jython is distributed as a self - extracting. class file created by liftoff. to install jython, open the command line to the directory in which you have placed the jython - 21. class file and then type : you will probably type one of the following three lines, depending on your system. be sure not to put ". class " at the end of the file name. it can be necessay to set the classpath to include the current directory which command to use depends on your operating system and java version. if you have more than one java installed, you may have to supply an explicit path the java command. when installing the jdk 1. 2 from javasoft, the default is it install both the jdk and a plugin jre. the plugin jre is added to your path, so running the java jython - 21 command will make jython use the jre. specify the full path if you want to use jdk instead, ie : c : \ programs \ jdk1. 2 \ bin \ java - cp. jython - 21. if you do not have a gui, then add - o dir _ to _ install _ to to the command above. jython will install to the specified directory without bringing up the graphical installer. e. g. to install all modules to a jython - 2. 1 subdirectory in the current directory do : after completing installation, you should be able to run jython by typing : what can go wrong you should check out this section if your jython installation doesn ' t quite work right. it will contain tips for solving the most common problems. can ' t access standard python modules not all the modules form cpython is available in jython. some modules require a c language dynamic link library that doesn ' t exists in java. other modules are missing from jython just because nobody have had a need for it before and no - one have tested the cpython module with jython. if you discover that you are missing a module, try to copy the. py file from a cpython distribution to a directory on your jython sys. path. if that works you are set. if it doesn ' t work, try asking on jython - users mailing list. any other problems with the installation should be reported to jython - dev. as a workaround you can extract the jyt


does your child ever have difficulty speaking? does he or she hesitate or repeat syllables, words, or phrases? while your first inclination may be to call the issue stuttering, it may be a normal part of language development. so when should you be worried about a youngster struggling to get words out, how can you know if it ' s a true problem or just normal development, what causes stuttering, what can you do as a parent to help, and when should you seek professional help? these are just a few of the important questions to consider if you suspect your child is suffering from stuttering. as children learn to talk, many will stutter on occasion as part of normal language development. this interruption in speech is mistaken for stuttering, but it is actually known as dysfluency. many toddlers and preschoolers stumble on or mispronounce words, repeat sounds, hesitate as they talk, or have difficulty making certain sounds. a dysfluent child may occasionally repeat words or syllables once or twice. for example, they may say, “ i li - li - like that. ” normal dysfluency comes and goes and is more common in boys. it may be especially noticeable when a child is tired, stressed, or excited. while this may be worrisome to parents, most children learn to have normal speech and leave the dysfluency behind. as opposed to normal dysfluency, a child with a true stuttering problem will continue to stutter for longer than six months and will not improve during that time. a child with mild stuttering will repeat sounds more than twice. ( “ i li - li - li - li - like that. ” ) you may notice tension in the facial muscles, usually around the mouth. the child ' s voice may get higher in pitch with the repetitions and the child may get quiet and not breath for several seconds. a child with severe stuttering will struggle with more than 10 percent of his or her words and show considerable tension and effort. this child may even change words to avoid stuttering. a variety of factors contribute to the problem of stuttering. experts say that genetics play a large role, as nearly 60 percent of people who stutter have a family member who also stuttered. additionally, other developmental delays or language problems contribute to stuttering. for those who stutter, language is processed in a different area of the brain. there seems to be a communication problem between the brain and the body muscles responsible


who also stuttered. additionally, other developmental delays or language problems contribute to stuttering. for those who stutter, language is processed in a different area of the brain. there seems to be a communication problem between the brain and the body muscles responsible for speaking. if your child has a stuttering problem, it is important for parents and other family members to model relaxed, slow, normal - sounding speech when talking with the affected child. speaking in this manner is better than telling your child to slow down or to take a deep breath. each day, parents should give their child a time of undivided attention so the child can talk freely about what is on his or her mind. parents should never show annoyance or frustration at a child ' s stuttering, and you should avoid correcting or interrupting a stuttering child. being patient and reassuring is immensely important if your child is to outgrow stuttering. a large part of overcoming stuttering is often more a matter of overcoming the fear of stuttering. therefore, drawing attention to or making fun of a stuttering child will only make it worse for the child. also try to avoid putting your child in uncomfortable situations in which they must talk in front of people. if your child ' s stuttering lasts more than six months, if the stuttering is frequent and doesn ' t seem to be improving, if it is accompanied by facial or body movement, or if it is making your child self - conscious or anxious, speech therapy should be pursued. with effective treatment, your child can overcome stuttering and gain complete control over his or her use of language.


cameron, l. and rutland, a. and turner, rhiannon and holman - nicolas, rosie and powell, claire ( 2011 ) changing attitudes with a little imagination ’ : imagined contact effects on young children ’ s intergroup bias. anale de psychologia, 27 ( 3 ). pp. 708 - 717. issn 0212 - 9728. the current research tested a recent development in social psychology, namely ‘ imagined contact ’, among young children ( n = 123, 5 to 10 years ). children imagined interacting with a physically disabled child, or did not take part in this activity ( the control group ). compared with the control group, children who engaged in ‘ imagined contact ’ subsequently showed reduced inter - group bias in their general attitude and ratings of warmth and competence. imagined contact also led to more positive intended friendship behavior towards the disabled, but only among 5 – 6 year olds. this provides partial support for our hypothesis that younger children, perhaps as a result of their lack of out - group experience, are more likely to benefit from imagined contact. implications for the development of attitudes towards the disabled, imagined contact theory and the development of classroom - based prejudice - reduction techniques based on imagined contact are discussed. | subjects : | | b philosophy. psychology. religion > bf psychology | | divisions : | | faculties > social sciences > school of psychology | | depositing user : | | lindsey cameron | | date deposited : | | 10 may 2011 11 : 03 | | last modified : | | 20 apr 2012 14 : 46 | | resource uri : | | http : / / kar. kent. ac. uk / id / eprint / 27770 ( the current uri for this page, for reference purposes ) | - depositors only ( login required ) :


| search results for : all about kerala & kerala history over 15, 000 square miles of land live a population of some 24 million people with an overall density of 1, 600 persons per square mile. about one - sixth is forest ; of the rest, most of the land is cultivated often with maximum efficiency according to current indian standards. rice still dominates, being the staple food of the masses. rice cultivation is becoming extremely expensive due to high wages and high price of fertilizers ; often cheap rice can be purchased from neighboring andhrapradesh and tamil nadu, kuttanad, the rich alluvial coastland is no longer considered the granary of kerala ; the soil is no longer fertile ; and labor troubles and socialist land - reforms have driven hard - working farmers out of business. farmers are paying increasing attention to cultivating tea, coffee, pepper, cardamom, and rubber in the high ranges and the middle laterite hill region. after rice, coconut is the chief crop ; the coconut acreage is nearly equal to that of rice. next to rice as the essential food. coconut palm is the basis of economy for a very large number of people. the chief products of coconut are coir, copra, oil, and oil - cake. coconut is used as a staple article of diet in meat curries, vegetable curries, and pastries. the coconut - leaves are frequently used as thatch, for the manufacture of brooms, baskets, umbrellas, tattis ( screens kept soaked to cool rooms ), fans, and firewood. a large number of cottage industrial workers are employed in the production of coir - yarns ( rope ) which will later be used to make coco - mats ( coir - mats ). tapioca or cassava is the next important crop which like potato has saved millions of people from starvation during times of famine ; people eat less tapioca these days. spices like cardamom, pepper, gingelly, cloves, and ginger are important peasant - produced cash crops. nearly every homestead still has its plantains ( banana ), areca - nut palms, and mango trees. in the past ten years the gulf countries of the middle east have become avid buyers of kerala ' s agricultural products, so much so, greedy farmers ship the best of all their products including livestock abroad leaving the natives with only the second best produce. the cashew industry, once the monopoly of kerala, is still going strong in spite of stiff competition from china and africa


so much so, greedy farmers ship the best of all their products including livestock abroad leaving the natives with only the second best produce. the cashew industry, once the monopoly of kerala, is still going strong in spite of stiff competition from china and africa. fishing - plays a big part in kerala ' s cultural and commercial life. motorization of boats, better storage, and more efficient marketing have been undertaken during the past twenty - five years. they all have helped the fishing industry. because of the lack of minerals, coal, and iron ore, kerala can never become an industrial state like maharashtra, gujarat, and punjab. however, the abundance of forest products, availability of electric power, efficient supply of water, and the abundance of skilled workers have attracted many industries to kerala, notwithstanding the businessman ' s fear of the ever - looming specter of communism that kerala flaunts. except for local clay and laterite, the only minerals of kerala are ilmenite, monazite, and zircon sands on the beaches from quilon to kovalam. these contain 8 - 10 % thorium oxide which is of strategic importance in relation to atomic power. titanium from ilmenite and cerium from monazite are essential in some electrical and chemical industries - - for electrodes, tracer bullets, and benzine synthesis, among others. the titanium plant near trivandrum is a profitable undertaking. the keltron plant that manufactures radios and television sets makes kerala ' s name synonymous with t. v. the space research center of thumba is one of its kind in all of india. in short, like india, kerala also has entered the world of high technology and the age of space exploration. human potential export the major export of kerala today is its skilled workers and college graduates who go to most parts of india and abroad to places like the gulf countries. when immigration to europe and america opened up in the fifties and sixties, a large number of educated keralites went abroad seeking employment and fortune. their financial success in foreign lands resulted in increasing inflation in kerala due to higher wages and short supply of indigenous products and the rising cost of real estate. the gulf emigres hope that they would some day build a mansion and retire in glory in kerala, though the rate of immigration to the gulf countries has leveled off, immigration from kerala to other parts of india continue. this immigration phenomenon and the spread of education and prosperity have succeeded in checking kerala ' s population growth. kerala has almost achieved zero population growth. flora and fauna


