{"text": ". 09 / 332, 502, titled, \u201c system and method for intrusion detection using a time domain radar array, \u201d and u. s. patent application ser. no. 09 / 332, 503, titled, \u201c wide area time domain radar array, \u201d both filed on jun. 14, 1999, and both of which are assigned to the assignee of the present invention. the above patent documents are incorporated herein by reference. this section provides an overview of impulse radio technology and relevant aspects of communications theory. it is provided to assist the reader with understanding the present invention and should not be used to limit the scope of the present invention. it should be understood that the terminology \u2018 impulse radio \u2019 is used primarily for historical convenience and that the terminology can be generally interchanged with the terminology \u2018 impulse communications system, ultra - wideband system, or ultra - wideband communication systems \u2019. furthermore, it should be understood that the described impulse radio technology is generally applicable to various other impulse system applications including but not limited to impulse radar systems and impulse positioning systems. accordingly, the terminology \u2018 impulse radio \u2019 can be generally interchanged with the terminology \u2018 impulse transmission system and impulse reception system. \u2019 impulse radio refers to a radio system based on short, low duty - cycle pulses. an ideal impulse radio waveform is a short gaussian monocycle. as the name suggests, this waveform attempts to approach one cycle of radio frequency ( rf ) energy at a desired center frequency. due to implementation and other spectral limitations, this waveform may be altered significantly in practice for a given application. many waveforms having very broad, or wide, spectral bandwidth approximate a gaussian shape to a useful degree. impulse radio can use many types of modulation, including amplitude modulation, phase modulation, frequency modulation, time - shift modulation ( also referred to as pulse - position modulation or pulse - interval modulation ) and m - ary versions of these. in this document, the time - shift modulation method is often used as an illustrative example. however, someone skilled in the art will recognize that alternative modulation approaches may, in some instances, be used instead of or in combination with the time - shift modulation approach. in impulse radio communications, inter - pulse spacing may be held constant or may be varied on a pulse - by - pulse basis by information, a code, or both. generally, conventional spread spectrum systems employ codes to spread the normally narrow band information signal over a relatively wide band of frequencies. a conventional spread spectrum receiver correlates these", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_cryptography", "similarity_score": 0.6025497535670548, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 2, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.161393"}
{"text": "more detail in u. s. pat. no. 5, 677, 927 to fullerton et al. impulse transmission systems are based on short, low duty - cycle pulses. different pulse waveforms, or pulse types, may be employed to accommodate requirements of various applications. typical pulse types include a gaussian pulse, pulse doublet ( also referred to as a gaussian monocycle ), pulse triplet, and pulse quadlet as depicted in figs. 1a through 1d, respectively. an actual received waveform that closely resembles the theoretical pulse quadlet is shown in fig. 1e. a pulse type may also be a wavelet set produced by combining two or more pulse waveforms ( e. g., a doublet / triplet wavelet set ). these different pulse types may be produced by methods described in the patent documents referenced above or by other methods, as persons skilled in the art would understand. for analysis purposes, it is convenient to model pulse waveforms in an ideal manner. for example, the transmitted waveform produced by supplying a step function into an ultra - wideband antenna may be modeled as a gaussian monocycle. a gaussian monocycle ( normalized to a peak value of 1 ) may be described by where \u03c3 is a time scaling parameter, t is time, and e is the natural logarithm base. the power spectral density of the gaussian monocycle is shown in fig. 1f, along with spectrums for the gaussian pulse, triplet, and quadlet. the corresponding equation for the gaussian monocycle is : the center frequency ( fc ), or frequency of peak spectral density, of the gaussian monocycle is : it should be noted that the output of an ultra - wideband antenna is essentially equal to the derivative of its input. accordingly, since the pulse doublet, pulse triplet, and pulse quadlet are the first, second, and third derivatives of the gaussian pulse, in an ideal model, an antenna receiving a gaussian pulse will transmit a gaussian monocycle and an antenna receiving a gaussian monocycle will provide a pulse triplet. pulse trains impulse transmission systems may communicate one or more data bits with a single pulse ; however, typically each data bit is communicated using a sequence of pulses, known as a pulse train. as described in detail in the following example system, the impulse radio transmitter produces and outputs a train of pulses for each bit of information.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6060231027935896, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 4, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.163528"}
{"text": "application titled \u201c a method for specifying non - allowable pulse characteristics, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 592, 289, filed jun. 12, 2000, and incorporated herein by reference. a related method that conditionally positions pulses depending on whether code elements map to non - allowable regions is described in co - owned, co - pending application, titled \u201c a method and apparatus for positioning pulses using a layout having non - allowable regions, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 592, 248 filed jun. 12, 2000, and incorporated herein by reference. the signal of a coded pulse train can be generally expressed by : where k is the index of a transmitter, j is the index of a pulse within its pulse train, ( \u22121 ) fj ( k ), aj ( k ), bj ( k ), cj ( k ), and \u03c9 ( t, bj ( k ) ) are the coded polarity, pulse amplitude, pulse type, pulse width, and normalized pulse waveform of the jth pulse of the kth transmitter, and tj ( k ) is the coded time shift of the jth pulse of the kth transmitter. note : when a given non - temporal characteristic does not vary ( i. e., remains constant for all pulses ), it becomes a constant in front of the summation sign. various numerical code generation methods can be employed to produce codes having certain correlation and spectral properties. such codes typically fall into one of two categories : designed codes and pseudorandom codes. a designed code may be generated using a quadratic congruential, hyperbolic congruential, linear congruential, costas array, or other such numerical code generation technique designed to generate codes having certain correlation properties. a pseudorandom code may be generated using a computer ' s random number generator, binary shift - register ( s ) mapped to binary words, a chaotic code generation scheme, or the like. such \u2018 random - like \u2019 codes are attractive for certain applications since they tend to spread spectral energy over multiple frequencies while having \u2018 good enough \u2019 correlation properties, whereas designed codes may have superior correlation properties but possess less suitable spectral properties. detailed descriptions of numerical code generation techniques are included in a co - owned, co - pending patent application titled \u201c a method and apparatus for positioning pulses in time, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 592, 248, filed jun. 12, 2000, and incorporated herein by reference. it may be necessary to", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_cryptography", "similarity_score": 0.6165130728418157, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 8, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.169500"}
{"text": ", co - pending patent application titled \u201c a method and apparatus for positioning pulses in time, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 592, 248, filed jun. 12, 2000, and incorporated herein by reference. it may be necessary to apply predefined criteria to determine whether a generated code, code family, or a subset of a code is acceptable for use with a given uwb application. criteria may include correlation properties, spectral properties, code length, non - allowable regions, number of code family members, or other pulse characteristics. a method for applying predefined criteria to codes is described in co - owned, co - pending application, titled \u201c a method and apparatus for specifying pulse characteristics using a code that satisfies predefined criteria, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 592, 288, filed jun. 12, 2000, and incorporated herein by reference. in some applications, it may be desirable to employ a combination of codes. codes may be combined sequentially, nested, or sequentially nested, and code combinations may be repeated. sequential code combinations typically involve switching from one code to the next after the occurrence of some event and may also be used to support multicast communications. nested code combinations may be employed to produce pulse trains having desirable correlation and spectral properties. for example, a designed code may be used to specify value range components within a layout and a nested pseudorandom code may be used to randomly position pulses within the value range components. with this approach, correlation properties of the designed code are maintained since the pulse positions specified by the nested code reside within the value range components specified by the designed code, while the random positioning of the pulses within the components results in particular spectral properties. a method for applying code combinations is described in co - owned, co - pending application, titled \u201c a method and apparatus for applying codes having pre - defined properties, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 591, 690, filed jun. 12, 2000, and incorporated herein by reference. various aspects of a pulse waveform may be modulated to convey information and to further minimize structure in the resulting spectrum. amplitude modulation, phase modulation, frequency modulation, time - shift modulation and m - ary versions of these were proposed in u. s. pat. no. 5, 677, 927 to fullerton et al., previously incorporated by reference. time - shift modulation can be described as shifting the position of a pulse either forward or", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_cryptography", "similarity_score": 0.617422835083366, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 9, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.170653"}
{"text": "versions of these were proposed in u. s. pat. no. 5, 677, 927 to fullerton et al., previously incorporated by reference. time - shift modulation can be described as shifting the position of a pulse either forward or backward in time relative to a nominal coded ( or uncoded ) time position in response to an information signal. thus, each pulse in a train of pulses is typically delayed a different amount from its respective time base clock position by an individual code delay amount plus a modulation time shift. this modulation time shift is normally very small relative to the code shift. in a 10 mpps system with a center frequency of 2 ghz, for example, the code may command pulse position variations over a range of 100 ns, whereas, the information modulation may shift the pulse position by 150 ps. this two - state \u2018 early - late \u2019 form of time shift modulation is depicted in fig. 4a. a pulse train with conventional \u2018 early - late \u2019 time - shift modulation can be expressed : where k is the index of a transmitter, j is the index of a pulse within its pulse train, ( \u22121 ) fj ( k ), aj ( k ), bj ( k ), cj ( k ), and \u03c9 ( t, bj ( k ) ) are the coded polarity, pulse amplitude, pulse type, pulse width, and normalized pulse waveform of the jth pulse of the kth transmitter, tj ( k ) is the coded time shift of the jth pulse of the kth transmitter, \u03b4 is the time shift added when the transmitted symbol is 1 ( instead of 0 ), d ( k ) is the data ( i. e., 0 or 1 ) transmitted by the kth transmitter, and ns is the number of pulses per symbol ( e. g., bit ). similar expressions can be derived to accommodate other proposed forms of modulation. an alternative form of time - shift modulation can be described as one - of - many position modulation ( ompm ). the ompm approach, shown in fig. 4b, involves shifting a pulse to one of n possible modulation positions about a nominal coded ( or uncoded ) time position in response to an information signal, where n represents the number of possible states. for example, if n were four ( 4 ), two data bits of information could be conveyed. for further details regarding ompm, see \u201c apparatus, system and method for one - of - many position modulation in an impulse radio communication", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_metrology", "similarity_score": 0.623656293197036, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 10, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.171829"}
{"text": "possible states. for example, if n were four ( 4 ), two data bits of information could be conveyed. for further details regarding ompm, see \u201c apparatus, system and method for one - of - many position modulation in an impulse radio communication system, \u201d attorney docket no. 1659. 0860000, filed jun. 7, 2000, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference. an impulse radio communications system can employ flip modulation techniques to convey information. the simplest flip modulation technique involves transmission of a pulse or an inverted ( or flipped ) pulse to represent a data bit of information, as depicted in fig. 4c. flip modulation techniques may also be combined with time - shift modulation techniques to create two, four, or more different data states. one such flip with shift modulation technique is referred to as quadrature flip time modulation ( qftm ). the qftm approach is illustrated in fig. 4d. flip modulation techniques are further described in patent application titled \u201c apparatus, system and method for flip modulation in an impulse radio communication system, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 537, 692, filed mar. 29, 2000, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference. vector modulation techniques may also be used to convey information. vector modulation includes the steps of generating and transmitting a series of time - modulated pulses, each pulse delayed by one of at least four pre - determined time delay periods and representative of at least two data bits of information, and receiving and demodulating the series of time - modulated pulses to estimate the data bits associated with each pulse. vector modulation is shown in fig. 4e. vector modulation techniques are further described in patent application titled \u201c vector modulation system and method for wideband impulse radio communications, \u201d application ser. no. 09 / 169, 765, filed dec. 9, 1999, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference. reception and demodulation impulse radio systems operating within close proximity to each other may cause mutual interference. while coding minimizes mutual interference, the probability of pulse collisions increases as the number of coexisting impulse radio systems rises. additionally, various other signals may be present that cause interference. impulse radios can operate in the presence of mutual interference and other interfering signals, in part because they do not depend on receiving every transmitted pulse. impulse radio receivers perform a correlating, synchronous receiving function", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_cryptography", "similarity_score": 0.646290801874033, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 11, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.172946"}
{"text": "functions of the transmitter 602 and receiver 702. some of these include the time base 718, precision timing generator 714, code source 722, antenna 704, and the like. figs. 8a - 8c illustrate the cross correlation process and the correlation function. fig. 8a shows the waveform of a template signal. fig. 8b shows the waveform of a received impulse radio signal at a set of several possible time offsets. fig. 8c represents the output of the cross correlator for each of the time offsets of fig. 8b. for any given pulse received, there is a corresponding point that is applicable on this graph. this is the point corresponding to the time offset of the template signal used to receive that pulse. further examples and details of precision timing can be found described in u. s. pat. no. 5, 677, 927, and commonly owned co - pending application application ser. no. 09 / 146, 524, filed sep. 3, 1998, titled \u201c precision timing generator system and method, \u201d both of which are incorporated herein by reference. because of the unique nature of impulse radio receivers, several modifications have been recently made to enhance system capabilities. modifications include the utilization of multiple correlators to measure the impulse response of a channel to the maximum communications range of the system and to capture information on data symbol statistics. further, multiple correlators enable rake pulse correlation techniques, more efficient acquisition and tracking implementations, various modulation schemes, and collection of time - calibrated pictures of received waveforms. for greater elaboration of multiple correlator techniques, see patent application titled \u201c system and method of using multiple correlator receivers in an impulse radio system \u201d, application ser. no. 09 / 537, 264, filed mar. 29, 2000, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference. methods to improve the speed at which a receiver can acquire and lock onto an incoming impulse radio signal have been developed. in one approach, a receiver includes an adjustable time base to output a sliding periodic timing signal having an adjustable repetition rate and a decode timing modulator to output a decode signal in response to the periodic timing signal. the impulse radio signal is cross - correlated with the decode signal to output a baseband signal. the receiver integrates t samples of the baseband signal and a threshold detector uses the integration results to detect channel coincidence. a receiver", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_metrology", "similarity_score": 0.6080573466978098, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85a9d6c4-f3cb-485c-89f3-934c476a6508>", "chunk_index": 22, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.185783"}
{"text": "pp. 73 - 79 ). these three acquaintances parallel the requirements for a proposition \u2019 s being true ( on a correspondence theory of truth ) : ( a ) the truth - maker ( s is directly acquainted with the fact that p ) ; ( b ) the truth - bearer ( s is directly acquainted with the thought that p ) ; and ( c ) the correspondence relation ( s is directly acquainted with the correspondence between the fact that p and the thought that p ). given the subject \u2019 s direct acquaintance with ( i ), ( ii ), and ( iii ), he is directly acquainted with everything necessary to constitute being directly acquainted with a true proposition. to the extent that bonjour provides an account of knowledge by acquaintance, it is directed exclusively to basic empirical beliefs. bonjour describes his theory of basic empirical justification as taking place when a person directly apprehends that his experience fits or satisfies the description offered by the content of his belief ( bonjour 2001 ; bonjour 2003, especially pp. 60 - 76, 191 - 193 ; bonjour uses the language of \u201c direct acquaintance \u201d in 2001, while he prefers \u201c direct apprehension \u201d in 2003 ). it is the subject \u2019 s ability to have a direct acquaintance or apprehension of the contents of one \u2019 s own conscious experiences and how they fit or satisfy the content of one \u2019 s basic beliefs that makes knowledge by acquaintance possible. bonjour stresses, however, that fallibility can occur due to the subject \u2019 s misapprehension of one \u2019 s experience or failure to see the fit between the experience and the belief. despite the possibility of error, he believes that this does not undermine genuine cases when a subject does correctly apprehend the character of experience and sees its fit with one \u2019 s basic belief. on the other hand, there are non - traditional acquaintance theorists who have modified knowledge by acquaintance in such a way that one can be acquainted with and know physical objects directly ( such as brewer 2011 ). another deviation from the russellian tradition is to maintain that knowledge by acquaintance is a different kind of knowledge than propositional knowledge ( tye 2009, pp. 95 - 102 ). on this non - propositional approach to knowledge by acquaintance, there is a sense in which one can be said to know something with which one is acquainted, even though the person does not necessarily have any propositional belief states about the thing that is said to be known by acquaintance. perhaps the most influential problem raised for knowledge by acquaintance is commonly called the problem", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6043473448227509, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 5, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.393383"}
{"text": "said to know something with which one is acquainted, even though the person does not necessarily have any propositional belief states about the thing that is said to be known by acquaintance. perhaps the most influential problem raised for knowledge by acquaintance is commonly called the problem of the speckled hen ( due to gilbert ryle as reported by chisholm 1942 ). the problem arises by considering the case where someone looks at a hen with exactly 48 speckles on one side. yet, the perceiver \u2019 s experience is not adequate grounds for him to distinguish an experience of a hen with exactly 47 or 49 speckles. indeed, even if someone were to hold the belief that one \u2019 s experience is of a hen with exactly 48 speckles, it would by most standards fail to count as knowledge because the subject could have easily formed a false belief ( for example, that the hen has 47 or 49 speckles ) on the basis of being acquainted with that very experience ( for one way to understand this epistemic principle see \u201c the safety condition for knowledge \u201d ). in other words, typically people cannot distinguish between having a visual experience of a 47, 48, or 49 speckled hen. however, if a person is directly acquainted with these experiences and can plausibly satisfy the other conditions required for knowledge by acquaintance, then cases of this sort stand as potential counterexamples to possessing knowledge or justification through direct acquaintance. given the indiscernibility of the contents of mental states through direct acquaintance, this raises doubts whether one \u2019 s justification based on direct acquaintance can offer some unique, privileged state of knowledge. after all, one motivation for accepting knowledge by acquaintance is that the subject \u2019 s knowledge of his own mental states may be indubitable, whereas other kinds of knowledge cannot. the problem of the speckled hen challenges the idea that one may fail to have indubitable justification through knowledge by acquaintance because for just about any putative mental state with which one is acquainted, since there may be a different mental state that is virtually indistinguishable from it. it even raises the question whether these closely related states constitute genuinely different experiences for the subject at all. the problem of the speckled hen has continued to challenge contemporary accounts of knowledge by acquaintance ( see sosa 2003a, 2003b ; markie 2009 ; poston 2010 ). the challenge, as sosa puts it, is for the acquaintance theorist to \u201c tell us which sorts of features of our states of consciousness are epistemically effective ones", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6401539100657707, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 6, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.394471"}
{"text": "belief - states involving phenomenal concepts can accommodate the challenge of the speckled hen by plausibly maintaining that the concept of being 48 - speckled is not a phenomenal concept and thereby not a candidate for knowledge by acquaintance. third, one can maintain that there are degrees between determinate and determinable properties with which one is acquainted ( compare fales 1996, pp. 173 - 180 ). properties fall on a continuum between being more general to being more specific or determined. for example, a ripe tomato \u2019 s surface can be described generally as colored, more determinately as red, or even more determinately as vermilion. given this distinction in the determinateness of properties, it is possible that one could be directly acquainted with differing degrees of determinable properties. if experiences can instantiate varying degrees of these determinable properties ( and this is a matter of controversy that cannot be addressed here ), then in cases like the speckled hen the acquaintance theorist may hold that the subject is not directly acquainted with the experience of a hen with 48 speckles but with the experience having a less determinate property such as the property of being many - speckled. thus, in cases akin to the speckled hen, the subject may not be acquainted with the property of being 48 - speckled, but with a less determinate property like being many - speckled. another proposed solution to the problem of the speckled hen follows from distinguishing between the phenomenal and epistemic appearances of an experience ( gertler 2011, pp. 103 - 106 ). the phenomenal appearance of an experience is determined by the properties that constitute the experience. the epistemic appearance of an experience is what the experience inclines the subject to believe. for example, if someone takes a white plate and holds it under a green light, the plate phenomenally appears green ( that is, the property of being green partly constitutes the experience of the plate ) but with sufficient knowledge of the effects of green lighting on white objects, it does not epistemically appear green ( that is, the subject is not inclined to think that the plate is green ). in cases like the speckled hen, then, the experience may phenomenally appear to be 48 - speckled, but it may only epistemically appear to be many - speckled. the key to this solution is disambiguating the meaning of \u201c appearance \u201d to explain how in one sense the subject may have an appearance of a hen with 48 speckle", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6509567327966845, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 9, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.397852"}
{"text": "may only epistemically appear to be many - speckled. the key to this solution is disambiguating the meaning of \u201c appearance \u201d to explain how in one sense the subject may have an appearance of a hen with 48 speckles ( phenomenally ) and in another sense the subject may not have an appearance of a hen with 48 speckles ( epistemically ). with respect to the sellarsian dilemma, one response takes the horn of the dilemma that states propositional beliefs derive their justification from non - propositional experiences. for instance, fumerton ( 1995, pp. 74 - 76 ) proposes an account of knowledge by acquaintance ( see above section 2b ) where the subject is in a position to know a truth through three acquaintances. since acquaintance by itself is not an epistemic concept in need of justification, it enables the subject to be appropriately related to the source of one \u2019 s justification without necessitating further levels of justification. thus, in response to the challenge to explain how non - propositional experiences ( such as the raw experience of searing pain ) can justify propositional thoughts ( such as the belief that i am experiencing pain ), fumerton maintains that justification is made possible by being directly acquainted with the relation of correspondence that holds between the non - propositional experience and the propositional thought. bonjour offers another influential response to sellars \u2019 s dilemma ( 2001, pp. 28 - 34 ; 2003, especially pp. 69 - 74 ). on bonjour \u2019 s account of basic empirical knowledge ( see above section 2b ), the awareness or apprehension of the justification for one \u2019 s belief is built - in or partly constitutive of the justifying non - conceptual experience. while non - conceptual experiences do not stand in certain kinds of logical relations ( for example, inferring ) to conceptual beliefs, there is a relation of description or fit that holds between experiences and beliefs. since certain kinds of experiences have a built - in awareness of their contents, these experiences contain within themselves a kind of reason for thinking that the given description accurately fits. the crucial move in bonjour \u2019 s solution is to see that the built - in awareness renders the basic empirical belief justified without any further need for justification. staunch defenders of the sellarsian dilemma will likely remain unimpressed with these responses. the problem, they might urge, is that these alleged solutions push the problem back a level. those defending the dilemma will press these proposals to explain how propositional", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6149321132327357, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 10, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.398994"}
{"text": "staunch defenders of the sellarsian dilemma will likely remain unimpressed with these responses. the problem, they might urge, is that these alleged solutions push the problem back a level. those defending the dilemma will press these proposals to explain how propositional beliefs can correspond or accurately describe non - propositional experiences. in some places, fumerton and bonjour seem to suggest that first - hand experience with our own conscious states of mind adequately demonstrate how these relations are able to hold ( fumerton 1995, p. 77 ; bonjour 2003, pp. 69 - 74 ). other friends of direct acquaintance have suggested that experiences, while being non - propositional, may have a propositional structure ( or proto - propositional structure ) that allows for propositional content to map onto it ( fales 1996, pp. 166 - 169 ). for example, a non - propositional experience may be constituted by presenting particulars exemplifying specific properties, which naturally provides a structure resembling statements in the subject - predicate form. timothy mcgrew contends that basic empirical beliefs can be formed by indexically referring to one \u2019 s non - propositional experience as part of what constitutes the propositional content of the belief ( 1995, especially pp. 89 - 90 ). by embedding the non - propositional content as a constituent part of the belief ( for example, \u201c i am being appeared to thusly \u201d ), it is possible to show how non - propositional experiences may provide a basis for forming justified propositional beliefs ( for some concerns about the richness of indexically formed beliefs to serve as a foundation see sosa 2003b, especially pp. 122 - 124 ). while knowledge by acquaintance has its most immediate application to philosophical topics in epistemology, it has increasingly been applied to issues in metaphysics, especially in the philosophy of mind. in particular, knowledge by acquaintance has played a role in the knowledge argument against physicalism. some argue that knowledge of qualia is direct and unmediated, which provides an insight into the nature of the mind that cannot be known through the physical sciences. frank jackson presents this argument through a compelling thought experiment about mary ( jackson 1982 ; 1986 ). mary is a scientist who learns all the physical truths from her exhaustive study of the completed physics. for whatever reasons, mary has lived her entire life without experiencing any colors besides black, white, and shades of gray. one day after she has mastered all the physical truths and everything that can be deduced a prior", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6243440922762831, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 11, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.401163"}
{"text": "by suggesting that one can know all the propositional truths about something ( for example, the city of houston ) and yet not know it directly. the difference between knowledge of phenomenal consciousness and knowledge of brain states is like the difference between knowing about houston ( by reading a very thorough visitor \u2019 s guide ) and knowing houston directly ( by visiting the city ). according to these views, it is because knowledge by acquaintance is a different kind of knowledge that phenomenal knowledge appears to differ from descriptive, physical knowledge about brain states. although there is not space for a full evaluation of these views, one problem that has been raised is that knowledge by acquaintance cannot by itself account for the epistemic disparity that this solution is attempting to solve ( see nida - rumelin 1995 ; gertler 1999 ). in other words, the problem is that there appears to be propositional, factual content about the properties of conscious experience that these non - standard accounts of knowledge by acquaintance fail to capture. the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description has a number of important applications in philosophy. in epistemology, it underwrites a tradition from bertrand russell that continues to influence debates on the nature of foundationalism and the possibility of a privileged class of knowledge. in metaphysics, knowledge by acquaintance has increasingly been incorporated into arguments concerning the nature of conscious experience and the viability of physicalism. the current trend suggests that knowledge by acquaintance will continue to be refined and put to work on a variety of philosophical fronts. - balog, k. 2012. \u201c acquaintance and the mind - body problem. \u201d in simone gozzano and christopher hill ( eds. ), new perspectives on type identity : the mental and the physical ( pp. 16 - 43 ). cambridge : cambridge university press. - bonjour, l. 2001. \u201c toward a defense of empirical foundationalism. \u201d in michael raymond depaul ( ed. ), resurrecting old - fashioned foundationalism ( pp. 21 - 38 ). lanham : rowman and littlefield. - bonjour, l. 2003. \u201c a version of internalist foundationalism. \u201d in laurence bonjour and ernest sosa ( eds. ), epistemic justification : internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues ( pp. 5 - 96 ). malden : blackwell. - brewer, b. 2011. perception and its objects. oxford : oxford university press. - chalmers, d. 1996. the conscious mind.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6041398688191453, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 13, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.405201"}
{"text": ". externalism, foundations vs. virtues ( pp. 5 - 96 ). malden : blackwell. - brewer, b. 2011. perception and its objects. oxford : oxford university press. - chalmers, d. 1996. the conscious mind. oxford : oxford university press. - chalmers, d. 2003. \u201c the content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. \u201d in quentin smith and aleksandar jokic ( eds. ), consciousness : new philosophical perspectives ( pp. 220 - 272 ). oxford : oxford university press. - chalmers, d. 2004. \u201c phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument. \u201d in peter ludlow, yujin nagasawa, and daniel stoljar ( eds. ), there \u2019 s something about mary : essays on phenomenal consciousness and frank jackson \u2019 s knowledge argument ( pp. 269 - 298 ). cambridge : mit press. - chalmers, d. 2007. \u201c phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. \u201d in torin alter and sven walter ( eds. ), phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge : new essays on consciousness and physicalism ( pp. 167 - 194 ). oxford : oxford university press. - chisholm, r. 1942. \u201c the problem of the speckled hen. \u201d mind 51, 368 - 373. - conee, e. 1994. \u201c phenomenal knowledge. \u201d australasian journal of philosophy 72, 136 - 150. - davidson, d. 1986. \u201c a coherence theory of truth and knowledge. \u201d in ernest lepore ( ed. ), truth and interpretation : perspectives on the philosophy of donald davidson ( pp. 423 - 438 ). malden : blackwell. - fales, e. 1996. a defense of the given. lanham : rowman and littlefield. - feldman, r. 2004. \u201c the justification of introspective beliefs. \u201d in earl conee and richard feldman ( eds. ), evidentialism : essays in epistemology ( pp. 199 - 218 ). oxford : oxford university press. - fumerton, r. 1995. metaepistemology and skepticism. lanham : rowman and littlefield. - fumerton, r. 2005. \u201c speckled hens and objections of acquaintance. \u201d philosophical perspectives 19, 121 - 138. - gertler, b. 1999. \u201c a defense of the knowledge argument. \u201d philosophical studies 93, 317 - 336. - gertler, b. 2001", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6053504008414353, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 14, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.406156"}
