1964), arbitration was compelled to determine the un- ion's right to pursue rights vested for dozens of employ- ees under a collective bargaining agreement after a company merger with successor employer; and in Nolde Bros. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], arbitration was compelled to determine the right of the entire complement of employees to severance pay. See e.g. Alcan Packaging Co 729 F.3d 839, for an arbitra- tion on the applicability of severance pay for the work-forces at three plants in two states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "21 (1964), arbitration was compelled to determine the un- ion's right to pursue rights vested for dozens of employ- ees under a collective bargaining agreement after a company merger with successor employer; and in Nolde Bros. 430 U.S. 243, arbitration was compelled to determine the right of the entire complement of employees to severance pay. See e.g. Alcan Packaging Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for an arbitra- tion on the applicability of severance pay for the work-forces at three plants in two states. Second, as to the burden of discovery, unions, as representative of all the employees in a bargaining unit are entitled as a matter of course to any infor- mation in the employer's po ssession that is relevant to its role in grievance processing whether or not a griev- ance has actually been filed. 385 U.S. 431.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 839",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
		"context": "Alcan Packaging Co 729 F.3d 839, for an arbitra- tion on the applicability of severance pay for the work-forces at three plants in two states. Second, as to the burden of discovery, unions, as representative of all the employees in a bargaining unit are entitled as a matter of course to any infor- mation in the employer's po ssession that is relevant to its role in grievance processing whether or not a griev- ance has actually been filed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The duty to disclose all employee records, not only a grievant's, far exceeds what would have to be disclosed in order to seek PAGA civil penal- ties, 10 but labor law practitioners have not found this 10 Robert Gorman & Matthew Finkin, L ABOR LAW: ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY , supra § 20.5 at p. 651 (references omitted): The employer clearly must furnish information as to wage rates and classificat ions, merit pay increases, the costs of a welfare benefit plan . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "Arrigoni Enters., 136 S. Ct. 1409.It is not an afterthought, allowing the government torun roughshod over private property rights, violatingthe Fifth Amendment and leaving the distraughtlandowner with the task of initiating litigation. Instead,it \"places a condition\" on the government's exercise ofpower to take private property in. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless of whether the government takes possession of \"an entireparcel or merely a part thereof ,\" as in this case, \"it has a categorical duty to compensate\" the landowner.Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 482 U.S. 304. Regardless of whether the government takes possession of \"an entireparcel or merely a part thereof ,\" as in this case, \"it has a categorical duty to compensate\" the landowner.Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This principle dates back to an early holding of this Court that thegovernment must compensate the owner of privateproperty it uses in a manner that inflicts \"irreparableand permanent injury to any extent.\" 80 U.S. 166.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "Council, 535 U.S. 302. This principle dates back to an early holding of this Court that thegovernment must compensate the owner of privateproperty it uses in a manner that inflicts \"irreparableand permanent injury to any extent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Williamson County refers back to early precedent suggesting that provisions for obtaining compensationneed only be \"reasonable, certain, and adequate\" at thetime of the taking. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194, 8 citing Regional Rail, 419 U.S. at 124-125 (quoting Cherokee 135 U.S. 641).",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "80 U.S. 166. Williamson County refers back to early precedent suggesting that provisions for obtaining compensationneed only be \"reasonable, certain, and adequate\" at thetime of the taking. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194, 8 citing Regional Rail, 419 U.S. at 124-125 (quoting Cherokee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Cherokee Nation merits a closer look. The Constitution \"does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "In contrast to this carefully drafted statutoryprotection for property owners, the Ordinancedisturbed occupancy the moment it was passed, asevidenced by the violation notices Petitioner received.Thus, \"[i]n effect, Williamson County forces a property owner to shoulder the burden of securing compensationafter the local government effects a taking.\" Arrigoni , 136 S. Ct. at 1409 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denialof certiorari). In San Remo Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , Justice Rehnquist expressed reservations about requiring takingsclaimants \"to utilize all state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal takings claim.\" Id. at 349 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "1491, provided adequate procedures to compensate the railroads, and Congress did not withdraw that Act'sgrant of jurisdiction when it enacted the RegionalRailroad Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C.S. §§ 701 et seq., to reorganize railroads into a single viable systemoperated by a private for-profit corporation set up bythe government. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case holding that trade secrets are protectable property under the TakingsClause, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, andRodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq., did notwithdraw the availability of Tucker Act remedies, butrequired litigants to exhaust the statutory proceduresavailable under federal law. Yet Williamson County cites both of these cases as support for its requirement to exhaust state court remedies before pursuing a federal takings claim in federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 194. The logic here is not apparent. Williamson County does another end-run around the Constitution when it asserts that the state courtexhaustion requirement \"is analogous to th[is] Court'sholding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 195. 2 This purported 2 474 U.S. 327 overruled Parratt to the extent Parratt held that a state official's mere lack of care deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "Williamson County does another end-run around the Constitution when it asserts that the state courtexhaustion requirement \"is analogous to th[is] Court'sholding in 451 U.S. 527.\" Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 195. 2 This purported 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] overruled Parratt to the extent Parratt held that a state official's mere lack of care deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 analogy is flawed. In Parratt, an inmate sued for violation of due process when state prison officials negligently failed to deliver hobby materials he hadordered by mail.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": ". . serve as acheck on the possibility that a wrongful deprivationwould occur\" (citing cases, including [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538. Post- deprivation procedures may suffice in cases wherequick state action is necessary or where meaningfulpre-deprivation process is impossible or impractical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation",
		"context": "Post- deprivation procedures may suffice in cases wherequick state action is necessary or where meaningfulpre-deprivation process is impossible or impractical. Id. at 539; see, e.g ., North American Cold Storage Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is obviouslyimpractical to provide pre-deprivation process for an official's unforeseeable care lessness in delivering prison mail. But there is no immediate need for state actionwith respect to burial sites th at have been in places for decades, and it is neither impossible nor impractical toprovide an orderly procedure before the governmentconfiscates an interest in real property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Band's Remaining Arguments Also Fail To Overcome the Code's Clear Language",
		"context": "The Band's first position is correct: legisla-tive history is irrelevant. Th e statute is clear, and this Court does not \"allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 Second , the Band argues (at 47-48) that tribes will not greatly benefit from the special accommodations provided to governmental units in the Code because, for example, they have difficulty collecting taxes. The Court need not decide whether classification as a 23 The Band also contends (at 40-41) that its interpretation of \"other foreign or domestic gove rnment\" would not create surplus- age because the phrase would still cover entities created through interstate compacts, like the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
		"context": "is moot\" when intervening events have rendered the answer to that question irrelevant. Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More precisely, a n appeal from an \"order granting a preliminary injunction becomes moot when, becaus e of the defendant's compliance or 21 some other change in circumstances, nothing remains to be enjoined through a permanent injunction.\" Peo- ple for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 396 F.3d 416.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
		"context": "of 451 U.S. 390. More precisely, a n appeal from an \"order granting a preliminary injunction becomes moot when, becaus e of the defendant's compliance or 21 some other change in circumstances, nothing remains to be enjoined through a permanent injunction.\" Peo- ple for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this Court, p etitioners offer several theories why the preliminary -injunction appeal is not moot , but none is persuasive . They initially contend that the federal respondents' \"rescission\" of the challenged rule \"is a form of voluntary cessation. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
		"context": ". traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judi-cial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily al- tering questionable behavior .\" City News & Novelty, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also County of Los 440 U.S. 625 . Here, however, the ces sation of the challenged rule was dic- tated by the final judgment of a federal court. What- ever the nature of the actions by the federal government that preceded that final judgment, com- pliance with a binding judgment of a federal court is not \"voluntary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
		"context": ". traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judi-cial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily al- tering questionable behavior .\" City News & Novelty, 531 U.S. 278 ; see also County of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, however, the ces sation of the challenged rule was dic- tated by the final judgment of a federal court. What- ever the nature of the actions by the federal government that preceded that final judgment, com- pliance with a binding judgment of a federal court is not \"voluntary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
		"context": "Br. 17), the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in that case has since been vacated. See 941 F.3d 410, vacated and remanded sub nom Little Sisters of the Poor Jeanne Jugan 141 S. Ct. 192 ; see, e.g., Camre [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. Commodity Futures Trading 701 F.2d 653. If all of the speculative contingencies identified by petitioners were to play out as they hope , result ing in a live controversy in one of the courts below over the validity of the 2 019 public charge rule, petitioners could seek to intervene at that time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
		"context": "17), the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in that case has since been vacated. See 941 F.3d 410, vacated and remanded sub nom Little Sisters of the Poor Jeanne Jugan 141 S. Ct. 192 ; see, e.g., Camre 563 U.S. 692 ; cf. Commodity Futures Trading [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If all of the speculative contingencies identified by petitioners were to play out as they hope , result ing in a live controversy in one of the courts below over the validity of the 2 019 public charge rule, petitioners could seek to intervene at that time. Under the present circumstances, however, the preliminary - injunction appeal is moot.",
		"citation_value_orig": "701 F.2d 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Material Facts",
		"context": "CTS 4 Rule 56(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that \"[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. \" A factual dispute is \"genuine\" if a factfinder could reasonably resolve it in favor of either party. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A fact is \"material\" if it \"might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Material Facts",
		"context": "]\"6 The explicit protection against \"unreasonable searches and seizures\" makes \"reason ableness\" the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment inquiry . This Court assesses reasonableness \"by carefully weighing 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest s alleged to justify the intrusion.' \" County of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "See Whole Woman 's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2343 –46 (Alito, J., dissent- ing); Ashley Lopez, Three Years After Supreme Court Strikes Down Abortion Law, Half Of Texas' Clinics Are Still Closed (June 27, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/2SiM4Ux. Rulings such as Whole Woman 's Health do not de- serve any weight on account of stare decisis, and the Court should not hesitate to overrule a decision marked by mischaracterizations of the record and disregard of basic legal doctrines such as res judicata and severability . Stare decisis is not an inexorable command, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the amount of deference accorded to a judicial precedent depends on the quality of its reasoning. See Citizens 558 U.S. 310. Whole Woman 's Health should be over- ruled —without hesitation and without apology .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "Rulings such as Whole Woman 's Health do not de- serve any weight on account of stare decisis, and the Court should not hesitate to overrule a decision marked by mischaracterizations of the record and disregard of basic legal doctrines such as res judicata and severability . Stare decisis is not an inexorable command, see 501 U.S. 808, and the amount of deference accorded to a judicial precedent depends on the quality of its reasoning. See Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whole Woman 's Health should be over- ruled —without hesitation and without apology . In recent months some members of this Court have loudly protested decisions that overrule precedent, insist- ing that there must be a \"special justification\" to overrule an earlier decision that goes beyond a mere belief that the decision was wrongly decided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "Whole Woman 's Health should be over- ruled —without hesitation and without apology . In recent months some members of this Court have loudly protested decisions that overrule precedent, insist- ing that there must be a \"special justification\" to overrule an earlier decision that goes beyond a mere belief that the decision was wrongly decided. See Franchise Tax Board of Cal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]409 U.S. 810 , did not claim any \"special justification\" for overruling Baker apart from a desire to impose same-sex marriage on all 50 states.12 Indeed, Ober- gefell did not even claim that Baker was wrong at the time it was decided. The dissenters in Hyatt and Knick have also called for the overruling of Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ,13 and 417 U.S. 484,14 and they have done so without offering any \"spe- cial justification\" apart from their strongly held conviction that the cases were decided incorrectly . And one can be absolutely certain that those justices will vote to overrule not only Citizens United and Geduldig, but other prece- dents of this Court, if they obtain a fifth vote to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "In recent months some members of this Court have loudly protested decisions that overrule precedent, insist- ing that there must be a \"special justification\" to overrule an earlier decision that goes beyond a mere belief that the decision was wrongly decided. See Franchise Tax Board of Cal 139 S. Ct. 1485409 U.S. 810 , did not claim any \"special justification\" for overruling Baker apart from a desire to impose same-sex marriage on all 50 states.12 Indeed, Ober- gefell did not even claim that Baker was wrong at the time it was decided. The dissenters in Hyatt and Knick have also called for the overruling of Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ,13 and 417 U.S. 484,14 and they have done so without offering any \"spe- cial justification\" apart from their strongly held conviction that the cases were decided incorrectly . And one can be absolutely certain that those justices will vote to overrule not only Citizens United and Geduldig, but other prece- dents of this Court, if they obtain a fifth vote to do so. The recent efforts by these justices to wrap themselves in the mant le of precedent while accusing their colleagues of subverting norms of stare decisis are not credible, and they should not deter this Court from overruling Whole Woman 's Health or any other abortion-related pro- nouncement of this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "In recent months some members of this Court have loudly protested decisions that overrule precedent, insist- ing that there must be a \"special justification\" to overrule an earlier decision that goes beyond a mere belief that the decision was wrongly decided. See Franchise Tax Board of Cal 139 S. Ct. 1485409 U.S. 810 , did not claim any \"special justification\" for overruling Baker apart from a desire to impose same-sex marriage on all 50 states.12 Indeed, Ober- gefell did not even claim that Baker was wrong at the time it was decided. The dissenters in Hyatt and Knick have also called for the overruling of Citizens 558 U.S. 310 ,13 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],14 and they have done so without offering any \"spe- cial justification\" apart from their strongly held conviction that the cases were decided incorrectly . And one can be absolutely certain that those justices will vote to overrule not only Citizens United and Geduldig, but other prece- dents of this Court, if they obtain a fifth vote to do so. The recent efforts by these justices to wrap themselves in the mant le of precedent while accusing their colleagues of subverting norms of stare decisis are not credible, and they should not deter this Court from overruling Whole Woman 's Health or any other abortion-related pro- nouncement of this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "The recent efforts by these justices to wrap themselves in the mant le of precedent while accusing their colleagues of subverting norms of stare decisis are not credible, and they should not deter this Court from overruling Whole Woman 's Health or any other abortion-related pro- nouncement of this Court. See Smith v. Allwright , 321 12. The majority opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is likewise bereft of any \"special justification\" for overruling 478 U.S. 186 . See 539 U.S. at 577 –79. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "The recent efforts by these justices to wrap themselves in the mant le of precedent while accusing their colleagues of subverting norms of stare decisis are not credible, and they should not deter this Court from overruling Whole Woman 's Health or any other abortion-related pro- nouncement of this Court. See Smith v. Allwright , 321 12. The majority opinion in 539 U.S. 558 , is likewise bereft of any \"special justification\" for overruling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See 539 U.S. at 577 –79. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "See 539 U.S. at 577 –79. 13. See Ameri can Tradition Partnership, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]417 U.S. 484.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health",
		"context": "See 539 U.S. at 577 –79. 13. See Ameri can Tradition Partnership, 567 U.S. 516[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Abortion providers and their patients lack the \"close relationship\" this Court's precedent requires",
		"context": ". This Court's recent decisions set out stringent re- quirements for third -party standing. Kowalski prohibits basing third -party standing on hypothetical future rela- tionships, while Elk Grove Unified School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , underscores that the liti- gant's and third party's interests cannot conflict. Each demonstrate s that abortion providers lack third -party standing. 5",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "See 517 U.S. at 47, 72. As the Fourth Circuit has ob served, i t would have been ex- traordinary if Congress , \"in an insurrectionary mo- ment,\" responded to Seminole Tribe with a FCRA pro- vision quixotically purporting to subject States to both compensatory and punitive damages. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440. The far more plausible understanding is that Congress did not understand itself to be addr essing sovereign im- munity in Sections 1681n or 1681 o at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "As the Fourth Circuit has ob served, i t would have been ex- traordinary if Congress , \"in an insurrectionary mo- ment,\" responded to Seminole Tribe with a FCRA pro- vision quixotically purporting to subject States to both compensatory and punitive damages. 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The far more plausible understanding is that Congress did not understand itself to be addr essing sovereign im- munity in Sections 1681n or 1681 o at all. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "582 U.S. 79. Congress's unequivo- cal and unambiguous authorization of suits against fed- eral agencies in Section 1681u( j) is thus a strong indica- tion that it intended no such authorization in Sections 1681n and 1681 o. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals attempted to distinguish Sec- tion 1681u on the ground that \"only federal agencies are subject to [its] substantive requirements in the first place.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "891 F.3d 762",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "And compensatory dama ges are available only if \"actual damages\" resulted from an \"intentional or willful\" failure to take specified actions. 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FCRA suits, however, have neither limitation. If federal agenc ies could be sued under FCRA for erro- neous reporting of overdue debt, they would be subject to a damages action not only for a failure to update the consumer reporting agency, but also for a failure to cor- rect the relevant record.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "There is no sound r eason to believe that Congress intended to make the United States liable for money damages under FCRA based on the same conduct that Congress found insufficient to trigger money damages under the Pri- vacy Act. That is especially true given that the extent of liability under the Privacy Act was the subject of ex- tensive congressional debate: Congress considered and 38 rejected amendments that would have allowed recovery for negligent violations or the award of punitive dam- ages. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated in part on other grounds by 540 U.S. 614. It would not have undermined its prior careful and considered approach without being more explicit. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "665 F.2d 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "There is no sound r eason to believe that Congress intended to make the United States liable for money damages under FCRA based on the same conduct that Congress found insufficient to trigger money damages under the Pri- vacy Act. That is especially true given that the extent of liability under the Privacy Act was the subject of ex- tensive congressional debate: Congress considered and 38 rejected amendments that would have allowed recovery for negligent violations or the award of punitive dam- ages. See 665 F.2d 327, abrogated in part on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would not have undermined its prior careful and considered approach without being more explicit. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Indeed , the legislative history of the 1996 Act un- derscores that Congress did not understand itself to be imposing vast new liabilities on the United States and othe r governments . The federal government \"is one of the largest furnishers of credit information in the coun- try,\" so Congress would have anticipated that a \"waiver of sovereign immunity [in FCRA] would have a significant impact on the public fisc.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet there is no evidence that even a single Member of Congress was aware —let alone intended —that the ef- fect of the 1996 Act could be to impose new liability on the United States for violations of FCRA 's substantive provisions. The House Report on an early version of the 1996 Act observed only that extension of the provisions for private damages suits to \" 'any person who' \" fails to comply with FCRA would bring within the scope of the provisions \"persons who furnish information to con- sumer reporting agencies, such as banks and retailers.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)",
		"context": "Broader p rinciples of Medicare reimbursement fur- ther support the agency's conclusion that the \"purposes of \" paragraph (14) includ e aligning hospital payments with drug -acquisition co sts. Even before enactment of the OPPS, an \"overriding purpose in the Medicare scheme \" was to ensure \" reasonable (not excessive or un- warranted) cost reimbursement .\" Regions [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, t he very con- cept of reimbursement is linked to cost. An employee who submits an expense report expects to be reim- burse d for costs incurred.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. On remand, petitioner's claim likely should be dismissed on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity",
		"context": "25 -27 (explaining why neither false imprisonment nor abuse of process is analogous to petitioner's claim). 30 the district court nor the court of appeals passed on that argument. Because this Court is a \"court of review, not of first view,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the government agrees that the \"question of ab-solute immunity is properly left for remand.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. On remand, petitioner's claim likely should be dismissed on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity",
		"context": "On remand, however, the district court should likely dismiss petitioner's fabrication -of-evidence claim against respondent on absolut e-immunity grounds . Although Section 1983 does not expressly provide for a \"defense of official immunity,\" certain common -law immunities \"were so well established in 1871, when [Section] 1983 was enacted, that '[this Court] pre- sume[s] that Congress woul d have specifically so pro- vided had it wished to abolish ' them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 8 As the Court has observed , \"at common law prosecutors were immune from suits for malicious prosecution and for defamati on,\" and \"this immunity extended to the knowing use of false testimony before the grand jury and at trial.\" 500 U.S. 478; see Buckley , 509 U.S. at 269- 270.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. On remand, petitioner's claim likely should be dismissed on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity",
		"context": "509 U.S. 259 . 8 As the Court has observed , \"at common law prosecutors were immune from suits for malicious prosecution and for defamati on,\" and \"this immunity extended to the knowing use of false testimony before the grand jury and at trial.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Buckley , 509 U.S. at 269- 270. To be sure, \"[w]hen a prosecutor performs the inves- tigative functions normally performed by a detective or polic e officer, it is 'neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other. ' \" Buckley , 509 U.S. at 2 73 (citation 8 The same immunity analysis does not apply to prosecutions by the United States under 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. On remand, petitioner's claim likely should be dismissed on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity",
		"context": "\" Buckley , 509 U.S. at 2 73 (citation 8 The same immunity analysis does not apply to prosecutions by the United States under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Buckley , this Court found immunity inap- propriate for a prosecutor who allegedly fabricated evi- dence at an \"entirely investigative\" stage, well before any criminal proceedings had begun —though the Court declined to address wheth er such conduct would consti- tute a \"constitutional violation[] for which [Section] 1983 provides a remedy .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Government Coercion of Speech Devastated Aaron and Melissa Klein's Lives and Destroyed Their Business",
		"context": "14 Pet'r's Supp, Reply Br. 4–6, ASER.11, 506 P.3d 1108. 20 entirely separate from the declination of service.15 The bias and discrimination of the commissioner resulted in an egregious violation of the Kleins' rights underMasterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The incident giving rise to the case took place almost a decade ago, yet the litigation is still ongoing. 16 The Kleins challenged the constitutionality of theOregon government's draconian actions against themin Oregon state court in April 2016.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Government Coercion of Speech Devastated Aaron and Melissa Klein's Lives and Destroyed Their Business",
		"context": "Id. at 1086–87. In 2019, this Court granted a writ ofcertiorari in the Kleins' case, then remanded[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 139 S. Ct. 2713 (Mem) (2019). On remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the state agency's hand ling of the damages portion of the case was not neutral toward the Kleins' religionunder Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S. Ct. 1719.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Government Coercion of Speech Devastated Aaron and Melissa Klein's Lives and Destroyed Their Business",
		"context": "In 2019, this Court granted a writ ofcertiorari in the Kleins' case, then remanded138 S. Ct. 1719. 139 S. Ct. 2713 (Mem) (2019). On remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the state agency's hand ling of the damages portion of the case was not neutral toward the Kleins' religionunder Masterpiece Cakeshop , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court also struck the damagesaward issued by the state agency but upheld theremainder of the state agency's liability finding againstthe Kleins. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Respondents Identify No Reason To Ignore The Fourth Amendment's Original Meaning.",
		"context": "This Court has admonished that neither prece- dent, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], nor policy, see District of 554 U.S. 570, can justify abrogating the original understanding of the Constitution. This is particularly true where a party seeks to narrow its protection: The Fourth Amendment \"must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.\" Jones , 565 U.S. at 411; see also 818 F.3d 988.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Respondents Identify No Reason To Ignore The Fourth Amendment's Original Meaning.",
		"context": "This Court has admonished that neither prece- dent, see 541 U.S. 36, nor policy, see District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], can justify abrogating the original understanding of the Constitution. This is particularly true where a party seeks to narrow its protection: The Fourth Amendment \"must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.\" Jones , 565 U.S. at 411; see also 818 F.3d 988.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Respondents Identify No Reason To Ignore The Fourth Amendment's Original Meaning.",
		"context": "This Court has admonished that neither prece- dent, see 541 U.S. 36, nor policy, see District of 554 U.S. 570, can justify abrogating the original understanding of the Constitution. This is particularly true where a party seeks to narrow its protection: The Fourth Amendment \"must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.\" Jones , 565 U.S. at 411; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, Respondents' precedent- and policy-based arguments are wrong. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "818 F.3d 988",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "Applying a State's choice -of-law rules also comports with the principle that federal courts should not create federal common law to displace state- created rules in the absence of strong justifications. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[C]ases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified \" are \" 'few and restricted ,' \" O'Melveny & 512 U.S. 79 . Creating federal common law can be appropriate for matters concerning \"relationships with other coun- tries .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "Applying a State's choice -of-law rules also comports with the principle that federal courts should not create federal common law to displace state- created rules in the absence of strong justifications. See 140 S. Ct. 713. \"[C]ases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified \" are \" 'few and restricted ,' \" O'Melveny & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Creating federal common law can be appropriate for matters concerning \"relationships with other coun- tries .\" 519 U.S. 213 ; see, e.g., Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "\"[C]ases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified \" are \" 'few and restricted ,' \" O'Melveny & 512 U.S. 79 . Creating federal common law can be appropriate for matters concerning \"relationships with other coun- tries .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see, e.g., Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398. But t he selection of a choice -of-law rule under the FSIA for state -law-based claims does not usually implicate foreign policy concerns . Congress has deter- mined that applying state law is generally appropriate interpreting the current bill and its provisions,\" and \"no inferences should be drawn from differences\" between the 1973 and the 1976 section -by-section analyses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "\"[C]ases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified \" are \" 'few and restricted ,' \" O'Melveny & 512 U.S. 79 . Creating federal common law can be appropriate for matters concerning \"relationships with other coun- tries .\" 519 U.S. 213 ; see, e.g., Banco Nacional de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But t he selection of a choice -of-law rule under the FSIA for state -law-based claims does not usually implicate foreign policy concerns . Congress has deter- mined that applying state law is generally appropriate interpreting the current bill and its provisions,\" and \"no inferences should be drawn from differences\" between the 1973 and the 1976 section -by-section analyses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "See, e.g. , American Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 530 U.S. 363 ; 389 U.S. 429 . More generally , the Constitution limits a State's ability \" to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies, on slight connections, because it is a forum state .\" 345 U.S. 571 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "See, e.g. , American Ins. 539 U.S. 396; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 389 U.S. 429 . More generally , the Constitution limits a State's ability \" to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies, on slight connections, because it is a forum state .\" 345 U.S. 571 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "See, e.g. , American Ins. 539 U.S. 396; 530 U.S. 363 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . More generally , the Constitution limits a State's ability \" to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies, on slight connections, because it is a forum state .\" 345 U.S. 571 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "539 U.S. 396; 530 U.S. 363 ; 389 U.S. 429 . More generally , the Constitution limits a State's ability \" to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies, on slight connections, because it is a forum state .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Other constit utional provisions provide additional limits . See Allstate Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "Other constit utional provisions provide additional limits . See Allstate Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]472 U.S. 797. In light of those safe- guards , concerns about foreign relations in the context of international conflict -of-law problems \"limit the scope and reach of state law\" in certain instances, but \"they ordinarily do not supply a conflicts rule or a uni-form rule of substantive law to be followed by state courts or by federal courts sitting in diversity .\" See Eu- gene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.56, at 149 (1982) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law",
		"context": "Other constit utional provisions provide additional limits . See Allstate Ins. 22 U.S. 302[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In light of those safe- guards , concerns about foreign relations in the context of international conflict -of-law problems \"limit the scope and reach of state law\" in certain instances, but \"they ordinarily do not supply a conflicts rule or a uni-form rule of substantive law to be followed by state courts or by federal courts sitting in diversity .\" See Eu- gene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.56, at 149 (1982) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent Forecloses Arthrex's Bright-Line Test",
		"context": "est. Every time this Court has considered an Appoint- ments Clause challenge to an administrative adjudi-cator, it has concluded that the adjudicator is an infe- rior Officer. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049 (SEC ALJs); Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666 (appellate military judges); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has never held (or even hinted) that an admini strative adjudicator was a principal Officer. When squarely presented with the question in Edmond , the Court said no.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent Forecloses Arthrex's Bright-Line Test",
		"context": "Despite recognizing that \"Buckley's 'significant authority'\" standard for distin- guishing inferior Officers from mere employees was \"unadorned\" and \"framed in general terms,\" the Court saw no need for further \"elaborat[ion].\" Id. at 2051– 52 (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Now, even though nobody in Lucia suspected the adjudicators there might be principal Officers, see 138 S. Ct. at 2051 n.3, Arthrex asks the Court to adopt es-sentially the same bright-line rule to differentiate principal from inferior Officers. But as this Court re- affirmed just last Term, there is no \"'exclusive crite-rion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent Forecloses Arthrex's Bright-Line Test",
		"context": "30–33. This Court has recognized the political branches' primary role in \"defin[ing]\" and \"fill[ing]\" offices. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have an \"'inferior understanding of the realities of administration.'\" Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent Forecloses Arthrex's Bright-Line Test",
		"context": "Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted). The Judiciary is thus ill-suited to craft \"im- mutable rules\" that would constrain how Congress de- fines every sort of adjudicator in every single agency. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, adopting a \"'specific direction'\" like Arthrex's proposed bright-line test could \"'harass[ ]'\" the country with \"'endless controversies.'\" 487 U.S. 654.",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Precedent Forecloses Arthrex's Bright-Line Test",
		"context": "17 U.S. 316. Indeed, adopting a \"'specific direction'\" like Arthrex's proposed bright-line test could \"'harass[ ]'\" the country with \"'endless controversies.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Preserving Congress's discretion within justiciable constraints is a virtue, not a vice, under the Appoint- ments Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apprendi Is a Shield Protecting Against Increased Sanctions for Facts not Found by a Jury, not a Sword Allowing the Government to Evade the First Amendment with Sentencing Enhancements",
		"context": "1. Apprendi focuses on the requisite burden of proof for increased sentencing . The government is attempting to weaponize Ap- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Apprendi states the Constitution's guarantee that every fact supporting an upward depa rture from a crime sentenc- ing ran ge must meet the same burden of proof as the facts of the predicate offence. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apprendi Is a Shield Protecting Against Increased Sanctions for Facts not Found by a Jury, not a Sword Allowing the Government to Evade the First Amendment with Sentencing Enhancements",
		"context": "Pet. Br. at 40 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This is fine advice in the context of Booker , where that label meant the difference between a defendant receiving his full rights under the Constitution and the government working around the constitutional standard for crimi- nal convictions by labeling crimes as sentence en- hancements . The advice is i napposite here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apprendi Is a Shield Protecting Against Increased Sanctions for Facts not Found by a Jury, not a Sword Allowing the Government to Evade the First Amendment with Sentencing Enhancements",
		"context": "Statutory interpretation matters outside of Apprend i's core holding should be limited to statutes passed in Apprend i's wake. Unquestionably, Apprendi applies retroactively to every substantive crime masquerading as a sentence enhancement , regardless of when it was written into law. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (overruling in part 490 U.S. 638 , which applied Apprendi to a sentencing scheme previously upheld under pre -Apprendi case law) . Ac- cordingly , the Court may reasonably believe that leg- islation passed after Apprendi is written cognizant of the requirement that sentence enhancements receive the same fact -finding rigor as the predicate offence. But subparagraph (B)(i) was added to the statute in 19 86, 14 years before Apprendi .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Apprendi Is a Shield Protecting Against Increased Sanctions for Facts not Found by a Jury, not a Sword Allowing the Government to Evade the First Amendment with Sentencing Enhancements",
		"context": "Statutory interpretation matters outside of Apprend i's core holding should be limited to statutes passed in Apprend i's wake. Unquestionably, Apprendi applies retroactively to every substantive crime masquerading as a sentence enhancement , regardless of when it was written into law. See, e.g., 136 S. Ct. 616 (overruling in part [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which applied Apprendi to a sentencing scheme previously upheld under pre -Apprendi case law) . Ac- cordingly , the Court may reasonably believe that leg- islation passed after Apprendi is written cognizant of the requirement that sentence enhancements receive the same fact -finding rigor as the predicate offence. But subparagraph (B)(i) was added to the statute in 19 86, 14 years before Apprendi .",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 638",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Quill Firmly Established That Proper Reconsideration Of Quill's Bright-Line Standard For Sales And Use Taxes Lies With Congress",
		"context": "See id. at 318 (citing Prudential Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (\"No matter how [the Court] evaluate[s] the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with [the Court's] conclusions.\"). Further, overturning Quill 's bright-line rule in the context of this case may very well (as it could have in Quill ) \"raise thorny questions concerning the retroactive application of [state sales and use] taxes and might trigger substantial unanticipated liability\" in other cases. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Quill Firmly Established That Proper Reconsideration Of Quill's Bright-Line Standard For Sales And Use Taxes Lies With Congress",
		"context": "Congress possesses the \"power to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or even undesirable burdens.\" Id. at 318 (citing Commonwealth Edison [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A denial of cert iorari in this case would permit Congress the time and space to exercise that power in the context of est ablished legislative process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"",
		"context": "35 using the words \"domestic government.\" Those comparisons are of little use. \"[T]here is no 'canon of interpretation that forbids interpreting different words used in different parts of the same statute to mean roughly the same thing,'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Also, for each supposedly comparable statute, Con- gress had reasons to use the words \"tribe\" that do not apply to the Bankruptcy Code. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"",
		"context": "16 28 U.S.C. §§ 3002(7), 3002(10), 3104, 3205(a). 36 Stevens , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No such presump- tion applies to \"other foreign or domestic government\" or \"governmental unit,\" which naturally include sovereigns. Third , the Band quotes (at 25-26) the Sixth Circuit's pronouncement that \"there is not one example in all of history where [this] Cour t has found that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity without expressly mentioning Indian tribes some-where in the statute.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"",
		"context": "No such presump- tion applies to \"other foreign or domestic government\" or \"governmental unit,\" which naturally include sovereigns. Third , the Band quotes (at 25-26) the Sixth Circuit's pronouncement that \"there is not one example in all of history where [this] Cour t has found that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity without expressly mentioning Indian tribes some-where in the statute.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. None of those cases involved a statute using broad language of abrogation comparable to § 101(27) and § 106(a). Each involved a much narrower abrogation or none at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"",
		"context": "Santa Clara Pueblo construed a civil-rights statute that authorized federal habeas actions against tribal officials but no actions against tribes themselves. See 436 U.S. at 59. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved cross-claims filed in Missouri against two tribes, but Congress had authorized cross-claims against those tribes only in the Indian Territory. Id. at 513.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"",
		"context": "Indeed, the Band itself suggests that the word \"tribe\" is not needed after all. Following the dissent in the First Circuit, the Band offers (at 27) the phrases 17 The Court's other decisions about tribal immunity involved no contentions that federal statutes abrogated immunity. See Upper Skagit Indian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (state-law action to quiet title); Kiowa Tribe , 523 U.S. at 759-60 (state-law action for breach of contract); Potawatomi , 498 U.S. at 509 (state tax collection); Three Affiliated Tribes , 476 U.S. at 890 (state statute attempting to require waiver of tribal immunity as condition of access to state courts). 18 See also 139 S. Ct. 1804. 38 \"every government\" or \"any government with sover- eign immunity\" as clear enough to abrogate without the word \"tribe.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"",
		"context": "Following the dissent in the First Circuit, the Band offers (at 27) the phrases 17 The Court's other decisions about tribal immunity involved no contentions that federal statutes abrogated immunity. See Upper Skagit Indian 138 S. Ct. 1649 (state-law action to quiet title); Kiowa Tribe , 523 U.S. at 759-60 (state-law action for breach of contract); Potawatomi , 498 U.S. at 509 (state tax collection); Three Affiliated Tribes , 476 U.S. at 890 (state statute attempting to require waiver of tribal immunity as condition of access to state courts). 18 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 38 \"every government\" or \"any government with sover- eign immunity\" as clear enough to abrogate without the word \"tribe.\" But ever ything the Band has to say (at, e.g., 1, 14, 26, 27) about Congress's supposed \"practice\" of referring to Indian tribes only by name could equally be said of a st atute using those phrases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous, at Best",
		"context": "From the dawn of patent law in the United States until 2015, the USPTO never sought attorneys' fees from a dissatisfied patent applicant who appealed an unfavorable decision. In 2015, the USPTO changed course, moving to recover the prorated salaries of two attorneys and one paralegal for defending a suit against the Commissioner of Patents under § 1 45. NantKwest, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The history of 35 U.S.C. § 1 45 suggests that \"expenses\" was never meant to, nor was it ever previously understood to, include attorneys' fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "860 F.3d 1352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM",
		"context": "Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898. All parties and the courts below agree that under the rule of reason, if plaintiffs 8 establish that a restraint is \"prima facie anticompeti- tive,\" then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a \"procompetitive justification.\" California Dental [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Fed. Trade 133 S. Ct. 2223. The law places the burden of establishing pro- competitive benefits on the defendant largely because \"[t]he defendant, being the author of the restraints, is in a better position to explain why they are profitable and in consumers' best interests.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM",
		"context": "All parties and the courts below agree that under the rule of reason, if plaintiffs 8 establish that a restraint is \"prima facie anticompeti- tive,\" then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a \"procompetitive justification.\" California Dental 526 U.S. 756; accord Fed. Trade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The law places the burden of establishing pro- competitive benefits on the defendant largely because \"[t]he defendant, being the author of the restraints, is in a better position to explain why they are profitable and in consumers' best interests.\" 7 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1505, at 432 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM",
		"context": "of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010) (Horizontal Merger Guidelines) (merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims because \"much of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms\"); see generally Int'l Broth. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals essentially reversed the burden of proving procompetitive benefits. The court held that in a market involving a two-sided platform like credit cards, it was insufficient for plaintiffs merely to establish anticompetitive harm on one side of the platform.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM",
		"context": "The court's exclusive focus on the Amex platform was erroneous. 2 2 The court of appeals criticized the district court's reliance on its (unchallenged) finding that all consumers that shop with merchants that accept Amex credit cards are harmed because higher merchant fees are passed on in the form of higher retail 10 In any event, there is no requirement that an an- titrust plaintiff show net harm to both sides of a two- sided platform to establish a prima facie case. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (harm to advertis- ers; no showing of harm to readers); Lorain Journal 342 U.S. 143. The court of appeals' holding to the contrary hinges on its conclusion that the relevant market must be defined to include both sides of a two-sided market. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM",
		"context": "The court's exclusive focus on the Amex platform was erroneous. 2 2 The court of appeals criticized the district court's reliance on its (unchallenged) finding that all consumers that shop with merchants that accept Amex credit cards are harmed because higher merchant fees are passed on in the form of higher retail 10 In any event, there is no requirement that an an- titrust plaintiff show net harm to both sides of a two- sided platform to establish a prima facie case. See,345 U.S. 594 (harm to advertis- ers; no showing of harm to readers); Lorain Journal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals' holding to the contrary hinges on its conclusion that the relevant market must be defined to include both sides of a two-sided market. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM",
		"context": "And it is wrong because it is well settled that proving anticompetitive harm directly, by showing actual detrimental effects, is an alternative to proving anticompetitive harm indirectly by show- ing market power in a relevant market. See Fed. Trade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Since the purpose of the inquir- ies into market definition and market power is to de- prices. According to the Second Circuit, this \" fails to take into account the offsetting benefits to cardholders in the form of re- wards and other services.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Question Presented Is of Insufficient Importance to Warrant Certiorari",
		"context": "To begin with, Amgen identifies no current differences of federal law among the federal courts of appeals . And while this Court does occasionally grant certiorari to review Federal Circuit decisions involving patent law , the overwhelming majority of those decisions generated a panel dissent, en banc proceedings, or at least a call for rehearing en banc, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Hologic, 957 F.3d 1256 . None of that is present here. Additionally, as Amgen acknowledges, Pet.24, this Court has repeatedly denied petitions raising this 5 Amgen engages in further misdirection when it repeatedly quotes the opinion respecting en banc denial as \"acknowledg[ing] that '[o]ne can reasonably ask … why enablement is a question of law.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Question Presented Is of Insufficient Importance to Warrant Certiorari",
		"context": "But 22 the judg ments in those cases simply reflected a judicial conclusion that the evidence could not reasonably support a determination that a patent was enabled. They are no different from any other case where the court declares summary judgment or other judgment as a matter of law based on an insufficient evidentiary showing —even in cases involving purely factual issues. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The defendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned in this case, but that right was subject to the condition, fundamental in the conduct of civil actions, that the court may withdraw a case from the jury and direct a verdict according to the law if the evidence is uncontradicted and raises only a question of law. \"); see also 528 U.S. 440 . Indeed, even Amgen's leading case, Wood , makes clear that if the undisputed evidence demonstrates that a patent does not sufficiently enable an invention, \" undoubtedly it would be the duty of the court to declare the patent void.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Question Presented Is of Insufficient Importance to Warrant Certiorari",
		"context": "They are no different from any other case where the court declares summary judgment or other judgment as a matter of law based on an insufficient evidentiary showing —even in cases involving purely factual issues. See 213 U.S. 103 (\"The defendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned in this case, but that right was subject to the condition, fundamental in the conduct of civil actions, that the court may withdraw a case from the jury and direct a verdict according to the law if the evidence is uncontradicted and raises only a question of law. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, even Amgen's leading case, Wood , makes clear that if the undisputed evidence demonstrates that a patent does not sufficiently enable an invention, \" undoubtedly it would be the duty of the court to declare the patent void.\" 46 U.S. (5 How .)",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "w. The und eveloped conflict on the general question whether the Medicare Act incorporates the APA's notice -and-comment exception for interpretive rules does not warrant this Court's review of the specific application of section 1395hh(a)(2) raised here. vacated Secretary's action on other grounds), rev'd in part on other grounds , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Texas All. for Home Care 811 F. Supp. 2d 76, aff'd681 F.3d 4022008 WL 11381846 requires HHS to conduct notice -and- comment rulemaking before providing instructions to a Medicare Administrative Contractor that makes initial determinations of paymen ts due under Medicare, when those instructions rest on a non - legally -binding administrative interpretation of a relevant statutory provision.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.3d 1102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "w. The und eveloped conflict on the general question whether the Medicare Act incorporates the APA's notice -and-comment exception for interpretive rules does not warrant this Court's review of the specific application of section 1395hh(a)(2) raised here. vacated Secretary's action on other grounds), rev'd in part on other grounds , 746 F.3d 1102; Texas All. for Home Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd681 F.3d 4022008 WL 11381846 requires HHS to conduct notice -and- comment rulemaking before providing instructions to a Medicare Administrative Contractor that makes initial determinations of paymen ts due under Medicare, when those instructions rest on a non - legally -binding administrative interpretation of a relevant statutory provision.\" Pet. (I).",
		"citation_value_orig": "811 F. Supp. 2d 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "w. The und eveloped conflict on the general question whether the Medicare Act incorporates the APA's notice -and-comment exception for interpretive rules does not warrant this Court's review of the specific application of section 1395hh(a)(2) raised here. vacated Secretary's action on other grounds), rev'd in part on other grounds , 746 F.3d 1102; Texas All. for Home Care 811 F. Supp. 2d 76, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2008 WL 11381846 requires HHS to conduct notice -and- comment rulemaking before providing instructions to a Medicare Administrative Contractor that makes initial determinations of paymen ts due under Medicare, when those instructions rest on a non - legally -binding administrative interpretation of a relevant statutory provision.\" Pet. (I).",
		"citation_value_orig": "681 F.3d 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "Circuit on that question, it is unclear whether that court's application of the plain text of the Medicare Act produces an outcome that is any different than it would reach under the APA on the facts presented in this case. That is not a question for this Court to decide in the first instance. See, e.g., McLane Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 2. On the more general interpretive- rule- exception question addressed by the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "On the more general interpretive- rule- exception question addressed by the D.C. Circuit, the other circuit decisions the Government cites offer little more than conclusory statements appearing mostly in footnotes and all resting on an unexamined assumptio n that the Medicare Act incorporates the APA's exceptions. The first cited decision, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , merely assumed (in a footnote) that the Medicare Act incorporates the 5 Review by this Court would also be premature because there are other grounds for invalidating the agency's 2014 action: the Secretary's interpretation is inconsistent with the language and intent of the Medicare DSH statute (see note 2, supra ); the changed standard is arbitrary and capricious for several reasons, including the agency's failure to address the significant economic impact of the change (see pp. 36 -38, infra); under section 1395hh(e)(1)(A), \"a substantive change in regulations, manual in structions, interpretive rules, statements of policy, or guidelines of general applicability under this subchapter shall not be applied retroactively to items and services furnished before the effective date of the change\" except under certain circumst ances not relevant here ( see p. 7, supra ). 27 APA's exceptions without actually deciding the quest ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 F.3d 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "at 79 n.4 (\"We proceed herein as if the [statute's] exemption for interpretive rules were identical to the APA's. [The plaintiff] has not argued that the two standards are materially different.\"). The second case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], also did not decide the question, as the court \"found no reason to explore the possibility of a distinction between the Medicare Act and the APA.\" Id. at 633.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "at 633. And the third (again in a footnote) incorrectly cited Erringer as \"[holding] that [section 1395hh(a)(2)] imposes no standards greater than those established by the APA,\" and stated its agreement on that \"corollary\" issue. Baptist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This is not the sort of mature circuit split reflecting the well -considered analysis of the lower courts that would inform and assist this Court's consideration of the matter. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 F.3d 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "That also is incorrect. As procedures of the APA\" in issuing \"rules and regulations relating to benefits\"). 8 The Government incorrectly invokes [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to claim that the D.C. Circuit erred. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review",
		"context": "17a n.4, the D.C. Circuit did exactly that. In Monmouth Medical [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the court \"s[aw] no reason to explore the pos sibility of a distinction\" between the APA and the Medicare Act. Id. at 814.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 F.3d 807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioner's rule would severely damage trademark owners' ability to reorganize",
		"context": "(Nov. 25, 2018) (describing \"rebranding\" of three distressed restaurant brands, including the Ground Round trademark acquired from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case); see also Wi lton & Devore at 773 n.210. Reorganization may require rejection of franchise agreements with onerous contra ct terms or agreements with substandard or litigious licensees. See, e.g., Goren- stein Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the Sunbeam rule applies and licen- sees can continue to use licensed brands under the failed franchise business plans that yielded bankruptcy, reor- ganization will often be impossi ble. And as the court of appeals correctly observed, the Sunbeam rule would force licensors to choose between (1) retaining burden- some obligations associated with monitoring quality con- trol and continuing relationsh ips with adversarial fran- chisees, or (2) abandoning a valuable trademark to the public domain.",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 F.2d 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The outcome of this case will have serious implications for the recognition of harms caused by the unprecedented rise in the collection and use of sensitive user data",
		"context": "The cases being filed against Big Tech Amici are not a mere coincidence , or a concerted effort by the plaintiffs' bar to extract \"in terrorem \" settlements out of them . Rather, they are a recognition by courts that Big Tech Amici 's collect ion and use of consumers' sensitive data often causes concrete harms to consume rs. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied140 S. Ct. 937 (202 0), for instance, plaintiffs sued amicus Facebook , alleging that its use of face recognition technology violated Illinois' Biomet ric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) . In recent years, many states have enacted p rivacy laws , such as BIPA, t hat identify certain types of data as particularly sensitive and provide consumers with statutory rights to protect their information from those harm s. BIPA regulates the \"collection, use, safeguarding, and storage of biometrics,\" including scans of hands or face geometry, and imposes various 17 obligations on private entities regarding the collection, retention, use, and destruction of such information.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.3d 1264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The outcome of this case will have serious implications for the recognition of harms caused by the unprecedented rise in the collection and use of sensitive user data",
		"context": "As the Ninth Circuit stressed , \"both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual 's control of information concerning his or her person.\" Id. (quoting U.S. Dep 't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (198 9)). Drawing insight from th is Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, t he Ninth Circuit found that the fac e recognition technology at issu e could \"obtain information that is 'detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled, ' which would be almost impossible without such technology. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The outcome of this case will have serious implications for the recognition of harms caused by the unprecedented rise in the collection and use of sensitive user data",
		"context": "Drawing insight from th is Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, t he Ninth Circuit found that the fac e recognition technology at issu e could \"obtain information that is 'detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled, ' which would be almost impossible without such technology. \" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). As such, the Ninth Circuit held that BIPA protect s consumers' concrete privacy interests and that Facebook's conduct presented a material risk of harm to these interests . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The outcome of this case will have serious implications for the recognition of harms caused by the unprecedented rise in the collection and use of sensitive user data",
		"context": "at 598– 99. Finally , in a case concerning amicus Google's misuse of user data collected from cookies, the Third Circuit rejected the notion that internet companies like Google and Facebook may collect consumer data free from repercussion. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The court reasoned that in \"an era when millions of Americans conduct their affairs increasingly through electronic devices, the assertion ... that federal courts are powerless to provide a remedy when an internet company surreptitiously collects private data ... is untenable. Nothing in Spokeo or any other Supreme Court decision suggests otherwise.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "934 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE LOOK-THROUGH APPROACH IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE POLICY",
		"context": "By contrast, the formalistic approach advocated by Petitioner would promote arti- ficial distinctions and enco urage needless gamesman- ship. 7 See Pershing , 819 F.3d at 182-183; Bangor & Aroostook R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Rodriguez de 490 U.S. 477. 11",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 F. Supp. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE LOOK-THROUGH APPROACH IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE POLICY",
		"context": "7 See Pershing , 819 F.3d at 182-183; Bangor & Aroostook R.R. 359 F. Supp. 261; cf. Rodriguez de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": ". , a remedy that Congress has not provided.\" Chief Justice John Roberts, Oral Argu- ment, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] I. CONGRESS SHOULD DECIDE THIS IS- SUE DUE TO ITS UNIQUE COMPETENCE IN THIS AREA Since the outset, this Cou rt recognizes that it is a substantial step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to exercise its judicial authority to establish and apply a cause of action for \"damages against fed- eral officials in order to re medy a constitutional viola- tion.\" 137 S.Ct. 1843.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Chief Justice John Roberts, Oral Argu- ment, 137 S.Ct. 1843 I. CONGRESS SHOULD DECIDE THIS IS- SUE DUE TO ITS UNIQUE COMPETENCE IN THIS AREA Since the outset, this Cou rt recognizes that it is a substantial step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to exercise its judicial authority to establish and apply a cause of action for \"damages against fed- eral officials in order to re medy a constitutional viola- tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even when the Court does ex- ercise its judicial authority to establish and apply a cause of action, the Court must do so with the greatest limitations in mind. 403 U.S. 388; 442 U.S. 228.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "137 S.Ct. 1843. And even when the Court does ex- ercise its judicial authority to establish and apply a cause of action, the Court must do so with the greatest limitations in mind. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 442 U.S. 228. Bivens started with a Fourth Amendment violation against federal law enforcement officers when searching a home. Bivens, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "137 S.Ct. 1843. And even when the Court does ex- ercise its judicial authority to establish and apply a cause of action, the Court must do so with the greatest limitations in mind. 403 U.S. 388; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bivens started with a Fourth Amendment violation against federal law enforcement officers when searching a home. Bivens, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Bivens, supra. Soon af- ter Bivens , the Court then approved a Fifth Amend- ment equal protection claim against a United States Congressman for employment discrimination viola- tions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And then right after Passman , the Court expanded Bivens recognizing an Eighth Amend- ment claim against federal jailers for inadequate in- mate medical care. 446 U.S. 14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "442 U.S. 228. And then right after Passman , the Court expanded Bivens recognizing an Eighth Amend- ment claim against federal jailers for inadequate in- mate medical care. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Upon examining the now referred to \"ancient regime,\" Justice Kennedy wrote that during the mid- 20th century, the Court felt that it was a proper judicial function to \"provide such remedies as are nec-essary to make effective\" a statute's purpose. Abbasi, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 14",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Thus, as a routine matter with respect to stat- utes, the Court would imply causes of action not ex-plicit in the statutory text itself. See, e.g., J.I. Case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, upon re-examining this judicially created exception, Justice Kennedy recognized that 7 Bivens and its progeny coincided during a time when the Court followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now. Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "at 1855. Beginning in the late 1970s, Justice Kennedy ob- served that the Court began to move away from the \"old regime's judicially imp lied causes of action\" and cautioned that where Cong ress intends private liti- gants to have a cause of act ion, the far better course is for Congress to confer that remedy explicitly. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 532 U.S. 275556 U.S. 662. This is in concurrence with the fact that the Court refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants dur- ing the past 30 years. Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "at 1855. Beginning in the late 1970s, Justice Kennedy ob- served that the Court began to move away from the \"old regime's judicially imp lied causes of action\" and cautioned that where Cong ress intends private liti- gants to have a cause of act ion, the far better course is for Congress to confer that remedy explicitly. 441 U.S. 677; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]556 U.S. 662. This is in concurrence with the fact that the Court refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants dur- ing the past 30 years. Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "at 1855. Beginning in the late 1970s, Justice Kennedy ob- served that the Court began to move away from the \"old regime's judicially imp lied causes of action\" and cautioned that where Cong ress intends private liti- gants to have a cause of act ion, the far better course is for Congress to confer that remedy explicitly. 441 U.S. 677; see, e.g., 532 U.S. 275[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is in concurrence with the fact that the Court refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants dur- ing the past 30 years. Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "This is in concurrence with the fact that the Court refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants dur- ing the past 30 years. Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Abbasi , 137 S.Ct. at 1856; see also Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61. So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "So far, the Court decided against creating: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, 462 U.S. 367; a race- discrimination suit against military officers, 462 U.S. 296; a subs tantive due process suit against military officers, 8 U.S. 669; a procedural due process suit against So- cial Security officials, 487 U.S. 412; a pro- cedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, 510 U.S. 471; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison oper- ator, Correctional Services 534 U.S. 61; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, 551 U.S. 537; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a pri- vate prison, 565 U.S. 118. Even when a United States Citizen suffered a heart attack while working for a privately-operated prison, operating under the color of federal law, this Court refused to extend Bivens remedies beyond the very limited original boundaries that followed Bivens . See Correctional Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So when a party \"seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution itself,\" Justice Ken- nedy wrote, \"just as when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action und er a federal statute, separation-of-powers principle s are or should be cen- tral to the analysis.\" Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "In our case, nine years have passed since the shooting that started this litigation took place and to date, with ample opportunity to address the issue of cross-border shootings, Congress chooses not to do so. II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY AP- PLIED THIS COURT'S RULING IN ABBASI In the original petition before this Court, the Court remanded the case back to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with the instruction to reexamine the petitioner's Bivens claim in light of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] which was handed down two months prior to this case's decision. 137 S.Ct. 2003. Upon receiv- ing this cause on remand, the Fifth Circuit followed the Court's instructions and shut the door on the 11 petitioner's claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY AP- PLIED THIS COURT'S RULING IN ABBASI In the original petition before this Court, the Court remanded the case back to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with the instruction to reexamine the petitioner's Bivens claim in light of 137 S.Ct. 1843 which was handed down two months prior to this case's decision. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Upon receiv- ing this cause on remand, the Fifth Circuit followed the Court's instructions and shut the door on the 11 petitioner's claim. 885 F.3d 811.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 2003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Id. at 815. Judge Jones went on to write that beginning in 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"broke new ground by allowing suits that made consti- tutional claims against the federal government and its entities to proceed under a judicially recognized cause of action.\" Hernandez , 885 F.3d at 815. Circuit Judge Jones in Hernandez , begins by ana- lyzing the Petitioners' first claim that the \"unprovoked shooting of a civilian by a fede ral police officer is a proto- typical excessive force claim, presents no 'new context' under Bivens .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Id. 13 To date, the Court refuses to extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment to a foreign citizen residing in the United States against American law enforce- ment agents' search of his premises in Mexico. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Language in Verdugo 's majority opinion strongly suggests that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to American officers' ac- tions outside this country's borders. Hernandez , 885 F.3d at 817; Verdugo–Urquidez , 494 U.S. at 274–275, 110 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "In Hernandez , the Court itself de- scribed the Petitioners' Fourth Amendment claims as raising \"sensitive issues.\" Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Judge Jones went on to point out that the Petition- ers could prevail on a substantive due process Fifth Amendment claim but only if the federal courts accept two novel theories. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 2003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "The first theory requires the fed- eral courts allow a Bivens action to proceed based upon a Fifth Amendment excessive force claim simply be- cause Verdugo prevents the assertion of a comparable Fourth Amendment claim. But this first theory already is a non-starter because the courts have already recog- nized that all claims alleging excessive force by law en- forcement officers during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \"seizure\" of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \"reasonableness\" standard, rather than under a \"substantive due pro- cess\" approach. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 The second theory, according to Judge Jones, would require the extension of the Boumediene deci- sion, both beyond its explicit constitutional basis, Art. I, § 9, cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "I, § 9, cl. 2, the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, and beyond the United States government's de facto con- trol of the territory surro unding the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, Judge Jones wrote, \"even nine years later, no federal circuit court has extended the holding of Boumediene either substantively to other constitutional provisions or geographically to locales where the United States has neither de facto nor de jure control.\" Hernandez , 885 F.3d at 817.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Again Judge Jones writes, \"[t]he Su- preme Court has never implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving the military, national security, or intel- ligence.\" Id. at 819; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Abbasi , the Court stressed that \"[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and the President.\" Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "As Judge Jones stated, \"[n]ational-security concerns are hardly 'talismanic' whereas here border security is [the] issue.\" Id. ; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, Judge Jones asserts, the threat of Bivens liability will undermine the Border Patrol's ability to perform duties essential to national security. Hernandez , 885 F.3d at 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 F.3d 1337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "§ 211(e)(3)(B). Judge Jones also pointe d out a similar context – airport security – where the Third Circuit recently de- nied a Bivens remedy for a TSA agent's alleged consti- tutional violations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying on Abbasi , the Third Circuit's analysis is instructive in that to im- ply a Bivens action for damages against a TSA agent – TSA employees are tasked with assisting in a critical aspect of national security securing our nation's air- ports and air traffic – could indeed increase the proba-bility that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split- second decisions about suspicious passengers. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "at 1858. And, Judge Jones points out a similar context – airport security – where the Third Circuit recently de- nied a Bivens remedy for a TSA agent's alleged consti- tutional violations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying on Abbasi , the Third Circuit's analysis is instructive in that to im-ply a Bivens action for damages against a TSA agent – TSA employees are tasked with assisting in a critical 18 aspect of national security securing our nation's air- ports and air traffic – could indeed increase the proba- bility that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split-second decisions about suspicious passengers. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "The claim that the extraterritorial issues that surround the extension of Bivens in this instance do not invoke hes- itation as a \"special factor\" is manifestly incorrect. Over time, this Court has held that caution needs to be exercised when dealing with different sovereigns. Ki- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Kiobel , this Court issued an opinion affirming the dismissal of a complaint filed under the Alien Tort Statute seeking damages against the Nigerian, Dutch and British 19 companies for alleged violation s of the Law of Nations. See Kiobel , 569 U.S. at 108.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "In upholding the Second Circuit's decision dismissing the entire complaint filed, this Court cited the presumption against extraterrito-riality and wrote \"[t]he presumption 'serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in interna- tional discord.' \" Id. at 108-109 citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, the Kiobel deci- sion tangentially addresses Congressional intent and extraterritoriality. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "This presumption, while usually invoked in situa- tions dealing with statutory interpretation, should provide guidance for this Court in the Bivens context. In Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank , Justice Scalia wrote that \"[t]his disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality has occurred over many decades in 20 many courts of appeals and has produced a collection of tests for divining congre ssional intent that are com- plex in formulation and unpredictable in application.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Scalia goes on to hold that this presumption demon- strates \"the wisdom of the presumption against extra-territoriality. Rather than guess anew in each case, this Court applies the presu mption in all cases, pre- serving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "IV. THE NINTH CIRCUI T IS INCORRECT IN ITS APPLICATION OF ABBASI The entire Ninth Circuit Swartz opinion is based on the idea that absence of a remedy for the Petitioners is the basis for discountin g the special factors pre- sented by this case. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has made is abundantly clear that the absence of an alternative, statutory rem- edy for alleged violations of Constitutional rights, sometimes necessitates judicial action in awarding monetary compensation. See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "This Court has made is abundantly clear that the absence of an alternative, statutory rem- edy for alleged violations of Constitutional rights, sometimes necessitates judicial action in awarding monetary compensation. See Br. For United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 19 citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has e mphasized, the \"special fac- tor\" considerations should be the critical consideration even in the absence of an alternative remedy for al- leged wrongs. See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "As this Court has e mphasized, the \"special fac- tor\" considerations should be the critical consideration even in the absence of an alternative remedy for al- leged wrongs. See Br. For United States as Amicus Cu- riae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 19 citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Wilkie v. Robbins , Justice Souter writing for the majority opin- ion opined that \"paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before au- thorizing a new kind of federal litigation.\" 551 U.S. 537; citing 462 U.S. 367881 F.3d 1146, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Bivens in the context of a prisoner's First Amendment access to court or Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims arising out of a prison disciplinary process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "For United States as Amicus Cu- riae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 19 citing 551 U.S. 537. In Wilkie v. Robbins , Justice Souter writing for the majority opin- ion opined that \"paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before au- thorizing a new kind of federal litigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; citing 462 U.S. 367881 F.3d 1146, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Bivens in the context of a prisoner's First Amendment access to court or Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims arising out of a prison disciplinary process. In- terestingly, the Ninth Circuit's rational was based on the idea that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have ever addressed these claims be- fore, the circumstances of Vega 's case against private defendants plainly present a \"new context\" under Ab- basi. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "For United States as Amicus Cu- riae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 19 citing 551 U.S. 537. In Wilkie v. Robbins , Justice Souter writing for the majority opin- ion opined that \"paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before au- thorizing a new kind of federal litigation.\" 551 U.S. 537; citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]881 F.3d 1146, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Bivens in the context of a prisoner's First Amendment access to court or Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims arising out of a prison disciplinary process. In- terestingly, the Ninth Circuit's rational was based on the idea that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have ever addressed these claims be- fore, the circumstances of Vega 's case against private defendants plainly present a \"new context\" under Ab- basi. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "For United States as Amicus Cu- riae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 19 citing 551 U.S. 537. In Wilkie v. Robbins , Justice Souter writing for the majority opin- ion opined that \"paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before au- thorizing a new kind of federal litigation.\" 551 U.S. 537; citing 462 U.S. 367[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Ninth Circuit refused to extend Bivens in the context of a prisoner's First Amendment access to court or Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims arising out of a prison disciplinary process. In- terestingly, the Ninth Circuit's rational was based on the idea that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have ever addressed these claims be- fore, the circumstances of Vega 's case against private defendants plainly present a \"new context\" under Ab- basi. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "881 F.3d 1146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "Id. 26 To date, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment to a foreign citizen residing in the United States against American law enforcement agents' search of his premises in Mex-ico. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Language in Verdugo 's majority opinion strongly suggests that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to American offic- ers' actions outside this country's borders. Hernandez , 885 F.3d at 817; see also Verdugo–Urquidez , 494 U.S. at 274–275, 110 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT",
