destroyed most of the vessels of the defeated side. at santiago, none of the four us battleships present scored a single hit with their 12 - and 13 - inch guns. the naval war between china and japan and lesson from the war in the east, pages 90 - 143, the naval annual 1895. naval aspects of the spanish - american war, pages 123 - 174, the naval annual 1899 these were short - range engagements. at the battle of the yalu river, the victorious japanese did not open fire until the range had closed to 3, 000 yards ; naval guns were still too inaccurate to score hits at a longer range. by the early 1900s, british and american admirals expected that in future battleships would engage at considerably longer ranges. this was an anglo - american trend. french battleships had been expecting to engage at 7 - 8, 000 yards since the mid - 1880s. they would need to do so, because torpedo ranges were increasing ; " the addition of a gyroscope to the torpedo guidance mechanism in 1896, an invention perfected by 1900, overnight transformed the existing torpedo from a weapon accurate only at ranges up to 600 yards into one that could hit at three times this distance. " page 77, lambert, nicholas a. sir john fisher ' s naval revolution, pub university of south carolina, 1999, isbn - 1 - 57003 - 277 - 7 ; for example, in 1903, the us ordered a torpedo effective to 4, 000 yardspage 53, friedman, us battleships. both british and american admirals concluded that they needed to engage the enemy at longer ranges. in 1900, mediterranean sir john a. fisher commanding the royal navy mediterranean fleet ordered gunnery practice, with the 6 - inch guns, at a range of 6, 000 yards. lambert, sir john fisher ' s naval revolution. by 1904, the us naval war college was considering the effects on battleship tactics of 7 - 8, 000 yard range torpedoes. at the short ranges expected for combat in the 1890s, lighter guns had good accuracy ; combined with their high rate of fire, this produced the lethal ' hail of fire ' effect. as ranges increased, the accuracy of light and medium - calibre guns declined more rapidly than that of heavier weapons. lighter projectiles have a lower ratio of mass to frontal surface area, and so their velocity is reduced more quickly by air resistance. if all things are equal, higher velocity means higher accuracy. " moreover at long ranges gunners had to ' spot ' the fall of shot to correct their aim... the longer


area, and so their velocity is reduced more quickly by air resistance. if all things are equal, higher velocity means higher accuracy. " moreover at long ranges gunners had to ' spot ' the fall of shot to correct their aim... the longer the range, the lower the maximum theoretical rate of spotted fire. " page 52, friedman, us battleships. the early years of the 20th century saw the effective range of heavy guns increase. this was established on gunnery ranges by 1904, and proven in action at the battle of tsushima in 1905. " by 1904, the gunnery of the largest weapons had improved to the point where decisive hits could be made at the greatest ranges. this conclusion was confirmed by battle experience in the russo - japanese war, but serious planning for all - big - gun ships came considerably earlier in the major navies, based on peacetime gunnery experiments. " friedman us battlships p. 52 all - big - gun mixed - calibre ships, an all - big - gun mixed - calibre ship of the lord nelson class. she carried four 12 - inch and ten 9. 2 - inch guns. ] ] one approach to making more powerful battleships was to reduce the secondary battery, and substitute additional heavy guns : typically 9. 2 - or 10 - inch. these ships, described as ' all - big - gun mixed - calibre ' or later ' semi - dreadnought ', included the british king edward vii and lord nelson classes, the french danton class, and the japanese battleship satsuma. the design process for these ships often included discussion of a pure, ' all - big - gun one - calibre ', alternative. the june issue of proceedings of the us naval institute contained an article by us navy ' s leading gunnery expert prof p. r alger proposing a main battery of eight 12 - inch guns in twin turrets. the future chief constructor david w taylor responded suggesting that battleships of the future would be powered with steam turbines. page 51, friedman, norman, us battleships, an illustrated design history, pub naval institute press, 1985, isbn 0 - 87021 - 715 - 1 in may 1902, the bureau of construction and repair submitted a design for the mississippi class battleship with twelve 10 - inch guns in twin turrets, two at the ends and four in the wings. lt. cdr. h. c. poundstone submitted a paper to president roosevelt in december 1902 arguing the case for larger battleships. in an appendix to his paper, pounds


guns in twin turrets, two at the ends and four in the wings. lt. cdr. h. c. poundstone submitted a paper to president roosevelt in december 1902 arguing the case for larger battleships. in an appendix to his paper, poundstone suggested a greater number of 11 - inch and 9 - inch guns was preferable to a smaller number of 12 - inch and 9 - inch. " in an appendix he argued, as had signor, that there was little point in retaining the 8 - inch gun. better to replace the existing mix of 12 - and 8 - inch guns with 11 and 9 inch ; better, too, to save weight and gain numbers by using the smallest possible heavy - calibre weapon. poundstone ' s paper was not published by the proceedings until the june and september 1903 issues. " page 52, friedman, us battleships. the naval war college and c & r developed these ideas in studies between 1903 and 1905. war game studies begun in july 1903 " showed that a battleship armed with twelve 11 - or 12 - inch guns hexagonally arranged would be equal to three or more of the conventional type. " pages 53 - 58, friedman, us battleshipsin the british navy the same trend occurred. a design had also been circulated in 1902 - 03 for " a powerful ' all big - gun ' armament of two calibres, viz. four 12 - inch and twelve 9. 2 - inch guns. " page 426, parkes, quoting an i. n. a. paper of 9 april 1919 by sir philip watts. however, the admiralty decided to build three more king edward ( with a mixture of 12 - inch, 9. 2 - inch and 6 - inch ) in the 1903 - 04 programme instead. page 426, parkes. the concept was revived for the 1904 - 05 programme, the lord nelson class. restrictions on length and beam meant that the midships 9. 2 - inch turrets became single instead of twin, thus giving an armament of four 12 - inch, ten 9. 2 - inch, and no 6 - inch. the constructor for this design, j. h. narbeth, submitted an alternative drawing showing an armament of twelve 12 - inch guns, but the admiralty was not prepared to accept this. page 451 - 2, parkes. part of the rationale for the decision to retain mixed - calibre guns was the need to begin the building of the ships quickly because of the tense situation produced by the russo - japanese war


accept this. page 451 - 2, parkes. part of the rationale for the decision to retain mixed - calibre guns was the need to begin the building of the ships quickly because of the tense situation produced by the russo - japanese war. breyer, s. battleships and battlecruisers of the world, p. 113. the switch to all - big - gun designs the replacement of the 6 - inch or 8 - inch guns with weapons of 9. 2 - inch or 10 - inch calibre improved the striking power of a battleship, particularly at longer ranges. however, making the move to a uniform calibre of heavy guns offered a number of benefits. a uniform heavy - gun armament offered advantages for logistics and damage control. when the us were considering whether to have a mixed - calibre main armament for the south carolina class, for example, sims and poundstone stressed the advantages of homogeneity in terms of ammunition supply and the transfer of crews from the disengaged guns to replace wounded gunners. friedman, us battleships, p. 55. a uniform calibre of gun meant streamlined fire control. the designers of dreadnought prefered an all - big - gun design because it would mean only one set of calculations about adjustments to the range of the guns. " additional advantage is gained by having a uniform armament. a mixed armament necessitates separate control for each type ; owing to a variety of causes the range passed to 12 - in. guns is not the range that will suit the 9. 2in. or 6 - in. guns, although the distance of the target is the same. " first addendum to the report of the committee on designs, quoted in mackay r. fisher of kilverstone, p. 322 it is often argued that a uniform calibre was particularly important because the risk of confusion between shell - splashes of 12 - inch and lighter guns, which is held to make accurate ranging difficult. more recent investigation suggests that fire control in 1905 was not advanced enough to use the salvo - firing technique where this confusion might be importantfor the detail of this debate, see fairbanks c. the dreadnought revolution, international history review 1991 vol 13 part 2, in particular p. 250 ; confusion of shell - splashes does not seem to have been a concern of those working on all - big gun designsin britain : " fisher does not seem to have expressed interest in... the ability to hit an adversary at long range by spotting


confusion of shell - splashes does not seem to have been a concern of those working on all - big gun designsin britain : " fisher does not seem to have expressed interest in... the ability to hit an adversary at long range by spotting salvoes. it is also very diffficult to understand just when this method was first officially understood " ; mackay, fisher of kilverstone, p. 322. and in america : " the possibility of gunnery confusion due to two calibres as close as 10 and 12 inches was never raised. for example, sims and poundstone stressed the advantages of homogeneity in terms of ammunition supply and the transfer of crews from the disengaged guns to replace wounded gunners. friedman, us battleships, p. 55. nevertheless, the likelihood of engagements at longer ranges was important in deciding that the heaviest possible guns should be adopted as standard ; hence 12 - inch rather than 10 - inch. " in october w. l rogers of the naval war college wrote a long and detailed memorandum on this question, pointing out that as ranges became longer the difference in accuracy between even 10 - and 12 - inch guns became enormous " page 55, friedman, us battleships ; " the advantage at long range lies with the ship which carries the greatest number of guns of the largest type ", report of the committee on designs, quoted in mackay fisher of kilverstone p. 322furthermore, the newer designs of 12 - inch gun mounting had a considerably higher rate of fire, removing the advantage previously enjoyed by smaller calibres. in 1902, a 12 - inch gun might fire two rounds per minute ; in 1895, one round every four minutes was more likelyfriedman, battleship design and development, p. 98. in october 1903, the naval architect vittorio cuniberti published a paper in jane ' s fighting ships entitled " an ideal battleship for the british navy ", which called for a 17, 000 ton ship carrying a main armament of twelve 12 - in guns, protected by 12 - inch armour, and having a speed of 24 knots ( 44 km / h ). cuniberti, vittorio, " an ideal battleship for the british fleet ", all the world? s fighting ships, 1903, pp. 407 - 409. cuniberti ' s idea - which he had already proposed the idea to his own navy, the regia marina - was to make use of the high rate of fire of new 12 - inch guns to produce devastating rapid -