{"text": "hens and objections of acquaintance. \u201d philosophical perspectives 19, 121 - 138. - gertler, b. 1999. \u201c a defense of the knowledge argument. \u201d philosophical studies 93, 317 - 336. - gertler, b. 2001. \u201c introspecting phenomenal states. \u201d philosophy and phenomenological research 63, 305 \u2013 328. - gertler, b. 2011. self - knowledge. new york : routledge. - gertler, b. 2012. \u201c renewed acquaintance. \u201d in declan smithies and daniel stoljar ( eds. ), introspection and consciousness ( pp. 93 - 128 ). oxford : oxford university press. - hasan, a. forthcoming. \u201c phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification. \u201d philosophical studies. - jackson, f. 1982. \u201c epiphenomenal qualia. \u201d philosophical quarterly 32, 126 - 136. - jackson, f. 1986. \u201c what mary didn \u2019 t know. \u201d the journal of philosophy 83, 291 - 295. - markie, p. 2009. \u201c classical foundationalism and speckled hens. \u201d philosophy and phenomenological research 79, 190 - 206. - mcgrew, t. 1995. the foundations of knowledge. lanham : littlefield adams. - nida - rumelin, m. 1995. \u201c what mary couldn \u2019 t know : belief about phenomenal states. \u201d in thomas metzinger ( ed. ), conscious experience ( pp. 219 - 241 ). exeter : imprint academic. - pitt, d. \u201c the phenomenology of cognition, or, what it is like to think that p? \u201d philosophy and phenomenological research 69, 1 - 36. - poston, t. 2007. \u201c acquaintance and the problem of the speckled hen. \u201d philosophical studies 132, 331 - 346. - poston, t. 2010. \u201c similarity and acquaintance. \u201d philosophical studies 147, 369 - 378. - russell, b. 1905. \u201c on denoting. \u201d mind 14, 479 - 493. - russell, b. 1910. \u201c knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. \u201d proceedings of the aristotelian society 11, 108 - 128. - russell, b. 1997. problems of philosophy, ed. john perry. oxford : oxford university press. - russell, b. 1993. our knowledge of the external world. new york : routledge. - sellars", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.602603196829119, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:36dbdad9-46a1-4f0c-975c-ca3affb15757>", "chunk_index": 15, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:29.407232"}
{"text": "2006 08 11 by ker than | usatoday. com a two - year survey of enormous interstellar dust clouds has turned up eight organic molecules in two different regions of space. one is a stellar nursery awash in light while the other is a cold, starless void. the finding, detailed in the current issue of astrophysical journal, supports other recent studies suggesting molecules important for life commonly form in the gas and dust clouds that condense to form stars and planets. the molecules were discovered using the robert c. byrd green bank telescope ( gbt ), a large radio telescope located in west virginia. \" finding eight [ organic ] molecules in the space of two years is quite remarkable, \" said study leader jan hollis of nasa goddard space flight center. the newly discovered molecules are made up of 6 to 11 atoms each and are classified as organic because they contain carbon. five of the molecules were discovered in sagittarius b2 ( n ), a star - forming dust cloud located 26, 000 light - years from earth near the center of the milky way galaxy. this stellar nursery is the largest known repository of complex interstellar molecules. the other three molecules were found in the taurus molecular cloud ( tmc - 1 ), located only 450 light - years away. tmc - 1 is starless ; it is cold and dark and has a temperature of only 10 degrees above absolute zero. \" the discovery of these large organic molecules in the coldest regions of the interstellar medium has certainly changed the belief that large organic molecules would only have their origins in hot molecular cores, \" said study team member anthony remijan of the national radio astronomy observatory ( nrao ). \" it has forced us to rethink the paradigms of interstellar chemistry. \" just because a molecule is organic does not mean that it is made by living things. in fact, many of the newly spotted molecules are poisonous to organisms on earth, hollis said. but one of the molecules found in sagittarius b2 ( n ), called acetamide, contains a type of chemical bond important for linking together amino acids, the molecular building blocks of proteins. made up of 9 atoms, acetamide \" is the largest molecule found in space that has that bond, \" hollis told space. com. the molecules are thought to form by two main mechanisms. in the first, simple chemical reactions add an atom to a molecule that is stuck to the surface of a dust grain afloat in space. the second method involves chemical reactions between neutral", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6016554185284054, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:41049535-bf85-4cad-888c-f9251e6b55c0>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:30.290536"}
{"text": "laser technology uses light. light can be rapidly and precisely deflected, shaped and focused. if we pulse laser light and reduce pulse duration more and more, the laser tool works even more precisely. a benefit : the material being processed heats up less and less. high - power, ultra - short pulses, then, are the ideal solution for medical applications, in brain surgery for instance, as the cerebral membrane is not damaged. or for removing tumor tissue thereby conserving the surrounding tissue and blood vessels. this precision technology is also valued in the processing of materials, glass for instance : lasers are able to cut narrow speaker ports in smartphone displays. for years, ultra - short laser pulses have been used for the extremely precise and gentle processing of highly - sensitive materials. until now though, they have often lacked in power. the newly developed laser platform solves this problem with the innoslab amplifier as its core. four mirrors surround a laser crystal plate \u2013 the slab. pump radiation enters at the two opposite faces of the slab. ultra - short laser pulses are repeatedly reflected by these mirrors and pass through the slab several times. energy is transfered from the pump radiation to the laser pulse until the required power is achieved. the innoslab platform was developed by the fraunhofer institute for laser technology ilt in aachen and refined further together with several partners from industry and science : the chair for laser technology at rwth aachen university, the max planck institute for quantum optics mpq in munich and the companies jenoptik ag, edgewave and amphos \u2013 the latter two being ilt spin - offs. to develop new markets for laser systems with ultra - short wavelengths, the team of developers had to increase the mean laser output of ultra - short pulse beam sources \u2013 up to several hundred watts. higher power makes high volume production in industrie and shorter measuring times during scientific experiments possible. between 2008 and 2011, two joint projects revolved around developing the new beam source : the aim of the pikoflat project, supported by the federal ministry for education and research bmbf, was to structure printing tools and embossing dies. the goal was to reduce processing times while significantly increasing quality. one of the results of this project is the production of embossing cylinders that are used to create extremely fine artificial leather surfaces for the automotive industry. in the second joint project, korona, fraunhofer collaborated closely with the max planck institute of quantum optics in garching near munich and with rwth aachen university", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6108393255199684, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:588b52e0-fc80-44f1-80de-0d5b55f8dbf3>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:30.348524"}
{"text": "a drug is a chemical or biochemical compose able to deteriorate one or more intraneuronales activities and / or to disturb the communications interneuronales. the man recognized the capacity of drugs very early in his history and consumed those since then in order to modifying his physiological or psychic functions, his physiological reactions and his state of consciousnesses. and which can be mortal ( the ground is punt man! *! e! exchange. ) certain drugs can generate a dependence physical or psychological. the use of those can have as consequences of the physical or mental disturbances. the term \u201c drug \u201d recovers primarily two aspects : the nature of the biological effects that drug induced on the one hand, and on the other hand reports / ratios that which consumes it maintains with it. it is necessary that a given chemical compound either consumed so that it can answer the name of \u201c drug \u201d. it is the mode and the frequency of consumption which created the accoutumance or the dependence with the product. one can thus think that it is the consumer ( through his modes of consumption ), more than the product which determines which substance will be, for him, a drug. a system of regulation of the production, trade and consumption of drugs were set up during the 20th century. the rules enacted by the states take account of the political, social and medical implications of the drug taking and determine the reglementation of their use or their prohibition. a policy of prohibition more or less generalized was also installation for the products stupefiant s. the legislation installation thus makes it possible it also to specify the concept of drug. etymologythe etymology of the term is vague. for the majority of the modern works. some think that this word could also come from the hebrew \u201c rakab \u201d ( perfume ) or of the arab \u201c drawa \u201d ( ball of corn ). the taking into account of several parameters makes it possible to better determine the concept of drug. for pierre - arnaud chouvy, \u201c drug is first of all a product of origin animal e, vegetal e or synthetique, which, introduced into the organization by some means that it is, has on this one of the effects biodynamic, and who can, in certain cases, to create a more or less serious accoutumance \u201d. a third element making it possible to define a drug are the standards imposed by a given company. these three elements make it possible to apprehend drug like a phenomenon of societe. this difference in approach of", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6177637401973453, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:85aed761-ec40-4ebe-b467-d5ecf274f207>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:30.502373"}
{"text": "2. a look at some fractal application programs 3. extensions of iteration a presentation of various lengths can be developed by varying the amount of emphasis given to the different sections of the outline. the introduction is a good place to stress the need to include more than the computation component of mathematics and to identify the motivating aspects of teaching through applications. looking at examples of mathematical models and, also, looking at problems dealing with \" real world \" data can renew a teacher ' s interest in reaching beyond the teaching of computation and abstract procedures. to understand fractals, and eventually, to understand dynamical systems, requires some expertise with iteration. the number of examples of iteration and the complexity of the examples you select will depend on the length of the presentation and the type of audience. the length of the presentation will also determine how many fractals can be demonstrated and how much hands - on work can be done. the availability of computers or graphing calculators will extend the possibilities for demonstrations with fractals. even though the 1993 woodrow wilson national fellowship foundation math institute focused considerable amounts of time on the study of dynamical systems beyond fractals, this workshop outline is directed toward developing background concepts. in fact, most of the problems in this book on change can be used with students who have a good working knowledge of algebra ii or pre - calculus. this book, combined with the technology now available, provides a new way of exploring problems that prior to this may have been purely in the venue of a research mathematician. it is exciting to realize that the knowledge and resources for investigating a \" frontier \" of mathematics are now in the reach of many high school students. all the resources alluded to in this project are listed in the bibliography at the end of the 1993 wwnff math institute book on change.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_simulation", "similarity_score": 0.6633294092645812, "token_count": 366, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:cc14acc1-70b3-47a4-ad48-1ff12601aaf4>", "chunk_index": 4, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:30.906413"}
{"text": "libbrecht, k. g. and black, e. d. and hirata, c. m. ( 2003 ) a basic lock - in amplifier experiment for the undergraduate laboratory. american journal of physics, 71 ( 11 ). pp. 1208 - 1213. issn 0002 - 9505 http : / / resolver. caltech. edu / caltechauthors : libajp03 - published version see usage policy. use this persistent url to link to this item : http : / / resolver. caltech. edu / caltechauthors : libajp03 we describe a basic experiment for the undergraduate laboratory that demonstrates aspects of both, the science and the art of precision electronic measurements. the essence of the experiment is to measure the resistance of a small length of brass - wire to high accuracy using a simple voltage divider and a lock - in amplifier. by performing the measurement at different frequencies and different drive currents, one observes various random noise sources and systematic measurement effects. | additional information : | | \u00a9 2003 american association of physics teachers. received 9 august 2002 ; accepted 9 april 2003. | | usage policy : | | no commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | | deposited by : | | tony diaz | | deposited on : | | 30 jan 2009 00 : 40 | | last modified : | | 26 dec 2012 10 : 38 | repository staff only : item control page", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_metrology", "similarity_score": 0.6284929051068362, "token_count": 302, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:8889feab-6810-4335-b85a-727a2db8e58a>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:31.146665"}
{"text": "the large hadron collider ( lhc ) is the world \u2019 s largest and most powerful particle accelerator. it first started up on 10 september 2008, and remains the latest addition to cern \u2019 s accelerator complex. the lhc consists of a 27 - kilometre ring of superconducting magnets with a number of accelerating structures to boost the energy of the particles along the way. inside the accelerator, two high - energy particle beams travel at close to the speed of light before they are made to collide. the beams travel in opposite directions in separate beam pipes \u2013 two tubes kept at ultrahigh vacuum. they are guided around the accelerator ring by a strong magnetic field maintained by superconducting electromagnets. the electromagnets are built from coils of special electric cable that operates in a superconducting state, efficiently conducting electricity without resistance or loss of energy. this requires chilling the magnets to \u2011 271. 3\u00b0c \u2013 a temperature colder than outer space. for this reason, much of the accelerator is connected to a distribution system of liquid helium, which cools the magnets, as well as to other supply services. thousands of magnets of different varieties and sizes are used to direct the beams around the accelerator. these include 1232 dipole magnets 15 metres in length which bend the beams, and 392 quadrupole magnets, each 5 \u2013 7 metres long, which focus the beams. just prior to collision, another type of magnet is used to \" squeeze \" the particles closer together to increase the chances of collisions. the particles are so tiny that the task of making them collide is akin to firing two needles 10 kilometres apart with such precision that they meet halfway! all the controls for the accelerator, its services and technical infrastructure are housed under one roof at the cern control centre. from here, the beams inside the lhc are made to collide at four locations around the accelerator ring, corresponding to the positions of four particle detectors \u2013 atlas, cms, alice and lhcb.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6403518998909873, "token_count": 415, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:53ef0282-8527-4787-9fcb-72f5a7ed37b8>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:31.627621"}
{"text": "lives : neuronal and organismal lifespans decoupled mar 27, 2013 | 4. 9 / 5 ( 8 ) | 0 - sizing things up : the evolutionary neurobiology of scale invariance feb 28, 2013 | 4. 8 / 5 ( 10 ) | 14 force between two concentric solenoids 2 hours ago imagine a finite length solenoid with outer radius r1 and inner radius r2. this solenoid has a time - varying current going though it. this solenoid is... synchrotron, question about insertion devices and electron velocity 2 hours ago when an electron enters an insertion device ( wiggler and undulator ) from the storage ring in a synchrotron the tangential velocity is equal to the... equating differentials = > equating coefficients 4 hours ago hi all, in thermodynamics one often has equations like a dx + b dy = \u2202f / \u2202x dx + \u2202f / \u2202y dy from which follows a = \u2202f / \u2202x b = \u2202f / \u2202y the idea behind a reverse shock 10 hours ago so in a supernova explosion for example ( 5th slide ) http : / / www. astro. princeton. edu / ~ burrows / classes / 541 / blastwaveschisari. pdf ambient medium is... guass ' s law for a charge distribution 10 hours ago first, this is not a homework question, just something i ' ve been confused about for some time. i understand how to use guass ' s law in many ways but... 11 hours ago hello : ) i ' m new to this forum, so excuse me for my straightforwardness ; ) i ' m working on my bachelor work and i can ' t find a solution. i ' m writing... - more from physics forums - classical physics more news stories kate o ' reilly ' s spring allergy survival kit includes the usual stuff - nasal sprays, allergy pills and a box of tissues. this season, she ' s added a new weapon to her line of defense : an app on her smartphone. immunology may 24, 2013 | not rated yet | 0 biological processes are generally based on events at the molecular and cellular level. to understand what happens in the course of infections, diseases or normal bodily functions, scientists would need to... immunology may 24, 2013 | 5 / 5 ( 5 ) | 0 | ( medical xp", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6005817769556565, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:a7a8a83b-e9ae-493e-8b78-291faba5faba>", "chunk_index": 2, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:31.799205"}
{"text": "physics by aristotle public domain english translation by r. p. hardie and r. k. gaye when the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. for we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. plainly therefore in the science of nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. the natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature ; for the same things are not ' knowable relatively to us ' and ' knowable ' without qualification. so in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature. now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. thus we must advance from generalities to particulars ; for it is a whole that is best known to sense - perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. a name, e. g. ' round ', means vaguely a sort of whole : its definition analyses this into its particular senses. similarly a child begins by calling all men ' father ', and all women ' mother ', but later on distinguishes each of them. the principles in question must be either ( a ) one or ( b ) more than one. if ( a ) one, it must be either ( i ) motionless, as parmenides and melissus assert, or ( ii ) in motion, as the physicists hold, some declaring air to be the first principle, others water. if ( b ) more than one, then either ( i ) a finite or ( ii ) an infinite plurality. if ( i ) finite ( but more than one ), then either two or three or four or some other number. if ( ii ) infinite, then either as democritus believed one in kind, but differing in shape or form ; or different in kind and even contrary. a similar inquiry is", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6411364416170215, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.366288"}
{"text": ", then either two or three or four or some other number. if ( ii ) infinite, then either as democritus believed one in kind, but differing in shape or form ; or different in kind and even contrary. a similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of existents : for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing things are one or many, and if many, whether a finite or an infinite plurality. so they too are inquiring whether the principle or element is one or many. now to investigate whether being is one and motionless is not a contribution to the science of nature. for just as the geometer has nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his science - this being a question for a different science or for or common to all - so a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence. for if being is just one, and one in the way mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be the principle of some thing or things. to inquire therefore whether being is one in this sense would be like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of argument ( such as the heraclitean thesis, or such a thesis as that being is one man ) or like refuting a merely contentious argument - a description which applies to the arguments both of melissus and of parmenides : their premisses are false and their conclusions do not follow. or rather the argument of melissus is gross and palpable and offers no difficulty at all : accept one ridiculous proposition and the rest follows - a simple enough proceeding. we physicists, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion which is indeed made plain by induction. moreover, no man of science is bound to solve every kind of difficulty that may be raised, but only as many as are drawn falsely from the principles of the science : it is not our business to refute those that do not arise in this way : just as it is the duty of the geometer to refute the squaring of the circle by means of segments, but it is not his duty to refute antiphon ' s proof. at the same time the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though nature is not their subject : so it will perhaps be as well to spend a few words on them, especially as the inquiry", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6051787834051329, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 1, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.370927"}
{"text": "s proof. at the same time the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though nature is not their subject : so it will perhaps be as well to spend a few words on them, especially as the inquiry is not without scientific interest. the most pertinent question with which to begin will be this : in what sense is it asserted that all things are one? for ' is ' is used in many senses. do they mean that all things ' are ' substance or quantities or qualities? and, further, are all things one substance - one man, one horse, or one soul - or quality and that one and the same - white or hot or something of the kind? these are all very different doctrines and all impossible to maintain. for if both substance and quantity and quality are, then, whether these exist independently of each other or not, being will be many. if on the other hand it is asserted that all things are quality or quantity, then, whether substance exists or not, an absurdity results, if the impossible can properly be called absurd. for none of the others can exist independently : substance alone is independent : for everything is predicated of substance as subject. now melissus says that being is infinite. it is then a quantity. for the infinite is in the category of quantity, whereas substance or quality or affection cannot be infinite except through a concomitant attribute, that is, if at the same time they are also quantities. for to define the infinite you must use quantity in your formula, but not substance or quality. if then being is both substance and quantity, it is two, not one : if only substance, it is not infinite and has no magnitude ; for to have that it will have to be a quantity. again, ' one ' itself, no less than ' being ', is used in many senses, so we must consider in what sense the word is used when it is said that the all is one. now we say that ( a ) the continuous is one or that ( b ) the indivisible is one, or ( c ) things are said to be ' one ', when their essence is one and the same, as ' liquor ' and ' drink '. if ( a ) their one is one in the sense of continuous, it is many, for the continuous is divisible ad infinitum. there is, indeed, a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps not relevant to the present argument, yet des", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6363301463711604, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 2, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.375500"}
{"text": "- being, but in the sense that it is not at all. hence ' substance ' is not ; for it is true to say that it is white, which we found to mean not - being. if to avoid this we say that even ' white ' means substance, it follows that ' being ' has more than one meaning. in particular, then, being will not have magnitude, if it is substance. for each of the two parts must he in a different sense. ( 2 ) substance is plainly divisible into other substances, if we consider the mere nature of a definition. for instance, if ' man ' is a substance, ' animal ' and ' biped ' must also be substances. for if not substances, they must be attributes - and if attributes, attributes either of ( a ) man or of ( b ) some other subject. but neither is possible. ( a ) an attribute is either that which may or may not belong to the subject or that in whose definition the subject of which it is an attribute is involved. thus ' sitting ' is an example of a separable attribute, while ' snubness ' contains the definition of ' nose ', to which we attribute snubness. further, the definition of the whole is not contained in the definitions of the contents or elements of the definitory formula ; that of ' man ' for instance in ' biped ', or that of ' white man ' in ' white '. if then this is so, and if ' biped ' is supposed to be an attribute of ' man ', it must be either separable, so that ' man ' might possibly not be ' biped ', or the definition of ' man ' must come into the definition of ' biped ' - which is impossible, as the converse is the case. ( b ) if, on the other hand, we suppose that ' biped ' and ' animal ' are attributes not of man but of something else, and are not each of them a substance, then ' man ' too will be an attribute of something else. but we must assume that substance is not the attribute of anything, that the subject of which both ' biped ' and ' animal ' and each separately are predicated is the subject also of the complex ' biped animal '. are we then to say that the all is composed of indivisible substances? some thinkers did, in point of fact, give way to both arguments. to the argument that all things are one if being", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6450940056505514, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 6, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.381294"}
{"text": "the complex ' biped animal '. are we then to say that the all is composed of indivisible substances? some thinkers did, in point of fact, give way to both arguments. to the argument that all things are one if being means one thing, they conceded that not - being is ; to that from bisection, they yielded by positing atomic magnitudes. but obviously it is not true that if being means one thing, and cannot at the same time mean the contradictory of this, there will be nothing which is not, for even if what is not cannot be without qualification, there is no reason why it should not be a particular not - being. to say that all things will be one, if there is nothing besides being itself, is absurd. for who understands ' being itself ' to be anything but a particular substance? but if this is so, there is nothing to prevent there being many beings, as has been said. it is, then, clearly impossible for being to be one in this sense. the physicists on the other hand have two modes of explanation. the first set make the underlying body one either one of the three or something else which is denser than fire and rarer than air then generate everything else from this, and obtain multiplicity by condensation and rarefaction. now these are contraries, which may be generalized into ' excess and defect '. ( compare plato ' s ' great and small ' - except that he make these his matter, the one his form, while the others treat the one which underlies as matter and the contraries as differentiae, i. e. forms ). the second set assert that the contrarieties are contained in the one and emerge from it by segregation, for example anaximander and also all those who assert that ' what is ' is one and many, like empedocles and anaxagoras ; for they too produce other things from their mixture by segregation. these differ, however, from each other in that the former imagines a cycle of such changes, the latter a single series. anaxagoras again made both his ' homceomerous ' substances and his contraries infinite in multitude, whereas empedocles posits only the so - called elements. the theory of anaxagoras that the principles are infinite in multitude was probably due to his acceptance of the common opinion of the physicists that nothing comes into being from not - being. for this is the reason why they", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.612761876779436, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 7, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.382944"}
{"text": "so - called elements. the theory of anaxagoras that the principles are infinite in multitude was probably due to his acceptance of the common opinion of the physicists that nothing comes into being from not - being. for this is the reason why they use the phrase ' all things were together ' and the coming into being of such and such a kind of thing is reduced to change of quality, while some spoke of combination and separation. moreover, the fact that the contraries proceed from each other led them to the conclusion. the one, they reasoned, must have already existed in the other ; for since everything that comes into being must arise either from what is or from what is not, and it is impossible for it to arise from what is not ( on this point all the physicists agree ), they thought that the truth of the alternative necessarily followed, namely that things come into being out of existent things, i. e. out of things already present, but imperceptible to our senses because of the smallness of their bulk. so they assert that everything has been mixed in every. thing, because they saw everything arising out of everything. but things, as they say, appear different from one another and receive different names according to the nature of the particles which are numerically predominant among the innumerable constituents of the mixture. for nothing, they say, is purely and entirely white or black or sweet, bone or flesh, but the nature of a thing is held to be that of which it contains the most. now ( 1 ) the infinite qua infinite is unknowable, so that what is infinite in multitude or size is unknowable in quantity, and what is infinite in variety of kind is unknowable in quality. but the principles in question are infinite both in multitude and in kind. therefore it is impossible to know things which are composed of them ; for it is when we know the nature and quantity of its components that we suppose we know a complex. further ( 2 ) if the parts of a whole may be of any size in the direction either of greatness or of smallness ( by ' parts ' i mean components into which a whole can be divided and which are actually present in it ), it is necessary that the whole thing itself may be of any size. clearly, therefore, since it is impossible for an animal or plant to be indefinitely big or small, neither can its parts be such, or the whole will be the same. but flesh, bone, and the like", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6240523326659482, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 8, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.388505"}
{"text": ", for instance, from black and white. everything, therefore, that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries. up to this point we have practically had most of the other writers on the subject with us, as i have said already : for all of them identify their elements, and what they call their principles, with the contraries, giving no reason indeed for the theory, but contrained as it were by the truth itself. they differ, however, from one another in that some assume contraries which are more primary, others contraries which are less so : some those more knowable in the order of explanation, others those more familiar to sense. for some make hot and cold, or again moist and dry, the conditions of becoming ; while others make odd and even, or again love and strife ; and these differ from each other in the way mentioned. hence their principles are in one sense the same, in another different ; different certainly, as indeed most people think, but the same inasmuch as they are analogous ; for all are taken from the same table of columns, some of the pairs being wider, others narrower in extent. in this way then their theories are both the same and different, some better, some worse ; some, as i have said, take as their contraries what is more knowable in the order of explanation, others what is more familiar to sense. ( the universal is more knowable in the order of explanation, the particular in the order of sense : for explanation has to do with the universal, sense with the particular. ) ' the great and the small ', for example, belong to the former class, ' the dense and the rare ' to the latter. it is clear then that our principles must be contraries. the next question is whether the principles are two or three or more in number. one they cannot be, for there cannot be one contrary. nor can they be innumerable, because, if so, being will not be knowable : and in any one genus there is only one contrariety, and substance is one genus : also a finite number is sufficient, and a finite number, such as the principles of empedocles, is better than an infinite multitude ; for empedocles professes to obtain from his principles all that anaxagoras obtains from his innumerable principles. lastly, some contraries are more primary than others, and some arise from others - for example sweet and bitter, white", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6166589002292163, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 12, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.395750"}