		"context": "In Hernandez , the Court itself described the Petitioners' Fourth Amendment claims as raising \"sensitive issues.\" Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Abbasi , the Court stressed that \"[n]ational- security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and the President.\" Abbasi , 137 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 2003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden",
		"context": ". The decision below also is inconsistent with the analysis in Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where this Court upheld the display of a Ten Com- mandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. A plurality of the Court emphasized an \"unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "Neither is true. First, the court of appeals' decision is consistent with the distinction drawn by this Court between restrictions on \"outgoing\" correspondence to \"noninmate[s]\" and \"incoming\" correspondence to inmates. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Incoming\" messages pose unique risks because they are directed at and will be read by inmates. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "Thornburgh acknowledged that \"outgoing correspondence that magnifies grievances or contains inflammatory racial views cannot reasonably be expected to present a danger to the community inside the prison.\" Id. at 411-12 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis in original). Though it disapproved of Martinez 's analytical approach, Thornburgh left in place its central holding, which invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a prison regulation that prohibited \"statements that 'magnify grievances' or -19- 'unduly complain'\" in \"outgoing letters.\" Martinez , 416 U.S. at 415-16; see also Thornburgh , 490 U.S. at 411 (\"[A] careful reading of Martinez suggests that our rejection of the regulation at issue resulted not from a least restrictive means requirement, but from our recognition that the regulated activity centrally at issue in that ca se—outgoing personal correspondence from prisoner s—did not, by its very nature, pose a serious threat to prison order and security.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "Martinez , 416 U.S. at 415-16; see also Thornburgh , 490 U.S. at 411 (\"[A] careful reading of Martinez suggests that our rejection of the regulation at issue resulted not from a least restrictive means requirement, but from our recognition that the regulated activity centrally at issue in that ca se—outgoing personal correspondence from prisoner s—did not, by its very nature, pose a serious threat to prison order and security.\"). Thornburgh also noted that \"Martinez has been characterized in subsequent decisions of this Court as a case concerning 'written communication by inmates' to noninmate recipients.\" Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 412, n.10 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 826, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added). Inmate grievances are akin to \"outgoing\" correspondence because they are directed to \"noninmates,\" i.e., to prison staff. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "However, the record is devoid of any suggestion that Richey did or attempted to do so. -20- Second, if there exists a circu it split at all, it is not as pronounced as Dahne claims.8 Several of the cases on which Dahne relies did not involve Petition Clause claims at all. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, was a Fourteenth Amendment due process case . There, an inmate alleged that a prison deprived him of a liberty interest when it punished him for a \"maliciously untrue\" statement in a grievance. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "713 F.2d 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "at 1006-08. The inmate did not allege, and the Third Circuit did not consider, whether a violation of the inmate's right to petition had occurred. Similarly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], concerned an inmate's free speech challenge based on a \"libelous\" statement in a grievance. 9 Unlike Richey, the inmate in Hale did not allege a right to petition claim and did not assert an injury based on the prison's failure to 8 The various unpublished decisions that Dahne cites are not precedent and are thus insufficient to demonstrate a circuit split. See, e.g., Reyes 135 S. Ct. 2150 9 As this Court has recognized, \"[c]ourts should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the [Speech and Petition] Clauses or that Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition Clause claims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 917",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "Similarly, 371 F.3d 917, concerned an inmate's free speech challenge based on a \"libelous\" statement in a grievance. 9 Unlike Richey, the inmate in Hale did not allege a right to petition claim and did not assert an injury based on the prison's failure to 8 The various unpublished decisions that Dahne cites are not precedent and are thus insufficient to demonstrate a circuit split. See, e.g., Reyes [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 9 As this Court has recognized, \"[c]ourts should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the [Speech and Petition] Clauses or that Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition Clause claims.\" Borough of 564 U.S. 379. There is \"extensive common ground in the definition and delineation of these rights,\" but \"[t]here may arise cases where the special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a distinct analysis; and if that is so, the rules and principles that define the two rights might differ in emphasis and formulation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "9 Unlike Richey, the inmate in Hale did not allege a right to petition claim and did not assert an injury based on the prison's failure to 8 The various unpublished decisions that Dahne cites are not precedent and are thus insufficient to demonstrate a circuit split. See, e.g., Reyes 135 S. Ct. 2150 9 As this Court has recognized, \"[c]ourts should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the [Speech and Petition] Clauses or that Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition Clause claims.\" Borough of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is \"extensive common ground in the definition and delineation of these rights,\" but \"[t]here may arise cases where the special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a distinct analysis; and if that is so, the rules and principles that define the two rights might differ in emphasis and formulation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "See id . at 918 (noting that \"the prison investigated the [inappropriate statement in the grievance] and found it to be baseless\"). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], likewise indicated that the inmate's First Amendment claim was grounded in the First Amendment's Speech Clause, not the Petition Clause. See id . at 580 (referencing \"fr ee speech\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.2d 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "See id . at 580 (referencing \"fr ee speech\"). The same was true in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See id . at 1277 (noting that the court's decision \"depends on whether [the applicable prison rules] amounted to valid limitations on the exercise of speech\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 F.3d 1270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "at 1277 (noting that the court's decision \"depends on whether [the applicable prison rules] amounted to valid limitations on the exercise of speech\"). Other of Dahne's cases tu rned on facts that are materially different from those in this case. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an inmate who worked as a \"legal advisor\" to fellow prisoners \"threatened\" a staff member during an in- person witness interview on behalf of another inmate. As a result of the threat, the inmate lost his position as a legal advisor, following which he filed several grievances. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "250 F.3d 1032",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "Id. at 1037. Similarly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held th at an inmate's \"oral complaint[s]\" lost First Amendment protection because the inmate raised one of them \"public[ly]\" and -22- voiced another in a \"confrontational, disorderly manner.\" In both cases, the court noted that the inmate could instead have raised his concerns in a written grievance. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F.3d 791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": ". . \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the panel's decision itself acknowledged that prison administrators may punish offenses like the one in Watkins . App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 F.3d 866",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "App. 6a. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Eighth Circuit did not meaningfully analyze the application of the Petition Clause to an inmate's disrespectful language in a grievance. Rather, it affirmed the district court's decision to grant qualified immunity on an inmate's right to petition claim only \"[t]o the extent [the claim was] alleged\" and without meaningful discussion. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 910",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "Id. Given the vagueness of that holding, the state of the Eighth Circuit's law on this subject is uncertain given another case decided shortly before Cowans . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, none of the state court cases on which Dahne relies are \"decision[s] by a state court of last resort.\" Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "999 F.2d 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
		"context": "For that reason, those cases are insufficient to demonstrate a split of authority warranting this Court's review. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent there exists a split of authority regarding Dahne's proposed question, that split has not developed to the point of warranting review by this Court. The petition should be denied on that separate basis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C.The data that Argus Leader requested is \"confidential\" information that can be withheld under Exemption 4",
		"context": "287 F. Supp. 3d 50. Retailers also testified that they took measures to pro- tect the store-level data. See McDonnell Douglass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One retailer described extensive information security training for employees, a closed campus, and computer-network security measures implemented to keep financial data private, specifically in- cluding store-level SNAP sales data. JA93-94.",
		"citation_value_orig": "922 F. Supp. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Agency's Action Violates The Statute",
		"context": "And it would be extraordinary for Congress to do so by burying the modest term \"ad- 12 just[]\" at the end of clause (t)(14)(A)(iii)'s second su b- clause. See MCI Telecomms. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As if to conjure its preferred state of affairs into be- ing through sheer repetition, the government observes that subclause (I) (on acquisition cost) comes before subclause (II) (on average price) and then intones (Br.32 -35, 37) that the former is Congress's \"primary\" instruction and the latter only a \"backup.\" But the or-der of the subclauses, which are alternatives sepa- rated by \"or,\" cannot possibly make any analytical dif- ference.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Agency's Action Violates The Statute",
		"context": ", with any data on which the agency cares to rely. Those assertions are nothing less than an impermissible ne- gation of \"textually applicable provisions meant to 15 limit\" an agency's \"discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government seeks to paper over that problem by arguing (Br.41 -42) that the agency retains the op- tion to do a cost study that satisfies subparagraph (14)(D) if it ever desires to, and in that circumstance could set rates based on acquisition cost directly under subclause (I) rather than indirectly under subclause (II). But the fact that the government's interpretation renders a mandatory study —\"shall conduct\" —entirely voluntary demonstrates that the government is re-writing the statute, not i nterpreting it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The agency's explanation for its decision does not satisfy the APA's requirements for reasoned decisionmaking",
		"context": ", 924 F.3d at 703-705. One of the \"basic procedu ral requirements of ad- ministrative rulemaking is that an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions.\" Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Agency explanation s must be \"based on consideration of the relevant factors,\" a nd may not \"fail [] to consider an important aspect of the problem.\" State Farm , 463 U.S. at 42, 43.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The agency's explanation for its decision does not satisfy the APA's requirements for reasoned decisionmaking",
		"context": "Agency explanation s must be \"based on consideration of the relevant factors,\" a nd may not \"fail [] to consider an important aspect of the problem.\" State Farm , 463 U.S. at 42, 43. When an agency departs from its prior position, it must (among other things) supply a \"rea- soned explanation for the change ,\" Encino Motorcars , 136 S. Ct. at 2125 , and \"display awareness that it is changing positions ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To explain the illegality rationale here, the deci- sion memorandum invoke s just two considerations: the rulings in the DAPA li tigation and the Attorney 42 General 's letter. Regents Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The agency's explanation for its decision does not satisfy the APA's requirements for reasoned decisionmaking",
		"context": "App. 48a -49a. The decision memorandum asserts that the agency was unable to identify specific discretionary denials of defe rred action involving applicants who \" appeared to satisfy 16 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 43 the\" DACA eligibility criteria , Regents Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The agency's explanation for its decision does not satisfy the APA's requirements for reasoned decisionmaking",
		"context": "at 2575 -2576 . A reasoned explanation facilitates effec- tive judicial review and ensures \"political accountabil- ity,\" which is \"the very premise of administrative dis- cretion in all its forms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Regents Supp. App. 31a -34a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "223 F.3d 937",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the American Arbitration Association Rules Alter What \"Default\" Meant in 1925",
		"context": "8-13. But the FAA was enacted thirteen years before the Federal Rules came into existence, 6 and nothing in its text suggests an intent to incorporate an external, later-enacted body of law. See New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].7 6 Section 4 was amended in 1954 to add references to the Federal Rules regarding service of the notice of the petition to compel arbitration and the jury trial for which § 4 provides. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, chap. 1263, § 19, 68 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "50(a)(1) 39 (emphasis added). Rule 50, in other words, is designed to let courts evaluate the suffic iency of evidence entered into the trial record, not to decide questions of pure law that do not depend on that record. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And since a trial will moot any pretrial ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, see pp. 15-16, supra , litigants must file Rule 50 motions if they hope to raise a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "See Kaplan, supra , at 814. 41 Rule 50 addresses this tension between the sanctity of verdicts and judicial economy by (a) first requiring parties to raise their sufficiency of the evidence challenges in a motion for direct verdict before the case goes to the jury; and then (b) permitting them to \"renew\" their motion after the verdict. See Kaplan, supra , at 814-15; W [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That way , if a \"renew[ed]\" motion for a directed verdict is granted in error, the appellate court can simply reinstate the verdict. See 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2540 (3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "2022 update). Thus \"[t]he case is so shaped at the trial level as to increase the chance of a final disposition on appeal, should the case go so far.\" Kaplan, supra , at 815; see Montgomery Ward & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] motions and \"allow the jury to bring in a verdict\" to \"avoid[] the waste and expense of another trial\"). Rule 50's text and history thus make clear that it was never meant to become a modern-day substitute for a bill of exceptions in which all of the claims of legal and factual error in a case are list ed out in a pair of motions bookending either side of a verdict. Rather, Rule 50 was written to provide courts a framework to set aside jury verdicts in those specific circumstances where a court determines that the eviden ce admitted at trial was insufficient to support a verdict.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "Caselaw from this Court further confirms the point. The Court has analyzed the reviewability of 42 unrenewed Rule 50(a) motions challenging evidentiary sufficiency in a quartet of cases. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Globe Liquor 332 U.S. 571; Johnson, 344 U.S. at 49; Unitherm Food Sys., 546 U.S. 394. Each case involved the heartland of Rule 50 motions—challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence— and the holding of each case reflects that context. Cone held that where a party fails to make a Rule 50(b) motion, an appellate court cannot direct a verdict in the party's favor, primarily beca use of potential unfairness to the opposing part y .",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "Caselaw from this Court further confirms the point. The Court has analyzed the reviewability of 42 unrenewed Rule 50(a) motions challenging evidentiary sufficiency in a quartet of cases. See 330 U.S. 212; Globe Liquor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Johnson, 344 U.S. at 49; Unitherm Food Sys., 546 U.S. 394. Each case involved the heartland of Rule 50 motions—challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence— and the holding of each case reflects that context. Cone held that where a party fails to make a Rule 50(b) motion, an appellate court cannot direct a verdict in the party's favor, primarily beca use of potential unfairness to the opposing part y .",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "Caselaw from this Court further confirms the point. The Court has analyzed the reviewability of 42 unrenewed Rule 50(a) motions challenging evidentiary sufficiency in a quartet of cases. See 330 U.S. 212; Globe Liquor 332 U.S. 571; Johnson, 344 U.S. at 49; Unitherm Food Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Each case involved the heartland of Rule 50 motions—challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence— and the holding of each case reflects that context. Cone held that where a party fails to make a Rule 50(b) motion, an appellate court cannot direct a verdict in the party's favor, primarily beca use of potential unfairness to the opposing part y .",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
		"context": "5 Notably , none of these cases dealt with the separate question whether purely legal issues must be re-raised to be preserved, and none a ddressed the reviewability of issues resolved at summary judgment. The reason why is obvious: Rule 50 is not remotely directed at that question, and it should play no role in deciding whether a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment can be heard on appeal. 5 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 F.2d 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Excessive Force Claim Against a Law Enforcement Officer Is Not a Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Question",
		"context": "stion. In any event, the court of appeals' efforts to come up with \"special factors\" justifying its denial of a remedy are based on a gross misunderstanding of what this case is about. Citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the en banc majority held that no remedy should be available because, it said, the case involved issues of \"foreign policy.\" Contrary to what the Fifth Circuit seemed to think, however, the availability of a damages remedy for civil rights violations is not a foreign policy matter within the executive branch's competence. Rather, the trial of damages claims between individuals is a core judi- cial function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An Excessive Force Claim Against a Law Enforcement Officer Is Not a Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Question",
		"context": "If anything, the Fifth Circuit's decision—in failing to apply an ordinary judicial remedy to a claim by a Mexican national—is what could give rise to new diplomatic issues, directly contrary to Agee's caution that courts should avoid entanglementin international diplomacy. Agent Mesa was clearly on U.S. soil when he shot Sergio Hernández, and there are no practical or political difficulties in applying U.S. law regardless of which side of the border Sergio was on. Unlike [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], applying U.S. law in this case would not interfere with Mexico's foreign affairs or diplomacy. On the contrary, providing an adequate and effective remedy would show appropriate respect for Mexico's sovereignty on its own territory and for the rights of itsnationals. The court of appeals' suggestion that the matter can be resolved by the Border Violence Prevention Council completely misunderstands that Council's function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "Severability \"is a question of legislative intent.\" Alaska Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 543 U.S. 220 . In conducting that inquiry, the Court has applied a \"presumption in favor of severability.\" Regan , 468 U.S. at 653 (plurality opinion); see Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "Severability \"is a question of legislative intent.\" Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. 678; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In conducting that inquiry, the Court has applied a \"presumption in favor of severability.\" Regan , 468 U.S. at 653 (plurality opinion); see Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "In conducting that inquiry, the Court has applied a \"presumption in favor of severability.\" Regan , 468 U.S. at 653 (plurality opinion); see Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, \"the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed un-less it is evident that the Legislature wou ld not have en- acted those provisions which are within its power, ind e- pendently of that which is not. \" 462 U.S. 919 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "561 U.S. 477. Thus, \"the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed un-less it is evident that the Legislature wou ld not have en- acted those provisions which are within its power, ind e- pendently of that which is not. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 1. Section 708 of the Communications Act of 1934, of which the TCPA is a part, provides: \"If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be a ffected thereby.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "2395- 2402, and those provisions remained in place for the next 24 years without any exception for calls made to collect government -backed debts. That history show s that \"the bal ance of the legislation is []capable of functioning independent ly\" of the government -debt ex- ception. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684; s ee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], since t he automate d- call restriction will continue \"to protect privacy i nter- ests\" in the same way it did from 1991 -2015. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "The co urt of appeals' severab ility holding is con- sistent with this Court's resolution of similar issues in- volvin g the severability of exceptions to statutory rules . a. Like this case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved a \"general provision \" that was later amended to include a \"pro- viso.\" Id. at 526.",
		"citation_value_orig": "278 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "The Court further ex- plained that \"the statute, before the amendment, was entirely valid,\" ibid. , and that the unconstitutional amendment was \"a nullity and, therefore, powerless to work any change in the existing statute,\" which \"must stand as the only valid expression of the legislative in-tent,\" id. at 526 -527; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in Frost , the exception at issue here was \"added by way of amendment many years after the original sec- tion was enacted.\" 278 U.S. at 526 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "Frost thus reinforces the con- clusion that, if the Court finds the post- 2015 statutory scheme unconstitutional, the proper remedy is to sever the government -debt exception. 38 b. The Court's decision i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], further supports that conclusion. That case involved a federal statute \"gov- erning acquisition of U.S. citizenship by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen, the other, a citizen of an other nation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA",
		"context": "The Court then considere d \"the appropriate rem- edy,\" Morales -Santana , 137 S. Ct. at 1698 (citation omitted), which it described as a question of \"the legis-lature's intent,\" id. at 1699. The Court explained that it \"has looked to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion\" in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"in considering whether the legislature would have struck an exception and applied the general rule equally to all, or instead, would have broadened the exception to cure the equal protection violat ion.\" Morales -Santana , 137 S. Ct. at 1699- 1700. The Court further explained that, in accordance with Justice Harlan's opinion , \"a court should measure the intensity of commitment to the re-sidual policy —the main rule, not the exception —and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statu-tory scheme that would occur by extension [of the ex- ception] as opposed to abrogation [of it] .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. PETITIONER'S APPEAL TO HISTORICAL PRACTICE IS MISGUIDED",
		"context": "\"The Federal Government has,\" of course, \"expanded dramatically over the past two centuries.\" Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even more rece ntly, the administrative state has seen \"explosive growth … since 1970.\" West 142 S. Ct. 2587.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. PETITIONER'S APPEAL TO HISTORICAL PRACTICE IS MISGUIDED",
		"context": "Petitioner is mistaken. To start, even petitioner 's cursory version of the history is not \"dispositive, \" because \"a longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a statute's constitutionality.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is true \"even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.\" 397 U.S. 664.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. PETITIONER'S APPEAL TO HISTORICAL PRACTICE IS MISGUIDED",
		"context": "560 U.S. 126. That is true \"even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More to the point, however, petitioner's version of the history is woefully incomplete. It was not until 1986 that the modern FCA litigation ecosystem was formed—both through the FCA's amendments and the consonant government expansions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. PETITIONER'S APPEAL TO HISTORICAL PRACTICE IS MISGUIDED",
		"context": "Schumer , 520 U.S. at 950. Outside the FCA, \"[t]he proliferation of Government, State and Federal, would amaze the Framers, and the administrative state with its reams of regulations would leave them rubbing their eyes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. History simply cannot save petitioner's 18 interpretation from the constitutional quagmire that it would create. The Court should reject it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent",
		"context": "4-5, supra (collecting cases). a. An early example is [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which involved a federal criminal statute that punished any person who \"under color of any law willfully subjects\" anyone \"to the deprivation of any rights secured or protected by the Constitution.\" Id. at 93 ( Douglas, J., plurality).",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent",
		"context": "Vagueness Avoidance 44. 12 b. More recently, the Court engaged in explicit vagueness avoidance in Skilling , supra, a case con- cerning the honest -services statute enacted to resur- rect a lower -court body of law that had been rejected in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Skilling , the Court recognized the \"force\" of the argument that the honest -services statute was uncon- stitutionally vague. 561 U.S. at 405.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent",
		"context": "In these cases , a narrowing construction is still ultimately adopted. But the Court purports to justify that result using mere interpretation that de- termines semantic mea ning, rather than relying on vagueness avoidance as an integral tool of judicial construction . See, e.g., Ruan v. United States , 142 S. 13 Ct. 2370, 2377- 2380 (2022); Van 141 S. Ct. 1648; 140 S. Ct. 1566; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 574 U.S. 528; see also Vagueness Avoidance 46-52. That trend gets vagueness avoidance wrong by treating it as indistinguishable from ordinary consti- tutional avoidance, a tool for resolv ing ambiguity . See p. 7, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent",
		"context": ", Yates, 574 U.S. at 539- 549 (plurality opin- ion). Each of those outcomes makes vagueness avoid- ance virtually useless as a n analytical matter, render- ing it much like the modern form of the rule of lenity that is used only to resolve \"grievous ambiguity\" after all other tools have been exhausted. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The practical effect is that the se recent decisions rejecting exceedingly broad readings of federal penal statutes do not deter lower courts from adopting sim- ilarly broad constructions of other statutes . Each de- cision is essentially ad hoc , providing no broadly ap- plicable principles of construction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict on the question whether the CWA's prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants covers activities that cause pollutants to be conveyed through groundwater to waters of the United States",
		"context": "App. 22, at least where the plaintiff has established a \"direct hydro- logical connection \" between the point source and the navigable waters, ibid. In support of those rulings, both court s relied in part on the same language from Justice Scalia' s plurality opin ion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Maui Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict on the question whether the CWA's prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants covers activities that cause pollutants to be conveyed through groundwater to waters of the United States",
		"context": "19 -20. The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, recently issued a pair of decisions hold ing th at the prohibition on the \"dis- charge of [a] pollutant\" under Section 1311(a) was inap- plicable under analogous circumstances. The plaintiffs in Kentucky Waterways [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], brought suit under the Act against the operator of a coal -burning power plant that stored leftover coal ash in man -made ponds. Id. at 930- 931.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 925",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict on the question whether the CWA's prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants covers activities that cause pollutants to be conveyed through groundwater to waters of the United States",
		"context": "Id. at 937 . The Sixth Circuit applied the reasoning of Kentucky Waterways in Tennessee Clean Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], pet ition for reh'g pending, No. 17 -6155 (filed Oct. 22, 2018), which also involved allegations that pollutants from coal ash ponds had been conveyed through groundwater into navigable waters (there, the Cumberland River), id. at 438.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict on the question whether the CWA's prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants covers activities that cause pollutants to be conveyed through groundwater to waters of the United States",
		"context": "The circuit conflict is important. In addition to the Fourth, Sixth , and Ninth Circuit decisions described above , numerous district courts have confronted cases involving \"claim[s] that unpermitted wastes are reach- ing 'waters of the United States' by migration through groundwater that is hydrologically connected.\" Her- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sierra 145 F. Supp. 3d 601. Given the potential breadth of those provi- sions, and the ways in which groundwater may be con-nected to navigable waters, the question presented here has the potential to affect federal, state, and tribal reg-ulatory efforts in innumerable circumstances nation- wide. The implica tions for regulated parties are also significant, including because CWA violators may face 14 serious civil penalties and, in certain cases, criminal punishment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F. Supp. 2d 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict on the question whether the CWA's prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants covers activities that cause pollutants to be conveyed through groundwater to waters of the United States",
		"context": "Kinder Pet. App. 12 (quot- ing Gwaltney of Smithfield, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Based on its un- derstanding of that issue as being \" jurisdictional in na- ture, \" the Fourth Circuit felt compelled to \"address the question of an ongoing violation before proceeding fur- ther \" on the applica tion of the CWA's citizen -suit provi- sion to indirect discharges through groundwater. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": ". Going broadest still, the rest of the CAA confirms that best systems of emission reduction apply at the source. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When Congress wants an industry or source to hit an emission target by any means—including outside-the- fenceline measures—it says so directly. The CAA has express cap-and-trade programs, after all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": "So while the text creating those programs started elephant-sized, Section 111's requires the lower court's convoluted approach to get there. This Court should \"presume[]\" Congress acted deliberately when it \"include[d] particular language in one section of [the CAA] but omit[ted] it in another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 43 Section 111 thus differs from parts of the CAA less concerned with source-specific operations. The majority stressed that Section 111(a)(1) does not read like other parts of the CAA that discuss \"retrofit application[s]\" or \"retrofit technology.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": "Its standards of performance focus on \"pollution control devices.\" Union Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lagging facilities must \"install new control equipment.\" Nat'l- Southwire Aluminum 838 F.2d 835.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": "427 U.S. 246. Lagging facilities must \"install new control equipment.\" Nat'l- Southwire Aluminum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And emission limits must be \"to the fullest extent compatible with the available technology and economic feasibility.\" H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "838 F.2d 835",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": "§ 7401(a)(3). It also minimized the many ways the CAA balances environmental remediation with \"the allowance of reasonable economic growth.\" Chevron, U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44 Because Congress designed different parts of the statute to operate differently, a broad view of one of its purposes cannot drive the interpretive cart. And if Section 111's proper construction leaves EPA with too little power to respond to the serious issues surrounding climate change, the solution is not reinterpreting it with a purposivist bent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": "The answer is the same as when Congress confronted the problem of acid rain: When \"policy considerations suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to do it.\" Intel Corp. Inv. Pol'y [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Fed. Power 406 U.S. 621. For better or worse, Congress designed Section 111 as a tool to improve the performance of individual stationary sources, not a springboard for market transformation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope",
		"context": "Intel Corp. Inv. Pol'y 140 S. Ct. 768; see also Fed. Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For better or worse, Congress designed Section 111 as a tool to improve the performance of individual stationary sources, not a springboard for market transformation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress is not responsible for fixing Hardison's antonymous definition of undue hardship.",
		"context": "The separation of powers doctrine supplies the justification for the super stare decisis presumption. The theory goes that an initial interpretation of a statute is necessary as part of judicial review, but that subsequent reinterpretation s would usurp legislative authority to amend statutes . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, wrong statutory interpretations are \"balls tossed into Congress's court, for acceptance or not as that branch elects.\" Kimble , 576 U.S. at 456.",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress is not responsible for fixing Hardison's antonymous definition of undue hardship.",
		"context": "(\"A broad power to trump statutory text with erroneous gloss would remove the line between judicial interpretation and legislation.\"). It is also true that, where the Court engages in true statutory construction, a corollary justification for the super stare decisis presumption is that Congress's failure to amend a statute in response to judicial interpretation reflec ts tacit approval. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But almost five decades of Congressional silence on Hardison's non-interpretative judicial gloss should not be read as approval. See 328 U.S. 61.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress is not responsible for fixing Hardison's antonymous definition of undue hardship.",
		"context": "See, e.g., 491 U.S. 164. But almost five decades of Congressional silence on Hardison's non-interpretative judicial gloss should not be read as approval. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, the Congressional acquiescence theory is based on the \"false premise\" that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by what later Congresses want, \"rather than by what the law as enacted meant.\" 139 S. Ct. 1960.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress is not responsible for fixing Hardison's antonymous definition of undue hardship.",
		"context": "See 328 U.S. 61. In any event, the Congressional acquiescence theory is based on the \"false premise\" that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by what later Congresses want, \"rather than by what the law as enacted meant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Additionally, as Justice Barrett has pointed out, Congressional approval through silence \"circumvents the cons titutional limits on the 12 legislative process\" becaus e laws must be passed through bicameralism and presentment, Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals , 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. IF THE COURT RULES THAT THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT APPLY EXTRATERRITORIALLY, COURTS SHOULD RETAIN AUTHORITY TO STOP FOREIGN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT BY U.S. CITIZENS",
		"context": "Steele ¸ 344 U.S. at 282 (\"Petitioner concedes, as he must, that Congress in prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.\"). The Steele Court did not base this ruling on the text of the Lanham Act, but instead on fundamental principles of inte rnational law: For the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of i ts own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of 32 other nations or their nationals are not infringed. 344 U.S. at 285 -6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . ). Courts applying Steele have frequently relied on a defendant's status as a U.S. citizen to justify the grant or denial of an extraterritorial remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.",
		"context": "The Takings Clause states that \"private prop- erty\" shall not \"be taken for public use, without just compensation\" (U.S. Const., amend. V), and that rule is \"incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment\" ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As this Court has recognized, the Clause embodies the \"principles of Magna Carta\" that \"[t]he colonists brought to the New World, including that charter's protection against uncompen- sated takings.\" Horne , 576 U.S. at 358.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.",
		"context": "Ibid. (permitting seizure \"until they have received satisfaction for the debt that they paid for him\"); Den ex dem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Just as the Magna Carta protected property owners from uncompensated takings, it recog- nized that tax collectors could only seize property to satisfy the value of the debt payable to the Crown, leaving the property owner with the excess.\" Rafaeli, 952 N.W.2d 434.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.",
		"context": "Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation 343 (1876). For example, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for this Court that a tax collector had \"unquestionably ex- ceeded his authority\" when he sold more land than \"necessary to pay the tax in arrear.\" Stead's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While early decisions often interpreted particular statutes, it is not the case that, but for the statutes, tax collectors faced no limi- tations. Instead, it was widely understood that \"[t]he rule must be the same,\" even \"without any positive law for the purpose.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "8 U.S. 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.",
		"context": "As South Carolina's high court put it just after the Bill of Rights was adopted: \"It was against common right, as well as against Magna Charta, to take away the freehold of one man and vest it in another; and that too, to the prejudice of third persons, without any compensation.\" 1 S.C.L. 252. And just as the general principle of just compensation for a tak- ing was grounded in \"reason, justice and moral recti- tude\" ( VanHorne's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]),2 so too was the principle forbidding over-collection grounded in \"principles of obvious policy and universal justice.\" Tiernan , 6 Johns. Ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.",
		"context": "at 85; see 11 Minn. 48071 A. 40199 S.W. 1023 (landowner had the right to any \"excess in the bid over the amount which the sheriff could lawfully collect\" and \"the right to make the 12 Those decisions followed the general rule that an individual's interest in land was retained as \"equita- ble title\" even where legal title was terminated. As this Court explained in the mortgage context, under \"long-settled rules of law and equity in all of the states whose jurisprudence has been modelled upon the principles of the common law,\" a debtor retained \"eq- uitable title\" to the land even where, due to missed payments, \"legal title\" vested in the creditor. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"To 'extinguish the equitable title of the' debtor, the creditor was required 'to go into the Court of Chancery and obtain its order for the sale of the whole mortgaged property (if the whole is necessary,) free and discharged from the eq- uitable interest of the' debtor.\" Hall, 51 F.4th at 194 (quoting Bronson , 42 U.S. at 318-319).",
		"citation_value_orig": "42 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.",
		"context": "As relevant here, the same rule applied to foreclosures for \"payment of sheriff account to him\"); 94 N.W. 625; People ex rel. 10 A.D. 39551 F.4th 193, aff'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "76 U.S. 326",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's assertion of statutory overbreadth is unfounded",
		"context": "Those types of uses do not require permission in th e first place; or, to view the matter another way, everyone is presumed to have permission to use other people's names in those ways. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that Section 1028A will \"automatically\" apply \"whenever many of its predicate offenses are committed\" is unfounded . The predicate offenses that petitioner mentions (Br. 32 -34) —mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and healthcare fraud —can be and often are committed without using anyone else's means of identification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's assertion of statutory overbreadth is unfounded",
		"context": "The predicate offenses that petitioner mentions (Br. 32 -34) —mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and healthcare fraud —can be and often are committed without using anyone else's means of identification. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In those cases , Section 1028A would have no application. 33 The healthcare -fraud predicate at issue in this case is illustrative.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's assertion of statutory overbreadth is unfounded",
		"context": "33 The healthcare -fraud predicate at issue in this case is illustrative. Section 1028A would not apply if , for ex- ample, a patient defrauds a health care benefit program by lying about the patient's own eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]138 S. Ct. 1013347 F.3d 45. This case happens to involve one common type of healthcare fraud that does generally involve use of someone 's means of identification without lawful au- thority: filing false reimbursement claims on behalf of real patients. That species of healthcare fraud will usu- ally involve the unauthorized use of the patient's name or number to facilitate the fraud —precisel y the conduct that Section 1028A targets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "757 F.3d 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's assertion of statutory overbreadth is unfounded",
		"context": "33 The healthcare -fraud predicate at issue in this case is illustrative. Section 1028A would not apply if , for ex- ample, a patient defrauds a health care benefit program by lying about the patient's own eligibility for benefits. See, e.g., 757 F.3d 166138 S. Ct. 1013[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case happens to involve one common type of healthcare fraud that does generally involve use of someone 's means of identification without lawful au- thority: filing false reimbursement claims on behalf of real patients. That species of healthcare fraud will usu- ally involve the unauthorized use of the patient's name or number to facilitate the fraud —precisel y the conduct that Section 1028A targets.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 F.3d 45",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent's federal common law theory is refuted by the text of the Act",
		"context": "on the Judiciary , 94th Cong. 27 (1976). See Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], (\"[W]hether a stat e acts 'in the manner of ' a private party\" to engage in commercial activity is thus \"a question of behavior, not motivation . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "Ninth Circuit decisions that predate the events at issue in this case clearly establish that police officers cannot shoot a person—such as a woman conversing in her yard and holding a kitchen knife—if she does not pose an immediate risk of harm to an officer or third party, even if the person is holding a weapon. These cases reflect the Ninth Circuit's refinement of the basic principle that \"[a] n officer's use of deadly force is reasonable only if 'the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]126 F.3d 1189, involved the shooting of Kevin Harris at Ruby Ridge. 20 On the previous day, Harris had been involved in a firefight with other FBI agents, one of whom died, possibly from a bullet fired by Harris. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "39 F.3d 912",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "Ninth Circuit decisions that predate the events at issue in this case clearly establish that police officers cannot shoot a person—such as a woman conversing in her yard and holding a kitchen knife—if she does not pose an immediate risk of harm to an officer or third party, even if the person is holding a weapon. These cases reflect the Ninth Circuit's refinement of the basic principle that \"[a] n officer's use of deadly force is reasonable only if 'the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.'\" 39 F.3d 912[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved the shooting of Kevin Harris at Ruby Ridge. 20 On the previous day, Harris had been involved in a firefight with other FBI agents, one of whom died, possibly from a bullet fired by Harris. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "126 F.3d 1189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "Id. at 1204. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a suspect acted erratically outside his home and \"brandish[ed] a ha tchet at a police officer.\" Id. at 1276.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 F.3d 1272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "at 1285–86. Ninth Circuit law clearly establishes that police who shoot a suspect holding a semi-automatic rifle are not entitled to qualified immunity if there are conflicting accounts of whet her the suspect raised the weapon or threatened anyone with it. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Officer A attempted to break down the door to the home of a suspect who had a semiautomatic rifle 21 within arm's reach, while Officer B aimed his gun at the suspect through a window. Ultimately, Officer B shot the suspect through the window. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "952 F.2d 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "at 325. Surely the rule that police cannot shoot a suspect merely for holding a firearm also applies to a kitchen knife, which is generally less dangerous. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[W]here an officer had reason to believe that a suspect was only holding a knife, not a gun, and the suspect was not charging the officer and had made no slicing or stabbing motions toward him . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 F.3d 1139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": ". it was unreasonable for the officer to use deadly force against the suspect. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[E]ven when a suspect has a weapon, but the officer has no reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger of serious physical harm to him or others, deadly force is not justified . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 F.3d 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "In these cases, as in the current case, one or more officers claim that the person they shot raised a knife or did something threatening with it, but other witnesse s state that the shooting victim merely held the knife. The federal courts of appeals hold that summary judgment for the shooter is not warranted because the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the shooting victim fail to demonstrate a threat. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], police resp onding to a 911 call found a man (Sevier) sitting in hi s bedroom holding a knife. Sevier later emerged from the bedroom and stood in the doorway with the knife in his right hand. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 F.3d 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "Id. at 700. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], police resp onding to a 911 call found McKinney in his closet, holding a butcher knife in one hand and a twelve-inch stic k in the other. McKinney made a motion with the stick in his hand and began to rise from his seated position. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "997 F.2d 1440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "Id. at 407–08. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a police officer entered Duong's home in response to a call that three suspicious men had entered the home. When Officer Fox entered, he saw Duong on his back with a man on top of him. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "186 F. App'x 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves",
		"context": "Id. at 217. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], police officers found a man crying on the kitchen floor and holding a knife pointed at his chest. They ordered him to drop the knife, and he refused, but he did not make a threatening move. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 F.3d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope",
		"context": "Section 1252(f)(1) prohibits injunctive relief only where such relief \"enjoin[s] or restrain[s] the operation\" of covered provision s. Read in context, section 1252(f)(1) prevent s the lower courts from prohibiting the enforce- ment of covered provisions, but it does not prevent them from requiring such enforcement. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To \"enjoin\" is to \"forbid\" or \"prohibit,\" W EBSTER 'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 754 (2002) , and to \"restrain\" is to \"prevent from doing something,\" id. at 1936.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope",
		"context": "For example, in Nielsen v. Preap , the lower courts had enjoined section 1226's de- tention mandate , \"holding that criminal aliens are ex- empt from mandatory detention under [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(c) (and are thus entitled to a bond hearing) unless they are arrested when [they are] released , and no later.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Id. at 962.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope",
		"context": "Aleman 955 F.3d 762, cert. granted sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where the injunction in Gonzalez re- strain s the Executive's ability to remove aliens that Con- gress has deemed removable by requir ing bond hear- ings, id., the injunction here requires only the good -faith continuation of MPP until petitioners lawfully rescind it , Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 S. Ct. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope",
		"context": ". word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A different phrasing —such as \"compel\" or \"re- quire\" the \"continued operation\" —would have been a far more natural way to convey the opposite meaning here. Second , given th at \"enjoin\" may be fairly read as reaching either only prohibitory orders or both prohibi- tory and mandatory orders, this Court's longstanding precedent counsels the narrower meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope",
		"context": "Second , given th at \"enjoin\" may be fairly read as reaching either only prohibitory orders or both prohibi- tory and mandatory orders, this Court's longstanding precedent counsels the narrower meaning. \"Absent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, fed-eral courts retain their equitable power to issue injunc-tions in suits over which they have jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because Congress did not clearly seek to prevent lower courts from review- ing alleged executive dereliction , this Court should \"re- solve [any] ambiguities\" as allowing lower courts to act \"in accordance with their traditional practices.\" Hecht 321 U.S. 321.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope",
		"context": "442 U.S. 682 . Because Congress did not clearly seek to prevent lower courts from review- ing alleged executive dereliction , this Court should \"re- solve [any] ambiguities\" as allowing lower courts to act \"in accordance with their traditional practices.\" Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third , that view would read section 1252(f)(1) as amended by IIRIRA ahistorically . As respondents ' mer- its brief explained ( at 19, 23), IIRIRA was passed in re- sponse to persistent executive refusal to enforce Con- gress's immigration mandates .",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned",
		"context": ". The utter uselessness of Lemon as a constitutional yardstick for passive government monuments that include crosses is best illustrated by the fractured opinions of this Court in Capitol Square Review & Advisory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Justice O'Connor found that the reasonable observer looking at the Ku Klux Klan's display of a Latin cross in a plaza next to the state capital \"would view the Klan's cross display fully aware that Capitol Square is a public space in which a multiplicity of groups, both secular and religious, engage in expressive conduct.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VI. No \"Neutral\" Sex Stereotypes Are Taking Place",
		"context": "risks making the guarant ee of equal protection su- perficial, and so disserving it. Mechanistic classifica-tion of all our differences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.\" Tuan Anh [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
		"context": "Government officials sued in their i ndividual ca- pacities do not enjoy sovereign immunity. As this Court recognized in Alden v. Maine , \"[e]ven a suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fai rly attribu table to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See also 33 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fe deral Prac tice & Pro- cedure § 8352 (2d ed. 2019) (\"One way around sover- eign immunity is to sue not the sovereign, but the sovereign's officers .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
		"context": "When courts are considering lawsuits against non -sovereign de- fendants , Sossamon 's presumption against damages does not apply. Where immunity waivers do not ap ply, lower courts have recognized that the use of the phrase \"appropriate relief\" is sufficient to provide a damages remedy against defendants who do not enjoy sover- eign immunity. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That logic extends to cases un- der RFRA's companion statute, RLUIPA. The gov- ernment makes much of RLUIPA, statin g it \" uses the ident ical 'appropriate relief ' phrase.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 F.3d 1187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
		"context": "49. But lower courts have repeatedly determined that damages are av ailable against non -sovereign defend- ants under RLUIPA. See, e.g., Opulent Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]368 F. App'x 370510 F.3d 2. Those 23 courts have determined that, in some circumstances, \"appropriate relief\" include s damages. Perhaps this is why the only other circuit court t o have addressed the issue agrees that \"federal officers who violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity for damages.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "697 F.3d 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
		"context": "49. But lower courts have repeatedly determined that damages are av ailable against non -sovereign defend- ants under RLUIPA. See, e.g., Opulent Life 697 F.3d 279[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]510 F.3d 2. Those 23 courts have determined that, in some circumstances, \"appropriate relief\" include s damages. Perhaps this is why the only other circuit court t o have addressed the issue agrees that \"federal officers who violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity for damages.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 F. App'x 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
		"context": "Those 23 courts have determined that, in some circumstances, \"appropriate relief\" include s damages. Perhaps this is why the only other circuit court t o have addressed the issue agrees that \"federal officers who violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity for damages.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (3d Cir. 2016 ); see also Davil 777 F.3d 1198. This reasoni ng is con- sistent with the general construction of \"appropriate relief\" in cases involving non -sovereign defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
		"context": "Perhaps this is why the only other circuit court t o have addressed the issue agrees that \"federal officers who violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity for damages.\" 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016 ); see also Davil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This reasoni ng is con- sistent with the general construction of \"appropriate relief\" in cases involving non -sovereign defendants. The Department of Justice's Office of Legal Coun- sel reached the same conclusion shortly after Con- gress enacted RFRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 1198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 404(c)'s \"Limitations\" Could Have Easily Excluded Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders But Did Not",
		"context": "Congr ess would not accomplish that counterintuitive and con- sequential result through the government's convo- luted \"covered offense\" interpretation . After all, Con- gress does not \"hide elephants in mouseholes.\" Whit- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, again, if Congress had sought to exclude Section 841(b)(1)(C) crack offenders through Section 404(a) , it would have simply used \"amended \" rather than \"mod- ified.\" Or Congress would have crafted the \"c overed offense\" definition in an entirely different manner .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 404(c)'s \"Limitations\" Could Have Easily Excluded Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders But Did Not",
		"context": "Or Congress would have crafted the \"c overed offense\" definition in an entirely different manner . \"To supply omissions [from a statute] transcends the judicial function. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Doing so wo uld be particularly un- warranted here given how significant that purported limitation would be and how easily Congres s could have included it. The Court should reject the govern- ment's invitation to add a limitation that Congress it- self did not .",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 404(c)'s \"Limitations\" Could Have Easily Excluded Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders But Did Not",
		"context": "Doing so wo uld be particularly un- warranted here given how significant that purported limitation would be and how easily Congres s could have included it. The Court should reject the govern- ment's invitation to add a limitation that Congress it- self did not . See Hallst [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1989 ) (\"[W]e are not at liberty to create an exception where Congress has declined to do so\"). 25 In sum, pre-Fair Sentencing Act crack offenders sen- tenced under Section 841(b)(1)(C) have a \"covered of- fense \" under Se ction 404(a). Because the statutory text is plain, t he Court need go no further.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.",
		"context": "Petitioners argue that the word \"Legislature\" necessarily refers to \"'the representative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people.'\" Pet. 27 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ) (alteration in original). Hence, Petitioners contend, the General Assembly should \"bear primary responsibility for setting election rules.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Territoriality is the starting point for jurisdiction, online and offline",
		"context": "Extraterritoriality is there- fore the exception, rather than the rule, in matters of jurisdiction. This Court has recognized as much in the presumption that U.S. laws apply only within U.S. ter- ritory, absent a clear legislative indication to the con- trary. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 499 U.S. 244. The international community – including the United States – has recognized that territoriality is the starting point for establishing the jurisdiction in cyber-space as well. In 2013, for example, the GGE issued the following consensus statement regarding sovereignty and jurisdiction in cyberspace: 20 State sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty ap- ply to State conduct of [Information and Com- munication Technology]-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastruc- ture within their territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Territoriality is the starting point for jurisdiction, online and offline",
		"context": "Extraterritoriality is there- fore the exception, rather than the rule, in matters of jurisdiction. This Court has recognized as much in the presumption that U.S. laws apply only within U.S. ter- ritory, absent a clear legislative indication to the con- trary. 561 U.S. 247; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The international community – including the United States – has recognized that territoriality is the starting point for establishing the jurisdiction in cyber-space as well. In 2013, for example, the GGE issued the following consensus statement regarding sovereignty and jurisdiction in cyberspace: 20 State sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty ap- ply to State conduct of [Information and Com- munication Technology]-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastruc- ture within their territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Petitioner's knowledge-plus requirement would exclude from the ACCA many of the very crimes that it was designed to cover",
		"context": "3-7, supra . As in previous ACCA cases, t his 33 Court \"should not lightly conclude that Congress en- acted a self -defeating statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioner's theory would also produce other anoma- lous consequences. Petitioner would treat (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Petitioner's knowledge-plus requirement would exclude from the ACCA many of the very crimes that it was designed to cover",
		"context": "That distinction makes little sense \"i n the context of a statutory d efinition of ' violent felon y,' \" Johnson , 559 U.S. at 140. A conviction for threatening bodily in- jury does not necessarily require proof that t he defend- ant would actually have employed force; a mere bluff could suffice. See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 2 LaFave § 16.3 (2018) (explaining that \"[t]he weight of authority, fortified by the modern trend, is to include\" threats of injury that a defendant 34 does not intend to carry out) . A crime requiring reck- less causation of bodily injury , on the other hand, re- quires that the defendant deliberately —not just acci- dentally, see Voisine , 136 S. Ct. at 2279— place his own interests ahead of the bodily safety of others, and cause harmful results . Petitioner's approach, which would anomalously include t hreat offenses but not reckless - causation offense s, \"not only would defy common sense, but also would defeat Congress' stated objective of im- posing enhanced punishment on armed career criminals who have three prior convictions for violent felo- nies.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents",
		"context": ". A patent \"represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office,\" \"predicated on factors as to which reasonable men can differ widely\" and reached \"in an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the arguments which could be advanced by parties interested in proving patent invalidity.\" Lear, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unfortunately, the examiners conducting those ex parte proceedings have heavy caseloads: In the 2020 fiscal year, fewer than 8,500 patent examiners were tasked with reviewing more than 650,000 patent applications. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2020, at 189, 231 (2020) ( PTO Report ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Because It Entirely Disregards A Prescription's Purpose, Respondent's Standard Is Inconsistent With The Purpose Of The CSA",
		"context": "The CSA's purpose is to prevent diversion of con- trolled substances from legitimate to illegitimate channels. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The CSA was explicitly not intended to regulate or control the manner of medical practice. 21 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Because It Entirely Disregards A Prescription's Purpose, Respondent's Standard Is Inconsistent With The Purpose Of The CSA",
		"context": "Gonzales , 546 U.S. at 257 (\"the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute\"). It cer- tainly did not provide an \"intelligible principle\" guid-ing the delegation of that power. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The question is not how best to define \"medical practice\" or how the attor-ney general would prefer it be defined. 784 F.3d 666 (10th Cir.2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (\"If the separation of powers means any-thing, it must mean that the prosecutor isn't allowed 20 to define the crimes he gets to enforce.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Because It Entirely Disregards A Prescription's Purpose, Respondent's Standard Is Inconsistent With The Purpose Of The CSA",
		"context": "500 U.S. 160. The question is not how best to define \"medical practice\" or how the attor-ney general would prefer it be defined. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir.2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (\"If the separation of powers means any-thing, it must mean that the prosecutor isn't allowed 20 to define the crimes he gets to enforce.\"). The question is whether Congress, in enacting the CSA, clearly in- tended to subject medical pra ctitioners to decades in prison based on strict liability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "784 F.3d 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ex-post retrieval of Schedule B is no substitute for ex-ante reporting",
		"context": "But this Court has never held that s tate regulatory requirements are subject to a least -common- denominator criterion . Such a standard would be inconsistent with core fed- eralism values . See New State Ice [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Notably, the two States with the largest number of nonprofit organizations active within their borders — California and New York —are also two of the States that impose a S chedule B reporting requirement . See Brice McKeever, Nat'l Ctr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE IS BASED UPON A CHERISHED CONCEPT OF \"DUAL SOVEREIGNTY\"",
		"context": "In South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court identified five potential restraints upon Congress' use of conditional federal spending. One of those limitations is \"coercion,\" which includes commandeering states to perform functions dictated by the federal government. The Court noted that \"in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point 3 at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE IS BASED UPON A CHERISHED CONCEPT OF \"DUAL SOVEREIGNTY\"",
		"context": "Secretary Dole argued that the states still had the power to set the drinking age; they would merely lose some federal funding if they set it lower than age 21. This Court concluded at 211 that \"When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.\" The Court also said, \"Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress migh t be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion\" (quoting from Steward Machine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the State of New York sued the federal government asserting that provisions in the Low- Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 were coercive and violated state sovereignt y 2 See also, the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor in Dole. 4 under the Tenth Amendment. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE IS BASED UPON A CHERISHED CONCEPT OF \"DUAL SOVEREIGNTY\"",
