the existence of strict psychophysical or psychological laws, together with the strict and potentially deterministic physical laws, would be at odds with the essentially holistic and rational nature of belief attributions ( davidson 1970, 219 - 221. ) if causation requires causes and effects to fall under strict laws, and if there are no strict laws concerning mental events, mental causation seems to be impossible. this is the “ argument from the anomaly of the mental. ” one response would be to abandon the requirement that causes and effects must fall under strict laws. another response would be to retain the causal law requirement but to deny that the mental is anomalous in the relevant sense. davidson himself did neither of these. his anomalous monism was designed to show that mental causation is in fact compatible with the causal law requirement and the absence of strict psychological and psychophysical laws. davidson derived anomalous monism from the following three seemingly inconsistent premises : ( 1 ) principle of causal interaction : at least some mental events causally interact with physical events. ( 2 ) principle of the nomological character of causality : events related as cause and effect fall under strict causal laws. ( 3 ) principle of the anomalism of the mental : there are no strict psychological or psychophysical laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) apparently imply the falsity of ( 3 ) : “ it is natural to reason that the first two principles [... ] together imply that at least some mental events can be predicted and explained on the basis of laws, while the principle of the anomalism of the mental denies this ” ( davidson 1970, 209 ). davidson ’ s goal was to interpret ( 1 ), ( 2 ), and ( 3 ) in such a way that they are not only consistent but jointly entail that particular mental events which causally interact with other events are identical to physical events. according to davidson, ( 1 ) is an extensional claim about a relation between particular events : although the assertion of the causal relation between two events c and e requires describing them, the causal relation itself holds “ no matter how they are described ” ( davidson 1993, 6 ; 1970, 215 ). in contrast, ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) concern laws. since “ laws are linguistic ” ( davidson 1970, 215 ) and thus an intensional affair, particular events fall under laws “ only as described. ” ( 2 ) says that whenever two


contrast, ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) concern laws. since “ laws are linguistic ” ( davidson 1970, 215 ) and thus an intensional affair, particular events fall under laws “ only as described. ” ( 2 ) says that whenever two events c and e are related as cause and effect, there are descriptions “ dc ” and “ de ” of c and e, respectively, under which c and e instantiate a causal law, although there may be descriptions “ d * c ” and “ d * e ” under which they do not instantiate a causal law ( although “ d * c caused d * e ” is nevertheless a true singular causal statement ). given this, it is easy to see why davidson thinks that ( 1 ), ( 2 ), and ( 3 ) entail that mental events which causally interact with other events must be identical to physical events. by ( 1 ), some mental event m causes or is caused by a physical event p. by ( 2 ), m and p must therefore instantiate a strict causal law. that is, there must be descriptions “ dm ” and “ dp ” of m and p, respectively, such that “ dm - events cause dp - events ” ( or “ dp - events cause dm - events ” ) is a strict causal law. by ( 3 ), this can only be a physical law. hence, “ dm ” and “ dp ” must belong to the vocabulary of physics. since events are mental or physical “ only as described ” and since m has with “ dm ” at least one physical description, m must thus be a physical event ( davidson 1970, 224 ). however, while causation may admittedly be an extensional relation between particular events, many philosophers have argued that which causal relations an event enters into is determined by which event - types it falls under. the singing ’ s being the singing of a high c, it seems, is causally relevant for its causing the shattering, while its being the singing of the word “ freedom ” is not. according to anomalous monism, davidson ’ s critics claim, only the strict laws of physics can be causal laws, and hence events seem to be causally related only in virtue of falling under physical event - types, rendering mental event - types causally irrelevant : davidson ’ s argument for anomalous monism shows that any causal relation involving a mental event and a physical event holds only because a strict physical law subsumes the two events


physical event - types, rendering mental event - types causally irrelevant : davidson ’ s argument for anomalous monism shows that any causal relation involving a mental event and a physical event holds only because a strict physical law subsumes the two events under physical kinds or descriptions. the fact that the mental event is a mental event, or that it is the kind of mental event that it is, appears to be entirely immaterial to the causal relation. [... ] individual mental events [... ] do have causal efficacy, but only because they fall under physical kinds, and the mental kinds that they are have [... ] nothing to say about what causal relations they enter into. the causal structure of the world is wholly determined by the physical kinds and properties instantiated by events of this world. ( kim 2003b, 126 ) this is a prominent objection against anomalous monism ( see, for example, honderich 1982 ; kim 1989a, 1993a ; sosa 1993 ). anomalous monism may avoid token - or event - physicalism, but it seems to succumb to type - or property - epiphenomenalism : mental events, by being identical to physical events, are causally efficacious, but that they are the kind of mental event they are adds nothing to their causal efficacy ( for responses on behalf of anomalous monism see campbell 1997, 1998 ; davidson 1993 ; lepore & loewer 1987 ; mclaughlin 1989 ). anti - individualism or externalism holds that the content of mental states and the meaning of some natural language terms is a relational, or extrinsic, rather than a local, or intrinsic, property ( see burge 1979 ; putnam 1975 ). what are local or relational properties? suppose sarah weighs 110 pounds, is four foot five, has blond hair and is taller than jack. the first three properties seem to be local in the sense that they supervene upon sarah ’ s internal make - up and sarah can acquire or loose them only if she herself undergoes some change. the fourth property, in contrast, seems to be relational in the sense that sarah has it only by courtesy of certain external facts, namely, only if there is someone else, jack, who is smaller than she is. if jack grows tall enough, sarah loses the property of being taller than jack, although she herself does not undergo any change. according to hilary putnam, meanings of natural kind terms are relational properties ( see putnam 1975


, who is smaller than she is. if jack grows tall enough, sarah loses the property of being taller than jack, although she herself does not undergo any change. according to hilary putnam, meanings of natural kind terms are relational properties ( see putnam 1975 ). what sarah means by an utterance of, say, “ water, ” “ tiger, ” “ elm, ” or “ gold ” is not determined solely by her internal make - up, but also by her environment. consequently, such terms can mean different things in the mouth of molecularly identical twins that are indistinguishable with regard to their local properties. meanings “ just ain ’ t in the head, ” as putnam famously put it. moreover, the contents of the corresponding thoughts seem to be relational properties, too : what sarah believes when she has a belief she would express as, say, “ water is wet ” is determined by the way the world is and not solely by how things are “ inside ” her. tyler burge went even further and argued that natural kind terms are not the only terms whose meaning is determined by external factors and that not only differences in the physical environment can affect the meaning of a term or the content of a belief, but also differences in a subject ’ s historical, linguistic, or social environment ( see burge 1979 ). externalism or anti - individualism makes mental causation problematic. causality seems to be an entirely local affair in the sense that a system ’ s behavior apparently supervenes upon its internal make - up. consequently, two systems exactly alike in all internal respects will behave in exactly the same way, so that relational properties like being a genuine dollar coin or being a photo of sarah do not seem to make a difference to the behavior of, say, a vending machine or a scanner : as long as the piece of metal inserted into a vending machine has a certain set of local properties, the vending machine will exhibit a certain behavior, no matter whether the piece of mental inserted is a genuine dollar coin or a counterfeit, and a scanner will produce a certain distribution of pixels on the screen, no matter whether the object scanned is a photo of sarah or a piece of paper locally indistinguishable from a photo of sarah. the assumption that causation is a local affair, when combined with externalism or anti - individualism, leads to epiphenomenalism : the meaning or content of a mental state, being a relational property, threatens to be as irrelevant for our


that causation is a local affair, when combined with externalism or anti - individualism, leads to epiphenomenalism : the meaning or content of a mental state, being a relational property, threatens to be as irrelevant for our behavior as the property of being a genuine dollar coin is for the behavior of a vending machine. in order to avoid epiphenomenalism, we must either eschew anti - individualism or show how relational mental properties can make a causal difference. jerry fodor tried to explicate a notion of “ narrow content ” according to which the mental states of intrinsically indistinguishable subjects must have the same contents, although their relationally individuated “ wide contents ” may differ ( see fodor 1987, ch. 1, 1991 ). since narrow contents supervene upon the intrinsic make - up of a subject, fodor held, the charge of epiphenomenalism can be avoided. however, he has recently given up on this idea because it proved extremely difficult to say exactly what narrow contents are ( see fodor 1995 ). frank jackson and philip pettit argue that relational properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in so called “ program explanations, ” although strictly speaking the causal work is done solely by local properties ( see, for example, jackson & pettit 1990 ). in a similar vein, lynne rudder baker and tyler burge claim that the charge of epiphenomenalism “ just melts away ” ( baker 1993, 93 ) if we acknowledge that our explanatory practice which undoubtedly treats explanations in terms of relational properties as causal explanations trumps any metaphysical armchair argument to the contrary ( see baker 1993, 1995 ; burge 1993 ). and fred dretske argues that while the triggering causes of behavior are always local, relational mental properties can make a causal difference in virtue of being structuring causes of behavior, that is, in virtue of structuring a causal system in such a way that the occurrence of a triggering neurophysiological cause causes a given behavioral effect ( see, for example, dretske 1988 ). most philosophers nowadays defend some version of non - reductive physicalism. according to non - reductive physicalism, all scientifically respectable entities are physical entities, where entities which cannot be straightforwardly reduced to physical entities — mental events or properties, for instance — are physical at least in the broad sense that they superven