- 409. cuniberti ' s idea - which he had already proposed the idea to his own navy, the regia marina - was to make use of the high rate of fire of new 12 - inch guns to produce devastating rapid - fire from heavy guns to replace the ' hail of fire ' from lighter weapons. friedman, battleship design and development 1905 - 45, p. 98 something similar lay behind the japanese move towards heavier guns ; japanese shells contained a higher than normal proportion of high explosive, and were fused to explode on contact, starting fires rather than piercing armour. evans and peattie, kaigun, p. 63 the increased rate of fire overcame the principal objection to 12 - inch guns and laid the foundations for future advances in fire control. friedman, battleship design and development, p. 98 building the first dreadnoughts in japan, the two battleships of the 1903 - 4 programme were in fact the first to be laid down as all - big - gun designs, with eight 12 - inch guns. however, the design had armour which was considered too thin, meaning a substantial redesignbreyer, battleships and battlecruisers of the world, p. 331 ; the financial pressures of the russo - japanese war and the short supply of 12 - inch guns which had to be imported from britain meant that these ships were completed as the with a mixed - calibre 10 - inch and 12 - inch armament. the 1903 - 4 design also retained traditional triple - expansion steam engines. evans and peattie, kaigun, p. 159the dreadnought breakthrough occurred in britain in 1905. the new first sea lord, jackie fisher had long been an advocate of new technology in the royal navy and had recently converted to the idea of an all - big - gun battleship. fisher first firmly proposed the all - big - gun idea in a paper in 1904, where he called for battleships with sixteen 10 - inch guns ; by november 1904 he was convinced of the need for 12 - inch guns. an 1902 letter, where he suggested powerful ships ' with equal fire all round ', might have meant an all - big - gun design. mackay, rfisher of kilverstone p. 312fisher is often credited as the creator of the dreadnought type and the father of britain ' s great dreadnought battleship fleet, an impression he himself did much to reinforce. however, it is now seriously suggested fisher ' s main interest was in developing the battlecruiser and not the battleship. sumida, j. sir


britain ' s great dreadnought battleship fleet, an impression he himself did much to reinforce. however, it is now seriously suggested fisher ' s main interest was in developing the battlecruiser and not the battleship. sumida, j. sir john fisher and the dreadnought, journal of military history vol. 59 no. 4 ; p. 619 - 21 one of fisher ' s first actions on coming to office was to set up a committee on designs to consider future battleships and armoured cruisers. the committee ' s first task was to consider a new battleship. the specification for the new ship was a 12 - inch main battery and anit - torpedo - boat guns but no intermediate calibres, and a 21 - knot speed ( two or three knots faster than existing battleships ). breyer, battleships and battlecruisers of the world, p. 115 the initial designs intended twelve 12 - inch guns, though difficulties in positioning these guns led the chief constructor at one stage to propose a return to four 12 - inch guns with sixteen or eighteen 9. 2 - inch. the committee settled on a design carrying ten 12 - inch guns as her main armament, along with twenty - two 12 - pounders ( 3 inch, 76 mm ) as her secondary armamentbreyer, battleships and battlecruisers of the world, p. 115. the committee also took the adventurous step of giving dreadnought steam turbine propulsion. this was unprecedented in a large warship. the greater efficiency of the turbines meant that the 21 - knot design speed could be achieved in a smaller and cheaper shipbreyer, p. 46, p. 115construction took place at a remarkable rate ; her keel was laid on 2 october 1905, she was launched on 10 february 1906, and she was completed on 3 october 1906? an impressive demonstration of british industrial might. sumrall, p. 15 the new ship was named dreadnought ; the previous dreadnought, having been stricken from the effective list in 1905. page 10, the naval annual 1905the first us dreadnoughts were the south carolina class. detailed plans for these were worked out in july - november 1905, and approved by the board of construction on 23 november 1905. page 62, friedman, us battleships however building progress was slow ; specifications for bidders were issued on 21 march 1906, and the two ships were laid down in december 1906, after the completion of the british dreadnought. page 63, friedman, us battleships the design of dreadnoughts


progress was slow ; specifications for bidders were issued on 21 march 1906, and the two ships were laid down in december 1906, after the completion of the british dreadnought. page 63, friedman, us battleships the design of dreadnoughts, like that of any warship, was a difficult struggle to provide as much protection, mobility and firepower as possible on a ship of a realistic size and costfriedman, n. battleship design and development, p. 19 - 21. the characteristic of a dreadnought was an ' all - big - gun ' armament. dreadnoughts also carried thick armour, principally in a thick belt around the waterline, though also in one or more armoured decks which became thicker over time. protection against torpedoes, secondary armament, fire control and command equipment also had to be crammed into the hull. the inevitable consequence of demands for ever greater speed, striking power and staying power meant that the displacement and hence the cost of dreadnought designs tended to increase. dreadnought size was only eventually limited by the washington naval treaty in 1922, when an upper limit of 35, 000 tons was agreed ; in subsequent years a number of treaty battleships were commissioned designed to build up to this limit. once war came on the horion again, however, the race towards bigger and bigger battleships resumed. showing the armament distribution of a typical early british dreadnoughts ; main battery is in twin turrets, with two on the ' wings ' ; secondary battery is clustered around the superstructure. ] ] the defining characteristic of the dreadnought was the ' all - big - gun ' armament : a large number of very heavy guns. the number and size of guns in the main battery could vary. dreadnought herself mounted ten 12 - inch guns ; 12 - inch armament had been standard in the pre - dreadnought and this continued the first generation of dreadnought battleships, though the german navy continued to use 11. 1 - inch guns in its first class of dreadnoughts, the nassau class. breyer, p. 54, 266as dreadnoughts developed, there were continuing demands for more firepower in the main battery to match or outpace the likely enemy. this meant either more powerful heavy guns, a greater number of such guns, or an arrangement which meant the same number of guns could be better used. position of main armament the effectiveness of the guns depended in part on the layout of the turrets. dreadnought, and the british ships which immediately followed her, carried


guns, or an arrangement which meant the same number of guns could be better used. position of main armament the effectiveness of the guns depended in part on the layout of the turrets. dreadnought, and the british ships which immediately followed her, carried five turrets : one ahead and two astern on the centreline of the ship, and two in the ' wings ' next to the superstructure. this allowed three turrets to fire ahead and four turrets to fire broadside. nassau and the first few classes of german dreadnoughts adopted a ' hexagonal ' layout with one turret fore and aft and two wing - turrets on each side of the superstructure ; this meant that more guns were mounted in total, but the same number could fire ahead or broadside as with dreadnought. dreadnought designs experimented with different layouts of turrets. an alternative was to mount the centre turrets en echelon. the british neptune class staggered the wing turrets, so all ten guns could fire on the broadside, a feature copied by the german kaiser class. this, however, risked blast damage to parts of the ship which the guns fired over, and put great stress on the ship ' s frame. friedman, battleship design and development, p. 134the solution which imposed the least stress on the ship ' s hull was to put all the turrets on the centreline. this meant that every heavy gun could easily fire on the broadside, but fewer could fire end - on. it also meant the hull would be longer, and that the armoured belt would be heavier or thinner ; the deep, heavily - armoured magazines which served each turret also interfered with the distribution of boilers and engines. freidman, n. battleship design and development, p. 132 agincourt carried fourteen 12 - inch guns in seven centreline turrets, more heavy guns than any other dreadnought, but was not considered a success for these reasons. breyer, p. 138an improved centreline layout involved raising some turrets so they could fire over a turret immediately forward or astern of them. the u. s. navy adopted this feature with their very first dreadnoughts, the south carolina class. other navies were slower to do so, because of fears about the impact of the blast of the raised guns on the lower turret. raised turrets also raised the centre of gravity of the ship, potentially reducing stability ; for this reason it was impossible for more than two turrets to superfire, one fore and one aft. friedman, battleship design and development p.


on the lower turret. raised turrets also raised the centre of gravity of the ship, potentially reducing stability ; for this reason it was impossible for more than two turrets to superfire, one fore and one aft. friedman, battleship design and development p. 134 the most common superfiring arrangement was eight guns, with two turrets forward and two aft, allowing four guns to fire on either end and eight on a broadside. this was adopted as early as the south carolinas, spread to the royal navy with the orion class, and could be seen as late as the world war ii designs like bismarck and vanguard. the alternative to more turrets was to put more guns into each turret. economising on the number of turrets means the ship could be shorter or could devote more space to machinery. on the other hand, it meant that a higher proportion of the main battery could be put out of action by a single lucky enemy hit. the first nation to adopt the triple turret was russia, with their first dreadnoughts of the gangut classbreyer, p. 393 - 6 ; first seen in the u. s. navy in the nevada class, triple turrets only became popular elsewhere during and after world war i. for instance, the british g3 and n3 designs of 1921 ; the first german triple - turreted capital ship was scharnhorst. several later designs used quadruple turrets, for instance the king george v. fitzsimons, volume 15, p. 1635, and volume 24, p. 2587, " washington ". the quadruple turrets, however, often suffered from technical difficulties - most famously hms prince of wales in her engagement with the bismarck. friedman, battleship design and development, p. 132 main armament power and calibre used on super - dreadnoughts ] ] another way to increase the sriking power of a dreadnought was to increase the power of each gun. this could be done by increasing either the calibre of the weapon and hence the weight of shell, or by lengthening the barrel to increase muzzle velocity. either of these offered the chance to increase range and armour penetration. both methods offered advantages and disadvantages. as guns fire, their barrels wear out, losing accuracy and eventually requiring replacement. at times, this became a problematic ; the u. s. navy seriously considered stopping practice firing of heavy guns in 1910 because of the wear on the barrels. friedman battleship design and development, p. 129 the higher the muzzle velocity, the more