{"text": "empedocles professes to obtain from his principles all that anaxagoras obtains from his innumerable principles. lastly, some contraries are more primary than others, and some arise from others - for example sweet and bitter, white and black - whereas the principles must always remain principles. this will suffice to show that the principles are neither one nor innumerable. granted, then, that they are a limited number, it is plausible to suppose them more than two. for it is difficult to see how either density should be of such a nature as to act in any way on rarity or rarity on density. the same is true of any other pair of contraries ; for love does not gather strife together and make things out of it, nor does strife make anything out of love, but both act on a third thing different from both. some indeed assume more than one such thing from which they construct the world of nature. other objections to the view that it is not necessary to assume a third principle as a substratum may be added. ( 1 ) we do not find that the contraries constitute the substance of any thing. but what is a first principle ought not to be the predicate of any subject. if it were, there would be a principle of the supposed principle : for the subject is a principle, and prior presumably to what is predicated of it. again ( 2 ) we hold that a substance is not contrary to another substance. how then can substance be derived from what are not substances? or how can non - substances be prior to substance? if then we accept both the former argument and this one, we must, to preserve both, assume a third somewhat as the substratum of the contraries, such as is spoken of by those who describe the all as one nature - water or fire or what is intermediate between them. what is intermediate seems preferable ; for fire, earth, air, and water are already involved with pairs of contraries. there is, therefore, much to be said for those who make the underlying substance different from these four ; of the rest, the next best choice is air, as presenting sensible differences in a less degree than the others ; and after air, water. all, however, agree in this, that they differentiate their one by means of the contraries, such as density and rarity and more and less, which may of course be generalized, as has already been said into excess and defect. indeed this doctrine too ( that the one", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.629173886990477, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 13, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.397944"}
{"text": "this, that they differentiate their one by means of the contraries, such as density and rarity and more and less, which may of course be generalized, as has already been said into excess and defect. indeed this doctrine too ( that the one and excess and defect are the principles of things ) would appear to be of old standing, though in different forms ; for the early thinkers made the two the active and the one the passive principle, whereas some of the more recent maintain the reverse. to suppose then that the elements are three in number would seem, from these and similar considerations, a plausible view, as i said before. on the other hand, the view that they are more than three in number would seem to be untenable. for the one substratum is sufficient to be acted on ; but if we have four contraries, there will be two contrarieties, and we shall have to suppose an intermediate nature for each pair separately. if, on the other hand, the contrarieties, being two, can generate from each other, the second contrariety will be superfluous. moreover, it is impossible that there should be more than one primary contrariety. for substance is a single genus of being, so that the principles can differ only as prior and posterior, not in genus ; in a single genus there is always a single contrariety, all the other contrarieties in it being held to be reducible to one. it is clear then that the number of elements is neither one nor more than two or three ; but whether two or three is, as i said, a question of considerable difficulty. we will now give our own account, approaching the question first with reference to becoming in its widest sense : for we shall be following the natural order of inquiry if we speak first of common characteristics, and then investigate the characteristics of special cases. we say that one thing comes to be from another thing, and one sort of thing from another sort of thing, both in the case of simple and of complex things. i mean the following. we can say ( 1 ) ' man becomes musical ', ( 2 ) what is ' not - musical becomes musical ', or ( 3 ), the ' not - musical man becomes a musical man '. now what becomes in ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) - ' man ' and ' not musical ' - i call simple, and what each becomes - ' musical ' - simple also. but when ( 3 ) we say the ' not - musical man becomes a", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6401004610280144, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 14, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.404425"}
{"text": "the number of the principles of natural objects which are subject to generation, and how the number is reached : and it is clear that there must be a substratum for the contraries, and that the contraries must be two. ( yet in another way of putting it this is not necessary, as one of the contraries will serve to effect the change by its successive absence and presence. ) the underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy. for as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance, i. e. the ' this ' or existent. this then is one principle ( though not one or existent in the same sense as the ' this ' ), and the definition was one as we agreed ; then further there is its contrary, the privation. in what sense these are two, and in what sense more, has been stated above. briefly, we explained first that only the contraries were principles, and later that a substratum was indispensable, and that the principles were three ; our last statement has elucidated the difference between the contraries, the mutual relation of the principles, and the nature of the substratum. whether the form or the substratum is the essential nature of a physical object is not yet clear. but that the principles are three, and in what sense, and the way in which each is a principle, is clear. so much then for the question of the number and the nature of the principles. we will now proceed to show that the difficulty of the early thinkers, as well as our own, is solved in this way alone. the first of those who studied science were misled in their search for truth and the nature of things by their inexperience, which as it were thrust them into another path. so they say that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible. for what is cannot come to be ( because it is already ), and from what is not nothing could have come to be ( because something must be present as a substratum ). so too they exaggerated the consequence of this, and went so far as to deny even the existence of a plurality of things, maintaining that only being itself is. such then was", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6368467316635726, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 18, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.414991"}
{"text": "comes to be from being, and that being does not come to be except in a qualified sense. in that way, however, it does, just as animal might come to be from animal, and an animal of a certain kind from an animal of a certain kind. thus, suppose a dog to come to be from a horse. the dog would then, it is true, come to be from animal ( as well as from an animal of a certain kind ) but not as animal, for that is already there. but if anything is to become an animal, not in a qualified sense, it will not be from animal : and if being, not from being - nor from not - being either, for it has been explained that by ' from not being ' we mean from not - being qua not - being. note further that we do not subvert the principle that everything either is or is not. this then is one way of solving the difficulty. another consists in pointing out that the same things can be explained in terms of potentiality and actuality. but this has been done with greater precision elsewhere. so, as we said, the difficulties which constrain people to deny the existence of some of the things we mentioned are now solved. for it was this reason which also caused some of the earlier thinkers to turn so far aside from the road which leads to coming to be and passing away and change generally. if they had come in sight of this nature, all their ignorance would have been dispelled. others, indeed, have apprehended the nature in question, but not adequately. in the first place they allow that a thing may come to be without qualification from not being, accepting on this point the statement of parmenides. secondly, they think that if the substratum is one numerically, it must have also only a single potentiality - which is a very different thing. now we distinguish matter and privation, and hold that one of these, namely the matter, is not - being only in virtue of an attribute which it has, while the privation in its own nature is not - being ; and that the matter is nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the privation in no sense is. they, on the other hand, identify their great and small alike with not being, and that whether they are taken together as one or separately. their triad is therefore of quite a different kind from ours. for they got so far as to see that there must be some underlying nature,", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6022717381015872, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 20, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.426559"}
{"text": "identify their great and small alike with not being, and that whether they are taken together as one or separately. their triad is therefore of quite a different kind from ours. for they got so far as to see that there must be some underlying nature, but they make it one - for even if one philosopher makes a dyad of it, which he calls great and small, the effect is the same, for he overlooked the other nature. for the one which persists is a joint cause, with the form, of what comes to be - a mother, as it were. but the negative part of the contrariety may often seem, if you concentrate your attention on it as an evil agent, not to exist at all. for admitting with them that there is something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there are two other principles, the one contrary to it, the other such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it. but the consequence of their view is that the contrary desires its wtextinction. yet the form cannot desire itself, for it is not defective ; nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. the truth is that what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful - only the ugly or the female not per se but per accidens. the matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. as that which contains the privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what ceases to be - the privation - is contained within it. but as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. for if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it ; but this is its own special nature, so that it will be before coming to be. ( for my definition of matter is just this - the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result. ) and if it ceases to be it will pass into that at the last, so it will have ceased to be before ceasing to be. the accurate determination of the first principle in respect of form, whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are, is the province of the primary type of science ; so these", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6065500776100434, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 21, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.428369"}
{"text": "have ceased to be before ceasing to be. the accurate determination of the first principle in respect of form, whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are, is the province of the primary type of science ; so these questions may stand over till then. but of the natural, i. e. perishable, forms we shall speak in the expositions which follow. the above, then, may be taken as sufficient to establish that there are principles and what they are and how many there are. now let us make a fresh start and proceed. of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. ' by nature ' the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies ( earth, fire, air, water ) - for we say that these and the like exist ' by nature '. all the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness ( in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration ). on the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations i. e. in so far as they are products of art - have no innate impulse to change. but in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. i say ' not in virtue of a concomitant attribute ', because ( for instance ) a man who is a doctor might cure himself. nevertheless it is not in so far as he is a patient that he possesses the art of medicine : it merely has happened that the same man is doctor and patient - and that is why these attributes are not always found together. so it is with all other artificial products. none of them has in itself the source of its own production. but while in some cases ( for instance houses and the other products of manual labour ) that principle is in something else external to the thing, in others those which may cause a change in themselves in virtue of a concomitant attribute - it lies in the things themselves ( but not in virtue of what they are ). '", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6089949747318106, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 22, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.429869"}
{"text": "their nature and essence. consequently some assert earth, others fire or air or water or some or all of these, to be the nature of the things that are. for whatever any one of them supposed to have this character - whether one thing or more than one thing - this or these he declared to be the whole of substance, all else being its affections, states, or dispositions. every such thing they held to be eternal ( for it could not pass into anything else ), but other things to come into being and cease to be times without number. this then is one account of ' nature ', namely that it is the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change. another account is that ' nature ' is the shape or form which is specified in the definition of the thing. for the word ' nature ' is applied to what is according to nature and the natural in the same way as ' art ' is applied to what is artistic or a work of art. we should not say in the latter case that there is anything artistic about a thing, if it is a bed only potentially, not yet having the form of a bed ; nor should we call it a work of art. the same is true of natural compounds. what is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own ' nature ', and does not exist until it receives the form specified in the definition, which we name in defining what flesh or bone is. thus in the second sense of ' nature ' it would be the shape or form ( not separable except in statement ) of things which have in themselves a source of motion. ( the combination of the two, e. g. man, is not ' nature ' but ' by nature ' or ' natural '. ) the form indeed is ' nature ' rather than the matter ; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to fulfilment than when it exists potentially. again man is born from man, but not bed from bed. that is why people say that the figure is not the nature of a bed, but the wood is - if the bed sprouted not a bed but wood would come up. but even if the figure is art, then on the same principle the shape of man is his nature. for man is born from man. we also speak of a thing ' s nature as being exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is attained. the ' nature ' in this sense is not like ' doctor", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6112034986944626, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 24, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.432252"}
{"text": "shape of man is his nature. for man is born from man. we also speak of a thing ' s nature as being exhibited in the process of growth by which its nature is attained. the ' nature ' in this sense is not like ' doctoring ', which leads not to the art of doctoring but to health. doctoring must start from the art, not lead to it. but it is not in this way that nature ( in the one sense ) is related to nature ( in the other ). what grows qua growing grows from something into something. into what then does it grow? not into that from which it arose but into that to which it tends. the shape then is nature. ' shape ' and ' nature ', it should be added, are in two senses. for the privation too is in a way form. but whether in unqualified coming to be there is privation, i. e. a contrary to what comes to be, we must consider later. we have distinguished, then, the different ways in which the term ' nature ' is used. the next point to consider is how the mathematician differs from the physicist. obviously physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject - matter of mathematics. further, is astronomy different from physics or a department of it? it seems absurd that the physicist should be supposed to know the nature of sun or moon, but not to know any of their essential attributes, particularly as the writers on physics obviously do discuss their shape also and whether the earth and the world are spherical or not. now the mathematician, though he too treats of these things, nevertheless does not treat of them as the limits of a physical body ; nor does he consider the attributes indicated as the attributes of such bodies. that is why he separates them ; for in thought they are separable from motion, and it makes no difference, nor does any falsity result, if they are separated. the holders of the theory of forms do the same, though they are not aware of it ; for they separate the objects of physics, which are less separable than those of mathematics. this becomes plain if one tries to state in each of the two cases the definitions of the things and of their attributes. ' odd ' and ' even ', ' straight ' and ' curved ', and likewise ' number ', ' line ', and ' figure ', do not involve motion ; not so ' flesh ' and ' bone ' and ' man ' - these are", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.609046219349306, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 25, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.435872"}
{"text": "' and ' even ', ' straight ' and ' curved ', and likewise ' number ', ' line ', and ' figure ', do not involve motion ; not so ' flesh ' and ' bone ' and ' man ' - these are defined like ' snub nose ', not like ' curved '. similar evidence is supplied by the more physical of the branches of mathematics, such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy. these are in a way the converse of geometry. while geometry investigates physical lines but not qua physical, optics investigates mathematical lines, but qua physical, not qua mathematical. since ' nature ' has two senses, the form and the matter, we must investigate its objects as we would the essence of snubness. that is, such things are neither independent of matter nor can be defined in terms of matter only. here too indeed one might raise a difficulty. since there are two natures, with which is the physicist concerned? or should he investigate the combination of the two? but if the combination of the two, then also each severally. does it belong then to the same or to different sciences to know each severally? if we look at the ancients, physics would to be concerned with the matter. ( it was only very slightly that empedocles and democritus touched on the forms and the essence. ) but if on the other hand art imitates nature, and it is the part of the same discipline to know the form and the matter up to a point ( e. g. the doctor has a knowledge of health and also of bile and phlegm, in which health is realized, and the builder both of the form of the house and of the matter, namely that it is bricks and beams, and so forth ) : if this is so, it would be the part of physics also to know nature in both its senses. again, ' that for the sake of which ', or the end, belongs to the same department of knowledge as the means. but the nature is the end or ' that for the sake of which '. for if a thing undergoes a continuous change and there is a stage which is last, this stage is the end or ' that for the sake of which '. ( that is why the poet was carried away into making an absurd statement when he said ' he has the end for the sake of which he was born '. for not every stage that is last claims to be an end, but only that which", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6177849445674432, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 26, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.437704"}
{"text": "their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems. in one sense, then, ( 1 ) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called ' cause ', e. g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species. in another sense ( 2 ) the form or the archetype, i. e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called ' causes ' ( e. g. of the octave the relation of 2 : 1, and generally number ), and the parts in the definition. again ( 3 ) the primary source of the change or coming to rest ; e. g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed. again ( 4 ) in the sense of end or ' that for the sake of which ' a thing is done, e. g. health is the cause of walking about. ( ' why is he walking about? ' we say. ' to be healthy ', and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause. ) the same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e. g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. all these things are ' for the sake of ' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments. this then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term ' cause ' is used. as the word has several senses, it follows that there are several causes of the same thing not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute ), e. g. both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue. these are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of anything else that it may be - only not in the same way, the one being the material cause, the other the cause whence the motion comes. some things cause each other reciprocally, e. g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the origin of change. further the same thing is the cause of contrary results. for that which by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed for", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6395438640455426, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 28, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.441461"}
{"text": "point is the starting - point of the reasoning only, as there is no action. if then there is to be a house, such - and - such things must be made or be there already or exist, or generally the matter relative to the end, bricks and stones if it is a house. but the end is not due to these except as the matter, nor will it come to exist because of them. yet if they do not exist at all, neither will the house, or the saw - the former in the absence of stones, the latter in the absence of iron - just as in the other case the premisses will not be true, if the angles of the triangle are not equal to two right angles. the necessary in nature, then, is plainly what we call by the name of matter, and the changes in it. both causes must be stated by the physicist, but especially the end ; for that is the cause of the matter, not vice versa ; and the end is ' that for the sake of which ', and the beginning starts from the definition or essence ; as in artificial products, since a house is of such - and - such a kind, certain things must necessarily come to be or be there already, or since health is this, these things must necessarily come to be or be there already. similarly if man is this, then these ; if these, then those. perhaps the necessary is present also in the definition. for if one defines the operation of sawing as being a certain kind of dividing, then this cannot come about unless the saw has teeth of a certain kind ; and these cannot be unless it is of iron. for in the definition too there are some parts that are, as it were, its matter. nature has been defined as a ' principle of motion and change ', and it is the subject of our inquiry. we must therefore see that we understand the meaning of ' motion ' ; for if it were unknown, the meaning of ' nature ' too would be unknown. when we have determined the nature of motion, our next task will be to attack in the same way the terms which are involved in it. now motion is supposed to belong to the class of things which are continuous ; and the infinite presents itself first in the continuous - that is how it comes about that ' infinite ' is often used in definitions of the continuous ( ' what is infinitely divisible is continuous ' ). besides these, place, void, and time are thought to be necessary conditions of motion. clearly,", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6162393439848963, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 43, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.480882"}
{"text": "is how it comes about that ' infinite ' is often used in definitions of the continuous ( ' what is infinitely divisible is continuous ' ). besides these, place, void, and time are thought to be necessary conditions of motion. clearly, then, for these reasons and also because the attributes mentioned are common to, and coextensive with, all the objects of our science, we must first take each of them in hand and discuss it. for the investigation of special attributes comes after that of the common attributes. to begin then, as we said, with motion. we may start by distinguishing ( 1 ) what exists in a state of fulfilment only, ( 2 ) what exists as potential, ( 3 ) what exists as potential and also in fulfilment - one being a ' this ', another ' so much ', a third ' such ', and similarly in each of the other modes of the predication of being. further, the word ' relative ' is used with reference to ( 1 ) excess and defect, ( 2 ) agent and patient and generally what can move and what can be moved. for ' what can cause movement ' is relative to ' what can be moved ', and vice versa. again, there is no such thing as motion over and above the things. it is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes. but it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything common to these which is neither ' this ' nor quantum nor quale nor any of the other predicates. hence neither will motion and change have reference to something over and above the things mentioned, for there is nothing over and above them. now each of these belongs to all its subjects in either of two ways : namely ( 1 ) substance - the one is positive form, the other privation ; ( 2 ) in quality, white and black ; ( 3 ) in quantity, complete and incomplete ; ( 4 ) in respect of locomotion, upwards and downwards or light and heavy. hence there are as many types of motion or change as there are meanings of the word ' is '. we have now before us the distinctions in the various classes of being between what is full real and what is potential. def. the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is motion - namely, of what is alterable qua alterable, alteration : of what can be increased and its opposite what can be decreased (", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6671444311414534, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 44, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.487427"}
{"text": "def. the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is motion - namely, of what is alterable qua alterable, alteration : of what can be increased and its opposite what can be decreased ( there is no common name ), increase and decrease : of what can come to be and can pass away, coming to he and passing away : of what can be carried along, locomotion. examples will elucidate this definition of motion. when the buildable, in so far as it is just that, is fully real, it is being built, and this is building. similarly, learning, doctoring, rolling, leaping, ripening, ageing. the same thing, if it is of a certain kind, can be both potential and fully real, not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e. g. potentially hot and actually cold. hence at once such things will act and be acted on by one another in many ways : each of them will be capable at the same time of causing alteration and of being altered. hence, too, what effects motion as a physical agent can be moved : when a thing of this kind causes motion, it is itself also moved. this, indeed, has led some people to suppose that every mover is moved. but this question depends on another set of arguments, and the truth will be made clear later. is possible for a thing to cause motion, though it is itself incapable of being moved. it is the fulfilment of what is potential when it is already fully real and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion. what i mean by ' as ' is this : bronze is potentially a statue. but it is not the fulfilment of bronze as bronze which is motion. for ' to be bronze ' and ' to be a certain potentiality ' are not the same. if they were identical without qualification, i. e. in definition, the fulfilment of bronze as bronze would have been motion. but they are not the same, as has been said. ( this is obvious in contraries. ' to be capable of health ' and ' to be capable of illness ' are not the same, for if they were there would be no difference between being ill and being well. yet the subject both of health and of sickness - whether it is humour or blood - is one and the same. ) we can distinguish, then, between the two -", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.621611134684686, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 45, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.493082"}
{"text": "for if they were there would be no difference between being ill and being well. yet the subject both of health and of sickness - whether it is humour or blood - is one and the same. ) we can distinguish, then, between the two - just as, to give another example, ' colour ' and visible ' are different - and clearly it is the fulfilment of what is potential as potential that is motion. so this, precisely, is motion. further it is evident that motion is an attribute of a thing just when it is fully real in this way, and neither before nor after. for each thing of this kind is capable of being at one time actual, at another not. take for instance the buildable as buildable. the actuality of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. for the actuality of the buildable must be either this or the house. but when there is a house, the buildable is no longer buildable. on the other hand, it is the buildable which is being built. the process then of being built must be the kind of actuality required but building is a kind of motion, and the same account will apply to the other kinds also. the soundness of this definition is evident both when we consider the accounts of motion that the others have given, and also from the difficulty of defining it otherwise. one could not easily put motion and change in another genus - this is plain if we consider where some people put it ; they identify motion with or ' inequality ' or ' not being ' ; but such things are not necessarily moved, whether they are ' different ' or ' unequal ' or ' non - existent ' ; nor is change either to or from these rather than to or from their opposites. the reason why they put motion into these genera is that it is thought to be something indefinite, and the principles in the second column are indefinite because they are privative : none of them is either ' this ' or ' such ' or comes under any of the other modes of predication. the reason in turn why motion is thought to be indefinite is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuality - a thing that is merely capable of having a certain size is not undergoing change, nor yet a thing that is actually of a certain size, and motion is thought to be a sort of actuality, but incomplete, the reason for this view being that the potential whose actuality it is is incomplete. this is why it", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6116470274863969, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 46, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.498107"}
{"text": "change, nor yet a thing that is actually of a certain size, and motion is thought to be a sort of actuality, but incomplete, the reason for this view being that the potential whose actuality it is is incomplete. this is why it is hard to grasp what motion is. it is necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or with sheer actuality, yet none of these seems possible. there remains then the suggested mode of definition, namely that it is a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing. the mover too is moved, as has been said - every mover, that is, which is capable of motion, and whose immobility is rest - when a thing is subject to motion its immobility is rest. for to act on the movable as such is just to move it. but this it does by contact, so that at the same time it is also acted on. hence we can define motion as the fulfilment of the movable qua movable, the cause of the attribute being contact with what can move so that the mover is also acted on. the mover or agent will always be the vehicle of a form, either a ' this ' or ' such ', which, when it acts, will be the source and cause of the change, e. g. the full - formed man begets man from what is potentially man. the solution of the difficulty that is raised about the motion - whether it is in the movable - is plain. it is the fulfilment of this potentiality, and by the action of that which has the power of causing motion ; and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable, for it must be the fulfilment of both. a thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this, it is a mover because it actually does it. but it is on the movable that it is capable of acting. hence there is a single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one - for these are one and the same, although they can be described in different ways. so it is with the mover and the moved. this view has a dialectical difficulty. perhaps it is necessary that the actuality of the agent and that of the", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6212004616935445, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 47, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.500705"}
{"text": "operation is performed on some patient - it is not cut adrift from a subject, but is of a on b. ( 2 ) there is nothing to prevent two things having one and the same actualization, provided the actualizations are not described in the same way, but are related as what can act to what is acting. ( 3 ) nor is it necessary that the teacher should learn, even if to act and to be acted on are one and the same, provided they are not the same in definition ( as ' raiment ' and ' dress ' ), but are the same merely in the sense in which the road from thebes to athens and the road from athens to thebes are the same, as has been explained above. for it is not things which are in a way the same that have all their attributes the same, but only such as have the same definition. but indeed it by no means follows from the fact that teaching is the same as learning, that to learn is the same as to teach, any more than it follows from the fact that there is one distance between two things which are at a distance from each other, that the two vectors ab and ba, are one and the same. to generalize, teaching is not the same as learning, or agency as patiency, in the full sense, though they belong to the same subject, the motion ; for the ' actualization of x in y ' and the ' actualization of y through the action of x ' differ in definition. what then motion is, has been stated both generally and particularly. it is not difficult to see how each of its types will be defined - alteration is the fulfillment of the alterable qua alterable ( or, more scientifically, the fulfilment of what can act and what can be acted on, as such ) - generally and again in each particular case, building, healing, & c. a similar definition will apply to each of the other kinds of motion. the science of nature is concerned with spatial magnitudes and motion and time, and each of these at least is necessarily infinite or finite, even if some things dealt with by the science are not, e. g. a quality or a point - it is not necessary perhaps that such things should be put under either head. hence it is incumbent on the person who specializes in physics to discuss the infinite and to inquire whether there is such a thing or not, and, if there is, what it is. the appropriateness to the science", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6039523413652926, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 49, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.507619"}