to non - reductive physicalism, all scientifically respectable entities are physical entities, where entities which cannot be straightforwardly reduced to physical entities — mental events or properties, for instance — are physical at least in the broad sense that they supervene or depend upon physical entities. non - reductive physicalism is attractive because it promises to respect the naturalistic attitude characteristic of our modern scientific time while at the same time also preserving our self - conception as autonomous agents. for decades, however, jaegwon kim has argued that non - reductive physicalists unwittingly commit themselves to epiphenomenalism. his master argument is the so - called causal exclusion argument, which he uses as a reductio ad absurdum of non - reductive physicalism : if the mental were merely supervenient upon but not reducible to the physical, as non - reductive physicalism holds, it would be causally irrelevant ( barring overdetermination ). non - reductive physicalism is thus unable to steer a safe path between the scylla of reductionism on the one hand and the charybdis of epiphenomenalism on the other, so that those unwilling to embrace outright reductionism are forced to accept epiphenomenalism. kim ’ s most recent version of the causal exclusion argument, the so - called supervenience argument, has two stages. stage one holds that mental properties ( or, rather, their instances – a qualification that will be omitted from now on ) can cause other mental properties only if they can cause physical properties. stage two then holds that mental properties can cause physical properties only if they are reducible to physical properties or genuinely overdetermining. since overdetermination can be ruled out, the only remaining alternatives are “ reduction or causal impotence ” ( kim 2005, 54 ). suppose a mental property m causes a mental property m *. since mind - body supervenience “ is a shared minimum commitment of all positions that are properly called physicalist ” ( kim 2005, 13 ), non - reductive physicalism must posit a physical supervenience base p * of m * which is ( non - causally ) sufficient for m *. what, then, is responsible for m * ’ s occurrence — m or p *? there appears to be “ a tension between vertical determination and horizontal causation ” ( kim 2003a, 153 ) : “ under the assumption


for m *. what, then, is responsible for m * ’ s occurrence — m or p *? there appears to be “ a tension between vertical determination and horizontal causation ” ( kim 2003a, 153 ) : “ under the assumption of mind - body supervenience, m * occurs because its supervenience base p * occurs, and as long as p * occurs, m * must occur [... ] regardless of whether or not an instance of m preceded it. this puts the claim of m to be a cause of m * in jeopardy : p * alone seems fully responsible for, and capable of accounting for, the occurrence of m * ” ( kim 1998, 42 ). the upshot of this first stage of the argument is that the tension between m and p * can be resolved only by accepting that “ m caused m * by causing its supervenience base p * ” ( kim 2005, 40 ). stage two then goes on to argue that mental - to - physical causation is impossible. given the so - called causal closure of the physical, p * must have a sufficient and completely physical cause p, leading to a competition between m and p for the role of p * ’ s cause. barring overdetermination, m seems bound to loose this competition : if p is a sufficient cause of p *, then once p is instantiated all that is required for p * to occur is done and there is nothing left for m to contribute, causally speaking. this completes stage two of the causal exclusion argument. both steps together seem to lead to epiphenomenalism – unless mental properties are reducible or genuinely overdetermining, they must be causally inert, so that with the overdetermination option and the reduction option ruled out, epiphenomenalism is the inevitable consequence. in response, non - reductive physicalists have offered compatibilist accounts of mental causation designed to explain how irreducible mental properties can play a substantial causal role in the production of physical effects, given that the causal work is done solely by physical properties. the common core of these attempts is the idea that there is some compatibilist condition c such that ( 1. ) fulfilling c is sufficient for being causally relevant ; ( 2. ) properties which do not do any real causal work can fulfill c ; ( 3. ) c can be fulfilled by two or more properties without leading to any kind of “ causal competition


) fulfilling c is sufficient for being causally relevant ; ( 2. ) properties which do not do any real causal work can fulfill c ; ( 3. ) c can be fulfilled by two or more properties without leading to any kind of “ causal competition ; ” and ( 4. ) mental properties can fulfill c. prominent compatibilist candidates for c include figuring in counterfactual dependencies ( see lepore & loewer 1987 ) or program explanations ( see jackson & pettit 1990 ), being a determinable of the physical properties which do the causal work ( see yablo 1992 ), or falling under non - strict causal laws ( see fodor 1989 ; mclaughlin 1989 ). intuition tells us that we, as conscious selves, are in charge of our actions, and the man in the street finds the idea that consciousness is a causally irrelevant by - product of brain processes preposterous. empirical scientists, however, have long questioned these assumptions. many of them think that the brain causes our actions and then makes us think that it was us who did it : “ the unique human convenience of conscious thoughts that preview our actions gives us the privilege of feeling we willfully cause what we do. in fact, unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious thought about action and the action, and also produce the sense of will we experience by perceiving the thought as cause of the action ” ( wegner 2002, 98 ). no empirical research has provoked more philosophical discussion than benjamin libet ’ s experiments concerning the relationship between unconscious brain activity and the subjective feeling of volition during the initiation of simple motor actions ( see libet et al. 1983 ; libet 1985 ). previous research had shown that actions that are perceived to be the result of a conscious feeling of volition are also preceded by a pattern of brain activity known as the “ readiness potential. ” the question libet and his colleagues wanted to answer was : what comes first — the feeling of volition or the readiness potential? they instructed subjects to perform a simple motor activity, like pressing a button, within a certain time frame at an arbitrary moment decided by them ( “ let the urge to act appear on its own any time without any preplanning or concentration on when to act ” ; libet et al. 1983, 625 ). the subjects were asked to remember exactly when they made the decision, when they were first aware of the “ urge to act, ” by noticing the position of a dot circling a clock face (


” ; libet et al. 1983, 625 ). the subjects were asked to remember exactly when they made the decision, when they were first aware of the “ urge to act, ” by noticing the position of a dot circling a clock face ( the “ clock ” being a cathode ray oscilloscope modified so as to be able to measure time intervals of roughly fifty milliseconds ). the time when the action was carried out, when the subjects actually pressed the button, was measured by electronically recording the position of the dot. on average, it took about 200 milliseconds from the first conscious feeling of voliton to the actual pressing of the button. but libet and his collaborators also recorded the subjects ’ brain activity by means of an eeg. they found that an increased electrical activity, the so - called “ readiness potential, ” was built up ( primarily in the secondary motor cortex ) on average approximately 500 milliseconds before the button was pushed, and that means approximately 300 milliseconds before the subjects felt the conscious “ urge to act ” ( libet ’ s experiments have been repeated and improved several times ; see, e. g. keller & heckhausen 1990 ; haggard & eimer 1999 ; miller & trevena 2002 ; trevena & miller 2002 ). it is tempting to interpret this result as showing that the allegedly free decision of the subject was in fact determined by unconscious brain processes and that, at least insofar as decisions to act are concerned, our mind is a mere epiphenomenon, but it remains a controversial issue exactly what philosophical consequences we ought to draw from libet ’ s experiments ( see pockett et al. 2006 ). epiphenomenalism has had few friends. it has been deemed “ thoughtless and incoherent ” ( taylor 1927, 198 ), “ unintelligible ” ( benecke 1901, 26 ), “ quite impossible to believe ” ( taylor 1963, 28 ) and “ truly incredible ” ( mclaughlin 1994, 284 ). the resistance stems from the fact that many think that if epiphenomenalism were correct, we could not be the kind of being we are and we could not occupy the place in the world we occupy. we would instead be at the mercy of our brains and we would have to say that our actions are all our brains ’ actions and that ultimately “ we ” have nothing to do with them. if the eyebrows are raised they are not raised by us


. we would instead be at the mercy of our brains and we would have to say that our actions are all our brains ’ actions and that ultimately “ we ” have nothing to do with them. if the eyebrows are raised they are not raised by us. what is done is not done by us. [... ] we go piggy - back, and we cannot get off. where it goes, we go. what ’ s “ it ”? the body / brain is “ it. ” “ it ” is not us, is the point. epiphenomenalism would be the ruin of the self and that self ’ s life. [ … ] our supposed self is illusory, and we are deluded. [... ] we lose ourselves when consciousness ceases to be effective in what we chose. ( hyslop 1998, 68 ) in his book the fundamental questions of philosophy, alfred cyril ewing introduced epiphenomenalism as a theory that can be disposed of in a “ conclusive fashion ” ( ewing 1953, 127 ) : “ that epiphenomenalism is false is assumed in all practical life [... ] and it is silly to adopt a philosophy the denial of which is implied by us every time we do anything ” ( ewing 1953, 128 ). but what exactly is it that renders epiphenomenalism so evidently absurd? epiphenomenalism is counterintuitive. there ’ s no doubt about that. yet, philosophy, like all science, is not concerned with intuitiveness but with truth, and that a theory is counterintuitive does not show that it is not true. in fact, a host of widely accepted and feted theories are counterintuitive at first and some remain so forever : the copernican system, the freudian theory of the unconscious, einstein ’ s theories of special and general relativity or quantum mechanics. einstein ’ s theory of relativity, for instance, is much less intuitive than newtonian physics, but ultimately the fate of a theory depends on whether there are good arguments in favor of it, not on whether it is intuitive. if there are reasons for taking epiphenomenalism seriously, then we should do that, just as we do it in the case of the theory of relativity : “ epiphenomenalism may be counterintuitive, but it is not obviously false, so if a sound argument forces it on us, we should accept it ” (