. at times, this became a problematic ; the u. s. navy seriously considered stopping practice firing of heavy guns in 1910 because of the wear on the barrels. friedman battleship design and development, p. 129 the higher the muzzle velocity, the more pronounced the problem of gun wear. heavier shells are also affected less by air resistance, and so retain greater penetrating power at long range. the disadvantages of heavier guns were twofold : firstly, the guns and turrets required weighed much more ; and secondly, heavier and slower shells needed to be fired at a higher angle for the same range. friedman, battleship design and development, p. 130different navies approached the decision of calibre in different ways. the german navy, for instance, generally used a lighter calibre than the equivalent british ships, e. g. 12 - inch calibre when the british standard was 13. 5 - inch. however, because german metallurgy was superior, the german 12 - inch gun was superior to the british 12 - inch in terms of shell weight and muzzle velocity ; and because the german guns were lighter than the british 13. 5 - inch, german ships could afford more armour. friedman, battleship design and development, p. 130on the whole, however, the calibre of guns tended to increase. in the royal navy, the orion class, launched 1910, used ten 13. 5 - inch guns, all on the centreline ; the queen elizabeth class, launched 1913, used eight 15 - inch guns. in all navies, the calibre of guns increased and the number of guns tended to decrease to compensate. the fewer guns needed meant distributing them became less of an issue, and centreline turrets became entirely the norm. a further step change was planned for battleships designed and laid down at the end of world war i. the japanese nagato class in 1917 carried 16 - inch guns, matched by the us navy ' s colorado class. some designs went still further : the british " n3 " class would have carried nine 18 - inch guns, and the japanese planned an un - named class, also with 18 - inch armament. however, the washington naval treaty meant these mammoth battleships never got off the drawing board. the trend towards larger calibres was arrested by the naval treaties. the washington naval treaty limited battleship guns at 16 - inch ( 406 mm ) calibrebreyer, p. 72. later treaties preserved this limit, though reductions of the limit to 11 - inch, 12 - inch or


by the naval treaties. the washington naval treaty limited battleship guns at 16 - inch ( 406 mm ) calibrebreyer, p. 72. later treaties preserved this limit, though reductions of the limit to 11 - inch, 12 - inch or 14 - inch calibre were proposed. breyer, p. 73. the only battleships to break the limit were the japanese yamato class, begun in 1937, which carried 460 - mm ( 18. 1 - inch ) main gunsbreyer, p. 84. by the middle of world war ii, britain was making use of 15 - inch guns built as spares for the queen elizabeth class to arm the last british battleship, vanguard. breyer, p. 82a number of world war ii - era designs were drawn up proposing another move towards gigantic armament. the german h - 43 and h - 44 designs proposed 508 - mm ( 20 - inch ) guns, and there is evidence that hitler wanted calibres as high as 609 - mm ( 24 - inch ) breyer, p. 214 ; the japanese ' super yamato ' design also used 508 - mm gunsbreyer, p. 367. none of these proposals went further than very preliminary design work. shows a typical dreadnought protection scheme, with very thick armour protecting the turrets, magazines and engine spaces tapering away in less vital areas ; also note the subdivided underwater compartments to prevent sinking. ] ] dreadnoughts were protected by thick steel armour around their most vital areas. an armoured warship like a battleship was only of any use in a pitched battle if it could withstand seveal hits from the heaviest weapons it was likely to face and still be able to fight. the critical areas to defend were the engines, main armament and magazines ; a hit to the magazines could result in the ship blowing up, while damage to the engines could stop the battleship in the water, making it tactically useless and a sitting duck for further attacks. the question dreadnought designers faced was how to get the most effective protection for their vessels without the weight of armour critically slowing the ship. the earliest dreadnoughts were intended to take part in a pitched battle against other battleships at ranges of up to 10, 000 yards. in such an encounter, shells would fly on a relatively flat trajectory. for this reason, the early dreadnoughts ' armour was concentrated in a thick belt around the waterline ; this had a thickness of 11 in in dreadnought. behind this belt were arranged


, shells would fly on a relatively flat trajectory. for this reason, the early dreadnoughts ' armour was concentrated in a thick belt around the waterline ; this had a thickness of 11 in in dreadnought. behind this belt were arranged the ship ' s coal bunkers, to further protect the engineering spaces. to protect the innards of the ship from fragments of shells which detonated on the superstructure, much thinner steel armour was applied to the decks of the ship. dreadnought carried a total f 2. 5 in of deck armour on two decks. the final element of the protection scheme of the first dreadnoughts was the subdivision of the ship below the waterline into several watertight compartments. if the hull was holed - by shellfire, mine, torpedo, or collision - then, in theory, only one area would flood and the ship could survive. to make this precaution even more effective, many dreadnoughts had no hatches between different underwater sections, so that even a surprise hole below the waterline need not sink the ship. however, there were still a number of instances where flooding spread between underwater compartments. during the evolution of the dreadnought, armour schemes changed to reflect the greater risk of plunging shells from long - range gunfire, the increasing threat from both bombs dropped by aircraft and the need to protect battleships more adequately from torpedoes and mines. the threat of plunging fire and bombing meant a greater thickness of steel on the armoured deck, and the amont of protection devoted to the deck increased much more rapidly than did the amount in the main belt. for instance, the japanese superbattleship yamato carried a 16. 5 in main belt, as opposed to dreadnought ' s 11 but a deck as thick as 9 in against dreadnought ' s 2 in. the main belt itself was increasingly angled inwards to give a greater effective thickness against low - angle shells. the greatest evolution in dreadnought protection came with the development of the torpedo bulge and torpedo belt, both attempts to protect against underwater damage by mines and torpedoes. blades, in this case from the polish destroyer wicher ] ] dreadnoughts were propelled by two to four screw propellors. dreadnought herself, and all british dreadnoughts, had screw shafts driven by steam turbines. however, the turbine was a very experimental technology ; the first generation of dreadnoughts built in other nations used the slower triple - expansion steam engine which had been standard in pre - dreadnought


force, which would replace the battle line. in 1897 the royal navy had 62 battleships in commission or building, a lead of 26 over france and of 50 over germany, the rise and fall of british naval mastery, paul m. kennedy, isbn 0 - 333 - 35094 - 4, p. 209. and nations as distant ( and unlikely to be met in combat ) as brazil could ( in theory ) match the best britain had. in november 1906, dreadnought had the field to herself ; there were no challengers. the new class prompted an arms race with serious strategic and economic consequences. major naval powers raced to build their own dreadnoughts to catch up with the united kingdom. possession of modern battleships was not only vital to naval power, but as with nuclear weapons today, represented a nation ' s standing in the world. germany, france, russia, italy, austria and the united states all began dreadnought programmes ; and second - rank powers including turkey, argentina, brazil and chile commissioned dreadnoughts to be built in british and american yards. the first world war, john keegan, isbn 0 - 7126 - 6645 - 1, p. 281. the anglo - german arms race see also : causes of world war ibritain and germany had for some years been locked into a strategic struggle, as germany asserted herself as a colonial as well as a european power. it was this threat which prompted the building of dreadnought and made a naval arms race between the two nations inevitable. while fisher ' s reorganisation of the navy in 1904 and 1905 actually cut the naval estimates, the rise and fall of british naval mastery, paul m. kennedy, isbn 0 - 333 - 35094 - 4, p. 218. the pressing need for more and better ships to ensure naval superiority caused friction in the british government. the costs of maintaining the royal navy at a level capable of taking on the next two navies at the same time were immense. greger, rene, schlachtschiffe der welt, pp. 11 & 15. the first german response to dreadnought came with the nassau - class, laid down in 1907, followed by the helgoland - class in 1909. together with two battlecruisers — a type for which the germans had less admiration than fisher, but which could be built under authorisation for armored cruisers, rather than capital ships — these classes gave germany a total of ten modern capital ships built or building in 1909. while the british ships


a type for which the germans had less admiration than fisher, but which could be built under authorisation for armored cruisers, rather than capital ships — these classes gave germany a total of ten modern capital ships built or building in 1909. while the british ships were somewhat faster and more powerful than their german equivalents, a 12 : 10 ratio fell very short of the 2 : 1 ratio that the royal navy wanted to maintain. in 1909, the british parliament authorised an additional four capital ships, holding out hope germany would be willing to negotiate a treaty about battleship numbers. if no such solution could be found, an additional four ships would be laid down in 1910. even this compromise solution meant ( when taken together with some social reforms ) raising taxes enough to prompt a constitutional crisis in britain in 1909 - 10. in 1910, the british eight - ship construction plan went ahead, including four orion - class super - dreadnoughts, and augmented by battlecruisers purchased by australia and new zealand. in the same period of time, germany laid down only three ships, giving britain a superiority of 22 ships to 13. the british resolve demonstrated by their construction programme led the germans to seek a negotiated end to the arms race. while the admiralty ' s new target of a 60 % lead over germany was near enough to tirpitz ' s goal of cutting the british lead to 50 %, talks foundered on the question on whether british commonwealth battlecruisers should be included in the count, as well as non - naval matters like the german demands for recognition of her ownership of alsace - lorraine. the pace of the dreadnought race stepped up in both nations ' 1910 and 1911 budgets, with germany laying down four capital ships each year and britain five. the tensions came to a head following the german naval law of 1912. this proposed a fleet of 33 german battleships and battlecruisers, outnumbering the royal navy in home waters. to make matters worse, the austro - hungarian fleet was building 4 dreadnoughts, while the italians had four and were building two more. against such threats, the royal navy could no longer guarantee vital british interests. britain was faced with a choice of building more battleships, withdrawing from the mediterranean, or seeking an alliance with france. further naval construction was unacceptably expensive at a time when social welfare provision was making calls on the budget. withdrawing from the mediterranean would mean a huge loss of influence, weakening british diplomacy in the mediterranean and shaking the stability of the british empire. the only acceptable option,