{"text": "put under either head. hence it is incumbent on the person who specializes in physics to discuss the infinite and to inquire whether there is such a thing or not, and, if there is, what it is. the appropriateness to the science of this problem is clearly indicated. all who have touched on this kind of science in a way worth considering have formulated views about the infinite, and indeed, to a man, make it a principle of things. ( 1 ) some, as the pythagoreans and plato, make the infinite a principle in the sense of a self - subsistent substance, and not as a mere attribute of some other thing. only the pythagoreans place the infinite among the objects of sense ( they do not regard number as separable from these ), and assert that what is outside the heaven is infinite. plato, on the other hand, holds that there is no body outside ( the forms are not outside because they are nowhere ), yet that the infinite is present not only in the objects of sense but in the forms also. further, the pythagoreans identify the infinite with the even. for this, they say, when it is cut off and shut in by the odd, provides things with the element of infinity. an indication of this is what happens with numbers. if the gnomons are placed round the one, and without the one, in the one construction the figure that results is always different, in the other it is always the same. but plato has two infinites, the great and the small. the physicists, on the other hand, all of them, always regard the infinite as an attribute of a substance which is different from it and belongs to the class of the so - called elements - water or air or what is intermediate between them. those who make them limited in number never make them infinite in amount. but those who make the elements infinite in number, as anaxagoras and democritus do, say that the infinite is continuous by contact - compounded of the homogeneous parts according to the one, of the seed - mass of the atomic shapes according to the other. further, anaxagoras held that any part is a mixture in the same way as the all, on the ground of the observed fact that anything comes out of anything. for it is probably for this reason that he maintains that once upon a time all things were together. ( this flesh and this bone were together, and so of any", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6282017581943692, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 50, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.512005"}
{"text": "the all, on the ground of the observed fact that anything comes out of anything. for it is probably for this reason that he maintains that once upon a time all things were together. ( this flesh and this bone were together, and so of any thing : therefore all things : and at the same time too. ) for there is a beginning of separation, not only for each thing, but for all. each thing that comes to be comes from a similar body, and there is a coming to be of all things, though not, it is true, at the same time. hence there must also be an origin of coming to be. one such source there is which he calls mind, and mind begins its work of thinking from some starting - point. so necessarily all things must have been together at a certain time, and must have begun to be moved at a certain time. democritus, for his part, asserts the contrary, namely that no element arises from another element. nevertheless for him the common body is a source of all things, differing from part to part in size and in shape. it is clear then from these considerations that the inquiry concerns the physicist. nor is it without reason that they all make it a principle or source. we cannot say that the infinite has no effect, and the only effectiveness which we can ascribe to it is that of a principle. everything is either a source or derived from a source. but there cannot be a source of the infinite or limitless, for that would be a limit of it. further, as it is a beginning, it is both uncreatable and indestructible. for there must be a point at which what has come to be reaches completion, and also a termination of all passing away. that is why, as we say, there is no principle of this, but it is this which is held to be the principle of other things, and to encompass all and to steer all, as those assert who do not recognize, alongside the infinite, other causes, such as mind or friendship. further they identify it with the divine, for it is ' deathless and imperishable ' as anaximander says, with the majority of the physicists. belief in the existence of the infinite comes mainly from five considerations : ( 1 ) from the nature of time - for it is infinite. ( 2 ) from the division of magnitudes - for the mathematicians also use the notion of the infinite. ( 3 ) if coming to be and passing away", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6148818623666213, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 51, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.516045"}
{"text": "mainly from five considerations : ( 1 ) from the nature of time - for it is infinite. ( 2 ) from the division of magnitudes - for the mathematicians also use the notion of the infinite. ( 3 ) if coming to be and passing away do not give out, it is only because that from which things come to be is infinite. ( 4 ) because the limited always finds its limit in something, so that there must be no limit, if everything is always limited by something different from itself. ( 5 ) most of all, a reason which is peculiarly appropriate and presents the difficulty that is felt by everybody - not only number but also mathematical magnitudes and what is outside the heaven are supposed to be infinite because they never give out in our thought. the last fact ( that what is outside is infinite ) leads people to suppose that body also is infinite, and that there is an infinite number of worlds. why should there be body in one part of the void rather than in another? grant only that mass is anywhere and it follows that it must be everywhere. also, if void and place are infinite, there must be infinite body too, for in the case of eternal things what may be must be. but the problem of the infinite is difficult : many contradictions result whether we suppose it to exist or not to exist. if it exists, we have still to ask how it exists ; as a substance or as the essential attribute of some entity? or in neither way, yet none the less is there something which is infinite or some things which are infinitely many? the problem, however, which specially belongs to the physicist is to investigate whether there is a sensible magnitude which is infinite. we must begin by distinguishing the various senses in which the term ' infinite ' is used. ( 1 ) what is incapable of being gone through, because it is not in its nature to be gone through ( the sense in which the voice is ' invisible ' ). ( 2 ) what admits of being gone through, the process however having no termination, or what scarcely admits of being gone through. ( 3 ) what naturally admits of being gone through, but is not actually gone through or does not actually reach an end. further, everything that is infinite may be so in respect of addition or division or both. now it is impossible that the infinite should be a thing which is itself infinite, separable from sensible objects. if the infinite is neither a magnitude nor an aggregate, but is itself a substance and not an attribute, it will be indivisible", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6000805517902825, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 52, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.519646"}
{"text": ". this discussion, however, involves the more general question whether the infinite can be present in mathematical objects and things which are intelligible and do not have extension, as well as among sensible objects. our inquiry ( as physicists ) is limited to its special subject - matter, the objects of sense, and we have to ask whether there is or is not among them a body which is infinite in the direction of increase. we may begin with a dialectical argument and show as follows that there is no such thing. if ' bounded by a surface ' is the definition of body there cannot be an infinite body either intelligible or sensible. nor can number taken in abstraction be infinite, for number or that which has number is numerable. if then the numerable can be numbered, it would also be possible to go through the infinite. if, on the other hand, we investigate the question more in accordance with principles appropriate to physics, we are led as follows to the same result. the infinite body must be either ( 1 ) compound, or ( 2 ) simple ; yet neither alternative is possible. ( 1 ) compound the infinite body will not be, if the elements are finite in number. for they must be more than one, and the contraries must always balance, and no one of them can be infinite. if one of the bodies falls in any degree short of the other in potency - suppose fire is finite in amount while air is infinite and a given quantity of fire exceeds in power the same amount of air in any ratio provided it is numerically definite - the infinite body will obviously prevail over and annihilate the finite body. on the other hand, it is impossible that each should be infinite. ' body ' is what has extension in all directions and the infinite is what is boundlessly extended, so that the infinite body would be extended in all directions ad infinitum. nor ( 2 ) can the infinite body be one and simple, whether it is, as some hold, a thing over and above the elements ( from which they generate the elements ) or is not thus qualified. ( a ) we must consider the former alternative ; for there are some people who make this the infinite, and not air or water, in order that the other elements may not be annihilated by the element which is infinite. they have contrariety with each other - air is cold, water moist, fire hot ; if one were infinite, the others by now would have ceased to be. as it", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6204968268456861, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 54, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.526154"}
{"text": "or ' it is the games ' ; and potentially as matter exists, not independently as what is finite does. by addition then, also, there is potentially an infinite, namely, what we have described as being in a sense the same as the infinite in respect of division. for it will always be possible to take something ah extra. yet the sum of the parts taken will not exceed every determinate magnitude, just as in the direction of division every determinate magnitude is surpassed in smallness and there will be a smaller part. but in respect of addition there cannot be an infinite which even potentially exceeds every assignable magnitude, unless it has the attribute of being actually infinite, as the physicists hold to be true of the body which is outside the world, whose essential nature is air or something of the kind. but if there cannot be in this way a sensible body which is infinite in the full sense, evidently there can no more be a body which is potentially infinite in respect of addition, except as the inverse of the infinite by division, as we have said. it is for this reason that plato also made the infinites two in number, because it is supposed to be possible to exceed all limits and to proceed ad infinitum in the direction both of increase and of reduction. yet though he makes the infinites two, he does not use them. for in the numbers the infinite in the direction of reduction is not present, as the monad is the smallest ; nor is the infinite in the direction of increase, for the parts number only up to the decad. the infinite turns out to be the contrary of what it is said to be. it is not what has nothing outside it that is infinite, but what always has something outside it. this is indicated by the fact that rings also that have no bezel are described as ' endless ', because it is always possible to take a part which is outside a given part. the description depends on a certain similarity, but it is not true in the full sense of the word. this condition alone is not sufficient : it is necessary also that the next part which is taken should never be the same. in the circle, the latter condition is not satisfied : it is only the adjacent part from which the new part is different. our definition then is as follows : a quantity is infinite if it is such that we can always take a part outside what has been already taken. on the other hand, what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. for thus we define the whole -", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6414925766068168, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 60, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.633226"}
{"text": "definition then is as follows : a quantity is infinite if it is such that we can always take a part outside what has been already taken. on the other hand, what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. for thus we define the whole - that from which nothing is wanting, as a whole man or a whole box. what is true of each particular is true of the whole as such - the whole is that of which nothing is outside. on the other hand that from which something is absent and outside, however small that may be, is not ' all '. ' whole ' and ' complete ' are either quite identical or closely akin. nothing is complete ( teleion ) which has no end ( telos ) ; and the end is a limit. hence parmenides must be thought to have spoken better than melissus. the latter says that the whole is infinite, but the former describes it as limited, ' equally balanced from the middle '. for to connect the infinite with the all and the whole is not like joining two pieces of string ; for it is from this they get the dignity they ascribe to the infinite - its containing all things and holding the all in itself - from its having a certain similarity to the whole. it is in fact the matter of the completeness which belongs to size, and what is potentially a whole, though not in the full sense. it is divisible both in the direction of reduction and of the inverse addition. it is a whole and limited ; not, however, in virtue of its own nature, but in virtue of what is other than it. it does not contain, but, in so far as it is infinite, is contained. consequently, also, it is unknowable, qua infinite ; for the matter has no form. ( hence it is plain that the infinite stands in the relation of part rather than of whole. for the matter is part of the whole, as the bronze is of the bronze statue. ) if it contains in the case of sensible things, in the case of intelligible things the great and the small ought to contain them. but it is absurd and impossible to suppose that the unknowable and indeterminate should contain and determine. it is reasonable that there should not be held to be an infinite in respect of addition such as to surpass every magnitude, but that there should be thought to be such an infinite in the direction of division. for the matter and the infinite are contained inside what contains them, while", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6152413708919338, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 61, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.642489"}
{"text": "he is the size he is. the thought is an accident. ( a ) time indeed and movement are infinite, and also thinking, in the sense that each part that is taken passes in succession out of existence. ( b ) magnitude is not infinite either in the way of reduction or of magnification in thought. this concludes my account of the way in which the infinite exists, and of the way in which it does not exist, and of what it is. the physicist must have a knowledge of place, too, as well as of the infinite - namely, whether there is such a thing or not, and the manner of its existence and what it is - both because all suppose that things which exist are somewhere ( the non - existent is nowhere - - where is the goat - stag or the sphinx? ), and because ' motion ' in its most general and primary sense is change of place, which we call ' locomotion '. the question, what is place? presents many difficulties. an examination of all the relevant facts seems to lead to divergent conclusions. moreover, we have inherited nothing from previous thinkers, whether in the way of a statement of difficulties or of a solution. the existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement. where water now is, there in turn, when the water has gone out as from a vessel, air is present. when therefore another body occupies this same place, the place is thought to be different from all the bodies which come to be in it and replace one another. what now contains air formerly contained water, so that clearly the place or space into which and out of which they passed was something different from both. further, the typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies - namely, fire, earth, and the like - show not only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain influence. each is carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the one up, the other down. now these are regions or kinds of place - up and down and the rest of the six directions. nor do such distinctions ( up and down and right and left, & c. ) hold only in relation to us. to us they are not always the same but change with the direction in which we are turned : that is why the same thing may be both right and left, up and down, before and behind. but in nature each is distinct, taken apart by itself. it is not every chance direction which is '", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6483014334703511, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 64, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.657676"}
{"text": "too have surface and the other limits of body ; for the same statement will apply to them : where the bounding planes of the water were, there in turn will be those of the air. but when we come to a point we cannot make a distinction between it and its place. hence if the place of a point is not different from the point, no more will that of any of the others be different, and place will not be something different from each of them. ( 3 ) what in the world then are we to suppose place to be? if it has the sort of nature described, it cannot be an element or composed of elements, whether these be corporeal or incorporeal : for while it has size, it has not body. but the elements of sensible bodies are bodies, while nothing that has size results from a combination of intelligible elements. ( 4 ) also we may ask : of what in things is space the cause? none of the four modes of causation can be ascribed to it. it is neither in the sense of the matter of existents ( for nothing is composed of it ), nor as the form and definition of things, nor as end, nor does it move existents. ( 5 ) further, too, if it is itself an existent, where will it be? zeno ' s difficulty demands an explanation : for if everything that exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad infinitum. ( 6 ) again, just as every body is in place, so, too, every place has a body in it. what then shall we say about growing things? it follows from these premisses that their place must grow with them, if their place is neither less nor greater than they are. by asking these questions, then, we must raise the whole problem about place - not only as to what it is, but even whether there is such a thing. we may distinguish generally between predicating b of a because it ( a ) is itself, and because it is something else ; and particularly between place which is common and in which all bodies are, and the special place occupied primarily by each. i mean, for instance, that you are now in the heavens because you are in the air and it is in the heavens ; and you are in the air because you are on the earth ; and similarly on the earth because you are in this place which contains no more than you. now if place is what primarily contains each body", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6059481846883028, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 66, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.663594"}
{"text": "in the air and it is in the heavens ; and you are in the air because you are on the earth ; and similarly on the earth because you are in this place which contains no more than you. now if place is what primarily contains each body, it would be a limit, so that the place would be the form or shape of each body by which the magnitude or the matter of the magnitude is defined : for this is the limit of each body. if, then, we look at the question in this way the place of a thing is its form. but, if we regard the place as the extension of the magnitude, it is the matter. for this is different from the magnitude : it is what is contained and defined by the form, as by a bounding plane. matter or the indeterminate is of this nature ; when the boundary and attributes of a sphere are taken away, nothing but the matter is left. this is why plato in the timaeus says that matter and space are the same ; for the ' participant ' and space are identical. ( it is true, indeed, that the account he gives there of the ' participant ' is different from what he says in his so - called ' unwritten teaching '. nevertheless, he did identify place and space. ) i mention plato because, while all hold place to be something, he alone tried to say what it is. in view of these facts we should naturally expect to find difficulty in determining what place is, if indeed it is one of these two things, matter or form. they demand a very close scrutiny, especially as it is not easy to recognize them apart. but it is at any rate not difficult to see that place cannot be either of them. the form and the matter are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be separated. as we pointed out, where air was, water in turn comes to be, the one replacing the other ; and similarly with other bodies. hence the place of a thing is neither a part nor a state of it, but is separable from it. for place is supposed to be something like a vessel - the vessel being a transportable place. but the vessel is no part of the thing. in so far then as it is separable from the thing, it is not the form : qua containing, it is different from the matter. also it is held that what is anywhere is both itself something and that there is a different thing outside it. ( plato of course, if we may digress", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6056025054836571, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 67, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.665688"}
{"text": "the physicist - namely whether it exists or not, and how it exists or what it is - just as about place. the views taken of it involve arguments both for and against, in much the same sort of way. for those who hold that the void exists regard it as a sort of place or vessel which is supposed to be ' full ' when it holds the bulk which it is capable of containing, ' void ' when it is deprived of that - as if ' void ' and ' full ' and ' place ' denoted the same thing, though the essence of the three is different. we must begin the inquiry by putting down the account given by those who say that it exists, then the account of those who say that it does not exist, and third the current view on these questions. those who try to show that the void does not exist do not disprove what people really mean by it, but only their erroneous way of speaking ; this is true of anaxagoras and of those who refute the existence of the void in this way. they merely give an ingenious demonstration that air is something - - by straining wine - skins and showing the resistance of the air, and by cutting it off in clepsydras. but people really mean that there is an empty interval in which there is no sensible body. they hold that everything which is in body is body and say that what has nothing in it at all is void ( so what is full of air is void ). it is not then the existence of air that needs to be proved, but the non - existence of an interval, different from the bodies, either separable or actual - an interval which divides the whole body so as to break its continuity, as democritus and leucippus hold, and many other physicists - or even perhaps as something which is outside the whole body, which remains continuous. these people, then, have not reached even the threshold of the problem, but rather those who say that the void exists. ( 1 ) they argue, for one thing, that change in place ( i. e. locomotion and increase ) would not be. for it is maintained that motion would seem not to exist, if there were no void, since what is full cannot contain anything more. if it could, and there were two bodies in the same place, it would also be true that any number of bodies could be together ; for it is impossible to draw a line of division beyond which the statement would become", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6058274035720482, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 77, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.698511"}
{"text": ", there must be void. every body, again, they suppose to be tangible ; and of this nature is whatever has weight or lightness. hence, by a syllogism, what has nothing heavy or light in it, is void. this result, then, as i have said, is reached by syllogism. it would be absurd to suppose that the point is void ; for the void must be place which has in it an interval in tangible body. but at all events we observe then that in one way the void is described as what is not full of body perceptible to touch ; and what has heaviness and lightness is perceptible to touch. so we would raise the question : what would they say of an interval that has colour or sound - is it void or not? clearly they would reply that if it could receive what is tangible it was void, and if not, not. in another way void is that in which there is no ' this ' or corporeal substance. so some say that the void is the matter of the body ( they identify the place, too, with this ), and in this they speak incorrectly ; for the matter is not separable from the things, but they are inquiring about the void as about something separable. since we have determined the nature of place, and void must, if it exists, be place deprived of body, and we have stated both in what sense place exists and in what sense it does not, it is plain that on this showing void does not exist, either unseparated or separated ; the void is meant to be, not body but rather an interval in body. this is why the void is thought to be something, viz. because place is, and for the same reasons. for the fact of motion in respect of place comes to the aid both of those who maintain that place is something over and above the bodies that come to occupy it, and of those who maintain that the void is something. they state that the void is the condition of movement in the sense of that in which movement takes place ; and this would be the kind of thing that some say place is. but there is no necessity for there being a void if there is movement. it is not in the least needed as a condition of movement in general, for a reason which, incidentally, escaped melissus ; viz. that the full can suffer qualitative change. but not even movement in respect of place involves a void", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6238012840198695, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 79, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.703592"}
{"text": "time. to sum the matter up, the cause of this result is obvious, viz. that between any two movements there is a ratio ( for they occupy time, and there is a ratio between any two times, so long as both are finite ), but there is no ratio of void to full. these are the consequences that result from a difference in the media ; the following depend upon an excess of one moving body over another. we see that bodies which have a greater impulse either of weight or of lightness, if they are alike in other respects, move faster over an equal space, and in the ratio which their magnitudes bear to each other. therefore they will also move through the void with this ratio of speed. but that is impossible ; for why should one move faster? ( in moving through plena it must be so ; for the greater divides them faster by its force. for a moving thing cleaves the medium either by its shape, or by the impulse which the body that is carried along or is projected possesses. ) therefore all will possess equal velocity. but this is impossible. it is evident from what has been said, then, that, if there is a void, a result follows which is the very opposite of the reason for which those who believe in a void set it up. they think that if movement in respect of place is to exist, the void cannot exist, separated all by itself ; but this is the same as to say that place is a separate cavity ; and this has already been stated to be impossible. but even if we consider it on its own merits the so - called vacuum will be found to be really vacuous. for as, if one puts a cube in water, an amount of water equal to the cube will be displaced ; so too in air ; but the effect is imperceptible to sense. and indeed always in the case of any body that can be displaced, must, if it is not compressed, be displaced in the direction in which it is its nature to be displaced - always either down, if its locomotion is downwards as in the case of earth, or up, if it is fire, or in both directions - whatever be the nature of the inserted body. now in the void this is impossible ; for it is not body ; the void must have penetrated the cube to a distance equal to that which this portion of void formerly occupied in the void, just as if the water or air had not been displaced by the wooden cube, but had penetrated right", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6061416059370025, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 84, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.714872"}
{"text": "for it is not body ; the void must have penetrated the cube to a distance equal to that which this portion of void formerly occupied in the void, just as if the water or air had not been displaced by the wooden cube, but had penetrated right through it. but the cube also has a magnitude equal to that occupied by the void ; a magnitude which, if it is also hot or cold, or heavy or light, is none the less different in essence from all its attributes, even if it is not separable from them ; i mean the volume of the wooden cube. so that even if it were separated from everything else and were neither heavy nor light, it will occupy an equal amount of void, and fill the same place, as the part of place or of the void equal to itself. how then will the body of the cube differ from the void or place that is equal to it? and if there can be two such things, why cannot there be any number coinciding? this, then, is one absurd and impossible implication of the theory. it is also evident that the cube will have this same volume even if it is displaced, which is an attribute possessed by all other bodies also. therefore if this differs in no respect from its place, why need we assume a place for bodies over and above the volume of each, if their volume be conceived of as free from attributes? it contributes nothing to the situation if there is an equal interval attached to it as well. [ further it ought to be clear by the study of moving things what sort of thing void is. but in fact it is found nowhere in the world. for air is something, though it does not seem to be so - nor, for that matter, would water, if fishes were made of iron ; for the discrimination of the tangible is by touch. ] it is clear, then, from these considerations that there is no separate void. there are some who think that the existence of rarity and density shows that there is a void. if rarity and density do not exist, they say, neither can things contract and be compressed. but if this were not to take place, either there would be no movement at all, or the universe would bulge, as xuthus said, or air and water must always change into equal amounts ( e. g. if air has been made out of a cupful of water, at the same time out of an equal amount of air a cupful of water must have been made ), or void must necessarily exist ;", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6145959851811655, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 85, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.715955"}
{"text": "change into equal amounts ( e. g. if air has been made out of a cupful of water, at the same time out of an equal amount of air a cupful of water must have been made ), or void must necessarily exist ; for compression and expansion cannot take place otherwise. now, if they mean by the rare that which has many voids existing separately, it is plain that if void cannot exist separate any more than a place can exist with an extension all to itself, neither can the rare exist in this sense. but if they mean that there is void, not separately existent, but still present in the rare, this is less impossible, yet, first, the void turns out not to be a condition of all movement, but only of movement upwards ( for the rare is light, which is the reason why they say fire is rare ) ; second, the void turns out to be a condition of movement not as that in which it takes place, but in that the void carries things up as skins by being carried up themselves carry up what is continuous with them. yet how can void have a local movement or a place? for thus that into which void moves is till then void of a void. again, how will they explain, in the case of what is heavy, its movement downwards? and it is plain that if the rarer and more void a thing is the quicker it will move upwards, if it were completely void it would move with a maximum speed! but perhaps even this is impossible, that it should move at all ; the same reason which showed that in the void all things are incapable of moving shows that the void cannot move, viz. the fact that the speeds are incomparable. since we deny that a void exists, but for the rest the problem has been truly stated, that either there will be no movement, if there is not to be condensation and rarefaction, or the universe will bulge, or a transformation of water into air will always be balanced by an equal transformation of air into water ( for it is clear that the air produced from water is bulkier than the water ) : it is necessary therefore, if compression does not exist, either that the next portion will be pushed outwards and make the outermost part bulge, or that somewhere else there must be an equal amount of water produced out of air, so that the entire bulk of the whole may be equal, or that nothing moves. for when anything is displaced this will always happen, unless it comes round in a circle", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6198062799576504, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 86, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.718395"}
{"text": "potentially matter for both states ; so that the same thing is dense and rare, and the two qualities have one matter. the dense is heavy, and the rare is light. [ again, as the arc of a circle when contracted into a smaller space does not acquire a new part which is convex, but what was there has been contracted ; and as any part of fire that one takes will be hot ; so, too, it is all a question of contraction and expansion of the same matter. ] there are two types in each case, both in the dense and in the rare ; for both the heavy and the hard are thought to be dense, and contrariwise both the light and the soft are rare ; and weight and hardness fail to coincide in the case of lead and iron. from what has been said it is evident, then, that void does not exist either separate ( either absolutely separate or as a separate element in the rare ) or potentially, unless one is willing to call the condition of movement void, whatever it may be. at that rate the matter of the heavy and the light, qua matter of them, would be the void ; for the dense and the rare are productive of locomotion in virtue of this contrariety, and in virtue of their hardness and softness productive of passivity and impassivity, i. e. not of locomotion but rather of qualitative change. so much, then, for the discussion of the void, and of the sense in which it exists and the sense in which it does not exist. next for discussion after the subjects mentioned is time. the best plan will be to begin by working out the difficulties connected with it, making use of the current arguments. first, does it belong to the class of things that exist or to that of things that do not exist? then secondly, what is its nature? to start, then : the following considerations would make one suspect that it either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way. one part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet. yet time - both infinite time and any time you like to take - is made up of these. one would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality. further, if a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary that, when it exists, all or some of its parts must exist. but of time some parts have been, while others have", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6576608204635709, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 88, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.723075"}