as we do it in the case of the theory of relativity : “ epiphenomenalism may be counterintuitive, but it is not obviously false, so if a sound argument forces it on us, we should accept it ” ( chalmers 1996, 159 ). it might seem as if we can be introspectively aware of chains of mental occurrences, one of which is causing the other, for instance when we reason through an argument, write a piece of prose, or acquire a new belief by inferring it from previously held beliefs. we just know, it seems, that in these cases there is mental causation. the same may be said to be true of various chains of occurrences both inside and outside of our mind, for instance when volitions give rise to appropriate behavior, when a pain results in a wincing, or when fear makes our heart beat faster – one might say that in these cases, too, we have some immediate cognitive access to the causal efficacy of the mental. if we could indeed be in some sense “ directly acquainted ” with the fact that such sequences are the result of genuinely causal processes, epiphenomenalism would not be an option. yet, our awareness of regular successions does not and cannot reveal their causal nature. the awareness of the psychological or psychophysical sequences that make up our everyday life is no more awareness of causal processes than awareness of the sequence of shadows a moving car casts ( lachs 1963, 189 ). whatever those who hold that epiphenomenalism is “ incompetent to take account of the obvious facts of mental life ” ( taylor 1927, 198 ) mean, they cannot mean that it is contradicted by our immediate cognitive access to our mind ’ s causal effectiveness, because there is no phenomenological difference between a situation in which epiphenomenalism is false and a situation in which epiphenomenalism is true. one of the earliest objections to epiphenomenalism starts with the observation that we have the properties we have because they contributed positively to our ancestors ’ differential fitness and that a property which endows an organism with an evolutionary advantage must make a causal difference to its survival. since we have mental properties, while our ancient ancestors did not, the argument continues, these properties must have evolved over time and therefore must be capable of making a causal difference ( this argument is frequently attributed to popper & eccles 1977, but it was endorsed already by james 1879 ). epiphen


not, the argument continues, these properties must have evolved over time and therefore must be capable of making a causal difference ( this argument is frequently attributed to popper & eccles 1977, but it was endorsed already by james 1879 ). epiphenomenalists respond that mental properties may have evolved as nomologically necessary by - products of adaptive traits. a polar bear ’ s having a heavy coat decreases its fitness ( by slowing it down ), but is nevertheless an evolved trait because it was an inevitable by - product of a highly adaptive trait, namely, having a warm coat : “ having a heavy coat is an unavoidable concomitant of having a warm coat [... ], and the advantages for survival of having a warm coat outweighed the disadvantages of having a heavy one ” ( jackson 1982, 134 ). likewise, it could be that we enjoy our mental life because its neurophysiological causes contributed positively to our ancestors ’ differential fitness by making them “ fitter ” compared to those who lacked such neurophysiological equipment. maybe we have a mind because it was evolutionary adaptive to have a big brain and it is nomologically impossible to have a big brain without having a mind. the problem with this response is that while we understand perfectly well why polar bears can have warm coats only in virtue of having heavy coats, we have little or no idea why it should be necessary to have a mind in order to have a big brain. why should of all neurophysiological structures only those with a causally irrelevant mind as by - product be able to do what was required for our ancestors ’ survival? if a company claims that religion is not an employment criterion, but it turns out that all its employees are of the same religion, that cries out for an explanation, and the same holds if the epiphenomenalist claims that although our mind is totally ineffective, during the course of evolution only brain structures have evolved that are accompanied by a mind as a by - product. another problem is that epiphenomenalism seems to render our standard response to the other minds problem impossible. according to that response, our belief that our fellow human beings have a mental life similar to ours is justified by an argument from analogy, stated in its classic form by john stuart mill and bertrand russell ( mill 1865, 190 - 191 ; russell 1948, 208 - 209 & 501 - 504 ). since our own body and outward behavior are observably similar to


from analogy, stated in its classic form by john stuart mill and bertrand russell ( mill 1865, 190 - 191 ; russell 1948, 208 - 209 & 501 - 504 ). since our own body and outward behavior are observably similar to the body and the behavior of our fellow human beings, we are justified by analogy in believing that they enjoy a mental life similar to ours. the idea is to infer like mental causes from like behavioral effects and this does not work for the epiphenomenalist who denies that there are any mental causes. ( this is an objection to epiphenomenalism only if the argument from analogy does indeed provide a good solution to the other minds problem, and that is far from obvious – notoriously, inductions based on a single positive instance are problematic and in the case of other minds there is no independent way of verifying the conclusion. ) the epiphenomenalist can employ the same strategy as in the case of the argument from evolution and insist that our inference to the mental life of others need not advert to causality all the way up. if the similar behavior and the similar body of others provide evidence for anything, they provide evidence for the assumption that they are in physical states relevantly similar to those which, in us, are causally responsible for our mental life. this inference is not one from outward behavior to inward mental causes, but from outward behavior to inward neurophysiological causes and from there on further to inward mental effects, but it seems that it is no less reliable ( see benecke 1901 ; jackson 1982 ). davidson famously pointed out that i may have a reason for performing an action, perform that action, and yet not perform it for that reason ( davidson 1963, 9 ). suppose, for instance, i want to meet my mistress and i believe that i can attain this goal by giving her a call ; suppose i also have a second - order desire to get rid off my first - order desire and i believe that i can attain this goal by calling my psychiatrist. when i finally walk to the phone, it seems, i have a reason for doing so ( my first - order desire plus my corresponding belief ) which is not the reason for which i walk to phone ( wilson 1997, 72 ). according to davidson, the reasons for an action and the reasons for which the action is performed can be easily distinguished : the reasons for which an action is performed are those which cause the action. this explanation is not available to the ep


, 72 ). according to davidson, the reasons for an action and the reasons for which the action is performed can be easily distinguished : the reasons for which an action is performed are those which cause the action. this explanation is not available to the epiphenomenalist who holds that no reason ever causes an action. ( again, this is an objection against epiphenomenalism only if davidson ’ s distinction makes sense ; see latham 2003 for the view that it doesn ’ t. ) in response, however, the epiphenomenalist can hold that the reasons for which an action is performed are those that are caused by the neurophysiological cause of the action. knowledge, memory, justification, meaning and reference all seem to require the causal efficacy of what is known, remembered, believed, meant or picked out. how, for instance, could we say that sarah knows that there is orange juice in the fridge or that her belief that there is orange juice in the fridge is justified, if her belief were in no way causally connected to the fridge or the orange juice? the causal relation does not have to be direct – it may be that sarah ’ s mother saw the orange juice in the fridge, told it to sarah ’ s sister who in turn told it to sarah, causing her thereby to believe that there is orange juice in the fridge. most of our knowledge depends upon such indirect causal chains. we are not in direct causal contact with plato, the cholera, caesar ’ s crossing of the rubicon or the outbreak of world war i, but we can have knowledge about these things because we are linked to them by long causal chains starting with someone who was in direct causal contact with them. according to a causal theory of knowledge, knowledge is impossible without such a causal chain, and something similar holds for justification, memory, meaning, and reference. if sarah believes that it rained on february 1, 1953 in amsterdam, but the rain on february 1, 1953 in amsterdam is not causally related in any way to sarah ’ s belief, then it seems that her belief cannot be justified ; if the rain on that day is not causally related to sarah ’ s current mental states in any way, then it seems that she cannot remember the rain on february 1, 1953 in amsterdam ; and one reason why sarah ’ s twin on putnam ’ s famous twin earth ( see putnam 1975 ) cannot refer to water and why by using the word “ water ” she cannot mean water is that she never did causally interact with