		"context": "Id. at 177. Justice O'Connor stated that Congress may not simply \"commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,\" (q uoting from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But commandeering is not limited to direct compulsion. J. O'Connor added that \"a choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE IS BASED UPON A CHERISHED CONCEPT OF \"DUAL SOVEREIGNTY\"",
		"context": "(New York, supra). Either way, she wrote, \"the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,\" (quoting from Hodel, supra ). The Court expanded the anti-commandeering doctrine in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A provision in the Brady Gun Bill required chief law enforcement officers (the \"CLEO\") to administer part of the background check program. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE IS BASED UPON A CHERISHED CONCEPT OF \"DUAL SOVEREIGNTY\"",
		"context": "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problem s, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to minister or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case- by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty. In National Federation of Independent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court recognized the anti-commandeering doctrine again with the Congress's us e of the spending condition. Although the Court upheld most provisions of the ACA, it struck down another provision of the ACA that expanded Medicaid and coerced the states to either accept the expansion or risk losing existing Medicaid funding. The Court ruled that the federal 6 government cannot force the states to act against their will by withholding funds in a coercive manner.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE COURT SHOULD MAKE THE IMPLICIT STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT EXPRESS WITH REASONS AND ANALYSIS IN THESE CASES",
		"context": "The Court almost always identifies one or more \"questions presented\" by the case, either accepting one or more of the questions required to be suggested by the petitioner, or setting for the issue differently. When the court identifies a split among the decisions of the courts of appeals, it identifies the divergence, usually with some analysis.41 Given the poverty of authority and scholarship on the issue of the standards applied to requests for early certiorari, the Court is well poised to address the issue in the opinions in these cases. These are monumental cases, yet the court has months to consider the issue of why it granted certiorari before judgment here and 40 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (eff, Jan. 1, 2023) (listing specific types of cases generally considered for certiorari without \"controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion\") 41 See, e.g., 142 S. Ct. 1063; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 521 U.S. 179;. 18 include its explanation in the opinion in this case. Addressing this issue in the opinions in these cases will be authoritative and precedential.42",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE COURT SHOULD MAKE THE IMPLICIT STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT EXPRESS WITH REASONS AND ANALYSIS IN THESE CASES",
		"context": "The Court almost always identifies one or more \"questions presented\" by the case, either accepting one or more of the questions required to be suggested by the petitioner, or setting for the issue differently. When the court identifies a split among the decisions of the courts of appeals, it identifies the divergence, usually with some analysis.41 Given the poverty of authority and scholarship on the issue of the standards applied to requests for early certiorari, the Court is well poised to address the issue in the opinions in these cases. These are monumental cases, yet the court has months to consider the issue of why it granted certiorari before judgment here and 40 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (eff, Jan. 1, 2023) (listing specific types of cases generally considered for certiorari without \"controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion\") 41 See, e.g., 142 S. Ct. 1063; 556 U.S. 816; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]];. 18 include its explanation in the opinion in this case. Addressing this issue in the opinions in these cases will be authoritative and precedential.42",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "50 Press release: President Donald J. Trump Announces In- tent to Nominate and Appoint P ersonnel to Key Administration Posts (April 29, 2019), ht tps://www.whitehouse.g ov/presidential- actions/president-donald-j-trump-a nnounces-intent-nominate-appoint- personnel-key-administration-po sts-24/_ (Accessed May 22, 2019). 51 However, UTIER contends that the validity of the actions of the Oversight Board members is still a question that requires review by this Honorable Supreme Court. 52 United States Parole [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 53 Already, 568 U.S. 85. 54 422 U.S. 395.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "51 However, UTIER contends that the validity of the actions of the Oversight Board members is still a question that requires review by this Honorable Supreme Court. 52 United States Parole 445 U.S. 388. 53 Already, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 54 422 U.S. 395. 37 litigation.55 Thus, this Supreme Court should not exer- cise its judicial power over the Petitioner's request since it does not comply with the \"cases and controver- sies\" limitation imposed by Article III of the United States Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "52 United States Parole 445 U.S. 388. 53 Already, 568 U.S. 85. 54 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37 litigation.55 Thus, this Supreme Court should not exer- cise its judicial power over the Petitioner's request since it does not comply with the \"cases and controver- sies\" limitation imposed by Article III of the United States Constitution. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the ex- ceptions to the mootness doctrine do not apply in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "59 Any determination about this issue would thus be an advisory opinion, which is constitutionally pro- hibited.60 Moot questions \"require no answer. \"61 This 55 Already , 568 U.S. at 90-91. 56 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 57 393 U.S. 199. 58 392 U.S. 40.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "\"61 This 55 Already , 568 U.S. at 90-91. 56 419 U.S. 393. 57 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 58 392 U.S. 40. 59 455 U.S. 478.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "56 419 U.S. 393. 57 393 U.S. 199. 58 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 59 455 U.S. 478. 60 392 U.S. 83.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "57 393 U.S. 199. 58 392 U.S. 40. 59 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 60 392 U.S. 83. 61 North 404 U.S. 244.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "58 392 U.S. 40. 59 455 U.S. 478. 60 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 61 North 404 U.S. 244. 38 Honorable Court must deny th e petition for a writ of certiorari because the Presid ent's re-nomination of the current Oversight Board members is a strict compli- ance with the court of appe als mandate, thus, render- ing this case moot.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
		"context": "59 455 U.S. 478. 60 392 U.S. 83. 61 North [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 38 Honorable Court must deny th e petition for a writ of certiorari because the Presid ent's re-nomination of the current Oversight Board members is a strict compli- ance with the court of appe als mandate, thus, render- ing this case moot. ---------------------------------  ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below was correct.",
		"context": "This Court is not a court of error correction. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop , E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3), p. 351 (9th ed. 2007). Even so, the Eighth Circuit's decision — that Johnson's complaint should be dismissed —was correct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below was correct.",
		"context": "1a –37a. In other words, Johnson cannot show the Eighth Circuit's decision was wrong. Johnson next argues that —when adding information not included in his complaint —the State does not have a legitimate penological justification in refusing to adopt the untried and untested method of nitrogen hypoxia.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] –23. But Bucklew holds the opposite: the Eighth Amendment does not r equire a State to adopt an untried and untested method. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 Pet. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below was correct.",
		"context": "But even so, Johnson has undercounted the State's interests. Johnson forgets the State's strong interest in the timely enforcement of its judgments. Baze, 553 U.S. at 61; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Johnson must admit that adopting nitrogen hypoxia will significantly delay his execution. Worse still, Johnson has all but admitted that he no longer desires an execution by nitrogen hypoxia , and instead desires execution by firing squad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 2590",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION",
		"context": "The First Amendment prohibits \"governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.\" Turner Broadcasting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court applies \"the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differenti al burdens upon speech because of its content.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION",
		"context": "at 642. Likewise, when the government targets \"particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, \"[v]iewpoint discrimination is [ ] an egregious form of content discrimination.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION",
		"context": "Id. Indeed, \"[i] f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The scandalous - marks provision upsets this bedrock principle. It is unconstitutional precisely because it asks the government to deny registration based on whether \"society finds [an] idea itself offensive or disagreeable.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION",
		"context": "Specifically, \"'the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.'\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Accordingly, the Court held that the requirement that a mark not be \"offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group\" was viewpoint -based and subject to strict scrutiny. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Founding-Era Practice Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy",
		"context": "ed., 1836). In 1822, for example, Justice Story, addressing the defendant's argument that \"there is no proof, that the crime was committed within the district,\" instructed the jury that \"this is a fact to be established, at least by prima facie or presumptive proof by the prosecutor, and that the onus probandi rests on the government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with that practice, this Court held in 1862 that venue must be presented to and decided by the jury, emphasizing that \"application of the evidence in the ascertainment\" of the state boundary \"belong[ed] to the jury.\" 66 U.S. 484.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 F. Cas. 1239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Founding-Era Practice Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy",
		"context": "24 F. Cas. 1239. Consistent with that practice, this Court held in 1862 that venue must be presented to and decided by the jury, emphasizing that \"application of the evidence in the ascertainment\" of the state boundary \"belong[ed] to the jury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The natural corollary of submitting the question of venue to the jury was, of course, that the jury could acquit if the government failed to carry its burden to prove venue. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "66 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Founding-Era Practice Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy",
		"context": "25, § 35). 10 Likewise, in United States v. Wilson , the jury was instructed that it must \"acq uit\" if it had a \"reasonable doubt\" as to whether \"the carrier of the mail [was] 9 Jury practice is the relevant touchpoint for assessing original meaning because at the founding, criminal cases were generally resolved through a final jury verdict, and appellate review in criminal ca ses was not statutoril y available until well after the founding. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that at the time of the founding, \"most criminal prosecutions proceeded to final judgment,\" \"neither the United States nor the defendant had any right to appeal an adverse verdict,\" and \"[t]he verdict in such a case was unquestionably final, and could be raised in bar against any further prosecution for the same offense\"); see also David Rossman, \"Were There No Appeal\": The History of Review in American Criminal Courts , 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 518, 521 (1990). 10 Based in part on that rule, Marshall excluded the government's evidence of Burr's separate conduct outside of Virginia, emphasizing that such evidence alone could not suffice to establish the crimes alleged to have occurred in the district of Virginia.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Founding-Era Practice Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy",
		"context": "at 201. 34 robbed of the mail at the time and place referred to.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in United States v. Wright , the court entered judgment for the defendant on a jury's special verdict finding specific facts as to the plac es in which the alleged acts had occurred and finding the defendant \"not guilty\" to the extent those facts did not show that the crime was \"considered as in the county of Washington.\" 28 F. Cas. 790; see also 27 F. Cas. 578.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 F. Cas. 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Founding-Era Practice Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy",
		"context": ", Wilson , 28 F. Cas. at 712 (charging the jury that \"[i]f your verdict acquits the prisoner, we cannot grant a new trial, however much we may differ with you as to the law which governs the case\"); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2013) (reiterating longstanding rule that \"an acquittal precludes retrial\" and is \"unreviewable\" \"whether a judge directs a jury to return a verdict of acquittal, or forgoes that formality by entering a judgment of acquittal herself\" (citation omitted)). The original understanding of the venue right at the time of the founding would thus have included the understanding that if the government failed to prove venue, and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, the accused could not be tried again. 12 12 While a handful of state cases from the nineteenth century suggest that proceedings in an improper venue would not bar retrial under state double-jeopardy guaranties, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Moreover, the courts of appeals are in conflict re- garding the appropriate role of ameliorative measures after a grav e-risk finding. Like the Second Circuit, the Third and Ninth Circuit s require court s to consider po- tential ameliorative measures before making a decision whether to deny return under Article 13(b). See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 415 F.3d 1028 .5 In contrast, the First , Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that district courts may deny return under Article 13(b) even without examining whether they can craft suffi- ciently protective measures. See 386 F.3d 289 (con- cluding that \"[o] nce a district court concludes that re- turning a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, it has the discretion to refuse to do so ,\" and placing bur- den on petitioning parent to \"proffer[] \" any 5 Some state courts have also adopted the Second Circuit's re- quirement that courts consider potential ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Maurizio 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 F.3d 381",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Moreover, the courts of appeals are in conflict re- garding the appropriate role of ameliorative measures after a grav e-risk finding. Like the Second Circuit, the Third and Ninth Circuit s require court s to consider po- tential ameliorative measures before making a decision whether to deny return under Article 13(b). See In re437 F.3d 381 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .5 In contrast, the First , Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that district courts may deny return under Article 13(b) even without examining whether they can craft suffi- ciently protective measures. See 386 F.3d 289 (con- cluding that \"[o] nce a district court concludes that re- turning a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, it has the discretion to refuse to do so ,\" and placing bur- den on petitioning parent to \"proffer[] \" any 5 Some state courts have also adopted the Second Circuit's re- quirement that courts consider potential ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Maurizio 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 F.3d 1028",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Like the Second Circuit, the Third and Ninth Circuit s require court s to consider po- tential ameliorative measures before making a decision whether to deny return under Article 13(b). See In re437 F.3d 381 ; 415 F.3d 1028 .5 In contrast, the First , Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that district courts may deny return under Article 13(b) even without examining whether they can craft suffi- ciently protective measures. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (con- cluding that \"[o] nce a district court concludes that re- turning a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, it has the discretion to refuse to do so ,\" and placing bur- den on petitioning parent to \"proffer[] \" any 5 Some state courts have also adopted the Second Circuit's re- quirement that courts consider potential ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Maurizio 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93. 21 undertaking ); 526 F.3d 1340 (explaining that \"[a]lthough a court is not barred from considering evidence that a home coun- try can protect an at -risk child, neither the Convention nor ICARA require it to do so ,\" and concluding that the district court properly denied the petitioning parent's \"request to propose undertakings at a future eviden- tiary hearing \"); see also 511 F.3d 594 (reasoning that \"[o]nce the dis- trict court determines that the grave risk threshold is met,\" it is \"vested by the Convention with the discretion to refuse to order return,\" emphasizing that courts' use of such discretion to \"craft a ppropriate undertakings\" is \"intensely fact -bound\"); Van De 431 F.3d 567.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 F.3d 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "See 386 F.3d 289 (con- cluding that \"[o] nce a district court concludes that re- turning a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, it has the discretion to refuse to do so ,\" and placing bur- den on petitioning parent to \"proffer[] \" any 5 Some state courts have also adopted the Second Circuit's re- quirement that courts consider potential ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Maurizio 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93. 21 undertaking ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that \"[a]lthough a court is not barred from considering evidence that a home coun- try can protect an at -risk child, neither the Convention nor ICARA require it to do so ,\" and concluding that the district court properly denied the petitioning parent's \"request to propose undertakings at a future eviden- tiary hearing \"); see also 511 F.3d 594 (reasoning that \"[o]nce the dis- trict court determines that the grave risk threshold is met,\" it is \"vested by the Convention with the discretion to refuse to order return,\" emphasizing that courts' use of such discretion to \"craft a ppropriate undertakings\" is \"intensely fact -bound\"); Van De 431 F.3d 567. 6 That disagreement among domestic courts results in inconsistent application of the Convention within the United States , permitting abducting parents to forum shop among U.S. court s to obtain the most favorable rule. Here, for instance, had petitioner brought B.A.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 F.3d 1340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "See 386 F.3d 289 (con- cluding that \"[o] nce a district court concludes that re- turning a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, it has the discretion to refuse to do so ,\" and placing bur- den on petitioning parent to \"proffer[] \" any 5 Some state courts have also adopted the Second Circuit's re- quirement that courts consider potential ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Maurizio 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93. 21 undertaking ); 526 F.3d 1340 (explaining that \"[a]lthough a court is not barred from considering evidence that a home coun- try can protect an at -risk child, neither the Convention nor ICARA require it to do so ,\" and concluding that the district court properly denied the petitioning parent's \"request to propose undertakings at a future eviden- tiary hearing \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reasoning that \"[o]nce the dis- trict court determines that the grave risk threshold is met,\" it is \"vested by the Convention with the discretion to refuse to order return,\" emphasizing that courts' use of such discretion to \"craft a ppropriate undertakings\" is \"intensely fact -bound\"); Van De 431 F.3d 567. 6 That disagreement among domestic courts results in inconsistent application of the Convention within the United States , permitting abducting parents to forum shop among U.S. court s to obtain the most favorable rule. Here, for instance, had petitioner brought B.A.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 F.3d 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "See 386 F.3d 289 (con- cluding that \"[o] nce a district court concludes that re- turning a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, it has the discretion to refuse to do so ,\" and placing bur- den on petitioning parent to \"proffer[] \" any 5 Some state courts have also adopted the Second Circuit's re- quirement that courts consider potential ameliorative measures. See, e.g., Maurizio 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93. 21 undertaking ); 526 F.3d 1340 (explaining that \"[a]lthough a court is not barred from considering evidence that a home coun- try can protect an at -risk child, neither the Convention nor ICARA require it to do so ,\" and concluding that the district court properly denied the petitioning parent's \"request to propose undertakings at a future eviden- tiary hearing \"); see also 511 F.3d 594 (reasoning that \"[o]nce the dis- trict court determines that the grave risk threshold is met,\" it is \"vested by the Convention with the discretion to refuse to order return,\" emphasizing that courts' use of such discretion to \"craft a ppropriate undertakings\" is \"intensely fact -bound\"); Van De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 That disagreement among domestic courts results in inconsistent application of the Convention within the United States , permitting abducting parents to forum shop among U.S. court s to obtain the most favorable rule. Here, for instance, had petitioner brought B.A.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Here, for instance, had petitioner brought B.A.S . to Florida or Massachusetts instead of New York, a dis-trict court could have opted to deny return without considering potential ameliorative measures after a 6 Courts have sometimes treat ed the court -ordered conditions bearing on the child's circumstances upon return as part of the initial grave -risk inquiry, rather than as a subsequent step of ame- liorating an established risk . See, e.g., Nunez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The scope of district courts' discretion regarding the grave- risk inquiry is not at issue here, given that the Second Circuit requires consideration of ame- liorative measures after such a finding. 22 grave -risk finding .",
		"citation_value_orig": "58 F.3d 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": ". of physical force' as that phrase is used in [Section] 921(a)(33)(A).\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"When a person talks about 'using force' against another, one thinks of intentional acts—punching, kicking, shoving, or using a weapon. Conversely, one would not naturally call a car accident a 'use of force,' even if people were injured by the force of the accident. As Justice Holmes observed, '[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.3d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": "§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added);13 see Jeffrey A. Turner, Note, Reestablishing a 12 But see Voisine , 136 S. Ct. at 2290 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (\"[A] 'use of physical force' has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.\"). 13 \"Voisine expressly did not decide whether reckless conduct falls within the scope of § 16(a) and instead confirmed that it did not foreclose a different interpretation of that statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reh'g granted,942 F.3d 1159. 17 Knowledge Mens Rea Requirement for Armed Career Criminal Act \"Violent Felonies\" Post- Voisine, 72 Vand. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 1197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": "1717, 1731–44 (2019) (explaining why Voisine's narrow holding turning on the word \"use\" and its reasoning do not extend to the ACCA). \"While the word 'use' by itself is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness, the subsequent phrase against the person of another arguably conveys the need for the perpetrator to be knowingly or purposefully (and not merely recklessly) causing the victim's bodily injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining the ACCA force clause requires that the defendant act knowingly or intentionally with respect to the harm against another); cf. 543 U.S. 1. The ACCA's title, the \"Armed Career Criminals Act,\" further underscores the statute's focus: protecting society from dangerous armed career criminals who, on purpose and by design, use firearms and other weapons to perpetrate violent crimes against others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": "\"While the word 'use' by itself is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness, the subsequent phrase against the person of another arguably conveys the need for the perpetrator to be knowingly or purposefully (and not merely recklessly) causing the victim's bodily injury.\" 883 F.3d 485 (explaining the ACCA force clause requires that the defendant act knowingly or intentionally with respect to the harm against another); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The ACCA's title, the \"Armed Career Criminals Act,\" further underscores the statute's focus: protecting society from dangerous armed career criminals who, on purpose and by design, use firearms and other weapons to perpetrate violent crimes against others. \"As suggested by its title, the [ACCA] focuses upon the special danger created when a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—possesses a gun.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": "The ACCA's title, the \"Armed Career Criminals Act,\" further underscores the statute's focus: protecting society from dangerous armed career criminals who, on purpose and by design, use firearms and other weapons to perpetrate violent crimes against others. \"As suggested by its title, the [ACCA] focuses upon the special danger created when a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—possesses a gun.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 470 F.3d 964 (\"Titles can be useful devices to resolve doubt about the meaning of a statute.\" (cleaned up)). The ACCA's \"title is especially valuable here because it reinforces what the text's nouns and verbs independently suggest,\" id., namely, that only crimes where the perpetrator knowingly or purposely causes the victim bodily injury can be ACCA enhancement predicates.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": "The ACCA's title, the \"Armed Career Criminals Act,\" further underscores the statute's focus: protecting society from dangerous armed career criminals who, on purpose and by design, use firearms and other weapons to perpetrate violent crimes against others. \"As suggested by its title, the [ACCA] focuses upon the special danger created when a particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—possesses a gun.\" 553 U.S. 137; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Titles can be useful devices to resolve doubt about the meaning of a statute.\" (cleaned up)). The ACCA's \"title is especially valuable here because it reinforces what the text's nouns and verbs independently suggest,\" id., namely, that only crimes where the perpetrator knowingly or purposely causes the victim bodily injury can be ACCA enhancement predicates.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 F.3d 964",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm",
		"context": "Middleton , 883 F.3d at 499 (Floyd, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 146). Reckless use of force resulting in harm may give rise to criminal liability, but it does not meet this test. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, use of force against the person of another with the intent and purpose of causing harm is the sine qua non and touchstone for a \"violent felony\" under the ACCA. Congress's decision to draw a sharp distinction between reckless and intentional harm also reflects 19 the fundamental principle that intent matters in assigning blameworthiness, as well as the bedrock background presumption in the criminal law that unless Congress clearly states otherwise, criminal liability should only be imposed for knowing or intentional harms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "955 F.2d 858",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Damages awards are not \"appropriate relief\" in RFRA suits against individual federal officials",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. 2000bb -1(c). \"[T]he word 'appropriate' is inherently context dependent,\" Sossa- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and here the statutory language and history, separation -of-powers principles , and this Court's decision in Sossamon all in- dicate that damages are not appropriate. 18 1. The broader statutory language makes clear that dam ages awards against federal officials in their personal capacit ies are not \"appropriate relief \" In determining what constitutes \"appropriate relief \" under RFRA, this Court should draw guidance from the text of the entire provision , which states that prevailing plaintiffs may obtain \"appropriate relief against a gov-ernment .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Damages awards are not \"appropriate relief\" in RFRA suits against individual federal officials",
		"context": "The broader statutory language makes clear that dam ages awards against federal officials in their personal capacit ies are not \"appropriate relief \" In determining what constitutes \"appropriate relief \" under RFRA, this Court should draw guidance from the text of the entire provision , which states that prevailing plaintiffs may obtain \"appropriate relief against a gov-ernment .\" 42 U.S.C. 2000bb -1(c) (emphasis added) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The most n atural interpretation of the whole statutory phrase is that the awarded relief must actually run against the government . Damages awards against indi- vidual federal employee s in their personal capacities — for which the employees , rath er than the federal trea s- ury, are responsible —are not \"against a government\" in any real sense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Damages awards are not \"appropriate relief\" in RFRA suits against individual federal officials",
		"context": "The most n atural interpretation of the whole statutory phrase is that the awarded relief must actually run against the government . Damages awards against indi- vidual federal employee s in their personal capacities — for which the employees , rath er than the federal trea s- ury, are responsible —are not \"against a government\" in any real sense. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of the United States ,\" 42 U.S.C. 2000bb -2(1), damages award s against federal official s in their per- sonal capacities, unlike injunctive relief, do not run \"against [the] government\" and thus are not \"appropri- ate relief .\" Indeed, read in the context of the preceding terms in the definition of \" 'government' \"—\" branch, de- partment, agency, [and] instrumentality, \" ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Damages awards are not \"appropriate relief\" in RFRA suits against individual federal officials",
		"context": "See 759 Fed. Appx. 741, 744 n.4 (10th Cir. ) (per curiam), cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 196; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (11th Cir. ), cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 78 ; Webman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 441 F .3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 1198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. DHS Regulations Cannot, And Do Not, Fix The Due Process Concerns With Section 1231(a)(6)",
		"context": "Hausman, supra at 2. And DHS's procedures have rubber-stamped 41 prolonged detention of many noncitizens without individualized determinations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Diouf , 634 F.3d at 1092 (addressing an individual who was detained for two years based on DHS custody reviews); 285 F. Supp. 3d 997. The government ultimately concedes that \"[t]he Due Process Clause does, of course, require neutral administrative adjudicators.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 F.3d 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3582(c)(2) represents a narrow exception to the rule that a sentence of imprisonment may not be modified",
		"context": "As this Court has repeatedl y recognized, finality is \"essential to the operation of our criminal justice sys- tem.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with those principles, Congress has pro- vided that a court generally \"may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.\" 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3582(c)(2) represents a narrow exception to the rule that a sentence of imprisonment may not be modified",
		"context": "The statute also instructs that such a reduction cannot be granted unless it \"is consisten t with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.\" Ibid. As the Court observed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"Section 3582(c)(2)'s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise fi- nal sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceed- ing.\" Id. at 826.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Jury's Determination of Fair Use Should Be Afforded Deference",
		"context": "Because fair use is primarily a factual inquiry turning on the case-by-case weighing dis- cussed above, appellate courts should defer to jury findings on fair use. Thus, if a jury renders a general verdict on fair use, all supporting facts implied by the verdict must be construed in favor of the prevailing party and disturbed only if they are not supported by substantial evidence. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Circuit held that \"[t]he fair use ques- tion entails . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.2d 1552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Jury's Determination of Fair Use Should Be Afforded Deference",
		"context": ". [T]he historical facts in a fair use inquiry are generally few, generally similar from case to case, and rarely debat- ed, resolution of what any set of facts means to the fair use determination definitely does not 'resist gen- eralization.'\" Oracle , 886 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That holding is inconsistent with this Court's precedent as well as the text and legislative history of the fair use statute, all of which reflect the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. As discussed above, Congress intended that \"each case raising the question [of fair use] must be decided on its own set of facts.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "a. Since 1905, Congress has promoted commerce and consumer welfare through a voluntary nationwide trademark -registration system. See Park 'N Fly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. I n recogni- tion of the important commercial functions that trade- marks serve, Congress committed the resources of the federal government to examining, registering, and publishing —and thereby further ing the protection of — mark s that meet specified criteria. Trademark rights arise through use of the mark to identify goods and services in commerce, without re- gard to federal law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "I n recogni- tion of the important commercial functions that trade- marks serve, Congress committed the resources of the federal government to examining, registering, and publishing —and thereby further ing the protection of — mark s that meet specified criteria. Trademark rights arise through use of the mark to identify goods and services in commerce, without re- gard to federal law. See B & B Hardware, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather than modify or displace common -law trademark rights, the Lanham Act supplements those r ights by creating stat- utory rights and remedies that are available to all trade- mark owners. See 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of t he [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The demanding standard of review that applies to restrictions on speech is often inappropriate in these contexts. That conclusion follows from the First Amend- ment's text, which \"prohibits government from 'abridg- ing the freedom of speech' \" but \"does not confer an af- firmative right\" to government assistance in speaking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "The demanding standard of review that applies to restrictions on speech is often inappropriate in these contexts. That conclusion follows from the First Amend- ment's text, which \"prohibits government from 'abridg- ing the freedom of speech' \" but \"does not confer an af- firmative right\" to government assistance in speaking. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It also reflects the recognition that \"[t] he risk that content -based dis- tinctions will impermissibly interfere with the market- place of ideas is sometimes attenuated when the govern- ment is acting in a capacity other than as regulator.\" Davenport , 551 U.S. at 188.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "Davenport , 551 U.S. at 188. When the government \"does not restrict\" speech, \"but rather declines to promote\" it, Ysur sa, 555 U.S. at 355, the justification for strict scrutiny is generally absent, see id. at 359 , and the Court has instead applied a \"les s restrictive level of scrut iny,\" Christian Legal Soc'y , 561 U.S. at 680; see, 23 e.g., Ysur sa, 555 U.S. at 359; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 461 U.S. 540. For example, \"i t is well established that the govern- ment can make content -based distinctions when it sub- sidizes speech.\" Davenport , 551 U.S. at 188 -189.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "Davenport , 551 U.S. at 188. When the government \"does not restrict\" speech, \"but rather declines to promote\" it, Ysur sa, 555 U.S. at 355, the justification for strict scrutiny is generally absent, see id. at 359 , and the Court has instead applied a \"les s restrictive level of scrut iny,\" Christian Legal Soc'y , 561 U.S. at 680; see, 23 e.g., Ysur sa, 555 U.S. at 359; 473 U.S. 788; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, \"i t is well established that the govern- ment can make content -based distinctions when it sub- sidizes speech.\" Davenport , 551 U.S. at 188 -189.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "Regan , 461 U.S. at 548 . Rejecting the \"suggest[ion] that strict scrutiny applies whenever Congress subsidizes some speech, but not all speech,\" ibid. , the Court has instead required that funding conditions be reasonable , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Regan , 461 U.S. at 550- 551; Ysursa , 555 U.S. at 359 -360, and that they not \"reach outside\" the federal program, Agency for Int'l 570 U.S. 205 (201 3). c. The scandalous -marks provision does not restrict speech. \"[T]he refusal to register a mark does not pro- scribe any conduct or suppress any form of expression because it does not affect the applicant's right to use the mark i n question.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit",
		"context": "Regan , 461 U.S. at 548 . Rejecting the \"suggest[ion] that strict scrutiny applies whenever Congress subsidizes some speech, but not all speech,\" ibid. , the Court has instead required that funding conditions be reasonable , see 500 U.S. 173; Regan , 461 U.S. at 550- 551; Ysursa , 555 U.S. at 359 -360, and that they not \"reach outside\" the federal program, Agency for Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (201 3). c. The scandalous -marks provision does not restrict speech. \"[T]he refusal to register a mark does not pro- scribe any conduct or suppress any form of expression because it does not affect the applicant's right to use the mark i n question.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before the Constitution, States were immune from suit in each other's courts",
		"context": "Before the ratification of the Constitution, it was widely accepted that the States enjoyed sovereign im- munity from suit in each othe r's courts. That was clear from the reaction to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which a Pennsylvania citi-zen sued in the Pennsylvania courts to attach property belonging to Virginia. The suit \"raised such concerns throughout the States that the Virginia delegation to the Confederation Congress sought the suppression of the attachment order.\" Hall, 440 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before the Constitution, States were immune from suit in each other's courts",
		"context": "First, the state-court decision reviewed in Hall rejected Nevada's claim of sover-eign immunity on grounds different from those embraced by this Court. The California Supreme Cour t held that a State does \"not exercis[e] sovereign power\"—and thus is not entitled to immuni-ty—when it acts beyond its borders. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the respondents be-fore this Court largely advanced the argument on which the Cali-fornia Supreme Court had relied and barely addressed the consti- tutional issues. See Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 P.2d 1363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before the Constitution, States were immune from suit in each other's courts",
		"context": "Br., 1978 WL 206995. The Court thus lacked the robust adversarial presentation that contributes to sound de- cisionmaking, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 Bradford—who later became Attorney General of the United States under President Washington—urged that the case be dismissed on the ground that each State is a sovereign and that \"every kind of process, issued against a sovereign, is a violation of the laws of nations; and is in itself null and void.\" Nathan, 1 U.S. at 78.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before the Constitution, States were immune from suit in each other's courts",
		"context": "Id. at 574; see Pfander, 82 Calif. L. Rev. at 587 n.127; see also Na- tional City Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, it was widely accepted before the ratification of the Constitution that States' sovereign immunity from suit extended to proceed ings in the courts of other States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 patent damages require full compensation for harm proximately caused by the infringing conduct",
		"context": "And that question [is] primarily: had the infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made? Aro Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court review ed the statutory lan- guage and legislative history of § 284 and held that \"Congress sought to ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full compensation for 'any dam- ages' he suffered as a result of infringement.\" Id. at 654-655 (emphasis added.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 patent damages require full compensation for harm proximately caused by the infringing conduct",
		"context": "The Court has held that patent \"[i]nfring ement … is essentially a tort. \"9 Tort damages traditionally are limited to harm proximately caused by the tortious conduct.10 Further, the Court recently explained that federal statutory causes of action generally require proxi- mate causation: [W]e generally presume that a stat utory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by viola tions of the statute. For centuries, it has been a well established principle of [the common law], that in all cases of loss, 8 See, e.g., Panduit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Rite-Hite 56 F.3d 1538. 10 See388 F.2d 821 (could not recover damages for harm arising from a sequence of events triggered by negligence because the harm was \"too 'remote' or 'indirect' a consequence of defendants' negligence\": negligence caused a ship to become unmoored and collide into another ship, causing both ships to drift downstream and strike a bridge that then collapsed and blocked river traffic; \"somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous\"). 16 we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.2d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 patent damages require full compensation for harm proximately caused by the infringing conduct",
		"context": "The Court has held that patent \"[i]nfring ement … is essentially a tort. \"9 Tort damages traditionally are limited to harm proximately caused by the tortious conduct.10 Further, the Court recently explained that federal statutory causes of action generally require proxi- mate causation: [W]e generally presume that a stat utory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by viola tions of the statute. For centuries, it has been a well established principle of [the common law], that in all cases of loss, 8 See, e.g., Panduit 575 F.2d 1152 ; Rite-Hite [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 See388 F.2d 821 (could not recover damages for harm arising from a sequence of events triggered by negligence because the harm was \"too 'remote' or 'indirect' a consequence of defendants' negligence\": negligence caused a ship to become unmoored and collide into another ship, causing both ships to drift downstream and strike a bridge that then collapsed and blocked river traffic; \"somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous\"). 16 we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.3d 1538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 patent damages require full compensation for harm proximately caused by the infringing conduct",
		"context": "\"9 Tort damages traditionally are limited to harm proximately caused by the tortious conduct.10 Further, the Court recently explained that federal statutory causes of action generally require proxi- mate causation: [W]e generally presume that a stat utory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by viola tions of the statute. For centuries, it has been a well established principle of [the common law], that in all cases of loss, 8 See, e.g., Panduit 575 F.2d 1152 ; Rite-Hite 56 F.3d 1538. 10 See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (could not recover damages for harm arising from a sequence of events triggered by negligence because the harm was \"too 'remote' or 'indirect' a consequence of defendants' negligence\": negligence caused a ship to become unmoored and collide into another ship, causing both ships to drift downstream and strike a bridge that then collapsed and blocked river traffic; \"somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous\"). 16 we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause. That venerable principle reflects the reality that the judicial remedy cannot encom- pass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged wrongdoing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 F.2d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 284 patent damages require full compensation for harm proximately caused by the infringing conduct",
		"context": "Congress, we assume, is familiar with the common- law rule and does not mean to displace it sub silentio. We have thus construed fed- eral causes of action in a variety of con- texts to incorporate a requirement of prox- imate causation. Lexmark [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, the Court should confirm that § 284 pro- vides for full compensation for all harm that the pa- tent owner suffered that was proximately caused by the infringing conduct, including harm abroad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": ". Principles of federal-state comity dictate that \"state laws dealing with matters traditionally within a state's police powers are not to be preempted unless Congress's intent to do so is clear and manifest.\" Californians For Safe & Competitive Dump Truck [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Labor law enforcement measures are traditionally matters left to the state to regulate pursuant to its police powers. Metro.",
		"citation_value_orig": "152 F.3d 1184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "Metro. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a state's authority over its own law enforcement methods, especially those exercised within its own borders, is central to state sovereignty. 521 U.S. 898.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "471 U.S. 724. And a state's authority over its own law enforcement methods, especially those exercised within its own borders, is central to state sovereignty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would be an affront to California's sovereign dignity if private parties could hinder the state's ability to enforce its Labor Code through the backdoor mechanism of an arbitration agreement (with a waiver 24 of the State's rights) to which the State did not consent. The offense is even more acute here because Moriana's PAGA action, brought on the state's behalf, merely seeks to enforce state law, not federal law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "West Virginia ex. rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sanctioning such behavior under the auspices of federal preemption would \"trample the sovereign dignity of the State\" that authorized a proxy to bring the civil enforcement claim on its behalf under state law in its own forum. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "Sanctioning such behavior under the auspices of federal preemption would \"trample the sovereign dignity of the State\" that authorized a proxy to bring the civil enforcement claim on its behalf under state law in its own forum. Id. ; see also, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Comity concerns encourage federal courts to avoid undue interference with state activities and to promote \"proper respect for state functions.\" 401 U.S. 37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "672 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "; see also, 672 F.3d 661. Comity concerns encourage federal courts to avoid undue interference with state activities and to promote \"proper respect for state functions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"despite the variety of ... opportunities for federal preeminence,\" this Court has \"never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of preemption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.\" Travelers , 514 U.S. at 654-55.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "The question presented here is whether Congress intended the anomalous result of preempting California's anti-waiver rule, developed from statutes in California's inaugural civil code adopted in 1872. 25 State sovereignty and comity play a critical role in that analysis, as this Court has cited these considerations as bedrock principles that must be afforded considerable deference. See, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485 (\"[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. \"); 505 U.S. 88. And those factors must take on heightened importance when the State is the real party in interest to, and primary beneficiary of, the law enforcement claim that is potentially subject to preemption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "25 State sovereignty and comity play a critical role in that analysis, as this Court has cited these considerations as bedrock principles that must be afforded considerable deference. See, 529 U.S. 89; Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485 (\"[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And those factors must take on heightened importance when the State is the real party in interest to, and primary beneficiary of, the law enforcement claim that is potentially subject to preemption. Nothing in the FAA's text or its legislative history shows a clear and manifest intent to disable enforcement of one of California's police powers traditionally held by the State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent",
		"context": "Nothing in the FAA's text or its legislative history shows a clear and manifest intent to disable enforcement of one of California's police powers traditionally held by the State. Nor does the FAA's fundamental purpose promote the misuse of arbitration agreements to extinguish a party's substantive rights under state law. See, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. California's police powers would be supplanted and adversely affected by FAA preemption. PAGA's two primary objectives – enhancing labor law enforcement 26 and efficiently deploying taxpayer resources and unique incentives to address a problem that costs California billions of dollars each year -- address issues of great public concern.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "Petitioner first contends (Br. 37 -40) that a plain - text reading of Section 630(b) would contravene the rule that Congre ss must speak clearly when altering the constitutional balance of federal and state powers. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue in Gregory was whether an ambiguous exception to cov- erage of state employees in the ADEA extended to state judges. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "Id. at 461. By its nature, the Gregory rule does not apply where a statute is clear , see 501 U.S. at 461; see also Pennsyl- vania Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and here the ADEA's text unambiguously covers political subdivisions of any size , for the reasons already discussed. See pp. 8 -21, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "The ADEA clearly regulate s States and their political subdivisions; the only question is whether Congres s intended to reg- ulate such entities with fewer than 20 employees. P eti- tioner does not explain why the choice among different numerical threshold s would \"effect a significant change in the sensitive relation\" between federal and state gov- ernments. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Wyoming , 460 U.S. at 239 (explaining that the ADEA's application to state game wardens did not \"directly impair the State's ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government al func- tions\") (internal quotation marks omitted) . Moreover , the ADEA exposes state agencies only to limited liabil- ity, as States are immune from monetary damages in 27 ADEA suits brought by individuals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2077",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "See Kimel , supra .2 The application of the ADEA here thus bears little re- semblance to its application in Gregory . At a minimum, the Gregory canon has no application in this specific case, which involves a local governmental entity. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Petitioner next contends (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "41 ) that if government al entities constitute a separate category of covered em- ployers, the ADEA would apply \"even to state agencies and political subdivisions th at have no effect on c om- merce, \" in potential violation of the Commerce Clause. To invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance, how- ever, petitioner must identify both statutory language that \"is susceptible of multiple interpr etations\" and \"an interpretation that raises serious constitutional doubts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case satisfies neither requiremen t. Again, Section 630(b) is not ambiguous. In an at- tempt to generate ambiguity, petitioner asserts (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "41) that Congress typically \"includes a Commerce Clause hook\" when regulating public entities. But the two ex- amples that petitioner offers in which federal statutes 2 States are not immune from ADEA suits brought by the EEOC. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 559 F.3d 270. But suits brought by the federal government, as opposed to damages suits brought by individuals, do not similarly burden state sover- eignty. See generally Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "631 F.3d 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "41) that Congress typically \"includes a Commerce Clause hook\" when regulating public entities. But the two ex- amples that petitioner offers in which federal statutes 2 States are not immune from ADEA suits brought by the EEOC. See, e.g., 631 F.3d 174 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But suits brought by the federal government, as opposed to damages suits brought by individuals, do not similarly burden state sover- eignty. See generally Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 F.3d 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "See, e.g., 631 F.3d 174 ; 559 F.3d 270. But suits brought by the federal government, as opposed to damages suits brought by individuals, do not similarly burden state sover- eignty. See generally Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 apply an express \"interstate commerce\" limitation to governmental entities include such a limitation because the governmental entities appear alongside private en- tities. See 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "Jen- nings , 138 S. Ct. at 836. This Court has squarely held that the ADEA's application to state and local govern-ment s represent s \"a valid exercise of Congress's pow- ers under the Commerce Clause.\" Wyoming , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Even those examples do not support petitioner's argument: Title VII further defines an \"industry affecting commerce\" to \"in- clude[] any governmental industry, business, or activity .\" 42 U.S.C. 2000e(h).",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation",
		"context": "Although petitioner discusses (Br. 43) hypothet- ical \"application[s]\" of the ADEA to insular local enti- ties, it makes no serious effort to address this Court's precedents evaluating a class of activity's effect on com-merce \"in the a ggregate.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner neither attempts to distinguish those cases nor asks the Court to depart from them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 2's Application to Single-Member Districts Is Consistent with the Constitution",
		"context": "In amending § 2, Congress \"[i]nvok[ed] the power con- ferred by §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,\" to enact legislation that prophylactically prohibits more than intentional discrimination. Id. at 2331 (citing City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). There is no reason to exempt single-member redis- tricting plans from that broad authority. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits racially dis- criminatory denials or abridgments of the right \"to vote,\" and gives Congress the power to enforce that prohibition \"by appropriate legislation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 2's Application to Single-Member Districts Is Consistent with the Constitution",
		"context": "As Defendants concede, Br. 72, Congress may enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by legislation that extends beyond the Amendment's text so long as the \"end [is] legitimate\" and the \"means are ap- propriate.\" Katzenbach , 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Appropriate \"means\" include \"[l]egislation which de- ters or remedies constitutional violations even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional[.] \" City of 521 U.S. 57 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 Wheat. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 2's Application to Single-Member Districts Is Consistent with the Constitution",
		"context": "Katzenbach , 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting 4 Wheat. 316). Appropriate \"means\" include \"[l]egislation which de- ters or remedies constitutional violations even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional[.] \" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Such remedial legislation is appropriate so long as Congress had ev- idence of a pattern of constitutional violations to jus- tify the exercise of its enforcement powers. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Crime Victims Have the Right to Proceedings Free From Unreasonable Delay, Which Would Be Further Thwarted By the Granting of the Relief McKinney Seeks",
		"context": "§ 3771(b)(2)(A) provides: \"In a Federal habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a State conviction, the court shall ensure that a crime victim is afforded the rights 2 Ariz.R.Crim.P. 39(b)(17) provides that a victim \"has and is entitled to assert\" \"the right to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence.\" 3 Of course [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], albeit in a different context, fa mously coined the term \"Our Federalism.\" 11 described in paragraphs (3), (4), (7), and (8) of subsec- tion (a).\" Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) provides crime victims with \"The right to proceedings free from unrea- sonable delay.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Crime Victims Have the Right to Proceedings Free From Unreasonable Delay, Which Would Be Further Thwarted By the Granting of the Relief McKinney Seeks",
		"context": "While the Co urt denied the motion, noting that mandamus is a \"drastic\" remedy \"to be invoked only in ex-traordinary situations,\" the Court did recognize the victim's \"right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay,\" and said that it was \"sympathetic to Mr. Olesen regarding the long delays in this case.\" Id., at 871. Interestingly, the victim's representative suggested a use of Barker v. Wingo beyond its function in connec- tion with the speedy resolution rights of defendants : Interestingly, Mr. Olesen asks this court when as- sessing unreasonable delay to apply the factors set forth in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for evaluating the consti-tutional right to a speedy trial. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Crime Victims Have the Right to Proceedings Free From Unreasonable Delay, Which Would Be Further Thwarted By the Granting of the Relief McKinney Seeks",
		"context": "See407 U.S. 530. Assuming without deciding that these fac-tors apply, we agree with Mr. Olesen that the more than nine-and-a-half-year de lay is too long, he has not been responsible for the de lay, he has asserted his rights several times, and he has been prejudiced by the lengthy litigation. Nonethele ss, while the question is close, we cannot conclude at this juncture that the prej-udice and delay overcome [the convicted murderer's] 12 The relief sought by McKinney is the reversal of the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court affirming his death sentences (245 Ariz. 225), so that he may be sentenced all over again at the level of the trial court, either by a jury (on the basis that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] must be ap- plied retroactively at the resentencing), or by a trial judge (McKinney arguing that in any event, the Ari- zona Supreme Court could not resentence the Peti- tioner). Not only would this furth er delay resolution of a case already unreasonably delayed, it would require the State to again put on evidence in support of aggra- vating factors and to respond to any evidence adduced by McKinney of mitigating factors when evidence may no longer even be available. And once resentenced, presumably McKinney would again claim the right to appeal and the right to the various forms of post- conviction relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Following CONTU's Recommendations, Congress Amended The Copyright Act To Protect Computer Programs",
		"context": "§ 101 ; id. § 102(a) (protecting copyright in \"original works of authorship,\" including \"literary works\"); see also, e.g. , Atari Games [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amendments to other provisions in the Act ma ke clear that a computer program may be copyrighted. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "975 F.2d 832",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Following CONTU's Recommendations, Congress Amended The Copyright Act To Protect Computer Programs",
		"context": "Indeed, the very definition of a \"computer program\" in the Act recognizes the functional nature of computer software, yet extends copyright protection to the expressive aspects of these programs. Nor does the Act distinguish between different types of computer code. See Apple Comput., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also JOLT Article at 649. Despite the views of the CONTU dissenters that copyright protection should be denied to computer software because of its \"functional\" aspects, Congress chose a different path. Because Congress chose to protec t computer programs via copyright, traditional copyright principles must apply to the questions presented in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.2d 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ERISA's Text Applies The Same Duty Of Prudence, Derived From Trust Law, To All Fiduciaries",
		"context": "Section 404(c), which provid es a limited defense to ERISA liability for losses resu lting from a participant's investment choices under certain circumstances, does not justify imposing a different standard for the un- derlying fiduciary duty. To begin with, \"section 404(c) is not applicable\" here because it \"is an affirmative defense that is not appropri ate for consideration on a motion to dismiss when, as here, the plaintiffs did not raise it in the complaint.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated on other grounds by Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. 409; see also id. at 599 (collecting cases). In any event, \"although se ction 404(c) does limit a fiduciary's liability for losses that occur when partici- pants make poor choices from a satisfactory menu of options, it does not insulate a fiduciary from liability for assembling an imprudent menu in the first instance.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 F.3d 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ERISA's Text Applies The Same Duty Of Prudence, Derived From Trust Law, To All Fiduciaries",
		"context": "24. All but one circuit to address the question correctly have concluded that Section 404(c) does not insulate a fidu- ciary from liability for imprudent selection or monitor- ing of a plan's investment options. See Tibble , 729 F.3d at 1121-25; Pfeil , 671 F.3d at 599-601; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; DiFelice , 497 F.3d at 418 n.3. 2 2 Respondents cite (at 20) 556 F.3d 575, but, in its or der denying rehearing, the panel clarified that \"it refrained from making any definitive pronounce- ment\" on the safe harbor's applicability. Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 5 The division of responsibility under ERISA is clear: plan fiduciaries are charged with selecting and main- taining a prudent investment lineup; if they do so, and meet the Section 404(c) requirements, then they are not liable for losses caused by a participant's choices within that lineup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "633 F.3d 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ERISA's Text Applies The Same Duty Of Prudence, Derived From Trust Law, To All Fiduciaries",
		"context": "All but one circuit to address the question correctly have concluded that Section 404(c) does not insulate a fidu- ciary from liability for imprudent selection or monitor- ing of a plan's investment options. See Tibble , 729 F.3d at 1121-25; Pfeil , 671 F.3d at 599-601; 633 F.3d 552; DiFelice , 497 F.3d at 418 n.3. 2 2 Respondents cite (at 20) [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but, in its or der denying rehearing, the panel clarified that \"it refrained from making any definitive pronounce- ment\" on the safe harbor's applicability. Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 5 The division of responsibility under ERISA is clear: plan fiduciaries are charged with selecting and main- taining a prudent investment lineup; if they do so, and meet the Section 404(c) requirements, then they are not liable for losses caused by a participant's choices within that lineup. But th e safe harbor highlights the importance of fiduciaries prudently constructing and maintaining the investment lineup in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.3d 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government has not narrowly tailored the loan repayment prohibition",
		"context": "Americans for Prosperity 141 S. Ct. 2373 . As the Bonta Court recently explained, in order to \"satisfy[] the means - end fit that exacting scrutiny requires,\" the government must \"demonstrate its need for [the challenged law] in light of any less intrusive alternatives.\" 141 S. Ct. at 2386 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This requires an affirmativ e evidentiary showing by the government. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government has not narrowly tailored the loan repayment prohibition",
		"context": "Id. at 2386 -87 (citing Trustees of State Univ. of N. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Here, as in McCutcheon , \"there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Government's anticircumven tion interest, while avoiding 'unnecessary abridgment' of First Amendment rights.\" 572 U.S. at 221.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government has not narrowly tailored the loan repayment prohibition",
		"context": "Indeed, lower courts have extensively documented the role pay-to-play laws and government contractor contribution prohibitions have had in preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. See, e.g. , New York Republican State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied140 S. Ct. 908. Unmoved, t he Government and its allied amici point to irrelevant news reporting on speculated \"corruption\" involving the award of government contracts inspired by repayment of large perso nal campaign loans by then -Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine in 2012, Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt in 2018, and Kentucky Governor Wallace Wilkinson in 1987.",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.3d 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government has not narrowly tailored the loan repayment prohibition",
		"context": "Allows repayment of personal loans of up to $250,000 , which in theory present s the same corruption challenges as any contribution over the $250,000 aggregate repayment limit .5 5 It makes no difference that Appellee won his election and did not personally experience all of these problems. In a First Amendment facial challenge, \"a law may be invalidated as 32 The provision's underinclusiveness also \"raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also id. at 805 (observing that \"overbreadth in achieving one goal is not cured by the underbreadth in achieving the other\" ). Here, the law targets a specific type of debt – personal loans by the candidate – but exempts contributions used to pay down vendor debt and bank loans.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Awards of non-taxable costs undermine the incentives of section 412 to promote timely registration",
		"context": "Non-taxable cost awards can be substantial in copyright cases. In the proceedings below, the district court awarded more than $12 million in expert fees and other non-taxable costs. See Oracle USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Other courts have awarded substantial non-taxable costs. See, e.g., Mattel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85998 , aff'd,705 F.3d 11082015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156069.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 F.3d 948",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Awards of non-taxable costs undermine the incentives of section 412 to promote timely registration",
		"context": "See Oracle USA, 879 F.3d 948 . Other courts have awarded substantial non-taxable costs. See, e.g., Mattel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85998 , aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156069. La rge non-taxable cost awards, which may include sizeable expenditures like expert witness fees, undercut the incentives Congress enacted in § 412 to encourage timely registration of works. Under the Ninth Circuit decision, copyright owners can recover substantial cost awards without observing the requirements of § 412.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Awards of non-taxable costs undermine the incentives of section 412 to promote timely registration",
		"context": "H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 158 (1976) ; see also Derek Andrew, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 F.3d 696",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the Rule of Lenity Applies to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity, Chevron Deference Is Precluded",
		"context": ". \"[W]hen liberty is at stake,\" deference \"has no role to play.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 17 (Gorsuch, J., statement regarding denial of certiorari). The \"primary reason for Chevron is that it allows the executive branch to make policy decisions through the accrued expertise of administrative agencies. But in exchange, Chevron deference shifts the responsibility for lawmaking from the Congress to the Executive, at least in part.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the Rule of Lenity Applies to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity, Chevron Deference Is Precluded",
		"context": "And all of this flows from the language of Chevron itself, because at the outset, a court \"evaluate[s] 18 whether Congress has written clearly,\" and \"[t]o determine whether a statute has a plain meaning, \" a court asks \"whether its meaning may be settled by the 'traditional tools of statutory construction.'\" Hylton , 992 F.3d at 1157– 58 (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). \"These tools encompass our 'regular interpretive method,' Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], including the canons of construction.\" Id. at 1158.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the Rule of Lenity Applies to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity, Chevron Deference Is Precluded",
		"context": "Epic Sys. Corp. , 138 S.Ct. at 1630; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, this Court has followed this analysis before, applying the immigration rule of lenity to resolve a potential statutory ambiguity and then concluding that Chevron deference was no longer warranted. See 533 U.S. 289.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When the Rule of Lenity Applies to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity, Chevron Deference Is Precluded",
		"context": "at 1630; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 531 U.S. 159. In fact, this Court has followed this analysis before, applying the immigration rule of lenity to resolve a potential statutory ambiguity and then concluding that Chevron deference was no longer warranted. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In St. Cyr , this Court applied \"the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favo r of the alien,\" to \"foreclose[]\" a punitive reading of a deportation statute. 533 U.S. at 320.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Both Class And PAGA Actions Lack Informality, Making Them Slower, More Costly, And More Likely To Generate Procedural Morass Than Individual, Bilateral Arbitrations",
		"context": "An d if the small employer is unlucky enough to have 200 employees, then the potential liability becomes $ 8 million. In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc. , the Ninth Circuit held that PAGA arbitrations \"do not require the formal procedures of class arbitra- tions\" because the PAGA plaintiff seeks only civil penalties on behalf of the LWDA, which does not implicate the due process rights of the \"aggrieved employees.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What the Ninth Circuit overlooked is the due process right of the employer , who can be subject to millions of dollars of liability. Sakkab also understated the dif- ficulty of trying PAGA claims without any form of certification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 F.3d 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Both Class And PAGA Actions Lack Informality, Making Them Slower, More Costly, And More Likely To Generate Procedural Morass Than Individual, Bilateral Arbitrations",
		"context": "Code § 2699(c). Consequently, unlike class actions, \"a plaintiff cannot recover on behalf of individuals whom the plaintiff has not proven suffered a violation of the Labor Code by the defendant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, because PAGA has no class certification requirement, it may \"cover a vast number of employees, each of 9 Wesson refused to allow the case to proceed for a unique rea- son. The plaintiff ignored the trial court's order to submit a trial plan.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F. Supp. 2d 1246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": ". For decades, this Court has described First Amendment freedoms as \"delicate and vulnerable\" and in need of \"breathing space to survive.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has therefore subjected disclosur e requirements to \"the closest scrutiny,\" Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461, or, by an- other name, \"exacting scrutiny,\" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. Under this rigorous standard, the government must first prove that its disclosure requirement fur-thers a \"sufficiently important interest\" commensu-rate with \"the burden that [it] place[s] on individual rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": ". reflect[s] the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; ac- cord Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68, 71. Second, the govern- ment must demonstrate that its disclosure require- ment is substantially related to its asserted interest, e.g., 561 U.S. 186; Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 366–67; Brown , 459 U.S. at 92, or in other words, is \"closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 3 Amici curiae before the Ninth Circuit included the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational F und, Inc., the Campaign Legal Center, the Cato Institute, and the Pacific Legal Foundation. 11 abridgement of associational freedoms,\" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": "reflect[s] the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.\" 554 U.S. 724; ac- cord Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68, 71. Second, the govern- ment must demonstrate that its disclosure require- ment is substantially related to its asserted interest, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 366–67; Brown , 459 U.S. at 92, or in other words, is \"closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 3 Amici curiae before the Ninth Circuit included the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational F und, Inc., the Campaign Legal Center, the Cato Institute, and the Pacific Legal Foundation. 11 abridgement of associational freedoms,\" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see, e.g. , 572 U.S. 185; Gremillion , 366 U.S. at 296–97; Shelton , 364 U.S. at 488.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": "Second, the govern- ment must demonstrate that its disclosure require- ment is substantially related to its asserted interest, e.g., 561 U.S. 186; Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 366–67; Brown , 459 U.S. at 92, or in other words, is \"closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 3 Amici curiae before the Ninth Circuit included the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational F und, Inc., the Campaign Legal Center, the Cato Institute, and the Pacific Legal Foundation. 11 abridgement of associational freedoms,\" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gremillion , 366 U.S. at 296–97; Shelton , 364 U.S. at 488. Even if the government makes these showings, groups resisting disclosure may obtain as-applied exemptions from facially valid requirements by establishing \"a reasonable probabil- ity that the compelled disclosure of personal infor- mation will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.\" Reed , 561 U.S. at 200 (alterations omitted) (quoting Buckley , 424 U.S. at 74); see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": "Shelton , 364 U.S. at 488. \"[E]ven when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict con- stitutionally protected liberty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Many disclosure requirements have failed exact- ing scrutiny. This Court has held unconstitutional a state attorney general's demand for the names of members of the NAACP where the disclosure had no \"substantial bearing\" on the State's asserted interest in enforcing its foreign corporation registration stat- ute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": "This Court has held unconstitutional a state attorney general's demand for the names of members of the NAACP where the disclosure had no \"substantial bearing\" on the State's asserted interest in enforcing its foreign corporation registration stat- ute. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464–66. It has deemed 4 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 333 F.3d 168. 13 invalid a city ordinance demanding the names of or- ganizations' members and contributors for purposes of occupational license taxes where the city failed to show any relation between disclosure and a \"control- ling justification.\" Bates , 361 U.S. at 525, 527.",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 F.3d 1126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": "This Court has held unconstitutional a state attorney general's demand for the names of members of the NAACP where the disclosure had no \"substantial bearing\" on the State's asserted interest in enforcing its foreign corporation registration stat- ute. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464–66. It has deemed 4 See also 591 F.3d 1126; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 invalid a city ordinance demanding the names of or- ganizations' members and contributors for purposes of occupational license taxes where the city failed to show any relation between disclosure and a \"control- ling justification.\" Bates , 361 U.S. at 525, 527.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