the usa. japanese theorist sato tetsutaro developed the concept of a fleet at a minimum 70 % of the u. s. ' s. this would enable the japanese navy to win two decisive battles, the first early in a war, against the us pacific fleet, and the second against the us atlantic fleet which would inevitably be despatched as reinforcements. evans and peattie, kaigunjapan ' s first priority was to refit the pre - dreadnoughts she had captured from russia, and to complete satsuma and aki. like the south carolinas, the satsumas were designed before dreadnought, but gun shortages in britain ( which supplied them ) delayed her completion and resulted in her carrying a mixed armament, so she was known as a semi - dreadnought. these were followed by a modified aki - type : kawachi and settsu, which were laid down in 1909 and complete in 1912, and were armed with four 12 - inch / 50, eight 12 - inch / 45, ten 6 - inch / 45, and eight 4. 7 - inch / 40. " although nominally dreadnoughts, these ships did not have a really uniform main battery, since the guns differed in length, and therefore in performance, particularly at very long range. " page 229, gardiner, robert and gray, randal ( ed ) conway ' s all the world ' s fighting ships 1906 - 1921, conway maritime press, london, 1982. isbn 0 - 85177 - 245 - 5. this would have made fire control very difficult. dreadnoughts in other countries, a bretagne - class battleship. ] ] compared to the other major naval powers, france was slow to start building dreadnoughts, instead finishing the planned danton - class of pre - dreadnoughts, laying down five in 1907 and 1908. it was not until september 1910 the first of the courbet - class was laid down, making france the eleventh nation to enter the dreadnought race. the dreadnought race saw france drop from second to fifth in terms of naval power ; however, the closer alliance with britain made these reduced forces more than adequate for french needs. even though cuniberti had promoted the idea of an all - big - gun battleship in italy well before dreadnought, it took until 1909 for italy to lay down one of her own. the construction of dante alighieri was prompted by rumours of austro - hungarian dreadnought building. a further five dread


big - gun battleship in italy well before dreadnought, it took until 1909 for italy to lay down one of her own. the construction of dante alighieri was prompted by rumours of austro - hungarian dreadnought building. a further five dreadnoughts of the cavour - and andrea doria - class followed as italy sought to maintain its lead over austria - hungary. these ships remained the core of italian naval strength until world war ii. the subsequent caracciolo - class were cancelled on the outbreak of wwi. in january 1909, austro - hungarian admirals circulated a document calling for a fleet of four dreadnoughts. however, a constitutional crisis in 1909 - 10 meant no construction could be approved. in spite of this, two dreadnoughts were laid down by shipyards on a speculative basis, and later approved along with an additional two. the resulting ships, all tegetthoff - class, were to be accompanied by a further four ships, but these were cancelled on the outbreak of world war i. in june 1909, the russian empire laid down four dreadnoughts of the gangut - class for the baltic fleet and in 1911 three more imperatritsa mariya - class dreadnoughts for the black sea. gibbons, p. 205 taking lessons from tsushima and influenced by cuniberti, they ended up more closely resembling fisher ' s battlecruisers than dreadnought and proved badly flawed. fitzsimons, bernard, editor. " gangut ", in the encyclopedia of twentieth century weapons and warfare, volume 10, p. 1086. spain commissioned three dreadnoughts of the espana - class, laying the first down in 1909. the espanas were the lightest dreadnoughts ever built. while built in spain, the construction was reliant on british assistance. gibbons, p. 195brazil managed the remarkable achievement of being the third country with a dreadnought under construction, laying down two in british shipyards in 1907. this sparked off a small - scale arms race in south america, as argentina and then chile commissioned dreadnoughts. argentina placed orders in american yards and chile in britain, meaning that both of chile ' s two battleships were purchased by the british on the outbreak of war. one of them was later returned to the chilean government. turkey ordered two dreadnoughts from british yards which were seized by the british while greece ' s, ordered from germany, was taken over by the germans. the main


the outbreak of war. one of them was later returned to the chilean government. turkey ordered two dreadnoughts from british yards which were seized by the british while greece ' s, ordered from germany, was taken over by the germans. the main armament, ordered in the united states, consequently equipped a class of british monitors. greece in 1914 purchased two pre - dreadnoughts from the united states navy, renaming them kilkis and limnos in royal hellenic navy service. the seizure of the two turkish dreadnoughts, reshadiye and sultan osman i ( hms erin and agincourt ) nearing completion in 1914 in britain, resulted in far - reaching international repercussions. the turks were outraged by the british move and the germans saw an opening. through skillful diplomacy and by handing over the battlecruiser goeben and the cruiser breslau, the germans maneuvered the ottoman empire into the central powers. greger, rene : schlachtschiffe der welt, p. 252 in line ] ] even after dreadnought ' s commission, battleships continued to grow in size, guns, and technical proficiency as countries vied to have the best ships. by 1914 dreadnought was obsolete. the arrival of super – dreadnoughts is not as clearly identified with a single ship in the same way that the dreadnought era was initiated by hms dreadnought. however, it is commonly held to start with the british orion - class, and for the german navy with the konig. what made them " super " was the unprecedented jump in displacement of 2, 000 – tons over the previous class, the introduction of the heavier 13. 5inch ( 343 mm ) gun, and the distribution of all the main armament on the centreline. thus, in the four years between the laying down of dreadnought and orion, displacement had increased by 25 %, and weight of broadside had doubled. british super - dreadnoughts were joined by other nations as well. in japan, two fuso - class super - dreadnoughts were laid down in 1912, followed by the ise in 1914, with both classes carrying twelve 14 - inch ( 356 mm ) guns. in 1917, the nagato - class was ordered, the first dreadnoughts to mount guns, possibly making them the most powerful warships in the world. all were increasingly built from japanese rather than imported components. in france, the courbets were followed by three super -


class was ordered, the first dreadnoughts to mount guns, possibly making them the most powerful warships in the world. all were increasingly built from japanese rather than imported components. in france, the courbets were followed by three super - dreadnoughts of the bretagne - class ; another five normandie were cancelled on the outbreak of world war one. the later super - dreadnoughts, principally the queen elizabeth - class, dispensed with the " q " turret amidships, so weight and volume were freed up for larger, oil - fired boilers. oil had many advantages as a fuel over coal. it had more energy density than coal, and its liquid form vastly simplified refuelling arrangements ; oil required no stokers, and emitted much less smoke, aiding gun laying and making the ships less visible on the horizon. the new 15 inch gun ( 381 mm ) gave greater firepower in spite of the loss of a turret, and there was a thicker armour belt and improved underwater protection. the class had a 25 knot ( 46 km / h ) design speed and they were considered the first fast battleships. the design weakness of super - dreadnoughts, which distinguished them from post - world war i designs, was armor disposition. their design placed emphasis on vertical protection, needed in short range battles. these ships were capable of engaging the enemy at 20, 000 metres, but were vulnerable to the high angle ( " plunging " ) fire at such ranges. post - war designs typically had 5 to 6 inches ( 130 to 150 mm ) of deck armor to defend against this. the concept of zone of immunity became a major part of the thinking behind battleship design. lack of underwater protection was also a weakness of these pre - world war i designs which were developed only as the threat of the torpedo became real. the united states navy ' s " standard " - type battleships, beginning with the nevada - class, or " battleship 1912 ", were designed with long - range engagements and plunging fire in mind ; the first of these was laid down in 1912, five years before the battle of jutland taught the dangers of long - range fire to european navies. important features of the standard battleships were " all or nothing " armor and " raft " construction, a philosophy under which only the parts of the ship worth giving the thickest possible protection were worth armoring at all, and enough reserve buoyancy should be contained within the resulting armored " raft " to keep afloat the entire ship in the event the


philosophy under which only the parts of the ship worth giving the thickest possible protection were worth armoring at all, and enough reserve buoyancy should be contained within the resulting armored " raft " to keep afloat the entire ship in the event the unarmored bow and stern were thoroughly riddled and flooded. this design was proven in battle at the battle of guadalcanal, when an ill - timed turn by uss south dakota silhouetted her to japanese guns. though she suffered a terrible battering and her bow and stern were riddled and thoroughly flooded, her " raft " remained untouched and she remained both afloat and fully operational at the end of action. during world war i ] ] the first world war was almost an anticlimax for the great dreadnought fleets. there was no decisive clash of modern battlefleets to compare with the battle of tsushima. the role of battleships was marginal to the great land struggle in france and russia ; and it was equally marginal to the first battle of the atlantic, the battle between german submarines and british merchant shipping. by virtue of geography, the royal navy could keep the german high seas fleet bottled up in the north sea with relative ease. both sides were aware that, because of the greater number of british dreadnoughts, a full fleet engagement would result in a british victory. the german strategy was therefore to try to provoke an engagement on favourable terms : either inducing a part of the grand fleet to enter battle alone, or to fight a pitched battle near the german coastline, where friendly fields, torpedo - boats and submarines could be used to even the odds. the first world war, john keegan, isbn 0 - 7126 - 6645 - 1, p. 289the first two years of war saw conflict in the north sea limited to skirmishes by battlecruisers at the battle of heligoland bight and battle of dogger bank and raids on the english coast. in the summer of 1916, a further attempt to draw british ships into battle on favourable terms resulted in a clash of the battlefleets in the battle of jutland : an indecisive engagement. ireland, bernard : jane ' s war at sea, pp. 88 - 95in the other naval theatres there were no decisive pitched battles. in the black sea, russian and turkish battleships skirmished, but nothing more. in the baltic, action was largely limited to convoy raiding and the laying of defensive minefields ; the only significant clash of battleship squadrons was the battle of moon