what exactly is anthrax, and should you be worried about it? anthrax is an infection caused by a bacterium ( a type of germ ) called bacillus anthracis ( b. anthracis ). although it ' s most commonly seen in grazing animals like sheep, pigs, cattle, horses, and goats, anthrax also can occur in humans — although it ' s very rare. in the environment, the anthrax - causing bacterium forms spores ( a version of the germ covered by a hard protective shell ) that can live in the soil for years. people can become infected by coming into contact with these spores through a break in the skin ( such as a cut or scrape ), by eating food ( usually undercooked meat ) contaminated by them, or by inhaling spores ( breathing them into the lungs ). but anthrax is not contagious, which means that it can ' t spread from person to person. it ' s extremely unlikely that you or someone you know could get anthrax. in fact, there are usually only one or two reported cases of anthrax per year. most of these have been in people who work with animals or animal products. why are people so concerned? anthrax that occurs naturally in the environment isn ' t a huge threat. but b. anthracis can be grown in a laboratory and some people are worried about anthrax germs being grown as a weapon. the issue of laboratory - grown b. anthracis received lots of attention in 2001 after an anthrax outbreak in the united states. the outbreak scared many people, in part because five people died ( which is very rare ) and also because the outbreak coincided with the september 11 terrorist attacks. however, bioterrorism experts believe that it is technologically difficult to use anthrax effectively as a weapon on a large scale. types of anthrax the three main types of anthrax are : cutaneous or skin anthrax, can occur if someone with a cut or scrape handles contaminated animals or animal products. more than 95 % of anthrax cases are of the cutaneous type, which is the least dangerous form. a person with cutaneous anthrax will notice a small sore that develops into a painless ulcer with a black area in its center. if left untreated, the infection can spread to other areas of the body. intestinal anthrax can occur if someone eats undercooked contaminated meat. int


that develops into a painless ulcer with a black area in its center. if left untreated, the infection can spread to other areas of the body. intestinal anthrax can occur if someone eats undercooked contaminated meat. intestinal anthrax is far less common than cutaneous anthrax, but it can make someone much sicker. intestinal anthrax symptoms include severe abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, severe diarrhea, and bleeding from the digestive tract. pulmonary, or inhaled, anthrax is the rarest form of anthrax — but it ' s also the most dangerous. pulmonary anthrax can only occur if someone breathes thousands of anthrax spores into the lungs. pulmonary anthrax usually seems like a common cold or the flu at first, but it rapidly turns into severe pneumonia and requires hospitalization. it usually takes fewer than 7 days for a person to show signs of anthrax after being infected. however, symptoms of pulmonary anthrax can sometimes take months to appear. it ' s very difficult to get anthrax. just being exposed to the spores or coming into contact with an infected animal doesn ' t mean that a person will automatically develop the disease. for example, to get pulmonary anthrax ( the type of anthrax that killed the five people in the 2001 outbreak ), a person has to inhale thousands of spores. this is extremely difficult to do when the anthrax spores are found in soil or on infected animals. even in the case of the manmade outbreak in 2001, several of the people who were exposed were found to have b. anthracis spores only in their nostrils when tested. these spores hadn ' t made it to their lungs in sufficient amounts to cause a problem. in other words, the people had been exposed to the bacteria but had not developed the disease. how is anthrax diagnosed and treated? medical professionals can diagnose anthrax by taking samples from the skin sores, blood, or other bodily fluids of people who are believed to have been exposed to b. anthracis. these samples are then sent to a lab to check whether the person has the bacteria in his or her system. if anthrax is caught early, it is almost always successfully treated with antibiotics. if a person is known to have been exposed to b. anthracis but has no signs or symptoms of the disease, antibiotics may be given ( after exposure ) to prevent the disease from occurring. although


hereditary hemochromatosis is a genetic disease that causes the body to absorb and store too much iron. the condition gets its name from " hemo " for blood and " chroma " for color, referring to the characteristic bronze skin tone that iron overload can cause. someone with hereditary hemochromatosis who has never taken an iron supplement could find out in later years that iron overload is causing serious health problems. iron is a trace mineral that plays a vital role in the body. every red blood cell contains iron in its hemoglobin, the pigment that carries oxygen from the lungs to the tissues. we get iron from our diet, and normally the body absorbs about 10 % of the iron found in foods. people with hemochromatosis absorb double that amount. once absorbed, the excess iron doesn ' t leave the body. instead, it ' s stored in synovium ( joints ) and major organs such as the liver, heart, brain, pancreas, and lungs. over many years, iron accumulates to toxic levels that can damage or even destroy an organ. the iron overload can cause many health problems, most frequently a form of diabetes that ' s often resistant to insulin treatment. because of this, hereditary hemochromatosis is sometimes called " bronze diabetes. " some people with the disease develop symptoms by age 20, although signs of the condition usually appear between ages 40 and 60, when iron in the body has reached damaging levels. women are less likely to develop symptoms of iron buildup than men, probably due to normal iron loss during menstruation. however, hereditary hemochromatosis should not be considered a disease of older people or men. iron buildup is often present and silently causing problems long before symptoms occur — in men, women, adolescents, and in rare cases, children. causes of hereditary hemochromatosis although many people have never heard of hereditary hemochromatosis, it is not rare and affects as many as 1 in every 200 people in the united states, according to the centers for disease control and prevention ( cdc ). hereditary hemochromatosis is a genetic disorder caused by a mutation on a gene that regulates iron absorption — 1 in every 8 to 10 people in the united states carries a single copy of this defective gene, called hfe. carriers don ' t necessarily have the condition themselves, but can pass the mutated gene on to their children. hereditary hemochromatosis is an autosomal recess


the united states carries a single copy of this defective gene, called hfe. carriers don ' t necessarily have the condition themselves, but can pass the mutated gene on to their children. hereditary hemochromatosis is an autosomal recessive condition, which means that in order to get it, a child must inherit two mutated hfe genes — one from each parent. if a child inherits just one mutated hfe gene, the normal gene essentially balances out the defective hfe gene. even with two mutated genes, not everyone becomes ill. although a majority of those with two mutated genes will eventually develop some type of iron overload, far fewer of them will absorb enough iron to develop serious problems. in some cases, inheriting only one mutated gene may still eventually lead to iron overload, possibly affecting the heart, according to the iron disorders institute. in these people, the iron overload may be triggered by a precipitating factor, such as hepatitis ( inflammation of the liver ) or alcohol abuse. individuals with one mutated gene who become ill may also have mutations in other genes, yet to be discovered, that increase iron absorption. some people who test positive for hereditary hemochromatosis remain symptom - free for life. kids who test positive rarely have any symptoms because iron takes years to accumulate. patients who do have symptoms may experience : muscle aches and joint pain, primarily in the fingers, knees, hips, and ankles ; one of the earliest symptoms is arthritis of the knuckles of the first and second fingers depression, disorientation, or memory problems stomach swelling, abdominal pain, diarrhea, or nausea loss of body hair, other than that on the scalp gray or bronze skin similar to a suntan increased susceptibility to bacterial infections with such a wide range of possible symptoms, the disease can be extremely difficult to diagnose. as symptoms progress, it ' s frequently misdiagnosed as chronic hepatitis, other forms of diabetes, alzheimer ' s disease, iron deficiency, gallbladder illness, menstrual problems, thyroid conditions, or polycythemia ( an increase in the number of red blood cells ). it ' s important to understand that someone with hereditary hemochromatosis can have some symptoms without having all of them ( i. e., heart problems without skin color changes, diabetes, or liver problems ). luckily, the damage from hereditary hemochromatosis is completely preventable if it ' s


of the family ( proposed by the american hemochromatosis society ) routine iron testing of all kids at age 4 ; those who have a genetic risk, but remain symptom - free, continue to be tested every 5 years thereafter if you have a family history of hereditary hemochromatosis and are concerned about your child, talk to your doctor about screening tests. besides specific treatment for complications of the condition — such as insulin for diabetes — most individuals with hereditary hemochromatosis are treated by regularly drawing blood, a process called phlebotomy that ' s similar to making a blood donation. initially, blood may be drawn once or twice weekly during the " de - ironing " phase until the level of iron in the body has dropped to normal. in many cases, it requires 2 or 3 years of periodic phlebotomy to reach the desired level. after the de - ironing phase, when the serum ferritin level has fallen into the normal range, the patient usually remains on a maintenance schedule of three to four phlebotomy sessions a year. doctors check ferritin levels annually to monitor iron accumulation. for most people, this treatment will continue for life. when detected and treated early, any and all symptoms of hereditary hemochromatosis can be prevented, and the person can live a normal life. if left untreated, however, it can lead to damaging or even fatal iron overload. complications of untreated iron overload include : diabetes, arthritis, depression, impotence, hypogonadism ( deficient production of sex hormones by the testicles or ovaries ), gallbladder disease, cirrhosis ( disease and scarring of the liver ), heart attack, cancer, and failure of other organs. caring for your child treatment for kids typically isn ' t as aggressive as for adults, and making some minor dietary changes can help slow iron accumulation. talk to your doctor about taking steps to delay or reduce iron overload. you might : limit red meat in your child ' s diet. iron - rich vegetables are fine because the body doesn ' t absorb iron from plant sources very well. include moderate amounts of black, green, or oolong tea in your child ' s diet. the tannin from tea helps minimize iron absorption ( note : herbal tea doesn ' t contain tannin ). avoid breakfast cereals, breads, and snacks that are enriched with iron. ensure your child is immunized against hepatitis a and b.