1953 in amsterdam ; and one reason why sarah ’ s twin on putnam ’ s famous twin earth ( see putnam 1975 ) cannot refer to water and why by using the word “ water ” she cannot mean water is that she never did causally interact with water. if knowledge, justification, memory, meaning and reference require a causal contact with what is known, believed, remembered, meant and picked out, epiphenomenalism implies that we cannot have knowledge of or justified beliefs about mental states ( our own or those of others ), that we cannot remember past mental states, cannot refer to mental states and cannot make meaningful statements about them. however, it is absurd to hold that sarah cannot know that she is having a toothache, that she cannot remember the feeling she had when she fell in love for the first time etc. moreover, if a causal theory of meaning or reference is correct, then the very statements the epiphenomenalist uses to formulate her position are meaningless : “ if the mental contributes nothing to the way in which the linguistic practices involving ‘ [ psychological ' terms are developed and sustained in the speech - community [... ] then [ this ] would deprive the epiphenomenalist of the linguistic resources to enunciate his thesis ” ( foster 1996, 191 ). to the extent that epiphenomenalism aspires to make a meaningful statement about the nature of our mental life, it would thus be self - refuting since that is impossible if it is true ( see robinson 2006 for a discussion of this problem and for a reply on behalf of epiphenomenalism ). even if the epiphenomenalist could somehow formulate her position, it would be a pointless exercise from her point of view to try to convince us of its truth, because if she is right, rational considerations can have no causal influence upon our beliefs and actions. in response, the epiphenomenalist could argue that a causal chain cannot always be required because sarah can know, justifiably believe or remember that bachelors are unmarried and that two plus two equals four, or use the term “ the biggest star in the universe ” to refer to an object even if she never causally interacted with bachelors, the number two or the biggest star in the universe. the problem, however, is that our knowledge and our memories of and our talk about our mental states seem to be fundamentally different from the typical examples of knowledge, memory, or reference that


her feeling to her current state of knowledge or memory. why should such a chain be less capable of grounding knowledge or memory than a causal chain which starts with the toothache or the feeling itself? to insist without further explanation that the link has to be causal through and through does not tell us what the apparently indispensable je - ne - sais - quois about such a causal link is, without which knowledge, memory etc. are supposed to be impossible ( see pauen 2006 and staudacher 2006 for further discussion ). there are various objections against epiphenomenalism, nearly all of which are based upon the claim that this or that undeniable fact would be impossible if epiphenomenalism were true. in response, the epiphenomenalist typically points out that the causal relation she says holds between mental states and their neurophysiological correlates ensures that whenever her opponents appeal to a mental cause to account for some apparently undeniable fact, she can appeal to a physical cause which is correlated with the alleged mental cause with nomological necessity and does exactly the same causal job. - baker, l. ( 1993 ). metaphysics and mental causation, mental causation, hrsg. v. j. heil & a. mele, 75 - 95. oxford : clarendon press. - baker, l. ( 1995 ). explaining attitudes. cambridge : cambridge university press. - benecke, e. ( 1901 ). on the aspect theory of the relation of mind to body. proceedings of the aristotelian society, 1, 18 - 44. - birnbacher, d. ( 2006 ). causal interpretations of correlations between neural and conscious events. journal of consciousness studies, 13, 115 - 128. - bonnet, c. ( 1755 ). essai de psychologie. ou considerations de l ’ ame, sur l ’ habitude et sur l ’ education. london. reprinted 1978, hildesheim : georg olms verlag. - burge, t. ( 1979 ). individualism and the mental. midwest studies in philosophy, 4, 73 - 121. - burge, t. ( 1993 ). mind - body causation and explanatory practice, mental causation, hrsg. v. j. heil & a. mele, 97 - 120. oxford : clarendon press. - campbell, n. ( 1997 ). anomalous mon


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four laws that drive the universe by peter atkins ( oxford university press, usa, hardcover, 9780199232369, 130pp. ) publication date : november 2007 written by peter atkins, one of the worlds leading authorities on thermodynamics, this powerful and compact introduction explains what these four laws are and how they work, using accessible language and virtually no mathematics. guiding the reader a step at a time, atkins begins with zeroth ( so named because the first two laws were well established before scientists realized that a third law, relating to temperature, should precede them - - hence the jocular name zeroth ), and proceeds through the first, second, and third laws, offering a clear account of concepts such as the availability of work and the conservation of energy. atkins ranges from the fascinating theory of entropy ( revealing how its unstoppable rise constitutes the engine of the universe ), through the concept of free energy, and to the brink, and then beyond the brink, of absolute zero. c. p. snow once remarked that not knowing the second law of thermodynamics is like never having read a work by shakespeare. this brief but brilliant book introduces general readers to one of the cornerstones of modern science, four laws that are as integral to the well - educated mind as such great dramatic works as hamlet or macbeth.


, pp. 79 - 109. idem, “ a selection from the cuneiform historical texts from nineveh ( 1927 - 32 ), ” iraq 7, 1940, pp. 85 - 131. s. r. tokhtas ’ ev, “ scythica v trudakh ii vsesoyuznogo simpoziuma po drevnei istorii prichernomor ’ ya ( tskhaltubo, 1979 ), ” vdi, 1984a, pp. 133 - 43. idem, “ kimmeriiskyaya toponimiya i, ” in etnogenez narodov balkan i severnogo prichernomor ’ ya, moscow, 1984b, pp. 142 - 48. p. k. uslar, drevneishie skazaniya o kavkaze, tiflis, 1881. yu. g. vinogradov, “ polis v severnom prichernomor ’ e, ” in antichnaya gretsiya i, moscow, 1983, pp. 366 - 420. f. wehrli, die schule des aristoteles vii. herakleides pontikos, basel, 1953. c. b. welles, royal correspondence in the hellenistic period, new haven, conn., 1934. ( sergei r. tokhtas ’ ev ) originally published : december 15, 1991 last updated : october 20, 2011 this article is available in print. vol. v, fasc. 6, pp. 563 - 567


light behind the fall : japan ’ s electricity consumption, the environment, and economic growth by vaclav smil the phenomenon is unmistakable ( albeit largely unnoticed ), and the contrast lends itself to all kinds of symbolic interpretations : japan ’ s unending retreat from being a highly respected polity and economic powerhouse, widely expected to become the 21st century ’ s global ichiban, has entered troubled waters. as a result of that downward economic trend, whose beginning was signaled by the collapse of the nikkei index in 1990, japan ’ s gdp managed the real ( inflation - adjusted ) annual growth of just 1. 1 % between 1991 and 2006, while during the preceding 15 years the country ’ s gdp had nearly doubled. but this long - lasting economic and social malaise has been accompanied by a substantial ( 17 % ) increase in japan ’ s primary energy consumption. this is remarkable because pre - 1990 japan was the world ’ s most consistently, and most admirably, energy - efficient economy that had always managed to do with relatively less energy. overall efficiency of japan ’ s energy conversion ( usually measured as the amount of primary commercial energy used to generate a unit of gdp ) was high before the first opec oil price crisis in 1973 - 74, when the western nations were wasting energy with abandon. during the early 1970s it took about twice as much energy to produce a dollar of gdp in the us as it did in japan. and when europe and north america belatedly embarked on unprecedented energy conservation programs during the late 1970s, they found that the already frugal japan was becoming even more energy - parsimonious. this great energy conservation drive was going strong through 1985, when opec ’ s hold on the global oil market collapsed and oil prices fell from the historic high of nearly $ 40 in 1981 to less than $ 10 ; its effects would linger through the 1980s. by 1990 the us needed about 30 % less energy to produce a dollar of gdp than it did in 1974 — but japan had lowered the average energy of its economy by another 35 %. consequently, despite the pronounced appreciation of its currency ( by 1990 the purchasing power parity was ¥193 / us $ ), japan was thus even further ahead of the us in energy conservation than it had been before the first oil price crises of the early 1970s. but then an unexpected reversal took place. between 1990 and 2005, the energy intensity of the us economy ( using inflation - adjusted monies ) fell by another 12 %, but the energy intensity of the japanese economy


oil price crises of the early 1970s. but then an unexpected reversal took place. between 1990 and 2005, the energy intensity of the us economy ( using inflation - adjusted monies ) fell by another 12 %, but the energy intensity of the japanese economy first stagnated and then, by the year 2000, was actually about 6 % above the 1990 value. by the year 2005 it was still about 3 % higher. a closer look at the reasons for this reversal shows two surprising factors. first, japan ’ s fabulous industrial energy conservation machine had seized up ( fig. 1 ). energy intensities ( that is, energy used per unit value of product ) of all major industries — after falling by 20 - 50 % between 1973 and the late 1980s — had reached their lowest levels between 1988 and 1990, and had risen and stagnated afterwards : by the year 2000, the energy intensity for the iron and steel industry, manufacturing, and ceramics were about 12 %, 15 %, and 17 % above the 1989 level respectively. fig. 1. energy intensities of japan ’ s major industries why did this happen? fig. 1 clearly indicates that the rate of improvement was already considerably lower during the late 1980s than it had been during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and hence it would have been unrealistic to expect further large efficiency gains during the 1990s. this sequence is universal : the least expensive, technically the easiest or the most rewarding energy conservation measures ( “ low - hanging fruit ” in the engineering parlance ) are taken first, and subsequent improvements depend much more on the cost of energy : during the 1990s, world oil prices remained stable and low, discouraging more expensive conservation measures. but this does not explain the post - 1990 reversals of industrial energy intensity trends. those are attributable to several concurrent trends. first, as large numbers of more efficient energy converters and processes that were installed before 1990 began to age, their performance began to deteriorate. assiduous maintenance and upgrading can prevent such deterioration, but in many cases these steps were not taken because companies were short of funds as they faced contracting markets and foreign competition, or as they channeled their investment into setting up new facilities overseas ( especially in china ) and neglected the domestic infrastructure. contraction and stagnation of the japanese economy and foreign competition also meant that many industries began to use their assets less intensively, and lower utilization capacities often translate into higher energy ( and monetary ) costs per unit of production. finally, some industries tried to