pitched battles. in the black sea, russian and turkish battleships skirmished, but nothing more. in the baltic, action was largely limited to convoy raiding and the laying of defensive minefields ; the only significant clash of battleship squadrons was the battle of moon sound at which one russian pre - dreadnought was lost. the adriatic was in a sense the mirror of the north sea : the austro - hungarian dreadnought fleet remained bottled up by british and french blockading fleets. and in the mediterranean, the most important use of battleships was in support of the amphibious assault on gallipoli. the course of the war also illustrated the vulnerability of battleships to cheaper weapons. in september 1914, the u - boat threat to capital ships was demonstrated by successful attacks on british cruisers, including the sinking of three british armored cruisers by the german submarine u - 9 in less than an hour. sea mines proved a threat the next month, when the recently commissioned british super - dreadnought audacious struck a mine. by the end of october, british strategy and tactics in the north sea had changed to reduce the risk of u - boat attack. massie, robert. castles of steel, london, 2005. pp127 - 145 while jutland was the only major clash of battleship fleets in history, the german plan for the battle relied on u - boat attacks on the british fleet ; and the escape of the german fleet from the superior british firepower was effected by the german cruisers and destroyers closing on british battleships, causing them to turn away to avoid the threat of torpedo attack. further near - misses from submarine attacks on battleships and casualties amongst cruisers led to growing paranoia in the royal navy about the vulnerability of battleships. by october 1916, the royal navy had essentially abandoned the north sea, instructing the grand fleet not to go south of the farne islands unless adequately protected by destroyers. for the german part, the high seas fleet determined not to engage the british without the assistance of submarines ; and since the submarines were more needed for commerce raiding, the fleet stayed in port for the remainder of the war. the rise and fall of british naval mastery, paul kennedy, isbn 0 - 333 - 35094 - 4, pp. 247 - 249 other theatres equally showed the role of small craft in damaging or destroying dreadnoughts. the two austrian dreadnoughts lost in 1918 were the casualties of torpedo boats and of frogmen. after world war i the great dreadnought fleets came to an end a few years after world war i. the german


dreadnoughts. the two austrian dreadnoughts lost in 1918 were the casualties of torpedo boats and of frogmen. after world war i the great dreadnought fleets came to an end a few years after world war i. the german dreadnought fleet was scuttled in its entirety scapa flow by its crew in 1919. britain, the usa and japan planned another bout of naval expansion including bigger and more powerful battleships than ever before : ' n3 ', kii, and south dakota classes. instead of this cripplingly expensive expansion programme, the major naval powers concluded the washington naval treaty in 1922. the treaty laid out a list of ships, including most of the older dreadnoughts and almost all the newer ships under construction, which were to be scrapped or otherwise put out of use. it furthermore declared a ' building holiday ' during which no new battleships or battlecruisers were to be laid down. the ships which survived the treaty, including the most modern super - dreadnoughts of all three navies, formed the bulk of international capital ship strength through the 1920s and 1930s and, with some modernisation, into world war ii. from this point on, ' dreadnought ' became less widely used. the pre - dreadnought battleships, long obsolete, were almost without exception scrapped in the 1920s to comply with the washington treaty, so the term ' dreadnought ' became less necessary. many capital ships, both battleships and battlecruisers, were rebuilt as ' fast battleships '. while still sometimes referred to as dreadnoughts, these ships were the battleships which came to be used in world war ii. all text is available under the terms of the 0 dread nought biography


- for other places called lodi, see lodi. lodi is a town in lombardy, italy, on the right shore of the river adda. it is the capital of the province of lodi. the commune has an area of 41, 42 sq. km ; population ( 2001 ) 40, 805. its name is pronounced by italians as law - dee. it was a celtic village that in roman times was called in latin laus pompeia ( probably in honor of the consul gnaeus pompeius strabo ) and was known also because its position allowed many gauls of gallia cisalpina to obtain roman citizenship. it was in an important position at the crossing of vital roman roads. in became a catholic diocese and its first bishop, saint bassiano, ( 319 - 409 ), is the patron saint of the town ( celebrated on january 19 ). a free comune ( municipality ) around 1000, it fiercely resisted the milanese, who destroyed it in april 24 1158. frederick barbarossa re - built it on its current location. starting from 1220, the lodigiani ( inhabitants of lodi ) spent some decades in realizing an important work of hydraulic engineering : a system of miles and miles of artificial rivers and channels ( called consorzio di muzza ) was created in order to give water to the countryside, turning some arid areas into one of the ( still now ) most important agricultural areas of the region. lodi was ruled by the visconti family, who built a castle. in 1423, the antipope antipope john xxiii, from lodi ' s duomo, launched his bolla by which he convened the council of constance ( end of the great schism ). in 1454 representatives from all the regional states of italy met in lodi to sign the treaty known as the peace of lodi, by which they intended to work in the direction of italian unification, but this peace lasted only 40 years. the town was then ruled by the sforza family, france, spain, austria. in 1786 it became the eponymous capital of a province that included crema. on may 10, 1796 : battle of lodi : the young corsican general napoleon bonaparte won on the river adda his first important battle, defeating the austrians and later entering milan. this is why in many towns there are streets dedicated to the famous bridge ( for instance in paris 6th arrondissement, rue du pont de lodi ). in 1945, the


they are both nest - building social insects, but paper wasps and honey bees organize their colonies in very different ways. in a new study, researchers report that despite their differences, these insects rely on the same network of genes to guide their social behavior. the study appears in the proceedings of the royal society b : biological sciences. honey bees and paper wasps are separated by more than 100 million years of evolution, and there are striking differences in how they divvy up the work of maintaining a colony, said university of illinois entomology professor gene robinson, who led the study with postdoctoral researcher amy toth. " honey bees have a sharp division of labor between queens, which reproduce, and workers, which care for the brood and forage for food, while among paper wasps social roles are much more fluid, " he said. " and yet the same genes can be used by these different organisms to do similar kinds of things. this is the genetic toolkit idea : the same genetic elements are used for different types of division of labor. " a genetic toolkit already has been found for physical traits, such as the development of eyes, said robinson, who is also a professor in the institute for genomic biology. for example, the same gene, called pax - 6, is involved in eye development in mammals and insects, even though it is virtually certain that these structures did not evolve from a similar structure in a common ancestor. for the new study, the researchers compared the activation of genes in the brains of four groups of female paper wasps ( polistes metricus ) that have different roles in the nest, with some more active in reproduction and others more active in provisioning the brood. the purpose of the study was to determine if differences in brain gene activity between the wasps rely on the same networks of genes that in the honey bee ( apis mellifera ) drive their division of labor. a previous study of paper wasps by robinson, toth and their colleagues obtained a partial sequence of the wasp genome and looked at the expression of 32 genes. that analysis, published in science in 2007, showed that – as in honey bees – most of the targeted genes are activated differently in different groups of paper wasps. but those genes were hand - picked because they were important to honey bees, robinson said. for this reason, the team wanted to take a second look at the broad array of genes in the wasp – to be sure that the pattern they had identified was indeed special to wasps as well as bees. crop sciences professor matt hudson, the


observations on zugunruhe in spring migrating eared grebes. | abstract : | | about 200 north american eared grebes ( podiceps nigricollis californicus ) at tule lake refuge in northern california were observed engaging in successive waves of mass pattering and pattering flights on 25 may 2011. most grebes present in a part of a canal were involved in this activity. counts of grebes on the morning of 26 may suggest an important portion of the eared grebes seen in pattering could have left the area over night. the behavior was characterized as zugunruhe. directed mass pattering of eared grebes may contribute to synchronization of the onward migration of the birds involved. | migratory birds ( research ) animal flight ( research ) | publication : | | name : the wilson journal of ornithology publisher : wilson ornithological society audience : academic format : magazine / journal subject : biological sciences copyright : copyright 2012 wilson ornithological society issn : 1559 - 4491 | | issue : | | date : march, 2012 source volume : 124 source issue : 1 | | topic : | | event code : 310 science & research | | geographic : | | geographic scope : united states geographic code : 1usa united states | north american eared grebes ( podiceps nigricollis californicus ) are seldom seen in flight, except when they migrate ( bent 1919, gaunt et al. 1990 ). the migration of the species has been well studied ( storer and jehl 1985, gaunt et al. 1990, jehl 1997, cullen et al. 1999, jehl and mckernan 2002, jehl and henry 2010 ). cullen et al. ( 1999 ) indicate migration flights begin around dusk and end before dawn. jehl and henry ( 2010 ) note strict correspondence of departure with near - total darkness. grebes tend to gather as the time for departure nears ( jehl and mckernan 2002 ). predeparture activities include group diving, and submerging and surfacing in near unison. a unique call is given as grebes prepare to depart and immediately before actual take - off ( jehl and henry 2010 ). daytime flights are possibly observed only when grebes rebuild their flight muscles prior to migration when they may perform one or two short practice flights ( jehl and henry 2010 ) or race across the surface in short practice flights, often in


henry 2010 ). daytime flights are possibly observed only when grebes rebuild their flight muscles prior to migration when they may perform one or two short practice flights ( jehl and henry 2010 ) or race across the surface in short practice flights, often in small groups ( jehl and mckernan 2002 ). i was surprised to observe a mix of pattering and flight by larger groups of eared grebes in northern california during daylight conditions. i describe these common pattering flight maneuvers and discuss their possible meaning. a study of courtship of eared grebes was undertaken at upper klamath lake, oregon, and lower klamath refuge and tule lake refuge, both in northern california, from 14 to 27 may 2011. this region is known to support thousands of eared grebes each year for nesting, water levels permitting. the california refuges hosted 7, 397 and 3, 700 nests, respectively, in 2003 and 2004 ( shuford et al. 2006 ). fieldwork was from 0700 to 1700 hrs each day using a car as a blind. the car was parked at suitable places along roads near bodies of water and remained immobile for up to 3 hrs. the behavior and displays of grebes were documented either by photograph, video film or immediate voice recording. all observations of pattering flights are from tule lake refuge, part of the klamath basin national wildlife refuges, an artificial water impoundment of mostly open water covering ~ 5, 200 ha at an altitude of 1, 200 m and surrounded by croplands. the observations were in an area called the english channel ( 41 [ degrees ] 51 ' 202 n, 121 [ degrees ] 29 ' 727 w ) in the central part of the wildlife tour into the refuge. this is an l - shaped canal, < 50 m in width. it opens at its northern end into large sump la, an open and shallow area of the lake. it takes a left turn after ~ 1. 6 km in a straight line from north to south ( ns canal or ns part of the english channel ) and continues east for another 0. 5 km ( ew canal or ew part of the english channel ) until ending at a dam - levee that separates it from the adjacent larger sump 1b ( fig. 1 ). the entire canal is devoid of emerging vegetation. i differentiate between pattering ( a grebe with flapping wings runs with paddling feet or even partially glides over the water surface, but