my daughter needs to undergo a surgical procedure, and the doctor has recommended " minimally invasive " surgery. what type of surgery is this? will it be as safe — and effective — as standard surgery? - julianne minimally invasive surgery is becoming more and more common in hospitals. these procedures are performed through tiny incisions instead of one large opening. because the incisions are small, patients tend to have quicker recovery times and less discomfort than with conventional surgery — all with the same benefits. during a minimally invasive procedure, surgeons make several small incisions in the skin — just a few millimeters, in some cases. a long, thin tube with a miniature camera attached at the end ( called an endoscope ) is passed through one of the incisions. images from the endoscope are projected onto monitors in the operating room so surgeons can get a clear ( and magnified ) view of the surgical area. special instruments are passed through the other openings. these instruments allow the surgeon to perform the surgery by exploring, removing, or repairing whatever ' s wrong inside the body. in some cases, a patient might be scheduled for a minimally invasive procedure, but after getting a view inside the body the surgeon might have to " convert " the procedure to an open ( conventional ) surgery. this may be because the problem or the anatomy is different from what the surgeon expected. minimally invasive surgery can take longer than conventional surgery, but the pros usually outweigh the cons. because the incisions are small, the child usually feels less pain, has less scarring, and may recover more quickly than with conventional surgery. not all procedures can ( or should ) be done through minimally invasive methods, however. the removal of cancer tumors, for example, is often best performed through open surgery. your doctor will tell you what type of procedure is best for your child. be sure to ask about the possible risks associated with any procedure, as well as the potential benefits.


toddlers this age are moving from the eating habits they had as infants toward a diet more like your own. your job is to keep introducing new flavors and textures. food preferences are set early in life, so help your child develop a taste for healthy foods now. toddlers have little tummies, so serve foods that are packed with the nutrients they need to grow healthy and strong, and limit the sweets and empty calories. your toddler will continue to explore self - feeding, first with fingers and then with utensils at around 15 to 18 months of age. give your child many opportunities to practice these skills, but lend a hand when frustrations arise. as skills develop, step back and let your little one take over. toddlers also like to assert their independence, and the table is one place where you should give yours some sense of control. allow your toddler to respond to internal cues for hunger and fullness but set the boundaries. remember : you decide what variety of healthy foods to offer at a meal and your child decides which of those foods to eat, how much to eat, and whether to eat at all. a word about milk milk is an important part of a toddler ' s diet because it provides calcium and vitamin d, which help build strong bones. kids under age 2 should drink whole milk for the dietary fats needed for normal growth and brain development. when your child is 2, you can probably make the switch to low - fat or nonfat milk, but talk with your doctor before doing so. between 12 and 18 months of age is a good time for transition to a cup. instead of cutting out bottles all at once, you can gradually eliminate them from the feeding schedule, starting with mealtime. offer whole milk in a cup after the child has begun the meal. if you are breastfeeding, only offer milk in a cup and avoid the bottle habit altogether. some kids don ' t like cows milk at first because it ' s different from the breast milk or formula they ' re used to. if that ' s the case, it ' s ok to mix whole milk with formula or breast milk and gradually adjust the mixture so that it eventually becomes 100 % cow ' s milk. it ' s important to watch out for iron deficiency after kids reaches 1 year of age. it can affect their physical, mental, and behavioral development, and also can lead to anemia. to help prevent iron deficiency : limit your child ' s milk intake to 16 - 24 full ounces ( 480 - 720


reaches 1 year of age. it can affect their physical, mental, and behavioral development, and also can lead to anemia. to help prevent iron deficiency : limit your child ' s milk intake to 16 - 24 full ounces ( 480 - 720 milliliters ) a day. increase iron - rich foods in your child ' s diet, like meat, poultry, fish, beans, and iron - fortified foods. continue serving iron - fortified cereal until your child is 18 to 24 months old. talk with your doctor if you ' re concerned that your child drinks a lot of cow ' s milk or isn ' t getting enough iron, or if you ' re thinking of giving your child a vitamin supplement. foods to avoid by now your child should be eating a variety of foods. continue to watch for allergic reactions when introducing new foods. be aware that a child is at higher risk of developing food allergies if the child or one or more close family members have allergies or allergy - related conditions, like food allergies, eczema, or asthma. talk to the doctor if you have any concerns. avoid foods that could present choking hazards, like popcorn, hard candies, hot dogs, raw vegetables and hard fruits, whole grapes, raisins, and nuts. supervise your child at all times when eating. how much should my child eat? offer your child three meals and two or three healthy snacks a day, but keep in mind that it ' s common for toddlers to skip meals. allowing kids to skip a meal is a difficult concept for many parents, but kids should be allowed to respond to their own internal cues for hunger and fullness. don ' t push food on a child who ' s not hungry, but kids shouldn ' t be allowed to eat on demand all day long either. maintain a regular schedule of meals and snacks so your kids will come to expect that food will be available at certain times of the day. if you have any questions about how much your child should eat, speak with your doctor.


most people play a sport for the thrill of having fun with others who share the same interest. but it ' s not always fun and games. there can be a ton of pressure in high school sports. a lot of the time it comes from the feeling that a parent or coach expects you to always win. but sometimes it comes from inside, too : some players are just really hard on themselves. and individual situations can add to the stress : maybe there ' s a recruiter from your no. 1 college scouting you on the sidelines. whatever the cause, the pressure to win can sometimes stress you to the point where you just don ' t know how to have fun anymore. how can stress affect sports performance? stress is a feeling that ' s created when we react to particular events. it ' s the body ' s way of rising to a challenge and preparing to meet a tough situation with focus, strength, stamina, and heightened alertness. a little stress or the right kind of positive stress can help keep you on your toes, ready to rise to a challenge. the events that provoke stress are called stressors, and they cover a whole range of situations — everything from outright danger to stepping up to take the foul shot that could win the game. stress can also be a response to change or anticipation of something that ' s about to happen — good or bad. people can feel stress over positive challenges, like making the varsity team, as well as negative ones. distress is a bad type of stress that arises when you must adapt to too many negative demands. suppose you had a fight with a close friend last night, you forgot your homework this morning, and you ' re playing in a tennis match this afternoon. you try to get psyched for the game but can ' t. you ' ve hit stress overload! continuous struggling with too much stress can exhaust your energy and drive. eustress is the good type of stress that stems from the challenge of taking part in something that you enjoy but have to work hard for. eustress pumps you up, providing a healthy spark for any task you undertake. when the stress of competition starts to get to you, try these techniques to help you relax : deep breathing : find a quiet place to sit down. inhale slowly through your nose, drawing air deep into your lungs. hold your breath for about 5 seconds, then release it slowly. repeat the exercise five times. muscle relaxation : contract ( flex ) a group of muscles tightly. keep them tensed for about 5 seconds,


your nose, drawing air deep into your lungs. hold your breath for about 5 seconds, then release it slowly. repeat the exercise five times. muscle relaxation : contract ( flex ) a group of muscles tightly. keep them tensed for about 5 seconds, then release. repeat the exercise five times, selecting different muscle groups. visualization : close your eyes and picture a peaceful place or an event from your past. recall the beautiful sights and the happy sounds. imagine stress flowing away from your body. you can also visualize success. people who advise competitive players often recommend that they imagine themselves completing a pass, making a shot, or scoring a goal over and over. then on game day, you can recall your stored images to help calm nerves and boost self - confidence. positive self - talk : watch out for negative thoughts. whether you ' re preparing for a competition or coping with a defeat, tell yourself : " i learn from my mistakes! " " i ' m in control of my feelings! " " i can make this goal! " when sports become too stressful, get away from the pressure. go to a movie or hang out with friends. put your mind on something completely different. if sports make you so nervous that you get headaches, become nauseated, or can ' t concentrate on other things, you ' re experiencing symptoms of unhealthy stress that ’ s becoming a pattern. don ' t keep such stress bottled up inside you ; suppressing your emotions might mean bigger health troubles for you later on. talk about your concerns with a friend. simply sharing your feelings can ease your anxiety. sometimes it may help to get an adult ' s perspective — someone who has helped others deal with sports stress like your coach or fitness instructor. here are some other things you can do to cope with stress : treat your body right. eat well and get a good night ' s sleep, especially before games where the pressure ' s on. learn and practice relaxation techniques, like those described in the previous section. get some type of physical activity other than the sport you ' re involved in. take a walk, ride your bike, and get completely away from the sport that ' s stressing you out. don ' t try to be perfect — everyone flubs a shot or messes up from time to time ( so don ' t expect your teammates to be perfect either! ). forgive yourself, remind yourself of all your great shots, and move on. it ' s possible that some stress stems only from uncertainty. meet privately with your


from time to time ( so don ' t expect your teammates to be perfect either! ). forgive yourself, remind yourself of all your great shots, and move on. it ' s possible that some stress stems only from uncertainty. meet privately with your coach or instructor. ask for clarification if his or her expectations seem vague or inconsistent. although most instructors do a good job of fostering athletes ' physical and mental development, you may need to be the one who opens the lines of communication. you may also want to talk with your parents or another adult family member. if you ' re feeling completely overscheduled and out of control, review your options on what you can let go. it ' s a last resort, but if you ' re no longer enjoying your sport, it may be time to find one that ' s less stressful. chronic stress isn ' t fun — and fun is what sports are all about. recognizing when you need guidance to steer yourself out of a stressful situation doesn ' t represent weakness ; it ' s a sign of courage and wisdom. don ' t stop looking for support until you ' ve found it. enjoy the game winning is exhilarating! but losing and some amount of stress are part of almost any sports program — as they are in life. sports are about enhancing self - esteem, building social skills, and developing a sense of community. and above all, sports are about having fun.