and stagnation of the japanese economy and foreign competition also meant that many industries began to use their assets less intensively, and lower utilization capacities often translate into higher energy ( and monetary ) costs per unit of production. finally, some industries tried to stay competitive by concentrating on production of higher - quality items that are often much more energy - intensive than the mass produced varieties that now come increasingly from china and india ( stainless steel vs. ordinary sheet steel ; composite materials vs. ordinary ceramics ). the second reason was that japanese citizens — after generations of relatively frugal living — had finally began to spend more on their interior environment, and nowhere has this increase been clearer than in the rising consumption of electricity. between 1990 and 2005, japan ’ s generation of electricity rose by about 33 % in absolute, and by about 28 % in per capita terms — but per capita residential electricity consumption rose by about 45 %, to roughly 2, 200 kwh / year. this was by far the fastest increase in using any form of residential energy : between 1990 and 2005, consumption of liquid fuels ( dominated by kerosene for heating ) barely changed ( going up by less than 3 % ), and the combustion of natural gas ( for cooking and heating ) went up by less than a quarter. japan ’ s excellent surveys of the ownership of household electricity converters explain the reasons for this rise ( table 1 ). table 1. ownership of household electric converters ( units / 1, 000 households ) between 1990 and 2005 the ownership of automatic washing machines tripled ; installation of room air conditioners more than doubled ; there were 50 % more stereos, about 40 % more vcrs, 20 % more large refrigerators ( with the volume in excess of 300 liters ), and about 10 % more color tvs. moreover, in 2005, virtually every household had a personal computer, and nearly a fifth of them had a dishwasher, items that were relatively rare in 1990. and japanese bought more lights : between 1990 and 2005, the average consumption of electricity for residential lighting went up by about 50 %, to nearly 300 kwh / year / capita or nearly 950 kwh / household ; this was still slightly less than half of the average u. s. household rate, but more than 20 % higher than that of germany, 30 % higher than that of the uk, and twice as high as that of france. consequently, it would seem that japanese homes are increasingly filled with electric ( and electronic ) gadgets. the fact that they still have


higher than that of germany, 30 % higher than that of the uk, and twice as high as that of france. consequently, it would seem that japanese homes are increasingly filled with electric ( and electronic ) gadgets. the fact that they still have fewer lights per household than the three largest european economies — 17, compared to 18. 5 in france, 20. 1 in the uk and 30. 3 in germany ( the u. s. mean is 43 ) — is not a useful comparative metric. japanese lights are far more efficient than those in other affluent countries, because 95 % of them are fluorescent lights — mostly the tubes that produce up to 95 lumens of light per watt compared to just 10 - 15 lumens per watt ( lm / w ) for standard incandescent bulbs. in contrast, only about 45 % of europe ’ s lights and 35 % of u. s. lights are either linear or compact fluorescents ( fig. 2 ). fig. 2. shares of different lights in 2005 consequently, the proper indicator of lighting intensity is the actual quantity of illumination, the amount of lumens available per unit of household area. in japan ( using the average household area of 95 m2 ), this rate is about 515 lm / m2 compared to 315 lm / m2 in the u. s. and 450 lm / m2 in germany : high lighting efficiency and the relatively small area of japanese dwellings more than compensate for a significantly smaller number of lights in japanese homes ( table 2 ). but it is by no means clear to what side of an international comparative ledger this primacy belongs. table 2. residential lighting in japan, usa and germany ( 2005 ) on one hand, light usage in japan points to strongly collective japanese behavior and exemplary frugality ( 95 % use efficient fluorescent lights ), traits that other nations would find useful in their effort to lessen the impact of modern civilization on the global environment ; on the other hand, standard linear fluorescent lights are neither the most spectrally - optimized nor beautiful sources of illumination, and hence their near - universal usage can be seen as a sign of relative impoverishment and, as is so often the case in japan, as yet another inexplicable acceptance of bad taste in a culture that is so devoted to beautiful design. and the japanese, people with an even greater chronic sleep deficit than americans, keep their fluorescent tubes and compacts lit much longer than do people in any other affluent nation, averaging about 3. 4 hours a day


that is so devoted to beautiful design. and the japanese, people with an even greater chronic sleep deficit than americans, keep their fluorescent tubes and compacts lit much longer than do people in any other affluent nation, averaging about 3. 4 hours a day per light, compared to 1. 9 hours in the u. s., 1. 5 hours in germany and a mere hour in france. in a search for specific factors that would explain this significant difference i suggest three realities, none of them unique to japan but all of them quite pronounced in that country. the first factor that contributes to longer use of electric lights is japan ’ s ubiquitous long - distance commuting that often starts and ends in darkness. consequences of the chronic cumulative sleep deficit induced by this practice are well illustrated by a recent survey by infoplant market research : two - thirds of males and 71 % of females sleep when riding a train. the second factor is a sleep pattern common among japanese high - school students : napping ( inemuri ) during the late afternoon and then studying late at night and into the early morning. steger concluded that “ regardless of possible considerations of whether it makes sense, this rhythm seems to be a set sleeping pattern for students in general, and in particular for high - school students preparing for exams. since everyone follows a similar rhythm, it is difficult for an individual to change or even seriously question it. ” finally, there is a traditional japanese arrangement of infants and small children sleeping with the parents, who are readily accessible to children during waking episodes : this practice obviously leads to more light - switching at night, besides making yonaki, sleep - related nighttime crying, more common and a matter of concern for the country ’ s pediatricians. there is little doubt that the japanese would illuminate their households even more if electricity prices were lower. japan ’ s national electricity market was expanded in 2005, but ( unlike in many other countries ) large ( and vertically integrated ) utility companies ( dominated by the giant tokyo electric ) do not allow their customers to switch to other suppliers. even so, the mere threat of further market reforms has helped to reduce electricity prices, albeit only modestly : between 2000 and 2005 they fell by about 5 %. for decades the combination of increasing intensity of outdoor lighting and high densities of japan ’ s residential and industrial areas, and of the country ’ s transportation corridors, has created large bright patches of light across large parts of the archipelago seen on nighttime satellite images ( fig. 3 ). good news is that,


high densities of japan ’ s residential and industrial areas, and of the country ’ s transportation corridors, has created large bright patches of light across large parts of the archipelago seen on nighttime satellite images ( fig. 3 ). good news is that, regardless of what is going on in the outside world, there is now also considerably more light inside the japanese homes. fig. 3. nighttime satellite image of japan ’ s lights superimposed on a daylight satellite image of the archipelago and its eastern neighbors. vaclav smil is distinguished professor, university of manitoba, canada. his interdisciplinary research has roamed broadly over issues of environment, energy, food, population, economics, and policy studies. he wrote this article for japan focus. published on april 2, 2007. his article “ japan and china : the next fifty years, ” is available from japan focus. he can be reached via email and his homepage. 1. calculated from annual data series in : statistics bureau. japan statistical yearbook. tokyo : statistics bureau. the most recent volume is online : www. stat. go. jp / english / data / nenkan. 2. i dealt with various consequences of that transformation in : smil, v. 2006. japan and china : the next fifty years. japan focus summer 2006 : www. japanfocus. org / products / details / 2213. 3. see, among many others : smil, v. 1987. energy food environment : realities, myths, options. oxford : oxford university press ; smil, v. 1992. how efficient is japan ’ s energy use? current politics and economics of japan 2 ( 3 / 4 ) : 315 - 327. 4. i have used purchasing power parity, rather than official exchange rate, to calculate the japanese value from official energy and gdp statistics. 5. for the us data see : energy information administration. 2007. energy consumption, expenditures, and emissions indicators, 1949 - 2005. available online : www. iea. doe. gov / emeu / aer / txt / ptb0105. html. for the japanese data see : the energy conservation center. 2006. handbook of energy & economic statistics in japan. tokyo : the energy conservation center. 6. energy conservation center japan. 2007. japan energy conservation handbook. tokyo : eccj. 7. statistics bureau. 2007. japan statistical yearbook 2007. tokyo : statistics bureau. 8. compiled from data in 2007 and 1992 editions of japan statistical yearbook. 9. waide, p