adjacent larger sump 1b ( fig. 1 ). the entire canal is devoid of emerging vegetation. i differentiate between pattering ( a grebe with flapping wings runs with paddling feet or even partially glides over the water surface, but remains in constant contact with the water ), pattering flight ( after an initial pattering, a grebe is airborne for a distance limited to a few meters during which it does not touch the water surface ), and real flight ( the distance covered while airborne exceeds 10 m ). it is well established that eared grebes use pattering in the retreat display and during escape / pursuit or more generally during aggression ( mcallister 1958, cullen et al. 1999 ) ; these occurrences are not included. my objectives in this paper are to provide a full description of pattering and pattering flights by larger numbers of grebes, and to discuss possible reasons for their occurrences. observations in the southern english channel on 25 may started at 0900 hrs. over 200 eared grebes were scattered partially in loose groups all over the ew part of the english channel around midday when about three quarters of them engaged in pattering. the grebes did so in consecutive waves, all into a western direction towards the connection to the ns canal. the sudden take - off by one or two grebes seemed to cause others in their immediate vicinity and on their way to move in the same direction. groups of 10 - 30 birds pattered over a short distance ( 20 - 30 m ), some briefly loosing contact with the water surface in a pattering flight. grebes getting briefly airborne possibly did so to avoid collision with conspecifics that remained stationary on the water surface. grebes landed ahead of others that started similar maneuvers in their wake, perhaps carrying along some of those that had just stopped pattering. a few additional waves of pattering were launched. some birds dived after landing ; others elevated their necks, remained alert, and looked around without changing their westward orientation. most of the population, including subgroups closer to the ns canal which were not observed to patter, was swimming in the direction of the ns canal. the eastern and central parts of the ew canal were rather empty of eared grebes after some 2 - 3 rain, leaving only a few westem ( aechmophorus occidentalis ) and clark ' s grebes ( a. clarkii ) and a few ducks remaining. fewer than


eared grebes after some 2 - 3 rain, leaving only a few westem ( aechmophorus occidentalis ) and clark ' s grebes ( a. clarkii ) and a few ducks remaining. fewer than 100 eared grebes were still swimming in the western part of the ew canal towards the connection with the ns canal when they encountered about 40 birds swimming in a group to reenter the ew canal. a rough count less than 10 min later indicated that > 200 eared grebes had again spread over this canal. pattering and pattering flights started anew only ~ 20 min after the start of the first general movement by the eared grebes. take - off by one or two eared grebes incited others in their surroundings to join as before. the birds moved westward in several waves and continued swimming into the same direction after landing. more grebes left the ew canal where only about 30 remained, all towards its western end. a first group of swimming grebes returned ~ 1 min later. it was followed by other loose groups. i counted 130 grebes 5 rain later and soon > 240 birds were again present inside the ew canal. a longer period without group pattering, but with continuous calling, occasional displays and much surface feeding on phantom midges ( chaoborus crystillinus ) followed until ~ 1400 hrs. individual grebes performed feeding dives, but no group diving, or submerging and surfacing in near unison was observed. the general pattering in waves and westward swimming towards the connection with the ns canal started again and most eared grebes finally left the ew canal. the first grebes had turned and swam to return to the ew canal when a sudden simultaneous eastward pattering of > 50 re - entering grebes occurred. two or three more waves by other groups followed immediately. five minutes later, 232 grebes were counted inside the ew canal. only the continuous and contiguous calls of the birds were heard for ~ 20 min. ten birds then initiated a fourth round of pattering in waves. this time, the grebes had no common general direction. the grebes more in the central part of the observed area moved towards the dam, those already closer to the eastern end pattered into a more southwestward to westward direction. the population present divided into two groups. about 100 grebes were clustered near the dam and another 100 were scattered


of the observed area moved towards the dam, those already closer to the eastern end pattered into a more southwestward to westward direction. the population present divided into two groups. about 100 grebes were clustered near the dam and another 100 were scattered over the upper western third of the ew canal. the space in between both groups remained mostly empty. the western group started immediately to swim eastward while the eastern group slowly dispersed. the groups soon melted and spread over the empty space that had separated them. perhaps five additional pattering flights of up to 4 - 5 grebes were observed in between the different mass pattering and pattering flights. it was not known whether these were premature attempts to initiate a wave or whether they were unrelated to the mass movements. the observations ended at ~ 1700 hrs and 257 grebes were counted in the ew canal ( 26 in the connecting corner square to the ns canal ), 65 were present in the lower half of the ns canal and 347 in the upper half. only five additional eared grebes were detected at the mouth to sump 1a. other parts of the sump close to the english channel were empty of eared grebes. a count of the birds at 0700 hrs on the following day totaled exactly 400 individuals, 269 less than the previous count. only 77 grebes were observed inside the ew canal ( 28 in the connecting corner square ) while the ns canal had 323 grebes. three hours later, 126 eared grebes were recorded in the ew canal and 337 in the ns canal. the two counts on 26 may revealed quite differing numbers of grebes. the ew canal held 131 to 180 grebes less and the entire english channel held 206 to 269 grebes less than on the afternoon of 25 may. eared grebes had arrived at tule lake refuge in the course of the previous 2 - 3 weeks. i assume that shortly after arrival, their wing muscles were still in good flight condition on 25 may and intense practicing could not have explained the mass pattering. most birds were actively courting, but the group pattering did not appear to be related to pair bonding. there is also no reason to believe the grebes tried to divert an aerial predator with common flight activity as several instances of bald eagles ( haliaeetus leucocephalus ) appearing in flight over the grebes or even trying a catch in the canal did not trigger much reaction. birds pattering to


aerial predator with common flight activity as several instances of bald eagles ( haliaeetus leucocephalus ) appearing in flight over the grebes or even trying a catch in the canal did not trigger much reaction. birds pattering to escape a pursuing conspecific or to flee possible danger incited alarm at the most to a handful of other eared grebes in their immediate vicinity. the generalized pattering by larger groups of eared grebes observed appeared unrelated to courtship, aggression, fear or predator presence. a similar or comparable behavior by black - necked grebes ( p. n. nigricollis ) in europe has not been reported. there is comparable agitation in silvery grebes ( p. occipitalis ) during migration towards breeding areas. fjeldsa ( 1982 ) noted that silvery grebes show high restlessness and form long lines that move back and forth on a lake from where, in the subsequent night, at least part of the population departed. he termed this pre - migratory restlessness. movements of a group of 70 silvery grebes at laguna las encadenadas, argentina, in december 2006, were not limited to swimming, but included sudden quasi - simultaneous take - offs of individuals more at the rear end of the line. some flew up, reaching a height of ~ 2 m, possibly to avoid collision with the birds preceding them. they landed again in front of the group that was moving in one direction. the grebes at the rear end acted similarly. the group changed direction as it approached the shore, but continued swimming in a line, and pattering and flying from the back to the front ( konter 2009 ). eared grebes at tule lake refuge all swam actively into the same direction, although they did not form one line. they showed pattering and pattering flights in waves and repeated the directed group movements. a priori the comparison of total counts of grebes inside the english channel on the following day strongly suggests at least a major portion of the population had left the area. zugunruhe seems an appropriate characterization for the eared grebes ' behavior. additional pre - departure activities at tule lake refuge including group diving, submerging and surfacing in near unison as reported by jehl and henry ( 2010 ) were not obvious. the grebes ' diving and swimming seemed to be predominantly related to feeding, except the dives after mass pattering involved only a minority of a


and surfacing in near unison as reported by jehl and henry ( 2010 ) were not obvious. the grebes ' diving and swimming seemed to be predominantly related to feeding, except the dives after mass pattering involved only a minority of a group. active vocalization may have helped group cohesion, but it could not be distinguished from advertising by solitary birds or from contact calling by partners momentarily separated. it is not known to where the departing grebes flew and whether they targeted breeding areas in the region or flew a long distance. eared grebes can move to other sites used for breeding, even after arrival in a breeding area, or emigrate from the region ( cullen 1998 ). it is also unknown whether the grebes departed in flocks from the english channel and whether they headed in one or different directions. i assume they were migrants and the extent of their pattering flight maneuvers suggests an eagerness to move on. the counts of 25 and 26 may show that not all eared grebes had left the english channel over night. grebes present in the ns part were not observed on 25 may and they may not have engaged in group pattering. the first count on 26 may showed that low numbers of grebes were present inside the ew canal and the higher later count suggests that new grebes were continuously settling there. over 200 eared grebes left the english channel during the night and this number corresponds as an order of magnitude to the numbers involved in the group pattering. thus, most pattering grebes could have left over night and it is likely their zugunruhe contributed to a simultaneous departure. they were gradually replaced by conspecifics moving into the ew canal on the following day. eared grebes often do not arrive within a short lapse of time inside a breeding region where numbers generally build up over several weeks. they synchronize, however, nest establishment ( mcallister 1956, boe 1994 ). in this context, it is of interest to further investigate how a conspicuous pre - migratory group pattering as observed at tule lake refuge may contribute to a coordinated onward flight inside a breeding region that would facilitate simultaneous colony establishment by large numbers of pairs. unfortunately, the data from tule lake refuge do not permit any conclusion to be drawn. i am grateful to michele nuss from the tule lake refuge headquarters who was of great help in the preparation of my fieldwork. i thank j. r. jehl