thu october 20, 2011 ' living fossils ' just a branch on cycad family tree although dinosaurs died out 65 million years ago, there are still thought to be a few species left over from those days. plants called cycads are among these rare " living fossils " — they have remained pretty much unchanged for more than 300 million years, but a study in science magazine suggests that glamorous title may not be deserved. there ' s no time machine in washington, d. c., but harvard botanist sarah mathews leads me to what ' s arguably the next best thing — a room made of glass in the u. s. botanic garden, just downhill from the u. s. capitol. the sign says " the garden primeval — the first land plants. " right away we see something that looks like a fern growing out of the top of a palm trunk. but it ' s not a fern or a palm. in fact, it ' s more closely related to a pine tree. cycads produce seeds but not flowers. they evolved along with dinosaurs, which presumably munched them for lunch. so they ' ve earned the title living fossil. but " that assumption began to break down as we began sequencing dna, " mathews says. she and her colleagues — notably nathalie nagalingum from the royal botanic gardens in sydney — have used that dna to reconstruct the " family tree " of cycads. they find that the " trunk " of the family tree may reach back 300 million years, but the " branches, " today ' s 300 species, actually burst onto the scene about 12 million years ago. " and then it looks like around the world on multiple continents, cycads became more species - rich, " mathews says. what caused that sudden burst of new species? " that ' s the really fun puzzle of course, " she says. it ' s probably not a coincidence that other plants also put forth a burst of new species around that time, including cacti, ice - plants and agave. mathews suspects climate change played a role. " there was drying out and cooling going on, globally, " she says. this research is part of a broader effort to understand how all plants — most notably flowering plants — evolved. that story is gradually taking shape as scientists study more and more of the dna from plants. of course, you might argue this research has some broader philosophical repercussions as well. by finding that these species of cycads are just 12 million years


story is gradually taking shape as scientists study more and more of the dna from plants. of course, you might argue this research has some broader philosophical repercussions as well. by finding that these species of cycads are just 12 million years old — and so were not survivors from the days of the dinosaurs — has mathew ' s team demoted these species from their lofty status as living fossils? she says not. " i think that we ' ve actually found some interesting patterns for people who didn ' t think much about cycads before, " she says. what about people who think a lot about cycads? bart schutzman edits the cycad society ' s journal ( global circulation : 500 copies ). he ' s attracted to these plants because he feels a primal bond with this ancient species. and he says the news does not rock his world. today ' s cycads still predate human species, and by a lot. " what ' s the difference between old, older and very old, and very, very old? i mean they ' re all still very old, " he says with a chuckle. as for the moniker, living fossil? " it won ' t stop people from glamorizing the cycads as the living fossils because their lineage extends so far back, " schutzman says. so here ' s a little good news from washington : a walk through the " garden primeval " greenhouse still offers a reasonable glimpse of foliage from the days of the dinosaurs, though the species themselves don ' t have quite the same bragging rights.


when spilled food makes a huge mess ( in a tunnel or on a road ) originally published on thu january 24, 2013 7 : 42 am rarely do we consider the trucks, trains and tankers that transport our food around our cities — and around the world. it ' s not until an accident happens, and the food inside these vessels comes pouring out, that we remember all this food in motion around us, and how damaging it can be when it spills. the truth is, a lot of food is extremely sticky, bulky — and sometimes, flammable. and apparently, the people who move it around are just as accident prone as the rest of us. at least, that ' s what struck us after reading this week about the massive goat cheese fire in norway, in which nearly 30 tons of a specialty brown cheese called brunost caught on fire and burned for days, forcing the closure of a tunnel for an estimated two weeks. this giant roadside cheese flambe is hardly the first food disaster to cause more than a few headaches in recent years. take, for example, the recent yogurt disaster of may 2012, in which 36, 000 pounds of chobani greek yogurt spilled down a hillside in southern new york state. then there was the great pancake syrup fiasco of 2012 : last june, an entire semitrailer ' s worth of the sticky liquid spilled across interstate 75 in ohio and kentucky. ( ironically, the accident occurred after the truck slammed into an overpass at — wait for it — buttermilk pike. ) that cleanup required the expertise of the u. s. environmental protection agency. and our pals over at the two - way reported in 2011 on the tanker filled with yeast extract destined for a marmite factory in england that crashed and spilled, jamming the m1, which connects london to the northern part of england. food disasters can be deadly, too, as the folks at smithsonian ' s food & think blog have noted. some 94 years ago, boston ' s north end fell victim to the great molasses tragedy, when a giant tank capable of holding more than 2 million gallons of the sticky stuff exploded. the blast and ensuing mini - tsunami of molasses killed 21 people and injured 150 others. but not all spills are disastrous for bystanders. in china last year, when 770 pounds of eggs spilled out of a truck in a traffic accident, locals used it as an opportunity to stock up. you can watch the video on youtube here.


| this review appears in the november 8, 2002 issue of executive intelligence review. why hiroshima was bombed : the ' utopians ' duped a nation by william jones racing for the bomb : general leslie groves, the indispensable man, by robert norris. south royalton, vermont : steerforth press, 2002, 700 pages, hardback, $ 40. 00. the decision to use the atomic bomb, by gar alperovitz. new york : alfred knopf books, 1995, 847 pages, paperback, $ 17. 00. " the united states decision to drop the atom bomb on hiroshima and nagasaki saved over one million american lives which would have been sacrificed by an invasion of japan. " how often has this claim been restated whenever that horrendous event is mentioned on tv or in newspapers. and yet, it remains to this day a total fiction. not only the figure of " one million " which was gratuituously added in the cover story published later to enhance the much lower figures actually predicted by the war department had the united states been forced to invade japanbut even the lower, more accurate estimates, represented a complete fallacy. there would have been no casualties in a land invasion of japan because there would not have been any land invasion of japan. by mid - may 1945 it was clear to all who wished to see : japan was on the brink of surrendering. it is the merit of gar alperovitz ' s work that he documented the facts available as of 1995 by using the then - latest declassified records from the war period. the real purpose of the atomic bomb was not to win the war, but rather to shape the contours of the post - war world. alperowitz had an entire team working the files on this subject, with excellent results. the " team " aspect of the work leads, however, to a good deal of repetition. the recent biography by robert norris of one of the key players in that policy decision, gen. leslie groves, helps to fill out the picture of the real scope and purposes of the decision to drop the atomic bomb on japanese cities. the open conspiracy of h. g. wells in order to understand the real significance of the atom bomb decision, we must, however, go a bit beyond the confines of these two particular worksback to 1928, to the publication of a little - noticed manuscript by science - fiction writer h. g. wells, entitled the open conspiracy. in that work, wells called for