. japan energy conservation handbook. tokyo : eccj. 7. statistics bureau. 2007. japan statistical yearbook 2007. tokyo : statistics bureau. 8. compiled from data in 2007 and 1992 editions of japan statistical yearbook. 9. waide, p. 2006. light ’ s labour ’ s lost : policies for energy - efficient lighting. paris : international energy agency. available online : www. iea. org / textbase / work / 2007 / cfl / waide. pdf. 10. improvements in the efficacy of electric lights are traced in detail in : smil, v. 2005. creating the 20th century : technical innovations of 1867 - 1914 and their lasting impact. new york : oxford university press ; smil, v. 2003. energy at the crossroads : global perspectives and uncertainties. cambridge, ma : the mit press. compiled and calculated from data in waide, japan statistical yearbook and statistical abstract of the united states. 11. even in sub - arctic sweden with short winter days the average usage is only 1. 35 hours / lamp. 12. trains are the japanese second bedroom. what japan thinks, 7 december 2005. available online : whatjapanthinks. com / 2005 / 12 / 07 / trains - are - the - japaneses - second - bedroom 13. steger, b. 2006. sleeping through class to success : japanese notions of time and diligence. time & society 15 ( 2 - 3 ) : 197 - 215. if you have electronic access to time & society, i highly recommend this illuminating analysis. 14. fukumizu, m. et al. sleep - related nighttime crying ( yonaki ) in japan : a community - based study. pediatrics 115 ( 1 ) : 217 - 224. 15. sioshansi, f. p. and w. pfaffenberger, eds. 2006. electricity market reform : an international perspective. amsterdam : elsevier. 16. the image is available at : kitamoto, a. 2007. earth in the night : nighttime lights of the world data by dmsp satellites. tokyo : national institute of informatics : agora. ex. nii. ac. jp / ~ kitamoto / research / rs / world - lights. html. en


in the research. " it is extremely well done and the sample meticulously characterized. " the new investigation, led by the icelandic firm decode genetics, analyzed genetic material taken from blood samples of 78 parent - child trios, focusing on families in which parents with no signs of a mental disorder gave birth to a child who developed autism or schizophrenia. this approach allows scientists to isolate brand - new mutations in the genes of the child that were not present in the parents. most people have many of these so - called de novo mutations, which occur spontaneously at or near conception, and a majority of them are harmless. but recent studies suggest that there are several such changes that can sharply increase the risk for autism and possibly schizophrenia - and the more a child has, the more likely he or she is by chance to have one of these rare, disabling ones. some difference between the paternal and maternal side is to be expected. sperm cells divide every 15 days or so, whereas egg cells are relatively stable, and continual copying inevitably leads to errors, in dna as in life. still, when the researchers removed the effect of paternal age, they found no difference in genetic risk between those who had a diagnosis of autism or schizophrenia and a control group of icelanders who did not. " it is absolutely stunning that the father ' s age accounted for all this added risk, given the possibility of environmental factors and the diversity of the population, " said dr. kari stefansson, the chief executive of decode and the study ' s senior author. " and it ' s stunning that so little is contributed by the age of the mother. " dr. stefansson ' s co - authors included c. augustine kong of decode and researchers from the university of iceland, aarhus university in denmark, and the company illumina cambridge ltd. dr. stefansson said that it made sense that de novo mutations would play a significant role in brain disorders. at least 50 percent of active genes play a role in neural development, so that random glitches are more likely to affect the brain than other organs, which have less exposure. in the end, these kinds of mutations may account for 15 to 30 percent of cases of autism, and perhaps schizophrenia, some experts said. the remainder is likely a result of inherited genetic mutations and environmental factors that are the subjects of numerous studies. dr. stefansson and other experts said that an increase in the average age of fathers has most likely led to more cases of autism. unlike other theories proposed to explain the increase, like


genetic mutations and environmental factors that are the subjects of numerous studies. dr. stefansson and other experts said that an increase in the average age of fathers has most likely led to more cases of autism. unlike other theories proposed to explain the increase, like vaccinations, it is backed by evidence that scientists agree is solid. but this by itself hardly explains the overall increase in diagnoses, at least in the united states. the birthrate of fathers age 40 and older has increased by more than 30 percent since 1980, according to government figures, but the diagnosis rate has jumped tenfold, to 1 in 88 8 - year - olds in the most recent government survey. and it is not clear whether the rate of schizophrenia diagnosis has increased at all in that time. nonetheless, if these study findings hold up and extend to other brain disorders, wrote alexey kondrashov, of the university of michigan, in an editorial accompanying the study, " then collecting the sperm of young adult men and cold - storing it for later use could be a wise individual decision. " that very much depends on the individual, of course. " you are going to have guys who look at this and say, ' oh no, you mean i have to have all my kids when i ' m 20 and stupid? ' " said evan e. eichler, a professor of genome sciences at the university of washington in seattle. " well, of course not. you have to understand that the vast majority of these mutations have no consequences, and that there are tons of guys in their 50s who have healthy children. " this story, " father ' s age is linked to risk of autism and schizophrenia, " originally appeared in the new york times. ( copyright 2012 by nbc and new york times. all rights reserved. this material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. )


lesson plans for teaching organization a collection of learn nc ' s lesson plans for teaching organization, the second of the five features of effective writing. - getting paragraphing down p. a. t. - one way to remember when to indent and begin a new paragraph is when ( p ) the place changes, ( a ) the action changes, and ( t ) the time changes ( p - a - t ). in this lesson, students will learn how to identify appropriate places to indent new paragraphs in their writing. - great beginnings - good beginnings hook readers and make them want to continue reading. students will learn the features of good beginnings by reading the beginnings of several narrative picture books, and then writing good beginnings for their own narratives. - great endings - sometimes authors end their stories with a memory, a feeling, a wish, or a hope. other times they end the story by referring back to the language of the beginning. in this lesson, students will examine the characteristics of good endings by reading good endings of narrative picture books. they will then practice writing good endings for their own narratives. - little bit? big bit? little bit - this lesson helps students who tend to jump right in and tell their entire story in the first few sentences and then struggle to complete their story. students will learn to start and end their stories with just a “ little bit ” about the setup and closure of the story. - meanwhile - transition words that connect ideas - students will identify transition words in picturebooks that they can use in their own writing. transition words are the glue that holds sentences and paragraphs together. they signal that this is a new part of the story. - transition words and phrases - students will learn to combine sentences using two kinds of transition words : time transitions and thought ( logical ) transitions. transition words link related ideas and hold them together. they can help the parts of a narrative to be coherent or work together to tell the story. coherence means all parts of a narrative link together to move the story along. think of transition words as the glue that holds a story together. using transition words helps avoid the “ listing ” problem in stories. - cause and effect writing : what it looks like and who reads it - students examine the causes and effects presented in a brochure called “ ozone : the good and the bad. ” they also examine the language of the brochure with regard to audience appropriateness. students then write their own brochures examine their classmates ’ brochures for cause and effect and for


##re called “ ozone : the good and the bad. ” they also examine the language of the brochure with regard to audience appropriateness. students then write their own brochures examine their classmates ’ brochures for cause and effect and for audience appropriateness. - helping students understand text structures : informational problem / solution - this exercise teaches students to understand the organizational structure of problem / solution essays by having them write “ what it says ” and “ what it does ” statements about a text. asking students to write these statements about a text will enable students to read the text closely and will ensure that they understand the structure of a problem / solution text. - examining effective openers and closures in writings - students will listen to a reading of dr. seuss ’ and jack prelutsky ’ s hooray for difendoofer day! students will then work cooperatively to edit one another ’ s rough drafts of analytical essay, focusing on openers and closures. - practicing elaboration in a problem / solution essay - one theory suggests that students tend to list in an essay because they lack the tools to elaborate. because they do not have the strategies, they attempt to fill up the empty space by introducing new primary ideas instead of fleshing out the ideas they have already presented. this activity attempts to make students aware of the need to elaborate and to provide students with some workable strategies for elaborating. using a powerpoint presentation, the teacher demonstrates the necessity for elaboration in a problem / solution essay. students then choose a particular point in the powerpoint presentation to expand through elaboration. - making patterns, make sense - students will analyze organizational patterns in analytical writing by reading, oh, the places you ’ ll go! by dr. seuss. students will then apply these patterns to their own writing by creating children ’ s books about success. - thematic and organizational patterns in mclaurin ’ s “ the rite time of night ” - students will learn to identify and color - code thematic and organizational patterns found in the narrative and then use two - column notetaking to highlight how these patterns helped mclaurin give his story focus and organization. as a suggested follow - up activity, students are given ideas for writing their own narratives, using similar techniques as mclaurin.


this conception appears often in the works of the tragedians ; for instance, in the " oedipus tyrannus " of sophocles, where the main motive is the judgment which waits upon even unwitting violations of natural ties. still, this prosperity is external, consisting either in wealth, or power, or exemption from calamity. with the philosophers a moral element comes definitely into the word. the conception rises from outward propriety to inward correctness as the essence of happiness. but in all of them, from socrates onward, virtue depends primarily upon knowledge ; so that to be happy is, first of all, to know. it is thus apparent that the greek philosophy had no conception of sin in the bible sense. as virtue depended on knowledge, sin was the outcome of ignorance, and virtue and its consequent happiness were therefore the prerogative of the few and the learned. the biblical use of the word lifted it into the region of the spiritual, as distinguished from the merely intellectual, and besides, intrusted to it alone the task of representing this higher conception. the pagan word for happiness ( eujdaimonia, under the protection of a good genius or daemon ) nowhere occurs in the new testament nor in the scriptures, having fallen into disrepute because the word daemon, which originally meant a deity, good or evil, had acquired among the jews the bad sense which we attach to demon. happiness, or better, blessedness, was therefore represented both in the old and in the new testament by this word makariov. in the old testament the idea involves more of outward prosperity than in the new testament, yet it almost universally occurs in connections which emphasize, as its principal element, a sense of god ' s approval founded in righteousness which rests ultimately on love to god. thus the word passed up into the higher region of christian thought, and was stamped with the gospel signet, and laden with all the rich significance of gospel blessedness. it now takes on a group of ideas strange to the best pagan morality, and contradictory of its fundamental positions. shaking itself loose from all thoughts of outward good, it becomes the express symbol of a happiness identified with pure character. behind it lies the clear cognition of sin as the fountain - head of all misery, and of holiness as the final and effectual cure for every woe. for knowledge as the basis of virtue, and therefore of happiness, it substitutes faith and love. for the aristocracy of the learned virtuous, it