data from tule lake refuge do not permit any conclusion to be drawn. i am grateful to michele nuss from the tule lake refuge headquarters who was of great help in the preparation of my fieldwork. i thank j. r. jehl jr and c. e. braun for critical review and constructive comments on the first draft. received 13 july 2011. accepted 19 september 2011. bent, a. c. 1919. life histories of north american diving birds, order pygopodes. u. s. national museum bulletin 107 : 1 - 47. boe, j. s. 1994. nest site selection by eared grebes in minnesota. condor 96 : 19 - 35. cullen, s. a. 1998. population biology of eared grebes in naturally fragmented habitat. thesis. simon fraser university, burnaby, british columbia, canada. cullen, s. a., j. r. jehl, and g. l. nuechterlein. 1999. eared grebe. the birds of north america. number 433. fjeldsa, j. 1982. some behaviour patterns of four closely related grebes, podiceps nigricollis, p. gallardoi, p. occipitalis, and p. taczanowskii, with reflections on phylogeny and adaptive aspects of the evolution of displays. dansk ornithologisk forenings tidsskrift 76 : 37 - 68. gaunt, a. s., r. s. hikida, j. r. jehl jr., and l. fenbert. 1990. rapid atrophy and hypertrophy of an avian flight muscle. auk 107 : 649 - 659. jehl jr., j. r. 1997. cyclical changes in body composition in the annual cycle and migration of the eared grebe podiceps nigricollis. journal of avian biology 28 : 132 - 142. jehl jr., j. r. and a. e. henry. 2010. the postbreeding migration of eared grebes. wilson journal of ornithology 122 : 217 - 227. jehl jr., j. r. and r. l. mckernan. 2002. biology and migration of eared grebes at salton sea. hydrobiologia 473 : 245 - 253. konter, a. 2009. observations on diving times


r. and r. l. mckernan. 2002. biology and migration of eared grebes at salton sea. hydrobiologia 473 : 245 - 253. konter, a. 2009. observations on diving times, on pre - migratory restlessness and on some displays of silvery grebes podiceps occipitalis. regulus wissenschaftliche berichte 24 : 67 - 71. mcallister, n. 1958. courtship, hostile behavior, nest - establishment and egg laying in the eared grebe ( podiceps caspicus ). auk 75 : 290 - 311. shuford, w. d., d. l. thomson, d. m. mauser, and j. beckstrand. 2006. abundance and distribution of nongame waterbirds in the klamath basin of oregon and california from comprehensive surveys in 2003 and 2004. prbo conservation science, petaluma, california, usa. storer, r. w. and j. r. jehl jr. 1985. moult patterns and moult migration in the black - necked grebe podiceps nigricollis. ornis scandinavica 16 : 253 - 260. andre konter ( 1 ) ( 1 ) museum of natural history, 25, rue munster, luxembourg l - 2150, luxembourg ; e - mail : email @ example. com | gale copyright : | | copyright 2012 gale, cengage learning. all rights reserved. |


drone hijacking? that ’ s just the start of gps troublesjuly 8, 2012 on the evening of june 19, a group of researchers from the university of texas successfully hijacked a civilian drone at the white sands missile range in new mexico during a test organized by the department of homeland security. the drone, an adaptive flight hornet mini, was hovering at around 60 feet, locked into a predetermined position guided by gps. then, with a device that cost around $ 1, 000 and the help of sophisticated software that took four years to develop, the researchers sent a radio signal from a hilltop one kilometer away. in security lingo, they carried out a spoofing attack. “ we fooled the uav ( unmanned aerial vehicle ) into thinking that it was rising straight up, ” says todd humphreys, assistant professor at the radionavigation laboratory at the university of texas. deceiving the drone ’ s gps receiver, they changed its perceived coordinates. to compensate, the small copter dove straight down, thinking it was returning to its programmed position. if not for a safety pilot intervening before the drone hit the ground, it would have crashed. but for humphreys playing the part of an evil genius in a thriller movie, everything worked exactly to plan. “ it was beautiful, ” he tells danger room.


sport education : international perspectives presents a series of studies of the innovative pedagogical model that has taken the physical education world by storm. since the emergence of the sport education model in the mid - 1990s it has been adopted and adapted in physical education programs around the world and a new research literature has followed in its wake. this book offers a review of international sport education schemes and projects, and documents what it takes to run a successful sport education program. exploring sport education across all levels of education, from the elementary school to the university, the book provides answers to key question such as : with contributions from leading international scholars and practitioners from the us, europe and asia, this book offers a more thoughtful and critical set of perspectives on sport education than any other. it is essential reading for any student, pre - service teacher, classroom teacher or university instructor working in se, pe, youth sport, sports coaching or related disciplines about the author : peter hastie is a professor in the department of kinesiology at auburn university, usa. his research interests focus on examining various aspects of sport education in the attempt to find ways in which the model can be most effective in school and sports settings. table of contents : 1 the nature and purpose of sport education as an educational experience - peter hastie part 1 contexts of adoption of sport education 2 sustainable sport education in primary education : an english case study - toni o ’ donovan, ann mcphail and david kirk 3 sport education in korean schools - jinhee kim 4 the emergence of sport education in scottish primary schools - mike jess, nicola carse, paul mcmillan and matt atencio 5 applying the sport education model in university basic instruction courses - wesley meeteer, lynn housner, sean bulger, andrew hawkins and robert wiegand part 2 students and teachers responses to sport education 6 sport education in the elementary school : a report from cyprus - niki tsangaridou 7 sport education through the eyes of a teacher researcher and his students - ashley casey 8 a spanish teacher ’ s experience with sport education : a narrative account - diego martinez de ojeda, antonio calderon luquin and peter hastie 9 pursuing social and emotional learning outcomes through sport education : an australian case study - swee chong ang, dawn penney and karen swabey 10 explaining the attraction : understanding the motivational responses of students to sport education - tristan wallhead part 3 professional development for sport education 11 preparing preservice physical education teachers to teach sport education - matthew curtner - smith 12 learning sport education through reflective


explaining the attraction : understanding the motivational responses of students to sport education - tristan wallhead part 3 professional development for sport education 11 preparing preservice physical education teachers to teach sport education - matthew curtner - smith 12 learning sport education through reflective inquiry : four case studies - gary kinchin 13 professional learning of primary generalist teachers in ireland : modelling sport education - ann macphail and deborah tannehill 14 within school, in - depth professional development for sport education : a russian model - oleg sinelnikov | book : | | sport education : international perspectives | | publisher : | | taylor & francis, inc. | | number of pages : | | 248 | please note - * we sell only new book and do not sell old or used books. * the book images and summary displayed may be of a different edition or binding of the same title. * book reviews are not added by bookadda. * price can change due to reprinting, price change by publisher / distributor. bookadda ( www. bookadda. com ) is a premier online book store in selling books online across india at the most competitive prices. bookadda sells fiction, business, non fiction, literature, aieee, medical, engineering, computer book, etc. the books are delivered across india free of cost.


how machine learning can help to understand brain signals if a neurotechnological prosthesis should act upon commands from the brain, these have to be interpreted correctly. it is a challenging task because the amount of data is huge and the signals that the brain emits also change over time. computer scientists therefore want to leave it to learning machines to solve this ever - changing puzzle. | gunnar grah talked to martin riedmiller, machine learning lab | the usual way to make a computer do something goes like this : you decide what problem the machine is supposed to solve for you, then you write a programme that does exactly this. modern washing machines work that way. they have been told exactly what to do at what moment. this approach works very well for clearly defined problems, like getting dirt out of laundry. but there are many problems where solutions are not obvious, and the point of departure might always be a little bit different and require different solutions. in this case, computer scientists opt for letting the computer figure out the optimal solution for itself, an approach that is called “ machine learning ”. the human as trainer, not programmer machine learning resembles somewhat how humans acquire new skills, i. e. through examples, the structuring of a problem, and gaining experience. if, for instance, a computer is supposed to learn the different appearances of a broad - leaved tree and a conifer, a human “ trainer ” would provide the learning machine with examples of both classes, telling it in each case which class the tree on the picture belongs to. after some time, the computer will be able to correctly classify the presented trees, even though no human ever provided it with an actual list of things to look out for in order to master the task. if a problem requires not only a classification, but learning a complex procedure, like a robot walking on two legs without falling over, a trainer will at first be required to tell the machine whether an approach was “ good ” or “ bad ”. after sufficient training, the machine will master the problem and show some robustness in its solution, even if the situation varies slightly. also, a trained machine will be able to solve a new situation – e. g. the robot carrying something and therefore changing its weight distribution – faster than if it was starting from scratch. learning from the brain the secret of machine learning lies in the nature of the software that is at work at its base. a solution to a problem does not exist as specific lines of code that govern how the input from the


it was starting from scratch. learning from the brain the secret of machine learning lies in the nature of the software that is at work at its base. a solution to a problem does not exist as specific lines of code that govern how the input from the environment is dealt with in order to reach a desired outcome. instead, it employs an “ artificial neural network ”. this is a kind of programme that took its inspiration from the structure of the brain, where many individual items ( the nerve cells ) solve relatively simple problems ( like adding or multiplying values ), but are able to tackle much more complex tasks by being connected and existing in large numbers. an artificial neural network takes this concept into the realm of bits and bytes, but plays by the same rules. learning, just as in the real brain, manifests itself in the change of connections between individual neurons. these connectivity patterns between a multitude of mathematically represented nerve cells are where the solution to a given problem is stored. in consequence, there exists no neat equation that provides the solution, even though the final answer that the machine provides to a given problem is simple. the biological brain has acted as an inspiration, but computer scientists take this metaphor only as far as it is useful to them. to date, making the individual artificial neuron more and more complex, and thus ever more life - like, has not provided any real advantages, and software engineers therefore tend to go for what works best, not necessarily what comes closest to a real nerve cell. in terms of the general architecture however, natural evolution has led to time - tested concepts that are being exploited. machine learning programmes that analyse images, for instance, draw upon the structure of the visual cortex and the way how it breaks down the task into extracting individual features from a scene. using artificial networks to understand real ones within brainlinks - braintools, the task is a formidable one : machine learning is destined to help analysing signals recorded from brain activity. there is no intrinsic connection though that makes this link between a real and an artificial neural network something special : neither is machine learning the only approach to make sense of the activity of billions of nerve cells, nor is it less suitable to analyse completely different sets of data, like stock market developments. ultimately, machine learning should make it possible to read out movement commands from the brain ’ s surface. these could then be sent to a prosthesis or an assistive device like a robot – the use - case which the strategy “ linc ” within the cluster