, however, go a bit beyond the confines of these two particular worksback to 1928, to the publication of a little - noticed manuscript by science - fiction writer h. g. wells, entitled the open conspiracy. in that work, wells called for the establishment of a " world government " which would supersede the nation - state as the primary form of human social and political existence. reading wells today, one gets the eerie feeling of a weird fascist experiment, wrapped in pseudo - scientific rhetoric, in which big brother controls one ' s every move. this " utopian " scheme, as wells himself dubbed it, probably had little hope of success, except under conditions of raw terror, where a frightened population might come to feel that only in the womb of such a " world government " would there be any security. with the dropping of the atomic bombs on hiroshima and nagasaki in august 1945, such a condition, it was felt by wells ' devotees, had been brought about. shortly after the dropping of the bomb in 1945, lord bertrand russell, a compatriot of wells in the " world commonwealth " project, wrote a short essay entitled " the bomb and civilisation. " in this work russell wrote : " the prospect for the human race is sombre beyond all precedent.... either war or civilization must end, and if it is to be war that ends, there must be an international authority with the sole power to make the new bombs. all supplies of uranium must be placed under the control of the international authority, which shall have the right to safeguard the ore by armed forces. as soon as such an authority has been created, all existing atomic bombs, and all plants for their manufacture, must be handed over. and of course the international authority must have sufficient armed forces to protect whatever has been handed over to it. if this system were once established, the international authority would be irresistible, and wars would cease. at worst, there might be occasional brief revolts that would be easily quelled. " the power of the united states in international affairs is, for the time being, immeasurably increased, " russell continued. " if america were more imperialistic there would be another possibility, less utopian and less desirable, but still preferable to the total obliteration of civilized life. it would be possible for americans to use their position of temporary superiority to insist upon disarmament, not only in germany and japan, but everywhere except in the united states, or at any rate in every country not prepared


tremendous and violent reaction from all japanese. hanging of the emperor to them would be comparable to the crucifixion of christ to us. all would fight to die like ants. the position of the gangster militarists would be strengthened immeasurably. the war would be unduly prolonged ; our losses heavier than otherwise would be necessary. " for the same reason, it was also clear that, were the emperor to order his troops to surrender, they would, for the very same reason, do so to the very last solder. in march 1945, macarthur sent lt. gen. george kenney, the head of his air forces, to washington to brief the joint chiefs on the situation in the pacific. in a long talk with chief of staff gen. george marshall, on march 16, kenney argued that japan had lost its air power, its navy and merchant marine, and that there was no longer any necessity to wait for an end to the war in europe or for the russians to enter the pacific war, before moving toward a surrender. as kenney relates in the macarthur i know : " when i was in washington in march 1945, i repeated macarthur ' s ideas, but everyone i talked to in the war department and even among the air crowd disagreed. the consensus was that japan would hold out for possibly another two years.... while the dropping of the two atomic bombs may have hurried the japanese decision to quit, there is little doubt that macarthur was right in july when he told me that the projected operation olympicto invade japan on november 1, 1945would never take place. " " it was quite evident from a study of the context of the messages, that the japanese realized further resistance was futile, and were willing to grant any concessions to halt the war, providing the emperor remained as the spiritual head of the country, " kenney wrote. by the spring of 1945 these peace - feelers were coming in fast and furious. on may 7, 1945, the oss representative in portugal informed president truman that the counsellor of the japanese legation in portugal had told a source that the japanese were ready to cease hostilities provided they were allowed to retain possession of the home islands and that the terms " unconditional surrender " not be employed in the actual peace terms. other oss sources working with the vatican ' s cardinal giuseppe montini ( later pope paul vi ), were also in touch with the japanese, who were in the process of working out the terms of an eventual japanese surrenderagain


actual peace terms. other oss sources working with the vatican ' s cardinal giuseppe montini ( later pope paul vi ), were also in touch with the japanese, who were in the process of working out the terms of an eventual japanese surrenderagain with the proviso that the institution of the emperor be retained. the stated policy of the united states had been that of " unconditional surrender. " this had been stated by president roosevelt, almost fortuitously, when he met with british prime minister winston churchill at casablanca in january 1943. and yet, with roosevelt, the consummate politician, there was always room for finding a way out of a dilemma if the conditions warranted it. roosevelt did, in fact, deviate from the " unconditional surrender " formula when italy agreed to surrender in 1944. but by may 1945, franklin roosevelt was dead, and his new vice president, harry truman, had been sworn in as president of the united states. truman had replaced henry wallace as fdr ' s vice president prior to the 1944 elections, through the machinations of the southern democrats who hated roosevelt ' s new deal as well as his envisioned post - war grand design. they knew that roosevelt would not survive a fourth term. they therefore wanted to replace the strong new deal vice president henry wallace, with one of their own. former missouri tailor harry truman, a proud son of the confederacy ( both grandfathers fought for the south during the civil war ), who had come to prominence in missouri politics as a stooge of the kansas city - based criminal pendergast mob, was their man. as his chief foreign policy adviser, truman chose sen. james byrnes from south carolina, an even more dyed - in - the - wool confederate sympathizer. in june 1945, truman made byrnes secretary of state. the russian factor from the beginning of the war, the allied forces had decided that their main thrust would be in europe. in every aspect of supply and logistics, the atlantic theater received the primary attention, with macarthur, the army commander in the pacific, having to make do with whatever he got. the russian armies were almost solely deployed on the european front. after initial clashes with the japanese in manchuria in 1939, in which the japanese fared badly, the russians signed a neutrality treaty with japan. in his discussions with stalin at tehran in november 1943 and at yalta in february 1945, roosevelt had talked to the soviet leader about the possibility of redeploying russian troops to the east at


badly, the russians signed a neutrality treaty with japan. in his discussions with stalin at tehran in november 1943 and at yalta in february 1945, roosevelt had talked to the soviet leader about the possibility of redeploying russian troops to the east at the conclusion of the war with nazi germany. already in the beginning of the pacific campaign, macarthur had called for russian engagement against the japanese in manchuria, a measure that would have helped tie up some of their forces that would otherwise be available to be deployed against him. the russians, hard pressed by the advance of the nazi armies, were not eager to engage in a two - front war if that could be avoided. and yet, after the decisive victory of the red army at kursk in july 1943, it was felt in u. s. military circles that the russians might now consider moving against japan. in a joint chiefs ' instruction cited by alperovitz, in the fall of 1943 to the head of the american military mission in moscow, brig. gen. john deane, " the great importance to the united states of russia ' s full participation in the war against japan after the defeat of germany, as essential to the prompt and crushing defeat of japan at far less cost to the united states and great britain, " was clearly stated. again, just before the big three meetingroosevelt, churchill, and stalinat tehran in 1943, the joint chiefs stated : " we are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the u. s. s. r. into the war against japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event. " by the end of 1944, the war in europe was approaching a close. following the big three meeting in yalta in february 1945, representatives were sent to macarthur to brief him on the results. macarthur again called for a russian move on manchuria in order to tie up as many japanese divisions as possible, especially if events necessitated an invasion of the japanese home islands, for which preparations were, in fact, being made. the japanese were also aware that russian refusal to renew the neutrality pact would mean that they would also have russia to fight. the signals of a japanese willingness to surrender then began to multiply. in addition to the oss contacts in italy and portugal, the japanese were also making their desires known through their representatives in moscow and in sweden, with representatives of the swedish royal family. the swedish reports were forwarded to the united states by herschel v. johnson, the u


contacts in italy and portugal, the japanese were also making their desires known through their representatives in moscow and in sweden, with representatives of the swedish royal family. the swedish reports were forwarded to the united states by herschel v. johnson, the u. s. ambassador in stockholm. reporting on april 6, 1945, johnson wrote that it was " probable that very far - reaching conditions would be accepted by the japanese by way of negotiation, " but that " there is no doubt that unconditional surrender terms would be unacceptable to the japanese because it would mean dishonor. application of such terms would be fatal and lead to desperate action on the part of the people.... the emperor must not be touched, " johnson wrote. the atom bomb project on april 25, 1945, secretary of war henry stimson and gen. leslie groves, the manager of the manhattan project, met at the white house to brief the president on the status of the atomic bomb. the bomb project had been initiated by president roosevelt on the basis of an appeal by albert einstein. einstein, aware of nazi work on developing such weapons, had been urged by leo szilard, a protege of bertrand russell, who played on einstein ' s fears, to write a letter to president roosevelt urging him to begin work on an atomic weapon. szilard, a hungarian physicist and a devotee of h. g. wells, had worked his way into einstein ' s confidence while still a young physicist in berlin. in 1928 szilard had read wells ' open conspiracy, and waxed enthusiastic. by 1929 he had travelled to london to meet with wells and to negotiate the rights to publish wells ' works in central europe. szilard himself worked on a scheme to realize wells ' vision of a " world government " controlled by a chosen " scientific elite. " in fact, so enamored was he of this idea that he developed his own plan for creating such an " elite, " which he called the bund, " a closely knit group of people whose inner bond is pervaded by a religious and scientific spirit. " although formulating this proto - fascist vision at an early age, szilard bandied such ideas about in different forms until his death. how the einstein letter led to the manhattan project, under general groves, is well known. by the time the new president, harry truman, was briefed on the manhattan project in april 1945, the bomb was almost ready for testing. the growing realization by truman of the power and capability of


project, under general groves, is well known. by the time the new president, harry truman, was briefed on the manhattan project in april 1945, the bomb was almost ready for testing. the growing realization by truman of the power and capability of the new weapon gave truman the means to accomplish the task for which he had been chosento dismantle roosevelt ' s entire post - war design. roosevelt had dealt with the mercurial russian leader, joseph stalin, in a rather straightforward and open manner. not that this was without its difficulties, given stalin ' s propensities and paranoia. nevertheless, by 1944 roosevelt felt that he had created a certain rapport with stalin and intended to work to bring wartime ally russia into the concert of european nations after the war. writing in may 1944 in the saturday evening post, forrest davis, a correspondent favored by roosevelt, wrote : " mr. roosevelt is striving to bring the soviet union, which has fallen out with the european tradition, back into the family of nations, as a condition precedent to world organization. convinced that unless that reunion takes place, there can be no world association, nor assured hope of peace, the president ' s ' great design ' rests on two assumptions. first, he accepts the prevalent view that the soviet union will be able to organize effectively its manpower and resources in peace as well as war, thus becoming permanently a great power. he further assumes that the interests of a victorious russian state can be reconciled to those of the atlantic powers, china, and the small nations of europe and america. mr. roosevelt, gambling for stakes as enormous as any statesman ever played for, has been betting that the soviet union needs peace and is willing to pay for it by collaborating with the west. by no means unaware of the risks, he declines, nevertheless, to acknowledge them even to close associates. the white house is a delicate sounding board, reflecting everything that happens everywhere on the globe. it would be absurd to suppose that the president has not considered the implications of his russian policy in all angles and facets. the alternativea russia excluded, aggrieved and driven in on itself to prepare for the inevitable war of continentswas to him so much worse, that he saw himself with little choice. he chose, moreover, to prosecute his policy so sincerely that the russians, proverbially mistrustful, could have no ground for misgiving. " the utopians ' plans for establishing their global dictatorship were, on the other hand, precisely geared to play into those