new testament writers did not recognize any nice distinctions of meaning which called for the use of other terms. luke, for instance ( xxi. 2, 3 ), calls the widow who bestowed her two mites both penicran and ptwch. nevertheless, there is a distinction, recognized by both classical and eccleciastical writers. while oj penhv is one of narrow means, one who " earns a scanty pittance, " ptwcov is allied to the verb ptwssein, to crouch or cringe, and therefore conveys the idea of utter destitution, which abjectly solicits and lives by alms. hence it is applied to lazarus ( luke xvi. 20, 22 ), and rendered beggar. thus distinguished, it is very graphic and appropriate here, as denoting the utter spiritual destitution, the consciousness of which precedes the entrance into the kingdom of god, and which cannot be relieved by one ' s own efforts, but only by the free mercy of god. ( see on 2 cor. vi. 10 ; viii. 9. ) shall be comforted. see on john xiv. 16. as a human attribute, aristotle defines it as the mean between stubborn anger and that negativeness of character which is incapable of even righteous indignation : according to which it is tantamount to equanimity. plato opposes it to fierceness or cruelty, and uses it of humanity to the condemned ; but also of the conciliatory demeanor of a demagogue seeking popularity and power. pindar applies it to a king, mild or kind to the citizens, and herodotus uses it as opposed to anger. these pre - christian meanings of the word exhibit two general characteristics. the equanimity, mildness, kindness, represented by the classical word, are founded in self - control or in natural disposition. the christian meekness is based on humility, which is not a natural quality but an outgrowth of a renewed nature. to the pagan the word often implied condescension, to the christian it implies submission. the christian quality, in its manifestation, reveals all that was best in the heathen virtue - mildness, gentleness, equanimity - but these manifestations toward men are emphasized as outgrowths of a spiritual relation to god. the mildness or kindness of plato or pindar imply no sense of inferiority in those who exhibit them ; sometimes the contrary.


equanimity - but these manifestations toward men are emphasized as outgrowths of a spiritual relation to god. the mildness or kindness of plato or pindar imply no sense of inferiority in those who exhibit them ; sometimes the contrary. plato ' s demagogue is kindly from self - interest and as a means to tyranny. pindar ' s king is condescendingly kind. the meekness of the christian springs from a sense of the inferiority of the creature to the creator, and especially of the sinful creature to the holy god. while, therefore, the pagan quality is redolent of self - assertion, the christian quality carries the flavor of self - abasement. as toward god, therefore, meekness accepts his dealings without murmur or resistance as absolutely good and wise. as toward man, it accepts opposition, insult, and provocation, as god ' s permitted ministers of a chastening demanded by the infirmity and corruption of sin ; while, under this sense of his own sinfulness, the meek bears patiently " the contradiction of sinners against himself, " forgiving and restoring the erring in a spirit of meekness, considering himself, lest he also be tempted ( see gal. vi. 1 - 5 ). the ideas of forgiveness and restoration nowhere attach to the classical word. they belong exclusively to christian meekness, which thus shows itself allied to love. as ascribed by our lord to himself, see on matt. xi. 29. wyc. renders " blessed be mild men. " a candlestick ( thn lucnian ). rev., the stand. also a part of the furniture of every house, and commonly but one in the house : hence the article. the word, which occurs four times in the gospels and eight times elsewhere, means, in every case, not a candlestick, but a lamp - stand. in heb. ix. 2, the golden " candlestick " of the tabernacle is called lucnia ; but in the description of this article ( exod. xxv. 31, 39 ), we read, " thou shalt make the seven lamps thereof ; " and in zech. iv. 2, where the imagery is drawn from the sanctuary, we have a " candlestick " with a bowl on the top of it, " and his seven lamps thereon, and seven pipes ( for the oil ) to the lamps which are upon the top thereof. " " the pleasant valley of hi


by gary north the economist rarely uses the words " glut " and " shortage " without adding : at some price. other scholars are not equally wise. a free market theory of pricing rests on the supposition that gluts and shortages are temporary phenomena. prices adjust so as to clear a market. if this does not take place, the free market economist goes looking for evidence of state intervention. consider the problem of excess inventory. it is better to get something for unused and unwanted inventory than to pay for storage. so, selling prices adjust downward. this eventually eliminates the glut. the unpleasant experience also warns the producer not to do this again. why does a glut exist? because of an error in prior forecasting. suppliers believed that there would be buyers at a specific price. it turned out that there was an insufficient number of buyers at that expected price. then why does a glut persist? one answer : ignorance on the part of suppliers. but why should this ignorance persist? why don ' t suppliers get the picture? experienced sellers do get the picture. the problem is a continuing supply of new sellers who are unfamiliar with the market and ignorant of the past supply - demand conditions. or, as has been said so often, there ' s a sucker born every minute. there is no evidence that p. t. barnum ever said this, but it is nonetheless true. in the worldwide suckers ' market, gamblers are the only people who are slower to learn than young adults with masters ' degrees. bright graduate students possess a pair of non - marketable skills : the ability to write term papers and the ability to take academic exams. they are also economic illiterates and incurably naive. so, they become the trusting victims of the professorial class. the economics of the professorate no one ever sits down and tells a newly minted college graduate about the economics of the professorate. no one tells the student about the crucial and neglected work of the person who first blew the whistle on the economics of the ph. d., david w. breneman. he is the dean of the curry school of education at the university of virginia. he wrote his ph. d. dissertation on the economics of the ph. d. it was accepted in 1970 by the university of california, berkeley. it was based on research completed in 1968, the year prior to the beginning of the ph. d. glut. its title : " the ph. d. production process :


it was accepted in 1970 by the university of california, berkeley. it was based on research completed in 1968, the year prior to the beginning of the ph. d. glut. its title : " the ph. d. production process : a study of departmental behavior. " of all ph. d. dissertations ever written, this is the only one that one that should be read by every college student who is contemplating graduate school. of course, no one tells him. few people have ever heard of it. i read it in 1970. i do not recall how i came across it. i was completing my ph. d., so i was facing the ph. d. glut personally, which had begun in the fall of 1969. it had been predicted for the sciences by allan cartter of new york university in 1964. sometime around 1966, clark kerr, president of the university of california, had mentioned this looming problem to a group of us in an elite student organization called the california club. but i was naive. i figured, " it won ' t happen to me. " ha! as they say in those late - night ronco ads, " here ' s how it works! " academic departments grow in terms of the number of students enrolled. we know from parkinson ' s law that growth is an institutional imperative. administrators advance their careers by expanding the number of subordinates in their department. so, every academic department wants more students — students of a special kind. students are not of equal value to a department. the lower - division student ( freshman or sophomore ) does not rate highly in the currency of academic resource allocation : the full - time enrollment, or fte. the fte figure is what justifies the hiring of a full - time faculty member. the lower the ratio, the better. it may take 15 lower - division students to generate one fte. it may take only eight ph. d. - level graduate students to generate an fte. the more ph. d. students a department can attract, the faster the growth of that department. this is the iron law of academia. all other economic laws are sacrificed for it, as the economist says, other things being equal. this fact of academic economic life creates an incentive for departments to enroll lots of graduate students. it also rewards those departments that persuade m. a. students to go into the ph. d. program. also, the brightest graduate students may be asked to do unpaid or grant - paid research for senior professors. the


what is anesthesia? anesthesia is the administration of drugs or gases to create insensitivity to pain before surgical operations. the word comes from the greek “ an ” meaning “ without, ” and “ aesthesis ” or “ sensation. ” the word anesthesia was coined by the famous 19th century physician and poet oliver wendell holmes, sr., in 1846. who are anesthesiologists and what do they do? during surgery, anesthesia is administered for pain relief or “ depression of consciousness. ” before a major surgery, anesthesiologists administer general anesthesia, which causes full loss of consciousness in the patient. the responsibility of the anesthesiologist is to manage the patient ’ s pain while monitoring vital life functions, such as breathing, blood pressure, heart rate and homeostasis, as well as blood transfusions, if required. as the patient recovers from surgery, anesthesia in the form of dissociative drugs – either oral or injectable – may be administered. these drugs partially sedate the patient to ease pain and distress. anesthesiologists are extensively trained doctors specializing in human physiology, diseases and pre - operative medical evaluations, life support and pain control while a patient undergoes surgery, post - op recovery, intensive - care training and chronic and acute pain management. what are the various types of anesthesia? the different types of anesthesia include : what are the most common surgeries that use general anesthesia? - local – anesthesia in a single part of the body, such as a tooth or area of skin. local anesthesia is commonly used during dental procedures to reduce pain. it is the preferable and safer type of anesthesia for many situations, including cesarean section, since the patient still has consciousness and is not fully sedated. - regional – anesthesia in a larger part of the body than local anesthesia, such as a limb. the patient is not fully sedated. - general – anesthesia that “ puts the patient under ” into a state of unconsciousness or sedation. during general anesthesia, a patient will lose normal response to pain, memory, motor reflexes and consciousness, and will experience muscle relaxation. - dissociative – anesthesia brought on by dissociative drugs causing marked sensory loss and loss of pain and memory but not accompanied by actual loss of consciousness. a common effect of dissociative anesthesia is hallucinations. heart, lung and abdominal surgery are