		"context": "Shelton , 364 U.S. at 488. In sum, more than sixty years of precedent has taught that where the government burdens the free- dom of association, the First Amendment demands \"precision of regulation.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he strength of the governmental in-terest must reflect the seriousness of the actual bur-den on First Amendment rights,\" Davis, 554 U.S. at 744, and even a \"legitimate and substantial\" govern-mental purpose \"cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved,\" Shelton , 364 U.S. at 488.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Indiana Supreme Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Enforce the Protections Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "\"[T]he right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is 17 undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted. But there are certain funda- mental rights which this right of regulation cannot in- fringe.\" The Slaughter-House Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Four- teenth Amendment's promise of liberty would be an empty one if courts could simply abandon their respon- sibilities and give states free rein to abrogate the lib- erty and property rights set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. That is what the Indiana Supreme Court did here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "83 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Indiana Supreme Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Enforce the Protections Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.\" (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). While this Court has not resolved the incorpora- tion status of the Excessive Fines Clause, it has devel- oped a \"standard that is well established in our case law\" for deciding whether any particular protection guaranteed by the Bill of Rights applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Indiana Supreme Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Enforce the Protections Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "\"Our federal sys- tem 'charges state courts with a coordinate responsi- bility' to give effect to all Americans' federally pro- tected rights.\" Pet. 26 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat. 708, 710 (July 28, 1868) (\"the legislature of Indi- ana ratified [the Fourteenth Amendment] January 29th, 1867\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Indiana Supreme Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Enforce the Protections Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "20 What the court below should have done is ask, as this Court's cases require, whether the right to be free of excessive fines \"is fundamental to our scheme of or- dered liberty\" or \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\" Id. at 767 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 521 U.S. 702) (emphasis omit- ted). To answer those questions, this Court has looked to ancient legal codes, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, the common law and its prominent expounders such as Blackstone, the views of the American colonists in the Revolutionary era, early American state constitutions, records of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitu- tion and Bill of Rights, and evidence surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Indiana Supreme Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Enforce the Protections Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "20 What the court below should have done is ask, as this Court's cases require, whether the right to be free of excessive fines \"is fundamental to our scheme of or- dered liberty\" or \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\" Id. at 767 (quoting 391 U.S. 145, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis omit- ted). To answer those questions, this Court has looked to ancient legal codes, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, the common law and its prominent expounders such as Blackstone, the views of the American colonists in the Revolutionary era, early American state constitutions, records of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitu- tion and Bill of Rights, and evidence surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision that the agencies likely lacked statutory authority for the religious exemption is correct and does not warrant this Court's review",
		"context": "Yet before considering whether the accommodation violates RFRA, the Court would have to accept that RFRA delegates rulemaking power to executive branch agencies. Like all rules, the religious exem p- tion, \"must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the official. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm 476 U.S. 355 8 Petitioner takes issue (at 28 –29) with the court of appeals ' suggestion that the preexisting exemption for churches and house of worship —which is not at issue in this case —could be grounded in the ministerial exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision that the agencies likely lacked statutory authority for the religious exemption is correct and does not warrant this Court's review",
		"context": "546 U.S. 243 ; see Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 8 Petitioner takes issue (at 28 –29) with the court of appeals ' suggestion that the preexisting exemption for churches and house of worship —which is not at issue in this case —could be grounded in the ministerial exception. App. 33a –34a n.26; see 76 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision that the agencies likely lacked statutory authority for the religious exemption is correct and does not warrant this Court's review",
		"context": "Id. § 2000bb -4; see S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12 –13 (1993) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And neither of p e- titioner 's examples of prior rules purportedly autho r- ized by RFRA (Pet. 26 n.11) rely on that statute as a source of rulemaking authority, much less the sole source of authority the agencies need it to be here.9 9 In promulgating 42 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals' decision that the agencies likely lacked statutory authority for the religious exemption is correct and does not warrant this Court's review",
		"context": "Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (requiring age n- cies to \"ensur[e] that women covered by petitioners ' health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage \"). This is the a n- tithesis of enforcing the contraceptive coverage gua r- antee via less restr ictive means. See Priests for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 23– 26, 26 n.12 (2015 ) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ( \"A means that is not a reasonably feasible way of furthering the Gover n- ment 's interest cannot be deemed a less restrictive means of furt hering that interest. \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "808 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Three Circuits Allow the Government To Use Restrictions on Religious Speech to Avoid Creating a Designated Public Forum",
		"context": "Id. So even though the school had opened its doors to hun- dreds of groups and events \"pertaining to the welfare of the community,\" the fact that it had consistently barred religious groups meant that the restriction it- self transformed the forum from an open public forum to a limited public forum. The Ninth Circuit applied this same flawed ap- proach in Faith Center Church Evangelistic Minis- 462 F.3d 1194, opinion amended and superseded on other grounds on denial of reh'g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, a non -profit reli- gious corporation reserved several library meeting rooms for \"Prayer, Praise, and Worship Open to the Public.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 F.3d 891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Three Circuits Allow the Government To Use Restrictions on Religious Speech to Avoid Creating a Designated Public Forum",
		"context": "Despite this wide -open invitation, the court held that the \"[l]ibrary meeting room is a limited public forum,\" because the government \"did not intend for the…meeting room to be open for indis- criminate use.\" Id. at 1206, 1205 (citing Bronx House- hold of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying on the Sec- ond Circuit's circular logic, the cour t said the govern- ment's \"policy and practices make clear that the [gov- ernment] did not intend[] for the…meeting room to be [a designated public forum],\" because its \"policy ex- cludes…organizations who wish to engage in religious services.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 F.3d 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Three Circuits Allow the Government To Use Restrictions on Religious Speech to Avoid Creating a Designated Public Forum",
		"context": "at 1205. Thus , the exclusion was exempt from heightened scrutiny, and the court held the ex- clusion to justify itself under the rational basis stand- ard. Finally, the same error controlled the outcome in Archdiocese of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At issue was a transit authority's prohibition on advertisements that \"promote or oppose any reli- gion, religious practice, or belief.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "897 F.3d 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If Four Votes Are Not Enough, Then Fewer Votes Must Be Weaker",
		"context": "Nor was our affirmance of the judgment in that case by an equally divided court an au-thoritative precedent. While it was conclusive and binding upon the part ies as respects that controversy, the lack of an agreement by a ma-jority of the Court on the principles of law in- volved prevents it from being an authoritative determination for other cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] members have more weight? The Marks Rule goes even further and can convert the opinion of a single member into a binding prece- dent. Some courts of appeals concluded that the Marks Rule made Justice Sotomayor's opinion in 564 U.S. 522, not followed, Hughes, supra , into a binding precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If Four Votes Are Not Enough, Then Fewer Votes Must Be Weaker",
		"context": "315 U.S. 203 members have more weight? The Marks Rule goes even further and can convert the opinion of a single member into a binding prece- dent. Some courts of appeals concluded that the Marks Rule made Justice Sotomayor's opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], not followed, Hughes, supra , into a binding precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor's unreasonable good-faith belief that its collection efforts are lawful precludes the imposition of contempt sanctions",
		"context": "Under traditional principles governing the enforce- ment of ordinary civil injunctions, subjective bad intent is not required to support a finding of civil contempt. Unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt is \"remedial,\" not \"punitive.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 384 U.S. 364 . \"Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act.\" 336 U.S. 187 ; see 2 James L. High, A Trea- tise on the Law of Injunctions § 1418, at 1427 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor's unreasonable good-faith belief that its collection efforts are lawful precludes the imposition of contempt sanctions",
		"context": "Under traditional principles governing the enforce- ment of ordinary civil injunctions, subjective bad intent is not required to support a finding of civil contempt. Unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt is \"remedial,\" not \"punitive.\" 221 U.S. 418 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act.\" 336 U.S. 187 ; see 2 James L. High, A Trea- tise on the Law of Injunctions § 1418, at 1427 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor's unreasonable good-faith belief that its collection efforts are lawful precludes the imposition of contempt sanctions",
		"context": "221 U.S. 418 ; 384 U.S. 364 . \"Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 2 James L. High, A Trea- tise on the Law of Injunctions § 1418, at 1427 (4th ed. 1905) (\"Nor does the question of the motive or intent with which the writ was disobeyed alter or vary the re- sponsibility for the violation . \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor's unreasonable good-faith belief that its collection efforts are lawful precludes the imposition of contempt sanctions",
		"context": "1905) (\"Nor does the question of the motive or intent with which the writ was disobeyed alter or vary the re- sponsibility for the violation . \"). Courts of appeals thus generally recognize that \"[t]he 'intent of the recalcitrant party is irrelevant ' in a civil contempt proceeding ,\" Food Lion, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; but see First State Bank of 914 F.3d 1129. Respondents have identified no reason why a dif- ferent rule shoul d apply in the bankruptcy context. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 F.3d 1007",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor's unreasonable good-faith belief that its collection efforts are lawful precludes the imposition of contempt sanctions",
		"context": "1905) (\"Nor does the question of the motive or intent with which the writ was disobeyed alter or vary the re- sponsibility for the violation . \"). Courts of appeals thus generally recognize that \"[t]he 'intent of the recalcitrant party is irrelevant ' in a civil contempt proceeding ,\" Food Lion, 103 F.3d 1007 ; but see First State Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents have identified no reason why a dif- ferent rule shoul d apply in the bankruptcy context. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 F.3d 1129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Remaining Three Cases from California, Connecticut, and Missouri Reject Due Process Challenges But the Taxpayers All Have Connections to the Taxing State that Do Not Exist Here",
		"context": "The remaining three cases on which the Depart- ment relies present fundamentally different facts. The Department has repeatedly emphasized the Supreme Court of California's decision in McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Board and the Connecticut Supreme Court's deci- sion in Chase Manhattan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gavin , 733 A.2d 782. The North Carolina Supreme Court correctly distinguished these cases. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 P.2d 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Remaining Three Cases from California, Connecticut, and Missouri Reject Due Process Challenges But the Taxpayers All Have Connections to the Taxing State that Do Not Exist Here",
		"context": "The McCul- loch court relied upon the well-established principle that a state may \"tax the enti re income of a discretion- ary trust administered by a resident trustee whether he elects to distribute any part of such income or not.\" Id. at 420–21 (citing Guaranty Trust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of California held that \"[n]o possible doubt attaches to California's constitutional power to tax plaintiff as a trustee.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Threat of Data Theft",
		"context": "That the CFAA may be used to punish outsiders who cause damage to government computers has been well established at least since the Second Circuit's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But it is also important to recognize that interpreta- tion of the CFAA as advocated by Amici has proven an invaluable tool in combatting cybercrime committed by insiders who target law enforcement computer systems. An examination of several cases in which a computer operator was granted access permission to a system and was then prosecuted for malicious acts committed outside the scope of that access, is instructive:  Abusing Civilian Access to Provide Details of Ongoing Investigations to Criminals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Lamps Plus's policy arguments for a stricter standard are unconvincing",
		"context": "However serious those questions may be, this case involves only the antecedent question whether the par- ties have agreed to allow an arbitrator to address them. Under the FAA, that question is one of contractual in- tent, as Stolt-Nielsen held. Moreover, Lamps Plus's \"d ue process\" objections are unsupported by any real-world examples of unfair-ness, even though class arbitration has existed at least since this Court's decision in Green Tree Financial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and courts and ar- bitrators have been operating within the Stolt-Nielsen framework for nearly a decade. Abandoning the con- tractual approach to the ques tion should have a firmer justification. Lamps Plus's argument also proves too much: It suggests that no degree of clarity in an agree- ment between two parties should allow class arbitra-tion—a position not even Lamps Plus advocates.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Nelson Did Not Disavow Centuries of Anglo-American Property Law",
		"context": ". Nor does [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], control here , as the decision below mistakenly found. See Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature Of Railroad Operations Makes The Exit Option Impossible",
		"context": "Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent , 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1343, 1390 (2015); see also Hanover Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that is especially true for railroads. For many companies, doing business in a state where they are not \"at home\" is characterized by an office, a plant, one or more stores where products are sold or services rendered, and the presence of employees carrying out activities to advance the company's business.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature Of Railroad Operations Makes The Exit Option Impossible",
		"context": "For freight railroads, which operate in every state except Hawaii, doing business consists of transporting a wide range of commodities in rail cars moving over a lengthy, fixed right-of-way consisting of a roadbed and tracks—which is almost always property owned and maintained by the 3 A defendant may waive its due process right to resist the personal jurisdiction of a court. Ins. Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One method of waiver is to consent to a court's ex ercise of personal jurisdiction. Nat'l Equip.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature Of Railroad Operations Makes The Exit Option Impossible",
		"context": "One method of waiver is to consent to a court's ex ercise of personal jurisdiction. Nat'l Equip. Rental [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 railroad. The railroads' busi ness also includes operat- ing large, fixed facilities, such as yards, terminals, and repair shops that support th e transportation function and are physically connected to the railroad's line.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 U.S. 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature Of Railroad Operations Makes The Exit Option Impossible",
		"context": "3, 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1888) (describing how Congress exercised its authority under the Commerce 4 Conrail was created by the federal government as a govern- ment organization to stabilize th e freight railroad system in 1973, soon after the Pennsylvania Railroad had merged into the Penn Central Railroad and the new ra ilroad declared bankruptcy. See Regional Rail Reorganization Ac t of 1973, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "127 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To AEDPA's Restrictions On \"Second Or Successive\" Habeas Applications Because It Is Part Of A Habeas Petitioner's Initial Habeas Application",
		"context": "The answer is no. This Court has long held that \"Rule 59 [is] appli- cable in habeas corpus pr oceedings,\" and it has rec- ognized that the general process for seeking post-trial reconsideration in habeas litigation \"conformed to the practice in other civil proceedings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contrary to the de cision below, nothing in AEDPA's restrictions on \"second or successive\" habe- as applications strips habeas petitioners of the pro- cedural right to file timely post-judgment motions under Rule 59(e) before pursing appellate relief. As a matter of statutory text, structure, and history, AEDPA's gatekeeping provis ions for \"second or suc- cessive\" habeas applications do not apply to timely 16 Rule 59(e) motions because such motions are \"part and parcel of the petitioner's one full opportunity to seek collateral review.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To AEDPA's Restrictions On \"Second Or Successive\" Habeas Applications Because It Is Part Of A Habeas Petitioner's Initial Habeas Application",
		"context": "Contrary to the de cision below, nothing in AEDPA's restrictions on \"second or successive\" habe- as applications strips habeas petitioners of the pro- cedural right to file timely post-judgment motions under Rule 59(e) before pursing appellate relief. As a matter of statutory text, structure, and history, AEDPA's gatekeeping provis ions for \"second or suc- cessive\" habeas applications do not apply to timely 16 Rule 59(e) motions because such motions are \"part and parcel of the petitioner's one full opportunity to seek collateral review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "664 F.3d 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The First Amendment Protects Facetious Speech Involving Trademarks",
		"context": "6 158, 195–96 (1982). See also W. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, First Amendment protections are no less important in the context of trademark law than they are in defamation law or any other area. That is why in the trademark context, as in every other, courts have recognized that \"because parody is a form of social and literary criticism, it has socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment,\" Mattel 353 F.3d 792.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The First Amendment Protects Facetious Speech Involving Trademarks",
		"context": "of 319 U.S. 624. Accordingly, First Amendment protections are no less important in the context of trademark law than they are in defamation law or any other area. That is why in the trademark context, as in every other, courts have recognized that \"because parody is a form of social and literary criticism, it has socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment,\" Mattel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d 26.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 F.3d 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The First Amendment Protects Facetious Speech Involving Trademarks",
		"context": "That is why in the trademark context, as in every other, courts have recognized that \"because parody is a form of social and literary criticism, it has socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment,\" Mattel 353 F.3d 792. See also L.L. Bean, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When businesses seek the national spotlight, part of the territory includes accepting a certain amount of ridicule\"—including ridicule that employs their trademarks. Nike, 6 F.3d 1225.",
		"citation_value_orig": "811 F.2d 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The First Amendment Protects Facetious Speech Involving Trademarks",
		"context": "Bean, 811 F.2d 26. \"When businesses seek the national spotlight, part of the territory includes accepting a certain amount of ridicule\"—including ridicule that employs their trademarks. Nike, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 F.3d 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic",
		"context": "For example, in the ear ly 1970s, Congress passed legislation , including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act , which authorized forfeiture of property connected to the criminal enterprise . These laws – and other statutes like them in the years since – were an \"'extraordinary ' weapon\" against those who had significant involvement in organized crime, but they did not take into account the unfairness that such \"drastic\" measures would have against others with less culpability. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). -6- The responsibility for reviewing fines to ensure that they are not grossly disproportionate to the alleged wrongdoing lies principally with the judiciary. In fact, legislatures rely upon trial judges \" to mitigate the severity of punishmen t in the great majority of cases.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic",
		"context": "For example, in the early 1970s, Congress passed legislation, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, which authorized forfeiture of property connected to the criminal enterprise. These laws – and other statutes like them in th e years since – were an \"'extraordinary' weapon\" against those who had significant involvement in organized crime, but they did not take into account the unfairness that such \"drastic\" measures would have against others with less culpability. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The responsibility for reviewing fines to ensure that they are not grossly disproportionate to the -12- alleged wrongdoing lies principally with the judiciary. In fact, legislatures rely upon trial judges \"to mitigate the severity of punishment in the great majority of cases.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Other Stare Decisis Factors Should Not Deter The Court From Ensuring That It Correctly Answers The Important Constitutional Question Presented By This Case",
		"context": "To the contrary, \" when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, a majority of the Sta tes and numerous Territories had laws on the books that limited (and in many cases nearly prohibited) abortion. \" June Med ical Servs. L. L. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, Roe's majority recognized that the statutes \" under attack \" in that case were \"typical of those that, \" at that time, had \" been in effect in many States for approximately a century. \" Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Other Stare Decisis Factors Should Not Deter The Court From Ensuring That It Correctly Answers The Important Constitutional Question Presented By This Case",
		"context": "For one, those decisions are anomalies among th e Court 's 28 more recent fundamental rights cases. Sin ce they were decided, the Court generally has bestowed constitutional protection on an unenumerated right only when, carefully defined , the right is \" objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation 's history and tradition. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting 561 U.S. 742) . Roe and Casey did not follow that framework; instead, they subjected abortion restrictions to heightened scrutiny without determining that the freedom to ab ort before viability is embedded in our country 's settled traditions — which, of course, it is not. See June Medical , 140 S. Ct. at 2151 (Thomas, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Other Stare Decisis Factors Should Not Deter The Court From Ensuring That It Correctly Answers The Important Constitutional Question Presented By This Case",
		"context": "For one, those decisions are anomalies among th e Court 's 28 more recent fundamental rights cases. Sin ce they were decided, the Court generally has bestowed constitutional protection on an unenumerated right only when, carefully defined , the right is \" objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation 's history and tradition. \" 521 U.S. 702 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Roe and Casey did not follow that framework; instead, they subjected abortion restrictions to heightened scrutiny without determining that the freedom to ab ort before viability is embedded in our country 's settled traditions — which, of course, it is not. See June Medical , 140 S. Ct. at 2151 (Thomas, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Other Stare Decisis Factors Should Not Deter The Court From Ensuring That It Correctly Answers The Important Constitutional Question Presented By This Case",
		"context": "Sekulic et al., supra, at 1035- 36 (emphasis added). Additionally , we now know that invidious discrimination often underlies a decision to abort, yet neither Roe nor Casey considered \"states ' wholly separate interest in eliminating discrimination as a reason for an abortion. \" Preterm 994 F.3d 512[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 24 Selective abortions targeting unborn child ren with potential disabilities also have 24 Available at https ://tinyurl.com/tndmj6h2 (visited July 18, 2021). 30 proliferated, even as protections for born individuals with disabilities have increased .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED THE DIRECT-PURCHASER RULE VIA FOUR DECADES OF LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE",
		"context": ". Stare decisis has \"special force in the area of statutory construction\" where \"Congress remains free to alter\" what this Court has done. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even in antitrust, where Congress has given the federal courts the power to develop common law defining \"substantive violations,\" nothing \"suggest[s] that Congress intended courts to have the power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted.\" Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED THE DIRECT-PURCHASER RULE VIA FOUR DECADES OF LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE",
		"context": "491 U.S. 164. Even in antitrust, where Congress has given the federal courts the power to develop common law defining \"substantive violations,\" nothing \"suggest[s] that Congress intended courts to have the power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted.\" Texas Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Illinois Brick , the Court explicitly invited Congress, \"[s]hould [it] disagree wit h this result,\" to \"amend the [Clayton Act] to change it.\" 431 U.S. at 735 n.14.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED THE DIRECT-PURCHASER RULE VIA FOUR DECADES OF LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE",
		"context": "Given this \"positive inaction,\" Congress has shown that it agrees with the Court's construction of § 4. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the same time, because Congress is presumed to know of this Court's construction of statutory language , it \"adopt [s] that interpretation when it re -enacts a statute without chang[ing it] .\" 434 U.S. 575.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED THE DIRECT-PURCHASER RULE VIA FOUR DECADES OF LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE",
		"context": "407 U.S. 258. At the same time, because Congress is presumed to know of this Court's construction of statutory language , it \"adopt [s] that interpretation when it re -enacts a statute without chang[ing it] .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, n ot only has Congress repeatedly amended the Clayton Act, but it has twice amended § 4 itself , retain ing the 9 very language at issue in Illinois Brick . Those amendments give Illinois Brick extra precedential force .",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED THE DIRECT-PURCHASER RULE VIA FOUR DECADES OF LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE",
		"context": "Here, n ot only has Congress repeatedly amended the Clayton Act, but it has twice amended § 4 itself , retain ing the 9 very language at issue in Illinois Brick . Those amendments give Illinois Brick extra precedential force . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia should be affirmed because Petitioner cannot establish that the jury necessarily determined an issue of ultimate fact in his favor",
		"context": "Unlike Yeager, where the Court remanded in light of the \"voluminous\" record and \"complex[ ]\" proceedings, 557 U.S. at 125-26, the record in this case makes abundantly clear that Pe-titioner cannot carry his burden. For reasons of consti- tutional avoidance, the Court therefore should decline to address the novel constitutional question about waiver presented in this case. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even if the Court does answer the waiver question and concludes that Petitioner has not waived his right to argue issue preclus ion, there is no need for a remand given Petitioner's obvious inability to prove issue preclusion based on the uncomplicated record in this case. See 439 U.S. 463.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia should be affirmed because Petitioner cannot establish that the jury necessarily determined an issue of ultimate fact in his favor",
		"context": "See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 467 U.S. 138. But even if the Court does answer the waiver question and concludes that Petitioner has not waived his right to argue issue preclus ion, there is no need for a remand given Petitioner's obvious inability to prove issue preclusion based on the uncomplicated record in this case. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 45",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Practical Burdens of Compliance Formed the Foundations of Bellas Hess and Quill",
		"context": "Id. at 759 n.14 (internal quotations omitted). In 1992, two years before the world's first secure retail transaction over the Web, this Court revisit ed the issue of cross-State sales tax collection in Quill, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the Court recognized that modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result, it reaffirmed Bellas Hess on stare decisis grounds. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Convention Does Not Restrict Enforcement By Non-signatories",
		"context": "That is true in everyday language. \" A direction to a teenage son that he 'shall' clean his room does not thereby forbid him from taking out the trash, walking the dog, or going to school.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is also true of statutes. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "584 F.3d 1088",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Convention Does Not Restrict Enforcement By Non-signatories",
		"context": "It is also true of statutes. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624, suggested that Chapter 1 might have barred equitable estoppel \"if § 3 mandated stays only for disputes between parties to a written arbitration agreement.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Convention Does Not Restrict Enforcement By Non-signatories",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 568 U.S. 371. Indeed, Arthur Andersen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], suggested that Chapter 1 might have barred equitable estoppel \"if § 3 mandated stays only for disputes between parties to a written arbitration agreement.\" Id. at 631 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Convention Does Not Restrict Enforcement By Non-signatories",
		"context": "Then- Judge Alito's concurrence in China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is not to the contrary. That case involved two purported sig- natories, id. at 277 (majority o p.), and the panel acknowledged that \"estoppel principles\" can apply in Convention cases, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 F.3d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier",
		"context": "Notwithstanding the clear history and broad ac- ceptance of damages as relief for constitutional viola- tions, the government attemp ts to retroactively smuggle this Court's recent criticism of Bivens into Congress's enactment of RFRA years earlier. See Gov't Br. passim (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), 24 (citing 566 U.S. 658; this argument, however, so we a ssume, without deciding, that re- spondent's First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens . \"). The government's argument in this case is novel by comparison.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier",
		"context": "Notwithstanding the clear history and broad ac- ceptance of damages as relief for constitutional viola- tions, the government attemp ts to retroactively smuggle this Court's recent criticism of Bivens into Congress's enactment of RFRA years earlier. See Gov't Br. passim (citing 137 S. Ct. 1843), 24 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; this argument, however, so we a ssume, without deciding, that re- spondent's First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens . \"). The government's argument in this case is novel by comparison.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier",
		"context": "Thus, while the parties correctly agree that \"appropriate relief \" includes equitable remedies, the very definition of \"relief \" more strongly suggests monetary dama ges. And the history leading up to RFRA clearly indicates that both are appropriate to ensure the free exercise of religion in the United States. 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61). Whatever the current state of the Bivens cause of action, it can have no impact on the Congressional understanding of \"appropriate relief \" that went into a statute enacted in 1993.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier",
		"context": "And the history leading up to RFRA clearly indicates that both are appropriate to ensure the free exercise of religion in the United States. 19 556 U.S. 662; Correctional Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Whatever the current state of the Bivens cause of action, it can have no impact on the Congressional understanding of \"appropriate relief \" that went into a statute enacted in 1993. The appropriateness of damages for constitu- tional violations was settled and widely known at the time Congress enacted RFRA, before, and after.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier",
		"context": "The appropriateness of damages for constitu- tional violations was settled and widely known at the time Congress enacted RFRA, before, and after. Com- pare, e.g., Bell, 327 U.S. at 684 (\"[W]here federally pro- tected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be allowed to ad- just their remedies so as to grant the necessary re- lief. \"), with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Miller addressed \"sentencing schemes\" and did not further impose juvenile sentencing guidelines",
		"context": "Because \"[w]hen a new substantive rule of constitutional law is estab-lished, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the States' sovereign ad-ministration in their criminal justice systems.\" Id. (cit- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g., Graham , 560 U.S. at 75 (\"It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance\" with Graham 's rule that juvenile non- homicide offenders be given \"some meaningful oppor- tunity to obtain release based on demonstrated ma-turity and rehabilitation.\"). That Miller and Montgomery refused to require state courts to make formal, on -the-record factfindings is no surprise. And while the Court could adopt that rule here, supra , II.B, doing so would depart from this Court's typical approach, giving wide berth to criminal trial courts to decide an offender's guilt and to impose an appropriate punishment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"context": "48 U.S.C. § 2121(c)(2). Accord ingly, as this Court rec- ognized in Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Oversight Board does not, as a con-stitutional matter, exercise the authority of the fed- eral government, and its members are not officers of the United States. Rather, as PROMESA states, the Board was \"created as an entity within the territorial government for which it wa s established,\" 48 U.S.C. § 2121(c)(1), and, for constituti onal purposes, it is part of the local, territorial government of the Common-wealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"context": "That the sovereign immunity the Board invokes here is that of Puerto Rico is critical to the proper dis-position of this case. This Court's precedents undoubt-edly establish that, like other organized political enti- ties classified as territories under the Constitution, 5 Puerto Rico possesses sovereign immunity by virtue of \"the nature of the [Puerto] Rican government,\" which brings Puerto Rico \"within the general rule exempting a government sovereign in its attributes from being sued without its consent.\" Porto 227 U.S. 270; see also Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] point out, the source of the sover-eign immunity asserted here is significant in a num- ber of respects. First, the express terms of the Elev- enth Amendment, applicable only to suits \"against one of the United States,\" U.S. Const. amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "302 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"context": "amend. XI, do not limit Congress's powers with respect to the territories. Second, the underlying considerations of federalism manifested in the Eleventh Amendment, which this Court has held limit both th e authority of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity and the authority of federal courts to entert ain claims against states, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pennhurst State Sch. & 465 U.S. 89, are not present here. Territories, while analo- gous enough to sovereign entities to possess common- law sovereign immunity, do not themselves possess the same \"residuary and inviolable sovereignty,\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 715 (quoting The Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"context": "XI, do not limit Congress's powers with respect to the territories. Second, the underlying considerations of federalism manifested in the Eleventh Amendment, which this Court has held limit both th e authority of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity and the authority of federal courts to entert ain claims against states, see 527 U.S. 706; Pennhurst State Sch. & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], are not present here. Territories, while analo- gous enough to sovereign entities to possess common- law sovereign immunity, do not themselves possess the same \"residuary and inviolable sovereignty,\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 715 (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (C. Rossiter ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"context": "See Kawananakoa , 205 U.S. at 353. Waivers of sovereign immunity, moreover, may take the form either of ex press or implied consent to suit in a particular case, see id . (citing instances of such consent), or of constitutional or statutory provi-sions allowing classes of suit s to be brought against an entity that shares sovereign immunity, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]306 U.S. 505. 7 Because the Oversight Board's defense of sover- eign immunity can give it no immunity greater than that of Puerto Rico itself, the constitution and laws of Puerto Rico determine in the first instance whether the Oversight Board has a viable claim of sovereign immunity against this action. Moreover, if the Over- sight Board lacks a substant ial basis for its argument that the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity bars claims for access to official records to begin with, there is no reason for this Court to grapple with the ques- tions whether Congress must satisfy a clear statement standard when exercising its plenary authority under Article IV to abrogate a territory's sovereign immun- ity, or whether the legislat ion in this case satisfies such a standard of clarity—questions that divide the respondent and the United States despite their agree- ment on the nature of Puerto Rico's immunity and Congress's unfettered Article IV authority to abrogate",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
		"context": "See Kawananakoa , 205 U.S. at 353. Waivers of sovereign immunity, moreover, may take the form either of ex press or implied consent to suit in a particular case, see id . (citing instances of such consent), or of constitutional or statutory provi-sions allowing classes of suit s to be brought against an entity that shares sovereign immunity, see, e.g., 139 S. Ct. 1435[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Because the Oversight Board's defense of sover- eign immunity can give it no immunity greater than that of Puerto Rico itself, the constitution and laws of Puerto Rico determine in the first instance whether the Oversight Board has a viable claim of sovereign immunity against this action. Moreover, if the Over- sight Board lacks a substant ial basis for its argument that the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity bars claims for access to official records to begin with, there is no reason for this Court to grapple with the ques- tions whether Congress must satisfy a clear statement standard when exercising its plenary authority under Article IV to abrogate a territory's sovereign immun- ity, or whether the legislat ion in this case satisfies such a standard of clarity—questions that divide the respondent and the United States despite their agree- ment on the nature of Puerto Rico's immunity and Congress's unfettered Article IV authority to abrogate",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. The Legislative History of the 1986 Amendment is Not to the Contrary",
		"context": "Of course, a stray sentence in a committee report can hardly overcome either the plain language Congress used in Article 43(a) or the settled principles of statutory interpret ation that would compel the same reading even if the meaning of the text were not plain. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This disconnect is especially glaring here, where the purpose the government purports to derive from the legislative history (offenses for which death is \" prescribed by . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. The Legislative History of the 1986 Amendment is Not to the Contrary",
		"context": "And the meaning of the federal civilian statute of limitations is illuminated, if at all, by the full legislative history of the 1939 statute —not a lone remark in a 1986 committee report. The legislative history on which the government relies is, thus, immaterial subsequent legislative history on the critical point in dispute —the meaning of the term \"offense punishable by death.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10 b. The Complete Legisla tive History of the 1986 Amendment Does Not Support the Government's Reading Even if the 1986 amendment 's legislative history could illuminate the meaning of \"punishable by death\" in Article 43(a) , the government's reading rests on a cherry -picked statement taken out of context. As noted above, the 1986 amendment was motivated by the volume of serious offenses under the UCMJ that, as late as 1985, carried either a two - or three -year statute of limitations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. The Legislative History of the 1986 Amendment is Not to the Contrary",
		"context": "99 -331, at 249 –50, not a word was said about this purportedly seismic shift in military law. Cf. Church of Scientology of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], let alone in 1939. 29 where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 's 'dog that didn 't bark, ' that an amendment having the effect [the government] ascribes to it would have been differently described . \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Reconsideration Order",
		"context": "See, e.g., Multiple Ownership , 50 FCC 2d at 1074 (promulgating newspaper/broadcast cross -ownership rule). If the Commis sion had not previously adopted any ownership restrictions, and private parties had urged the agency to do so now in order to promote mi- nority and female ownership of broadcast stations, the burden clearly would have been on the proponents to identify evid ence that the proposed restrictions would have the desired effect. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Once an existing rule has c eased to serve its original purpose, i t is similarly reasonable to expect comment- ing parties who advance new rationales for that rule to support their positions w ith evidence. Respondents failed to do so here .",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "McDonald , 561 U.S. at 765, n. 13. This Court's reasoning, regardless of the potential for a different outcome, would be different had those issues arisen for the first time today rather than more than a century ago. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company v. Bombolis , 241 U.S . 211 (1916). 4 precedents into doubt, then stare decisis has no meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "4 precedents into doubt, then stare decisis has no meaning. The doctrine of stare decisis \"is of fundamenta l importance to the rule of law \" and departures from it demand \"special justification.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court does not depart from stare decisis absent \"compelling justification\" because it \"promotes stability, predictability, and respect for ju dicial authority. \" 502 U.S. 197.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "483 U.S. 468. This Court does not depart from stare decisis absent \"compelling justification\" because it \"promotes stability, predictability, and respect for ju dicial authority. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All support leaving Apodaca undisturbed. First, Apodaca is 46 years old , and Louisiana (as well as Oregon) has relied on it since 1972 to instruct jurors in felony trials that they may return non -unanimous verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "Although the State would contend that a new rule requiring unanimous verdicts in state criminal cases should not be applied retroactively during collateral review, the outcome of such a hypothetical case is not certain and a flood of defendants undoubtedly would immediately file m otions claiming otherwise . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 542 U.S. 406 (2004 ). Indeed, one professor noted that \"the number of [Oregon] juries rendering verdicts with one or two holdouts is 25 percent of all juries. \"4 The potential that about one out of every 4 Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy , 199 (BasicBooks 1994).",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "Although the State would contend that a new rule requiring unanimous verdicts in state criminal cases should not be applied retroactively during collateral review, the outcome of such a hypothetical case is not certain and a flood of defendants undoubtedly would immediately file m otions claiming otherwise . Cf. 542 U.S. 348; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2004 ). Indeed, one professor noted that \"the number of [Oregon] juries rendering verdicts with one or two holdouts is 25 percent of all juries. \"4 The potential that about one out of every 4 Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy , 199 (BasicBooks 1994).",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "(citation omitted). The Apodaca and Johnson decisions provide a workable rule that is both clear and easy to apply here—the verdict in this non -capital felony may be returned by the concurrence of ten of twelve jurors.6 Because these decisions do not defy consistent application, this factor also weighs against vacating this Court's precede nt. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Furthermore, t he Court has not questioned Apodaca and Johnson and has cited one or both of them without reservation. E.g., Schad , 501 U.S. at 634, n. 5 (plurality) (\"a state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no right to a unanimous jury verdict\"); 441 U.S. 130 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari",
		"context": "See 555 U.S. 223 . Furthermore, t he Court has not questioned Apodaca and Johnson and has cited one or both of them without reservation. E.g., Schad , 501 U.S. at 634, n. 5 (plurality) (\"a state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no right to a unanimous jury verdict\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Sixth Circuit's Reasoning In Applying Clear-Error Review Is Not Persuasive",
		"context": "To give that undefined concept its proper contours, courts must articulate legal principles and \"exercise judg-ment about the values that animate\" habitual resi- dence, Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1073, including stability, continuity, and settled purpose, see infra Part II.A. In this respect, habitual residence closely resem- bles other types of determi nations that are reviewed de novo , such as probable cause, reasonable suspicion, the voluntariness of a confession, and Miranda \"in custody\" determinations. See Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 699; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like thos e other concepts, habitual residence has a \"hybrid qual ity\" that subsumes a number of historical facts within \"a 'complex of val- ues.'\" Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the FAA Clearly States that it Applies to all Arbitration Agreements Unless Expressly Exempted by the FAA or other Federal Law",
		"context": ". based on our abiding convictionth[at] communication suffers when language says whatit does not mean.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A fair reading of the 10 139 S. Ct. 2400. 9 FAA's text encompasses and applies to the arbitration contract in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "81 Cal.App.4th 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text of the FAA Clearly States that it Applies to all Arbitration Agreements Unless Expressly Exempted by the FAA or other Federal Law",
		"context": "based on our abiding convictionth[at] communication suffers when language says whatit does not mean.\" 81 Cal.App.4th 564. A fair reading of the 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 FAA's text encompasses and applies to the arbitration contract in this case. Numerous California courtdecisions, however – dictated by Iskanian – seize upon the final 17 words of section 2 of the FAA, its savingsclause, to assert that the arbitration contract is at oddswith \"grounds\" that \"exist at law or in equity for therevocation of any contract.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's jurisprudence on ripeness in pre-enforcement cases",
		"context": ". In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court conducted a plaintiff- specific assessment and found that claims by three of the named plaintiffs were not ripe where there was no threatened prosecution as to those plaintiffs. The Court reasoned as follows: If these three had alleged that they would be prosecuted for the conduct they planned to en- gage in, and if the District Court had found this allegation to be true – either on the ad-mission of the State's di strict attorney or on any other evidence – then a genuine contro-versy might be said to exist. But here appel-lees Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's jurisprudence on ripeness in pre-enforcement cases",
		"context": "\"Spe- cifically, we have held that a plaintiff satisfies the 15 injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges 'an inten- tion to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a stat- ute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.' \" Ibid. , quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Susan B. Anthony List case involved SBA's challenge to an Ohio statute prohibiting false state- ments during the course of a campaign where a candi- date lodged a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission which found probable cause and setthe matter for full hearing. Susan B. Anthony List , supra , 134 S. Ct. at 2339.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's jurisprudence on ripeness in pre-enforcement cases",
		"context": "With the existence of a prior state proceeding against SBA, evidence showing 20-80 complaints to the state elec-tions commission each year, and SBA's stated intent to continue its activities, this Court had no difficulty concluding there existed a continued threat of a future 16 complaint against SBA, making the claims ripe. Id., at 2343-2346. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court addressed First Amendment associational freedom claims of personal assistants working under Illinois's Rehabilitation Pro-gram which required payment of union dues from non- union members. In footnote 30, the majority concluded similar workers in the related \"Disabilities Program\" were not ripe even though potentially subject to the Illinois law because those personal assistants had not yet unionized. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Legislative History Shows That Congress's Purpose Was to Ensure the Immediate Transfer to Immigration Custody of Noncitizens When Released from Criminal Custody",
		"context": ". during which mandatory detention of criminal aliens would not be the general rule.\" Matter of Garvin - Noble , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The need for a \"transition period\" make s sense only if Congress understood Section 1226(c) to require immediate detention at the time of release. Had Congress intended \"when\" to authorize detention \"at any time after\" release, there would have been no need to provide a two -year delay in its effective date to account for resource constraints.",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 I. & N. Dec. 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "The Eleventh Circuit , by contrast, reject s the \"con- clusion that a finding of scienter can be preclud ed by a defendant's identification of a reasonable interpreta- tion of an ambiguous regulation that would have per- mitted its conduct. \" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, the defendant is liable if it \"knew or should have known that its conduct violated a regula-tion in light of any ambiguity at the time of the alleged violation. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 F.3d 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "T he Seventh Cir- cuit rejects this requirement . To the extent Olhausen diverges from Phalp , Ol- hausen is irrelevant because \"[u]npublished opinions are not controlling authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .3 Even if Olhausen had been published, the prior decision in Phalp would control . See 392 F.3d 1306 . Insofar as respondent s regard Olhausen as evi- dence that Phalp is consistent with the Seventh Cir- cuit's decision s, that is wrong —as Phalp itself makes clear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 F.3d 1340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "To the extent Olhausen diverges from Phalp , Ol- hausen is irrelevant because \"[u]npublished opinions are not controlling authority.\" 487 F.3d 1340 .3 Even if Olhausen had been published, the prior decision in Phalp would control . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Insofar as respondent s regard Olhausen as evi- dence that Phalp is consistent with the Seventh Cir- cuit's decision s, that is wrong —as Phalp itself makes clear. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F.3d 1306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "Respondents ' answer vis-à-vis the Ninth Circuit's precedents is similarly unpersuasive. Respondent s do not seriously dispute that the two published cases cited in the petition, United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 261 F.3d 821 , conflict with the decision below. See Pet. 15 -16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 F.3d 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "Respondents ' answer vis-à-vis the Ninth Circuit's precedents is similarly unpersuasive. Respondent s do not seriously dispute that the two published cases cited in the petition, United States ex rel. 195 F.3d 457 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , conflict with the decision below. See Pet. 15 -16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 F.3d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "15 -16. Instead, re- spondent s cite United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , an un- published decision where the scienter analysis is two sentences long. But although McGrath cited Safeco , it placed dispositive weight on the fact that the defend- ant subjectively held its interpretation, in good faith, when it presented claims. See 690 F. App'x at 552 (finding no scienter because the defendant's \"good faith interpretation .",
		"citation_value_orig": "690 F. App'x 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "See Swoben , 848 F.3d at 1178. But the rest of the decision shows that the Ninth Cir- cuit's rejection of th at argument cannot be read as a n endorsement of the Seventh Circuit's extreme rule that the defendant's subjective understanding is irrele- vant . Respondent s cite [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . BIO 20. But nei- ther Hagood nor any other Ninth Circuit case has ever held that a defendant's subjective understanding is ir- relevant to scienter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "81 F.3d 1465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "Not so. I n United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the de- fendant argued that a finding of sciente r was impossi- ble because \"no court or Government entity had inter- preted the decades -old signature -timing requirement to prohibit the conduct alleged,\" and the Sixth Circuit itself had been \" 'left to interpret the regulation's lan- guage ' in the first instanc e\" during the FCA case. Pra- ther Appellee Br., 2017 WL 5495615. The defendant argued that because the Sixth Circuit \"in- terpreted the regulation as a matter of first impression in 2016 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "892 F.3d 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
		"context": "at 43. 8 That defense is indistinguishable from respond- ents' argument that there was no authoritative inter- pretation of U&C pricing vis-à-vis discount programs before the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But although the argument worked in the Sev- enth Circuit, it failed in the Sixth because the defend- ant took steps to avoid learning whether its conduct violated the regulation and ignored internal warnings that it was noncompliant. See Prather, 892 F.3d at 837.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.3d 632",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act \"Under Color of\" Law",
		"context": "A. The State -Action Inquiry Is Ill -Suited to a Rigid Test Because \"most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments,\" Flagg Bros., Inc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court has repeatedly been called upon to decide whether challenged conduct amount s to what the Court has de- scribed as \"state action ,\" id. at 155. Through its long expe- rience with cases raising state -action questions, this Court 17 has identif ied s everal pertinent factors that make the in- quiry particularly unsuitable for a one-size-fits-all ap- proach .",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act \"Under Color of\" Law",
		"context": "First , the state -action inquiry necessarily reflects a balance of interests . An o verly narrow concept ion of state action can provide insufficient protection for individual rights and can sanction abuses of governmental power . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An overly broad concept ion can threaten \"indi- vidual freedom \" and can impose on the government and its officials \"responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed .\" Lugar , 457 U.S. at 936.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act \"Under Color of\" Law",
		"context": "). Third , because a finding of no state action renders challenged conduct \"immune from the restrictions of\" the Constitution , Jackson , 419 U.S. at 349, this Court has been especially reluctant to issue sweeping rulings that may prove overbroad in future cases. The state -action test functions as a blunt on/off switch: If a particular consider- ation is treated \"as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action,\" Brentwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , then the absence of that one consideration will render all other considerations irrelevant . A more flexible approach that refuses to treat a ny particular factor as dispositive , by contrast, can allow the same factor to be considered within the context of the rel- evant constitutional framework . In New Jersey v. TLO , 469 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act \"Under Color of\" Law",
		"context": "• \"[T]he line between private conduct and govern- mental action cannot be defined by reference to any gene ral formula unrelated to particular exercises of governmental authority .\" Columbia Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. • \"This Court has never attempted the impossible task of formulating an infallible test for determin- ing w hether the State in any of its manifestations has become significantly involved in private [con- duct] .\" 387 U.S. 369 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act \"Under Color of\" Law",
		"context": "Sys., 412 U.S. 94. • \"This Court has never attempted the impossible task of formulating an infallible test for determin- ing w hether the State in any of its manifestations has become significantly involved in private [con- duct] .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 19 These pronouncements reflect the wisdom of resolving the state -action inquiry \"in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present,\" rather than seeking to divine some \"constitutional precept\" of \"nigh universal applica- tion.\" Burton , 365 U.S. at 726.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "18 U.S. 76. The consequences for individual liberty are dire. Con- torted interpretations of criminal laws deprive the people of the \"fair notice\" that due process demands, McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 576, and \" 'partak[e] of the odious nature of an ex post facto law' \" by declaring conduct criminal after the fact, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Expansive interpretations of federal criminal statutes also \"upset the Constitution's balance between national and local power.\" Bond , 572 U.S. at 866.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "Tor- 578 U.S. 452. Overcriminalization similarly undermines \"the separa- tion of powers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It is the legislature, not the Court, which is 2 See R. Leider, The Modern Common Law of Crime , 111 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 407, 477 (2021) (recounting practice where, one day each week, \"federal prosecutors divert ed all local drug cases to federal court\"); 976 F. Supp. 2d 417 at 95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "at 357. And it consolidates \"[t]he terrifying force of the criminal justice system\" in individual prosecutors, rather than entrusting it to \"society as a whole\" represented in the legislature. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has consistently curbed overcriminalization. It has invalidated vague federal criminal laws that \"hand off the legislature's responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "This Court has consistently curbed overcriminalization. It has invalidated vague federal criminal laws that \"hand off the legislature's responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges.\" Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]527 U.S. 41461 U.S. 352405 U.S. 156141 S. Ct. 1648; see McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 575 (rejecting reading of \"official act\" in bribery statute that 8 included everything \"from arranging meetings to inviting a guest to an event\"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 865-866 (rejecting reading of \"chemical weapon\" in chemical weapons treaty that included every toxic chemical); 529 U.S. 848483 U.S. 358. The Court has refused to read criminal laws to reach \"conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author- ities.\" Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "This Court has consistently curbed overcriminalization. It has invalidated vague federal criminal laws that \"hand off the legislature's responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges.\" Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see 138 S. Ct. 1204[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]461 U.S. 352405 U.S. 156141 S. Ct. 1648; see McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 575 (rejecting reading of \"official act\" in bribery statute that 8 included everything \"from arranging meetings to inviting a guest to an event\"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 865-866 (rejecting reading of \"chemical weapon\" in chemical weapons treaty that included every toxic chemical); 529 U.S. 848483 U.S. 358. The Court has refused to read criminal laws to reach \"conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author- ities.\" Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "This Court has consistently curbed overcriminalization. It has invalidated vague federal criminal laws that \"hand off the legislature's responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges.\" Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see 138 S. Ct. 1204527 U.S. 41[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]405 U.S. 156141 S. Ct. 1648; see McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 575 (rejecting reading of \"official act\" in bribery statute that 8 included everything \"from arranging meetings to inviting a guest to an event\"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 865-866 (rejecting reading of \"chemical weapon\" in chemical weapons treaty that included every toxic chemical); 529 U.S. 848483 U.S. 358. The Court has refused to read criminal laws to reach \"conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author- ities.\" Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "This Court has consistently curbed overcriminalization. It has invalidated vague federal criminal laws that \"hand off the legislature's responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges.\" Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see 138 S. Ct. 1204527 U.S. 41461 U.S. 352[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]141 S. Ct. 1648; see McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 575 (rejecting reading of \"official act\" in bribery statute that 8 included everything \"from arranging meetings to inviting a guest to an event\"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 865-866 (rejecting reading of \"chemical weapon\" in chemical weapons treaty that included every toxic chemical); 529 U.S. 848483 U.S. 358. The Court has refused to read criminal laws to reach \"conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author- ities.\" Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "This Court has consistently curbed overcriminalization. It has invalidated vague federal criminal laws that \"hand off the legislature's responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges.\" Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see 138 S. Ct. 1204527 U.S. 41461 U.S. 352405 U.S. 156141 S. Ct. 1648; see McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 575 (rejecting reading of \"official act\" in bribery statute that 8 included everything \"from arranging meetings to inviting a guest to an event\"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 865-866 (rejecting reading of \"chemical weapon\" in chemical weapons treaty that included every toxic chemical); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]483 U.S. 358. The Court has refused to read criminal laws to reach \"conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author- ities.\" Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 848",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see 138 S. Ct. 1204527 U.S. 41461 U.S. 352405 U.S. 156141 S. Ct. 1648; see McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 575 (rejecting reading of \"official act\" in bribery statute that 8 included everything \"from arranging meetings to inviting a guest to an event\"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 865-866 (rejecting reading of \"chemical weapon\" in chemical weapons treaty that included every toxic chemical); 529 U.S. 848483 U.S. 358. The Court has refused to read criminal laws to reach \"conduct traditionally regulated by state and local author- ities.\" Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court has emphasized that it \"cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will 'use it responsibly.' \" McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 576 (re- fusing to rely on prosecutorial discretion when interpre- ting bribery statute); see 138 S. Ct. 1101; 526 U.S. 398.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808. And the Court has emphasized that it \"cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will 'use it responsibly.' \" McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 576 (re- fusing to rely on prosecutorial discretion when interpre- ting bribery statute); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 526 U.S. 398. The right-to-control theory is the latest in a long line of aggressive prosecution theories to reach this Court. It is both a symptom and a cause of overcriminalization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
		"context": "Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 24 (refusing to read the prop- erty fraud statutes to reach \"false statements on [state] license applications\"); see Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1574 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to effect \" 'a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction' \"); Bond , 572 U.S. at 863 (refusing to read a chemical weapons treaty to \"reach purely local crimes\"); McNally , 483 U.S. at 360 (refusing to read the property fraud statutes to allow \"the Federal Government [to] set[ ] standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi- cials\"); 401 U.S. 808. And the Court has emphasized that it \"cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will 'use it responsibly.' \" McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 576 (re- fusing to rely on prosecutorial discretion when interpre- ting bribery statute); see 138 S. Ct. 1101; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The right-to-control theory is the latest in a long line of aggressive prosecution theories to reach this Court. It is both a symptom and a cause of overcriminalization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Will Have Far-Reaching Implications For Landowners Across The Country",
		"context": "15 Limiting the Service's proper role with respect to \"crit- ical habitat\" designations is vital. \"Designation of private property as critical habitat can impose significant costs on landowners because federal agencies may not authorize, fund, or carry out actions that are likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.\" Otay Mesa Prop., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case alone, the agency's interpretation allowed it to impose $34 million in costs on the landowner petitioners merely because the Service found a single feature essen- tial to the dusky gopher frog's survival on their land. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "41a, 43a, 48a-49a, 56a, 59a-60a (¶¶ 3, 8, 29, 52-53, 66-69). Those allegations govern on review of an order grant- ing a motion to dismiss. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 751 n.2 (2 017); Pet. Br. 6.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "Br. 6. The well-settled principle \"that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint,\" Caterpillar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], bars Apple's attempt to seek dismissal based on a revision of respondents' claim that respondents did not plead. By contrast, the phrase \"distribution services\" appears nowhere in the operative complaint. As support for its characterization of the complaint, Apple quotes only (at 2, 36) allegations that it \"derive[d] supra- competitive profits from the distribution of iPhone apps worldwide\" and that it has \"cornered 100% of the worldwide distribution market for iPhone applica- tions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "41a (¶ 3). Thos e allegations do not limit the owners' claims to distri bution services, but rather define those claims as applying to the aftermarket for iPhone apps at the distribution (that is, retail) level – the level at which Apple sells them. There is nothing unusual about a claim that a market is cartelized or monopolized at the distribution or retail level.11 If 11 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (affirming injunction against conspiracy of motion picture exhibitors to monopolize the business of operating movie theaters in certain towns; declining to consider, as \"immaterial,\" whether movie 31 one company acquired all the gas stations in a metro- politan area, then the price of gas to driver s in that market would rise to supracompetiti ve levels regardless of whether gasoline producers or whole- salers were competing with one another. Even if the relevant mark et here were the market for app-distribution services (which it is not), Apple still would have no support for its assertion (at 34-35) that it provides those distribution services solely to developers and not to iPhone owners. To the contrary, Apple's own Services Terms describe the App Store as a \"Service[]\" that allows customers to \"buy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "Thus, even on Apple's own inaccurate characterization of the trans- action, Apple still provides app-di stribution services directly to iPhone owners , and iPhone owners pay money directly to Apple. If respondents can prove they pay more as a result of Apple's anticompetitive conduct, then the Clayton Act permits them to recover the resulting damages. Apple further errs in invoking (at 35) this Court's recent decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\" Amex \"), and describing the App Store as a \"two-sided platform[].\" As th is Court explained in Amex , a two-sided transaction platform is \"best understood as su pplying only one product – transactions – which is jointly consume d\" by the parties on both sides of the platform. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006); see IIA Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 346f, at 194 (where the ultimate seller controls the intermediate seller, the plaintiff is considered to purchase directly from the ultimate seller for Illinois Brick purposes). Here, Apple is in control – it offers take-it-or-leave-it terms to both developers an d iPhone owners, reserving volumes of Gibbon.\" AT&T [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 the right to change those terms unilaterally at any time. If Apple's contention that it is a sales agent in the relevant sense of being controlled by the develop- ers is even plausible, it at best po ints to a factual dispute that should not be resolved in Apple's favor on a motion to dismiss.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "Apple's decision for now to allow developers a limited choice in establishing pricing for a pps as part of Apple's own profit-maximizing strategy should not enable it to claim that developers are the ones in control. 34 More generally, Apple's inse rtion of agency language in its contracts should not alter the antitrust analysis; it does not affect the directness of the purchase of apps by iPhone owners from Apple itself or the substance of the transactions either between Ap ple and the developers or between Apple and the iPhone owners. See American Needle, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same is true of Apple's language stating that there is a \"sales contract\" between the iPhone owner and the developer to which Apple is \"not a party.\" Apple Services Terms § G. That language means little; the Apple Services Terms themse lves obligate the iPhone owner to pay Apple – not the developer – for the app, 13 and they give Apple the right to enforce the terms of the app's license ag reement just as the developer could.14 That point is further illuminated by the leading antitrust treatise, which a ddresses the specific hypo- thetical that Apple invokes – travel agents selling 13 See Apple Services Terms § B (\"Apple will charge your pay- ment method (such as your credit card .",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product",