had a successful test of the atomic bomb to use as a bargaining chip in such a meeting. the political implications of the bomb were clearly in the forefront of interest for the utopian faction. chief among them was secretary of war henry stimson. speaking on may 14 to army chief of staff gen. george marshall and john j. mccloy ( one of stimson ' s top assistants at the war department ), relating a discussion he had just had with british foreign secretary anthony eden, stimson commented : " it is a case where we have got to regain the lead [ over russia ] and perhaps do it in a rough and realistic way.... i told him this was a place where we really held all the cards. i called it a royal straight flush and we mustn ' t be a fool about the way we play. they can ' t get along without our help and our industries, and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique. " truman was of one mind with stimson on this point, and, therefore, worked to delay a meeting with stalin. truman wrote churchill that he wanted to put off the big three meeting until after june 30 on the flimsy pretext that the u. s. budget was coming up in congress. stalin was anxious to meet. harry hopkins, just back from a trip to moscow on may 28, was told the meeting would not be until july. hopkins objected : " i think stalin would like to have the meeting at an earlier date because of the many pressing problems to be decided. " and yet truman persisted in delaying, raising suspicions among the russians as to his motives. for what was truman waiting? general groves was pushing his scientists to test the bomb by the beginning of july. technical considerations caused a delay in the testand another delay in truman ' s planned meeting with stalin. finally, grove pushed for a test on july 14. biographer norris notes how groves, in explaining the rush to project director j. robert oppenheimer on july 2, stressed " the importance of trying to arrange for the 14th [ of july ]... and to tell his people that it wasn ' t his fault. but came from higher authority. " on june 5, truman then informed churchill in regard to the forthcoming meeting, " i find, after full consideration that july 15 is the earliest date that is practicable for me to attend. " indeed, if all went well, it was the earliest date at which truman would would know if the test


the forthcoming meeting, " i find, after full consideration that july 15 is the earliest date that is practicable for me to attend. " indeed, if all went well, it was the earliest date at which truman would would know if the test had been successful. the decision to bomb the test in alamogordo, new mexico, on july 14, 1945, produced results beyond anyone ' s imagination. as reports streamed back to washington, the mood was almost ecstatic among the utopians. indeed, stimson felt that the effect of the bomb was so great that he advised truman the weapon might enable the united states to force the soviet union to abandon or radically alter its entire system of government. a war department memorandum on june 16 noted that " the president feels the u. s. is by far the strongest country in the world and he proposes to take the lead at the coming meeting, " and that in " this connection he proposes to raise all the controversial questions. " with the successful test of the bomb, the issue now became whether to use itand, if so, against whom? with the surrender of nazi germany already a fact, japan was really the only candidate. but what if the japanese also surrendered before the bomb was actually used in war, as all indicators were showing they intended to do? testing the bomb in a real - time situation required, therefore, delaying such a surrender for as long as possible in order to use the bomb to end the warand demonstrate in an unequivocal and stark, terrifying manner, the raw power now possessed by the united states. plans for the bombing of japan were already well under way when the alamogordo test took place. under the frenetic leadership of groves, targets were being picked. an interim committee had been set up by stimson ' s assistant, harvey bundy, consisting of stimson ; james conant, chairman of the national defense research committee ; dr. vannevar bush, director of the office of scientific research and development ( osrd ) ; dr. karl compton, head of the office of field service ( osrd ) and president of mit ; assistant secretary of state william clayton ; and the undersecretary of the navy, ralph bard. at stimson ' s suggestion, truman appointed jimmy byrnes to serve as truman ' s personal liaison to the committee. the interim committee was to advise the president on how the bomb was to be used after the war. groves, who was a member of the target committee, also received


truman appointed jimmy byrnes to serve as truman ' s personal liaison to the committee. the interim committee was to advise the president on how the bomb was to be used after the war. groves, who was a member of the target committee, also received a permanent invitation to attend the meetings of the interim committee, and, in fact, attended all of their meetings. two or more bombs were to be prepared. truman became totally euphoric when groves ' more detailed report on the alamogordo experiment reached him on july 21. " the president was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when i saw him, " stimson confided in his diary. byrnes was also ecstatic, telling szilard " that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make russia more manageable in europe. " indeed, there was a growing feeling that with the anglo - americans retaining sole possession of the bomb, the post - war period would indeed become something of an anglo - american century, as bertrand russell would call for in his piece later in 1945. norris ' book clearly shows groves to have been a strong proponent of such a view, though more inclined to make this solely an " american " preserve, not to be shared fully with the british. as he would express this later more publicly, in an important quote overlooked by his biographer norris, but not lost on alperovitz, groves was committed to " an american - administered pax - atomicaan atomic league of nations, founded upon the west ' s supposed technological superiority and the secret, preclusive monopoly of atomic raw materials. " in the light of this policy shift, the appearance of japanese peace - feelers now became a threat that might obviate the use of the atomic bomb in war. anything that would permit the japanese to surrender before its use against japan was therefore to be squelched. the envisioned entry of the russian forces into manchuria had therefore to be delayed for as long as possible. some people in washington saw clearly what was in the works. acting secretary of state joseph grew, a former ambassador to japan, caught wind of what was happeningand it frightened him. grew renewed his efforts to quickly get a statement of intent from the united states which would guarantee a retention of the emperor, and facilitate a rapid japanese surrenderbefore the bomb could be used. more generally, grew realized that there was a substantial peace party in japan, and that the peace - feelers the allied intelligence forces were picking up, were for real


emperor, and facilitate a rapid japanese surrenderbefore the bomb could be used. more generally, grew realized that there was a substantial peace party in japan, and that the peace - feelers the allied intelligence forces were picking up, were for real. the position of the united states, he felt, should be supportive of that peace party, and immediately clarifying the role of the emperor in the peace terms was absolutely essential if peace were to be quickly achieved. many leading republicans were also calling for such a statement. on july 3, the new york times reported that the senate republican minority leader, wallace white, " declared that the pacific war might end quickly if president truman would state, specifically, in the upper chamber, just what unconditional surrender means for the japanese. " the war department ' s operations division advised on july 12, 1945 that " the present stand of the war department is that japanese surrender is just possible and is attractive enough to the u. s. to justify us in making any concession which might be attractive to the japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the pacific are not adversely affected. " indeed, by this time the japanese peace - feelers were becoming a drumbeat. on july 12, as truman was travelling to potsdam aboard the presidential yacht, the augusta, emperor hirohito was declaring in a meeting of the supreme council for the direction of the war, that although war planning had to continue, it was also " necessary to have a plan to close the war at once. " a cable intercepted on july 12 from foreign minister togo to japanese ambassador sato in moscow, and given to truman aboard the augusta on his way to potsdam, stated : " we are now secretly giving consideration to the termination of the war because of the pressing situation which confronts japan both at home and abroad. " unlike the previous peace - feelers, these were very official and very high - level, even involving the leadership of the japanese army, the only real hold - outs for continued fighting. by the time of the potsdam meeting it was also known that japan was asking russia, with which it still had a neutrality treaty, to help it get out of the war. using the bomb ' diplomatically ' but truman, with an entirely different agenda, was not ready for peacenot yet at any rate. indeed, arriving at potsdam, the united states was already taking measures to delay russian entry into the war in the pacific. at yalta it had been agreed that russia would enter the pacific theater in exchange for several conditions


peacenot yet at any rate. indeed, arriving at potsdam, the united states was already taking measures to delay russian entry into the war in the pacific. at yalta it had been agreed that russia would enter the pacific theater in exchange for several conditions : it would receive the kurile islands from japan, regain control over the chinese far eastern and south manchurian railroads as well as the ports of dairen and port arthur, and the " independence of mongolia would be assured. " in turn, stalin agreed to sign a treaty with nationalist china. roosevelt had assured stalin that he would convince chiang kai - shek to accept concessions to russia in manchuria. the signing of an agreement between china and the soviet union would therefore be the immediate prelude to soviet entry into manchuria. with truman ' s new agenda, and the successful demonstration of the atomic bomb, the brakes had to be put on the signing of such an agreement. on july 6, as he was leaving for potsdam, jimmy byrnes instructed averell harriman, the key contact with the soviets, to " inform both the soviet government and t. v. soong [ the chinese foreign minister then in moscow for negotiations with the russians ] that as a party to the yalta agreement we would expect to be consulted before any arrangement is concluded between the soviet and chinese governments. " harriman even had to pressure soong to be tougher with the russians about these concessions. " he [ soong ] was far less concerned than we had been about such details as whether chinese or russian troops would guard the railroad or who would be the port master of dairen, " harriman wrote. " i saw him almost every day and urged him to be more firm. " at potsdam, truman adopted his most belligerent pose. in a letter to his wife bess on june 20, truman wrote : " we had a tough meeting yesterday. i reared up on my hind legs and told ' em where to get off, and they got off. i have to make perfectly plain to them at least once a day that so far as this president is concerned, santa claus is dead, and that my first interest is u. s. a., then i want the jap war won and i want ' em both in it. " after the plenary session of july 24, truman approached stalin as stalin was about to leave the conference, and mentioned to him casually " that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. " the poker - faced stalin simply commented, according