{"text": "is thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz. because the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement. this also explains the common saying that human affairs form a circle, and that there is a circle in all other things that have a natural movement and coming into being and passing away. this is because all other things are discriminated by time, and end and begin as though conforming to a cycle ; for even time itself is thought to be a circle. and this opinion again is held because time is the measure of this kind of locomotion and is itself measured by such. so that to say that the things that come into being form a circle is to say that there is a circle of time ; and this is to say that it is measured by the circular movement ; for apart from the measure nothing else to be measured is observed ; the whole is just a plurality of measures. it is said rightly, too, that the number of the sheep and of the dogs is the same number if the two numbers are equal, but not the same decad or the same ten ; just as the equilateral and the scalene are not the same triangle, yet they are the same figure, because they are both triangles. for things are called the same so - and - so if they do not differ by a differentia of that thing, but not if they do ; e. g. triangle differs from triangle by a differentia of triangle, therefore they are different triangles ; but they do not differ by a differentia of figure, but are in one and the same division of it. for a figure of the one kind is a circle and a figure of another kind of triangle, and a triangle of one kind is equilateral and a triangle of another kind scalene. they are the same figure, then, that, triangle, but not the same triangle. therefore the number of two groups also - is the same number ( for their number does not differ by a differentia of number ), but it is not the same decad ; for the things of which it is asserted differ ; one group are dogs, and the other horses. we have now discussed time - both time itself and the matters appropriate to the consideration of it. everything which changes does so in one of three senses. it may change ( 1 ) accidentally, as for instance when we say that something musical walks, that which walks being something in which aptitude for music is an accident. again ( 2 ) a thing", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6048465090234124, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 103, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.743752"}
{"text": "neither caused nor experienced by the form or the place or the quantity. so we are left with a mover, a moved, and a goal of motion. i do not include the starting - point of motion : for it is the goal rather than the starting - point of motion that gives its name to a particular process of change. thus ' perishing ' is change to not - being, though it is also true that that that which perishes changes from being : and ' becoming ' is change to being, though it is also change from not - being. now a definition of motion has been given above, from which it will be seen that every goal of motion, whether it be a form, an affection, or a place, is immovable, as, for instance, knowledge and heat. here, however, a difficulty may be raised. affections, it may be said, are motions, and whiteness is an affection : thus there may be change to a motion. to this we may reply that it is not whiteness but whitening that is a motion. here also the same distinctions are to be observed : a goal of motion may be so accidentally, or partially and with reference to something other than itself, or directly and with no reference to anything else : for instance, a thing which is becoming white changes accidentally to an object of thought, the colour being only accidentally the object of thought ; it changes to colour, because white is a part of colour, or to europe, because athens is a part of europe ; but it changes essentially to white colour. it is now clear in what sense a thing is in motion essentially, accidentally, or in respect of something other than itself, and in what sense the phrase ' itself directly ' is used in the case both of the mover and of the moved : and it is also clear that the motion is not in the form but in that which is in motion, that is to say ' the movable in activity '. now accidental change we may leave out of account : for it is to be found in everything, at any time, and in any respect. change which is not accidental on the other hand is not to be found in everything, but only in contraries, in things intermediate contraries, and in contradictories, as may be proved by induction. an intermediate may be a starting - point of change, since for the purposes of the change it serves as contrary to either of two contraries : for the intermediate is in a sense the extremes. hence we", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6008696981835251, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 105, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.748226"}
{"text": "of becoming be becoming, nor can the becoming of any process be that process. finally, since there are three kinds of motion, the substratum and the goal of motion must be one or other of these, e. g. locomotion will have to be altered or to be locally moved. to sum up, then, since everything that is moved is moved in one of three ways, either accidentally, or partially, or essentially, change can change only accidentally, as e. g. when a man who is being restored to health runs or learns : and accidental change we have long ago decided to leave out of account. since, then, motion can belong neither to being nor to relation nor to agent and patient, it remains that there can be motion only in respect of quality, quantity, and place : for with each of these we have a pair of contraries. motion in respect of quality let us call alteration, a general designation that is used to include both contraries : and by quality i do not here mean a property of substance ( in that sense that which constitutes a specific distinction is a quality ) but a passive quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or to be incapable of being acted on. motion in respect of quantity has no name that includes both contraries, but it is called increase or decrease according as one or the other is designated : that is to say motion in the direction of complete magnitude is increase, motion in the contrary direction is decrease. motion in respect of place has no name either general or particular : but we may designate it by the general name of locomotion, though strictly the term ' locomotion ' is applicable to things that change their place only when they have not the power to come to a stand, and to things that do not move themselves locally. change within the same kind from a lesser to a greater or from a greater to a lesser degree is alteration : for it is motion either from a contrary or to a contrary, whether in an unqualified or in a qualified sense : for change to a lesser degree of a quality will be called change to the contrary of that quality, and change to a greater degree of a quality will be regarded as change from the contrary of that quality to the quality itself. it makes no difference whether the change be qualified or unqualified, except that in the former case the contraries will have to be contrary to one another only in a qualified sense : and a thing ' s possessing a quality in a greater or in a", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6050805340846853, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 110, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.756092"}
{"text": "makes no difference whether the change be qualified or unqualified, except that in the former case the contraries will have to be contrary to one another only in a qualified sense : and a thing ' s possessing a quality in a greater or in a lesser degree means the presence or absence in it of more or less of the opposite quality. it is now clear, then, that there are only these three kinds of motion. the term ' immovable ' we apply in the first place to that which is absolutely incapable of being moved ( just as we correspondingly apply the term invisible to sound ) ; in the second place to that which is moved with difficulty after a long time or whose movement is slow at the start - in fact, what we describe as hard to move ; and in the third place to that which is naturally designed for and capable of motion, but is not in motion when, where, and as it naturally would be so. this last is the only kind of immovable thing of which i use the term ' being at rest ' : for rest is contrary to motion, so that rest will be negation of motion in that which is capable of admitting motion. the foregoing remarks are sufficient to explain the essential nature of motion and rest, the number of kinds of change, and the different varieties of motion. let us now proceed to define the terms ' together ' and ' apart ', ' in contact ', ' between ', ' in succession ', ' contiguous ', and ' continuous ', and to show in what circumstances each of these terms is naturally applicable. things are said to be together in place when they are in one place ( in the strictest sense of the word ' place ' ) and to be apart when they are in different places. things are said to be in contact when their extremities are together. that which a changing thing, if it changes continuously in a natural manner, naturally reaches before it reaches that to which it changes last, is between. thus ' between ' implies the presence of at least three things : for in a process of change it is the contrary that is ' last ' : and a thing is moved continuously if it leaves no gap or only the smallest possible gap in the material - not in the time ( for a gap in the time does not prevent things having a ' between ', while, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the highest note sounding immediately after the lowest ) but in the material in which the motion takes place. this is manifestly true not", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6354239288983423, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 111, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.757088"}
{"text": "things prior in definition, e. g. numbers, while contact is not. and if there is continuity there is necessarily contact, but if there is contact, that alone does not imply continuity : for the extremities of things may be ' together ' without necessarily being one : but they cannot be one without being necessarily together. so natural junction is last in coming to be : for the extremities must necessarily come into contact if they are to be naturally joined : but things that are in contact are not all naturally joined, while there is no contact clearly there is no natural junction either. hence, if as some say ' point ' and ' unit ' have an independent existence of their own, it is impossible for the two to be identical : for points can touch while units can only be in succession. moreover, there can always be something between points ( for all lines are intermediate between points ), whereas it is not necessary that there should possibly be anything between units : for there can be nothing between the numbers one and two. we have now defined what is meant by ' together ' and ' apart ', ' contact ', ' between ' and ' in succession ', ' contiguous ' and ' continuous ' : and we have shown in what circumstances each of these terms is applicable. there are many senses in which motion is said to be ' one ' : for we use the term ' one ' in many senses. motion is one generically according to the different categories to which it may be assigned : thus any locomotion is one generically with any other locomotion, whereas alteration is different generically from locomotion. motion is one specifically when besides being one generically it also takes place in a species incapable of subdivision : e. g. colour has specific differences : therefore blackening and whitening differ specifically ; but at all events every whitening will be specifically the same with every other whitening and every blackening with every other blackening. but white is not further subdivided by specific differences : hence any whitening is specifically one with any other whitening. where it happens that the genus is at the same time a species, it is clear that the motion will then in a sense be one specifically though not in an unqualified sense : learning is an example of this, knowledge being on the one hand a species of apprehension and on the other hand a genus including the various knowledges. a difficulty, however, may be raised as to whether a motion is specifically one when the same thing changes from the same to", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6262593593202548, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 113, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.760849"}
{"text": "there might be a case of two men being restored to health at the same time in the same way, e. g. from inflammation of the eye, yet this motion is not really one, but only specifically one ). suppose, however, that socrates undergoes an alteration specifically the same but at one time and again at another : in this case if it is possible for that which ceased to be again to come into being and remain numerically the same, then this motion too will be one : otherwise it will be the same but not one. and akin to this difficulty there is another ; viz. is health one? and generally are the states and affections in bodies severally one in essence although ( as is clear ) the things that contain them are obviously in motion and in flux? thus if a person ' s health at daybreak and at the present moment is one and the same, why should not this health be numerically one with that which he recovers after an interval? the same argument applies in each case. there is, however, we may answer, this difference : that if the states are two then it follows simply from this fact that the activities must also in point of number be two ( for only that which is numerically one can give rise to an activity that is numerically one ), but if the state is one, this is not in itself enough to make us regard the activity also as one : for when a man ceases walking, the walking no longer is, but it will again be if he begins to walk again. but, be this as it may, if in the above instance the health is one and the same, then it must be possible for that which is one and the same to come to be and to cease to be many times. however, these difficulties lie outside our present inquiry. since every motion is continuous, a motion that is one in an unqualified sense must ( since every motion is divisible ) be continuous, and a continuous motion must be one. there will not be continuity between any motion and any other indiscriminately any more than there is between any two things chosen at random in any other sphere : there can be continuity only when the extremities of the two things are one. now some things have no extremities at all : and the extremities of others differ specifically although we give them the same name of ' end ' : how should e. g. the ' end ' of a line and the ' end ' of", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.600410417514618, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 115, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.762888"}
{"text": "will not be simultaneous : for the time may be divided at many points. if, therefore, the present cannot possibly have these characteristics, it follows that it must be the same present that belongs to each of the two times. but if this is so it is evident that the present is also indivisible : for if it is divisible it will be involved in the same implications as before. it is clear, then, from what has been said that time contains something indivisible, and this is what we call a present. we will now show that nothing can be in motion in a present. for if this is possible, there can be both quicker and slower motion in the present. suppose then that in the present n the quicker has traversed the distance ab. that being so, the slower will in the same present traverse a distance less than ab, say ag. but since the slower will have occupied the whole present in traversing ag, the quicker will occupy less than this in traversing it. thus we shall have a division of the present, whereas we found it to be indivisible. it is impossible, therefore, for anything to be in motion in a present. nor can anything be at rest in a present : for, as we were saying, only can be at rest which is naturally designed to be in motion but is not in motion when, where, or as it would naturally be so : since, therefore, nothing is naturally designed to be in motion in a present, it is clear that nothing can be at rest in a present either. moreover, inasmuch as it is the same present that belongs to both the times, and it is possible for a thing to be in motion throughout one time and to be at rest throughout the other, and that which is in motion or at rest for the whole of a time will be in motion or at rest as the case may be in any part of it in which it is naturally designed to be in motion or at rest : this being so, the assumption that there can be motion or rest in a present will carry with it the implication that the same thing can at the same time be at rest and in motion : for both the times have the same extremity, viz. the present. again, when we say that a thing is at rest, we imply that its condition in whole and in part is at the time of speaking uniform with what it was previously : but the present contains no ' previously ' : consequently, there can be no rest in", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6066922864996132, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 132, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.786781"}
{"text": "of the motion must all be susceptible of the same divisions ( though spheres of motion are not all divisible in a like manner : thus quantity is essentially, quality accidentally divisible ). for suppose that a is the time occupied by the motion b. then if all the time has been occupied by the whole motion, it will take less of the motion to occupy half the time, less again to occupy a further subdivision of the time, and so on to infinity. again, the time will be divisible similarly to the motion : for if the whole motion occupies all the time half the motion will occupy half the time, and less of the motion again will occupy less of the time. in the same way the being - in - motion will also be divisible. for let g be the whole being - in - motion. then the being - in - motion that corresponds to half the motion will be less than the whole being - in - motion, that which corresponds to a quarter of the motion will be less again, and so on to infinity. moreover by setting out successively the being - in - motion corresponding to each of the two motions dg ( say ) and ge, we may argue that the whole being - in - motion will correspond to the whole motion ( for if it were some other being - in - motion that corresponded to the whole motion, there would be more than one being - in motion corresponding to the same motion ), the argument being the same as that whereby we showed that the motion of a thing is divisible into the motions of the parts of the thing : for if we take separately the being - in motion corresponding to each of the two motions, we shall see that the whole being - in motion is continuous. the same reasoning will show the divisibility of the length, and in fact of everything that forms a sphere of change ( though some of these are only accidentally divisible because that which changes is so ) : for the division of one term will involve the division of all. so, too, in the matter of their being finite or infinite, they will all alike be either the one or the other. and we now see that in most cases the fact that all the terms are divisible or infinite is a direct consequence of the fact that the thing that changes is divisible or infinite : for the attributes ' divisible ' and ' infinite ' belong in the first instance to the thing that changes. that divisibility does so we have already shown : that infinity does", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6121647811970058, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 135, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.789666"}
{"text": "motion. and so it is impossible for one and the same thing to be infinitely in process of becoming or of perishing. the reasoning he will prove that in a finite time there cannot be an infinite extent of motion or of coming to rest, whether the motion is regular or irregular. for if we take a part which shall be a measure of the whole time, in this part a certain fraction, not the whole, of the magnitude will be traversed, because we assume that the traversing of the whole occupies all the time. again, in another equal part of the time another part of the magnitude will be traversed : and similarly in each part of the time that we take, whether equal or unequal to the part originally taken. it makes no difference whether the parts are equal or not, if only each is finite : for it is clear that while the time is exhausted by the subtraction of its parts, the infinite magnitude will not be thus exhausted, since the process of subtraction is finite both in respect of the quantity subtracted and of the number of times a subtraction is made. consequently the infinite magnitude will not be traversed in finite time : and it makes no difference whether the magnitude is infinite in only one direction or in both : for the same reasoning will hold good. this having been proved, it is evident that neither can a finite magnitude traverse an infinite magnitude in a finite time, the reason being the same as that given above : in part of the time it will traverse a finite magnitude and in each several part likewise, so that in the whole time it will traverse a finite magnitude. and since a finite magnitude will not traverse an infinite in a finite time, it is clear that neither will an infinite traverse a finite in a finite time. for if the infinite could traverse the finite, the finite could traverse the infinite ; for it makes no difference which of the two is the thing in motion ; either case involves the traversing of the infinite by the finite. for when the infinite magnitude a is in motion a part of it, say gd, will occupy the finite and then another, and then another, and so on to infinity. thus the two results will coincide : the infinite will have completed a motion over the finite and the finite will have traversed the infinite : for it would seem to be impossible for the motion of the infinite over the finite to occur in any way other than by the finite traversing the infinite either by locomotion over it or by measuring it. therefore, since this is impossible, the", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6096389296623377, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 144, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.802548"}
{"text": "the aforesaid fallacious assumption. nor in reference to contradictory change shall we find anything unanswerable in the argument that if a thing is changing from not - white, say, to white, and is in neither condition, then it will be neither white nor not - white : for the fact that it is not wholly in either condition will not preclude us from calling it white or not - white. we call a thing white or not - white not necessarily because it is be one or the other, but cause most of its parts or the most essential parts of it are so : not being in a certain condition is different from not being wholly in that condition. so, too, in the case of being and not - being and all other conditions which stand in a contradictory relation : while the changing thing must of necessity be in one of the two opposites, it is never wholly in either. again, in the case of circles and spheres and everything whose motion is confined within the space that it occupies, it is not true to say the motion can be nothing but rest, on the ground that such things in motion, themselves and their parts, will occupy the same position for a period of time, and that therefore they will be at once at rest and in motion. for in the first place the parts do not occupy the same position for any period of time : and in the second place the whole also is always changing to a different position : for if we take the orbit as described from a point a on a circumference, it will not be the same as the orbit as described from b or g or any other point on the same circumference except in an accidental sense, the sense that is to say in which a musical man is the same as a man. thus one orbit is always changing into another, and the thing will never be at rest. and it is the same with the sphere and everything else whose motion is confined within the space that it occupies. our next point is that that which is without parts cannot be in motion except accidentally : i. e. it can be in motion only in so far as the body or the magnitude is in motion and the partless is in motion by inclusion therein, just as that which is in a boat may be in motion in consequence of the locomotion of the boat, or a part may be in motion in virtue of the motion of the whole. ( it must be remembered, however, that by ' that which is without parts ' i mean that", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6078408323151956, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 150, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.808703"}
{"text": "be in motion in consequence of the locomotion of the boat, or a part may be in motion in virtue of the motion of the whole. ( it must be remembered, however, that by ' that which is without parts ' i mean that which is quantitatively indivisible ( and that the case of the motion of a part is not exactly parallel ) : for parts have motions belonging essentially and severally to themselves distinct from the motion of the whole. the distinction may be seen most clearly in the case of a revolving sphere, in which the velocities of the parts near the centre and of those on the surface are different from one another and from that of the whole ; this implies that there is not one motion but many ). as we have said, then, that which is without parts can be in motion in the sense in which a man sitting in a boat is in motion when the boat is travelling, but it cannot be in motion of itself. for suppose that it is changing from ab to bg - either from one magnitude to another, or from one form to another, or from some state to its contradictory - and let d be the primary time in which it undergoes the change. then in the time in which it is changing it must be either in ab or in bg or partly in one and partly in the other : for this, as we saw, is true of everything that is changing. now it cannot be partly in each of the two : for then it would be divisible into parts. nor again can it be in bg : for then it will have completed the change, whereas the assumption is that the change is in process. it remains, then, that in the time in which it is changing, it is in ab. that being so, it will be at rest : for, as we saw, to be in the same condition for a period of time is to be at rest. so it is not possible for that which has no parts to be in motion or to change in any way : for only one condition could have made it possible for it to have motion, viz. that time should be composed of moments, in which case at any moment it would have completed a motion or a change, so that it would never be in motion, but would always have been in motion. but this we have already shown above to be impossible : time is not composed of moments, just as a line is not composed of points, and motion is not composed of starts : for this theory", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6251027506562888, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 151, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.809813"}
{"text": "in motion, but would always have been in motion. but this we have already shown above to be impossible : time is not composed of moments, just as a line is not composed of points, and motion is not composed of starts : for this theory simply makes motion consist of indivisibles in exactly the same way as time is made to consist of moments or a length of points. again, it may be shown in the following way that there can be no motion of a point or of any other indivisible. that which is in motion can never traverse a space greater than itself without first traversing a space equal to or less than itself. that being so, it is evident that the point also must first traverse a space equal to or less than itself. but since it is indivisible, there can be no space less than itself for it to traverse first : so it will have to traverse a distance equal to itself. thus the line will be composed of points, for the point, as it continually traverses a distance equal to itself, will be a measure of the whole line. but since this is impossible, it is likewise impossible for the indivisible to be in motion. again, since motion is always in a period of time and never in a moment, and all time is divisible, for everything that is in motion there must be a time less than that in which it traverses a distance as great as itself. for that in which it is in motion will be a time, because all motion is in a period of time ; and all time has been shown above to be divisible. therefore, if a point is in motion, there must be a time less than that in which it has itself traversed any distance. but this is impossible, for in less time it must traverse less distance, and thus the indivisible will be divisible into something less than itself, just as the time is so divisible : the fact being that the only condition under which that which is without parts and indivisible could be in motion would have been the possibility of the infinitely small being in motion in a moment : for in the two questions - that of motion in a moment and that of motion of something indivisible - the same principle is involved. our next point is that no process of change is infinite : for every change, whether between contradictories or between contraries, is a change from something to something. thus in contradictory changes the positive or the negative,", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.610318099087248, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 152, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.810830"}
{"text": "the same principle is involved. our next point is that no process of change is infinite : for every change, whether between contradictories or between contraries, is a change from something to something. thus in contradictory changes the positive or the negative, as the case may be, is the limit, e. g. being is the limit of coming to be and not - being is the limit of ceasing to be : and in contrary changes the particular contraries are the limits, since these are the extreme points of any such process of change, and consequently of every process of alteration : for alteration is always dependent upon some contraries. similarly contraries are the extreme points of processes of increase and decrease : the limit of increase is to be found in the complete magnitude proper to the peculiar nature of the thing that is increasing, while the limit of decrease is the complete loss of such magnitude. locomotion, it is true, we cannot show to be finite in this way, since it is not always between contraries. but since that which cannot be cut ( in the sense that it is inconceivable that it should be cut, the term ' cannot ' being used in several senses ) - since it is inconceivable that that which in this sense cannot be cut should be in process of being cut, and generally that that which cannot come to be should be in process of coming to be, it follows that it is inconceivable that that which cannot complete a change should be in process of changing to that to which it cannot complete a change. if, then, it is to be assumed that that which is in locomotion is in process of changing, it must be capable of completing the change. consequently its motion is not infinite, and it will not be in locomotion over an infinite distance, for it cannot traverse such a distance. it is evident, then, that a process of change cannot be infinite in the sense that it is not defined by limits. but it remains to be considered whether it is possible in the sense that one and the same process of change may be infinite in respect of the time which it occupies. if it is not one process, it would seem that there is nothing to prevent its being infinite in this sense ; e. g. if a process of locomotion be succeeded by a process of alteration and that by a process of increase and that again by a process of coming to be : in this way there may be motion for ever so far as the time", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6087205103652457, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 153, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.811807"}
{"text": ", e. g. from white to black or from good to bad, which is not of a kind specifically distinct : it is numerically the same if it proceeds from something numerically one to something numerically one in the same period of time, e. g. from a particular white to a particular black, or from a particular place to a particular place, in a particular period of time : for if the period of time were not one and the same, the motion would no longer be numerically one though it would still be specifically one. we have dealt with this question above. now let us further take the time in which a has completed its motion, and let it be represented by k. then since the motion of a is finite the time will also be finite. but since the movents and the things moved are infinite, the motion ezho, i. e. the motion that is composed of all the individual motions, must be infinite. for the motions of a, b, and the others may be equal, or the motions of the others may be greater : but assuming what is conceivable, we find that whether they are equal or some are greater, in both cases the whole motion is infinite. and since the motion of a and that of each of the others are simultaneous, the whole motion must occupy the same time as the motion of a : but the time occupied by the motion of a is finite : consequently the motion will be infinite in a finite time, which is impossible. it might be thought that what we set out to prove has thus been shown, but our argument so far does not prove it, because it does not yet prove that anything impossible results from the contrary supposition : for in a finite time there may be an infinite motion, though not of one thing, but of many : and in the case that we are considering this is so : for each thing accomplishes its own motion, and there is no impossibility in many things being in motion simultaneously. but if ( as we see to be universally the case ) that which primarily is moved locally and corporeally must be either in contact with or continuous with that which moves it, the things moved and the movents must be continuous or in contact with one another, so that together they all form a single unity : whether this unity is finite or infinite makes no difference to our present argument ; for in any case since the things in motion are infinite in number the whole motion will be infinite, if, as is theoretically possible, each", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6209174329125997, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 156, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.814827"}
{"text": "they all form a single unity : whether this unity is finite or infinite makes no difference to our present argument ; for in any case since the things in motion are infinite in number the whole motion will be infinite, if, as is theoretically possible, each motion is either equal to or greater than that which follows it in the series : for we shall take as actual that which is theoretically possible. if, then, a, b, g, d form an infinite magnitude that passes through the motion ezho in the finite time k, this involves the conclusion that an infinite motion is passed through in a finite time : and whether the magnitude in question is finite or infinite this is in either case impossible. therefore the series must come to an end, and there must be a first movent and a first moved : for the fact that this impossibility results only from the assumption of a particular case is immaterial, since the case assumed is theoretically possible, and the assumption of a theoretically possible case ought not to give rise to any impossible result. that which is the first movement of a thing - in the sense that it supplies not ' that for the sake of which ' but the source of the motion - is always together with that which is moved by it by ' together ' i mean that there is nothing intermediate between them ). this is universally true wherever one thing is moved by another. and since there are three kinds of motion, local, qualitative, and quantitative, there must also be three kinds of movent, that which causes locomotion, that which causes alteration, and that which causes increase or decrease. let us begin with locomotion, for this is the primary motion. everything that is in locomotion is moved either by itself or by something else. in the case of things that are moved by themselves it is evident that the moved and the movent are together : for they contain within themselves their first movent, so that there is nothing in between. the motion of things that are moved by something else must proceed in one of four ways : for there are four kinds of locomotion caused by something other than that which is in motion, viz. pulling, pushing, carrying, and twirling. all forms of locomotion are reducible to these. thus pushing on is a form of pushing in which that which is causing motion away from itself follows up that which it pushes and continues to push it : pushing off occurs when the movent does not follow up the thing that it has moved : throwing", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6071777455328694, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 157, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.815856"}