		"context": "15 The treatise draws the conc lusion that a broker can sue a combination of upstream suppliers, just as a purchaser-reseller could. The same reasoning shows equally that consumers can seek damages from a cartel of brokers (or \"sales agents\"), just as they could from a monopolizing reseller, if those brokers use their market power to increase the price of tickets. c. Apple sought review in this Co urt primarily on the strength of the Eighth Circuit's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and now defends that decision only briefly (at 6, 38-39). Ticketmaster 's flawed reasoning and incor- rect result underscore the de fects in Apple's position. In Ticketmaster , plaintiff concertgoers sued Ticket- master for \"monopolizing, or attempting to monopo- lize, the market for ticket distribution services\" and for \"engaging in price fixing with various concert ven- ues and promoters.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 F.3d 1166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Jury instructions must clearly require the subjective mental states of knowledge or intention.",
		"context": "Negligent conduct is not made criminal by this statute , however, as the statute clearly requires a mens rea of knowledge or intent . \"[E]ven a negligent physician is inoculated against criminal liability under Section 841(a) as long as he acts in good faith.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Because good faith is a defense to criminal 27 charges under Section 841(a) but not to civil liability for medical malpractice, 'inclusion of a good faith instruction is … a plainspoken method of explaining to the jury a critical difference between the two standards. '\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Jury instructions must clearly require the subjective mental states of knowledge or intention.",
		"context": "\"Because good faith is a defense to criminal 27 charges under Section 841(a) but not to civil liability for medical malpractice, 'inclusion of a good faith instruction is … a plainspoken method of explaining to the jury a critical difference between the two standards. '\" Id. at 45 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). It must be acknowledged , however, that the words \"good faith\" do not appear in Section 841(a) or Section 1306.04(a ). If proper jury instructions consistent with the \"knowingly or intentionally \" mens rea requirement in the statute are given , there may well be no need for a judge -made \"good faith \" defense .",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. If the Defense Were Available, Discretionary Abstention Would Not Apply Here",
		"context": ". Even if this Court were to find that a freestanding, comity-based abstention defense separate from forum non conveniens is available in FS IA cases, the only appropriate remedy would be remand, not dismissal. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Ho [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet such an exercise would be pointless here, and should also be denied. The Brief of U.S. as Amicus Curiae urges a remand for consideration of factors that Petitioners already lit-igated and abandoned.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The BIA's interpretations lack consistency and cause confusion",
		"context": ". Finally, deference is sometimes justified as a means of ensuring uniformity in application of the law. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But, as this case illustrates, BIA decisions are often destabilizing. See Valenzuela Gallardo , 968 F.3d at 1058 (recounting BIA's failed attempts to define \"obstruc tion of justice\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The BIA's interpretations lack consistency and cause confusion",
		"context": ", 942 F.3d 874. Other times the BIA reverses itself, or takes sides in a circuit split, which is obviously \"not a sustainable way to administer uniform justice in the area of immigration.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Uniformit y is simply not a feature of BIA adjudication. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "The notion that the Takings Clause may apply to government actions beyond the traditional physical appropriation of property emerged gradually over the next century as this Court considered cases in which government action very closely resembled the appro- priation of property. The first of these cases, Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. , involved a state- authorized dam that completely flooded the peti- tioner's property. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court, an- alyzing the similar Takings Clause in the Wisconsin 15 constitution, noted that \"[i]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result\" if the government \"can, in effect, subject [real property] to total destruction with- out making any compensation, because, in the narrow- est sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "The Court made clear, however, that \"[b]eyond this we do not go, and this case calls us to go no further.\" Id. Nearly fifty years later, in Pennsylvania Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court again nar- rowly expanded the reach of the Takings Clause. This time the Clause was expanded to encompass regula- tions that the Court viewed as particularly oppressive. Yet this Court was once again careful to limit its newly recognized regulatory takings doctrine to instances in which the effect of a regulation is tantamount to the direct appropriation of property contemplated in the text of the Fifth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "the statute was invalid as effecting a 'taking' without just compen- sation.\" Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 127-28 (emphasis added) (describing the holding in Mahon); cf. Arm- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that although \"not every destruction or injury to prop- erty by governmental action has been held to be a 'tak- ing' in the constitutional sense,\" the government's \" to- tal destruction \" of the full value of certain liens by tak- ing possession of the underlying property constituted a \"taking\" (emphasis added)); Hudson Cty. Water 209 U.S. 349. This Court summarized the status of its regulatory takings jurisprudence to date in Penn Central Trans- portation Co. v. City of New York , 438 U.S. at 123.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 127-28 (emphasis added) (describing the holding in Mahon); cf. Arm- 364 U.S. 40 (holding that although \"not every destruction or injury to prop- erty by governmental action has been held to be a 'tak- ing' in the constitutional sense,\" the government's \" to- tal destruction \" of the full value of certain liens by tak- ing possession of the underlying property constituted a \"taking\" (emphasis added)); Hudson Cty. Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court summarized the status of its regulatory takings jurisprudence to date in Penn Central Trans- portation Co. v. City of New York , 438 U.S. at 123. It acknowledged that the question of when a regulation 17 is sufficiently akin to an appropriation to require com- pensation under the Takings Clause \"has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty,\" id., and \"this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fair- ness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per- sons,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "at 124-25. This Court has sought to clarify its regulatory tak- ings doctrine in recent years, and it has continued to recognize that there are limits on applying the Takings Clause beyond direct physical appropriations of prop- erty. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court emphasized the \"right to exclude\" and held that an unconstitutional per se tak- ing occurs \"where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.\" Id. at 832.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "at 827-29. The Court determined that requiring such an easement without compensation vi- olated the Takings Clause. The Court based its holding in Nollan in part on its previous determination in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that \"where governmental action results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property,\" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432-33 n.9), that action effects an unconstitutional taking per se, re- gardless of \"whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner,\" id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35); accord Kaiser 444 U.S. 164. The Loretto Court had made clear, however, that \"deprivation of the right to use and ob- tain a profit from property is not, in every case, inde- pendently sufficient to establish a taking,\" 458 U.S. at 436, and it noted the case law's consistent distinction between \"permanent physical occupation\" and \"gov- ernment action outside the owner's property that causes consequential damages within,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "The Court determined that requiring such an easement without compensation vi- olated the Takings Clause. The Court based its holding in Nollan in part on its previous determination in 458 U.S. 419, that \"where governmental action results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property,\" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432-33 n.9), that action effects an unconstitutional taking per se, re- gardless of \"whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner,\" id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35); accord Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Loretto Court had made clear, however, that \"deprivation of the right to use and ob- tain a profit from property is not, in every case, inde- pendently sufficient to establish a taking,\" 458 U.S. at 436, and it noted the case law's consistent distinction between \"permanent physical occupation\" and \"gov- ernment action outside the owner's property that causes consequential damages within,\" id. at 428.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , the Court explained that it has recognized two categories of regulations that are takings per se, regardless of the public interest furthered by the governmental action: (1) \"regulations that compel the property owner to suf- fer a physical 'invasion' of his property,\" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015—\"at least with regard to permanent in- vasions,\" such as those requiring landlords to allow the permanent placement of cable facilities in their apart- ment buildings, id. (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419), and (2) regulations that \"den[y] all economically bene- ficial or productive use of land,\" id. (emphasis added) 19 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834); see id. at 1017 (suggesting that the justification for the latter rule might be \"that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation\" (emphasis added)). The Court thus emphasized that \"when the owner of real prop- erty has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suf- fered a taking.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "The notion that the Takings Clause may apply to government actions beyond the physical expropriation of property emerged gradually over the next century as this Court considered cases in which government action very closely resembled expropriations of prop- erty. The first of these cases, Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. , involved a state-authorized dam that flooded the petitioner's property. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court noted that \"[i]t would be a very cu- rious and unsatisfactory result, if . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "The Court made clear, however, that \"[b]eyond this we do not go, and this case calls us to go no further.\" Id. Nearly fifty years later, in Pennsylvania Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court again nar- rowly expanded the reach of the Takings Clause. This time the Clause was expanded to encompass regula- tions that the Court viewed as particularly oppressive. Yet this Court was once again careful to limit its newly recognized regulatory takings doctrine to instances in which the effect of a regulation is tantamount to the direct appropriation of property contemplated in the text of the Fifth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "the statute was invalid as effecting a 'taking' without just compen- sation.\" Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 127-28 (emphasis added) (describing the holding in Mahon); cf. Arm- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hudson Cty. Water 209 U.S. 349. This Court summarized the status of its regulatory takings jurisprudence to date in Penn Central Trans- portation Co. v. City of New York , 438 U.S. at 123.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 127-28 (emphasis added) (describing the holding in Mahon); cf. Arm- 364 U.S. 40; Hudson Cty. Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court summarized the status of its regulatory takings jurisprudence to date in Penn Central Trans- portation Co. v. City of New York , 438 U.S. at 123. It acknowledged that the question of what constitutes a regulatory taking (where a regulation is sufficiently akin to an expropriation to require compensation un- der the Takings Clause) \"has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty,\" id., and \"this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require 15 that economic injuries caused by public action be com- pensated by the government, rather than remain dis- proportionately concentrated on a few persons,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "at 124-25. This Court has sought to clarify its regulatory tak- ings doctrine in recent years, and it has continued to recognize that there are limits on applying the Takings Clause beyond direct appropriations of physical prop- erty. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that a \"permanent physical occupation\" amounting to an unconstitutional taking occurs \"where individuals are given a perma- nent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.\" Id. at 832 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "at 827- 29. The Court determined that requiring such a \"per- manent and continuous\" easement without compensa- tion violated the Takings Clause. The Court based its holding in Nollan in part on its previous determination in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that 16 \"where governmental action results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property,\" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (emphasis added) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432-33 n.9), that action effects an unconstitutional taking per se, regardless of \"whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only mini- mal economic impact on the owner,\" id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35); accord Kaiser 444 U.S. 164. The Loretto Court had made clear, however, that \"depriva- tion of the right to use and obtain a profit from prop- erty is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking,\" 458 U.S. at 436, and it \"under- score[d] the constitutional distinction between a per- manent occupation and a temporary physical inva- sion,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "The Court determined that requiring such a \"per- manent and continuous\" easement without compensa- tion violated the Takings Clause. The Court based its holding in Nollan in part on its previous determination in 458 U.S. 419, that 16 \"where governmental action results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property,\" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (emphasis added) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432-33 n.9), that action effects an unconstitutional taking per se, regardless of \"whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only mini- mal economic impact on the owner,\" id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35); accord Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Loretto Court had made clear, however, that \"depriva- tion of the right to use and obtain a profit from prop- erty is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking,\" 458 U.S. at 436, and it \"under- score[d] the constitutional distinction between a per- manent occupation and a temporary physical inva- sion,\" id. at 434.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
		"context": "In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , the Court explained that it has recognized two categories of regulations that are takings per se, regardless of the public interest furthered by the governmental action: (1) \"regulations that compel the property owner to suf- fer a physical 'invasion' of his property,\" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015—\"at least with regard to permanent in- vasions,\" such as those requiring landlords to allow the permanent placement of cable facilities in their apart- ment buildings, id. (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419), and (2) regulations that \"den[y] all economically bene- ficial or productive use of land,\" id. (emphasis added) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834); see id. at 1017 (suggesting that the justification for the latter rule might be \"that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation\" (emphasis added)). The Court thus emphasized that \"when the owner of real prop- erty has been called upon to sacrifice all economically 17 beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suf- fered a taking.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "Ibid . Both of those considera- tions weigh in favor of requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove a lack of probable cause as an element of a retalia tory -arrest tort action. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1. As in the context of retaliatory prosecution, a claim of retaliatory arrest will implicate \" a distinct body of highly valuable circumstantial\" probable -cause evi- dence that is \"apt to prove or disprove retaliatory causa- tion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "Hartman , 547 U.S. at 261; see Reichle , 566 U.S. at 668 (\"Like retaliatory prosecution cases, evidence of the presence or absence of probable cause for the arrest will be available in virtually eve ry retaliatory arrest case.\"). And no less than for a criminal prosecution, probable cause for an arrest provides an objective standard by which to judge the propriety of that arres t; the exist- ence of probable cause generally provides a \"legal jus- tification\" for an arrest under the Fourth Amendment irrespective of the \"actual motivations of the individual officers involved.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 812- 813 (1996 ) (defendant challenging his arrest in a criminal proceeding must establish the absence of probable cause); see 532 U.S. 318 . This Court has explained that \" evenhanded law enforce- ment is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.\" Devenpeck , 543 U.S. at 153 (citation omi tted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "Hartman , 547 U.S. at 261; see Reichle , 566 U.S. at 668 (\"Like retaliatory prosecution cases, evidence of the presence or absence of probable cause for the arrest will be available in virtually eve ry retaliatory arrest case.\"). And no less than for a criminal prosecution, probable cause for an arrest provides an objective standard by which to judge the propriety of that arres t; the exist- ence of probable cause generally provides a \"legal jus- tification\" for an arrest under the Fourth Amendment irrespective of the \"actual motivations of the individual officers involved.\" 517 U.S. 17, 812- 813 (1996 ) (defendant challenging his arrest in a criminal proceeding must establish the absence of probable cause); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has explained that \" evenhanded law enforce- ment is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.\" Devenpeck , 543 U.S. at 153 (citation omi tted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "Hartm an, 547 U.S. at 262. Similarly, plaintiffs sometimes allege that they were arrested by an officer who lacked retaliatory ani- mus but who was induced to make the arrest by another official with such animus. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; TSA Management Directive No. 1100.88-1 (TSA agents lack arrest authority). This case demonstrates the difficulties of assessing causation when multiple officers are involved in an arrest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 F.3d 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "That presumption does not apply in the same way in cases involving arrests, Reichle, 566 U.S. at 669, but its absence does not diminish the \"powerful evidentiary significance\" of probable cause in that context , Hart- man , 547 U.S. at 2 61. Moreover, this Court has held that the existence of probable cause establishes as a matter of law that \"the balanc[e] of private and public interests\" favors an arrest and that an officer's decision to arrest is \"constitutionally reasonabl e\" under the Fourth Amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, in much the same way that the pr e- sumption of regularity for prosecutions cuts against a suspect's claim that his criminal charges grew out of animus, the fact that an arrest supported by probable cause is per se reasonable cuts against a suspect's claim that his arrest was induced by animus. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "The suspect's expressive activity may itself provide the probable cause for an arrest . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 40 U.S.C. 6135 (\" It is unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device designe d or adapted to bring into public notice a party, or ganization, or movement.\"). Other times, the content and manner of the suspect's expression bears directly o n an officer's decision \"wheth- er the suspect is ready to cooperate, or, on the other hand, whet her he may present a continuing threat to interests that the law must protect.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "6135 (\" It is unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device designe d or adapted to bring into public notice a party, or ganization, or movement.\"). Other times, the content and manner of the suspect's expression bears directly o n an officer's decision \"wheth- er the suspect is ready to cooperate, or, on the other hand, whet her he may present a continuing threat to interests that the law must protect.\" Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1953; see District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is what happened here: Trooper Weight testified that he perceived respondent to be a threat based on a combination of the content of respond- ent's speech, his body language, and his inebriated state. See J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "These circumstances of everyday policing distin- guish retaliatory -arrest claims from other settings where there is usually more time for decisionmaking , speech may not be a relevant consideration, and defend- ants may be able to offer objective evidence of a nonre- taliatory motive. See, e.g., Board of Cnty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]429 U.S. 274 , 22 requires the plaintiff to come forward with prima facie evidence that protected speech was a \"substantial\" or \"motivating\" factor in bringing about the adverse action, id. at 287, which shifts the burden to the defend- ant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have taken the same action \"even without the impetus to retaliate,\" Hartman , 547 U.S. at 260 (citing Mt. Healthy , 429 U.S. at 287).",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "These circumstances of everyday policing distin- guish retaliatory -arrest claims from other settings where there is usually more time for decisionmaking , speech may not be a relevant consideration, and defend- ants may be able to offer objective evidence of a nonre- taliatory motive. See, e.g., Board of Cnty. 518 U.S. 668[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 22 requires the plaintiff to come forward with prima facie evidence that protected speech was a \"substantial\" or \"motivating\" factor in bringing about the adverse action, id. at 287, which shifts the burden to the defend- ant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have taken the same action \"even without the impetus to retaliate,\" Hartman , 547 U.S. at 260 (citing Mt. Healthy , 429 U.S. at 287).",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "Applying the Mt. Healthy framework to retaliatory - arrest cases, however, would routinely shift the burden to defendants , because \"an official's state of mind is 'easy to allege and hard to disprove. ' \" Crawford [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Without the objective screen of probable cause, it will be \"difficult to discern whether an arrest was caused by the officer's legitimate or illegitimate consideration of speech,\" Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1953, and such \"ques- tions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment,\" 457 U.S. 800. Given that \"[t]here are on average about 29,000 arrests per day in this country,\" Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1953, the consequences of respondent's approach for law enforcement and the judiciary would be severe.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "Healthy framework to retaliatory - arrest cases, however, would routinely shift the burden to defendants , because \"an official's state of mind is 'easy to allege and hard to disprove. ' \" Crawford 523 U.S. 574 . Without the objective screen of probable cause, it will be \"difficult to discern whether an arrest was caused by the officer's legitimate or illegitimate consideration of speech,\" Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1953, and such \"ques- tions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that \"[t]here are on average about 29,000 arrests per day in this country,\" Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1953, the consequences of respondent's approach for law enforcement and the judiciary would be severe. Police officers and departments would be forced to defend against, and courts would be required to adj udicate, a \"flood[ ] [of ] dubious retaliatory arrest suits.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "But that observation does not indicate that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to damages liability in a tort action for retaliatory arrest in violation o f the First Amendment. Unlike expressive activity, immuta- ble characteristics such as race will \"seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, an equal -protection claim based on such disparate treatment alr eady includes a stringe nt objec- tive screen, requiring detailed proof that the govern- ment in fact treated similarly situated people differ- ently. See 517 U.S. 456.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim",
		"context": "133 S. Ct. 2411. Moreover, an equal -protection claim based on such disparate treatment alr eady includes a stringe nt objec- tive screen, requiring detailed proof that the govern- ment in fact treated similarly situated people differ- ently. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The anomaly of respondent's approach is that retaliatory -arrest claims alone would lack an objec- tive screen under Section 1983. Plaintiffs who bring Section 1983 actions fo r other alleged violations of the First Amendment ( e.g., retaliatory prosecution) or Fourth Amendment have to plausibly plead and prove the absence of probable cause; and those who allege violations of the Fourteenth Amendment have to plau- sibly plead and prove differential treatment of similarly situated people.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "See, e.g., Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 224, 226 -227 (observing that n o \"talisman ic definition of 'voluntariness ' \" exist s and courts must engage in \"careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances \") (citation omitted) . If Miranda warnings were required to admit statements in pretrial proceedings, that would likewise raise a host of factual questions —for example, \"[w] hether the suspect was in 'custody,' whether or not there was 'interrogation,' whether warnings were given or were adequate, whether the defendant's equivocal statement constituted an invocation of rights, [and] whether waiver was knowing and intelligent.\" Withrow , 507 U.S. at 709 -710 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ) (footnotes om itted).6 And deter- mining whether a statement was compelled under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , may implicate a va- riety of subsidiary factual and legal questions concern-ing whether the defendant believed his employer had threatened him with the loss of his job, whether that be- lief was objectively reasonable, and whether he volun- tarily waived his Fifth Amendment pr ivilege. See, e.g. , 842 F.2d 382, 396 -402 (D.C. 6 Miranda has not been applied by this Court to bar anything but the use of unwarned statements to prove guilt in the government's case in chief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 493",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "Withrow , 507 U.S. at 709 -710 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ) (footnotes om itted).6 And deter- mining whether a statement was compelled under 385 U.S. 493 , may implicate a va- riety of subsidiary factual and legal questions concern-ing whether the defendant believed his employer had threatened him with the loss of his job, whether that be- lief was objectively reasonable, and whether he volun- tarily waived his Fifth Amendment pr ivilege. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 396 -402 (D.C. 6 Miranda has not been applied by this Court to bar anything but the use of unwarned statements to prove guilt in the government's case in chief. See, e.g., 530 U.S. 428. Consistent with its prophylactic purpose and limits, Miranda should not extend to preliminary proceedings, even if statements resulting from actual coercion cannot be introduced in such proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "842 F.2d 382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 842 F.2d 382, 396 -402 (D.C. 6 Miranda has not been applied by this Court to bar anything but the use of unwarned statements to prove guilt in the government's case in chief. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with its prophylactic purpose and limits, Miranda should not extend to preliminary proceedings, even if statements resulting from actual coercion cannot be introduced in such proceedings. 28 Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "R. E vid. 1101(d) (3); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3142(f ) (providing that evidentiary rules do not apply to pretrial bail de- terminations) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (describing \"the inappropriateness of applying the rules of evidence as a criterion to deter-mine probable cause,\" and approving reliance on partic- ular evidence to prove probable cause even though the 29 same evidence could not be \"admi[tted] in evidence to prove the accused's guilt\") . Requiring adjudication of suppression issues would thus fundamentally alter the nature of pretrial proceedings. Indeed, the f actfinder in a preliminary proceeding in the federal system will often lack authority to rule on the admissibility of a defendant's statements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "636(b)(1)(A), including pre- liminary examinations and bail determinations. 28 U.S.C. 636(a)(2) and (b)(1)(A); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1 (a) (provid- ing that probable cause hearings should be conducted by magistrates).",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "But the statute expressly withholds authority to resolve motions \"to suppress evidence in a criminal case,\" instead limiting magistrate judges to \"propos[ing] findings and recommendations\" on such motions. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) -(C); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In recognition that preliminary hearings conducted by magistrate judges are not a proper forum to raise suppression is- sues, Federal Rule of Criminal Pr ocedure 5.1 provides that a defendant in the preliminary proceeding \"may not object to evidence on the ground that it was unlaw- fully acquired .\" Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "For example, a defendant could claim that statements showing that he had abandoned searched propert y were involuntary, creating a spin -off suppression question . Courts have correctly rejected extending the Self -Incrimination Clause to that context, reasoning that the Clause \"preserv[es] the integrity of our criminal trials \" and thus \" should not be superim- posed ipso facto to the wholly different considerations\" 31 in adjudicating a suppression motion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,420 U.S. 960 . In sum, t he court of appeals' interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause would unsettle current prac- tice and disrupt the timing and process of adjudication of pretrial matters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 F.2d 670",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process",
		"context": "1101(d)(1). But the text of the Self- Incrimination Clause offers no similar carve out if the concept of pro- hibited incrimination sweep s beyond the adjudication of a defendant's guilt and pun ishment. Indeed, the plaintiffs in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,559 U.S. 1057, asserted precisely this theory of a Fifth Amend- ment violation in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.3d 910",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. ANCs were created by ANCSA to serve an Indian law purpose and to provide programs and services to Alaska Natives and American Indians",
		"context": "See generally 1 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.07 (2012). Mindful of those concerns, ANCSA's principal drafter explained that Congress \"rejected the paternalism of the past and gave Alaska Natives an inno- vative way to retain their land and culture without forcing them into a failed reservation system.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statute's main innovation was the ANC, a sui generis entity tailor-made for Alaska's Native communi- ties. Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to divide the State into twelve geographic regions, each \"composed as far as practicable of Natives having a com- mon heritage and sharing common interests.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 P.2d 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Eighth Circuit, Arizona, and Kentucky Support (to Some Degree) Free Speech Protections for Business Operations when Non-Discrimination or Public Accommodations Laws are Invoked",
		"context": "But still, the Larsens faced the arduous and uncertain task of challenging the law through the courts. And while the 8th Circuit is correctly upholding the law in this area, it would provide welcome relief to small business owners across the country if this Court would use this case to extent the protections nation -wide. 8 Joseph [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719418 U.S. 241 In B rush & Nib, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that that a painter and calligrapher who created custom wedding invitations annot be compelled to ser- vice same sex weddings. Phoenix \" claim[ed] that if we dare to allow Plaintiffs to express their beliefs, we, in essence, run the risk of resurrecting the Jim Crow laws of the Old South.\" Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d 890.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Eighth Circuit, Arizona, and Kentucky Support (to Some Degree) Free Speech Protections for Business Operations when Non-Discrimination or Public Accommodations Laws are Invoked",
		"context": "But still, the Larsens faced the arduous and uncertain task of challenging the law through the courts. And while the 8th Circuit is correctly upholding the law in this area, it would provide welcome relief to small business owners across the country if this Court would use this case to extent the protections nation -wide. 8 Joseph 343 U.S. 495 ; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]418 U.S. 241 In B rush & Nib, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that that a painter and calligrapher who created custom wedding invitations annot be compelled to ser- vice same sex weddings. Phoenix \" claim[ed] that if we dare to allow Plaintiffs to express their beliefs, we, in essence, run the risk of resurrecting the Jim Crow laws of the Old South.\" Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d 890.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Eighth Circuit, Arizona, and Kentucky Support (to Some Degree) Free Speech Protections for Business Operations when Non-Discrimination or Public Accommodations Laws are Invoked",
		"context": "But still, the Larsens faced the arduous and uncertain task of challenging the law through the courts. And while the 8th Circuit is correctly upholding the law in this area, it would provide welcome relief to small business owners across the country if this Court would use this case to extent the protections nation -wide. 8 Joseph 343 U.S. 495 ; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] In B rush & Nib, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that that a painter and calligrapher who created custom wedding invitations annot be compelled to ser- vice same sex weddings. Phoenix \" claim[ed] that if we dare to allow Plaintiffs to express their beliefs, we, in essence, run the risk of resurrecting the Jim Crow laws of the Old South.\" Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d 890.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ASSERT THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF WOMEN SEEKING ABORTIONS",
		"context": "Kowalski , 543 U.S. at 129 . As this Court put it in Heald v. District of Columbia , \"one who would strike down a state statute as violative of the federal Constitution must show that he is within the class of persons with respe ct to whom the act is unconstitutional and that the alleged uncon- stitutional feature injures him.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet t he Fifth Cir cuit—like many courts addressing challenges to abortion regu-lations —held that Plaintiffs have third -party stand- ing to challenge Act 620 on behalf of their patients. That was error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 U.S. 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
		"context": ". Enforceable, exclusive rights incentivize creativity and the dissemination of works. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 347 U.S. 201. They also enable recoupment of investments. 537 U.S. 186.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
		"context": ". Enforceable, exclusive rights incentivize creativity and the dissemination of works. 565 U.S. 302; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They also enable recoupment of investments. 537 U.S. 186.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
		"context": "565 U.S. 302; 347 U.S. 201. They also enable recoupment of investments. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reality has proven the wisdom of these policy determinations. Industries driven by the production of copyrighted works greatly benefit the U.S. economy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clean Power Plan's costs, which Petitioners wildly overstate, are not a workable criterion for Application of the Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "The estimated costs of the c lean Power Plan were also unexceptional for EPA pollution-control rules. The 9 agency's 1979 new source performance standards for coal- burning power plants, which the U.S. c ourt of Appeals for the D. c. circuit upheld, were projected to cost utilities \"tens of billions of dollars\" by 1995, resulting in higher energy costs and consumer prices. Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the 2012 fuel- efficiency and greenhouse gas emission standards for motor vehicles, which were not challenged in court, were projected to cost industry $150 billion, at an annualized rate of at least $6.5 billion. 77 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.2d 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clean Power Plan's costs, which Petitioners wildly overstate, are not a workable criterion for Application of the Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Ass'n of Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chem. Mfrs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "615 F.2d 794",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clean Power Plan's costs, which Petitioners wildly overstate, are not a workable criterion for Application of the Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "Chem. Mfrs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c losures are, furthermore, consistent with the \"technology-forcing character\" of the c lean Air Act, which this c ourt has long recognized. 421 U.S. 60.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clean Power Plan's costs, which Petitioners wildly overstate, are not a workable criterion for Application of the Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "470 U.S. 116. c losures are, furthermore, consistent with the \"technology-forcing character\" of the c lean Air Act, which this c ourt has long recognized. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Focusing on Regulatory Costs Would Create Arbitrary Results and Perverse Incentives Even if petitioners' claims regarding the c lean Power Plan's costs were accurate, using regulatory costs as a criterion for application of the major questions doctrine would lead to at least three undesirable and potentially absurd results.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Clean Power Plan's costs, which Petitioners wildly overstate, are not a workable criterion for Application of the Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "Admin., https:// 11 www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_02_03.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) . Such a relatively minor impact is highly unlikely to cause the massive dislocation that the court decried, but upheld on its own reading, in King v. Burwell , where eliminating the tax credit at issue would have decreased healthcare enrollment by 70% and caused unsubsidized premiums to increase by 47%. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Focusing on decontextualized regulatory costs would disregard such nuance and complicate regulation of larger industries. Second, focusing on regulatory costs would incentivize agencies to issue less beneficial regulations—breaking with decades of practice and violating common sense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. The majority wrongly claimed that neutral rules excuse the duty to accommodate",
		"context": "Congress amended Title VII because otherwise neutral rules often dis- criminate against religious minorities. As the Seventh Circuit put it, Congress require d accommodation from otherwise neutral rules \"to ensure that employees would not have to sacrifice their jobs to observe their religious practices.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Neutrality is not a defense. A neutral rule that pre- vents religious practice is a trigger that requires ac- commodation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.3d 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "The government mostly agrees. It acknowledges that \"one who … lawfully possesses or 4 controls property will in all likelihood have a legiti- mate expectation of privacy by virtue of th[e] right to exclude.\" GB 36 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And the government does not dispute that Byrd possessed and controlled the car with the renter's permission when the officers searched the car or that he could have lawfully pre- vented strangers from rummaging through the car's trunk. Nonetheless, the government argues that the po- lice may search the locked trunk of a car dri ven by an unlisted driver, without justifying the search to any court and even if they lack probable cause to believe the trunk contains evidence of a crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "See id. at 142 (distinguishing a defendant who had never been in the basement from a houseguest who had a measure of possession and 6 control over it).1 The privacy intrusion caused by opening a locked trunk and riffling through its con- tents , where the unlisted driver has the key and sole possession of the car , is certainly greater than the in- trusion from patting the outside of a bag placed on a bus's luggage storage rack. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An unlisted rental -car driver stands in the same legal position as a n apartment subletter where the rental agreement between the landlord and the initial tenant prohibits subleasing. OB 37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "Rakas simply described a context where the owner was the driver. Nowhere did this Court suggest that the owner's , as opposed to the renter's, permission was necessary to have a reasonable expectation of privacy . Indeed , in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which Rakas reaffirmed, the defendant rea- sonably expected privacy despite having only the renter's permission to spend the night. OB 22. There is no reason to believe the result in Jones would have been different if the landlord barred overnight gu ests; the friend's privacy expectation c ame from the social 8 understanding that a houseguest expect s privacy when spending the night in another's home , not from the landlord's permission.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "See GB 15 (alterations omitted). Indeed , a driver given permission by the renter to drive the car does not even depriv e \"the rental company of any short- term use to which it otherwise would have been enti- tled.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Violating the authorized -driver provi- sion may result in additional civil liability if the car is damaged , but \"it does not also result in a violation of criminal law.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 N.E.3d 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "Violating the authorized -driver provi- sion may result in additional civil liability if the car is damaged , but \"it does not also result in a violation of criminal law.\" Id . ; see also United Stat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 In- deed, courts consider unlisted driving so common and foreseeable that many refuse to enforce authorized - driver provisions. OB 33; NAPD Br. 26 -29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 F.3d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "JA 24. And even in cases where rental agreements say that a violation would void the con- tract, such lang uage would apply equally to the myriad other use restrictions, and would not implicate the driver's reasonable ex- pectations of privacy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 The passengers in Rakas were found to lack a rea- sonable expectation of privacy not because they were \"passengers qua passengers,\" but because they failed to establish that they had possession and control over the search area. The defendants , who had been in the car only briefly , \"did not cl aim that they had any le- gitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the car which were searched. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "763 F.3d 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "OB 26-28. Byrd's close relat ion- ship to Reed enabled Reed to \"share … h[er] privacy 12 with hi[m].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government's response brushes off the \"im- portance of the family\" and the privacy expectations families share, asserting that personal connections to the renter are irrelevant unless they are memorial- ized in rental agreements or state law, GB 40. But the privacy of the family is the default —it needs no af- firmative legislation or contract to be entitled to re- spect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.",
		"context": "The government's response brushes off the \"im- portance of the family\" and the privacy expectations families share, asserting that personal connections to the renter are irrelevant unless they are memorial- ized in rental agreements or state law, GB 40. But the privacy of the family is the default —it needs no af- firmative legislation or contract to be entitled to re- spect. And that is true whether Reed was Byrd's fiancée (as he testified) or \"merely\" his long -term girl- friend and the mother of his children (as the govern- ment contends) .4 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The sentencing judge's rationale and the parties' agreement each can show that the Guidelines bore a reasonably close connection to the sentence",
		"context": "; see Freeman , 564 U.S. at 529-30 (plurality). The judge must separately de- termine both whether to accept the guilty plea and whether to accept the plea agreement (including the recommended sentence ). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 A plea hearing comes first. Ac cepting a plea en- tails placing the defendant under oath, determining that he underst ands his rights and how the plea pro- cedure works, and ensuring that the plea is voluntary. Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 670",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The sentencing judge's rationale and the parties' agreement each can show that the Guidelines bore a reasonably close connection to the sentence",
		"context": "at 530- 31. The same will be true when a court approves the sentence after \"finding it 'fair and reasonable' under the Guidelines.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] was \"based on\" the Guidelines because the court calculated the Guidelines range, then ex- plained that it \"considered the sentence imposed 'suf- ficient' ' in view of the fact that the crack cocaine guidelines are what they are .'\" 707 F.3d 337. c. The Guidelines can be a basis for the sentence in another way too: when the parties' agreement is based on the Guidelines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "825 F.3d 1014",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The sentencing judge's rationale and the parties' agreement each can show that the Guidelines bore a reasonably close connection to the sentence",
		"context": "The same will be true when a court approves the sentence after \"finding it 'fair and reasonable' under the Guidelines.\" 825 F.3d 1014 was \"based on\" the Guidelines because the court calculated the Guidelines range, then ex- plained that it \"considered the sentence imposed 'suf- ficient' ' in view of the fact that the crack cocaine guidelines are what they are .'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. The Guidelines can be a basis for the sentence in another way too: when the parties' agreement is based on the Guidelines. W here C -type plea agree- ments are concerned, a sentence often will be \"based 21 on\" the agreement, because the agreement is a foun- dation for the sentence under the plain terms of Rule 11(c) (1)(C).",
		"citation_value_orig": "707 F.3d 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The sentencing judge's rationale and the parties' agreement each can show that the Guidelines bore a reasonably close connection to the sentence",
		"context": "But it preserves the parties' ability to appeal such a sentence on the ground that it \"was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.\" 18 U.S.C . § 3742(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(1)- (2); see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the Guidelines weren't being applied, there would be no incorrect application of the Guide lines to appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 F.2d 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "As this Court has explained, \" qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government. They are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.\" Hughes Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are \"private persons acting … under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain.\" United States ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 939",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "They are \"private persons acting … under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain.\" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Placing Executive power into the hands of financially motivated profiteers was evidently by design: Congress \"sought to disperse some quantum of executive authority amongst the general public.\" United States ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "9 Placing Executive power into the hands of financially motivated profiteers was evidently by design: Congress \"sought to disperse some quantum of executive authority amongst the general public.\" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in 1986, when Congress greatly expanded relators' powers, legislators were remarkably candid about the fact that Congress simply did not like how the Executive Branch was performing its constitutionally assigned duties. One legislator, for example, said that \"the Government bureaucracy [was] unwilling to guard against or aggressively punish fraud,\" and another lamented that the \"Department of Justice has not done an acceptable job of prosecuting defense contractor fraud.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 F.3d 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "9 F.3d at 754. For the Fifth Circuit, \"the unilateral power to dismiss an action notwithstanding the objections of [relator]\" was essential to a holding that \"the Executive retains significant control over litigation pursued under the FCA by a qui tam relator.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] purports to deprive the Executive Branch of its historical prerogative to decide which cases should go forward in the name of the United States.\" 318 F.3d 250; cf. 996 F.3d 1110.",
		"citation_value_orig": "252 F.3d 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "For the Fifth Circuit, \"the unilateral power to dismiss an action notwithstanding the objections of [relator]\" was essential to a holding that \"the Executive retains significant control over litigation pursued under the FCA by a qui tam relator.\" 252 F.3d 749 purports to deprive the Executive Branch of its historical prerogative to decide which cases should go forward in the name of the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 996 F.3d 1110. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 F.3d 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "\"As the interests of the government and relator diverge,\" however, the \"congressionally created enlistment of private enforcement is increasingly ill served.\" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So is the Constitution's vesting of executive power in the Executive rather than in congressionally deputized \"bounty hunters.\" Barr OLC Memo at 211, 238.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 F.3d 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
		"context": "But petitioner urges the Court to read the FCA to eliminate one of the Executive's most powerful controls—under a statute that already limits the Executive's usual set of controls. That would render the FCA unconstitutional. As this Court has done many times, therefore, the FCA should be \"construed as to avoid serious doubt of [its] constitutionality,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and petitioner's in terpretation should be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Town of Greece",
		"context": "Just two years after Hosanna -Tabor , this Court faced the question of the constitutionality of legisla- tive prayer under the Establishment Clause in Town of Greece, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In answering that question, the Court emphatically de- clared that \"the Establishment Clause must be inter- preted by reference to historical practices and under- standings.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "The Fifth Amendment of the United States Con- stitution, made applicable to the states by the Four- teenth Amendment, provides that \"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just com- pensation.\" The plain language of the Takings Clause \"requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for a public pur- pose.\" Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Property\" is defined broadly as \"[t]hat which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one.\" Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "1909) (footnote omitted). The rights associated with the ownership of prop- erty are often likened to a \"bundle of sticks.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property , 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 1191 n. 146 (1999) (tracing the use of the \"bundle of rights\" theory to the late 1800s); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property , 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 899 (2000) (explaining that property is often conceived to be a \"bundle of rights\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "885, 899 (2000) (explaining that property is often conceived to be a \"bundle of rights\"). Each of the sticks in the bundle is associated with a different right of ownership, and individual sticks in the bundle have been considered \"property\" for pur- poses of the Takings Clause. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In cases where the government physically ac- quires an interest in private property for a public pur- pose, this Court has recognized such government action to constitute a categorical or per se taking re- quiring the payment of just compensation without con- sideration given to other facts. See 505 U.S. 1003; see also 483 U.S. 825 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "See, e.g., 458 U.S. 419. In cases where the government physically ac- quires an interest in private property for a public pur- pose, this Court has recognized such government action to constitute a categorical or per se taking re- quiring the payment of just compensation without con- sideration given to other facts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 483 U.S. 825 . The government's physical possession of private property is a per se 8 taking because \" '[s]uch an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's prop- erty interests,' depriving the owner of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "See, e.g., 458 U.S. 419. In cases where the government physically ac- quires an interest in private property for a public pur- pose, this Court has recognized such government action to constitute a categorical or per se taking re- quiring the payment of just compensation without con- sideration given to other facts. See 505 U.S. 1003; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government's physical possession of private property is a per se 8 taking because \" '[s]uch an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's prop- erty interests,' depriving the owner of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "In fact, the Court has recognized a categorical duty to compensate property owners for a wide variety of property an d property interests. For example, in Loretto , 458 U.S. at 435, the Court found a per se taking when the government appropriates part of a rooftop to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40524 U.S. 156570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in- volving land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "In fact, the Court has recognized a categorical duty to compensate property owners for a wide variety of property an d property interests. For example, in Loretto , 458 U.S. at 435, the Court found a per se taking when the government appropriates part of a rooftop to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants. See also 328 U.S. 256[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40524 U.S. 156570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in- volving land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "See also 328 U.S. 256467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]524 U.S. 156570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in- volving land. Id. at 612.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "See also 328 U.S. 256467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]570 U.S. 595, the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in- volving land. Id. at 612.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "See also 328 U.S. 256467 U.S. 986. Financial interests in property in the form of liens, mortgages, and interest have been determined to be property protected by the Takings Clause . See Arm- 364 U.S. 40524 U.S. 156[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court recognized that government exactions involving money are af- forded the same takings protections as exactions in- volving land. Id. at 612.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "In Koontz , the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court decision, which concluded that the Nollan /Dolan exaction rule did not apply \"be- cause the subject of the exaction issue was money ra-ther than a more tangible interest in real property.\" Id. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reviewing the Florida court's decision, this Court ex-plained that, \"if we accepted this argument it would be easy for land-use permitting officials to evade the lim- itation of Nollan and Dolan \" by \"simply giv[ing] the owner a choice of either surrendering an easement or making a payment equal to the easement's value.\" 10 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "at 619. In cases involving the sale of property to satisfy a tax debt, the Court has determined the former owner of the property to be entitled to the surplus proceeds. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court examined a federal law that permit-ted the federal government to sell property to collect delinquent federal tax debts. Although the law did not expressly provide for the former owner to receive the surplus, the Court concluded that the former owner of the proceeds was entitled to receive the surplus pro- ceeds and claims for such proceeds were not barred by the statute of limitations. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "104 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "Id. at 221-22. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court, in reviewing the same federal law at issue in Taylor , concluded that a debtor was entitled to the surplus proceeds in the sale of the debtor's property by the federal government to satisfy a tax delinquency. Id. at 149-50.",
		"citation_value_orig": "110 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
		"context": "Id. at 150. In this case, the Eighth Circuit Court relied on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in re- jecting Tyler's claim that the Takings Clause protects her ownership in the surplus proceeds. Tyler , 26 F.4th at 793-94. However, the takings claim in Nelson was 11 addressed by the Court in dicta after denying the property owner's principal arguments related to due process and equal protection claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. This Court Has Recognized the Need for Complete Presidential Immunity To Prevent the Type of Distraction These Subpoenas Portend",
		"context": "This Court has underscored the disastrous potential for Presidential distraction that compels a finding of Presidential immunity. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that the President is immune from personal liability for official acts performed in office because of the serious potential for Presidential distraction over fears of personal liability. This Court held: \"Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges – for whom absolute immunity is now established – a President must concern himself with matters likely to arouse the most intense feelings….",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. This Court Has Recognized the Need for Complete Presidential Immunity To Prevent the Type of Distraction These Subpoenas Portend",
		"context": "This Court has underscored the disastrous potential for Presidential distraction that compels a finding of Presidential immunity. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that the President is immune from personal liability for official acts performed in office because of the serious potential for Presidential distraction over fears of personal liability. This Court held: \"Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges – for whom absolute immunity is now established – a President must concern himself with matters likely to arouse the most intense feelings….",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The history of discrimination",
		"context": "Evans' history also bears on the question of pur- poseful discrimination in a way the history in Miller- El did not: it affects his credibility. The object of the step-three inquiry is to evaluate whether a prosecu- tor's proffered justifications \"should be believed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To that end, it is hard to imagine a better predictor of 42 willingness to deceive than a documented history of dishonesty on the very matter at issue. Reams of im- peachment law rest upon the firmly established proposi- tion that propensity to be untruthful matters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "Petitioner also points (Br. 21 -24) to a line of this Court's decisions beginning with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that have arguably recog- nized a special, per se rule for fraud suits . Under that 28 rule, a limitations period is deemed not to apply to a suit for fraud while the plaintiff, despite reasonable diligence, remains unaware of the fraud. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "88 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "In the ensuing years , the Court often reiterated Bai- ley's rule. See, e.g. , Exploration [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 132 U.S. 604 ; 130 U.S. 320; 115 U.S. 528 ; 111 U.S. 185 . But the Court appears to have appl ied that per se rule only in suits that sounded in fraud that either had been concealed or was inherently self -concealing . 30 See Exploration Co. , 247 U.S. at 446 (suit by govern- ment to annul land patent based on fraud ); Traer , 115 U.S. at 536 (suit to invalida te \"fraudulent transac- tions\"); Rosenthal , 111 U.S. at 186 (suit to recover assets conveyed in \" fraud ulent transfer\" under bank- ruptcy law ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "247 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "In the ensuing years , the Court often reiterated Bai- ley's rule. See, e.g. , Exploration 247 U.S. 435 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 130 U.S. 320; 115 U.S. 528 ; 111 U.S. 185 . But the Court appears to have appl ied that per se rule only in suits that sounded in fraud that either had been concealed or was inherently self -concealing . 30 See Exploration Co. , 247 U.S. at 446 (suit by govern- ment to annul land patent based on fraud ); Traer , 115 U.S. at 536 (suit to invalida te \"fraudulent transac- tions\"); Rosenthal , 111 U.S. at 186 (suit to recover assets conveyed in \" fraud ulent transfer\" under bank- ruptcy law ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "In the ensuing years , the Court often reiterated Bai- ley's rule. See, e.g. , Exploration 247 U.S. 435 ; 132 U.S. 604 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 115 U.S. 528 ; 111 U.S. 185 . But the Court appears to have appl ied that per se rule only in suits that sounded in fraud that either had been concealed or was inherently self -concealing . 30 See Exploration Co. , 247 U.S. at 446 (suit by govern- ment to annul land patent based on fraud ); Traer , 115 U.S. at 536 (suit to invalida te \"fraudulent transac- tions\"); Rosenthal , 111 U.S. at 186 (suit to recover assets conveyed in \" fraud ulent transfer\" under bank- ruptcy law ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "In the ensuing years , the Court often reiterated Bai- ley's rule. See, e.g. , Exploration 247 U.S. 435 ; 132 U.S. 604 ; 130 U.S. 320; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 111 U.S. 185 . But the Court appears to have appl ied that per se rule only in suits that sounded in fraud that either had been concealed or was inherently self -concealing . 30 See Exploration Co. , 247 U.S. at 446 (suit by govern- ment to annul land patent based on fraud ); Traer , 115 U.S. at 536 (suit to invalida te \"fraudulent transac- tions\"); Rosenthal , 111 U.S. at 186 (suit to recover assets conveyed in \" fraud ulent transfer\" under bank- ruptcy law ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "115 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "In the ensuing years , the Court often reiterated Bai- ley's rule. See, e.g. , Exploration 247 U.S. 435 ; 132 U.S. 604 ; 130 U.S. 320; 115 U.S. 528 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Court appears to have appl ied that per se rule only in suits that sounded in fraud that either had been concealed or was inherently self -concealing . 30 See Exploration Co. , 247 U.S. at 446 (suit by govern- ment to annul land patent based on fraud ); Traer , 115 U.S. at 536 (suit to invalida te \"fraudulent transac- tions\"); Rosenthal , 111 U.S. at 186 (suit to recover assets conveyed in \" fraud ulent transfer\" under bank- ruptcy law ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "111 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
		"context": "Pri- vate actions for f raud traditionally encompassed mis- representations made knowing ly or at least reckless ly. See, e.g., ibid. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . FDCPA claims generally do not require that element of a traditional fraud claim. In general, the FDCPA's private -action provision imposes a strict -liability regime, and many of its provi- sions prohibit conduct that do es not involve deception at all, but rather involve s harassment and abuse designed to pressure a debtor to repay a debt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FSIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended the Act to bar service by mail to a foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "a. This Court has recognized that \"o ne of the FSIA's basic objectives, as shown by its history,\" was to \"em- bod[y] basic princip les of international law long fol- lowed both in the United States and elsewhere.\" Boli- varian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to the 551 U.S. 193. Consistent with that purpose, the legislative history demonstrates that Con gress rejected proposed provisions that would have conflict ed with the VCDR. An early draft of the FSIA permitted service on a foreign state by \"registered or certified mail to the ambassador or chief of mission of the foreign state\" in the United States .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FSIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended the Act to bar service by mail to a foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "a. This Court has recognized that \"o ne of the FSIA's basic objectives, as shown by its history,\" was to \"em- bod[y] basic princip les of international law long fol- lowed both in the United States and elsewhere.\" Boli- varian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 ; see also, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with that purpose, the legislative history demonstrates that Con gress rejected proposed provisions that would have conflict ed with the VCDR. An early draft of the FSIA permitted service on a foreign state by \"registered or certified mail to the ambassador or chief of mission of the foreign state\" in the United States .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FSIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended the Act to bar service by mail to a foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "Bull. , No. 1840, at 458 (Sept. 30, 1974) ; see also , e.g., Helmerich , 137 S. Ct. at 1320 (noting the State Depart- ment's role in drafting the FSIA ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress's deci- sion to remove servic e by mail to a foreign state's am- bassador to the United States strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FSIA to permit service \"via\" or in \"care of \" an embassy, w hich is functionally equivalent. S ee pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FSIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended the Act to bar service by mail to a foreign state's embassy in the United States",
		"context": "Congress's deci- sion to remove servic e by mail to a foreign state's am- bassador to the United States strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FSIA to permit service \"via\" or in \"care of \" an embassy, w hich is functionally equivalent. S ee pp. 26-28, supra ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The House Report accompanying the bill that be- came the FSIA further supports the view that service under Section 1608(a)(3) must be sent to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned. The House Report explain s that some litigants had attempted to serve foreign states by \"mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to a diplomatic mission of the foreign state.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "For over a century, this Court has applied the \"person\" presumption even in circumstances in which the government would benefit from inclusion within the ambi t of the term. In United States v. Fox , the Court refused to read a New York statute to permit a land conveyance to the federal government upon finding that it was not a na tural or an artificial person. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such an extension of the term \"person,\" the Court explained, would require an \"express definition.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 U.S. 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "Id. Similarly, i n 1925 , the Court rejected the proposition that the United States could be deemed a priority creditor in bankruptcy after holding that reading \"person\" to encompass the government would contravene \"the normal usages of speech .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Years later, the Court determined that the United States was not permitted to recover civil damage s for antitrust injuries under the Sherman Act ; the Court reject ed the government 's position that expanding the ordinary meaning of \"person\" was appropriate for public policy reasons. 312 U.S. 600.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "268 U.S. 315. Years later, the Court determined that the United States was not permitted to recover civil damage s for antitrust injuries under the Sherman Act ; the Court reject ed the government 's position that expanding the ordinary meaning of \"person\" was appropriate for public policy reasons. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund , the Court found that a federal 7 agency could not be a \"person\" for purposes of the federal removal statute. 500 U.S. 72.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "312 U.S. 600. And in International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund , the Court found that a federal 7 agency could not be a \"person\" for purposes of the federal removal statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In so finding, the Court observed that the government faced the \"additional hurdle\" that \"' in common usage, the term 'person ' does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it .'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "In so finding, the Court observed that the government faced the \"additional hurdle\" that \"' in common usage, the term 'person ' does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it .'\" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). In short, the Court has applied the presumption consistently through all these cases , even where the government stood to gain from being considered a \"person.\" The reason is obvious: a statutory term means what it means; that meaning does not vary based on the government's preferred outcome.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "The reason is obvious: a statutory term means what it means; that meaning does not vary based on the government's preferred outcome. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 504 U.S. 505, noting that application of the presumption to states \"would have 'subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before.'\" Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "The reason is obvious: a statutory term means what it means; that meaning does not vary based on the government's preferred outcome. Cf. 543 U.S. 371; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], noting that application of the presumption to states \"would have 'subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before.'\" Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
		"context": "In other words, the government is treated both as an ordinary litigant and as a sovereign in the same statutory scheme . Given the longstanding presumption against reading \"person\" to encompass the government , this Court should not infer that Congress intended that contradictory result in the absence of any textual indication . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Where Congress authorized private suits based on negligence, it provided additional procedural protections absent from Section 14(e)",
		"context": "If this Court were to embrace an inferred cause of action extending to any negligently inaccurate statements made in connection with a te nder offer, however, such suits—and, perhaps more importantly, the threat of such suits in the face of unfavorable coverage—would be fair game. As Judge Friendly observed in analogous circumstances, the implications of such a regime would be \"frightening.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 F.2d 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Wayfair Is Not Relevant",
		"context": "North Carolina repeatedly invokes South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but that case is not relevant here . Wayfair, a Commerce Clause decision, endorsed the minimum -contacts framework that both parties agree governs this case. Wayfair rejected a physical-presence rule that played no part in the decisions below because Quill long ago rejected that requirement in the due process context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Wayfair Is Not Relevant",
		"context": "Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent Wayfair has any application , it confirms the decision below. In Wayfair, South Dakota argued that a nonresident taxpayer's own forum-directed conduct created a sufficient nexus for the State to collect sales tax from resident customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 F.2d 848",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It Would Be Unsound For An Implied Remedy To Have Greater Scope Than An Explicit Remedy",
		"context": ". \"It would be unsound\" for \"a statute's express sys- tem of enforcement to require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary compli- ance while a judicially implied system of enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to the recipient's knowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The FTC seeks that unsound result here. Sections 5 and 19 of the FTC Act author- ize monetary and equitable remedies only after the 32 FTC issues a rule prohibiting a specific business practice or obtains a final cease-and-desist order against that practice—and a party engages in it anyway.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State plaintiffs lack standing",
		"context": "But t hat argument rests on speculative and im- plausible predictions about third- party behavior that lack any record support. House Br . 25-30; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First, it would be untenable to conclude that indi- viduals eligible for Medicaid or CHIP have signed up for insurance solely because of t he current version of Section 5000A, or that they would disenroll if Section 5000A were invalidated. State plaintiffs point ( Texas Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State plaintiffs lack standing",