learning should make it possible to read out movement commands from the brain ’ s surface. these could then be sent to a prosthesis or an assistive device like a robot – the use - case which the strategy “ linc ” within the cluster aims for. so far, it is an open question what kind of commands could actually be discriminated within the patterns of signals that electrodes can read out from the brain ’ s surface. could machine learning reliably identify the difference between different grasp movements, for instance as they are necessary to grab either a pen or a bottle? will the computer look for individual movements, or will it be able to extract whole intentions like “ i want to put the bottle back into the fridge ”? such higher concepts would be an elegant way to steer a prosthetic arm. the user would not have to think all commands in the right order and with the right extent, but could leave it to the autonomously planning prosthesis to figure out the best way after sending a general command. however, there is a pitfall : in abstract concepts, it might become even more difficult to know what the activity pattern actually stands for. we might find an activity pattern that appears every time that the person thinks “ fridge ”, but it might actually stand for an association that the person makes, like “ cold ”. between the infinite number of possible thoughts and possible connections, this will be an ambitious challenge for data analysis by machine learning. furthermore, it remains to be seen how many activity patterns are identical between individuals. ideally, a patient should not have to go through lengthy training sessions to teach the system all manners of different movements from scratch, but the device should arrive with some pre - installed knowledge of the most basic patterns. even then, there would be enough that the system would have to learn in order to adapt to the individual patient. after all, no two brains – not even those of twins – are identical. and it is very likely that the same holds true for the brain ’ s activity patterns. but computer scientists are optimistic that these training sessions would not take too long – rather minutes or hours than days and weeks. but machine learning is not only a useful tool on the user ’ s end. likewise, artificial neural networks could come in handy to help a robotic arm or other assistive device to execute movements and find the ideal action to reach a certain goal. what makes machine learning an attractive candidate for this task it that its artificial neural network learned the solution to a problem and wasn ’ t spoon -


brazil ' s national department of mineral production ( dnpm ) is coordinating an analysis of the largest brazilian sylvite beds found in the state of amazonas, with the objective of establishing partnerships for exploration. sylvite is a mineral from which potassium chloride ( kcl ) is extracted to be used as a fertilizer. currently, brazil imports 85 % of the total potassium chloride consumed in the country. the remaining 15 % come from the taquari - vassouras mine, located in the state of sergipe, in the northeast of the brazil. amazon sylvite beds were found in the 1980s, by petrobras. estimated reserves are to the order of 1 billion tons, more than twice the 450 million - ton beds found initially in sergipe, where sylvite is explored by the companhia vale do rio doce. current annual production of potassium chloride is 600 thousand tons, which supplies part of the center - south of the country. one of brazil ' s government priorities is to invest in mineral research and exploration, says minister of mines and energy, dilma rousseff. according to the minister, if brazil is to have development in mining, the government has to have an updated and modern mining department. brazil was told last year that canadian mining interests could invest as much as us $ 2 billion in gold, nickel, copper and diamond operations in brazil. last year the dnpm inaugurated a data bank network connecting its 25 districts nationwide at a cost of us $ 25 million. translation : andrea alves


by raji edayathumangalam, phd the answer to that question depends on whether your daily vitamin d intake is adequate or whether you have any risk factors for vitamin d deficiency and adverse effects on bone health. factors that place individuals in the high - risk category include obesity, very dark skin, not spending adequate time in the sun daily, habitually wearing sunscreen ( which reduces skin ’ s capacity to make vitamin d ), always wearing protective clothing, osteoporosis, taking anti - seizure medications that accelerate vitamin d clearance from the body, inflammatory bowel disorder with distal small bowel removed ( where much of the vitamin d is absorbed ), and other vitamin d malabsorption disorders. if one or more of these risk factors applies to you, then the institute of medicine ( iom ) and expert researchers collectively recommend that your healthcare provider measure your blood vitamin d levels to determine what your daily vitamin d intake should be. further, they recommend that your clinician re - measure levels every couple of months and adjust your daily supplement accordingly to make sure that your blood vitamin d reaches optimum levels. the vitamin d debate last year, the iom announced an increased daily recommendation of 600 international units ( iu ) for children and adults less than 70 years, 800 iu for adults over age 70, and an increased daily, safe upper limit from 2, 000 iu to 4, 000 iu. at a recent lecture and panel discussion at brigham and women ’ s hospital, vitamin d researchers disputed the iom ’ s conclusion that most of the us population has adequate vitamin d levels. the featured speaker was bess dawson - hughes, md, senior scientist and director of bone metabolism laboratory at tufts university, who was joined by a panel of bwh vitamin d experts including scott t. weiss, md, joann manson, md, and meryl s. leboff, md, who moderated the discussion. based on her scientific evidence, dr. dawson - hughes recommended that individuals at average risk for vitamin d deficiency should take 800 - 1000 iu of vitamin d daily and need not be clinically tested. she also pointed out that a significant proportion of the us population satisfies one or more of the above - mentioned high - risk criteria ( like obesity ) and cautioned that the iom ’ s public recommendations are therefore still too dangerously low for the high - risk individuals. despite the ongoing debate between the iom and the scientific community on what daily vitamin d intake levels should be and precisely what


thomas archerarticle free pass thomas archer, ( born c. 1668 — died may 23, 1743, whitehall, london, eng. ), british architect and practitioner of what was, for england, an extraordinarily extravagant baroque style, marked by lavish curves, large scale, and bold detail. archer, the son of a warwickshire squire, was educated at trinity college, oxford, and then spent four years abroad. after receiving several lucrative royal appointments, he bought the manor of hale, hampshire, in 1715 and rebuilt the house and church. archer ’ s dynamic work borrowed much from the 17th - century italian architects gian lorenzo bernini and francesco borromini. although he was not as original as some of the prominent english architects of his time, he was considered important. most of his designs were executed from 1705 to 1715, including the north front of chatsworth house ( c. 1705 ) in derbyshire, heythrop house ( 1707 – 10 ) in oxfordshire, a garden pavilion at wrest park ( 1709 – 11 ) in bedfordshire, roehampton house ( c. 1712 ) in surrey ( now in wandsworth, london ), and the churches of st. philip ( c. 1710 – 15 ) in birmingham, st. paul ( 1712 – 30 ) in deptford, and st. john ( 1713 – 28 ) in westminster. the last two resulted from his appointment in 1711 as a commissioner for the building of 50 new churches. what made you want to look up " thomas archer "? please share what surprised you most...


gotthold ephraim lessingarticle free pass gotthold ephraim lessing, ( born jan. 22, 1729, kamenz, upper lusatia, saxony [ germany ] — died feb. 15, 1781, braunschweig, brunswick [ germany ] ), german dramatist, critic, and writer on philosophy and aesthetics. he helped free german drama from the influence of classical and french models and wrote plays of lasting importance. his critical essays greatly stimulated german letters and combated conservative dogmatism and cant while affirming religious and intellectual tolerance and the unbiased search for truth. education and first dramatic works. lessing ’ s father, a highly respected theologian, was hard put to support his large family even though he occupied the position of pastor primarius ( chief pastor ). at the age of 12, lessing, even then an avid reader, entered the famous furstenschule ( “ elector ’ s school ” ) of st. afra, in meissen. a gifted and eager student, lessing acquired a good knowledge of greek, hebrew, and latin, while his admiration for the plays of the latin dramatists plautus and terence fired him with the ambition to write comedies himself. in the autumn of 1746 lessing entered the university of leipzig as a student of theology. his real interests, however, lay toward literature, philosophy, and art. lessing became fascinated by the theatre in leipzig, which had recently been revitalized by the work of a talented and energetic actress, caroline neuber. neuber took an interest in the young poet and in 1748 successfully produced his comedy der junge gelehrte ( “ the young scholar ” ). the play is a delightful satire on an arrogant, superficial, vain, and easily offended scholar, a figure through which lessing mocked his own bookishness. the other comedies belonging to this leipzig period of 1747 – 49 ( damon, die alte jungfer [ “ the old maid ” ], der misogyn [ “ the misogynist ” ], die juden [ “ the jews ” ], der freigeist [ “ the free thinker ” ] ) are witty commentaries on human weaknesses — bigotry, prejudice, nagging, fortune hunting, matchmaking, intrigue, hypocrisy, corruption, and frivolity. set against this background are virtuous men and women who are considerate and selfless, sensitive and helpful, forthright, and faithful in love


, matchmaking, intrigue, hypocrisy, corruption, and frivolity. set against this background are virtuous men and women who are considerate and selfless, sensitive and helpful, forthright, and faithful in love. in die juden lessing praised unappreciated nobility of mind and thus struck a blow against bigotry toward the jews at a time when they were still confined to a ghetto life. lessing had set himself the goal of becoming the german moliere : in these comedies he most interestingly begins to draw his characters as recognizable individuals, breaking away from the traditional dramatic “ types. ” early in 1748 lessing ’ s parents, who disapproved of his association with the theatre in leipzig, summoned him home. but he managed to win their consent to begin studying medicine and was soon allowed to return to leipzig. he quickly found himself in difficulties because he had generously stood surety for some members of the neuber company — although himself heavily in debt. when the company folded, he fled from leipzig in order to avoid being arrested for debt. he eventually reached berlin in 1748, where he hoped to find work as a journalist through his cousin mylius, who was by this time an established editor. in the next four years he undertook a variety of jobs, mainly translating french and english historical and philosophical works into german. but he also began to make a name for himself through his brilliant and witty criticism for the berlinische privilegierte zeitung, on which he was book review editor. he also launched a periodical of his own, beitrage zur historie und aufnahme des theaters ( “ contributions to the history and improvement of the theatre ” ), which was discontinued in 1750. what made you want to look up " gotthold ephraim lessing "? please share what surprised you most...