{"text": "with that which suffers increase and that which suffers decrease respectively : and if two things are continuous with one another there can be nothing intermediate between them. it is evident, therefore, that between the extremities of the moved and the movent that are respectively first and last in reference to the moved there is nothing intermediate. everything, we say, that undergoes alteration is altered by sensible causes, and there is alteration only in things that are said to be essentially affected by sensible things. the truth of this is to be seen from the following considerations. of all other things it would be most natural to suppose that there is alteration in figures and shapes, and in acquired states and in the processes of acquiring and losing these : but as a matter of fact in neither of these two classes of things is there alteration. in the first place, when a particular formation of a thing is completed, we do not call it by the name of its material : e. g. we do not call the statue ' bronze ' or the pyramid ' wax ' or the bed ' wood ', but we use a derived expression and call them ' of bronze ', ' waxen ', and ' wooden ' respectively. but when a thing has been affected and altered in any way we still call it by the original name : thus we speak of the bronze or the wax being dry or fluid or hard or hot. and not only so : we also speak of the particular fluid or hot substance as being bronze, giving the material the same name as that which we use to describe the affection. since, therefore, having regard to the figure or shape of a thing we no longer call that which has become of a certain figure by the name of the material that exhibits the figure, whereas having regard to a thing ' s affections or alterations we still call it by the name of its material, it is evident that becomings of the former kind cannot be alterations. moreover it would seem absurd even to speak in this way, to speak, that is to say, of a man or house or anything else that has come into existence as having been altered. though it may be true that every such becoming is necessarily the result of something ' s being altered, the result, e. g. of the material ' s being condensed or rarefied or heated or cooled, nevertheless it is not the things that are coming into existence that are altered, and their becoming is not an alteration. again, acquired states, whether of the body or of the soul, are not alterations. for some are", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6212808071486604, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 161, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.822234"}
{"text": ". that there may be a straight line equal to a circle. but these are not commensurable : and so the corresponding motions are not commensurable either. but may we say that things are always commensurable if the same terms are applied to them without equivocation? e. g. a pen, a wine, and the highest note in a scale are not commensurable : we cannot say whether any one of them is sharper than any other : and why is this? they are incommensurable because it is only equivocally that the same term ' sharp ' is applied to them : whereas the highest note in a scale is commensurable with the leading - note, because the term ' sharp ' has the same meaning as applied to both. can it be, then, that the term ' quick ' has not the same meaning as applied to straight motion and to circular motion respectively? if so, far less will it have the same meaning as applied to alteration and to locomotion. or shall we in the first place deny that things are always commensurable if the same terms are applied to them without equivocation? for the term ' much ' has the same meaning whether applied to water or to air, yet water and air are not commensurable in respect of it : or, if this illustration is not considered satisfactory, ' double ' at any rate would seem to have the same meaning as applied to each ( denoting in each case the proportion of two to one ), yet water and air are not commensurable in respect of it. but here again may we not take up the same position and say that the term ' much ' is equivocal? in fact there are some terms of which even the definitions are equivocal ; e. g. if ' much ' were defined as ' so much and more ', ' so much ' would mean something different in different cases : ' equal ' is similarly equivocal ; and ' one ' again is perhaps inevitably an equivocal term ; and if ' one ' is equivocal, so is ' two '. otherwise why is it that some things are commensurable while others are not, if the nature of the attribute in the two cases is really one and the same? can it be that the incommensurability of two things in respect of any attribute is due to a difference in that which is primarily capable of carrying the", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6064535387173768, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 166, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.827528"}
{"text": "a definite thing that undergoes alteration, and a certain amount, or rather degree, of alteration is completed in a certain amount of time : thus in twice as much time twice as much alteration will be completed and conversely twice as much alteration will occupy twice as much time : and the alteration of half of its object will occupy half as much time and in half as much time half of the object will be altered : or again, in the same amount of time it will be altered twice as much. on the other hand if that which causes alteration or increase causes a certain amount of increase or alteration respectively in a certain amount of time, it does not necessarily follow that half the force will occupy twice the time in altering or increasing the object, or that in twice the time the alteration or increase will be completed by it : it may happen that there will be no alteration or increase at all, the case being the same as with the weight. it remains to consider the following question. was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being, and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion? or are we to say that it never had any becoming and is not perishing, but always was and always will be? is it in fact an immortal never - failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all naturally constituted things? now the existence of motion is asserted by all who have anything to say about nature, because they all concern themselves with the construction of the world and study the question of becoming and perishing, which processes could not come about without the existence of motion. but those who say that there is an infinite number of worlds, some of which are in process of becoming while others are in process of perishing, assert that there is always motion ( for these processes of becoming and perishing of the worlds necessarily involve motion ), whereas those who hold that there is only one world, whether everlasting or not, make corresponding assumptions in regard to motion. if then it is possible that at any time nothing should be in motion, this must come about in one of two ways : either in the manner described by anaxagoras, who says that all things were together and at rest for an infinite period of time, and that then mind introduced motion and separated them ; or in the manner described by empedocles, according to whom the universe is alternately in motion and at rest - in motion, when love is making the one out of many, or strife is making many out of one", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6153806138667721, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 172, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.838053"}
{"text": "motion and separated them ; or in the manner described by empedocles, according to whom the universe is alternately in motion and at rest - in motion, when love is making the one out of many, or strife is making many out of one, and at rest in the intermediate periods of time - his account being as follows : ' since one hath learned to spring from manifold, and one disjoined makes manifold arise, thus they become, nor stable is their life : but since their motion must alternate be, thus have they ever rest upon their round ' : for we must suppose that he means by this that they alternate from the one motion to the other. we must consider, then, how this matter stands, for the discovery of the truth about it is of importance, not only for the study of nature, but also for the investigation of the first principle. let us take our start from what we have already laid down in our course on physics. motion, we say, is the fulfilment of the movable in so far as it is movable. each kind of motion, therefore, necessarily involves the presence of the things that are capable of that motion. in fact, even apart from the definition of motion, every one would admit that in each kind of motion it is that which is capable of that motion that is in motion : thus it is that which is capable of alteration that is altered, and that which is capable of local change that is in locomotion : and so there must be something capable of being burned before there can be a process of being burned, and something capable of burning before there can be a process of burning. moreover, these things also must either have a beginning before which they had no being, or they must be eternal. now if there was a becoming of every movable thing, it follows that before the motion in question another change or motion must have taken place in which that which was capable of being moved or of causing motion had its becoming. to suppose, on the other hand, that these things were in being throughout all previous time without there being any motion appears unreasonable on a moment ' s thought, and still more unreasonable, we shall find, on further consideration. for if we are to say that, while there are on the one hand things that are movable, and on the other hand things that are motive, there is a time when there is a first movent and a first moved, and another time when there is no such thing but only something that is at", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.610066597361836, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 173, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.839150"}
{"text": ". if, then, view which we are criticizing involves these impossible consequences, it is clear that motion is eternal and cannot have existed at one time and not at another : in fact such a view can hardly be described as anythling else than fantastic. and much the same may be said of the view that such is the ordinance of nature and that this must be regarded as a principle, as would seem to be the view of empedocles when he says that the constitution of the world is of necessity such that love and strife alternately predominate and cause motion, while in the intermediate period of time there is a state of rest. probably also those who like like anaxagoras, assert a single principle ( of motion ) would hold this view. but that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly : for nature is everywhere the cause of order. moreover, there is no ratio in the relation of the infinite to the infinite, whereas order always means ratio. but if we say that there is first a state of rest for an infinite time, and then motion is started at some moment, and that the fact that it is this rather than a previous moment is of no importance, and involves no order, then we can no longer say that it is nature ' s work : for if anything is of a certain character naturally, it either is so invariably and is not sometimes of this and sometimes of another character ( e. g. fire, which travels upwards naturally, does not sometimes do so and sometimes not ) or there is a ratio in the variation. it would be better, therefore, to say with empedocles and any one else who may have maintained such a theory as his that the universe is alternately at rest and in motion : for in a system of this kind we have at once a certain order. but even here the holder of the theory ought not only to assert the fact : he ought to explain the cause of it : i. e. he should not make any mere assumption or lay down any gratuitous axiom, but should employ either inductive or demonstrative reasoning. the love and strife postulated by empedocles are not in themselves causes of the fact in question, nor is it of the essence of either that it should be so, the essential function of the former being to unite, of the latter to separate. if he is to go on to explain this alternate predominance, he should adduce cases where such a state of things exists,", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6082009222427927, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 176, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.842124"}
{"text": "without being at one time present, and at another absent. nevertheless, how this can be so remains matter for inquiry ; how it comes about, i mean, that the same motive force at one time causes a thing to be in motion, and at another does not do so : for the difficulty raised by our objector really amounts to this - why is it that some things are not always at rest, and the rest always in motion? the third objection may be thought to present more difficulty than the others, namely, that which alleges that motion arises in things in which it did not exist before, and adduces in proof the case of animate things : thus an animal is first at rest and afterwards walks, not having been set in motion apparently by anything from without. this, however, is false : for we observe that there is always some part of the animal ' s organism in motion, and the cause of the motion of this part is not the animal itself, but, it may be, its environment. moreover, we say that the animal itself originates not all of its motions but its locomotion. so it may well be the case - or rather we may perhaps say that it must necessarily be the case - that many motions are produced in the body by its environment, and some of these set in motion the intellect or the appetite, and this again then sets the whole animal in motion : this is what happens when animals are asleep : though there is then no perceptive motion in them, there is some motion that causes them to wake up again. but we will leave this point also to be elucidated at a later stage in our discussion. our enquiry will resolve itself at the outset into a consideration of the above - mentioned problem - what can be the reason why some things in the world at one time are in motion and at another are at rest again? now one of three things must be true : either all things are always at rest, or all things are always in motion, or some things are in motion and others at rest : and in this last case again either the things that are in motion are always in motion and the things that are at rest are always at rest, or they are all constituted so as to be capable alike of motion and of rest ; or there is yet a third possibility remaining - it may be that some things in the world are always motionless, others always in motion, while others again admit of both conditions. this last is the account of the matter that we must give", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6005973185523776, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 179, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.845532"}
{"text": "of rest ; or there is yet a third possibility remaining - it may be that some things in the world are always motionless, others always in motion, while others again admit of both conditions. this last is the account of the matter that we must give : for herein lies the solution of all the difficulties raised and the conclusion of the investigation upon which we are engaged. to maintain that all things are at rest, and to disregard sense - perception in an attempt to show the theory to be reasonable, would be an instance of intellectual weakness : it would call in question a whole system, not a particular detail : moreover, it would be an attack not only on the physicist but on almost all sciences and all received opinions, since motion plays a part in all of them. further, just as in arguments about mathematics objections that involve first principles do not affect the mathematician - and the other sciences are in similar case - so, too, objections involving the point that we have just raised do not affect the physicist : for it is a fundamental assumption with him that motion is ultimately referable to nature herself. the assertion that all things are in motion we may fairly regard as equally false, though it is less subversive of physical science : for though in our course on physics it was laid down that rest no less than motion is ultimately referable to nature herself, nevertheless motion is the characteristic fact of nature : moreover, the view is actually held by some that not merely some things but all things in the world are in motion and always in motion, though we cannot apprehend the fact by sense - perception. although the supporters of this theory do not state clearly what kind of motion they mean, or whether they mean all kinds, it is no hard matter to reply to them : thus we may point out that there cannot be a continuous process either of increase or of decrease : that which comes between the two has to be included. the theory resembles that about the stone being worn away by the drop of water or split by plants growing out of it : if so much has been extruded or removed by the drop, it does not follow that half the amount has previously been extruded or removed in half the time : the case of the hauled ship is exactly comparable : here we have so many drops setting so much in motion, but a part of them will not set as much in motion in any period of time. the amount removed is, it is true, divisible into a number of parts, but no one of these was set in motion separately", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6380439606568487, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 180, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.846944"}
{"text": "much in motion, but a part of them will not set as much in motion in any period of time. the amount removed is, it is true, divisible into a number of parts, but no one of these was set in motion separately : they were all set in motion together. it is evident, then, that from the fact that the decrease is divisible into an infinite number of parts it does not follow that some part must always be passing away : it all passes away at a particular moment. similarly, too, in the case of any alteration whatever if that which suffers alteration is infinitely divisible it does not follow from this that the same is true of the alteration itself, which often occurs all at once, as in freezing. again, when any one has fallen ill, there must follow a period of time in which his restoration to health is in the future : the process of change cannot take place in an instant : yet the change cannot be a change to anything else but health. the assertion. therefore, that alteration is continuous is an extravagant calling into question of the obvious : for alteration is a change from one contrary to another. moreover, we notice that a stone becomes neither harder nor softer. again, in the matter of locomotion, it would be a strange thing if a stone could be falling or resting on the ground without our being able to perceive the fact. further, it is a law of nature that earth and all other bodies should remain in their proper places and be moved from them only by violence : from the fact then that some of them are in their proper places it follows that in respect of place also all things cannot be in motion. these and other similar arguments, then, should convince us that it is impossible either that all things are always in motion or that all things are always at rest. nor again can it be that some things are always at rest, others always in motion, and nothing sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion. this theory must be pronounced impossible on the same grounds as those previously mentioned : viz. that we see the above - mentioned changes occurring in the case of the same things. we may further point out that the defender of this position is fighting against the obvious, for on this theory there can be no such thing as increase : nor can there be any such thing as compulsory motion, if it is impossible that a thing can be at rest before being set in motion unnaturally. this theory, then, does away with becoming and perishing. moreover, motion, it would", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6023181912528426, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 181, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.848142"}
{"text": "science potentially in a sense, though not in the same sense as he knew it potentially before he learnt it. and when he is in this condition, if something does not prevent him, he actively exercises his knowledge : otherwise he would be in the contradictory state of not knowing. in regard to natural bodies also the case is similar. thus what is cold is potentially hot : then a change takes place and it is fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and hinders it. so, too, with heavy and light : light is generated from heavy, e. g. air from water ( for water is the first thing that is potentially light ), and air is actually light, and will at once realize its proper activity as such unless something prevents it. the activity of lightness consists in the light thing being in a certain situation, namely high up : when it is in the contrary situation, it is being prevented from rising. the case is similar also in regard to quantity and quality. but, be it noted, this is the question we are trying to answer - how can we account for the motion of light things and heavy things to their proper situations? the reason for it is that they have a natural tendency respectively towards a certain position : and this constitutes the essence of lightness and heaviness, the former being determined by an upward, the latter by a downward, tendency. as we have said, a thing may be potentially light or heavy in more senses than one. thus not only when a thing is water is it in a sense potentially light, but when it has become air it may be still potentially light : for it may be that through some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position, whereas, if what hinders it is removed, it realizes its activity and continues to rise higher. the process whereby what is of a certain quality changes to a condition of active existence is similar : thus the exercise of knowledge follows at once upon the possession of it unless something prevents it. so, too, what is of a certain quantity extends itself over a certain space unless something prevents it. the thing in a sense is and in a sense is not moved by one who moves what is obstructing and preventing its motion ( e. g. one who pulls away a pillar from under a roof or one who removes a stone from a wineskin in the water is the accidental cause of motion ) : and in the same way the real cause of the motion of a ball rebounding from a wall is not the wall but the thrower", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6519381665869604, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 186, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.854813"}
{"text": "wa ly we shall get this same result as follows. if everything that is in motion is moved by something that is in motion, ether this being in motion is an accidental attribute of the movents in question, so that each of them moves something while being itself in motion, but not always because it is itself in motion, or it is not accidental but an essential attribute. let us consider the former alternative. if then it is an accidental attribute, it is not necessary that that is in motion should be in motion : and if this is so it is clear that there may be a time when nothing that exists is in motion, since the accidental is not necessary but contingent. now if we assume the existence of a possibility, any conclusion that we thereby reach will not be an impossibility though it may be contrary to fact. but the nonexistence of motion is an impossibility : for we have shown above that there must always be motion. moreover, the conclusion to which we have been led is a reasonable one. for there must be three things - the moved, the movent, and the instrument of motion. now the moved must be in motion, but it need not move anything else : the instrument of motion must both move something else and be itself in motion ( for it changes together with the moved, with which it is in contact and continuous, as is clear in the case of things that move other things locally, in which case the two things must up to a certain point be in contact ) : and the movent - that is to say, that which causes motion in such a manner that it is not merely the instrument of motion - must be unmoved. now we have visual experience of the last term in this series, namely that which has the capacity of being in motion, but does not contain a motive principle, and also of that which is in motion but is moved by itself and not by anything else : it is reasonable, therefore, not to say necessary, to suppose the existence of the third term also, that which causes motion but is itself unmoved. so, too, anaxagoras is right when he says that mind is impassive and unmixed, since he makes it the principle of motion : for it could cause motion in this sense only by being itself unmoved, and have supreme control only by being unmixed. we will now take the second alternative. if the movement is not accidentally but necessarily in motion - so that, if it were not in motion", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6215673416818566, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 189, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.857811"}
{"text": "in this sense only by being itself unmoved, and have supreme control only by being unmixed. we will now take the second alternative. if the movement is not accidentally but necessarily in motion - so that, if it were not in motion, it would not move anything - then the movent, in so far as it is in motion, must be in motion in one of two ways : it is moved either as that is which is moved with the same kind of motion, or with a different kind - either that which is heating, i mean, is itself in process of becoming hot, that which is making healthy in process of becoming healthy, and that which is causing locomotion in process of locomotion, or else that which is making healthy is, let us say, in process of locomotion, and that which is causing locomotion in process of, say, increase. but it is evident that this is impossible. for if we adopt the first assumption we have to make it apply within each of the very lowest species into which motion can be divided : e. g. we must say that if some one is teaching some lesson in geometry, he is also in process of being taught that same lesson in geometry, and that if he is throwing he is in process of being thrown in just the same manner. or if we reject this assumption we must say that one kind of motion is derived from another ; e. g. that that which is causing locomotion is in process of increase, that which is causing this increase is in process of being altered by something else, and that which is causing this alteration is in process of suffering some different kind of motion. but the series must stop somewhere, since the kinds of motion are limited ; and if we say that the process is reversible, and that that which is causing alteration is in process of locomotion, we do no more than if we had said at the outset that that which is causing locomotion is in process of locomotion, and that one who is teaching is in process of being taught : for it is clear that everything that is moved is moved by the movent that is further back in the series as well as by that which immediately moves it : in fact the earlier movent is that which more strictly moves it. but this is of course impossible : for it involves the consequence that one who is teaching is in process of learning what he is teaching, whereas teaching necessarily implies possessing knowledge, and learning not possessing it. still more", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6161720625470187, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 190, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.859037"}
{"text": "the following argument also makes it evident that the first movent must be something that is one and eternal. we have shown that there must always be motion. that being so, motion must also be continuous, because what is always is continuous, whereas what is merely in succession is not continuous. but further, if motion is continuous, it is one : and it is one only if the movent and the moved that constitute it are each of them one, since in the event of a thing ' s being moved now by one thing and now by another the whole motion will not be continuous but successive. moreover a conviction that there is a first unmoved something may be reached not only from the foregoing arguments, but also by considering again the principles operative in movents. now it is evident that among existing things there are some that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. this fact has served above to make it clear that it is not true either that all things are in motion or that all things are at rest or that some things are always at rest and the remainder always in motion : on this matter proof is supplied by things that fluctuate between the two and have the capacity of being sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. the existence of things of this kind is clear to all : but we wish to explain also the nature of each of the other two kinds and show that there are some things that are always unmoved and some things that are always in motion. in the course of our argument directed to this end we established the fact that everything that is in motion is moved by something, and that the movent is either unmoved or in motion, and that, if it is in motion, it is moved either by itself or by something else and so on throughout the series : and so we proceeded to the position that the first principle that directly causes things that are in motion to be moved is that which moves itself, and the first principle of the whole series is the unmoved. further it is evident from actual observation that there are things that have the characteristic of moving themselves, e. g. the animal kingdom and the whole class of living things. this being so, then, the view was suggested that perhaps it may be possible for motion to come to be in a thing without having been in existence at all before, because we see this actually occurring in animals : they are unmoved at one time and then again they are in motion, as it seems. we must grasp the fact, therefore, that animals move", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6048963499335119, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 197, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.866566"}
{"text": "be there, and the two events will not be simultaneous, whereas the truth is that a is at b at a sectional point of time and does not occupy time there. in this case, therefore, where the motion of a thing is continuous, it is impossible to use this form of expression. on the other hand in the case of a thing that turns back in its course we must do so. for suppose h in the course of its locomotion proceeds to d and then turns back and proceeds downwards again : then the extreme point d has served as finishing - point and as starting - point for it, one point thus serving as two : therefore h must have come to a stand there : it cannot have come to be at d and departed from d simultaneously, for in that case it would simultaneously be there and not be there at the same moment. and here we cannot apply the argument used to solve the difficulty stated above : we cannot argue that h is at d at a sectional point of time and has not come to be or ceased to be there. for here the goal that is reached is necessarily one that is actually, not potentially, existent. now the point in the middle is potential : but this one is actual, and regarded from below it is a finishing - point, while regarded from above it is a starting - point, so that it stands in these same two respective relations to the two motions. therefore that which turns back in traversing a rectilinear course must in so doing come to a stand. consequently there cannot be a continuous rectilinear motion that is eternal. the same method should also be adopted in replying to those who ask, in the terms of zeno ' s argument, whether we admit that before any distance can be traversed half the distance must be traversed, that these half - distances are infinite in number, and that it is impossible to traverse distances infinite in number - or some on the lines of this same argument put the questions in another form, and would have us grant that in the time during which a motion is in progress it should be possible to reckon a half - motion before the whole for every half - distance that we get, so that we have the result that when the whole distance is traversed we have reckoned an infinite number, which is admittedly impossible. now when we first discussed the question of motion we put forward a solution of this difficulty turning on the fact that the period of time occupied in traversing the distance contains within itself an infinite number of units : there is no absurdity", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6044554409434855, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 207, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.878877"}
{"text": ". if the units are actual, it is not possible : if they are potential, it is possible. for in the course of a continuous motion the traveller has traversed an infinite number of units in an accidental sense but not in an unqualified sense : for though it is an accidental characteristic of the distance to be an infinite number of half - distances, this is not its real and essential character. it is also plain that unless we hold that the point of time that divides earlier from later always belongs only to the later so far as the thing is concerned, we shall be involved in the consequence that the same thing is at the same moment existent and not existent, and that a thing is not existent at the moment when it has become. it is true that the point is common to both times, the earlier as well as the later, and that, while numerically one and the same, it is theoretically not so, being the finishing - point of the one and the starting - point of the other : but so far as the thing is concerned it belongs to the later stage of what happens to it. let us suppose a time abg and a thing d, d being white in the time a and not - white in the time b. then d is at the moment g white and not - white : for if we were right in saying that it is white during the whole time a, it is true to call it white at any moment of a, and not - white in b, and g is in both a and b. we must not allow, therefore, that it is white in the whole of a, but must say that it is so in all of it except the last moment g. g belongs already to the later period, and if in the whole of a not - white was in process of becoming and white of perishing, at g the process is complete. and so g is the first moment at which it is true to call the thing white or not white respectively. otherwise a thing may be non - existent at the moment when it has become and existent at the moment when it has perished : or else it must be possible for a thing at the same time to be white and not white and in fact to be existent and non - existent. further, if anything that exists after having been previously non - existent must become existent and does not exist when it is becoming, time cannot be divisible into time - atoms. for suppose that d was becoming white in the time a and that at another time b, a time", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6126437099057638, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 209, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.880817"}