		"context": "And even if some individuals did en- roll in Medicaid or CHIP because they misinterpreted Section 5000A as a mandate, state plaintiffs advance no explanation for why those indiv iduals would give up their free (or nearly free) insurance if this Court inval- idated Section 5000A. That would hardly be \"predict- able\" behavior. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, state plaintiffs fail to back up their s pecu- lation with actual facts. Compare id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State plaintiffs lack standing",
		"context": "At bottom, s tate plaintiffs have not suffered any in- jury stemming from Section 5000A; all they really want is to eliminate other, distinct aspects of the ACA. If that \"game of gotcha against Congress\" could give rise to standing, AAPC , slip op. 16 , then the \"judicial process\" could be freely used \"to usurp the powers of the political branches,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That cannot be the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The 1986 Amendments did not change the statute of limitations from a waivable affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar",
		"context": "92-1559, at 8, does not indicate that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Even if the Department of Justice was proposing a pleading requirement (rather than making a statement that the argument would arise in the course of litigation), many nonjurisdictional claim- processing rules require plaintiffs to allege compliance with the rule. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless, while the government may now argue that the Quiet Title Act requires plaintiffs to plead when their claims accrued, Resp. 30, the Act's text contains no such requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The 1986 Amendments did not change the statute of limitations from a waivable affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar",
		"context": "30, the Act's text contains no such requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 This is because the statute of limitations contains a discovery rule. See Petitioner's Brief at 28, 524 U.S. 38 (No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The 1986 Amendments did not change the statute of limitations from a waivable affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar",
		"context": "§ 2409a; see also 549 U.S. 199. 4 This is because the statute of limitations contains a discovery rule. See Petitioner's Brief at 28, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 97-731). And \"the application of tolling 4 The Quiet Title Act requires a plaintiff to plead \"with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property\" and \"the circumstances under which it was acquired,\" but only requires the plaintiff to allege with particularity \"the righ t, title, or interest claimed by the United States,\" not when or how the plaintiff discovered the adverse interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The lack of a jury instruction and sufficient evidence of the knowledge-of-status element seriously affects the integrity of the judicial proceedings",
		"context": ". The con trolling question in the fourth-prong anal y- sis is not whether t he d efendan t may have been found guilty in l ight of information never considered by the jury. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the funda- mental constitutional rights at issue here g uide the fourth prong analysis. \"It is crucial in m aintaining public perception of fairne ss and integrity in the jus- tice system that courts exhibit regard for fundamen- tal ri ghts a nd resp ect for prisoners as people.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1897",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The lack of a jury instruction and sufficient evidence of the knowledge-of-status element seriously affects the integrity of the judicial proceedings",
		"context": "This ex- ceeds the bounds of the appellate court's discret ion. 30 To be sure, this Court has declined on p lain error review to gra nt relief fo r unpreserved indictment or instructional error. In both Unit ed S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 520 U.S. 461, the decisive considera tion was not information offered for the fir st time after trial, but rather the \"'overwhelming' and 'essentially un- controverted ' [evidence ].\" Cotton, 535 U.S . at 633 (quoting Johnson , 520 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The lack of a jury instruction and sufficient evidence of the knowledge-of-status element seriously affects the integrity of the judicial proceedings",
		"context": "This ex- ceeds the bounds of the appellate court's discret ion. 30 To be sure, this Court has declined on p lain error review to gra nt relief fo r unpreserved indictment or instructional error. In both Unit ed S 535 U.S. 625, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the decisive considera tion was not information offered for the fir st time after trial, but rather the \"'overwhelming' and 'essentially un- controverted ' [evidence ].\" Cotton, 535 U.S . at 633 (quoting Johnson , 520 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The lack of a jury instruction and sufficient evidence of the knowledge-of-status element seriously affects the integrity of the judicial proceedings",
		"context": "\"That is not enou gh,\" for \"[t]he Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action[.]\" By the same token, \" appe llate courts 31 are not free to revise the basis on which a defendant is convicted simply because the s ame result would likely obt ain on retrial.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To do so \"offends th e most basic notions of due process.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Text, Structure, History, and Purpose of the FRSA and Other Statutes that Use the Contributing Factor Framework Show that Employees Need Not Prove Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "Start with the text and structure of these statutes. Because \"[c]onte xt is a primary determinant of meaning,\" Scalia & Garner, at 167 , \"[s]tatutory construction…is a holistic endeavor ,\" United Sav. Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In ascertaining a statute's \"plain meaning,\" courts therefore \"must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.\" K Mart 486 U.S. 281 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Text, Structure, History, and Purpose of the FRSA and Other Statutes that Use the Contributing Factor Framework Show that Employees Need Not Prove Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "Ass'n of 484 U.S. 365. In ascertaining a statute's \"plain meaning,\" courts therefore \"must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.\" K Mart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Close attention to the language and design of these statutes compel s the conclusion that proof of retaliatory intent is not necessary to prevail in whistleblower claims governed by the contributing -factor framework. The text and structure of SOX and the FRSA are nearly identical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Text, Structure, History, and Purpose of the FRSA and Other Statutes that Use the Contributing Factor Framework Show that Employees Need Not Prove Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "It was therefore w ell-established by the time that Congress included the contributing -factor framework in AIR- 21 in 2000 , and incorporated AIR -21 into SOX in 2002 and the FRSA in 2007, that whistleblower claims analyzed under this framework did not require proof of improper motive or intent . \"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when i t re-enacts a statute without change.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"So, too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": ". carry weapons in case of confrontation.\" District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. New York's proper cause licensing regime is clearl y a burden on that right because it entirely forecloses the exercise of the right by the vast majority of New Yorkers. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": "Intermediate scrutiny allows both a less substantial state interest and a looser fit between that interest and the regulation chosen to serve the interest, but it still requires narrow tailoring. \"In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under both forms of heightened scrutiny, however, the government bears the burden of proving the fit between the challenged infringement on a fundamental right and the governmental interest justifying the infringement. This is the central distinction between heightened scrutiny and rational basis review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": "This is the central distinction between heightened scrutiny and rational basis review. 2 2 Under rational basis review, \"a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 The government bears a real burden to establish such a fit even on intermediate scrutiny. In Craig v. Boren , the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to an Oklahoma statute alleged to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": "4 The government bears a real burden to establish such a fit even on intermediate scrutiny. In Craig v. Boren , the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to an Oklahoma statute alleged to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statute made it unlawful to sell a type of beer to males under 21 or to females under 18. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": "Id. at 204. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court addressed a prohibition on certified public accountants soliciting potential clients in person. The Court analyzed the solicitation ban under the intermediate scrutiny framework articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 447 U.S. 557. See Edenfield , 507 U.S. at 767-69.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": "at 204. In 507 U.S. 761, the Court addressed a prohibition on certified public accountants soliciting potential clients in person. The Court analyzed the solicitation ban under the intermediate scrutiny framework articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Edenfield , 507 U.S. at 767-69. The state Board of Accountancy sought to justify the ban on two grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review",
		"context": "In fact, the only record evidence supporting the ban was an affidavit that the Court rejected as \"contain[ing] nothing more than a series of conclusory statements that add little if anything to the Board's original statement of its justifications.\" Id. In Florida [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court again applied intermediate scrutiny to a restriction on commercial speech. The restriction at issue was a Florida Bar rule prohibiting lawyers from contacting potential clients within thirty days following an accident. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Applying Equitable Exceptions to Rule 23(f) Is Fully Consistent with Appellate Rules 26(b) and 2",
		"context": ". isthat it confuses extending a limitations period withsuspending one.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Contrary to Nutraceutical's suggestion, \"[t]olling doesnot extend any statutory deadline; instead it'temporarily halts' the running of the statutory clock.\" 7 This Court subsequently granted certiorari and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision that th e time prescription at issue was jurisdictional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "589 F.3d 1201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Applying Equitable Exceptions to Rule 23(f) Is Fully Consistent with Appellate Rules 26(b) and 2",
		"context": "7 Contrary to Nutraceutical's suggestion, \"[t]olling doesnot extend any statutory deadline; instead it'temporarily halts' the running of the statutory clock.\" 7 This Court subsequently granted certiorari and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision that th e time prescription at issue was jurisdictional. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 41 Id. (citing 304 F.3d 1276's 14-day time period iscalculated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Applying Equitable Exceptions to Rule 23(f) Is Fully Consistent with Appellate Rules 26(b) and 2",
		"context": "562 U.S. 428. 41 Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s 14-day time period iscalculated. As applied to this case, equitable tollingsimply stopped the 14-day period to file a Rule 23(f)petition until the district court resolved Lambert'smotion for reconsideration. This is entirely consistent with Rule 26(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 F.3d 1276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
		"context": "Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action F ilings: 2019 Year in Review , 38 (Jan. 2020), https://bit.ly/3t8gWHz. And numerous district courts in other circuits have relied on decisions from the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh 12 maintenance theory therefore would ensure that the Basic presumption remains rebuttable, and vindicate Congress's intent to restrain the proliferation and in terrorem effect of meritless securities class actions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Blue Chip 421 U.S. 723. Indeed, Congress passed the PSLRA \"to restrict abuses in securities class-action litigation, including . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
		"context": "Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action F ilings: 2019 Year in Review , 38 (Jan. 2020), https://bit.ly/3t8gWHz. And numerous district courts in other circuits have relied on decisions from the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh 12 maintenance theory therefore would ensure that the Basic presumption remains rebuttable, and vindicate Congress's intent to restrain the proliferation and in terrorem effect of meritless securities class actions. See 561 U.S. 247; Blue Chip [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, Congress passed the PSLRA \"to restrict abuses in securities class-action litigation, including . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
		"context": ". the practice of filing lawsuits against issuers of securities in response to any change in stock price, regardless of defendants' culpability.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even after the passage of the PSLRA, however, many securities class ac tions are lawyer-driven Circuits in applying an inflation-maintenance theory. See,2018 WL 2117337 (citing Second Circuit decision); 2017 WL 1734224, report and recommendation adopted , 2017 WL 2493142.",
		"citation_value_orig": "180 F.3d 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
		"context": "2021 WL 1953702020 WL 5235005. Given this background, it is no surprise that the plaintiffs' bar has come to rely heavily on the inflation-maintenance theory. Generic or 7 Matrixx Initiatives, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 aspirational statements will not increase a company's stock price, so the plaintiffs' bar has turned eagerly to a pleading theory that hinges on later stock price declines. Indeed, a recent study states that in 71% of cases when defendants tried to rebut the Basic presumption, plaintiffs have asserted that the statements merely maintained the company's stock price at inflated levels and that the price then dropped when the alleged fraud became public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
		"context": "Br. at 35-36; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Schleicher , 618 F.3d at 683-84 (\"[C]ertification substantially increases the settlement value of a securities suit. \"); 366 F.3d 70. In sum, the Second Circuit's application of the inflation-maintenance theory undermines Congress's statutory scheme for private securities litigation, which includes express measures to limit the ability of plaintiffs to bring meritless cases and extort settlements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
		"context": "at 35-36; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 U.S. 148; Schleicher , 618 F.3d at 683-84 (\"[C]ertification substantially increases the settlement value of a securities suit. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, the Second Circuit's application of the inflation-maintenance theory undermines Congress's statutory scheme for private securities litigation, which includes express measures to limit the ability of plaintiffs to bring meritless cases and extort settlements. For these reasons, this Court should prevent the inflation-maintenance theory from swallowing the fundamental premise of the Basic presumption of price impact and prune the ever- growing judicial oak of Section 10(b) liability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 F.3d 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Equitable Considerations That Supported the Application of Tolling in American Pipe (and Crown Cork) Do Not Support Application of the Ninth Circuit's Tolling Rule in the Instant Case",
		"context": "In a securities class action such as this one, there are certain absent class members whose dam- ages claims are so significant – or who for other reasons attach such value to their claims – that if the court refused to certify a class, they likely would pursue their claims by bringing their own individual actions. Without a tolling rule that suspended the limitations period with respect to such individual actions, each of these absent class members may feel compelled to make a protective filing. The tolling ruled applied in American Pipe (and later in Crown, Cork & Seal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) eliminates the need for such protective filings. It thereby relieves a potentially vast number of class members of the burdens of making protective filings, and furthers \"'the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy' served by Rule 23.\" ANZ Secs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Equitable Considerations That Supported the Application of Tolling in American Pipe (and Crown Cork) Do Not Support Application of the Ninth Circuit's Tolling Rule in the Instant Case",
		"context": "It thereby relieves a potentially vast number of class members of the burdens of making protective filings, and furthers \"'the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy' served by Rule 23.\" ANZ Secs. , 137 S. Ct. at 2051; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (if American Pipe had not suspended the statute of limitations with regard to the individual claims of absent class members, \" all class members would be forced to intervene to preserve their claims, and one of the major goals of class action litigation – to simplify litigation involving a large number of class members with similar claims – would be de- feated.\" (emphasis added)); Korwek , 646 F. Supp. at 964-965 (it was \"contemplated by the Supreme Court in .",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Equitable Considerations That Supported the Application of Tolling in American Pipe (and Crown Cork) Do Not Support Application of the Ninth Circuit's Tolling Rule in the Instant Case",
		"context": ". would likely be invited by a refusal to apply the tolling rule\" in American Pipe (emphasis added)).7 For the reasons explained below, however, there is no similar cause for concern that, in a feder- al securities class action governed by the PSLRA, individual class members would make innumerable protective filings seeking to frame their cases as class actions in the absence of a tolling rule that suspend- ed the applicable limitations periods as to such putative class actions. 7 See also, e.g ., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated on other grounds , 23 F. Supp. 3d 203; 3-24 Products Liability Practice Guide § 24.02 (2017) (\"The reason for adopting American Pipe tolling is the promotion of judicial economy and efficiency—the main reasons for having a class action procedure in the first place. Without tolling, courts would be inundated with protective motions to intervene or individual complaints filed by putative plaintiff class members seeking to avoid the statute of limitations bar\" (emphasis added)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F. Supp. 2d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The IOIA's Purpose And Drafting History Confirm That The \"Same Immunity\" Provision Incorporates The Current Law Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "Given the clarity of the IOIA's text and structure, there is no need to consult other sources of statutory meaning. But insofar as the Court chooses to inspect the \"same immunity\" provision's purpose and draft-ing history, those sources \"confirm[]\" what \"the text alone\" expresses—that the provision incorporates the law of foreign sovereign immunity as it currently stands. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 1. Congress's \"basic purpose\" in enacting the IOIA was \"to confer upon international organiza- tions, and officers and employees thereof, privileges and immunities of a governmental nature .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The IOIA's Purpose And Drafting History Confirm That The \"Same Immunity\" Provision Incorporates The Current Law Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "As the United States has explained, there is \"no reason\" for such incongruit ies. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A] group of states acting through an international organization\" should not be \"entitled to a broader immunity than its member states enjoy when acting alone.\" OSS Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 764. International organiza- tions have no right to be uniquely above the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.2d 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The IOIA's Purpose And Drafting History Confirm That The \"Same Immunity\" Provision Incorporates The Current Law Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": ". statutory language that [Congress] discarded in favor of other language.\" Chickasaw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cement s this analysis. In that case, the Court consid ered the scope of the evi- dentiary privilege established by Federal Rule of Ev- idence 501. The Judicial Conference Advisory Com-mittee on the Rules of Evidence had proposed that Congress adopt a set of nine specific privileges that would have codified then-existing common law rules.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The IOIA's Purpose And Drafting History Confirm That The \"Same Immunity\" Provision Incorporates The Current Law Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "H.R. Rep. No. 105-802, at 13 (1998) (citation omitted) (describing the impact of an amend- ment to the FCPA); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37 stead, Congress provided in Rule 501 that privilege claims are governed by \"[t]he common law—as in- terpreted by United States courts in the light of rea-son and experience.\" Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law",
		"context": "Ibid. And the relevant time is the period when the Constitution was ratified: the injury-in-fact requirement ensures that the jurisdiction of federal courts does not expand beyond the \"cases\" and \"controversies\" permitted by Article III. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Vermont Agency of Nat. 529 U.S. 765. 19 Disclosure of a search term, without more, does not have a \"close relationship\" to any harm recognized at common law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law",
		"context": "And the relevant time is the period when the Constitution was ratified: the injury-in-fact requirement ensures that the jurisdiction of federal courts does not expand beyond the \"cases\" and \"controversies\" permitted by Article III. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns 554 U.S. 269; Vermont Agency of Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Disclosure of a search term, without more, does not have a \"close relationship\" to any harm recognized at common law. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law",
		"context": "193, 211 (1890) (recognizing that Folsom is based on \"the theory of property in the contents of letters\"); 1855 WL 6410. And copyright's status as a protected property interest is well grounded in the common law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs also pointed at oral argument to the government's briefing in Bartnicki v. Vopper , which explained that the common law prohibited \"the publication of a private letter without the author's consent.\" U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law",
		"context": "56. But the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private parties. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 tort recovery requires not only wrongful act plus causation reaching to the plaintiff, but proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably be assessed.\" 540 U.S. 614.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law",
		"context": "See, e.g., 466 U.S. 109. 21 tort recovery requires not only wrongful act plus causation reaching to the plaintiff, but proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably be assessed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, some \"privacy torts\" permit recovery for \"presumed damages\" calculated \"without reference to specific harm.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law",
		"context": "PROSSER ON TORTS , supra , § 116A (emphasis added); see also Memphis Cnty. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, the disclosure of search terms to third- party websites through referrer headers alleged here does not resemble the public disclosures of private facts that may support a common-law privacy tort.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A claim for nominal damages does not prevent mootness if intervening events have eliminated any threat of recurring or future injury to the plaintiff's legal rights or interests.",
		"context": "The \"oldest and most consistent thread in the fed- eral law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This prohibition comes from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the power of federal courts to the adjudication of \"Cases\" and \"Controversies,\" and it means that federal courts cannot \"say what the law is\" just because a party de- sires it. 5 U.S. 137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A claim for nominal damages does not prevent mootness if intervening events have eliminated any threat of recurring or future injury to the plaintiff's legal rights or interests.",
		"context": "392 U.S. 83. This prohibition comes from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the power of federal courts to the adjudication of \"Cases\" and \"Controversies,\" and it means that federal courts cannot \"say what the law is\" just because a party de- sires it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, they may exercise their power to declare the law \"only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the 10 determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.\" Chicago & Grand Trunk R. 143 U.S. 339.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A claim for nominal damages does not prevent mootness if intervening events have eliminated any threat of recurring or future injury to the plaintiff's legal rights or interests.",
		"context": "5 U.S. 137. Instead, they may exercise their power to declare the law \"only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the 10 determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.\" Chicago & Grand Trunk R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Claims for nominal damages like the one in this case \"come[ ] to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning.\" Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's ERISA Preemption Cases Are Correct",
		"context": "In amicus 's view, however, this Court's decisions reflect an interpretation of, rather than a gloss on, the words 14 \"related to.\" This Court has repeatedly recognized that \"the venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex ('the law cares not for trifles') is part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept.\" Wis. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, ERISA's preemption provision is properly construed to exclude statutes with only a de minimis relationship to ERISA plans. Rather, under bedrock principles of statutory interpretation, a statute is preempted only if its relationship to ERISA is sufficiently proximate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's ERISA Preemption Cases Are Correct",
		"context": "That interpretation would render ERISA's broadly-worded preemption provision entire ly superfluous, because \"ordinary pre-emption\" principles exist regardless of whether a statute includes an express preemption clause. As this Court has recognized, \"[t]here is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, \"State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "The district court should address that issue on remand based on guidance from this Court. 3 The equitable remedy of an accounting of a defendant's profits is separate and distinct from the legal remedy of an award of the plaintiff's actual damages. Reebok Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] arise when imprecise language conflates the two forms of monetary relief. See, e.g., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061 (declining to order accounting in light of plaintiff's failure to adduce \"sufficient evidence of Defendants' sales to support an award of Defendants' profits even if an award of such damages [sic] were otherwise 4 the law provides that a plaintiff may recover, as one of the remedies under the Lanham Act, an accounting \"subject to the principles of equity.\" Adding an extra-statutory willfulness requirement for any possible accounting is antithetical to having courts apply principles of equity based on the facts and circumstances of each case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "970 F.2d 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "Adding an extra-statutory willfulness requirement for any possible accounting is antithetical to having courts apply principles of equity based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of equity requires flexibility to address the facts of each matter. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 349 U.S. 294. The rule articulated by the court of appeals in this case, which follows the precedent in several circuits, represents a rigid rule that disregards the flexible nature of equity. appropriate\"), aff'd,742 F. App'x 291.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 631",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "Adding an extra-statutory willfulness requirement for any possible accounting is antithetical to having courts apply principles of equity based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of equity requires flexibility to address the facts of each matter. See 560 U.S. 631; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The rule articulated by the court of appeals in this case, which follows the precedent in several circuits, represents a rigid rule that disregards the flexible nature of equity. appropriate\"), aff'd,742 F. App'x 291.",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "Unless directly quoting other sources, this brief therefore uses \"accounting\" when referring to the equitable remedy of defendant's profits and \"award\" when referring to the legal remedy of plaintiff's damages. 5 Requiring willfulness regardless of the other equities of the case is also inconsistent with this Court's traditional preference for flexible standards, rather than bright-line rules in intellectual property cases. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923; Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. 545; 510 U.S. 517. The accounting remedy is similarly an equitable one that does not lend itself to the application of bright- line rules. Outside of the trademark context, there is no general principle of equity that demands proof of willfulness for an accounting of profits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1979",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "Unless directly quoting other sources, this brief therefore uses \"accounting\" when referring to the equitable remedy of defendant's profits and \"award\" when referring to the legal remedy of plaintiff's damages. 5 Requiring willfulness regardless of the other equities of the case is also inconsistent with this Court's traditional preference for flexible standards, rather than bright-line rules in intellectual property cases. See 136 S. Ct. 1979; Halo Elecs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. 545; 510 U.S. 517. The accounting remedy is similarly an equitable one that does not lend itself to the application of bright- line rules. Outside of the trademark context, there is no general principle of equity that demands proof of willfulness for an accounting of profits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1923",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "Unless directly quoting other sources, this brief therefore uses \"accounting\" when referring to the equitable remedy of defendant's profits and \"award\" when referring to the legal remedy of plaintiff's damages. 5 Requiring willfulness regardless of the other equities of the case is also inconsistent with this Court's traditional preference for flexible standards, rather than bright-line rules in intellectual property cases. See 136 S. Ct. 1979; Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923; Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. 545; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The accounting remedy is similarly an equitable one that does not lend itself to the application of bright- line rules. Outside of the trademark context, there is no general principle of equity that demands proof of willfulness for an accounting of profits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "There is, however, no reason courts should require it in all cases as a necessary threshold.5 Several courts have applied a factor-based approach for determining whether an accounting is appropriate. Under this test, the factors for consideration include, but are not limited to: \"(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have 4 A lack of willfulness should weigh against an accounting, and it does under the tests for an accounting articulated by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. See Synergistic Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d 168; Quick Techs., 313 F.3d 338. 5 As in the context of other equitable remedies, evidence of the defendant's intent is an important factor in the analysis of whether an accounting of a defendant's profits is an appropriate remedy. A defendant's intent might not necessarily rise to the level of \"willful\" infringement, but still could support an accounting.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 F.3d 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "There is, however, no reason courts should require it in all cases as a necessary threshold.5 Several courts have applied a factor-based approach for determining whether an accounting is appropriate. Under this test, the factors for consideration include, but are not limited to: \"(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have 4 A lack of willfulness should weigh against an accounting, and it does under the tests for an accounting articulated by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. See Synergistic Int'l, 470 F.3d 162; Banjo Buddies, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Quick Techs., 313 F.3d 338. 5 As in the context of other equitable remedies, evidence of the defendant's intent is an important factor in the analysis of whether an accounting of a defendant's profits is an appropriate remedy. A defendant's intent might not necessarily rise to the level of \"willful\" infringement, but still could support an accounting.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "There is, however, no reason courts should require it in all cases as a necessary threshold.5 Several courts have applied a factor-based approach for determining whether an accounting is appropriate. Under this test, the factors for consideration include, but are not limited to: \"(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have 4 A lack of willfulness should weigh against an accounting, and it does under the tests for an accounting articulated by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. See Synergistic Int'l, 470 F.3d 162; Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d 168; Quick Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 As in the context of other equitable remedies, evidence of the defendant's intent is an important factor in the analysis of whether an accounting of a defendant's profits is an appropriate remedy. A defendant's intent might not necessarily rise to the level of \"willful\" infringement, but still could support an accounting.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 F.3d 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:64 (5th ed.). These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; 631 F.3d 464; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 F.3d 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:64 (5th ed.). These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; 631 F.3d 464; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully.",
		"citation_value_orig": "41 F.3d 1242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:64 (5th ed.). These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; 631 F.3d 464; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully.",
		"citation_value_orig": "968 F.2d 1532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:64 (5th ed.). These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; 631 F.3d 464; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 931",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 631 F.3d 464; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully. No willfulness prerequisite exists for awarding actual damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully. No willfulness prerequisite exists for awarding actual damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "631 F.3d 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; 631 F.3d 464; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Burger King 855 F.2d 779; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully. No willfulness prerequisite exists for awarding actual damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "595 F.3d 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "These rationales include making plaintiffs whole as a proxy for the legal remedy of an award of their actual damages,6 depriving defendants of unjust gains,7 and deterring defendants 6 See, e.g ., Visible Sys. 551 F.3d 65; Minn. Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d 1242; George Basch 968 F.2d 1532; 886 F.2d 931. 7 See, e.g., Hamilton–Brown Shoe 240 U.S. 251; 631 F.3d 464; 595 F.3d 478; Burger King [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 8 from future misconduct. The importance of willfulness should vary depending on the facts of each case and the rationale offered by the plaintiff in each case.8 For example, if the proxy-for-actual-damages model applies, a prevailing plaintiff should be made whole regardless whether the defendant acted willfully. No willfulness prerequisite exists for awarding actual damages.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.2d 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "See, e.g., Minn. Pet Breeders , 41 F.3d at 1247. Therefore, even if willfulness is not a necessary prerequisite, a court may properly conclude that an accounting is inappropriate if the only argument advanced by a plaintiff for an accounting is deterrence of future infringement. Maltina [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; W.E. Bassett 435 F.2d 656. 8 See Tamko Roofing Prods., 282 F.3d 23; Mason , 855 F.2d at 781; Maltina Corp ., 613 F.2d at 205; W.E.",
		"citation_value_orig": "613 F.2d 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern",
		"context": "Therefore, even if willfulness is not a necessary prerequisite, a court may properly conclude that an accounting is inappropriate if the only argument advanced by a plaintiff for an accounting is deterrence of future infringement. Maltina 613 F.2d 582; W.E. Bassett [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 See Tamko Roofing Prods., 282 F.3d 23; Mason , 855 F.2d at 781; Maltina Corp ., 613 F.2d at 205; W.E. Bassett Co ., 435 F.2d at 664; Roulo , 886 F.2d at 941.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 F.2d 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Because the FCA's 1986 Amendments Promoted Relator-Driven Suits, the Discovery-Based Limitations Rule Added by Those Amendments Must Be Read Accordingly",
		"context": "After a period of relative disuse, Congress amended the FCA in 1986 to revive the Act in the wake of federal program expansion and, consequently, more government spending and opportunities for fraud. See United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2–3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "931 F.2d 1493",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Because the FCA's 1986 Amendments Promoted Relator-Driven Suits, the Discovery-Based Limitations Rule Added by Those Amendments Must Be Read Accordingly",
		"context": "5266, 5288–89). \"The basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make the FCA a 'more useful tool against fraud in modern times.' \" Cook [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and increasing relator rewards from ten up to twenty-five percent in intervened cases and from twenty-five up to thirty percent in declined cases. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1)–(2) (1982), with 31 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Because the FCA's 1986 Amendments Promoted Relator-Driven Suits, the Discovery-Based Limitations Rule Added by Those Amendments Must Be Read Accordingly",
		"context": "Most significantly, Cong ress added (b)(2)'s discovery- based limitations rule to help the Government catch more fraud, giving suit-bring ers the option of the most 47 favorable time period—whichever occurs last.5 The ex- press goal of this section wa s to \" 'ensure the Govern- ment's rights are not lost through a wrongdoer's successful deception,' because 'fraud is, by nature, de- ceptive.' \" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners provide no reason that Con- gress would have wanted to bar relators from exposing well-hidden frauds, while allowing the Government to sue for the same fraud. 6 Although relators are often better-positioned to discov er fraud than the Govern- ment, it does not mean that Congress intended a 5 It does not aid Petitioners that (b)(2) was imported from 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "162 F.3d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Because the FCA's 1986 Amendments Promoted Relator-Driven Suits, the Discovery-Based Limitations Rule Added by Those Amendments Must Be Read Accordingly",
		"context": "48 wholesale ban on relators' ability to use (b)(2)'s discov- ery rule in declined cases. Notwithstanding Petitioners' efforts, \"it is impos- sible to infer from a few is olated and ambiguous phrases a congressional purpose.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners' meager recitation of legis-lative history arguments, none of which actually ad- dress (b)(2)'s applicability to relators , does no better than that. Unremarkably, DOJ's statements to Con-gress in support of amendments suggested by the At- torney General reflect DOJ's own contemporaneous interests, which interests ar e of a piece with relator- driven suits vindicating precisely the same Govern- ment objectives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Because the FCA's 1986 Amendments Promoted Relator-Driven Suits, the Discovery-Based Limitations Rule Added by Those Amendments Must Be Read Accordingly",
		"context": "These scraps of legislative history cannot be used to manu- facture congressional intent . \"Nothing in the legisla- tive history\" of the FCA \"co nfirms that this particular point\"—(b)(2)'s applicability to relators—\"bore on the congressional deliberations or was given specific con- sideration.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent the legislative history of the 1986 FCA Amendments informs at all, it demonstrates the overriding objective of doing everything possible to roll back rampant procurement fraud. Petitioners' reading of (b)(2) sidesteps the critical prosecution role that FCA relators have played throughout its history.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................. 2 Basic 485 U.S. 224 .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 513 U.S. 374 ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 519 F.3d 879 ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re592 F.3d 347 ................. 9 561 U.S. 247 .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen 568 U.S. 455 ................................. 2 Basic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 513 U.S. 374 ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 519 F.3d 879 ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re592 F.3d 347 ................. 9 561 U.S. 247 .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen 568 U.S. 455 ................................. 2 Basic 485 U.S. 224 .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 519 F.3d 879 ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re592 F.3d 347 ................. 9 561 U.S. 247 .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen 568 U.S. 455 ................................. 2 Basic 485 U.S. 224 .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 513 U.S. 374 ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re592 F.3d 347 ................. 9 561 U.S. 247 .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 F.3d 879",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen 568 U.S. 455 ................................. 2 Basic 485 U.S. 224 .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 513 U.S. 374 ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 519 F.3d 879 ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................. 9 561 U.S. 247 .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "592 F.3d 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen 568 U.S. 455 ................................. 2 Basic 485 U.S. 224 .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 513 U.S. 374 ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 519 F.3d 879 ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re592 F.3d 347 ................. 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "................................................................................. 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation , In re966 F.3d 595 ....................................... 4, 5, 6 Amgen 568 U.S. 455 ................................. 2 Basic 485 U.S. 224 .............. passim Finisar Corporation Securities Litigation , In re2017 WL 6026244 ...................................................... 6 Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 ................................................... passim IBEW Local 98 Pension 818 F.3d 775 ........................................... 5, 6 513 U.S. 374 ............................................................ 10 448 F. Supp. 3d 46 .......... 6 519 F.3d 879 ............................................... 3 Morgan Stanley Information Fund Securities Litigation , In re592 F.3d 347 ................. 9 561 U.S. 247 .......................................................... 5, 6 Stoneridge Investment Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]............... 3 875 F.3d 79, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 1702 <tinyurl.com/seccla ssactions2019> ................................. 5 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "20-222 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP , INC., ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM , ET AL . ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS Respondents seek to defend the indefensible. In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that a defendant in a multi-billion dollar securi ties class action may not re- but the presumption of classw ide reliance recognized in Basic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by pointing to the generic nature of the statements on which the claims are based. The Second Circuit categorically precluded that evidence on the ground that it is also relevant to the substantive element of materia lity. That holding contra- venes this Court's holding in Halliburton 573 U.S. 258, that a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption at the class-certification stage with any relevant evidence, even if the evidence is also relevant at the merits st age.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "Yet in their 33-page brief in opposition, respondents engage in a pro-tracted effort to distract fr om the serious legal defects and enormous practical implications of those holdings. In particular, respondents seek to recast petitioners' pri- mary argument as a request for resolution at the class- certification stage of the merits issue of materiality. That is a transparent effort to take Halliburton II out of the equation and bring this case instead within the ambit of Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this case is controlled by Halliburton II , not Amgen , and the decision below renders Halliburton II a dead letter. As Judge Sullivan emphasized in dissent, the majority's approach would ma ke class certification \"all but a certainty\" in every case brought under the inflation- maintenance theory, because it effectively prevents de- fendants from showing a lack of price impact on the \"back end\" as well as the \"front end.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "That is plainly wrong. In a securities-fraud case, statements (or omis- sions) are the most basic form of evidence, without which no plaintiff could ever prove its claim. See, e.g., Ston- eridge Investment Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 519 F.3d 879. As 4 Judge Sullivan put it, \"[c]an didly, I don't see how a re- viewing court can ignore the alleged misrepresentations when assessing price impact.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "That is plainly wrong. In a securities-fraud case, statements (or omis- sions) are the most basic form of evidence, without which no plaintiff could ever prove its claim. See, e.g., Ston- eridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. 148; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As 4 Judge Sullivan put it, \"[c]an didly, I don't see how a re- viewing court can ignore the alleged misrepresentations when assessing price impact.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 F.3d 879",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
		"context": "19-547, cert. granted,140 S. Ct. 12622020 WL 6037206. The Second Circuit has hosted more than one in every three securities class actions since 2017, see Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2019 Year in Review 38 (2020) <tinyurl.com/sec- classactions2019>, and this Court has recognized its strong influence on other courts, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. In any event, the Second Circuit's decision impli- cates a conflict among the courts of appeals on the second question presented: namely, whether a defendant seek-ing to rebut the Basic presumption bears only a burden of production or also the burd en of persuasion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to religious students.",
		"context": ". For many religious students, faith is the most important aspect of their lives. Faith involves a \"deep psychological commitment,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and is \"fundamental to [a] believer's identity.\" Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitu tional Construction and Conceptions of the Self , 97 H ARV. L. REV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to religious students.",
		"context": "Indeed, religion has been described as \"an 'ultimate concern,' [and] as 'a unified belief system that cuts across and directs more than a single aspect of an individual's life.'\" Note, supra at 1477–78. As this Court put it in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], religious belief encompasses a faith \"to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent.\" In other words, religion \"plays a particularly important role in an individual's sense of self ,\" William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society , and Speech-Based Claims for Religious Exempt ions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability , 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1937, 1939 (2011), and \"gives me aning and orientation to a person's whole life,\" Note, supra at 1477–78.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to religious students.",
		"context": "Religious freedom is \"an unalienable right,\" precisely because it is fu ndamental to a person's identity and worldview. As this Court's cases teach, \"[t]he First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and relig ious expression are too precious to be either proscr ibed or prescr ibed by the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is why the Framer s protected religious freedom in the Bill of Rights. And, though not strictly immutable, courts have long acknowledged that classifications based on religion must satisfy strict scrutiny because religious identity is a characteristic that \"either cannot realistically change or ought not be compelled to change because it is fundamental to their identities.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to religious students.",
		"context": "That is why the Framer s protected religious freedom in the Bill of Rights. And, though not strictly immutable, courts have long acknowledged that classifications based on religion must satisfy strict scrutiny because religious identity is a characteristic that \"either cannot realistically change or ought not be compelled to change because it is fundamental to their identities.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as amended (Feb. 2, 2016). Religious affiliation is \"of such fundamental impor-tance that individuals shou ld not be required to modify it.\" 467 F.3d 344.",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to religious students.",
		"context": "804 F.3d 277, as amended (Feb. 2, 2016). Religious affiliation is \"of such fundamental impor-tance that individuals shou ld not be required to modify it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, \"the free exercise of religion . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 F.3d 344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Reading section 3731(b)(2) to Cover All Qui Tam Actions Advances the FCA's Coherent Structure and Procedural Plan",
		"context": "The statute creates comple- mentary but distinct procedural roles for the relator and the Government during litigation, while granting potential party status to both. To be coherent, the FCA's structure and this plan command a reading that puts relators on the same statute of limitations footing as the Government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]](2) is squarely the latter type of section; it has no language differentiating relators from the Government and thus applies to both. Second, even if the statutory sche me permitted reading (b)(2) to distinguish between relators and the Government, it certainly does not support Petitioners' further cut be-tween intervened and non-intervened actions. Third, Petitioners' argument that (b )(1) is superfluous if (b)(2) applies to non-intervened a ctions is not only belied by the plain language of (b)(2) itself, but legally untena- ble.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Tenth Circuit's Concerns About Conflicts Between the FDCPA and Colorado Foreclosure Law Are Unfounded",
		"context": "2018 WL 3984544 shields communications made with \"the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.\" In the narrow context of communications required by state foreclosure statut es, courts have predictably found that the ubiquitous clauses in deeds of trust in which the borrower consents to a power of sale foreclosure in the event of a default have conveyed consent for the purposes of § §1692c(a) and 1692c(b). 2017 WL 5068340; 2017 WL 1196586; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd, 401 F ed. Appx. 389 (10th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F. Supp. 2d 1138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Tenth Circuit's Concerns About Conflicts Between the FDCPA and Colorado Foreclosure Law Are Unfounded",
		"context": "2010). Applica tion of these rulings here is consistent with the prevailing FDCPA juris prudence that has invoked these consent exceptions sparingly, typically to avo id absurd or anomalous results. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1168 –73 (9th Cir. 2006 ). See generally H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 F.3d 1162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Tenth Circuit's Concerns About Conflicts Between the FDCPA and Colorado Foreclosure Law Are Unfounded",
		"context": "Ho, 858 F.3d at 588 (Korman , D.J., dissenting). This Court has cautioned against constructions of §1692c that needlessly thwart creditors' established statutory remedies under state laws. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lower courts have followed this directive and interpreted the FDCPA and state foreclosure laws to shield communications to the borrower and lienholders necessary to comply w ith state foreclosure law. 2017 WL 4776991.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Tenth Circuit's Concerns About Conflicts Between the FDCPA and Colorado Foreclosure Law Are Unfounded",
		"context": "2017 WL 4776991. 25 Courts have held that the FDCPA applies to foreclosures in circuits that comprise the majority of states in the United States . Appellate court rulings date back to 2006 , when the Fourth Circuit ruled in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Tenth Circuit pointed to no specific instances where courts have found that a foreclosure law firm violated the referenced FDCPA sections merely by serving a court filing or recorded document on parties in the manner prescribed by state foreclosure law. Notably, the law in Colorado since 1992 has been that the broad sco pe of FDCPA provisions apply to foreclosure proceedings under Colo. R. Civ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 F.3d 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Williamson County's exhaustion requirement has created a tangled web that ensnares aggrieved landowners and allows the government to evade its Fifth Amendment responsibility to compensate them",
		"context": "§ 1983litigants. In a key ruling confirming the absence of a state exhaustion requirement for § 1983 litigants, thisCourt anticipated the type of entanglementsWilliamson County has spawned, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, and availability of interimrelief. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Patsy, this Court observed that the \"difficult questions concerning the design and scope ofan exhaustion requirement\" could be addressedefficiently by legislation but \"if answered incrementallyby the judiciary,\" the result would be \"costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Because of the protections afforded by the ministerial exception, its application should be determined before courts reach the merits",
		"context": "So although plaintiffs occasionally plead themselves o ut of court, see 412 F. Supp. 3d 859, the ministerial excep tion cannot always be determined at the motion-to-dismis s stage. Because, in most cases, the party asserting the ministerial exception needs to rely on evidence outside the four corners of the complaint to demon- strate that the exception applies, courts typically address the ministerial exception on motions for summary judgment. 863 F.3d 190; Grussgott , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, that is how the district courts revolved the issue in these cases. Berru Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "882 F.3d 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Because of the protections afforded by the ministerial exception, its application should be determined before courts reach the merits",
		"context": "The rationale for the ministerial exception should guide how courts address these procedural issues. T he protection of personal religious liberty encompasse d by the ministerial exception includes the recogniti on that it is not only the decisions made by the court that \"impinge\" on religious liberty but the \"very proces s of inquiry\" leading to those decisions that impinges o n that liberty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, \"it is well established, in numerous other contexts, that court s should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs.\" 530 U.S. 793.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Because of the protections afforded by the ministerial exception, its application should be determined before courts reach the merits",
		"context": "440 U.S. 490. Indeed, \"it is well established, in numerous other contexts, that court s should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The structural interest in avoiding the establishment of religion also commends limiting the scope of courts' involvement in cases before determining if the ministerial excepti on applies. Indeed, the ministerial exception is unlik e most other affirmative defenses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Secrets Nonjusticiability Bar In Government Contract Cases",
		"context": "And our state-secrets jurispru-dence bearing upon that authority is not Reynolds , but two cases dealing with a lleged contracts to spy.\" Gen- eral Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 485-86 (citation omitted). Those two spy contract cases— [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 544 U.S. 1—held \"public policy forbids suits based on covert espionage agree- ments.\" General Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 486 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). From them, General Dy- namics derived the general rule of contract law that government contract claims whose fair resolution re- quires secret evidence are nonjusticiable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Secrets Nonjusticiability Bar In Government Contract Cases",
		"context": "And our state-secrets jurispru-dence bearing upon that authority is not Reynolds , but two cases dealing with a lleged contracts to spy.\" Gen- eral Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 485-86 (citation omitted). Those two spy contract cases— 92 U.S. 105, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—held \"public policy forbids suits based on covert espionage agree- ments.\" General Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 486 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). From them, General Dy- namics derived the general rule of contract law that government contract claims whose fair resolution re- quires secret evidence are nonjusticiable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Secrets Nonjusticiability Bar In Government Contract Cases",
		"context": "In maintaining a clear boundary between the Reynolds evidentiary privilege and the Totten /Tenet government-contract justici ability bar, the Court firmly rejected the Government's attempt to conflate these two distinct state-secrets doctrines. In its brief in General Dynamics , the Government attempted to broaden the state secrets justiciability bar beyond 15 government contract disputes by incorporating it into the Reynolds evidentiary privilege. Brief for the United States at 24-27, General Dynamics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court decisively blocked that attempt, noting that \" Reynolds has less to do with these cases than the parties believe\" and reiterating that \" Reynolds decided a purely evi- dentiary dispute by applying evidentiary rules,\" not by imposing a justiciability bar or \"order[ing] judgment in favor of the Government. \"3 General Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 485.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State Secrets Nonjusticiability Bar In Government Contract Cases",
		"context": "The Court should continue to maintain the dis- tinction between the two state-secret doctrines, which have different origins and serve different purposes. 3 The Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. , which the court of appeals panel below was compelled to follow, erroneously imports the Totten /Tenet government-contract justiciability bar into the Reynolds state se- crets evidentiary priv ilege. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's subsequent decision in General Dy- namics demonstrates the error of the Ninth Circuit's approach, and explains the reasons why the justiciability bar is uniquely a creature of contract law and is limited to attempts to litigate gov-ernment contract disputes. Moreover, there is no basis for a justiciability bar in section 1782 proceedings because those proceedings are only for the pro-duction of evidence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 1070",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Commission's Ownership-Diversity Findings Are Irrational",
		"context": "That is no assessment at all; it is a wholesale failure to consider the entire prob lem. \"[D]eference cannot fill the lack of an evidentiary foundation\" for an agency's conclusions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government responds (Br. 37-38) that there was no 1990s-era data on female ownership, and that studying the effect of the cross-ownership restrictions, specifically, would have been impractical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Commission's Ownership-Diversity Findings Are Irrational",
		"context": "The Reconsideration Order found, on the same record, 42 that retaining the rules would not help and jettisoning them would do no harm. This unexplained about-face is yet another arbitrary aspect of the Commission's repeal. See Encino Motorcars , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Reconsideration Order attempted to square the circle by decreeing that the Commission's original 2016 statement that the rules \"promote[] opportunities for diversity in … ownership,\" JA172, meant only that retaining the rules \"would promote ownership diversity generally\"—not \"minority and female ownership specifically,\" e.g., App.162a. This re-interpretation blinks reality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Commission's Ownership-Diversity Findings Are Irrational",
		"context": "Stripped of its contrived re-interpretation of the 2016 Order, the Reconsideratio n Order's about-face on whether the existing ownership rules promote race- and gender-ownership diversity is wholly unexplained, indeed, unacknowledged. When an agency changes course, it \"must at least 'display awareness that it is changing position' and 'show that there are good reasons for the new policy.'\" Encino Motorcars , LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Commission knows how to do so, and has transparently explained changes in position on other aspects of the rules. E.g., App.67a-69a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Alternative Theories Are Unsupported by Treaty Text",
		"context": "But that pre-existing right did not include a righ t to any minimum quantity of fish. Salmon harvests vari ed from year to year, and low harvests sometimes \"caused near starvation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It also did not include a right to bar all obstructions, as tribes regularly erected weirs. J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 F. Supp. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Alternative Theories Are Unsupported by Treaty Text",
		"context": "See, e.g. , State's Opening Br. 30-39; Fishing Vessel , 443 U.S. at 685, 670 (holding that Tribes are enti tled to \"a fair share of the available fish,\" rather than ad opting Tribes' proposed rule that \"the treaties had reserved a pre-existing right to as many fish as their commercial and subsistence needs dictated\") (emphasis added); Puyallup [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, Respondents claim that the right of \"taking\" fish \"preserved the Tribes' ability to actually harvest fish[.]\" Tribes' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Debt Collection Litigation Is Also Prevalent",
		"context": "6 collection were sued.14 Combined with the estimate that 70 million Americans were contacted about a debt in a year, this figure translates into more than 10 million Amer icans being sued in debt collection lawsuits each year.15 But advances in technology in the field of collection do not correlate with higher quality collection efforts. To the contrary, for example, the robo-signing deficiencies that came to light during the 2009 foreclosure crisis also infiltrated the debt collection industry. Thus, in Midland Funding [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the court found that an affidavit signed by a \"specialist\" who signed 200 to 400 affidavits per day, falsely claiming to have personal knowledge of its content s, was misleading and violated the FDCPA . Mass filings of debt collection cases have also resulted in the mass entry of default judgments, none of which are obtained on the merits, with studies showing such defaults occur ring in 70 to 94 percent of cases.16 The FTC reported that , at a 14 CFPB 2017 Consumer Views Report, supra , at 27. 15 See Paula Hannaford -Agor, et al., Nat'l Ctr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "644 F. Supp. 2d 961",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "1. This Court has long recognized that many consti- tutional rights apply differently in the context of the militar y. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 462 U.S. 296. When the Framers empowered Congress to \"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces ,\" U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "1. This Court has long recognized that many consti- tutional rights apply differently in the context of the militar y. See, e.g., 517 U.S. 748 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the Framers empowered Congress to \"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces ,\" U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "Although \"[t]he later -added Bill of Rights limited this power to some degree, \" it \"did not alter the allocation to Congress of the 'primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military.' \" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court has therefor e repeatedly emphasized that \"judicial deference is at its apogee when legislative ac- tion under the congressio nal authority to raise and sup- port armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.\" Solorio , 483 U.S. at 447 (brackets, citations, and ellipsis omitted ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "\" Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted). The Court has accordingly resolved constitutional chal- lenges to military disciplinary regulations with a focus on the \" very significant differences between military law and civilian law and between the mil itary commu- nity and the civilian community. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300- 305; 444 U.S. 348; 424 U.S. 828; 346 U.S. 137 . The Court has taken a similar approach even to pro- cedural questions that do not directly affect primary conduct. In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "\" Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted). The Court has accordingly resolved constitutional chal- lenges to military disciplinary regulations with a focus on the \" very significant differences between military law and civilian law and between the mil itary commu- nity and the civilian community. \" 417 U.S. 733; see, e.g., Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300- 305; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 424 U.S. 828; 346 U.S. 137 . The Court has taken a similar approach even to pro- cedural questions that do not directly affect primary conduct. In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "\" Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted). The Court has accordingly resolved constitutional chal- lenges to military disciplinary regulations with a focus on the \" very significant differences between military law and civilian law and between the mil itary commu- nity and the civilian community. \" 417 U.S. 733; see, e.g., Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300- 305; 444 U.S. 348; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 346 U.S. 137 . The Court has taken a similar approach even to pro- cedural questions that do not directly affect primary conduct. In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "\" Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted). The Court has accordingly resolved constitutional chal- lenges to military disciplinary regulations with a focus on the \" very significant differences between military law and civilian law and between the mil itary commu- nity and the civilian community. \" 417 U.S. 733; see, e.g., Chappell , 462 U.S. at 300- 305; 444 U.S. 348; 424 U.S. 828; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court has taken a similar approach even to pro- cedural questions that do not directly affect primary conduct. In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "The Court has taken a similar approach even to pro- cedural questions that do not directly affect primary conduct. In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the Court has accordingly upheld Con- gress's judgme nts that courts- martial should not re- quire petit juries, 255 U.S. 1 , that summary courts -martial can be held with- out counsel, Middendorf , 425 U.S. at 44, and that mili- tary judges need not have fixed terms of office, see 510 U.S. 163 . It would be anomalous to accord any less deference to 34 Congress's determinations of the appropriate punish- ment for crimes by military personnel .",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\" 425 U.S. 25 . And the Court has accordingly upheld Con- gress's judgme nts that courts- martial should not re- quire petit juries, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that summary courts -martial can be held with- out counsel, Middendorf , 425 U.S. at 44, and that mili- tary judges need not have fixed terms of office, see 510 U.S. 163 . It would be anomalous to accord any less deference to 34 Congress's determinations of the appropriate punish- ment for crimes by military personnel . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "255 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "In particular, t he Court has explained that it will enforce procedures adopted by Congress for mili-tary prosecutions unless the \" factors militating in fa- vor\" of broader due -process protections \" are so extraor- dinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress.\" 425 U.S. 25 . And the Court has accordingly upheld Con- gress's judgme nts that courts- martial should not re- quire petit juries, 255 U.S. 1 , that summary courts -martial can be held with- out counsel, Middendorf , 425 U.S. at 44, and that mili- tary judges need not have fixed terms of office, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It would be anomalous to accord any less deference to 34 Congress's determinations of the appropriate punish- ment for crimes by military personnel . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "at 9 (express authorization by President Bush). No sound basis exists for a court to conclude that the Constitution forbids it . See Youngstown Sheet & Tube [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The judgment that military rape should be a capital offense reflects the distinctive harms to military disci- pline, recruitment, morale, combat readiness, and coalition -building that are caused by rape in the mili- tary ranks. Rape in any context is an egregious and de- struc tive crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "Mattis Memo . In addition, some military punis hments must be im- posed in wartime conditions unlike anything that might arise in the civilian sphere. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a \" combat environment, \" for example, a sanction of \" confinement, even of a prolonged nature, may be an inadequate deterrent \" for crimes like rape. MCM App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "595 F.2d 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "The military - specific factors that informed the 150 -year his tory of that classification are far outside the realm of the harms considered by this Court in determining proportional punishments for civilian rape. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 36 In civilian Eighth Amendment cases , this Court has emphasized \"that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the accep tability of the death pen alty under the Eighth Amendment.\" Coker , 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "In the UCMJ, as in any other context, statutory provisions should be read, if possible, to form a coherent whole —not to nullify one another. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Arti- cle 55's bar on \"cruel or unusual punishment\" thus can- not reasonably be understood to implicitly invalidate Article 120's more specific authorization of the death penalty for military rape. 10 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
		"context": "Arti- cle 55's bar on \"cruel or unusual punishment\" thus can- not reasonably be understood to implicitly invalidate Article 120's more specific authorization of the death penalty for military rape. 10 U.S.C. 855; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress appears to have enacted Article 55 on the understanding that the Eighth Amendment does not, by its own force, apply directly to the milita ry justice sys- tem. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
		"context": "1098bb(a)(1) (emphasis added) . Nothing in the Act lim- its the Title IV provisions that the Secretary can waive or modify; to the contrary, \"the word 'any' has an ex- pansive meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 34 C.F.R. 682.402 , 685.212) ; 87 Fed. Reg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
		"context": "But there is no reason to think that Congress, by empowering the Secretary to \"waive or modify\" any Title IV student -aid provision, intended to limit the Secretary to modest changes when such changes would not suffice to ameliorate borrower hard- ship due to the emergency. \"By introducing a limit ation not found in the statute, respondents ask [this Court] to 39 alter, rather than to interpret, the [Act].\" Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But courts have no author- ity to \"impos[e] limits on an agency's discretion that are not supported by the text.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
		"context": "1098bb(a)(1). \" [T]he use of such a 'not- withstanding' clause clearly signals the drafter's inten- tion that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section override conflicting provisions of any other section.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The provisions authorizing debt relief in other circum- stances —which were not enacted with specific refer- ence to the HEROES Act —thus cannot be construed to limit the Secretary's authority under the Act . Second , the States assert (Nebraska Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
		"context": "1098bb(a)(1) (emphasis added) . Nothing in the Act lim- its the Title IV provisions that the Secretary can waive or modify; to the contrary, \"the word 'any' has an ex- pansive meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 34 C.F.R. 682.402 , 685.212) ; 87 Fed. Reg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
		"context": "But there is no reason to think that Congress, by empowering the Secretary to \"waive or modify\" any Title IV student -aid provision, intended to limit the Secretary to modest changes when such changes would not suffice to ameliorate borrower hard- ship due to the emergency. \"By introducing a limit ation not found in the statute, respondents ask [this Court] to 39 alter, rather than to interpret, the [Act].\" Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But courts have no author- ity to \"impos[e] limits on an agency's discretion that are not supported by the text.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
		"context": "1098bb(a)(1). \" [T]he use of such a 'not- withstanding' clause clearly signals the drafter's inten- tion that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section override conflicting provisions of any other section.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The provisions authorizing debt relief in other circum- stances —which were not enacted with specific refer- ence to the HEROES Act —thus cannot be construed to limit the Secretary's authority under the Act . Second , the States assert (Nebraska Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Contrary to Petitioners' and the Solicitor General's contention, there is no \"consensus view\" regarding the expropriation exception",
		"context": "Petitioners and the Unit ed States Solicitor Gen- eral remain adamant that a sovereign's taking from its own nationals, even if the takings were an integral 13 part of the atrocities of the Holocaust, cannot confer jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. Both argue that a so-called \"consensus view\" exists and that a \"violation of international law\" for purposes of the expropriation exception ca nnot mean expropriations of property owned by a county's own nationals. Fur- thermore, both Petitioners and their Amicus claim that this \"consensus view\" is recognized by members of this Court, referring to Justice Breyer's concur- rence in Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet Justice Breyer made no such recogni- tion in his concurrence. Rather, regarding the expro- priation exception, Justice Breyer wrote: \" if the lower courts are correct in their consensus view that § 1605(a)(3)'s reference to 'violation of international law' does not cover expropriations of property belong-ing to a county's own nationals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right",