so conserving energy to focus on scientific tasks will be important. " we ' re trying to augment the human - machine cooperative working relationship so that the machines can do a lot of the tedious tasks, " says frank delgado, project lead for scout. for example, by using scout to drive explorers " to the location where they need to do their science, when they get there, they ' re a lot fresher. " scout looks like an oversized dune buggy. its design is loosely based on the moon buggy used by astronauts on the apollo 15, 16 and 17 missions back in the 1970s. its seats are built to accommodate two passengers wearing bulky spacesuits. its joystick and computer touch screen are optimized for easy use by heavily gloved hands. and it is tricked out with an eclectic array of cameras, speakers and a host of communications gear. its maximum ground speed : 6 miles per hour. scout had its first real - world test during the 2004 desert rats field season, but in that initial shakedown it was driven under manual control. " we basically focused on having somebody drive it from onboard, " says delgado. " so if you needed to get to a crater or somewhere to collect some rocks, they would jump onboard, and they ' d drive it. " this year the rats team tried out several automated modes of operation, including tele - operation, voice commands and gesture recognition. the field tests, which were highly successful, were the first ever that involved such complex interaction between humans and a semi - autonomous robotic assistant. one type of tele - operation involved operating the rover in real - or near - real - time from a remote location. the operators used a joystick and a set of switches, knobs and buttons to control the rover as though they were onboard. delgado ' s team was able to tele - operate scout in this way both from a desert rats command center located about a half - mile from the test site and from a control center about 1200 miles away at the johnson space center in houston. this is a feasible approach for operating a robotic rover on the moon from a lunar base or even from earth. it could also be used by humans operating a rover from a local command base on mars. it wouldn ' t be possible to tele - operate a mars rover from earth in real - time, however, because it takes too long for radio - command signals to get from one planet to the other. earth - based scientists could tele - operate a rover on mars using


or - flight responses to injury stimulate immune cell activities that are involved in wound healing. but when the ' wound ' is in the heart and caused by atherosclerosis, that increased activity actually accelerates the underlying disease, " nahrendorf explains. " while most of this work was done in mice, we have hints that something similar may happen in human patients – for example, we found increased numbers of blood stem cells in the spleens of patients who had died shortly after a heart attack. " ralph weissleder, md, phd, a corresponding author of this study and director of the mgh center for systems biology where the work was performed, adds that these findings set the stage for a totally novel approach to cardiovascular disease. therapies directed to the sites of white blood cell production, including the bone marrow or the spleen, may be able to prevent immune - system exacerbation of atherosclerosis. " this gives us potential new therapeutic targets that we had not thought about before. clinically, we focus on reducing risk factors such as elevated cholesterol and blood pressure, but not inflammation. we hope our work can help change that, " he says. weissleder is a professor of radiology, and nahrendorf an assistant professor of radiology at harvard medical school. co - lead authors of the nature paper are partha dutta, phd, and gabriel courties, phd, of the mgh center for systems biology. collaborators include filip swirski, phd, mgh center for systems biology, and peter libby, md, chief of cardiology at brigham and women ’ s hospital, where the clinical data were analyzed. the study was primarily supported by grants from the national institutes of health. massachusetts general hospital, founded in 1811, is the original and largest teaching hospital of harvard medical school. the mgh conducts the largest hospital - based research program in the united states, with an annual research budget of more than $ 750 million and major research centers in aids, cardiovascular research, cancer, computational and integrative biology, cutaneous biology, human genetics, medical imaging, neurodegenerative disorders, regenerative medicine, reproductive biology, systems biology, transplantation biology and photomedicine. media contacts : sue mcgreevey, email @ example. com, 617 724 - 2764 u. s. news & world report ranks mass general the # 1 hospital in america based on our quality of care, patient safety and reputation in 16 different special


during the late middle ages. h f vos ( elwell evangelical dictionary ) a harnack, history of dogma ; a hauck, s h e r k, i. adoptionism, in a broad sense, a christological theory according to which christ, as man, is the adoptive son of god ; the precise import of the word varies with the successive stages and exponents of the theory. roughly, we have ( 1 ) the adoptionism of elipandus and felix in the eighth century ; ( 2 ) the neo - adoptionism of abelard in the twelfth century ; ( 3 ) the qualified adoptionism of some theologians from the fourteenth century on. ( 1 ) adoptionism of elipandus and felix in the eighth century this, the original form of adoptionism, asserts a double sonship in christ : one by generation and nature, and the other by adoption and grace. christ as god is indeed the son of god by generation and nature, but christ as man is son of god only by adoption and grace. hence " the man christ " is the adoptive and not the natural son of god. such is the theory held towards the end of the eighth century by elipandus, archbishop of toledo, then under the mohammedan rule, and by felix, bishop of urgel, then under the frankish dominion. the origin of this hispanicus error, as it was called, is obscure. nestorianism had been a decidedly eastern heresy and we are surprised to find an offshoot of it in the most western part of the western church, and this so long after the parent heresy had found a grave in its native land. it is, however, noteworthy that adoptionism began in that part of spain where islamism dominated, and where a nestorian colony had for years found refuge. the combined influence of islamism and nestorianism had, no doubt, blunted the aged elipandus ' s catholic sense. then came a certain migetius, preaching a loose doctrine, and holding, among other errors, that the second person of the blessed trinity did not exist before the incarnation. the better to confute this error, elipandus drew a hard and fast line between jesus as god and jesus as man, the former being the natural, and the latter merely the adoptive son of god. the reassertion of nestorianism raised a storm of protest from catholics, headed by beatus, abbot of libana, and etherius, bishop of osma. it was to maintain his


was room for a second filiation, resting on grace, the grace of union ( gratia unionis ). they did not agree, however, in qualifying that second filiation. some called it adoptive, because of its analogy with our supernatural adoption. others, fearing lest the implication of the word adoption might make jesus a stranger to, and alien from god, preferred to call it natural. none of these theories runs counter to a defined dogma ; yet, since sonship is an attribute of the person, there is danger of multiplying the persons by multiplying the filiations in christ. a second natural filiation is not intelligible. a second adoptive filiation does not sufficiently eschew the connotation of adoption as defined by the council of frankfort. " we call adoptive him who is stranger to the adopter. " the common mistake of these novel theories, a mistake already made by the old adoptionists and by abelard, lies in the supposition that the grace of union in christ, not being less fruitful than habitual grace in man, should have a similar effect, viz., filiation. less fruitful it is not, and yet it cannot have the same effect in him as in us, because to him it was said : " thou art my son, today have i begotten thee " ( hebrews 1 : 5 ) ; and to us, " you were afar off " ( ephesians 2 : 13 ). publication information written by j. f. sollier. transcribed by bob knippenberg. the catholic encyclopedia, volume i. published 1907. new york : robert appleton company. nihil obstat, march 1, 1907. remy lafort, s. t. d., censor. imprimatur. + john cardinal farley, archbishop of new york this page - - - - is at this subject presentation was last updated on - - send an e - mail question or comment to us : e - mail the main believe web - page ( and the index to subjects ) is at : believe religious information source - by alphabet http : / / mb - soft. com / believe / indexaz. html


jake is a 15 - year - old high school student who has been participating in the model demonstration project since 2003. since the beginning, jake ' s mother and home care providers have played a critical role in helping him realize success. when the project began in 2003, jake had no formal means of communication, and his school program focused largely on developing functional skills. our efforts began with identifying a means of communication and a tool for writing. late spring 2004 we began exploring light - tech communication systems. our first efforts involved a 4 - location flip chart. in this video, you see jake using a combination of partner assisted scanning and eye - pointing to make choices. this is the first time jake and his mom have tried this system. success on day 1! watching jake use the 4 - location flip chart with eye - pointing helped us evaluate his vision and his understanding of symbols. it became clear to us that he was able to visually distinguish between symbols in the mayer johnson boardmaker sign language symbol library. while we continued to explore light - tech solutions, we started exploring switch access. jake had years of trials with single switches without much success. efforts with 2 - switch step scanning proved much more successful for him. he uses his arm to move the highlighter from one item to the next and his knee to select desired options. in this video, jake is having fun interacting with the members of his family... including the dogs. by the fall of 2004, it was quite evident that 2 - switch step scanning was going to provide jake with an important way to interact with technology and to control partner - assisted scanning interactions. based upon our understanding of jake ' s vision and his use of 2 - switch scanning we tried a number of computer - based options for accessing the alphabet and writing. in the end, a light - tech solution provided the best supports for jake in his early efforts to write. late winter 2005 the best way for jake to access the alphabet turned out to be a light - tech flip chart. using this alternative pencil, jake could indicate which letters his partner should write for him. jake used his arm to access the mover switch which lit a green light indicating that his partner should move to the next letter. when his partner pointed to a desired letter, jake used his knee to access the picker switch which lit a red light indicated that his partner should write that letter for him. throughout the year, jake engaged in self - selected writing using the alphabet flip chart at home. he selected the topics for his writing and wrote in a