. " after the plenary session of july 24, truman approached stalin as stalin was about to leave the conference, and mentioned to him casually " that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. " the poker - faced stalin simply commented, according to truman, that " he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ' good use of it against the japanese. ' " judging from stalin ' s placid reaction, truman and churchill thought that stalin didn ' t really understand that truman had been referring to the atomic bomb. the wily soviet leader, however, knew a lot more than he was letting on. what his russian science advisers, like the great scientist vladimir vernadsky, were not able to tell him about the bomb, well - placed spies in the manhattan project were. marshal zhukov relates stalin ' s comments to his own people following this encounter with truman. " stalin, in my presence, told molotov about his conversation with truman, " zhukov wrote in his memoirs. " ' they ' re raising the price, ' said molotov. stalin gave a laugh, ' let them. we ' ll have to have a talk with kurchatov today about speeding up our work. ' " stalin was referring to the soviet bomb program, headed up by academician i. v. kurchatov. potsdam : preventing japan ' s surrender it was also at potsdam that churchill was informed of the successful test. british chief of staff field marshal sir alan brookesby wrote that churchill " was completely carried away. it was no longer necessary for the russians to come into the japanese war ; the new explosive alone was sufficient to settle the matter. furthermore, we now had something in our hands which would redress the balance with the russians. " by this time, the interim committee had decided that the bomb would be used, without warning, on a japanese war plant, preferably in the vicinity of an area in which many japanese workers were living, for maximum psychological effect. norris relates how groves wanted to target kyoto itself, the most important religious center for the japanese, but stimson, anxious that the japanese remain malleable enough after the war in order to serve in the post - war battle against the spread of communism in asia, rejected this proposal, assenting only to the targetting of hiroshima, nagasaki, niigata, and kokura. there was only one true dissenter to this decision of the committeeralph bard, navy secretary james forrestal ' s undersecretary


proposal, assenting only to the targetting of hiroshima, nagasaki, niigata, and kokura. there was only one true dissenter to this decision of the committeeralph bard, navy secretary james forrestal ' s undersecretary and representative. in a june 27 memorandum, bard wrote : " ever since i have been in touch with this program i have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against japan, that japan should have some preliminary warning, for say two or three days in advance of use. the position of the united states as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling. " bard also stressed that some u. s. declaration regarding the status of the emperor should be given to encourage the japanese to surrender quickly. but truman and byrnes were not prepared to issue such a declaration. in fact, the draft statement for the potsdam meeting, drawn up by stimson and john mccloy, had included explicit assurances for the emperor. william leahy, the chief of staff of the army and navy under roosevelt, who had been kept on by truman, wrote on july 18 : " from a strictly military point of view, the joint chiefs of staff consider it inadvisable to make any statement or take any action at the present time that would make it difficult or impossible to utilize the authority of the emperor to direct a surrender of the japanese forces, in the outlying areas as well as in japan proper. " although truman was in agreement with the policy of building up post - war japan as a counterweight to soviet influence, he, in collaboration with byrnes, decided to purge the reference to the emperor from the potsdam proclamation. as far as the japanese knew, " unconditional surrender " was still the policy of the allies. in a further affront to stalin, the united states issued the proclamation to the press before even informing him, much less soliciting his approval of the final text. the effect of the potsdam declaration was devastating. navy captain ellis zacharias, a specialist who had been working on psychological - warfare ideas in cooperation with the overseas branch of the office of war information, had been, like his navy commanders, keen on encouraging a quick japanese surrender. zacharias had been closely following the japanese intercepts, and knew that the signals to end the war were coming from the highest levels, and that the position of the emperor was the decisive issue. the potsdam declaration smashed these hopes. it " wrecked everything


all his plans for using it to establish the " world government. " in late may 1945, szilard and fellow scientists harold urey and walter bartky met with jimmy byrnes. byrnes told them that general groves had informed him that russia had no uranium, and that therefore there was no fear of them developing atomic weapons. in reality, already in 1940, russian scientist vladimir vernadsky had appointed a committee to investigate the uranium resources of the soviet union. while they did discover uranium deposits in central asia, it would be the countries of eastern europe and soviet - occupied east germany which would provide the great bulk of the uranium for the soviet nuclear program. in a memorandum to byrnes, szilard underlined that it was the post - war organization of the atomic bomb threat which would be of utmost importance. in accordance with his wellsian program, he urged that there be established international controls on atomic research, with the direct involvement of the scientists in the decisions as to its use. byrnes found the idea rather ludicrous. " he [ szilard ] felt that scientists, including himself, should discuss the matter with the cabinet, which i did not feel desirable. his general demeanor and his desire to participate in policymaking made an unfavorable impression on me. " more significant opposition came from the military leadership of the country, most of whom were adamantly opposed to the use of the atomic bomb. alperovitz documents this resistance quite extensively in separate chapters dealing with the reaction from each of the uniformed services ; all regarded the bombing as militarily unnecessary. stimson himself, when in europe for the potsdam talks, saw fit to solicit the opinion of gen. dwight eisenhower, commander - in - chief of allied forces in europe. " the incident took place in 1945 when secretary of war stimson, visiting my headquarters in germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on japan, " eisenhower would later write in his autobiography, mandate for change. " i was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act.... the secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in new mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. during the recitation of the relevant facts, i had been conscious of a feeling of depression, and so i voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief


, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. during the recitation of the relevant facts, i had been conscious of a feeling of depression, and so i voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because i thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment, i thought no longer mandatory as a measure to save american lives. it was my belief that japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ' face. ' the secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons i gave for my quick conclusions. " although gen. douglas macarthur, the pacific theater commander, wasn ' t informed of the existence of the atomic bomb until five days before it was dropped on hiroshima, he had already, in the spring of 1945, sent his air force chief, maj. gen. george kenney, to washington to explain his view that the japanese were close to surrender. when kenney came to washington and explained this to gen. george marshall, marshall called in his top advisers. kenney would report to macarthur later that he had not succeeded in convincing them. macarthur, until his death, insisted that bombing hiroshima and nagasaki had no military value whatsoever. truman ' s chief of staff, adm. william leahy, who chaired the meetings of the joint chiefs of staff, continually insisted that the japanese were on the brink of surrender. as late as july 16, leahy was urging the british chief of staff to have churchill get truman to modify the term " unconditional surrender. " leahy would later say, quite accurately, of the decision : " truman told me it was agreed they would use it, after military men ' s statements that it would save many, many american lives, by shortening the war, only to hit military objectives. of course, then they went ahead and killed as many women and children as they could, which was just what they wanted all the time. " adm. ernest king, the commander in chief of the u. s. fleet, was convinced that the successful blockade of japan was bringing japan to its knees. there was no need to invade japan proper, king argued, because japan was as good as defeated. this analysis would later be fully corroborated by the strategic bombing survey, which in 1946 examined the destruction caused in japan by a combination of the blockade and


no need to invade japan proper, king argued, because japan was as good as defeated. this analysis would later be fully corroborated by the strategic bombing survey, which in 1946 examined the destruction caused in japan by a combination of the blockade and the incessant conventional bombing. the survey concluded that japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing, a soviet declaration of war, or an american invasion. that the utopians were also aware of these facts is attested by comments made to truman on june 6 by stimson. stimson wrote in his diary. " i told him i was anxious about this feature of the war [ massive conventional bombing ] for two reasons : first, because i did not want to have the united states get the reputation of outdoing hitler in atrocities ; and second, i was a little fearful that before we could get ready, the air force might have japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strength. he laughed and said he understood. " on aug. 6 at 8 : 16 in the morning the bomber enola gay dropped " little boy, " with a yield equivalent to 12, 500 tons of tnt, on the city of hiroshima, with a population of 290, 000 civilians and 43, 000 soldiers. when calculations were made at the end of august, the death toll was in the realm of 100, 000, but many more would die soon thereafter from the effects of the bombing. by the end of 1950, the toll had reached 200, 000, with death rates calculated at 54 %! on aug. 9, " fat man " was dropped on nagasaki, with 70, 000 dead calculated by the end of 1945 and a total of 140, 000 dead within the next five years. on hearing of the successful bombing of hiroshima, truman commented, " this is the greatest thing in history! " general macarthur was dumbfounded, as macarthur ' s pilot, weldon e. rhoades, noted in his diary on the day after the bombing : " general macarthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this frankenstein monster. i had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to okinawa. he wants time to think the thing out, so he has postponed the trip to some future date to be decided later. " the reaction and the cover - up more significant, perhaps, than the arduous plodding through the files to get a clear step - by - step picture of the events leading up to the decision, are the