		"context": "XIV. This Court has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies many of the Bill of Rights' protections to the States, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and has employed differing tests to determine which of these protections are to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Early cases asked whether a right reflects \"immutable principles which inhere in the very idea of free government,\" 211 U.S. 78, and whether a right is \"the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty\" and essential to \"a fair and enlightened system of justice,\" 302 U.S. 319. More recently, the Court has emphasized \"whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 6 fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right",
		"context": "This Court has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies many of the Bill of Rights' protections to the States, see, e.g. , 391 U.S. 145, and has employed differing tests to determine which of these protections are to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Early cases asked whether a right reflects \"immutable principles which inhere in the very idea of free government,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and whether a right is \"the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty\" and essential to \"a fair and enlightened system of justice,\" 302 U.S. 319. More recently, the Court has emphasized \"whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 6 fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.\" 561 U.S. 742, and whether it is \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right",
		"context": "This Court has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies many of the Bill of Rights' protections to the States, see, e.g. , 391 U.S. 145, and has employed differing tests to determine which of these protections are to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Early cases asked whether a right reflects \"immutable principles which inhere in the very idea of free government,\" 211 U.S. 78, and whether a right is \"the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty\" and essential to \"a fair and enlightened system of justice,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More recently, the Court has emphasized \"whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 6 fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.\" 561 U.S. 742, and whether it is \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "302 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right",
		"context": "Early cases asked whether a right reflects \"immutable principles which inhere in the very idea of free government,\" 211 U.S. 78, and whether a right is \"the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty\" and essential to \"a fair and enlightened system of justice,\" 302 U.S. 319. More recently, the Court has emphasized \"whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 6 fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and whether it is \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\" Id. at 767.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right",
		"context": "The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action 7 abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the \"establishment of religion\" clause. The interrelation of these complementary clauses was well summarized in a statement of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, quoted with approval by this Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]: \"The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.\" 330 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "13 Wall. 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right",
		"context": "The interrelation of these complementary clauses was well summarized in a statement of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, quoted with approval by this Court in 13 Wall. 679]: \"The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The text of the Establishment Clause – prohibiting Congress from making any law \"respecting an establishment of religion\" – is worded as a constraint on the federal government. This would not, in and of itse lf, preclude incorporation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents' new theory of the international law of takings is waived and erroneous",
		"context": "27-28. This Court should not consider a jurisdictional theory raised for the first time. See, e.g., OBB Personenverkehr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Regardless, Respondents' new theory misunder- stands the international law of takings embodied in the exception. A state's regulation of property rights within its jurisdiction is a core sovereign power, gov-erned only by domestic law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents' new theory of the international law of takings is waived and erroneous",
		"context": "Respondents try to transform a rule of interna- tional law concerned with state-to-state relations into a human-rights principle prote cting people against the wrongdoing of their own states. They cite no interna- tional-law source supporting their reimagining of the law of expropriation.3 Adopting this approach would expand the expropriation exception even further than the court of appeals did, because almost all plaintiffs invoking the expropriation exception allege that their state deprived them of full rights as nationals. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unsurprisingly, every court of appeals decision to consider Respondents' the-ory has rejected it. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents' new theory of the international law of takings is waived and erroneous",
		"context": "Unsurprisingly, every court of appeals decision to consider Respondents' the-ory has rejected it. See id. at 551; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government's reading defies the legitimate purposes of civil detention",
		"context": "17, at 6 (E.D. C al.). 43 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (citing Wong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In fact, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that punishment— with its twin pillars of retribution and deterrence —is not a permis- sible aim of any civil detention system . See 534 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government's reading defies the legitimate purposes of civil detention",
		"context": "43 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (citing Wong 163 U.S. 228). In fact, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that punishment— with its twin pillars of retribution and deterrence —is not a permis- sible aim of any civil detention system . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Running headlong into these clear precedents, the government argues that Section 1231 should apply to withholding -only cases specifically because it \"has an overriding interest in\" using the immigration detention system as a \"tool[]\" to \"diminish illegal immigration.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The government's reading defies the legitimate purposes of civil detention",
		"context": "§ 236.1(c)(8). If the noncitizen is unable to satisfy an IJ that he or she will not abscond , then there will be no release from custody under Section 1226. See Guerrero [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That is to say, the procedures that exist under Sec- tion 1226 are designed to address the interests the government now advances. But they also consider an individual 's liberty interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage",
		"context": ". Warrantless police entry into the home is the \"chief evil\" against which the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent. United States District Court , 407 U.S. at 313; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Amendment's protections also extend to a home's cur- tilage. Oliver , 466 U.S. at 180 (describing the common law's distinction between \"open fields\" and \"curtilage,\" and observing that \"only the curtilage, not the neigh- boring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage",
		"context": "Oliver explained that curtilage was \"the area to which extends the inti- mate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In California v. Ciraolo , the Court described the protection afforded to the cu rtilage as \"essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psy- chologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.\" 476 U.S. 207.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage",
		"context": "(quoting 116 U.S. 616). In California v. Ciraolo , the Court described the protection afforded to the cu rtilage as \"essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psy- chologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, more re- cently, the Court reaffirmed that a home's curtilage \"enjoys protection as part of the home itself.\" Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6 (\"This right [i.e., to retreat into one's home and be free from unreasonable governmental 28 intrusions] would be of li ttle practical value if the State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage",
		"context": "Important here, the Virginia Supreme Court in Collins also con- cluded that warrantless police entry to search a vehicle located on private property that was \"open to the pub- lic\" – such as a home's driveway – did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 619 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 S.E.2d 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Privity and Its Equitable Factual Considerations Are the Backstop That Avoid the Parade of Horribles Raised by Those Who Would Abolish Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Assignor estoppel applies to the assignor and all those in privity with the assignor at the time that the validity challenge is sought to be asserted. See MAG Aerospace Industries, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Today, the transfer of patent rights is commonplace, particularly from an employee inventor to an employer, as well as from one assignee to another. However, not every assignment results in an accused assignor being estopped from raising invalidity challenges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.3d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Privity and Its Equitable Factual Considerations Are the Backstop That Avoid the Parade of Horribles Raised by Those Who Would Abolish Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Id. at 793 (quoting American Mach. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196. As applied to assignor estoppel, \"[w]hether two parties are in privity depends on the nature of their relationship in light of the alleged infringement.\" Mentor , 150 F.3d at 1379.",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.2d 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Privity and Its Equitable Factual Considerations Are the Backstop That Avoid the Parade of Horribles Raised by Those Who Would Abolish Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Id. at 793 (quoting American Mach. 35 F.2d 526[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As applied to assignor estoppel, \"[w]hether two parties are in privity depends on the nature of their relationship in light of the alleged infringement.\" Mentor , 150 F.3d at 1379.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Presume That Statutes Apply Prospectively Only",
		"context": ". [and] congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.\" Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 265.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts Presume That Statutes Apply Prospectively Only",
		"context": "6 Because \"[e]lementary co nsiderations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly,\" this bedrock principle of American jurisprudence works to ensure that newly enacted laws will apply only prosp ectively absent a clear legislative directive for retroactive application. Id. ; see also E. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has articulated a test for determining whether a law applies retroactively: \"When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so .",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES",
		"context": "\"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement provi des \"a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions\" into the home by \"agents of the government.\" 466 U.S. 740.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES",
		"context": "407 U.S. 297. The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement provi des \"a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions\" into the home by \"agents of the government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, all warrantless intrusions of the home are unreasonable —no matter their purpose —in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Collateral estoppel bars the Cliffords from maintaining here the claims they lost in Minnesota",
		"context": "Thus, this Court \"has long recognized\" that \"'the determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit.'\" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It is well settled that a party cannot avoid preclusion simply by switching defendants. Blonder-Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. 313.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 U.S. 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Collateral estoppel bars the Cliffords from maintaining here the claims they lost in Minnesota",
		"context": "(quoting 94 U.S. 351). It is well settled that a party cannot avoid preclusion simply by switching defendants. Blonder-Tongue Labs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Preclusion applies here. The \"general rule\" of collateral estoppel \"is that '[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Collateral estoppel bars the Cliffords from maintaining here the claims they lost in Minnesota",
		"context": "B&B Hardware , 575 U.S. at 148 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)); see ibid. (the Court \"regularly turns to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for the ordinary elements of issue preclusion\"). Collateral estoppel bars relitigating both factual and legal issues (see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27; Cougar 21 Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1019), and thus serves the broader interest of judicial economy (see Parklane Hosiery [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; B&B Hardware , 575 U.S. at 147; cf. 142 S. Ct. 2095. The common sense of issue preclusion is that \"it is appropriate and fair to impose an estoppel against a party who has already litigated an issue once and lost.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "This Court 's recognition of associational standing exemplif ies this principle. As the Court has long held, a membership organization may maintain a federal action \"to redress its members ' injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself. \" Food & Commercial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 426 U.S. 26 (\"Since [the plain- tiffs] allege no injury to themselves as organizations, 16 and indeed could not in the context of this suit, they can establish standing only as representatives of those of their members who have been injured in f act, and thus could have brought suit in their own right. \"). An association may represent its members in federal liti- gation when \" (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization' s pur- pose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "This Court 's recognition of associational standing exemplif ies this principle. As the Court has long held, a membership organization may maintain a federal action \"to redress its members ' injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself. \" Food & Commercial 517 U.S. 544 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Since [the plain- tiffs] allege no injury to themselves as organizations, 16 and indeed could not in the context of this suit, they can establish standing only as representatives of those of their members who have been injured in f act, and thus could have brought suit in their own right. \"). An association may represent its members in federal liti- gation when \" (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization' s pur- pose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "\"). An association may represent its members in federal liti- gation when \" (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization' s pur- pose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. \" Food & Commercial Work- ers, 517 U.S. at 553 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When these requirements are satisfied, \" injury to an organi- zation' s members will satisfy Article III, \" and the or- ganization may \"litigate in federal court on their be- half\" without \"'eliminat[ing] or attenuat[ing] the con- stitutional requirement of a case or controversy. '\" Au- tomobile 477 U.S. 274 , the Court considered whether a death -row inmate had standing to challenge the con- stitutionality of a state 's failure to provide mandatory appellate review of the death sentence of another in-dividual who had waived his right to appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "Food & Commercial Work- ers, 517 U.S. at 553 (quoting 432 U.S. 333 . When these requirements are satisfied, \" injury to an organi- zation' s members will satisfy Article III, \" and the or- ganization may \"litigate in federal court on their be- half\" without \"'eliminat[ing] or attenuat[ing] the con- stitutional requirement of a case or controversy. '\" Au- tomobile [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court considered whether a death -row inmate had standing to challenge the con- stitutionality of a state 's failure to provide mandatory appellate review of the death sentence of another in-dividual who had waived his right to appeal. After con- cluding that the inmate failed to demonstrate the req- uisite injury in fact to himself, id. at 156 –61, the Court went on to consider whether he could maintain the ac- tion as a \"next friend \" to the other inmate, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "Crit- ically, however, the Court did not require the next friend to demonstrate a discrete Article III injury to himself ; indeed, the Court had already concluded that the putative next friend in Whitmore had failed to demon strate that he had suffered a cognizable injury. Whitmore's discussion of next -friend standing only makes sense because Article III does not preclude rep- resentative suits seeking federal redress on behalf of injured third parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is of a piece with these precedents. In Sprint , the Court confirmed that the plaintiff maintaining a fed-eral suit need not have suffered a redressable injury in fact. In that case, the plaintiff was an assignee of a legal claim for mon ies owed by long-distance carriers to the assignors, who were payphone operators.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "at 286 (quoting Vt . Agency of Nat . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court further concluded that a judgment would re- dress that injury because \" the long -distance carriers would write a check to the aggre gators for the amount of dial -around compensation owed .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "This Court's representational -standing cases con- firm that, although Article III does not impose a dis- tinct injury -in-fact requirement on representatives, it does place limits on whom a court may recognize as an appropriate representative. So too with Congress. When considering injury in fact, this C ourt has recog- nized that , although \" Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements ,\" Spokeo , Inc. , 136 S. Ct. at 1547–48 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), it may \"elevate to the status of legally cog- nizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law ,\" id. at 1549 (quoting De- fenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 578) (bracket s omit- ted). In identifying injuries , Congress's \" judgment is … instructive and important ,\" id., even though it is subject to Article III limits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "In identifying injuries , Congress's \" judgment is … instructive and important ,\" id., even though it is subject to Article III limits. Congress's judgment in designating representatives who can sue on behalf of injured parties is likewise entitled to respect . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is in- structive. In that case, the Court considered the stand- ing of proponent s of a state ballot measure prohibiting same -sex marriage to appeal a district court decision holding t he law unconstitutional. The Court con- cluded that the proponent s lacked Article III standing because the interest they asserted was not \"distin- guishable from the general interest of every citizen\" of the state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "I d. at 707 . And because the proponents lacked Article III standing, they could not , absent a valid representational relationship, \"rest a claim to re- lief on the legal rights or interests of third parties ,\" id. at 708 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), such as the state. 20 The Court accordingly considered whether the pro- ponents could serve directly as the state's representa- tives to defend the law after state officials declined to appeal the district court's decision. The Court held that the proponents could not serve in that capacity because they were not \"state officers, acting in an offi- cial capacity,\" id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "Similarly, in the governmental context, the Court acknowledged that a state has discretion to authorize state officials who would not otherwise have standing \"to speak for the State in federal court.\" Id. at 710; see also Arizonans for Official [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As th is Court recently ex- plained, although not unbounded, \"the choice belongs to\" the state , Va. House of 139 S. Ct. 1945 . This Court's cases thus show that respecting Con- gress's judgment that plan beneficiaries are appropri-ate parties to represent the plan's financial interests vis-à-vis fiduciaries will not give Congress carte blanche to clothe any stranger with a generalized grievance with authority to litigate in an Article III court .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
		"context": "Id. at 710; see also Arizonans for Official 520 U.S. 43. As th is Court recently ex- plained, although not unbounded, \"the choice belongs to\" the state , Va. House of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court's cases thus show that respecting Con- gress's judgment that plan beneficiaries are appropri-ate parties to represent the plan's financial interests vis-à-vis fiduciaries will not give Congress carte blanche to clothe any stranger with a generalized grievance with authority to litigate in an Article III court . Because, as explained below, plan participants are not strangers to the plans they seek to represent, Congress's decision to authorize them to litigate on 21 the plan's behalf does not transgress Article III's case - or-controversy requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions broadly restrict a State's authority to seek reimbursement from a beneficiary's tort recovery",
		"context": "s and other property. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act's third-party provisions are an exception to that prohi- bition—but one strictly lim ited by the provisions' terms. The most relevant provision, 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions broadly restrict a State's authority to seek reimbursement from a beneficiary's tort recovery",
		"context": "B. This Court's Decisions Interpreting the Medicaid Act Twice before, this Court has interpreted the provi- sions at issue. See Ahlborn , 547 U.S. at 275-92; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1. Ahlborn In Ahlborn , the Court considered whether the Medicaid Act permitted a stat e agency to \"recover the entirety of the costs it paid \" on a beneficiary's behalf by claiming \"more than just [the] portion of a judg-ment or settlement that represents payment for med- ical expenses.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions broadly restrict a State's authority to seek reimbursement from a beneficiary's tort recovery",
		"context": "E.M.A. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the state statute violated federal law because it did not afford the beneficiary an opportunity to rebut the 11 presumption that one-third of every tort recovery was allocable to such medical expenses. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "674 F.3d 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions broadly restrict a State's authority to seek reimbursement from a beneficiary's tort recovery",
		"context": "This textual conclusion, the dissent opined, was com-pelled by Ahlborn and consistent with the decisions of most courts, including the unanimous Florida Su-preme Court. Id. 39-50; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc over Judge Wilson's dissent. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 So. 3d 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. State procedural rules that do not depend on resolving the merits of a federal claim are independent of federal law",
		"context": ". For a state procedural rule to be \"independent,\" the basis of the state law decision must not be \"interwoven with federal law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Resolution of the state procedural law question must not \"depend[] on a federal constitutional ruling.\" Stewart , 536 U.S. at 860.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 1032",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. State procedural rules that do not depend on resolving the merits of a federal claim are independent of federal law",
		"context": "In determining whether to invoke the procedural rule at issue, state law required a court to \"evaluate whether 'at its core, [a] claim implicates a significant right that requires a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.'\" Id. at 859–60 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But that inquiry did not require state courts to decide the merits of the claim, that is, whether a federal law violation had occurred. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 P.3d 1067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. State procedural rules that do not depend on resolving the merits of a federal claim are independent of federal law",
		"context": "A state court applying the state rule \"need only identify what type of claim it is, and there is no indication that this identification is based on an interpretation of what federal law requires.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Stewart thus demonstrate s that when a state court ruling merely \"categorizes\" a federal claim without addressing its merits —as does Rule 32.1(g) —that decision is independent of federal law and federal review is unavailable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was preserved in this case",
		"context": "1252(f )(1). Because jurisdictional limitations speak to \"a court 's power ,\" a jurisdictional defect \"can never be forfeited or waived.\" Unit ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]211 U.S. 149. The fact that Section 1252(f )(1) strips courts of juris- diction to grant a particular form of relief, rather than to hear a particular type of case, does not alter that analysis. Although limits on relief ordinarily are not ju- risdictional, Congress \"is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label\" —including exemp- tion from forfeiture —to whatever requirements it chooses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was preserved in this case",
		"context": "1252(f )(1). Because jurisdictional limitations speak to \"a court 's power ,\" a jurisdictional defect \"can never be forfeited or waived.\" Unit ed 535 U.S. 625[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that Section 1252(f )(1) strips courts of juris- diction to grant a particular form of relief, rather than to hear a particular type of case, does not alter that analysis. Although limits on relief ordinarily are not ju- risdictional, Congress \"is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label\" —including exemp- tion from forfeiture —to whatever requirements it chooses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was preserved in this case",
		"context": "The fact that Section 1252(f )(1) strips courts of juris- diction to grant a particular form of relief, rather than to hear a particular type of case, does not alter that analysis. Although limits on relief ordinarily are not ju- risdictional, Congress \"is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label\" —including exemp- tion from forfeiture —to whatever requirements it chooses. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress unambiguously did so in Section 1252(f )(1), which expressly states that no court \"sha ll have juris- diction or authority\" to grant the specified relief. 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was preserved in this case",
		"context": "1252(f )(1). That limitation \"is jurisdictional because explicit statutory language makes it so.\" Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g. , Rockwell In t'l 549 U.S. 457; Gov't Reply Br. at 1-2, Aleman Gonzalez , supra (No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was preserved in this case",
		"context": "That limitation \"is jurisdictional because explicit statutory language makes it so.\" Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312; see, e.g. , Rockwell In t'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gov't Reply Br. at 1-2, Aleman Gonzalez , supra (No. 20 -322) (explaining that Section 1252(f )(1) is not subject to forfeiture and this Court has authority to de-cide the Section 1252(f )(1) question it added in Aleman Gonzalez even though the government had not raised Section 1252(f )(1) in the petition for a writ of certiorari).",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil",
		"context": "And, more fundamentally, this Court's precedents do not allow the courts to analyze the inconsistency of the law with objectors' conscience. See Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 724-725; Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hernan- 9 490 U.S. 680; 450 U.S. 707. To the contrary, this Court's precedents estab- lish that it is for the objector alone to define the tenets of its religious observance. Smith , 494 U.S. at 887 (\"Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibil- ity of a religious claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil",
		"context": "And, more fundamentally, this Court's precedents do not allow the courts to analyze the inconsistency of the law with objectors' conscience. See Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 724-725; Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of 494 U.S. 872; Hernan- 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 450 U.S. 707. To the contrary, this Court's precedents estab- lish that it is for the objector alone to define the tenets of its religious observance. Smith , 494 U.S. at 887 (\"Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibil- ity of a religious claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil",
		"context": "And, more fundamentally, this Court's precedents do not allow the courts to analyze the inconsistency of the law with objectors' conscience. See Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 724-725; Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of 494 U.S. 872; Hernan- 9 490 U.S. 680; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the contrary, this Court's precedents estab- lish that it is for the objector alone to define the tenets of its religious observance. Smith , 494 U.S. at 887 (\"Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibil- ity of a religious claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Forest Service Has Jurisdiction Over, And The Power Under The MLA To Grant Rights-Of-Way To Cross, Forest System Lands Through Which A National Trail Passes",
		"context": "C. Proceedings Below Throughout its efforts to secure the necessary approvals to build the pipeline, Atlantic has faced opposition and litigation by environment groups at every turn. See, e.g. , Sierr a [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Forest Service approval proved no exception. Almost as soon as the Forest Service granted Atlantic the rights -of- way, a contingent of environmental groups (\"respondents\") petitioned the Fourth Circuit to vacate the agency's decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Forest Service Has Jurisdiction Over, And The Power Under The MLA To Grant Rights-Of-Way To Cross, Forest System Lands Through Which A National Trail Passes",
		"context": "Most recently, the court vacated the Fish and Wildlife Service's second -round Bio logical Opinion and Incidental Take Statement for the 17 project, remanding yet again for further agency proceedings. See Defs. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT More than a century ago, Congress declared that lands like th ose comprising the George Washington National Forest \"shall be permanently reserved, held, and administered as national forest lands.\" 16 U.S.C. §521.",
		"citation_value_orig": "931 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Forest Service Has Jurisdiction Over, And The Power Under The MLA To Grant Rights-Of-Way To Cross, Forest System Lands Through Which A National Trail Passes",
		"context": "The Trails Act expressly confirms as much with respect to federal lands: \"Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered lands which are compo nents of the National Trails System.\" 1 The pending Mountain Valley Pipeline project has suffered a similar fate. See Sierra Club, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , reh'g granted739 F. App'x 185; Sierra 909 F.3d 635 . 18 Id. §1246(a) (1)(A).",
		"citation_value_orig": "897 F.3d 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle",
		"context": "Citing the Ninth Circuit's mandate rule, the Solicitor General argues that the petitioners in Publishers Business Services \"forfeited their current argument that the district court lacked authority to grant the FTC monetary relief \" by failing to assert it in a prior appeal. 10 Solicitor General does not identify any \"logically antece- dent questions that could prevent [the Court] from reach- ing the question of the correct interpretation\" of § 13(b) in this case. Unite Here Local [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There are none. To the contrary, this case is an ideal vehicle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": ". is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 386 U.S. 1. As one circuit court summarized, \"if any concept is fundamental to our American system of 7 justice, it is that those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit.\" 372 F.3d 39.",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": ". is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice.\" 294 U.S. 103; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As one circuit court summarized, \"if any concept is fundamental to our American system of 7 justice, it is that those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit.\" 372 F.3d 39.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "294 U.S. 103; see also 386 U.S. 1. As one circuit court summarized, \"if any concept is fundamental to our American system of 7 justice, it is that those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unsurprisingly, all eleven circuits to consider the issue have found that an individual who was convicted based on deliberately fabricated evidence has a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 F.3d 39",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "Unsurprisingly, all eleven circuits to consider the issue have found that an individual who was convicted based on deliberately fabricated evidence has a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 750 F.3d 273; 407 F.3d 274; 352 F.3d 939; 174 F.3d 1271. As this Court has explained, \"[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.\" 445 U.S. 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "682 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "Unsurprisingly, all eleven circuits to consider the issue have found that an individual who was convicted based on deliberately fabricated evidence has a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g. , 682 F.3d 567; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 407 F.3d 274; 352 F.3d 939; 174 F.3d 1271. As this Court has explained, \"[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.\" 445 U.S. 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "Unsurprisingly, all eleven circuits to consider the issue have found that an individual who was convicted based on deliberately fabricated evidence has a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g. , 682 F.3d 567; 750 F.3d 273; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 352 F.3d 939; 174 F.3d 1271. As this Court has explained, \"[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.\" 445 U.S. 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 F.3d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "Unsurprisingly, all eleven circuits to consider the issue have found that an individual who was convicted based on deliberately fabricated evidence has a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g. , 682 F.3d 567; 750 F.3d 273; 407 F.3d 274; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 174 F.3d 1271. As this Court has explained, \"[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.\" 445 U.S. 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 F.3d 939",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "Unsurprisingly, all eleven circuits to consider the issue have found that an individual who was convicted based on deliberately fabricated evidence has a cognizable cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g. , 682 F.3d 567; 750 F.3d 273; 407 F.3d 274; 352 F.3d 939; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has explained, \"[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.\" 445 U.S. 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "174 F.3d 1271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": ", 682 F.3d 567; 750 F.3d 273; 407 F.3d 274; 352 F.3d 939; 174 F.3d 1271. As this Court has explained, \"[a] damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a remedy acts both \"to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.\" 504 U.S. 158.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION",
		"context": "445 U.S. 622. Such a remedy acts both \"to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An established body of academic work, some of it based on empirical studies, confirms that § 1983 suits are an effective means of deterring official misconduct. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The simultaneity test cannot be applied consistently",
		"context": "As a co nsequence, even the courts that otherwise embrace the simultaneity test abandon it in a significant percentage of cases. The Eighth Circuit, for instance, normally applies the simultaneity test to determi ne whether offenses were committed on different \"occasions.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the court has decided that the test is an \"a wkward fit for analysis in the conspiracy context,\" given that conspiracies may last for months or even years. 751 F.3d 586.",
		"citation_value_orig": "759 F.3d 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The simultaneity test cannot be applied consistently",
		"context": "See 759 F.3d 909. But the court has decided that the test is an \"a wkward fit for analysis in the conspiracy context,\" given that conspiracies may last for months or even years. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, when a defendant's prior of- fenses include \"an underlying conspiracy conviction that overlaps with a separate conviction for conduct that oc-curred as a punctuated event within that conspiracy,\" the court instead asks a different question: whether the non- conspiracy offense \"formed a separate unit within the There were four individuals in this . … [O]ne possibility is that Mr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "751 F.3d 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The simultaneity test cannot be applied consistently",
		"context": "at 590. Like the Eighth Circuit, ot her courts of appeals that normally apply the simultanei ty test switch to something like a \"separate unit\" standard when a conspiracy or other long-duration crime is involved. See 961 F.3d 618[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The result in each of these cases was adopted at the Government's urging. Of course, the meaning of the \"occasions\" clause cannot depend on whether a conspiracy or other long-duration of- fense is involved in a particular case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "872 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The simultaneity test cannot be applied consistently",
		"context": "The result in each of these cases was adopted at the Government's urging. Of course, the meaning of the \"occasions\" clause cannot depend on whether a conspiracy or other long-duration of- fense is involved in a particular case. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That courts are un- able to resolve cases consistently under the simultaneity test is more than just a failin g of administrability; it shows that the test is built on sand . The better, fairer, and more textually coherent approach is to give the \"occasions\" clause its plain meaning—in every case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. STATUTES AFFECTING THE DONATIVE COMPONENT OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE",
		"context": "The insurance company interpleads or pays the proceeds into court for distribution to the successful claimant. The divorce statute affects only the donative transfer, the component of the policy that raises no Contracts Clause issue. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 The Joint Editorial Board's analysis is correct. Statutes affecting the donative component of an insurance policy raise no Contracts Clause issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 F.3d 1311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Second Question Presented Is Meritless",
		"context": "24-31. To the extent it could, it would only highlight that this Court's review is unwarranted: if the Government \"routine[ly]\" treats the appellate process as a mere alternative to its own administrative process, then it cannot maintain that it requires this Court's discretionary intervention. Second, citing Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Government cont ends that the October Memoranda \"deal[t] the problem afresh\" instead of merely providing additional reasons as \" post hoc rationalizations\" for an already-completed decision. Pet. 25-26.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Second Question Presented Is Meritless",
		"context": "Against this evidence, the Government cites only its self-serving recital in the October Memoranda themselves that it considered the issues anew, claiming that this recital is entitled to the \"'presumption of regularity' owed to agency action.\" Pet. 31 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the Fifth Circuit effectively found that any such presumption—if it applied at all—was demons trably overcome. This Court, likewise, is \"not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary ci tizens are free.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Second Question Presented Is Meritless",
		"context": "But the Fifth Circuit effectively found that any such presumption—if it applied at all—was demons trably overcome. This Court, likewise, is \"not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary ci tizens are free.\" Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case presents even more compelling reasons than in Regents to conclude that the agency's later memoranda \"can be viewed only as impermissible post hoc rationalizations.\" 140 S. Ct. 1909.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Second Question Presented Is Meritless",
		"context": "Pet. 29-30 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the reopening doctrine presents a very close analogue to the question whether the October Memoranda actually reconsidered the termination decision, see NARPO , 158 F.3d at 141, and the Government offers no better analogue. For the reasons explained by the Fifth Circuit, App.28a-30a, the reopening doctrine's factors provide helpful guidance for determining whether \"the agency actually reconsidered the rule.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 F.3d 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Second Question Presented Is Meritless",
		"context": "20 In the alternative, the Government argues that \"where … an agency 'explicitly' reconsiders a prior decision,\" it has reopened the prior action. Pet. 30 (citing Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But here, the agency \"explicitly,\" id., stated that it was not reconsidering the termination decision in its September 29 announcement, which the Fifth Circuit noted was \"the closest thing this case has to an NPRM.\" App.28a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "901 F.2d 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Whether Every Member Of A Class Has To Show Article III Standing At The Rule 23 Stage Of The Case Is Not Before The Court",
		"context": "at 28 (class plaintiffs \"must demonstrate that each and every member suffered some common injury\") (emphasis 7 Not only is such a suggestion a flagrant misstating of the law of this Court and the courts of appeals, but that issue also is not properly before the Court. It was not properly raised by Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or its opening brief; there is no circ uit split that warrants this Court's consideration; and it has not been the subject of briefing and thus the Court \"lack[s] the benefit of the adversarial process in a complex area.\" Apple [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, amicus urges the Court not to reach this issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": ". This Court's historical practice supports application of de novo review. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558; Cooper Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although this Court has never expressly held what standard of review applies, it has always effectively reviewed the substantive intervention of right standards, including adequacy of representation, de novo without any indication of deference to the distr ict court or, if reaching the issue in the first instance, that the Court itself was exercising discretion. Additionally, this Court has often distinguished review of intervention of right from review of permissive intervention by emphasizing that the latt er is reviewed for abuse of discretion, implying that the same is not true for the former.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 424",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "Additionally, this Court has often distinguished review of intervention of right from review of permissive intervention by emphasizing that the latt er is reviewed for abuse of discretion, implying that the same is not true for the former. This practice is particularly apparent in cases reversing denials of intervention of right, none of which evince any degree of deference to the district court. See Trbovich , 404 U.S. at 538; Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135–36; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bhd. of R.R. 331 U.S. 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "See Trbovich , 404 U.S. at 538; Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135–36; 343 U.S. 156; Bhd. of R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, even the dissent in Cascade, which would have affirmed the denial of intervention, implicitly adhered to this practice by addressing the 40 intervention of right question at length and apparently de novo and, forced to address permis sive intervention, in a brief footnote said that the district court did not \"abuse its discretion.\" 386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The practice is also present in cases affirming denials of intervention , see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sam Fox Pub l'g 366 U.S. 683; Sutphen 342 U.S. 19; 334 U.S. 131; Allen Calculators, 322 U.S. 137 , and in cas es affirming permissive intervention , see 310 U.S. 434. 2 Finally, this Court's past statements about when rulings on intervention motions are appealable support the same distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The practice is also present in cases affirming denials of intervention , see, e.g. , 400 U.S. 517; Sam Fox Pub l'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sutphen 342 U.S. 19; 334 U.S. 131; Allen Calculators, 322 U.S. 137 , and in cas es affirming permissive intervention , see 310 U.S. 434. 2 Finally, this Court's past statements about when rulings on intervention motions are appealable support the same distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The practice is also present in cases affirming denials of intervention , see, e.g. , 400 U.S. 517; Sam Fox Pub l'g 366 U.S. 683; Sutphen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 334 U.S. 131; Allen Calculators, 322 U.S. 137 , and in cas es affirming permissive intervention , see 310 U.S. 434. 2 Finally, this Court's past statements about when rulings on intervention motions are appealable support the same distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The practice is also present in cases affirming denials of intervention , see, e.g. , 400 U.S. 517; Sam Fox Pub l'g 366 U.S. 683; Sutphen 342 U.S. 19; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Allen Calculators, 322 U.S. 137 , and in cas es affirming permissive intervention , see 310 U.S. 434. 2 Finally, this Court's past statements about when rulings on intervention motions are appealable support the same distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The practice is also present in cases affirming denials of intervention , see, e.g. , 400 U.S. 517; Sam Fox Pub l'g 366 U.S. 683; Sutphen 342 U.S. 19; 334 U.S. 131; Allen Calculators, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and in cas es affirming permissive intervention , see 310 U.S. 434. 2 Finally, this Court's past statements about when rulings on intervention motions are appealable support the same distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "386 U.S. at 159 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The practice is also present in cases affirming denials of intervention , see, e.g. , 400 U.S. 517; Sam Fox Pub l'g 366 U.S. 683; Sutphen 342 U.S. 19; 334 U.S. 131; Allen Calculators, 322 U.S. 137 , and in cas es affirming permissive intervention , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 Finally, this Court's past statements about when rulings on intervention motions are appealable support the same distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review",
		"context": "of R.R. Trainmen , 331 U.S. at 534 –35. 2 This Court's statement that it was affirming the grant of intervention in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because the district court did not \"abuse its discretion\" is consistent with this practice. In Georgia , the \"district court did not explain whether it granted intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2),\" and the intervenors defended the district court's decision under the standards of both. See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "Namely, the Court should reaf- firm the validity of existing physician-only precedent and clarify the scope of WWH as to other abortion re- strictions. Prior to WWH , States relied on at least two settled constitutional baselines in abortion jurisprudence, de- riving from the Court's recognition of state police power in its precedent: (1) the basic notion that States could require that abortion providers be licensed; and (2) the power to restrict the performance of abor- tions to physicians only. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]505 U.S. 833. As the Seventh Circuit has recently noted: The Court's recognition of the state's power to license abortion care providers stretches back 7 to Roe v. Wade 's companion case, 410 U.S. 179. The appellant in Bolton did not challenge the state's requirement that abor-tions be provided only by licensed physicians.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "Namely, the Court should reaf- firm the validity of existing physician-only precedent and clarify the scope of WWH as to other abortion re- strictions. Prior to WWH , States relied on at least two settled constitutional baselines in abortion jurisprudence, de- riving from the Court's recognition of state police power in its precedent: (1) the basic notion that States could require that abortion providers be licensed; and (2) the power to restrict the performance of abor- tions to physicians only. See 520 U.S. 968[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Seventh Circuit has recently noted: The Court's recognition of the state's power to license abortion care providers stretches back 7 to Roe v. Wade 's companion case, 410 U.S. 179. The appellant in Bolton did not challenge the state's requirement that abor-tions be provided only by licensed physicians.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "Prior to WWH , States relied on at least two settled constitutional baselines in abortion jurisprudence, de- riving from the Court's recognition of state police power in its precedent: (1) the basic notion that States could require that abortion providers be licensed; and (2) the power to restrict the performance of abor- tions to physicians only. See 520 U.S. 968505 U.S. 833. As the Seventh Circuit has recently noted: The Court's recognition of the state's power to license abortion care providers stretches back 7 to Roe v. Wade 's companion case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The appellant in Bolton did not challenge the state's requirement that abor-tions be provided only by licensed physicians. The Court confirmed the legitimacy of that type of restriction in later cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The appellant in Bolton did not challenge the state's requirement that abor-tions be provided only by licensed physicians. The Court confirmed the legitimacy of that type of restriction in later cases. In Simopou- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it h eld that a state could require second-trimester abortions to be per-formed in licensed clinics, because it was \"not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 'protecting the woman's own health and safety.' \" Id. at 519, 103 S.Ct. 2532 (quoting 410 U.S. 113).",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "In Simopou- 462 U.S. 506, it h eld that a state could require second-trimester abortions to be per-formed in licensed clinics, because it was \"not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 'protecting the woman's own health and safety.' \" Id. at 519, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting 410 U.S. 113). Casey expanded on this point. 505 U.S. at 885, 112 S.Ct. 2791.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 S.Ct. 2532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "In Simopou- 462 U.S. 506, it h eld that a state could require second-trimester abortions to be per-formed in licensed clinics, because it was \"not an unreasonable means of furthering the State's compelling interest in 'protecting the woman's own health and safety.' \" Id. at 519, 103 S.Ct. 2532 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Casey expanded on this point. 505 U.S. at 885, 112 S.Ct. 2791.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "at 519, 103 S.Ct. 2532 (quoting 410 U.S. 113). Casey expanded on this point. 505 U.S. at 885, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There the Court said that \"[o]ur cases reflect the fact that the Constitu- tion gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an ob-jective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 S.Ct. 2791",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "Id. By the mid-1990s, the proposition that a state may require only licensed physicians to per- form an abortion was so well established that a lower court's contrary conclusion merited summary reversal. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whole Woman's Health 937 F.3d 864. And specifica lly with resp ect to state physician-only laws, state and federal courts fully 8 apprehended that the Court's holding in Mazurek stood for the proposition t hat States could limit the performance of abortions to physicians without resort to factual inquiry.6 After the Court's WWH decision, from 2017 to 2019, abortion providers around the country systemat-ically filed lawsuits to begin eliminating state abortion regulations in place for years; those which States un- derstood had long been upheld as constitutionally per-missible by this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "Whole Woman's Health 937 F.3d 864. And specifica lly with resp ect to state physician-only laws, state and federal courts fully 8 apprehended that the Court's holding in Mazurek stood for the proposition t hat States could limit the performance of abortions to physicians without resort to factual inquiry.6 After the Court's WWH decision, from 2017 to 2019, abortion providers around the country systemat-ically filed lawsuits to begin eliminating state abortion regulations in place for years; those which States un- derstood had long been upheld as constitutionally per-missible by this Court. 7 And lower courts interpreting WWH in these cases perceive a tension between WWH and prior binding U.S. Supreme Court abortion prece-dent, precluding them from summarily disposing of claims attacking baseline laws that have long been 6 See Planned Parenthood Ariz., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical He alth 734 F.3d 406. 7 See footnote 3 above.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 P.3d 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "And specifica lly with resp ect to state physician-only laws, state and federal courts fully 8 apprehended that the Court's holding in Mazurek stood for the proposition t hat States could limit the performance of abortions to physicians without resort to factual inquiry.6 After the Court's WWH decision, from 2017 to 2019, abortion providers around the country systemat-ically filed lawsuits to begin eliminating state abortion regulations in place for years; those which States un- derstood had long been upheld as constitutionally per-missible by this Court. 7 And lower courts interpreting WWH in these cases perceive a tension between WWH and prior binding U.S. Supreme Court abortion prece-dent, precluding them from summarily disposing of claims attacking baseline laws that have long been 6 See Planned Parenthood Ariz., 257 P.3d 181; Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical He alth [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 See footnote 3 above. 9 settled.8 As a result, States are left mystified as to the impact of this Court's prior precedent after WWH .",
		"citation_value_orig": "734 F.3d 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "10 abortion to make the procedure more conveniently available for women.11 In response, Idaho argued that plaintiffs' attacks on its physician-only laws are precluded by this Court's decision in Mazurek , 520 U.S. at 974-75 (citation omit- ted), which relied on a line of U.S. Supreme Court prec- edent and held: \"to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physi- cians perform abortions. \"12 The Mazurek plaintiffs, like plaintiffs in pending cases across the country, argued Montana's physician-only law was an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion and a violation of the equal protection clause. 13 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Mazurek plaintiffs were licensed physicians performing abor-tion services in Montana, and one physician assistant- certified, Susan Cahill. 906 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "906 F. Supp. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The Mazurek plaintiffs argued, just like plaintiffs across the country do now, that all \"available evidence shows that properly trained physician assistants are capable of performing first-trimester abortions with complication rates equal to or lower than correspond- ing rates for physicians.\" 906 F. Supp. at 566; Resp'ts' Br., Mazurek , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 96-1104), 1997 WL 33484620. They also argued, just like plaintiffs 11 See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "39 at 15-16. 13 See footnote 9 above. 11 across the country do now, that certain APCs per- formed many procedures equally or more complex than medication and aspiration abortions and with compa- rable or even greater risk.14 Resp'ts' Br., Mazurek , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 96-1104), 1997 WL 33484620. And, finally, the Mazurek plaintiffs, just like the plaintiffs across the country do now, ar gued the effect of the phy- sician-only restriction was to reduce the ability of women to obtain an abortion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "at 567. Plaintiffs appealed the preliminary injunction de- nial to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit \"concluded\" without ruling \"upon the propriety of a preliminary in-junction . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 F.3d 566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Montana argued that: (1) it was \"settled\" law that States could limit the performance of abortions to physicians; (2) \"[o]nly early intervention by this Court will impress upon panels like that below the obligation to adhere to bind- ing precedent\"[;] and (3) the Ninth Circuit erred in di- recting the district court to engage in a factual inquiry into whether the \"physicians only\" provision served a legitimate health function. (Pet. For Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, 16-20, Mazurek , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 96-1104)). The Mazurek plaintiffs primarily opposed the petition on the grounds that the Court should not grant certio- rari on an appeal of an (incomplete) ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction, but they also argued the precedent was not settled and that the medical justifi- cations for the law had changed since it was enacted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "96-1104)). The Mazurek plaintiffs primarily opposed the petition on the grounds that the Court should not grant certio- rari on an appeal of an (incomplete) ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction, but they also argued the precedent was not settled and that the medical justifi- cations for the law had changed since it was enacted. Resp'ts' Br., Mazurek , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 96-1104), 1997 WL 33484620. This Court agreed with Montana and took the un- usual step of granting certiorari to correct the Ninth Circuit's \"clearly erroneous\" decision \"under [its] prec-edent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "The Court's deci-sion was intended, and acted, as a shield against the threat of legal action for those six States: a result that would have been left in doubt had the Court been en-gaging in a fact-specific pu rpose or effect analysis. The Court's precedent in Mazurek is now in doubt, even though this Court gave no indication that WWH was meant to overrule Mazurek . See WWH ; and see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lower courts are not dismissing claims attacking physician-only laws out of hand, in line with this Court's precedent. Instead, States are be-ing forced to litigate whether the benefits of their once settled physician-only laws justify the alleged burdens of the law under an enhanced standard of review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "1 (2018 WL 3121180) ¶¶ 133-148. 17 informed consent,20 24-hour waiting periods,21 record- keeping requirements for abortion providers,22 and various licensing and qualification provisions.23 These laws were upheld by this Court because they were \"not efforts to sway or direct a woman's choice, but rather are efforts to enhance the d eliberative quality of [a woman's decision] or are neutral regulations on the health aspects of her decision.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 916- 17; see also Planned Parenthood of Central [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., 462 U.S. 476; Roe, 410 U.S. at 150; Simopoulos , 462 U.S. 506. 20 Informed consent requirements are being challenged in the Indiana physician-only lawsuit, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67, 122-140; Loui-siana physician-only lawsuit, Dkt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "1 (2018 WL 3121180) ¶¶ 133-148. 17 informed consent,20 24-hour waiting periods,21 record- keeping requirements for abortion providers,22 and various licensing and qualification provisions.23 These laws were upheld by this Court because they were \"not efforts to sway or direct a woman's choice, but rather are efforts to enhance the d eliberative quality of [a woman's decision] or are neutral regulations on the health aspects of her decision.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 916- 17; see also Planned Parenthood of Central 428 U.S. 52; see Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Roe, 410 U.S. at 150; Simopoulos , 462 U.S. 506. 20 Informed consent requirements are being challenged in the Indiana physician-only lawsuit, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67, 122-140; Loui-siana physician-only lawsuit, Dkt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
		"context": "1 (2018 WL 3121180) ¶¶ 133-148. 17 informed consent,20 24-hour waiting periods,21 record- keeping requirements for abortion providers,22 and various licensing and qualification provisions.23 These laws were upheld by this Court because they were \"not efforts to sway or direct a woman's choice, but rather are efforts to enhance the d eliberative quality of [a woman's decision] or are neutral regulations on the health aspects of her decision.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 916- 17; see also Planned Parenthood of Central 428 U.S. 52; see Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., 462 U.S. 476; Roe, 410 U.S. at 150; Simopoulos , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 Informed consent requirements are being challenged in the Indiana physician-only lawsuit, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67, 122-140; Loui-siana physician-only lawsuit, Dkt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Even if it affirms, the Court should retain Pennsylvania Fire for insurance cases",
		"context": "German All. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even the Lochner -era Court was not concerned this would \"subjec[t] to regulation every act of human endeavor and the price of every ar- ticle of human use.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "233 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' remaining arguments lack merit",
		"context": "40) that enforcing the enablement requirement will compel inventors to engage in \"rote identification of permutations within an invention\" merely to ensure that a competitor cannot avoid the force of the patent by mak ing an in significant 32 change to a claimed product . But t he \"doctrine of equiv- alents\" already prevents such efforts to evade the pa- tent laws through insignificant variations on a patented invention. Festo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under that well- established doctrine, \"[t]he scope of a patent is not lim- ited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equiva- lents to the claims described.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' remaining arguments lack merit",
		"context": "A patent holder therefore may enforce her patent against a com- petitor who has made \"unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions\" in order to bring her own conduct outside the patent 's literal coverage . Graver Tank & Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners have not alleged th at, under the doctrine of equivalents, respondent s' use of their own patented antibod y infringed petitioners' original, more limited patents on antibody 21B12 or the other exemplars peti- tioners created . That may be because respondents ' an- tibody would be found meaningfully distinct from the ones petitioner s have produced .",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioners' \"Conflicts\" Are Imaginary",
		"context": "Muskrat , 219 U.S. at 361- 62. Indeed, even in the area of abortion reg- ulation, every court of appeals that has been asked to do so has recognized this jurisdictional limit. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nova Health 416 F.3d 1149; Hope 249 F.3d 603 other court of appeals decisions allow- ing lawsuits against clerks based on their ministerial du- ties, (B) this Court's decisions regarding section 1983 suits against state judges, and (C) Ex parte Young 's al- lowance of a constitutional challenge in a lawsuit against 19 Minnesota's attorney general. But there is no conflict: these cases come out differently because they involved a different legal question or because state law gave the de- fending official enforcement authority absent here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioners' \"Conflicts\" Are Imaginary",
		"context": "Muskrat , 219 U.S. at 361- 62. Indeed, even in the area of abortion reg- ulation, every court of appeals that has been asked to do so has recognized this jurisdictional limit. See 729 F.3d 427; Nova Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hope 249 F.3d 603 other court of appeals decisions allow- ing lawsuits against clerks based on their ministerial du- ties, (B) this Court's decisions regarding section 1983 suits against state judges, and (C) Ex parte Young 's al- lowance of a constitutional challenge in a lawsuit against 19 Minnesota's attorney general. But there is no conflict: these cases come out differently because they involved a different legal question or because state law gave the de- fending official enforcement authority absent here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 F.3d 1149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioners' \"Conflicts\" Are Imaginary",
		"context": "Muskrat , 219 U.S. at 361- 62. Indeed, even in the area of abortion reg- ulation, every court of appeals that has been asked to do so has recognized this jurisdictional limit. See 729 F.3d 427; Nova Health 416 F.3d 1149; Hope [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] other court of appeals decisions allow- ing lawsuits against clerks based on their ministerial du- ties, (B) this Court's decisions regarding section 1983 suits against state judges, and (C) Ex parte Young 's al- lowance of a constitutional challenge in a lawsuit against 19 Minnesota's attorney general. But there is no conflict: these cases come out differently because they involved a different legal question or because state law gave the de- fending official enforcement authority absent here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court's decisions in the trust context focus on the contacts of the person over whom the State asserts jurisdiction",
		"context": "21–22, the Court in Greenough distinguished Safe Deposit on exactly that basis. Greenough , 331 U.S. at 496 (noting that Safe Deposit \"held i nvalid a state's tax on a trust' s intangibles\" because the property was \"actually in the hands of the nonresident trustee and not subject to the control\" of the resident beneficiary). Second, the State contends that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rejected the \"separateness theory\" under which the contacts of people in the trust relationship are evaluated individually . Stone did not involve jurisdiction and did not change this Court's understanding of trust law. That case addressed a trust that gave the beneficiary an absolute right to the income \"at such times and in such amounts as she should deem best.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress incorporated the deliberative process privilege into FOIA to protect effective governmental decision-making",
		"context": "Sears , 421 U.S. at 150 (citations omitted). For the de- liberative process privilege to succeed at promoting candor in individual agency employees, the privilege must have clear rules. See National Security [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, this Court has described FOIA Exemp- tion 5 in straightforward terms: FOIA \"distinguish[es] between predecisional memoranda prepared in order to assist an agency decision -maker in arriving at his deci- sion, which are exempt from disclosure, and postdeci-sional memoranda setting forth the reasons for an agency decision already made , which are not.\" Renego- tiation 421 U.S. 168 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress incorporated the deliberative process privilege into FOIA to protect effective governmental decision-making",
		"context": "See National Security 752 F.3d 460. Accordingly, this Court has described FOIA Exemp- tion 5 in straightforward terms: FOIA \"distinguish[es] between predecisional memoranda prepared in order to assist an agency decision -maker in arriving at his deci- sion, which are exempt from disclosure, and postdeci-sional memoranda setting forth the reasons for an agency decision already made , which are not.\" Renego- tiation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . B. The draft documents at issue in this case fall well within the bounds of the deliberative process privilege.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress incorporated the deliberative process privilege into FOIA to protect effective governmental decision-making",
		"context": "The draft documents at issue in this case fall well within the bounds of the deliberative process privilege. 1. The ESA Section 7 regulations and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , establish t hat the Services made their decision in the consultation process only when they signed and issued their Final Biological Opinion in May 2014. Before the Services' made their decision, in December 2013, they prepared provisional draft s of biological opinio ns and related materials under cons ideration to accompany th ose draft opinions if they were finally issued. Those drafts were created for pur-poses of discussion, and they provided a \"valuable de- 19 liberative tool\" in the ESA Section 7 process that im- proved t he Services' ability to protect species.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress incorporated the deliberative process privilege into FOIA to protect effective governmental decision-making",
		"context": "The Services' December 2013 provisional draft s— containing preliminary analysis by agency staff and prepared as recommendations to supervisors with d eci- sionmaking authority, J.A. 67 —are \"classic example[s] of a deliberative document.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those documents are privileged because, until the Final Biological Opinion was issued , the Services' decisionmakers were free to \"change their minds.\" Grumman Aircraft , 421 U.S. at 189 -190.",
		"citation_value_orig": "808 F.3d 895",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Under Oncale and Title VII, Courts Must Consider Whether Recognizing the Derivative Claim Would Be Inconsistent With Title VII Goals; If So, the Claim Should Be Denied or the McDonald Douglas Burdens Test Should Apply",
		"context": "The mixed-motive test was intended to remove roadblocks to the claims about which Congress was principally concerned , not add more. Congress likely did not imagine a situation in which males would have a claim for discrimination because of sex that would enable them to take advantage of the mixed-motive test and offset a 35 womans claim of discrimination because of sex. While Congress did limit recovery in mixed-motive cases, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23245, it was considering motives other than sexually harassing another coworker or a customer. 42 U.S.C. §2000-e5(g)(2)(B).",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.3d 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "2. Indeed, it is a failure to comply with the fundamental judicial duty \" not on- ly to give judgment but to expound law. \" Philip Ham- burger, Law and Judicial Duty 614 (2008); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Judges are bound by their \"oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and [they] must therefore show restraint when that document restrains [them] and be active when it commands action. [They] must, in other words, say 'what the law is. '\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "837 F.3d 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "As Alex- ander Hamilton explained, u nder the federal Consti- tution, \"the nationa l and State [court] systems are to be regarded as one whole. \" The Federalist No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And state courts are thus \"not to decide merely according to the laws or consti- tution of the state, but according to the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. \" Martin , 5 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "93 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "at 342. This is hardly a rare occurrence: state courts fre- quently handle claims involving federal constitution- al law, especially in the criminal context. This in- cludes, for instance, applications of the Fourth Amendment, such as determining whether searches or seizures were reasonable, see, e.g., 136 S. Ct. 2056; the Sixth Amendment, such as matters considering the rights to counsel, speedy trial, and confrontation, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; the Eighth Amendment, such as issues turning on whether there was excessive bail or a cruel and unusual punish- ment, see, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 1039. In these and many other areas, c riminal defendants depend up on state judges to give seri ous attention to the constitutional argu- ments raised by counsel, regardless of whether this Court has spoken to that particular issue, and re- gardless of whether it is an easy or difficult question. Criminal defendants, moreover, do not get to decide whethe r they are prosecuted in state or federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 855",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "at 342. This is hardly a rare occurrence: state courts fre- quently handle claims involving federal constitution- al law, especially in the criminal context. This in- cludes, for instance, applications of the Fourth Amendment, such as determining whether searches or seizures were reasonable, see, e.g., 136 S. Ct. 2056; the Sixth Amendment, such as matters considering the rights to counsel, speedy trial, and confrontation, see, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 855; the Eighth Amendment, such as issues turning on whether there was excessive bail or a cruel and unusual punish- ment, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In these and many other areas, c riminal defendants depend up on state judges to give seri ous attention to the constitutional argu- ments raised by counsel, regardless of whether this Court has spoken to that particular issue, and re- gardless of whether it is an easy or difficult question. Criminal defendants, moreover, do not get to decide whethe r they are prosecuted in state or federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1039",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "§ 2254(d). This deference assumes that the \"considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary \" deserve \"great weight \" from the federal courts . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, \" federal courts are not to run roughshod over the considered findings and judgments of the state courts that con- ducted the original trial and heard the initial ap- peals. \" 529 U.S. 362.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "474 U.S. 104. Thus, \" federal courts are not to run roughshod over the considered findings and judgments of the state courts that con- ducted the original trial and heard the initial ap- peals. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They must instead \" attend closely to those considered decisions, and give them full effect when their find- ings and judgments are consistent with federal law. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "In other words, federal courts assume that state courts are engaging in the same endeavor as they are in interpret ing and applying the Constitution. As this reasoning indicates, when state courts refuse to fully consider constitutional claims raised in good faith, it is criminal defendants who suffer. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case illustrates th ese concern s. The Indiana Supreme Court gave no attention to the underlying constitutional issue, concluding instead that the wis- er course of action was simply to \" declin e to find or assume incorporation until the Sup reme Court de- cides the issue.\" Op inion — On Petiti on to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals at 5, State v. Ty- son Timbs, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Eighth Amend- ment 's prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause\" as somehow indicating that this guarantee did not apply to the 8 states. Id. at 4-5 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 745 n.13 ( 2010) ). And second, it \"elect[ed] not to impose federal obligations on the State, \" to avoid adopting \"a federal test that may op- erate to impede development of [Indiana 's] own e x- cessive -fines jurisprudence.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "at 6. But nothing in this Court's jurispruden ce suggests that McDonald can be fairly read as indicating that this Court has concluded that the E xcessive Fines Clause is inapplicable to the states —quite the oppo- site is the case. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it is odd to say that a state court's refusal to ex- ercise its independent role as an expositor of the fed- eral Constitution somehow serves the interests of federalism. Unfortunately, Indiana is not alone in this ap- proach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Unfortunately, Indiana is not alone in this ap- proach. Other state courts examining the E xcessive Fines Clause have done much the same, assuming either the guarantee has or has not been incorporated without extended disc ussion. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]766 So. 2d 837642 N.E.2d 460819 F.3d 221 , cert. denied137 S. Ct. 305 (same); Discount Inn, 803 F.3d 317. The time is therefore ripe for this matter to be con- sidered, and for this Court to give guidance not only on the substance of the Constitution, but also on low- er courts' obligations to interpret and apply it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "160 A.3d 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Unfortunately, Indiana is not alone in this ap- proach. Other state courts examining the E xcessive Fines Clause have done much the same, assuming either the guarantee has or has not been incorporated without extended disc ussion. See, e.g., 160 A.3d 153[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]642 N.E.2d 460819 F.3d 221 , cert. denied137 S. Ct. 305 (same); Discount Inn, 803 F.3d 317. The time is therefore ripe for this matter to be con- sidered, and for this Court to give guidance not only on the substance of the Constitution, but also on low- er courts' obligations to interpret and apply it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 So. 2d 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Unfortunately, Indiana is not alone in this ap- proach. Other state courts examining the E xcessive Fines Clause have done much the same, assuming either the guarantee has or has not been incorporated without extended disc ussion. See, e.g., 160 A.3d 153766 So. 2d 837642 N.E.2d 460[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied137 S. Ct. 305 (same); Discount Inn, 803 F.3d 317. The time is therefore ripe for this matter to be con- sidered, and for this Court to give guidance not only on the substance of the Constitution, but also on low- er courts' obligations to interpret and apply it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Other state courts examining the E xcessive Fines Clause have done much the same, assuming either the guarantee has or has not been incorporated without extended disc ussion. See, e.g., 160 A.3d 153766 So. 2d 837642 N.E.2d 460819 F.3d 221 , cert. denied137 S. Ct. 305 (same); Discount Inn, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The time is therefore ripe for this matter to be con- sidered, and for this Court to give guidance not only on the substance of the Constitution, but also on low- er courts' obligations to interpret and apply it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "803 F.3d 317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THIS IS AN INAPPROPRIATE VEHICLE BOTH BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO PURSUE AVAILABLE REMEDIES IN THE COURTS BELOW AND BECAUSE GRANTING PETITIONER'S REQUEST WOULD NOT AFFECT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THE CASE",