{"text": "after having been previously non - existent must become existent and does not exist when it is becoming, time cannot be divisible into time - atoms. for suppose that d was becoming white in the time a and that at another time b, a time - atom consecutive with the last atom of a, d has already become white and so is white at that moment : then, inasmuch as in the time a it was becoming white and so was not white and at the moment b it is white, there must have been a becoming between a and b and therefore also a time in which the becoming took place. on the other hand, those who deny atoms of time ( as we do ) are not affected by this argument : according to them d has become and so is white at the last point of the actual time in which it was becoming white : and this point has no other point consecutive with or in succession to it, whereas time - atoms are conceived as successive. moreover it is clear that if d was becoming white in the whole time a, the time occupied by it in having become white in addition to having been in process of becoming white is no more than all that it occupied in the mere process of becoming white. these and such - like, then, are the arguments for our conclusion that derive cogency from the fact that they have a special bearing on the point at issue. if we look at the question from the point of view of general theory, the same result would also appear to be indicated by the following arguments. everything whose motion is continuous must, on arriving at any point in the course of its locomotion, have been previously also in process of locomotion to that point, if it is not forced out of its path by anything : e. g. on arriving at b a thing must also have been in process of locomotion to b, and that not merely when it was near to b, but from the moment of its starting on its course, since there can be, no reason for its being so at any particular stage rather than at an earlier one. so, too, in the case of the other kinds of motion. now we are to suppose that a thing proceeds in locomotion from a to g and that at the moment of its arrival at g the continuity of its motion is unbroken and will remain so until it has arrived back at a. then when it is undergoing locomotion from a to g it is at the same time undergoing also its locomotion to a from g :", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6244216188127072, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 210, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.883782"}
{"text": "at g the continuity of its motion is unbroken and will remain so until it has arrived back at a. then when it is undergoing locomotion from a to g it is at the same time undergoing also its locomotion to a from g : consequently it is simultaneously undergoing two contrary motions, since the two motions that follow the same straight line are contrary to each other. with this consequence there also follows another : we have a thing that is in process of change from a position in which it has not yet been : so, inasmuch as this is impossible, the thing must come to a stand at g. therefore the motion is not a single motion, since motion that is interrupted by stationariness is not single. further, the following argument will serve better to make this point clear universally in respect of every kind of motion. if the motion undergone by that which is in motion is always one of those already enumerated, and the state of rest that it undergoes is one of those that are the opposites of the motions ( for we found that there could be no other besides these ), and moreover that which is undergoing but does not always undergo a particular motion ( by this i mean one of the various specifically distinct motions, not some particular part of the whole motion ) must have been previously undergoing the state of rest that is the opposite of the motion, the state of rest being privation of motion ; then, inasmuch as the two motions that follow the same straight line are contrary motions, and it is impossible for a thing to undergo simultaneously two contrary motions, that which is undergoing locomotion from a to g cannot also simultaneously be undergoing locomotion from g to a : and since the latter locomotion is not simultaneous with the former but is still to be undergone, before it is undergone there must occur a state of rest at g : for this, as we found, is the state of rest that is the opposite of the motion from g. the foregoing argument, then, makes it plain that the motion in question is not continuous. our next argument has a more special bearing than the foregoing on the point at issue. we will suppose that there has occurred in something simultaneously a perishing of not - white and a becoming of white. then if the alteration to white and from white is a continuous process and the white does not remain any time, there must have occurred simultaneously a perishing of not - white, a becoming of white, and a becoming of not - white : for the time of the three", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.603170827609536, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 211, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.886412"}
{"text": "the termination do not coincide, whereas in motion over a circle they do coincide, and so this is the only perfect motion. this differentiation also provides another means of showing that the other kinds of motion cannot be continuous either : for in all of them we find that there is the same ground to be traversed repeatedly ; thus in alteration there are the intermediate stages of the process, and in quantitative change there are the intervening degrees of magnitude : and in becoming and perishing the same thing is true. it makes no difference whether we take the intermediate stages of the process to be few or many, or whether we add or subtract one : for in either case we find that there is still the same ground to be traversed repeatedly. moreover it is plain from what has been said that those physicists who assert that all sensible things are always in motion are wrong : for their motion must be one or other of the motions just mentioned : in fact they mostly conceive it as alteration ( things are always in flux and decay, they say ), and they go so far as to speak even of becoming and perishing as a process of alteration. on the other hand, our argument has enabled us to assert the fact, applying universally to all motions, that no motion admits of continuity except rotatory motion : consequently neither alteration nor increase admits of continuity. we need now say no more in support of the position that there is no process of change that admits of infinity or continuity except rotatory locomotion. it can now be shown plainly that rotation is the primary locomotion. every locomotion, as we said before, is either rotatory or rectilinear or a compound of the two : and the two former must be prior to the last, since they are the elements of which the latter consists. moreover rotatory locomotion is prior to rectilinear locomotion, because it is more simple and complete, which may be shown as follows. the straight line traversed in rectilinear motion cannot be infinite : for there is no such thing as an infinite straight line ; and even if there were, it would not be traversed by anything in motion : for the impossible does not happen and it is impossible to traverse an infinite distance. on the other hand rectilinear motion on a finite straight line is if it turns back a composite motion, in fact two motions, while if it does not turn back it is incomplete and perishable : and in the order of nature, of definition, and of time alike the complete", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.606747148705552, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 213, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.888821"}
{"text": "' density ' or ' rarity ' : for it is by ' combination ' and ' separation ' that the place of these things in their systems is determined. moreover to these we may add those who make soul the cause of motion : for they say that things that undergo motion have as their first principle ' that which moves itself ' : and when animals and all living things move themselves, the motion is motion in respect of place. finally it is to be noted that we say that a thing ' is in motion ' in the strict sense of the term only when its motion is motion in respect of place : if a thing is in process of increase or decrease or is undergoing some alteration while remaining at rest in the same place, we say that it is in motion in some particular respect : we do not say that it ' is in motion ' without qualification. our present position, then, is this : we have argued that there always was motion and always will be motion throughout all time, and we have explained what is the first principle of this eternal motion : we have explained further which is the primary motion and which is the only motion that can be eternal : and we have pronounced the first movent to be unmoved. we have now to assert that the first movent must be without parts and without magnitude, beginning with the establishment of the premisses on which this conclusion depends. one of these premisses is that nothing finite can cause motion during an infinite time. we have three things, the movent, the moved, and thirdly that in which the motion takes place, namely the time : and these are either all infinite or all finite or partly - that is to say two of them or one of them - finite and partly infinite. let a be the movement, b the moved, and g the infinite time. now let us suppose that d moves e, a part of b. then the time occupied by this motion cannot be equal to g : for the greater the amount moved, the longer the time occupied. it follows that the time z is not infinite. now we see that by continuing to add to d, i shall use up a and by continuing to add to e, i shall use up b : but i shall not use up the time by continually subtracting a corresponding amount from it, because it is infinite. consequently the duration of the part of g which is occupied by all a in moving the whole of b, will be finite. therefore a finite thing cannot impart to anything an infinite motion. it is", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.6211636796898292, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:1235ace3-8541-4277-99db-fbb585272a48>", "chunk_index": 216, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.892050"}
{"text": "here is the latest american chemical society ( acs ) office of public affairs weekly presspac with news from acs \u2019 34 peer - reviewed journals and chemical & engineering news. this information is intended for your personal use in news gathering and reporting and should not be distributed to others. anyone using advance acs office of public affairs weekly presspac information for stocks or securities dealing may be guilty of insider trading under the federal securities exchange act of 1934. please cite the individual journal, or the american chemical society, as the source of this information. scientists in the united kingdom are reporting an advance toward overcoming one of the key challenges in nanotechnology : getting molecules to move quickly in a desired direction without help from outside forces. their achievement has broad implications, the scientists say, raising the possibility of coaxing cells to move and grow in specific directions to treat diseases. it also could speed development of some long - awaited nanotech innovations. they include self - healing structures that naturally repair tears in their surface and devices that deliver medication to diseased while sparing healthy tissue. the study is scheduled for the october issue of acs nano, a monthly journal. mark geoghegan and colleagues note long - standing efforts to produce directed, controlled movement of individual molecules in the nano world, national science foundation model of atomic structure of where objects are about 1 / 50, 000ththe width of a human hair. the main solutions so far have involved use of expensive, complex machines to move the molecules and they have been only partially successful, the scientists say. the scientists used a special surface with hydrophobic ( water repelling ) and hydrophilic ( water - attracting ) sections. the region between the two sections produced a so - called \u201c energy gradient \u201d which can move tiny objects much like a conveyor belt. in lab studies, the scientists showed that plastic nanoparticles ( polymer molecules ) moved quickly and in a specific direction on this surface. \u201c this could have implications in many technologies such as coaxing cells to move and grow in given directions, which could have major implications for the treatment of paralysis, \u201d the scientists said. scientists in australia are reporting development and testing in laboratory animals of a potential new material for diagnosing malignant melanoma, the most serious form of skin cancer. their study is scheduled for the september 10 issue of the acs \u2019 journal of the medicinal chemistry, a bi - weekly publication. ivan greguric and colleagues working within the cooperative research consortium for biomedical imaging develop, an australian government funded research group, note that", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6063281335212892, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:515a25dd-a818-4d70-a699-99a41a408c03>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.924756"}
{"text": "of fundamental constants ). which alternative do you prefer? the universe where everything is just right for our existence has been labelled the \u201c goldilocks \u201d universe. is it just right by chance or design? your answer will shape your approach to life. can we also put another, even more important truth of gnosticism, on a firm scientific footing that would give atheists pause for thought? illumination does not teach that there are two separate physical universes \u2013 one containing the true god and another created by satan. rather, satan \u2019 s universe physically exists within the greater universe. in other words, the \u201c big bang \u201d represents a temporal event within a pre - existing, limitless universe. the universe of the big bang has a beginning and an end, but the universe enfolding it does not. the big bang universe is expanding, but it won \u2019 t go on expanding forever. it is not expanding ( or stretching ) into nothing as some scientists claim. in fact, the idea of pure nothingness is incoherent since every scientist accepts the concept of the quantum vacuum : a sea of virtual particles, a sea of becoming where being and nothingness are inextricably linked. according to exponents of relational time and space, if all objects were somehow removed from the universe there would be no time and space, but it is now an accepted truth that the quantum vacuum would still be there. in other words, the quantum vacuum takes the place of what newton referred to as absolute space. although time might not be particularly meaningful in the quantum vacuum, it is still possible to talk of a temporal succession of events, so although there is no absolute time ( in a newtonian sense ), there is still time of some description. space and time, as manifested through the quantum vacuum, are integral to the universe. if there is an entity that can be regarded as absolute space \u2013 the quantum vacuum \u2013 then, at the very least, the expanding universe must be expanding into it. in fact, the big bang universe is expanding into a pre - existing universe \u2013 that of the true god. the big bang universe is a finite universe within an eternal, infinite universe. that point must be emphasised. although our universe is vast beyond the imagining, it is of no size at all in comparison with infinity. if our universe ends, that does not imply the end of the greater universe \u2013 the macrocosmos. but how can a physical sub - universe exist within a physical super - universe without catastrophic collisions taking place all of the time", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6119860741007264, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:3e989797-5e34-4ba1-9dc9-8eb785bcccba>", "chunk_index": 4, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.997296"}
{"text": "in comparison with infinity. if our universe ends, that does not imply the end of the greater universe \u2013 the macrocosmos. but how can a physical sub - universe exist within a physical super - universe without catastrophic collisions taking place all of the time? the answer lies in the definition of \u201c matter \u201d. illumination teaches that \u201c matter \u201d is what exists in a physical universe ( a universe with dimensions ) as opposed to a mental universe without dimensions. but it goes on to draw a sharp distinction between two different types of matter. the matter that illumination condemns as the creation of satan is matter that possesses mass. but there is also other matter that has no mass but still exists within the dimensional universe. light, consisting of massless photons, is matter of this type. light, massless matter, is always contrasted in gnostic thought with mass - matter. it turns out that modern quantum physics provides a precise technical vocabulary for what illumination has always taught. all elementary particles can be divided into two categories : matter particles ( known as fermions ) and force carrying particles ( called bosons ). fermions can be further subdivided into quarks and leptons. as for bosons, there are six types : photons, w and z bosons, gluons, gravitons and higgs bosons ( the existence of the latter two has not yet been experimentally verified ). photons, gluons and gravitons have zero mass. illumination teaches that the super - universe is the province of matter without mass. in the language of ancient times, it is referred to simply as the \u201c kingdom of light \u201d. as for satan \u2019 s sub - universe, the \u201c kingdom of matter \u201d, it consists of quarks, leptons, bosons and nothing else ( apart from the fluctuations of the quantum vacuum that pervades all of existence ). the key to the division between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of matter is the higgs boson, sometimes referred to as the \u201c god particle \u201d. ( in the armageddon conspiracy, it is named the \u201c satan particle \u201d since it is the centrepiece of satan \u2019 s creation. ) higgs bosons are the particles associated with the higgs field and it is by \u201c swimming \u201d through the higgs field that particles acquire their mass. if there were no higgs bosons and no higgs field then nothing in the universe would have mass. critically, photons, being massless, do not interact", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6377018905578267, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:3e989797-5e34-4ba1-9dc9-8eb785bcccba>", "chunk_index": 5, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.998276"}
{"text": "is by \u201c swimming \u201d through the higgs field that particles acquire their mass. if there were no higgs bosons and no higgs field then nothing in the universe would have mass. critically, photons, being massless, do not interact with the higgs field or with higgs bosons. they don \u2019 t feel the higgs field. illumination has always taught that light and matter are in opposition and now physics has reflected a sharp divide between photons ( light ) and particles with mass. they can co - exist in the same environment, but whereas fermions interact with the higgs field, photons do not. another astonishing finding of physics is that bosons obey \u201c bose - einstein \u201d statistics while fermions obey \u201c fermi - dirac \u201d statistics. the key point here is that fermions comply with the pauli exclusion principle : two fermions cannot occupy the same quantum state. bosons are completely different. no exclusion principle applies to them and they can occupy the same quantum state. it is this feature that underlies laser technology. it also underlies something much more remarkable. in the kingdom of light, everything is made of photons. bodies can be created from photons obeying bose - einstein statistics. \u201c angels \u201d are made of photons. and they can enter the material universe that we inhabit and return at a later time whence they came. the kingdom of light is not \u201c perishable \u201d in the way that the kingdom of matter is. as we have said, the material universe created by the big bang is vast beyond comprehension, and no human will ever escape from it in human form. it is therefore understandable that some people refuse to speculate about what lies beyond. they will never reach the boundary of our universe, so why concern themselves with it? in ancient gnostic thinking, there is a boundary ( \u201c horos \u201d ), which prevents entry to the kingdom of light, conceals what happens there, and allows only the elect to pass through to the higher kingdom. ask yourself this : if it is possible to have a universe that envelops this one, from which access to and from this universe is possible ( at the speed of light ), and that can contain bodies that obey bose - einstein statistics rather than fermi - dirac statistics, is this is a legitimate scientific basis for that most elusive of entities that has always haunted the human imagination : the immortal soul? the soul is not an entity from an invisible, unknowable, un", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6220352610502676, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:3e989797-5e34-4ba1-9dc9-8eb785bcccba>", "chunk_index": 6, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:32.999247"}
{"text": "rather than fermi - dirac statistics, is this is a legitimate scientific basis for that most elusive of entities that has always haunted the human imagination : the immortal soul? the soul is not an entity from an invisible, unknowable, unreachable other dimension. it \u2019 s from the universe of light that surrounds our universe of matter. it is real. it manifests itself as an energy field \u2013 an aura \u2013 around us. and it can return whence it came. exactly as gnosticism has always taught. most religions assert that heaven and hell exist in a mysterious and unknowable different dimension from that of our existence here on earth. they claim that faith is required to cope with this ineffable enigma. illumination, on the other hand, teaches that knowledge is the key and faith is less than worthless. the kingdoms of heaven and hell ( light and matter ) exist in the same physical realm, the finite kingdom of matter within the infinite kingdom of light, separated by the boundary ( horos ). the boundary can be crossed without invoking spooky, supernatural, metaphysical forces. the process is amenable to study by conventional science. mass - matter can exist only where the higgs field is present. it is not present in the kingdom of light : no mass - matter can exist there. light, on the other hand, can exist in both kingdoms and can travel back and forth. that is the basis of \u201c angels \u201d and \u201c souls \u201d. do you see? light can exist in two, entirely different universes. light is the key to everything. that is why the iluminati chose that name for their secret society. that is why their religion is called illumination. light \u2013 illumination \u2013 is the secret of life. light is knowledge. light is thought. light is gnosis. matter, faith and satan are the darkness that must be dispelled. turn to the light. the scientific basis of what is taught by illumination lies in fermions and bosons, fermi - dirac statistics and bose - einstein statistics, mass, photons and the higgs field. although it could be argued that humanity has a vast and impressive knowledge of fermions ( matter particles ), the science of bosons ( photons, gravitons and higgs bosons in particular ) is in its infancy. as mentioned earlier, higgs bosons and gravitons haven \u2019 t even been experimentally verified as of 2009. by 3009 ( if humanity", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6034327184404404, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:3e989797-5e34-4ba1-9dc9-8eb785bcccba>", "chunk_index": 7, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.001730"}
{"text": "to teach. for example, if scientists have developed a material that is robust to all manner of natural forces, following much trial and error, that could be a \u201c three little pigs \u201d material, able to protect itself from a \u201c big bad wolf \u201d force. if scientists are convinced they have not achieved the best result they could from an experiment and they need to wait for what is coming next, it could be termed \u201c billy goats gruff \u201d research, with the boffin taking the role of the deluded troll. and when there is only one solution to a complex problem, scientists could be said to be searching for whatever fits the \u201c glass slipper \u201d. it \u2019 s not just me who is mining this path. this week, there have been reports about the formation of the gamburtsev mountains in antarctica, with theories on how they came to be. it seems that they were covered with ice 34 million years ago and were then, quite literally, frozen in time. or as it is being reported round the world, \u201c like sleeping beauty, they retained their eerie youthfulness. \u201d but scientists also need to be careful. once again this week, the world has been reading about the cern research facility in switzerland, and the fact that for the second time, neutrinos seem to be travelling faster than the speed of light. the cern researchers had better be right. if it turns out they are wrong after all, will anybody ever take them seriously again. or will they come to be known as \u201c scientists who cried wolf \u201d.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6157595932040584, "token_count": 313, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:01a040f9-76a3-428a-aa2c-c4f94c035a99>", "chunk_index": 1, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.256128"}
{"text": "time has played a central role in mathematics from its very beginnings, yet it remains one of the most mysterious aspects of the world in which we live. the beginnings of civilisation on earth required a knowledge of the seasons, and the mysteries surrounding the length of the year, the length of the day and the length of the month began to be studied. all the world religions gave time a central role, be it in astrology, stories of creation, cyclical world histories, notions of eternity, etc. philosophers have tried to come to grips with the concept ; some have argued that time is a basic property of the universe while others have argued that it is an illusion or a property of the human mind and not of the world. a huge effort has been put into making devices to measure time with ever increasing accuracy from the beginnings of recorded history to the present day. quantum mechanics and relativity theory in the 20th century have shown the complexities, and sometime apparent paradoxes, in the notion of time. yet basic mathematics takes time as understood and develops the calculus around a particle whose position at time t is given by x ( t ), its velocity is dx / dt, the derivative of x ( t ) with respect to time, and its acceleration is the second derivative. this requires time to be continuous and a time interval to always be divisible, yet quantum theory tells us that time is quantised and quite unlike mathematical time which forms the basis of applied mathematics. we shall look at the fascinating 20th century developments in understanding time in the article a history of time : 20th century time. in this article we examine how ideas about time developed, culminating in newton ' s universal absolute mathematical time. of course the very title of these articles : \" a history of time \" is confusing. the idea of \" history \" already contains the idea of \" time \". but let us make it clear that what we intend to investigate in these two articles is a history of how ideas about time have developed and, as always in this archive, we emphasise the mathematical aspects. mathematics almost certainly began through the study of time, particularly the need to record sequences of events. an understanding of the seasons is vital for the successful growing of crops. when should crops be planted? when would the rains come? when would rivers flood? when should one harvest the crops? the natural timekeepers in the sky are the daily passage of the sun and the monthly phases of the moon. the fact that knowing the length of a year was vitally important, yet much less visible", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_metrology", "similarity_score": 0.6374411906997479, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:591dbed1-1fd4-4d6c-ade4-17af6f9e08e8>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.284568"}
{"text": "to the belief that time always flows forward. it was only in the middle of the 19th century that the second law of thermodynamics was proposed by clausiusand this was the first law to lack symmetry in the direction of time, see. clausius read a paper to the berlin academy on 18 february 1850 which contained this second law of thermodynamics. he defined entropy which originally measured the amount energy in the form of work that can be extracted from a hot gas but later came to represent a more general measure of the randomness of a system. the second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy of a closed system will always increase, that is its randomness will always increase. this is illustrated by the fact that if we take a box with a membrane across the middle, one side filled with a hot gas, the other with a cold gas, then removing the membrane will result in the hot and cold gases mixing and the temperature will approach the average temperature of the two gases. one would not expect to see the reverse happen. if the box was filled with gas, one would not expect high energy molecules to move to one side of the box and low energy molecules to the other. the system is not time symmetric. despite the difficulties which still existed in understanding the notion of time, by the last part of the 19th century one would have to say that newton ' s universal time had proved extremely effective in providing a basis for laws which had been observed to hold to a high degree of accuracy. although we are far from understanding the notion of time today, the 20th century saw a revolution in the study of time. we may not understand time, but we know that newton ' s absolute time cannot provide the answer. in the article a history of time : 20th century time we examine this revolution. article by : j j o ' connor and e f robertson mactutor history of mathematics", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_thermodynamics", "similarity_score": 0.6483258273205676, "token_count": 386, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:591dbed1-1fd4-4d6c-ade4-17af6f9e08e8>", "chunk_index": 11, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.303325"}
{"text": "shapes of nanoparticle. these can be produced selectively simply by changing the crystallographic surface features of the strontium titanate substrate on which they form and the physical conditions used to anneal, or fix, the nanoparticles to that surface. in order to characterize the resulting nanoparticle arrays, the team turned to scanning electron microscopy ( sem ) at the emc and synchrotron x - ray scattering at x - ray operations and research / bessrc beamline 11 - id - d at the aps. they found that they could produce nanoparticles in a small size range from 30 to 40 nm by annealing at a temperature of 1450k under a flow of the relatively unreactive gas, nitrogen. the team demonstrated that each array on the strontium titanate surface contains 75 million particles in a square lattice, with a spacing of 200 nm between the particles. the x - ray diffraction and sem measurements show that the particles lock on to the crystal structure of the substrate and are shaped like a cuboctahedron cut in half. the researchers once more used dft calculations to explain how this particular shape arises during the process and suggest that it is due to the partial \u201c wetting \u201d of platinum on the strontium titanate during annealing. having produced such perfect platinum nanoparticle arrays, the team then carried out some bulk tests of their catalytic prowess. oxygen - reduction electrocatalytic activity was used to test each of the three arrays produced on different crystal surfaces of strontium titanate with good results. this catalytic test, the researchers say, is one of the most important ways of evaluating electrocatalytic activity. intriguingly, the crystallographic surface form of the nanoparticles displayed activity opposite to what is seen with conventional non - nanoscopic platinum catalysts traditionally modeled with single - crystal extended surfaces. the one that would conventionally be most reactive turned out to be the least catalytically active form, and vice versa. the researchers suggest that this is due to a \u201c division of labor \u201d effect arising through the close proximity of the facets of the divided cuboctahedrons, which allows oxygen to be adsorbed onto the conventionally less catalytic surface more effectively than it otherwise would be. such insights regarding the behavior of catalysts are allowing researchers to lay bare the simplistic notion that catalysts simply speed up reactions and are helping them develop novel materials with a wide range of potential applications", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6541901323955102, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:4b135f8c-77eb-46b0-91bd-2494aa882977>", "chunk_index": 1, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.481689"}
{"text": "catalytic surface more effectively than it otherwise would be. such insights regarding the behavior of catalysts are allowing researchers to lay bare the simplistic notion that catalysts simply speed up reactions and are helping them develop novel materials with a wide range of potential applications. \u201c this work demonstrates for the first time full control over all possible variables connected with high surface area catalysts, such as size, shape, number, and even the orientation of particles, \u201d said team member hoydoo you. \u201c from the standpoint of x - ray scientists, control over spatial orientation of particles and their arrangement in a relatively perfect square lattice would allow single nanoparticle scattering experiments to be performed, but with millions of nanoparticles. \u201d the team concedes that electron beam lithography, being a serial \u2014 or sequential \u2014 rather than parallel technique, limits how much surface can be covered with catalytic nanoparticles in a given time. however, they also point out that parallel nanofabrication techniques could be developed to overcome such a limitation. komanicky adds that, \u201c the aps played a crucial role in the characterization of the arrays produced. since the coverage of platinum catalyst on the sto substrate is relatively low, use of a high - brilliance x - ray source was necessary for confident characterization of the epitaxial relation between the catalyst particles and the substrate, and detection of misoriented particles. \u201d \u2014 david bradley", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6067604976760116, "token_count": 289, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:4b135f8c-77eb-46b0-91bd-2494aa882977>", "chunk_index": 2, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.482249"}