to be decided later. " the reaction and the cover - up more significant, perhaps, than the arduous plodding through the files to get a clear step - by - step picture of the events leading up to the decision, are the revelations by the alperovitz team of the growing u. s. domestic reaction to the bombing and the frantic efforts by the perpetrators to cover their tracksa story which has received very little publicity. reports of the terrible facts and consequences of the atomic bombingsmost especially, author john hersey ' s " hiroshima, " which filled the august 1946 issue of the new yorker magazine and sold hundreds of thousands of copieshad a strong impact on the american public. a steady stream of criticism of the bombing came from key religious leaders in the united states. the effect of what james conant derided as " this type of sentimentalism " moved conantnow president of harvardto ask his friend harvey bundy to get stimson to counterattack. conant agreed with bertrand russell that the demonstration of the atomic bomb in a war situation had been essential to force the world into a control regime. but the american citizen had to be " convinced " by a counter - story on japan. at the time stimson was working on his memoirs, being assisted by harvey bundy ' s son, mcgeorge bundy. the two now readily undertook the task of providing the " cover - up " for the atom bomb decision. mcgeorge bundy would write a draft for stimson ' s perusal and signature. after his discussions with conant, harvey bundy himself had drafted a number of " pointers " that he felt should be included in such an article : namely, that the bomb decision was primarily ordered with the thought that it would save american lives ; that no major person in authority thought that japan would surrender on terms acceptable to the allies ; that the interim committee had rejected targets " where the destruction of life and property would be the very greatest " ; that the committee had discussed " intensively " whether the bomb should be used at all ; and that the committee had also considered the possibility of a demonstration prior to its use in war. in particular he wanted to downplay any inference that the bomb played any role in u. s. relations with the soviet union. with " old bundy ' s " notes in hand, " young bundy " who later, as national security adviser to kennedy and johnson, would help to maneuver these presidents into the jungles of vietnamwent


. relations with the soviet union. with " old bundy ' s " notes in hand, " young bundy " who later, as national security adviser to kennedy and johnson, would help to maneuver these presidents into the jungles of vietnamwent to work on the draft. various people, including groves, supreme court justice felix frankfurter, secretary of war robert patterson, and bernard baruch, who would shortly present truman ' s first draconian nuclear control plan to the united nations, had their say in the draft. groves underlined the basic lie of the piece : that the dropping of the bomb shortened the war by months and saved many human lives which the planned invasion of japan would have exacted. conant himself wanted to make the point that, given the tremendous destruction of the conventional bombing of japan, the atom bomb was just like any other bomb, only a bit more destructive. tellingly, conant urged bundy to drop all reference to the issue of the emperor in the paper. in the final draft, bundy so exaggerated the figures that it stated twice that the dropping of the bomb had saved over a million lives. and yet, the best estimates given to general marshall of the possible casualty rates of american forces in a full - scale invasion, were always in the range of 40, 000 to 46, 000. the big lie just kept getting bigger. the essay was published in the february 1947 issue of harper ' s magazine. breaking all precedent as regards copyright, harper ' s gave permission for anyone who wanted to reproduce the article to do so. it was therefore quickly reprinted in the washington post, the st. louis post dispatch, the omaha world herald, reader ' s digest, the bulletin of atomic scientists, and many other papers. mcgeorge bundy quipped to stimson, " the harper ' s article has been read by everyone i meet, and it seems to have covered the subject so well that i find no follow - up work needed.... i think we deserve some sort of medal for reducing these particular chatterers to silence. " not everyone felt that the effect was sufficient, however. conant had karl compton, the president of mit, launch a parallel defense of the bombing in the atlantic monthly, upping the ante in terms of the outrageous claims of the number of lives saved. " i believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousandsperhaps several millionsof lives, both american and japanese, " compton wrote. this was


terms of the outrageous claims of the number of lives saved. " i believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousandsperhaps several millionsof lives, both american and japanese, " compton wrote. this was, for them, not merely an attempt to justify their actions. " if the propaganda against the use of the atomic bomb had been allowed to grow unchecked, " conant wrote stimson, " the strength of our military position by virtue of having the bomb would have been correspondingly weakened, and with the weakening would have come a decrease in the probabilities of an international agreement for the control of atomic energy. " indeed this, and not the defeat of japan, had been the real wellsian purpose of the bomb project to begin with. the cold war begins the effect on russia of the hiroshima and nagasaki bombings was immediate. visiting moscow together with marshal zhukov a few days after the bombing of hiroshima, eisenhower, according to edgar snow, answered " a private question privately, " with the following remarks : " i would have said, i was sure we could keep the peace with russia. now, i don ' t know. i had hoped the bomb wouldn ' t figure in this war. until now i would have said that we three, britain with her mighty fleet, america with the strongest air force, and russia with the strongest land force on the continent, we three could have guaranteed the peace of the world for a long, long time to come. but now, i don ' t know. people are frightened and disturbed all over. everyone feels insecure again. " three policies emerged for dealing with the advent of the nuclear age. bertrand russell and his utopian co - thinkers demanded the united states get ready for preventive nuclear war against the soviet union, to enforce a u. s. - british nuclear monopoly. the policy of truman, and of wall street, was the " baruch plan " for world government enforcement of complete nuclear technological apartheid. among truman ' s circles there was still the illusion that the united states would remain sole proprietor of nuclear weapons for a long time to come. on oct. 8, 1946, truman was asked if the united states would keep control of all nuclear technological information. " well, i don ' t think it would do any good to let them in on the know - how, " truman said, " because i don ' t think they could do it, anyway. " truman ' s initial response to this was to attempt to use


don ' t think it would do any good to let them in on the know - how, " truman said, " because i don ' t think they could do it, anyway. " truman ' s initial response to this was to attempt to use the forum of the united nations to impose top - down control on the nations of the world with regard to the research and development and the production of nuclear technology, and the top - down control of the nuclear materials themselvesone of the key elements in the groves post - war plans for nuclear weapons, as norris documents. truman appointed the aging financier bernard baruch, formerly head of the war production board during world war i, as the head of the u. s. delegation to the un atomic energy commission, assuring a hard line on the control issue. baruch ' s plan demanded " swift and sure punishment " of any nation which attempted independently to develop nuclear technology, and insisted that the veto power of the un security council be suspended entirely in matters of atomic control. bertrand russell was also delighted with the baruch plan, as the realization of his " world government " idea. and the soviet union ' s swift and complete rejection of the baruch plan in 1946, provided grist for russell ' s " preventive war " mill ; in 1949 george eliot published a book entitled if russia strikes, in which he called on the united states to present moscow with an ultimatum : cease research and production efforts on the atomic bomb and accept the baruch plan, or face an american attack that would " raze the u. s. s. r. with an air atomic offensive. " the " preventive war " scenario also won its adherents among some u. s. military layers, particularly those air forces officers who had bought into the supremacy of " air power " as the real war - winning capability. the head of the newly founded united states air force, gen. henry h. ( hap ) arnold, in a report to secretary of war stimson, asserted that the " one defense against the atomic bomb " was " to hit it before it starts. " in a speech at the boston navy yard on aug. 25, 1950, navy secretary francis matthews gave a speech which supported the utopians ' thesis. matthews said that the united states should consider " instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace. " many other leading figures in the truman administration supported matthews ' callincluding stuart symington, director of the national security resources board and former secretary of the air force


states should consider " instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace. " many other leading figures in the truman administration supported matthews ' callincluding stuart symington, director of the national security resources board and former secretary of the air force, and gen. albert wedemeyer, commander of the sixth army. by the time of the matthews ' speech, however, the soviets had eliminated the u. s. atomic monopoly on nuclear weapons, exploding a nuclear device on the steppes of kazakstan in august 1949. the proposals for " preventive war " would continue on and off for several years, but neither truman, nor much less eisenhowerwho effectively judoed the utopian gameplanwere ever prepared to go that far. the world now entered the era of mutual and assured destruction. eisenhower ' s atoms for peace from here on in, preventive war with the soviets would be viewed as more and more suicidal. the resulting ' ' balance of terror " would now be used by the same utopians as the argument for bringing the world into the era of world government, including russell ' s attempt during the cuban missile crisis to bring the americans and the soviets into an " arms control regime. " the third post - war nuclear policy, however, and the initiative that promised to break through this controlled environment, was the " atoms for peace " program launched in 1953 by president eisenhower. envisioning international cooperation between states as the means of fostering their development by the peaceful uses of nuclear power, rather than the establishment of the institutional straitjacket of a world police regime, ike succeeded in engaging the soviet union in cooperation for development. in the course of that program, between 1956 and 1959, the united states concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with 40 different countries, with the soviet union providing nuclear power for the satellite countries of eastern europe. from 1956 to 1962, the atoms for peace program provided research reactors, nuclear training, and fissionable material to 26 states. later, in a similar peace - through - development initiative, president ronald reagan adopted lyndon larouche ' s technology - sharing concept for his strategic defense initiative ( sdi ) proposal. the utopians in the reagan administrationwho included such well - known figures in today ' s " get saddam " operation as richard perle, doug feith, and paul wolfowitzsucceeded in sabotaging that program, creating the basis for their " comeback " under george herbert walker bush. they are now intent on realizing the nightmare of the wellsian - russell