		"context": ". Petitioner seeks this Court's review of the denial of his intervention motion in order to have the panel's decision on the merits reconsidered in light of June Medical, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. 32, 17–21.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Auer Deference Violates the Due Process Clause by Requiring Judges to Display Bias",
		"context": "9. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187 . Hamburger explains that \"the Constitution prohibits judges from denying the due process of law, and judg-es therefore cannot engage in systematic bias in favor of the government. Nonethele ss, judges defer to administrative inter- pretation, thus often engaging in systematic bias for the gov- ernment and against other parties.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 So. 3d 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only the Judicial Branch is vested with judicial power",
		"context": "1 . As a result, Congress \"cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the \"Constitution assigns that job—resolution of the mun- dane as we ll as the glamorous, matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of law —to the Judiciary.\" 564 U.S. 462.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Only the Judicial Branch is vested with judicial power",
		"context": "14 U.S. 304. Rather, the \"Constitution assigns that job—resolution of the mun- dane as we ll as the glamorous, matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of law —to the Judiciary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is, therefore, \"emphatically \" the independent and exclu- sive \" province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.\" Marbury , 5 U.S. at 177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Transgender People Are Not Excluded From Title VII's Protections",
		"context": "The facts of discrimination cases brought by transgender people make clear that discrimination against transgender people invariably is based on the same sex stereotyping held unlawful in cases involv- ing cisgender individuals: The plaintiffs are perceived as men who are not \"masculine\" enough or women who are not \"feminine\" enough. Most of the reported cases involve claims that em- ployers discriminated against transgender employees for a perceived failure to conform to stereotypes asso- ciated with the sex they were assigned at birth. In Smith v. City of Salem , for example, a transgender woman's co-workers \"began commenting on [her] appearance and mannerism as not being mas- culine enough,\" and after her supervisors became aware of her \"allegedly unmasculine conduct and ap- pearance,\" they forced her to undergo psychological 11 evaluations and schemed to intimidate her into re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Glenn v. Brumby , a transgender woman's su- pervisor asked her to go home when she \"came to work presenting as a woman\" because her supervisor \"deemed her appearance inappropriate because he was a man dressed as a woman and made up as a woman, \" then fired her because she intended to pro- ceed with a gender transition, come to work as a woman, and change her legal name. 663 F.3d 1312.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 F.3d 566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Transgender People Are Not Excluded From Title VII's Protections",
		"context": "In Smith v. City of Salem , for example, a transgender woman's co-workers \"began commenting on [her] appearance and mannerism as not being mas- culine enough,\" and after her supervisors became aware of her \"allegedly unmasculine conduct and ap- pearance,\" they forced her to undergo psychological 11 evaluations and schemed to intimidate her into re-378 F.3d 566. In Glenn v. Brumby , a transgender woman's su- pervisor asked her to go home when she \"came to work presenting as a woman\" because her supervisor \"deemed her appearance inappropriate because he was a man dressed as a woman and made up as a woman, \" then fired her because she intended to pro- ceed with a gender transition, come to work as a woman, and change her legal name. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Rosa v. Park West Bank & Tr. Co. , the plaintiff, who had been assigned a male gender at birth and was dressed in \"traditionally feminine attire,\" was told to go home and change into \"more traditionally male at- tire.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "663 F.3d 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Transgender People Are Not Excluded From Title VII's Protections",
		"context": "In Rosa v. Park West Bank & Tr. Co. , the plaintiff, who had been assigned a male gender at birth and was dressed in \"traditionally feminine attire,\" was told to go home and change into \"more traditionally male at- tire.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Schwenk v. Hartford , a transgender woman was assaulted because she called herself \"Crystal Marie,\" \"ha[d] shoulder-length hair, [was] ex- tremely soft-spoken and feminine, crie[d] easily, and use[d] make-up and other female grooming products.\" 204 F.3d 1187.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Transgender People Are Not Excluded From Title VII's Protections",
		"context": "214 F.3d 213. And in Schwenk v. Hartford , a transgender woman was assaulted because she called herself \"Crystal Marie,\" \"ha[d] shoulder-length hair, [was] ex- tremely soft-spoken and feminine, crie[d] easily, and use[d] make-up and other female grooming products.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Harris Funeral Homes case exemplifies both types of improper sex stereotyping: Ms. Stephens was fired because Mr. Rost, the owner of Harris Homes, believed that her appearance and behavior did not align with the stereotypes associated with either the sex assigned to her at birth or her gender identity. His testimony makes this clear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 F.3d 1187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Transgender People Are Not Excluded From Title VII's Protections",
		"context": "See Smith , 387 F.3d at 573-75 (Title VII); Whita- ker By 858 F.3d 1034; Schwenck , 204 F.3d at 1201-03 (Gender Motivated Violence Act, which Court recognized \"par- allel[s] Title VII\"); Glenn , 663 F.3d at 1320-21 (apply- ing Title VII caselaw in analyzing claim under Equal Protection Clause).6 This Court should reach the same conclusion. 6 Many district courts reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509; 12 F. Supp. 3d 780; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 305 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "577 F. Supp. 2d 293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "But § 13(b) author- izes the Commission to seek a permanent injunction, not such injunctions and \"further equitable relief.\" Where \" 'Congress includes particu lar language in one section of 4 a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Commis- sion cannot deny that, as a matter of text, Congress un- derstood \" permanent injunction\" to be dis tinct from \"monetary relief \" and \"equitable relief \" gen erally. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "The Commission responds that, \"[w]hen Congress uses a statutory term like 'injunction' with a long - established legal understanding, the term 'brings the old soil with it. ' \" Resp .Br. 20 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That is true —but it under- mines the Commission's expansive view. Myriad authori - ties attest that the \"prospective \" nature of injunctive relief is incompatible with awarding monetary relief for past harms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "31. But t his Court has plainly stated that \"[t]he func tion of an injunction is to afford preventive relief, not to redress alleged wrongs which have been committed already.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Traditionally, injunctions encompass judicial commands \" other than the payment to the complainant of a sum of money .\" 1 R. Foster, A Treatise on Federal Practice, Civil and Criminal § 205 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "144 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Neither the Commission nor its amici iden- 5 tify one case where a court ordered the payment of money as compensation for past harms via an injunction. 3. The Commission urges (at 29-30) that injunctions \"have been used to order the return of money, \" invoking [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Osborn , however, a first injunc- tion was issued to restrain a state official from collecting an allegedly illegal tax on the bank. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Wh ere a party does not seek the return of \"particular funds or property in the defendant's pos session\" that could be \"traced\" to the plaintiff—but instead seeks to \"impos e personal liability on the de fendant\"—the remedy \"is not\" considered \" equitable \" relief at all, much less an injunc- tion. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. That leaves the Commission's assertion that \"[t]rea tises have recognized for centuries that in- junctions may serve restorative purposes.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Pet.Br. 22-24. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], demonstrates the point. There, the Court held that Com m'rs , 26 A. 115; 20 N.Y.S. 45 ; Ex parte55 F. 704; In re149 U.S. 164. 7 \"divestiture is a form of injunctive relief within the meaning of § 16\" of the Clayton Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
		"context": "22-24. 495 U.S. 271, demonstrates the point. There, the Court held that Com m'rs , 26 A. 115; 20 N.Y.S. 45 ; Ex parte55 F. 704; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 \"divestiture is a form of injunctive relief within the meaning of § 16\" of the Clayton Act. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the plain meaning of the ACCA's force clause, a predicate offense that can be committed recklessly does not qualify as a 'violent felony'",
		"context": "924(e)(2)(B)(i ). As this Court has pre- viously recognized in the con text of a materially identical provision, the key language in that clause is \"against the person of another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reading that clause to reach reckless offenses, as the court of appeals did, fails to give effect to the clause's plain meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Zarda's interpretation of Title VII produces significant ambiguities, indefensible outcomes, and troubling results",
		"context": "That logic does not carry over to Title VII's disparate-impact provisions, 42 U.S.C. 2000e- 2(a)(2) & (k), which care nothing about an employer's \"discriminatory intent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accepting Zarda's theory risks creating an anomaly: sexual orientation is effectively added to Title VII's dispar ate-treatment provision but not its disparate-impact sections. That, of course, will not stop some employees from contending otherwise, and in the meantime, employers will be forced to guess.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Zarda's interpretation of Title VII produces significant ambiguities, indefensible outcomes, and troubling results",
		"context": "Those policies and practices are not trivial; they protect vital interests of em ployers, coworkers, and the public. Sex-specific facilities like sleeping quarters, restrooms, and showers \"afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex.\" Virginia , 518 U.S. at 550 n.19; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] by excluding them \"from consideration for approximately 75% of the available correctional counselor jobs.\" Id. at 332 n.16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 F.3d 1215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Zarda's interpretation of Title VII produces significant ambiguities, indefensible outcomes, and troubling results",
		"context": "They ensure that police and fire personnel have the requisite physical fitness to protect the public. Because of physiological differences between men and women, the average fit man tests at a higher level for certain physical fitness measurements than the average fit woman. Virginia , 518 U.S. at 550 n.19 (allowing adjustments to \"physical training programs \" to account for \"physio- logical differences between male and female indivi- duals\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But if Zarda is righ t, men need only satisfy the lower standards, thereby placing unqualified men in the field and sacrificing public safety. Either that or women will be held to the men's standard, which will risk excluding women from police and fire forces.",
		"citation_value_orig": "812 F.3d 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Zarda's interpretation of Title VII produces significant ambiguities, indefensible outcomes, and troubling results",
		"context": "In addition, dress and grooming standards advance a core interest of many organizations—how the entity presents itself to the world. Courts and the EEOC allow those policies to differentiate between men and women if they do not burden members of one sex more than the other. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Zarda's interp retation would hijack organizations' reasonable choices on how to shape their public images. The implications of Zarda's stereotyping arguments are particularly unsettling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Zarda's interpretation of Title VII produces significant ambiguities, indefensible outcomes, and troubling results",
		"context": "Most Americans—including people of faith, business owners, and anyone who uses sex- specific restrooms or locker-room facilities—will be affected by this ruling. Just as this Court should not shield voters \"from the consequences of their political choices,\" Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], neither should it force them to pay for decisions they never made. Congress, on the other hand, is \"able to calibrate [Title VII's] provisions in a way that [this Court] cannot.\" Arabian Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To \"Resolve[] Its Liability,\" A Settling Party Must Conclusively Decide A Preexisting Liability In The Settlement Agreement",
		"context": "To trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B), then, a settlement must meet two conditions. First, the settlement must conclusively deal with the liability, such that the matter \"is not susceptible to further dispute or negotiation.\" Asarco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The need for finality is consistent with ordinary usage of \"resolved.\" For example, a settling party has \"resolved its liability to the United States\" when it has 39 been \"released .",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To \"Resolve[] Its Liability,\" A Settling Party Must Conclusively Decide A Preexisting Liability In The Settlement Agreement",
		"context": ". . from further liability\" in a settlement, Key Tronic , 511 U.S. at 811-12 (emphasis added); a government contractor has \" resolved its disputes with [an] agency\" by entering into a \"'final and conclusive'\" settlement, S & E Contractors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]571 U.S. 1175. Requiring a final, conclusive decision on liability is also consistent with the traditional principles of contribution described above. See supra at 21-22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To \"Resolve[] Its Liability,\" A Settling Party Must Conclusively Decide A Preexisting Liability In The Settlement Agreement",
		"context": ". liability.\" See Advocate Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This interpretation is confirmed by the traditional principles of contribution discussed above: Contribution requires the resolution of a shared liability—one that both (or more) parties face. See supra at 21-22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To \"Resolve[] Its Liability,\" A Settling Party Must Conclusively Decide A Preexisting Liability In The Settlement Agreement",
		"context": "Cf. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] authorizes contribution only when a party has entered into a settlement that conclusively deals with or decides that party's preexisting liability to undertake a response action or pay response costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The County's reliance on feudal practice is unavailing",
		"context": "Tyler was not a vassal owing fealty to her lord but a modern fee simple owner of real property. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he Founders unambiguously rejected quit-rent as inconsistent with a free people. Indeed, their opposition to the feudal premise underlying quit -rent was one of the \"causes of that discontent\" that produced the American Revolution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel",
		"context": "To accomplish these important goals, Congress was not content to rely on the market to develop and support a domestic biofuels industry of its own accord; rather, Congress designed the RFS \"to force the market to create ways to produce and use greater and greater volumes of 6 renewable fuel each year.\" Ams. for Clean [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Respondents and their amici explain, the text of § 7545(o)(9) is clear and defeats Petitioners' contention that EPA may exempt small refineries that did not have extensions when the RFS went into effect or whose prior exemptions have lapsed. But even if the text were unclear or ambiguous, the legislative intent underlying the statute refutes Petitioners' position.",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "1117(a) (empha- sis added). By referencing \"principles of equity,\" the text refers courts to the set of equitable rules that limited the availability of these remedies. See Mon- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, a well- established rule limited the availability of a defend- ant's profits award to cases where a defendant acted willfully. See supra at 30–43.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "See supra at 30–43. That rule is therefore an \"equitable principle\" that limits the availability of monetary remedies under Section 1117(a). That sets this case apart from Park 'N Fly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That case involved an incontestable trademark. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "See supra at 34; infra at 47 (discussing other principles of equity). But \"[d]iscretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The requirement of willfulness is one such legal standard. And although equity juris- diction historically involved \"the power of the Chan- cellor to do equity,\" equity often operates in practice to limit or deny the available remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "2018) (\"Even if a plaintiff makes out a case for relief the court of equity may in its discre- tion refuse its aid. \"); cf. Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Nor are equity and clear rules somehow mutual- ly exclusive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "See Equity , Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1940) (\"A branch of reme- dial justice by and through which relief is afforded 46 in the courts of equity.\"). Indeed, \"courts of equity must be governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that understanding carried over to our judicial system. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "Well-established equitable principles demonstrate the point. A preliminary injunction, for example, cannot issue unless four factors are met. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And an accounting of profits is unavailable \"where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the case.\" Champion Spark Plug , 331 U.S. at 131; accord Minnesota Pet Breeders , 41 F.3d at 1247; Morgenstern Chem.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "And an accounting of profits is unavailable \"where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the case.\" Champion Spark Plug , 331 U.S. at 131; accord Minnesota Pet Breeders , 41 F.3d at 1247; Morgenstern Chem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. The decisions on which Romag relies (at 30–32) only confirm that \"in a system of laws discretion is rarely without limits.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 F.2d 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "The decisions on which Romag relies (at 30–32) only confirm that \"in a system of laws discretion is rarely without limits.\" Indep. Fed'n of Flight At- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 47 Start with Halo Electronics . At issue was a provi- sion of the Patent Act stating that, if patent in- fringement is established, a court \"may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion",
		"context": "at 393–394; id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (\"[T]here is a difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the established four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean slate.\"). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is similar. A fee provision in the Copy- right Act was at issue. See 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1979",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "26 U.S.C. 7421(a). That \"broad and mandatory language,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \" could 16 scarcely be more explicit\" in precluding pre -payment suits . Bob Jones 416 U.S. 725. a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "7421(a). That \"broad and mandatory language,\" 553 U.S. 1, \" could 16 scarcely be more explicit\" in precluding pre -payment suits . Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. a. The Anti -Injunction Act does not foreclose judicial review of tax disputes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "1346(a)(1); see 26 U.S.C. 6532, 7422(a) ; Clint- wood Elkhorn , 553 U.S. at 4; see generally 15 Mertens § 58A:1 et seq. (Edward J. Smith ed., Aug. 2020 update) To bring a refund suit, a taxpayer ordinarily must pay the tax owed in full, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]362 U.S. 145, except in limited circ umstances where Congress has author- ized suits following a partial payment, see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 6694(c), 6703(c), 7422(g)(1). The refund -suit remedy \"offer[s] [a taxpayer] a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality\" of a disputed tax.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "1346(a)(1); see 26 U.S.C. 6532, 7422(a) ; Clint- wood Elkhorn , 553 U.S. at 4; see generally 15 Mertens § 58A:1 et seq. (Edward J. Smith ed., Aug. 2020 update) To bring a refund suit, a taxpayer ordinarily must pay the tax owed in full, 357 U.S. 63[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], except in limited circ umstances where Congress has author- ized suits following a partial payment, see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 6694(c), 6703(c), 7422(g)(1). The refund -suit remedy \"offer[s] [a taxpayer] a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality\" of a disputed tax.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "Instead, t he plaintiff must pay the tax and then dispute it in a refund suit. See National Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]136 S. Ct. 2429. Section 7422 similarly pre- vents circumvention of the statutory framework by b ar- ring suits to recover taxes that have already been as- sessed or collected until \" a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary \" in accordance with 18 IRS procedures. 26 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "(citation omitt ed); accord NFIB , 567 U.S. at 543 . The Code's \"pay first and litigate later\" approach (Flora , 357 U.S. at 75 (citation omitted) ) also embodies the longstanding tradition of Anglo -American law. From \"[t]ime out of mind,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], English law permitted the gov- ernment to collect taxes by summary administrative proceedings , granting taxpayers the right to dispute those taxes only by paying the tax and suing for a re- fund, see Murray's 59 U.S. 272 . In the early years of the Republic, t hose traditional pro- cedures were incorporated from the familiar proce- dures of English law and the laws of the States. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "(citation omitt ed); accord NFIB , 567 U.S. at 543 . The Code's \"pay first and litigate later\" approach (Flora , 357 U.S. at 75 (citation omitted) ) also embodies the longstanding tradition of Anglo -American law. From \"[t]ime out of mind,\" 295 U.S. 247, English law permitted the gov- ernment to collect taxes by summary administrative proceedings , granting taxpayers the right to dispute those taxes only by paying the tax and suing for a re- fund, see Murray's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In the early years of the Republic, t hose traditional pro- cedures were incorporated from the familiar proce- dures of English law and the laws of the States. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax",
		"context": "Those narrow, context -specific excep- tions reflect Congress's policy judgment that, apart from the few areas where Congress has deemed pre- payment review appropriate, the general bar on such review control s. This Court also has construed the Anti -Injunction Act not to bar suits in two other, limited circumstances , but neither applies here . The Cour t has held that, if \"equity jurisdiction otherwise exists\" and it is \"clear that un der no circumstances could the G overnment ul- timately prevail under the most liberal view of the law and the facts ,\" a pre -payment suit can go forward on the theory that such an \"exaction is merely in ' the guise of a tax.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Peti- tioner does not invoke that exception. The Court also has held that the Act does not bar suit where a taxpayer lacks any \"alternative legal avenue by which to contest the legality of a particular tax,\" such as \"a suit for a re- fund .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, LOWER COURTS ARE CONFLICTED ON APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION RULE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION",
		"context": ". For well over a decade, it has been clear that Fifth Amendment Takings claims are separate and distinct from due process cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Lingle , the Court determined that the \"substantially advance s legitimate state interests [test]\" was not a proper takings standard. Agins v. 447 U.S. 255 , abrogated by Lingle at 542.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, LOWER COURTS ARE CONFLICTED ON APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION RULE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION",
		"context": "544 U.S. 528. In Lingle , the Court determined that the \"substantially advance s legitimate state interests [test]\" was not a proper takings standard. Agins v. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , abrogated by Lingle at 542. By eliminating the substantially advances test, the Court separated due process claims from Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims. In Lingle , this Court admitted the Agins means -ends inquiry was one that \"commingl[ed] of due process and takings inquiries, \" and that such \"reliance on due process precedents\" has \"no proper place in [our] takings jurisprudence. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, LOWER COURTS ARE CONFLICTED ON APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION RULE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION",
		"context": "In Lingle , this Court admitted the Agins means -ends inquiry was one that \"commingl[ed] of due process and takings inquiries, \" and that such \"reliance on due process precedents\" has \"no proper place in [our] takings jurisprudence. \" Id. at 529; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Certainly, \"[ a takings] suit pursuing just compensation is entirely irrelevant to the validity of land use regulations, and has no effect on any facts relevant to [ a due process] claim. \" Nader James K horassani , Must Substantive 6 Due Process Land Use Claims be so \" Exhaust\" ing?, 81 Fordham L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, LOWER COURTS ARE CONFLICTED ON APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION RULE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION",
		"context": "409, 443 (2012). Perhaps not surprisingly , four of this Court's Justices voiced their concern that Williamson County should be re evaluated in the same year as the Lingle decision . San Remo Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (commenting that descriptions of Williamson County by lower courts include \"unpleasant,\" \"unfortunate,\" \"unclear,\" \"nonsense,\" \"draconian,\" and \"Kafkaesque\")(citations omitted). A decade afterward, this Court has done little to clarify the reach of Williamson County to land use constitutional claims other than federal takings. Without guidance by this Court, the circuit split has deepened over the applicability of Williamson County exhaustion requi rements to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, LOWER COURTS ARE CONFLICTED ON APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION RULE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION",
		"context": "In particular, some lower court s hold that Williamson's exhaustion prong is mandatory and extend it to due process and equal protection land use claims . Other courts treat Williamson County as rightly prudential, but this results in a confusing set of inter - and intra -circuit ripeness rules that are nigh impossible for a common property owner to comprehend. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 7 Other courts hold that Williamson County's exhaustion prong do es not apply to due process or equal protection land use claims. The circuit split is deep and ready for this Court's intervention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Individual Mandate No Longer Functions As a Tax and Cannot Be Sustained As a Constitutional Exercise of Congress's Power to Tax",
		"context": ". In National Federation of Independent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The only possible remaining Constitutional authority for the individual mandate was Congress's power to tax. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsb urg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan , held that it was \"fairly possible,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Individual Mandate No Longer Functions As a Tax and Cannot Be Sustained As a Constitutional Exercise of Congress's Power to Tax",
		"context": "§ 5000A (emphasi s added). The use of the word \"shall\" connotes a mandatory requirement. E.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because the mandatory requirement no longer triggers a tax payment generating revenue for the government, the individual mandate is unmoored from any of Congress's enumerated powers. It is unconstitutional under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, NFIB, 576 U.S. at 561, and it is now unconstitutional under Congress's taxing power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "The government argues that this provision is ambiguous because \"un- der\" can mean \"governed by.\" But a word is not am- biguous simply because it has multiple dictionary definitions. \"Ambiguity is a creature not of defini- tional possibilities but of statutory context,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1994), and the word \"under\" \"draw[s] its meaning from its context,\" Ar- 502 U.S. 129. See also 508 U.S. 129. In this context, \"under\" unambiguously connects the reference to a \"notice to appear\" with the statuto- ry provision that defines that term.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "The government argues that this provision is ambiguous because \"un- der\" can mean \"governed by.\" But a word is not am- biguous simply because it has multiple dictionary definitions. \"Ambiguity is a creature not of defini- tional possibilities but of statutory context,\" 513 U.S. 115 ( 1994), and the word \"under\" \"draw[s] its meaning from its context,\" Ar- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 508 U.S. 129. In this context, \"under\" unambiguously connects the reference to a \"notice to appear\" with the statuto- ry provision that defines that term.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "But a word is not am- biguous simply because it has multiple dictionary definitions. \"Ambiguity is a creature not of defini- tional possibilities but of statutory context,\" 513 U.S. 115 ( 1994), and the word \"under\" \"draw[s] its meaning from its context,\" Ar- 502 U.S. 129. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this context, \"under\" unambiguously connects the reference to a \"notice to appear\" with the statuto- ry provision that defines that term. It thus means \"in accordance with\" or \"according to,\" standard defi- nitions of \"under,\" as th is Court has recognized.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "In this context, \"under\" unambiguously connects the reference to a \"notice to appear\" with the statuto- ry provision that defines that term. It thus means \"in accordance with\" or \"according to,\" standard defi- nitions of \"under,\" as th is Court has recognized. Nat'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 568 U.S. 519. The statute unambigu- ously triggers the stop-time rule on service of a \"no-tice to appear\" \"in accordance with\" section 1229(a)'s definition of that term. Interpreting \"under\" to mean \"governed by\" would not help the government, because on the govern- ment's interpretation section 1229(a) would not ac- tually \"govern\" the notice to appear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "In this context, \"under\" unambiguously connects the reference to a \"notice to appear\" with the statuto- ry provision that defines that term. It thus means \"in accordance with\" or \"according to,\" standard defi- nitions of \"under,\" as th is Court has recognized. Nat'l Ass'n of 138 S. Ct. 617; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statute unambigu- ously triggers the stop-time rule on service of a \"no-tice to appear\" \"in accordance with\" section 1229(a)'s definition of that term. Interpreting \"under\" to mean \"governed by\" would not help the government, because on the govern- ment's interpretation section 1229(a) would not ac- tually \"govern\" the notice to appear.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "The government claims (at 25-26) that Con-gress necessarily intends different language to have different meanings, but then recognizes (at 26) that Congress used different phrases—\"written notice re- quired under\" and \"notice in accordance with\"—to mean exactly the same thing in the same paragraph of section 1229a(b). It is therefore unremarkable that the stop-time rule—which appears in a different section altogether—describes notice that satisfies section 1229(a)'s definition of a \"notice to appear\" us-ing distinct, but similar language. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further, Congress had good reason to use slightly different language in the in absentia provision, which requires compliance with two notice require- ments. While \"notice to appear\" is a defined term encompassing the notice required under paragraph (1) of section 1229(a), there is no defined term en- compassing the notice required under paragraph (2).",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "In the stop-time rule, Congress described compliant no- tice as \"notice to appear under section 1229(a)\" not due to a \"mistake in draftsmanship\" ( see Gov't Br. 26), but because the stop-time rule requires compli-ance only with the \"notice to appear\" definition in paragraph (1). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s \"notice to ap- pear\" definition triggers the stop-time rule. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "It d oes not suggest, as the gov- ernment would have it, that if Congress cared about 10 providing notice of a hearing time and place it would have required oral notice. 4. The government misreads this Court's deci- sions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 541 U.S. 401, and 535 U.S. 106. See Gov't Br. 32-34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 757",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "It d oes not suggest, as the gov- ernment would have it, that if Congress cared about 10 providing notice of a hearing time and place it would have required oral notice. 4. The government misreads this Court's deci- sions in 532 U.S. 757, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 535 U.S. 106. See Gov't Br. 32-34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Is Unambiguous",
		"context": "It d oes not suggest, as the gov- ernment would have it, that if Congress cared about 10 providing notice of a hearing time and place it would have required oral notice. 4. The government misreads this Court's deci- sions in 532 U.S. 757, 541 U.S. 401, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Gov't Br. 32-34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Lucia Does Not Support The Federal Circuit's Remands Because Any Fix In Lucia Was Administrative Rather Than Judicial",
		"context": "The Federal Circuit apparently viewed the re- mands as required by this Court's decision in Lucia . See Arthrex , 941 F.3d at 1325, 1340 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Arthrex , 953 F.3d at 764 n.3 (Moore, J., concurring in denial of re-hearing en banc) (\"Per the Supreme Court's decision in Lucia , Arthrex , and the other appeals with preserved Appointments Clause challenges, were vacated and re-manded for hearings before new panels of APJs, who 13 are now properly appointed .\") (emphasis added). But the Federal Circuit failed to recognize the key differ- ence between that case and this one: the fix came from a different branch of government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Lucia Does Not Support The Federal Circuit's Remands Because Any Fix In Lucia Was Administrative Rather Than Judicial",
		"context": "See Lucia , 138 S. Ct. at 2055 n.6 (\"While this case was on judicial review, the SEC issued an order ratifying the prior appointments of its ALJs.\"). This agency fix is properly considered prospective only, for the executive branch, unlike the judicial branch, generally acts pro- spectively rather than retroactively. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in this case, the Federal Circuit's \"fix,\" i.e., the striking of the removal protections on APJs, came from the judiciary rather than the agency, and so under this Court's jurisprudence, it must at least presumptively be considered retroactive rather than prospective only. That is, assuming the Federal Circuit was correct to declare the removal restrictions as applied to APJs unconstitutional and to seve r them, the APJs were in effect always removable at will.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Lucia Does Not Support The Federal Circuit's Remands Because Any Fix In Lucia Was Administrative Rather Than Judicial",
		"context": "at 65. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, another primary benefit of the retroactivity doctrine is that it strengthens stare decisis – by forcing judges to write under the fiction that their current statement of the law was always the law, retroactivity requires that judges adhere closely enough to precedent that they may plausibly do so. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Prospective deci-sionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis . \"). Where the fix comes from the judiciary as it did in this case (unlike in Lucia ), it must at least pre- sumptively be considered retroactive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. This Court's later decisions created an arrow exception for a nontestifying co-defendant's facially inculpatory statement",
		"context": "Rich- ardson , 481 U.S. at 207 ; see Carr , 577 U.S. at 125 (sim- ilarly describing Bruton as \"a narrow departure from the presumption that jurors fol low their instructions \"). The Court has refused, however, to expand that excep- tion beyond true cases of \"facial\" incrimination , in which the nontestifying co -defendant's statement ei- ther names the defendant, include s similar identifying information (like a nickname or physical description ), or is so obvious ly redacted that the jury is virtually certain to see through its unmistakabl e artificiality . Only those circumstances have been deemed to give rise to such an \" 'overwhel ming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that the usual presump- tion must give way. a. In Bruton , the Court confronted a joint trial in which a district court had admitted a post -arrest con- fession by Bruton's co -defendant that \"expressly\" ac- cused Bruton , by name , of participating in a postal robbery.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. This Court's later decisions created an arrow exception for a nontestifying co-defendant's facially inculpatory statement",
		"context": "At the same time, the Court recognized the poten- tial for \"alternative ways\" of allowing \"the prosecution the benefit of the confession to prove the confes- sor's guilt\" in a joint trial, without creating the same degree of risk that the jury would disregard its in- structions and use the confession against a nonconfess- ing defendant. Bruton , 391 U.S. at 133 -134 & n.10 . And over the next two decades, the Court declined to expand Bruton , finding no confrontation error when a prosecutor used a nontestifying co-defendant's confes- sion during an opening statement, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; when a court a dmitted the confession of a co -defendant who testified but de- nied making the confession , 402 U.S. 622; and when a jury was permit- ted to use a co-defendant's confession against a non- confessing defendant for nonhearsay rebuttal purpos- es, 471 U.S. 409. b. The Court 's subsequent decision in Richardson clarified Bruton 's \"narrow\" scope even more directly .",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. This Court's later decisions created an arrow exception for a nontestifying co-defendant's facially inculpatory statement",
		"context": "At the same time, the Court recognized the poten- tial for \"alternative ways\" of allowing \"the prosecution the benefit of the confession to prove the confes- sor's guilt\" in a joint trial, without creating the same degree of risk that the jury would disregard its in- structions and use the confession against a nonconfess- ing defendant. Bruton , 391 U.S. at 133 -134 & n.10 . And over the next two decades, the Court declined to expand Bruton , finding no confrontation error when a prosecutor used a nontestifying co-defendant's confes- sion during an opening statement, 394 U.S. 731; when a court a dmitted the confession of a co -defendant who testified but de- nied making the confession , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and when a jury was permit- ted to use a co-defendant's confession against a non- confessing defendant for nonhearsay rebuttal purpos- es, 471 U.S. 409. b. The Court 's subsequent decision in Richardson clarified Bruton 's \"narrow\" scope even more directly .",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. This Court's later decisions created an arrow exception for a nontestifying co-defendant's facially inculpatory statement",
		"context": "At the same time, the Court recognized the poten- tial for \"alternative ways\" of allowing \"the prosecution the benefit of the confession to prove the confes- sor's guilt\" in a joint trial, without creating the same degree of risk that the jury would disregard its in- structions and use the confession against a nonconfess- ing defendant. Bruton , 391 U.S. at 133 -134 & n.10 . And over the next two decades, the Court declined to expand Bruton , finding no confrontation error when a prosecutor used a nontestifying co-defendant's confes- sion during an opening statement, 394 U.S. 731; when a court a dmitted the confession of a co -defendant who testified but de- nied making the confession , 402 U.S. 622; and when a jury was permit- ted to use a co-defendant's confession against a non- confessing defendant for nonhearsay rebuttal purpos- es, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. The Court 's subsequent decision in Richardson clarified Bruton 's \"narrow\" scope even more directly .",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "1. As this Court explained in Skilling v. United States, property fraud requires that \"the victim's loss of money or property supplied the defendant's gain, with one the mirror image of the other.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, it must involve not only a deprivation of the victim's property, but the defend- ant's gain of (or attempt to gain) that same property. See also 997 F.2d 1219.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "561 U.S. 358. In other words, it must involve not only a deprivation of the victim's property, but the defend- ant's gain of (or attempt to gain) that same property. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Thus, the statute does not apply to schemes that \"lack[] similar symmetry,\" such as deceitful efforts to deprive people of \"intangible\" rights such as the right to a public official's \"honest services.\" Skilling , 561 U.S. at 400.",
		"citation_value_orig": "997 F.2d 1219",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "And it has held that that requirement is not satisfied in a right-to-control case. a. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that interfering with another person's right to control his property is not the same as acquiring or obtaining that property. The decision in Scheidler was based on the text of the Hobbs Act, which prohibits the \"obtaining of property from another\" through force, threats, or vi- olence. 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "21 The Court began with the \"the general presump- tion that a statutory term has its common-law mean- ing.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 342 U.S. 246). Examining the common law, this Court held that the phrase \"obtaining of property\" was a phrase with a well-known meaning—\"this 'obtaining of property' requirement included both a deprivation and acquisition of property.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "21 The Court began with the \"the general presump- tion that a statutory term has its common-law mean- ing.\" Id. (citing 495 U.S. 575, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Examining the common law, this Court held that the phrase \"obtaining of property\" was a phrase with a well-known meaning—\"this 'obtaining of property' requirement included both a deprivation and acquisition of property.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "To ob-tain property means to come into possession of it, which ordinarily means the acquiror must have \"re-ceived 'something of value fr om' [the other party] that they could exercise, transfer, or sell.\" Id. at 405 (quot- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Notably, this Court explicitly rejected the right-to- control doctrine as a basis fo r liability. The protestors \"may have deprived or sought to deprive [the plain- tiffs] of their alleged property right of exclusive control of their business assets, but they did not acquire any such property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "Id. 22 b. This Court reaffirmed Scheidler 's holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The de- fendant in Sekhar had sent threatening emails to a New York state employee in hopes that the employee would approve an investment in a fund managed by the defendant's firm. The Second Circuit held that be- cause the defendant generally sought to profit by his conduct, he had sought to \"obtain property\" within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "The de- fendant in Sekhar had sent threatening emails to a New York state employee in hopes that the employee would approve an investment in a fund managed by the defendant's firm. The Second Circuit held that be- cause the defendant generally sought to profit by his conduct, he had sought to \"obtain property\" within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court reversed. It reiterated both the plain meaning and common-law meaning of the statutory phrase \"obtaining property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "at 738. When one merely deprives another of information relevant to the use or dispos ition of property, no fluent English speaker would say that he obtained and exer- cised the right to control that property. 23 c. More recently, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Cour t extended the logic of Scheidler and Sekhar to the federal forfeiture statute. That statute allows the government to forfeit \"prop- erty constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of\" the crime. 21 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1626",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable — Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant",
		"context": "Scheidler , 537 U.S. at 403. It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that when Congress borrows common-law terms, this Court as-sumes that Congress meant to incorporate the com- mon-law meanings. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus , when Congress used the phrase \"obtaining money or property\" in the fraud statutes, it is reasonable to assume that Congress meant to incorporate the common-law meaning—the same meaning that this Court already elucidated in other statutes using the same phrase. Statutory interpretation can be complicated when the ordinary English meaning of a term diverges from its common-law meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "That lan- guage grants authority to Congress over interstate com- merce. It is not naturally read to \"limit the power of States to regulate commerce\" within their own territories. Uni- ted Haulers Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the Consti- tution limits state authority over particular aspects of commerce, it does so expressly. See, e.g., U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Michael J. Klarman, The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution 151 (2016). The Clause's goal was to \"curb[] state protectionism\" and dis- crimination. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The scope of any inferred limit on in-state regulatory authority should be consonant with that historical purpose. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Connecticut \"laid heavier duties on imports\" from Massa- chusetts than from Great Britain. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786), in 2 The Writings of James Madison 218 (G. Hunt ed. 1901); see Klarman, supra , at 23-24; Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Edmund Randolph warned that such protectionism had prompted retaliatory measures, leading to \"jealousy, rivalship, and hatred.\" 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 82 (Jonathan Elliot ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Concerns about protectionism and discrimination permeate the debates leading to the Con-stitution's adoption. See, e.g., James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), in 2 Writings of James Madison , supra , at 361-362; The Federalist No. 14 22, at 144 (Hamilton); Statement of Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 21, 1787), in 4 Writings of James Madison , supra , at 259; C & A Carbone, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Concerned about States' \"Discrimi- nation in favour of their Own Citizens,\" Pennsylvania implored the Annapolis Convention to address state duties \"upon Goods imported in Vessels\" from \"other parts of the Union greater than those laid on Goods imported in Vessels belonging to the enacting State.\" Letter from Tench Coxe to Virginia Commissioners (Sept. 13, 1786), in 9 The Papers of James Madison 124-126 (Robert A. Rut- land et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "\" Pet. Br. 23 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But petitioners overlook that the Clause was directed to a specific threat: protectionist and dis- criminatory legislation. Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contem- porary Comment , 25 Minn. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "This Court's early dormant Commerce Clause ca- ses confirm that. Non-protectionist state laws were rou-tinely upheld despite interstate effects. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court upheld pilotage fees where \"Penn-sylvania d[id] not give a preference to the port of Phila- delphia.\" Id. at 314-315.",
		"citation_value_orig": "53 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Id. at 314-315. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court upheld a statute where \"[t]here [was] no attempt to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States.\" Id. at 140; see Fred- erick H. Cooke, Commerce Clause of the Federal Con- stitution 119-122 nn.23-25 (1908) (collecting cases).",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Id. at 140; see Fred- erick H. Cooke, Commerce Clause of the Federal Con- stitution 119-122 nn.23-25 (1908) (collecting cases). Absent discrimination, the States' traditional police powers were upheld despite potential for \"considerable 5 Hillside Dairy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]22 U.S. 1. As Justice Bushrod Washington observed, the Commerce Clause does not, absent conflicting federal law, \"impair the right of the state governments to legislate, in such manner as in their wisdom may seem best.\" 6 F. Cas. 546.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Id. at 140; see Fred- erick H. Cooke, Commerce Clause of the Federal Con- stitution 119-122 nn.23-25 (1908) (collecting cases). Absent discrimination, the States' traditional police powers were upheld despite potential for \"considerable 5 Hillside Dairy 539 U.S. 59[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Bushrod Washington observed, the Commerce Clause does not, absent conflicting federal law, \"impair the right of the state governments to legislate, in such manner as in their wisdom may seem best.\" 6 F. Cas. 546.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "6 F. Cas. 546. By contrast, discriminatory or protectionist laws have been invalidated. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]553 U.S. 337; Brown-Forman Distillers 476 U.S. 573; and 491 U.S. 324—all involved protectionism. See Energy & Env't Legal 793 F.3d 1169. 18 For example, Baldwin invalidated a New York statute requiring milk sold in the State to have been purchased from suppliers at a minimum price, even if the purchase from suppliers occurred outside New York.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "6 F. Cas. 546. By contrast, discriminatory or protectionist laws have been invalidated. See 91 U.S. 275553 U.S. 337; Brown-Forman Distillers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and 491 U.S. 324—all involved protectionism. See Energy & Env't Legal 793 F.3d 1169. 18 For example, Baldwin invalidated a New York statute requiring milk sold in the State to have been purchased from suppliers at a minimum price, even if the purchase from suppliers occurred outside New York.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "6 F. Cas. 546. By contrast, discriminatory or protectionist laws have been invalidated. See 91 U.S. 275553 U.S. 337; Brown-Forman Distillers 476 U.S. 573; and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—all involved protectionism. See Energy & Env't Legal 793 F.3d 1169. 18 For example, Baldwin invalidated a New York statute requiring milk sold in the State to have been purchased from suppliers at a minimum price, even if the purchase from suppliers occurred outside New York.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "By contrast, discriminatory or protectionist laws have been invalidated. See 91 U.S. 275553 U.S. 337; Brown-Forman Distillers 476 U.S. 573; and 491 U.S. 324—all involved protectionism. See Energy & Env't Legal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 For example, Baldwin invalidated a New York statute requiring milk sold in the State to have been purchased from suppliers at a minimum price, even if the purchase from suppliers occurred outside New York. 294 U.S. at 518-519 & n.1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 F.3d 1169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Id. at 19 This Court has declined to extend those cases to laws that do not present discrimination or protectionism risks. In Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of Ameri- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court refused to enjoin a Maine law requiring manufacturers selling drugs in Maine to offer rebates or face \"prior authorization requirements\" in Maine's Medicaid program. Id. at 654.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Br. 26 (quoting Carbone , 511 U.S. at 393)—the ordinance upheld in United Haulers had the same effect—but the enactment's protectionist nature. Southern Pacific [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], concerned interference with the \"interstate movement of trains\"—an instrumentality of interstate commerce, id. at 779—not implicated here. Pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Pp. 21-22, infra . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a plurality would have deemed Illinois's effort to \"regulate directly and to interdict\" corporate takeover offers that \"would not affect a single Illinois shareholder\" impermissibly extraterritorial. Id. at 642- 643.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "at 642- 643. But a majority later rejected a challenge to a similar Indiana restriction that limited its application to Indiana corporations par- tially owned by Indiana shareholders, even though \"most\" corporate takeovers were \"launched by offerors outside Indiana.\" CTS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Insofar as the Edgar plurality invoked incidental effects outside Indiana, its ratio- nale does not survive CTS . 20 Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Elec. Co-op. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pike concerned an Arizona decision that promoted Arizona industry—requiring fruit packaging in Arizona—at the expense of other States. 397 U.S. at 138-140, 144.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "397 U.S. at 138-140, 144. Al- though cases following Pike have considered ostensibly \"even-handed[]\" state laws, id. at 142, close \"examination support[s] the conclusion that the Court has looked for discrimination rather than for baleful effects,\" Aman- da Acquisition [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"As long as a State's\" law \"does not dis- criminate against out-of-state interests, it should survive this Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.\" CTS , 481 U.S. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "877 F.2d 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "A broader view of Pike would be anomalous. Racial minorities cannot obtain searching review of state laws by showing only disparate impact, or that burdens exceed benefits. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[I]t is hard to see any justifica-tion for providing substantially greater judicial protection to interstate businesses\" under an implied dormant Com- merce Clause than against categories of discrimination the Constitution expressly proscribes. Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause , 3 Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "1. This Court \"has only rarely held that the Com- merce Clause itself pre-empts an entire field from state regulation, and then only when a lack of national uni- formity would impede the flow of interstate goods\"—their physical movement—by disrupting instrumentalities of interstate commerce like trains and trucks. Exxon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], on which peti- tioners rely, Pet.Br. 26, 31-32, proves the point. Sullivan involved trains—the quintessential instru- mentality of interstate commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Ibid. (em- phasis added); see N.Y., N.H. & H.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Locally regulating the sale of pork products within California does not affect the \"free flow\" of goods generally. Sullivan , 325 U.S. at 779.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 U.S. 628",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "3. Congress can investigate and determine whether a preemptive federal regime is appropriate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such de- terminations \"require a policy decision based on political and economic considerations.\" Moorman Mfg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Such de- terminations \"require a policy decision based on political and economic considerations.\" Moorman Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should not legislate uniform standards—even if Congress would be \"amply justif[ied]\" in enacting \"legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "But petitioners defy that principle as soon as they articu-late it, positing a regime where other States project their laws into California to displace California's decisions about the food that appears on California grocery shelves. \"The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Acting \"as laboratories,\" 555 U.S. 160, States may \"try novel social and economic experiments\" without \"the rest of the country[ ތs]\" approval. New State Ice 285 U.S. 262.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "\"The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.\" 441 U.S. 418. Acting \"as laboratories,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], States may \"try novel social and economic experiments\" without \"the rest of the country[ ތs]\" approval. New State Ice 285 U.S. 262. California has determined the pork—safer and more humane—that will appear on the State's grocery shelves.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "441 U.S. 418. Acting \"as laboratories,\" 555 U.S. 160, States may \"try novel social and economic experiments\" without \"the rest of the country[ ތs]\" approval. New State Ice [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. California has determined the pork—safer and more humane—that will appear on the State's grocery shelves. That California imports most of its pork changes nothing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Farmers in those States that choose to produce pork consistent with Propo- 25 sition 12's standards do not violate the less-stringent minimum standards their States allow. Laws that \"create additional, but not irreconcilable, obligations are not considered to be 'inconsistent.' \" Instructional Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners' \"horizontal federalism\" is highly selective. California has decided to regulate its markets by ridding them of pork that it finds immoral and contrary to \"the health and safety of California consumers.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.3d 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism",
		"context": "Goldsmith & Volokh, supra, at 9. The \"commerce clause\" does not \"dictate[]\" a \"result\" that \"would be ultimately to force all of the states to accept the lowest standard for conducting the business permitted by one of them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners challenge a law they consider economically undesirable. \"There was a time when this Court presumed to make such binding judgments for society, under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause,\" but the Court \"should not seek to reclaim that ground for judicial 26 supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision of the Court Below Frustrates the Ability to Vindicate a Procedural Due Process Right Through Section 1983 and Disrespects Principles of Comity and Federalism",
		"context": "That statute is rendered a hollow promise for plaintiffs like Reed if, by the time they know their rights have been violated , it is too late to go to federal court. At the same time , the decision of the court below also manages to tread upon the principles of federal- ism and comity that are designed to protect the inter- ests of states and their courts. As this Court has ex- plained , \"the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions ,\" recognizes the importance of \" a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and fed- eral interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the State s.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The rule of the court below \"unduly interfere[s] with the legitimate activities of the States\" in multiple ways. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision of the Court Below Frustrates the Ability to Vindicate a Procedural Due Process Right Through Section 1983 and Disrespects Principles of Comity and Federalism",
		"context": ". . \"); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Certainly, in our federalist system, it is not 22 the role of a lower federal court to alter this estab- lished state judiciary scheme. As this Court has ex- plained, the rule \"that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them\" is \"bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial proce- dure .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Decision of the Court Below Frustrates the Ability to Vindicate a Procedural Due Process Right Through Section 1983 and Disrespects Principles of Comity and Federalism",
		"context": "Certainly, in our federalist system, it is not 22 the role of a lower federal court to alter this estab- lished state judiciary scheme. As this Court has ex- plained, the rule \"that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them\" is \"bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial proce- dure .\" Howlett By & Through [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, just as \"stays and ad hoc abstention\" were not sufficient in McDonough to justify an accrual rule that would have required state criminal d efendants to sue their prosecutors while criminal proceedings were still on going, 139 S. Ct. at 2158, so too her e. Under the rule of the court below, such devices will likely be in- voked —and need to be adjudicated —in every Section 1983 case challenging Article 64 that is filed while Ar- ticle 64 proceedings are still ongoing in the state ap- pellate process . Not only will that unduly burden fed- eral district courts, see McDonough , 139 S. Ct. at 2158 (\"there is no reason to put the onus to safeguard comity on district courts exercising case -by-case discretion — particularly at the forese eable expense of potentially prejudicing litigants and cluttering dockets with dormant, unripe cases \"), but the creation of a rule that will almost always result in abstention or other mech- anisms to stall or even dismiss potentially meritorious litigation also runs counter to the core principle that \"[i]n the main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction ,\" Sprint Commc'ns, 571 U.S. 69 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Statute Is Clear and Supports an Award of Full Costs",
		"context": "Focusing first on the text, the Court should interpret the statute based on the \"ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.\" Wisconsin Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this exercise, the Court may consider dictionary definitions and common usage. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Statute Is Clear and Supports an Award of Full Costs",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Looking It Up: Diction aries and Statutory Interpretation , 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (1994).",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "924(a)(1) . \"With respect to the categories of conduct that are made punishable by [Section 924(a)(1)], if performed 'knowingly,' \" the Court ex- plained, \" the background presumption that every citi- zen knows the law makes it unnecessary to adduce spe- cific evidence to prove that 'an evil -meaning mind' di- rected the ' evil-doing hand. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same meaning of \"know- ingly\" accordingly holds for Section 924(a)(2 ), which was in fact originally pa rt of Section 924(a)(1) . See 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "L. No. 100 -690, § 6462, 102 Stat. 4374 (reorganization); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The principle that \"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution\" is \"deeply rooted in the American legal system.\" 498 U.S. 192; see 32 U.S. 404.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "4374 (reorganization); 572 U.S. 639. The principle that \"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution\" is \"deeply rooted in the American legal system.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 32 U.S. 404. \"Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law.\" Cheek , 498 U.S. at 199; see O. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 48 (1881) (\"[T]o a dmit the excuse [of ignorance] at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law -maker has determined to make men know and obey .",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "4374 (reorganization); 572 U.S. 639. The principle that \"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution\" is \"deeply rooted in the American legal system.\" 498 U.S. 192; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law.\" Cheek , 498 U.S. at 199; see O. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 48 (1881) (\"[T]o a dmit the excuse [of ignorance] at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law -maker has determined to make men know and obey .",
		"citation_value_orig": "32 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "\"). Con- gress may choose to deviate from that presumption, for instance by specifying that a crime must be committed \" 'willfully, ' \" a term that may connote the \"intentional violation of a known legal duty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But unless Congress clearly indicates that it is \"carving out an exception,\" statutory language must be construed in li ght of \"the traditional rule.\" Cheek , 498 U.S. at 200.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "924(a)(1)(D) , thereby supplementing the por- tions of Section 924 that attach more -specific punish- ments to violations of other regulatory pr ovisions. \"[T]he term 'willfully' in § 924(a)(1)(D ) requires a de- fendant to have ' acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is instead satisfied when the defendant knowingly com- mits the act or acts underlying the regulatory violation — 21 i.e., shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition . The Court has explained that \"unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term 'knowingly' merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense .\" Bryan , 524 U.S. at 193 (footnote omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "And in the context of a viola- tion of Section 9 22(g) , \"the defendant's status\" —e.g., as a felon or an unlawful alien —is \"an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to commit the current offense .\" Old Chief , 519 U.S. at 191. Although a defe ndant's status is an element of a criminal offense defined by Sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2), \"different elements of the same offense can require dif- ferent mental states,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioner accordingly acknowled ges (Br. 31 -32) that at least one element of the offense —the requirement of a connection to interstate or foreign commerce, see 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "31 -32) that at least one element of the offense —the requirement of a connection to interstate or foreign commerce, see 18 U.S.C. 922(g) —does not require any showing of mens rea. A s he recognizes, mens rea re- quirements often do not attach to jurisdictiona l ele- ments, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the applica tion of that general rule here under- mines any possible textual inference that the \"know- ingly\" mens rea applies to every element . The structure of the s tatute shows that background circumstances, like the defendant's status, are likewise excluded. As discussed above, the range of regulatory provisions to which Section 924(a)(2) applies includes some that require mens rea as to background circum- stances and some that do not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1619",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "Instead, with respect to those regulatory provisions, \"knowingly violates\" must refe r to the acts, and n ot to the background circumstances. And if that singular phrase has that meaning with re- spect to some of the covered re gulatory violations, it should have that same meaning with respect to all of them. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Differential application of the \"knowingly\" require- ment to Section 922(g), as compared to regulatory pro- visions with more explicit mens rea requirement s, would not only be textually incongruous but would pro- duce unsound results. Under such a regime, the gov- ernment could convict a firearm seller who has only \"reasonable cause\" to know that the purchaser is an al-ien unlawfully in the United States, see 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "Congress could not have intended to impose a know - ledg e requirement for prosecuting aliens (or felons, or other categories of regulated people ), but a negligence requirement for those who unwittingly deal with them. c. Requiring knowledge of the background circum- stance of a defendant's status, in the context of a prose- cution for a violation of Section 922(g), would be anom- alous in other ways as well. To begin with, t his Court has repeatedly rejected arguments \"that the prosecu- tion must prove a defendant's knowledge of the legal 23 status\" of items , persons, or actions as a prerequisite to a criminal conviction, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], including when construing statutes that punish defendants who act \"knowingly.\" See, e.g., 402 U.S. 558; Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. 337; see also Boyce Motor Lines , 342 U.S. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Here, the fact that someone is an \"alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States,\" 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "c. Requiring knowledge of the background circum- stance of a defendant's status, in the context of a prose- cution for a violation of Section 922(g), would be anom- alous in other ways as well. To begin with, t his Court has repeatedly rejected arguments \"that the prosecu- tion must prove a defendant's knowledge of the legal 23 status\" of items , persons, or actions as a prerequisite to a criminal conviction, 418 U.S. 87, including when construing statutes that punish defendants who act \"knowingly.\" See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. 337; see also Boyce Motor Lines , 342 U.S. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Here, the fact that someone is an \"alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States,\" 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A), is plainly a \" legal\" status , as the Court has understood that concept .",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "c. Requiring knowledge of the background circum- stance of a defendant's status, in the context of a prose- cution for a violation of Section 922(g), would be anom- alous in other ways as well. To begin with, t his Court has repeatedly rejected arguments \"that the prosecu- tion must prove a defendant's knowledge of the legal 23 status\" of items , persons, or actions as a prerequisite to a criminal conviction, 418 U.S. 87, including when construing statutes that punish defendants who act \"knowingly.\" See, e.g., 402 U.S. 558; Boyce Motor Lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Boyce Motor Lines , 342 U.S. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Here, the fact that someone is an \"alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States,\" 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A), is plainly a \" legal\" status , as the Court has understood that concept .",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "861(b) and (c). The government , however, need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his own age (or, indeed, the age of the juvenile used in the crime) . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nor, for example, need the govern- ment prove self-knowledge of status by a \"public official \" who accepts a bribe, 18 U.S.C 201(b)(2); by \"an officer, employee, contractor, or consu ltant of the United States\" 24 who misap propriates classified materials , 18 U.S.C. 1924(a) ; or by a \"parent, legal guardian, or person hav- ing custody or control of a minor\" who allows the minor to be used for child pornography, 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "981 F.2d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "For example, al l non citizens (and all felons) are ineligible to serve on federal juries, 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1) and (5), and they must disclose that status if called for jury service, see 28 U.S.C. 1864(a), 1865(a); 25 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Aliens who are illegally or unlawfully in the United States are also ineligible for many federal, state, and lo- cal public benefits, including public assistance , unem- ployment benefits, and governme nt gra nts, contracts, and loans, see 8 U.S.C. 1611, 1621(a) and (c)(1), 1641(b), and t hus should not apply for them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct",
		"context": "9 -10. But he may not rely on the complexi- ties of that law to mount a mistake -of-law defense. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. His disregard or igno- rance of the circumstances that give rise to a legal obli-gation to depart the United States does not entitle him to escape liability for illegally possessing a firearm while he remains.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2001",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	}
]