{"text": "the beginning of this story has been told many times. in 1985, a confluence of events led to an unexpected and unplanned experiment with a new kind of microscope resulting in the discovery of a new molecule made purely of carbon \u2013 the very element chemists felt there was nothing more to learn about. buckyballs \u2013 sixty carbon atoms arranged in a soccer ball shape \u2013 had been discovered and the chemical world, not to mention the physical and material worlds, would never be the same. a versatile filler for plastics the mechanical ( stiffness, strength, toughness ), thermal and electrical properties of pure buckytube materials enable a multitude of applications, from batteries and fuel cells to fibres and cables to pharmaceutics and biomedical materials. scores of additional applications emerge when one thinks of blending nanotubes with other materials to improve existing properties or to provide new ones. using nanotubes as fillers in thermoplastics and thermosets, for example, has been discussed for several years, and is only recently undergoing rapid investigation and development as sufficient quantities of high - quality buckytube material is becoming available to enable such investigations. one of the most important technology developments of the last half of the twentieth century was the substantial replacement of metals with plastics. most of this replacement has been in structural applications, where plastics have been engineered to outperform steel and other structural metals by providing adequate strength or stiffness at lower weight and cost. a key property that metals will always have over plastics, however, is in electrical conductivity. plastics are amazingly good electrical insulators ; in fact, this property gives rise to many of the most widespread and important uses of plastics. nevertheless, the applications for plastics would be broadened substantially if good solutions existed to make these materials conductive. these application areas include : antistatic, electrostatic dissipative, and electromagnetic shielding and absorbing materials. electromagnetic interference and radiofrequency interference ( emi / rfi ) shielding, for example, is essential in laptop computers, cell phones, pagers and other portable electronic devices to prevent interference with and from other electronic equipment. at present, there is no suitable plastic material for this purpose, and metal, in one form or another, is typically added to provide this function in electronic equipment cases, imposing substantial weight and manufacturing expense. electrically conductive plastics for some applications, plastics have been loaded with conductive materials for years to provide conductivity. the most common filler is carbon black, which is relatively inexpensive", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6628359978423685, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:162ca55a-0b56-4fde-8020-24ed109895f6>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.574482"}
{"text": "are terrific electrical conductors, as described above. no polymer is a better conductor and none better is likely to be found. ( so - called conductive polymers, a class of long - chain molecules with a conjugated backbone, would be better described as molecular resistors ; they are intrinsically semiconducting. ) second, buckytubes have a phenomenally high aspect ratio. individual tubes are about 1 nm in diameter ( about half the diameter of dna, and about 1 / 10, 000th the diameter of graphite fibres ), and 100 - 1000 nm in length. thus, the aspect ratio of buckytubes is around 100 - 1000, compared with about 1 for carbon black particles. this already changes the game entirely, by pushing the critical loading level downward, as described above. finally, buckytubes naturally form, in fact are born with, a morphology that is probably ideal for conductive filler applications. buckytubes self - assemble into \u201c ropes \u201d of tens to hundreds of aligned tubes, running side by side, branching and recombining. when examined by electron microscopy, it is exceedingly difficult to find the end of any of these ropes. thus, ropes form naturally occurring very long conductive pathways that can be exploited in making electrically conductive filled composites. initial indications are that dramatically lower loadings of buckytubes are required to reach a given level of conductivity than for any other conductive fillers. the opportunities for conductive plastics, as well as thermosets, filled with buckytubes are abundant. very low loadings ( < 0. 1 % ) provide for antistatic and electrostatic dissipative applications. one example is in painting automobile body parts, which are increasingly made of plastics. because they are insulators, plastic parts charge up, which cause them to repel electrostatically the paint droplets formed in spray - painting of the body parts. this results in a great deal of wasted paint, which is both an economic and an environmental problem. a conductive primer coat can be applied, but that extra processing step is also quite costly. the ideal situation is to make the part itself sufficiently conductive to drain away charge build up by connecting the part to ground during the painting process. another broad area of application for buckytube - filled plastics is in emi / rfi shielding, which has uses, as described above, in portable electronics, and defence applications. if, as appears likely, good at", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6334546056641415, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:162ca55a-0b56-4fde-8020-24ed109895f6>", "chunk_index": 2, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.577985"}
{"text": "the center for nanoscale materials ( cnm ) at the u. s. department of energy ' s ( doe ) argonne national laboratory dedicated its new scanning probing microscopy building recently during its annual users conference. the new building will house a new scanning probe microscope that measures spin - polarized electrons on surfaces. \" the spin - polarized scanning probing microscope ( lt - spm ) is a wonderful addition to the many tools available to researchers at the cnm, \" said interim cnm director derrick mancini. \" nanomagnetism is a burgeoning field, and the lt - spm will provide the most cutting - edge technology for this research. \" nanomagnetism research using the lt - spm may lead to more energy - efficient motors, advanced information storage, processing prototype devices, advanced medical therapy and biomagnetic sensing concepts. the lt - spm is a multi - functional scanning probe microscope devoted to the high - resolution properties of spin - polarized surfaces at high magnetic fields ( 9 t ) and low temperatures ( 4. 2 k ). this state - of - the - art instrument expands the cnm programs in nanomagnetism and nanoferroelectrics. with the spin - polarized capabilities and the ability to characterize insulating samples, this instrument will propel the cnm to the forefront of science using scanning probes to pursue fundamental materials research. a new building was constructed adjacent to the cnm to house the lt - spm, which requires a highly stable operating environment that is free of acoustic and vibratory interference. the microscope also produces relatively large stray magnetic fields that are incompatible with instruments in the cnm, which was designed specifically to be free of magnetic fields. the lt - spm is a necessary to tool for important scientific research, so a new building was designed to specifically hold the machine and place it far enough away from the cnm that the magnetic fields would not pose a problem to other instruments in the building. construction on the building was finished at the end of september and the facility will be ready for occupancy by the end of fall. the building cost $ 1. 5 million and was paid for institutional general plant project funds from the laboratory.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6284924445587428, "token_count": 453, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:274012ce-3ea0-4b92-9235-0956a04c1a14>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:33.580475"}
{"text": "properties. so it seems that the research efforts should focus on reducing material cost. once the cost is low enough, as the saying goes : \" if you build it, they will come! \". thanks, chuck. this article was focused specifically on carbon composites. both metals you mention are considered for aerospace - - titanium especially is used in various places on aircraft - - but are usually considered far too expensive ( materials ) and / or slow to produce to consider for mass manufacturing of high - volume cars. titanium is sometimes used in high - end race cars. thanks, rob. progress isn ' t very fast, but it is being made. what ' s just happened recently is the formation of these consortia of major players with a lot of r & d dollars committed to making it happen. costs will definitely come down once the processes and materials have been developed that will work in high volumes, since lower - cost materials and processes are among the top goals of all of these efforts. by experimenting with the photovoltaic reaction in solar cells, researchers at mit have made a breakthrough in energy efficiency that significantly pushes the boundaries of current commercial cells on the market. in a world that ' s going green, industrial operations have a problem : their processes involve materials that are potentially toxic, flammable, corrosive, or reactive. if improperly managed, this can precipitate dangerous health and environmental consequences. a quick look into the merger of two powerhouse 3d printing oems and the new leader in rapid prototyping solutions, stratasys. the industrial revolution is now led by 3d printing and engineers are given the opportunity to fully maximize their design capabilities, reduce their time - to - market and functionally test prototypes cheaper, faster and easier. bruce bradshaw, director of marketing in north america, will explore the large product offering and variety of materials that will help cad designers articulate their product design with actual, physical prototypes. this broadcast will dive deep into technical information including application specific stories from real world customers and their experiences with 3d printing. 3d printing is", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6200005179819856, "token_count": 417, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:cbdbedc8-2612-43b2-8a18-4902c5f57df2>", "chunk_index": 3, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:34.202193"}
{"text": "of things may influence, disrupt, distort, or even condition our thinking. intense heat or cold may make any but the most elementary thinking extremely difficult. low pressure systems in the atmosphere may depress us, and high pressure systems may exhilarate us. our wishes, whether born of material interests or immaterial desires for diversion, may lead us to wrong conclusions. pathological mental states may render us incapable of sound reasoning. our minds do not exist in splendid isolation from our bodies but are rather so much connected with them that we can rarely ignore them for long. if i were bitten by a rattlesnake, i suspect i would have great difficulty even breathing, much less thinking. but all that should be nothing to the point. it is the very office of reason to put at naught all these influences which distort conclusions. if i draw my conclusion as to what is of ultimate importance in this world in the presence of a bengal tiger on the loose, i may be expected to modify it in more serene surroundings, to say nothing of how others might view my conclusion. in like manner, it is the business of reason to remove all discrepancies in thought, whatever their source. the source of the discrepancy does not matter any more than the fact that ezekiel bulver \u2019 s father was a man mattered in his conclusions about a triangle. the question is whether or not it is possible to construct a triangle any two of whose sides must not be longer combined than the other. if it is not, it matters not at all whether the person who drew the conclusion was a man or woman, a bourgeois or industrial worker, had an inferiority complex or had sublimated his sexual desires. anyone who doubts this axiom about triangles can test it for himself. all else is irrelevant. it evades the issue.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_mechanics", "similarity_score": 0.601353820458438, "token_count": 374, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:629e2658-a112-486e-a7a7-17cdb5acdcaa>", "chunk_index": 5, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:34.410496"}
{"text": "the optical microscope, invented 400 years ago, throughout these years furnished a tremendous amount of knowledge. in particular, the microscope has been used widely in life sciences. after about 300 - year history of instrumenal development and reach harvest of discoveries, it was found by ernst abbe in 1873 that the wave nature of light poses a limit to the resolution power of microscopes due to diffraction, a finding which has become known as abbe ' s diffraction barrier. however, recently it was realized, most notably through the work of stefan hell starting in the 1990 - s, that abbe ' s barrier can be overcome. as a result, new optical microscopes are emerging now, enabling previously unthinkable high, namely, nanometer, resolution, that are most valuable for biological applications. breaking abbe ' s diffraction barrier a confocal microscope, commonly used in fluorescence microscopy studies, eliminates out - of - focus light coming into the detector, improving the imaging ; using multi - photon excitation ( usually, two - photon ), one can slightly increase the resolution power. despite these tricks, until recently the resolution of optical microscopes remained bounded by the abbe ' s diffraction barrier, with the size of the illuminated area limited to approximately 250nm in the focal plane and 500nm in the direction of the optical axis. the state of affairs changed in 1990 - s, when new light microscopy concepts were developed that improve the resolution up to about 30nm, thus breaking abbe ' s barrier. these techniques include 4pi microscopy, i5m microscopy, and stimulated emission depletion ( sted ) microscopy. the 4pi microscope achieves its high resolution along the optical axis ( about 100nm ) by using the coherent light from a laser split into two beams, which are focused at the same point onto a sample. constructive interference of the two beams enhances the focusing of the light ; two - photon illumination is usually employed to further narrow the excitation volume. a newer type of microscopy, sted, allows for even better resolution ( 30nm ) in fluorescent studies, due to the combination of two light pulses separated by a short time : the illumination light pulse and a successive pulse that supresses the fluorescent emission everywhere except the center of the illuminated region. unlike the 4pi microscope, sted setups are not available commercially yet. more on the 4pi and sted microscopes can be found on the web page of stefan hell '", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_optics", "similarity_score": 0.6350141758473518, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:7c67b54e-12a2-4580-a330-5ba1785568fa>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:34.896727"}
{"text": "term for any approach to the arts, whether theoretical, critical or historical, that emphasizes the autonomy or primacy of formal qualities. in the case of painting, these qualities are usually understood to be compositional elements such as line, value, colour and texture : they can be distinguished from technique on the one hand and content on the other. because compositional elements can be considered and enjoyed independently of the way in which a picture evokes the visible world, tells a story or expresses philosophical ideas, some formalists have argued that representation of any kind is incidental to art. they may be answered by those who insist that formal values, when elevated to objects of primary interest, in fact perform a kind of representation. the difficulties involved in the use of such terms helps explain why formalism has met with resistance in recent decades ; at the same time, the issues that it attempts to address are so fundamental to art that it is bound to arouse perennial interest. the origins of formalism are deeply rooted in ancient thought, in the belief for example that the universe is governed by numerical relationships, or in the notion of form as the intelligible quality of things, imposed upon or inherent in matter. even in antiquity such ideas were applied to the arts : aristotle understood art ( techne ) as a shaping process analogous to the processes of nature, while vitruvius distinguished the design ( lineamenta ) of a building from its material existence. these applications were developed during the renaissance. the humanist philosopher benedetto varchi, in a lecture ( due lezzione, florence, 1550 ) on one of michelangelo \u2019 s sonnets, defined the task of the sculptor as the drawing - forth of the \u2018 actual \u2019 from the \u2018 potential \u2019 being. in the enlightenment, with its concern for the psychological nature of knowledge, there arose the notion that the experience of a work of art as a work of art was neither purely sensual nor purely rational and that an \u2018 aesthetic \u2019 experience could be distinguished from other kinds of experience. if in looking at a picture we are moved to religious insights, for example, we are not experiencing the picture aesthetically. kant, on the other hand, in his critique of judgment, formulated the possibility of \u2018 adherent \u2019 as well as \u2018 pure \u2019 beauty and admitted that beauty could be a symbol of the good, that aesthetic experience could thus have a resonance in the realm of morality. friedrich schiller, pushing kant \u2019 s ideas towards romanticism, emphasized the spiritually therapeutic nature of aesthetic experience, its capacity", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6124352540045784, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:527ed3e7-d4de-4c5c-9a29-71d4af8352f3>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:35.119948"}
{"text": "researchers in nanomedicine have long dreamed of an age when molecular - scale computing devices could be embedded in our bodies to monitor health and treat diseases before they progress. the advantage of such computers, which would be made of biological materials, would lie in their ability to speak the biochemical language of life. several research groups have recently reported progress in this field. a team at the california institute of technology, writing in the journal science, made use of dna nanostructures called seesaw gates to construct logic circuits analogous to those used in microprocessors. just as silicon - based components use electric current to represent 1 \u2019 s and 0 \u2019 s, bio - based circuits use concentrations of dna molecules in a test tube. when new dna strands are added to the test tube as \u201c input, \u201d the solution undergoes a cascade of chemical interactions to release different dna strands as \u201c output. \u201d in theory, the input could be a molecular indicator of a disease, and the output could be an appropriate therapeutic molecule. a common problem in constructing a computer in a test tube is that it is hard to control which interactions among molecules occur. the brilliance of the seesaw gate is that a particular gate responds only to particular input dna strands. in a subsequent nature paper, the caltech researchers showed off the power of their technique by building a dna - based circuit that could play a simple memory game. a circuit with memory could, if integrated into living cells, recognize and treat complex diseases based on a series of biological clues. this circuitry has not been integrated into living tissue, however, in part because its ability to communicate with cells is limited. zhen xie of the massachusetts institute of technology and his collaborators have recently made progress on this front. as they reported in science, they designed an rna - based circuit that was simpler but could still distinguish modified cancer cells from noncancerous cells and, more important, trigger the cancer cells to self - destruct. both techniques have been used only in artificial scenarios. yet the advances in dna - based circuits offer a new, powerful platform to potentially realize researchers \u2019 long - held biocomputing dreams.", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_computing", "similarity_score": 0.6207177868869248, "token_count": 435, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:03f6ff15-61eb-45db-a179-aa6709520962>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:36.266028"}
{"text": "14. 5 relational model of databases as an example of how data can be organized conceptually, we shall describe the relational data model. in this conceptual model, the data in the database is viewed as being organized into a series of relations or tables of data which are associated in ways defined in the data dictionary. a relation consists of rows of data with columns containing particular attributes. the term \" relational \" derives from the mathematical theory of relations which provides a theoretical framework for this type of data model. here, the terms \" relation \" and data \" table \" will be used interchangeably. table 14 - 2 defines one possible relation to record unit cost data associated with particular activities. included in the database would be one row ( or tuple ) for each of the various items involved in construction or other project activities. the unit cost information associated with each item is then stored in the form of the relation defined in table 14 - 2. table 14 - 2 illustration of a relation description : unit price information attributes using table 14 - 2, a typical unit cost entry for an activity in construction might be : this entry summarizes the unit costs associated with construction of 12 \" thick brick masonry walls, as indicated by the item description. the item _ code is a numerical code identifying a particular activity. this code might identify general categories as well ; in this case, 04. 2 refers to general masonry work. item _ code might be based on the masterformat or other coding scheme. the crew _ code entry identifies the standard crew which would be involved in the activity. the actual composition of the standard crew would be found in a crew relation under the entry 04. 2 - 3, which is the third standard crew involved in masonry work ( 04. 2 ). this ability to point to other relations reduces the redundancy or duplication of information in the database. in this case, standard crew number 04. 2 - 3 might be used for numerous masonry construction tasks, but the definition of this crew need only appear once. description : common brick masonry, 12 \" thick wall, 19. 0 bricks per s. f. work _ unit : 1000 bricks work _ unit, output and time _ unit summarize the expected output for this task with a standard crew and define the standard unit of measurement for the item. in this case, costs are given per thousand bricks per shift. finally, material ( matl _ unit _ cost ) and installation ( instcosts ) costs are recorded along with the date ( datemcos and dateicos )", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_materials", "similarity_score": 0.6075471288210201, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:cf93d754-49e5-47d9-af27-f1975325a7c3>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:36.312722"}
{"text": "error. for example, suppose one queried the database to find the material cost entered on a particular date. this response might be misleading since more than one material cost could have been entered on the same date. similarly, if there are multiple rows with the same itemcode value, then a query might give erroneous responses if one of the rows was out of date. finally, each row has only a single entry for each attribute. the ability to combine or separate relations into new arrangements permits the definition of alternative views or external models of the information. since there are usually a number of different users of databases, this can be very useful. for example, the payroll division of an organization would normally desire a quite different organization of information about employees than would a project manager. by explicitly defining the type and organization of information a particular user group or application requires, a specific view or subset of the entire database can be constructed. this organization is illustrated in fig. 14 - 1 with the data dictionary serving as a translator between the external data models and the database management system. behind the operations associated with querying and manipulating relations is an explicit algebraic theory. this algebra defines the various operations that can be performed on relations, such as union ( consisting of all rows belonging to one or the other of two relations ), intersection ( consisting of all rows belonging to both of two relations ), minus ( consisting of all rows belonging to one relation and not another ), or projection ( consisting of a subset of the attributes from a relation ). the algebraic underpinnings of relational databases permits rigorous definitions and confidence that operations will be accomplished in the desired fashion. example 14 - 3 : a subcontractor relation as an illustration of the preceding discussion, consider the problem of developing a database of possible subcontractors for construction projects. this database might be desired by the cost estimation department of a general contractor to identify subcontractors to ask to bid on parts of a project. appropriate subcontractors appearing in the database could be contacted to prepare bids for specific projects. table 14 - 3 lists the various attributes which might be required for such a list and an example entry, including the subcontractor ' s name, contact person, address, size ( large, medium or small ), and capabilities. table 14 - 3 subcontractor relation example to use this relation, a cost estimator might be interested in identifying large, electrical subcontractors in the database. a query typed into the dbm such as : select from sub", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_computing", "similarity_score": 0.6116114929413283, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:cf93d754-49e5-47d9-af27-f1975325a7c3>", "chunk_index": 2, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:36.314722"}
{"text": "- for a topical guide to this subject, see outline of economics. economics is the social science that analyzes the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. the term economics comes from the ancient greek \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1 ( oikonomia, \" management of a household, administration \" ) from \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 ( oikos, \" house \" ) + \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 ( nomos, \" custom \" or \" law \" ), hence \" rules of the house ( hold ) \". political economy was the earlier name for the subject, but economists in the late 19th century suggested \" economics \" as a shorter term for \" economic science \" that also avoided a narrow political - interest connotation and as similar in form to \" mathematics \", \" ethics \", and so forth. a focus of the subject is how economic agents behave or interact and how economies work. consistent with this, a primary textbook distinction is between microeconomics and macroeconomics. microeconomics examines the behavior of basic elements in the economy, including individual agents ( such as households and firms or as buyers and sellers ) and markets, and their interactions. macroeconomics analyzes the entire economy and issues affecting it, including unemployment, inflation, economic growth, and monetary and fiscal policy. other broad distinctions include those between positive economics ( describing \" what is \" ) and normative economics ( advocating \" what ought to be \" ) ; between economic theory and applied economics ; between rational and behavioral economics ; and between mainstream economics ( more \" orthodox \" and dealing with the \" rationality - individualism - equilibrium nexus \" ) and heterodox economics ( more \" radical \" and dealing with the \" institutions - history - social structure nexus \" ). economic analysis may be applied throughout society, as in business, finance, health care, and government, but also to such diverse subjects as crime, education, the family, law, politics, religion, social institutions, war, and science. at the turn of the 21st century, the expanding domain of economics in the social sciences has been described as economic imperialism. there are a variety of modern definitions of economics. some of the differences may reflect evolving views of the subject or different views among economists. scottish philosopher adam smith ( 1776 ) defined what was then called political economy as \" an inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations \", in particular as : - a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator [ with the twofold objectives of providing ] a plent", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6125909087777743, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:c14adde3-028b-4b3e-98de-01691757676b>", "chunk_index": 0, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:37.655536"}
{"text": "from quantitative methods such as operations research and programming and from statistical methods such as regression analysis in the absence of certainty and perfect knowledge. a unifying theme is the attempt to optimize business decisions, including unit - cost minimization and profit maximization, given the firm ' s objectives and constraints imposed by technology and market conditions. uncertainty and game theory uncertainty in economics is an unknown prospect of gain or loss, whether quantifiable as risk or not. without it, household behavior would be unaffected by uncertain employment and income prospects, financial and capital markets would reduce to exchange of a single instrument in each market period, and there would be no communications industry. given its different forms, there are various ways of representing uncertainty and modelling economic agents ' responses to it. game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that considers strategic interactions between agents, one kind of uncertainty. it provides a mathematical foundation of industrial organization, discussed above, to model different types of firm behavior, for example in an oligopolistic industry ( few sellers ), but equally applicable to wage negotiations, bargaining, contract design, and any situation where individual agents are few enough to have perceptible effects on each other. as a method heavily used in behavioral economics, it postulates that agents choose strategies to maximize their payoffs, given the strategies of other agents with at least partially conflicting interests. in this, it generalizes maximization approaches developed to analyze market actors such as in the supply and demand model and allows for incomplete information of actors. the field dates from the 1944 classic theory of games and economic behavior by john von neumann and oskar morgenstern. it has significant applications seemingly outside of economics in such diverse subjects as formulation of nuclear strategies, ethics, political science, and evolutionary biology. risk aversion may stimulate activity that in well - functioning markets smooths out risk and communicates information about risk, as in markets for insurance, commodity futures contracts, and financial instruments. financial economics or simply finance describes the allocation of financial resources. it also analyzes the pricing of financial instruments, the financial structure of companies, the efficiency and fragility of financial markets, financial crises, and related government policy or regulation. some market organizations may give rise to inefficiencies associated with uncertainty. based on george akerlof ' s \" market for lemons \" article, the paradigm example is of a dodgy second - hand car market. customers without knowledge of whether a car is a \" lemon \" depress its price below what a quality second - hand car", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6200347818267975, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:c14adde3-028b-4b3e-98de-01691757676b>", "chunk_index": 10, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:37.666024"}
{"text": "the objective is to find ones which are at least as simple in information requirements, more precise in predictions, and more fruitful in generating additional research than prior theories. in microeconomics, principal concepts include supply and demand, marginalism, rational choice theory, opportunity cost, budget constraints, utility, and the theory of the firm. early macroeconomic models focused on modeling the relationships between aggregate variables, but as the relationships appeared to change over time macroeconomists, including new keynesians, reformulated their models in microfoundations. the aforementioned microeconomic concepts play a major part in macroeconomic models \u2013 for instance, in monetary theory, the quantity theory of money predicts that increases in the money supply increase inflation, and inflation is assumed to be influenced by rational expectations. in development economics, slower growth in developed nations has been sometimes predicted because of the declining marginal returns of investment and capital, and this has been observed in the four asian tigers. sometimes an economic hypothesis is only qualitative, not quantitative. expositions of economic reasoning often use two - dimensional graphs to illustrate theoretical relationships. at a higher level of generality, paul samuelson ' s treatise foundations of economic analysis ( 1947 ) used mathematical methods to represent the theory, particularly as to maximizing behavioral relations of agents reaching equilibrium. the book focused on examining the class of statements called operationally meaningful theorems in economics, which are theorems that can conceivably be refuted by empirical data. economic theories are frequently tested empirically, largely through the use of econometrics using economic data. the controlled experiments common to the physical sciences are difficult and uncommon in economics, and instead broad data is observationally studied ; this type of testing is typically regarded as less rigorous than controlled experimentation, and the conclusions typically more tentative. however, the field of experimental economics is growing, and increasing use is being made of natural experiments. statistical methods such as regression analysis are common. practitioners use such methods to estimate the size, economic significance, and statistical significance ( \" signal strength \" ) of the hypothesized relation ( s ) and to adjust for noise from other variables. by such means, a hypothesis may gain acceptance, although in a probabilistic, rather than certain, sense. acceptance is dependent upon the falsifiable hypothesis surviving tests. use of commonly accepted methods need not produce a final conclusion or even a consensus on a particular question, given different tests, data sets, and prior beliefs. criticism based on professional standards and non - replicability", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6290161280491098, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:c14adde3-028b-4b3e-98de-01691757676b>", "chunk_index": 17, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:37.673749"}
{"text": "- rappaport, steven ( 1996 ). \" abstraction and unrealistic assumptions in economics \", journal of economic methodology, 3 ( 2 ), pp. 215 \u2013 236. abstract, ( 1998 ). models and reality in economics. edward elgar, p. 6, ch. 6 \u2013 8. - friedman, milton ( 1953 ), \" the methodology of positive economics \", essays in positive economics, university of chicago press, pp. 14 \u2013 15, 22, 31. \u2022 boland, lawrence a. ( 2008 ). \" assumptions controversy \", the new palgrave dictionary of economics, 2nd edition online abstract. accessed may 30, 2008. - hodgson, g. m ( 2007 ). \" evolutionary and institutional economics as the new mainstream \". evolutionary and institutional economics review 4 ( 1 ) : 7 \u2013 25. retrieved 2010 - 10 - 02. - keynes, j. m. ( september 1924 ). \" alfred marshall 1842 \u2013 1924 \". the economic journal 34 ( 135 ) : 311 \u2013 372. doi : 10. 2307 / 2222645. jstor 2222645. - joskow, paul ( may 1975 ). \" firm decision - making policy and oligopoly theory \". the american economic review 65 ( 2, papers and proceedings of the eighty \u2013 seventh annual meeting of the american economic association ) : 270 \u2013 279, particularly 271. jstor 1818864. - england, paula ( 1993 ). \" the separative self : androcentric bias in neoclassical assumptions \", beyond economic man : feminist theory and economics, university of chicago press, pp. 37 \u2013 53. - ferber, m. a. and julie a. nelson, \" beyond economic man : ten years later, \" in marianne a. ferber and julie a. nelson, eds., feminist economics today : beyond economic man. chicago : university of chicago press, 2003. - marilyn waring ( 1988. ) if women counted. san francisco : harper & row. isbn 0 - 06 - 250933 - 0 - philip mirowski, more heat than light : economics as social physics. new york : cambridge university press, 1989, pp. 377 \u2013 8. - please see partial list of publications, including peer - reviewed papers and books, on john mcmurtry ' s wikipedia page, as well as links to the text of several of his peer - reviewed papers and peer - reviewed secondary references analyzing and discussing his work. - john mcmurtry, the cancer stage of", "subdomain_id": "subdomain_quantum_field_theory", "similarity_score": 0.6056605384303579, "token_count": 512, "source_dataset": "HuggingFaceFW/fineweb-edu", "source_id": "<urn:uuid:c14adde3-028b-4b3e-98de-01691757676b>", "chunk_index": 48, "filtering_threshold": 0.6, "created_at": "2025-12-26T12:46:37.707272"}