and from its mountain view, calif., campus, offering bikes for employees to ride from building to building on that campus, and using recyclable materials throughout those buildings. and when it comes to its server farms, " we do believe we have the most energy efficient data centers. " google takes exception on its official google blog to the statistics quoted in the times story regarding the energy used to web search vs. boiling a kettle of water. a speedy search uses less energy, the company claims ; about the same amount of energy as the human body uses in about 10 seconds. google has asked to see a copy of the study, and wissner - gross says he is more than happy to send them one. one of the times article ' s authors had interviewed a google engineer " whose job is to look at data centers to make sure they ' re more energy efficient, and he didn ' t really use any of his material, " yood said. google ' s side of things greenpeace doesn ' t really focus on the energy efficiencies used by google or web companies in general, said spokesperson daniel kessler. it is more focused on electronics products, the toxic materials used and company recycling initiatives. however, google gets high marks for its green efforts in washington d. c., kessler said. " i commend google for its lobbying and the legislative work they ' re doing when it comes to clean energy, " kessler told technewsworld. " in the whole tech sector, they ' re really on the forefront on taking action regarding the climate. " google ' s data centers burn through a lot of energy in the course of providing answers to search queries around the world, and the cheapest form of that energy right now is coal, said roger kay, principal at endpoint technologies associates, who keeps a close eye on the environmental policies at it companies. " it ' s taking that electricity bill they ' ve got and kind of making it a proportion of the total expenditure of the generation of electricity, and then allocating that as a cost to google and saying that ' s their responsibility, their piece of it, " kay told technewsworld. " it ' s just modeling, a modeling exercise that may not necessarily be a reflection of reality. " the location of the information needed in a web search may also play a part, kay said. " if you ' re looking for the latest on brad pitt, then that ' s likely to be stored in multiple servers towards the


reflection of reality. " the location of the information needed in a web search may also play a part, kay said. " if you ' re looking for the latest on brad pitt, then that ' s likely to be stored in multiple servers towards the edge of the network, where it will be an easy search. google through its traffic management knows a lot of people are interested in that. but if you want to read cicero ' s works, which haven ' t been read for a while, you may have to go deep into the network. " the researcher ' s take wissner - gross, who manages the web site co2stats. com to help educate people about energy efficiencies on the internet, has been inundated with press requests since the times story was published. the times quoted him correctly in the story as saying, " a google search has a definite environmental impact " and " google operates huge data centers around the world that consume a great deal of power, " he confirmed. " i don ' t think anybody would disagree with those statements, " wissner - gross said. " everything online has a definite environmental impact. i think everybody can agree on that, including google. " there ' s a difference between regular servers and those used in advanced data centers, wissner - gross said, and he acknowledges that google would have a financial interest in maintaining an energy - efficient infrastructure. " energy consumption may be a higher fraction of infrastructure costs for large companies like google than the hardware itself. " in between answering reporters ' e - mails and appearing on cnbc, wissner - gross has had a lot of time to think about why the sunday times focused on google in its story. " the short answer is, it ' s a really easy way to sell papers. google is a very successful company and it ' s a very easy way to get readership by making grandiose claims about them. "


new robots – about the size of a pair of dice – can assemble microcircuits, deliver injections to individual cells, and probe the molecule - scale world, according to a final report released last month on a european micro - robotics project called micron. the work could eventually lead to teams of such robots automating work on the molecular scale, first for research projects and prototype assembly, and eventually for industrial applications, such as testing drugs and building consumer electronics. the goal of the european project, which involved eight groups from seven countries, was to develop several small robots, each equipped with a specialized tool, and to show that the robots could work together to complete a task that a single robot working alone couldn ’ t do. the researchers managed to develop several tools, including micromanipulators, an atomic force microscope ( afm ) probe, and a precise “ syringe chip ” for injecting cells. but they did not achieve the teamwork goal – they ran out of time and money before getting more than one of a handful of prototypes working perfectly. nevertheless, “ it looks like they ’ ve made a great amount of progress. they ’ re pretty sophisticated robots, ” says ron fearing, professor of electrical engineering and computer sciences at uc berkeley, who is also developing tiny robots. “ it will start to be really interesting when they get dozens of robots working together, ” he says. “ but it ’ s a pretty impressive accomplishment just having a couple of those things working. ” in an experiment that used a robot to inject fluid into cells, a process scientists might use to study dna or the effects of new drugs, the researchers first fixed in place a single cell using traditional equipment. after the robot filled its syringe with fluid, it was guided to the cell by a human controller, and injected a precise amount of fluid into the cell ( small enough that the cell would not burst ). the liquid was designed to fluoresce once metabolized by the cell, confirming that the cell had survived the operation. once the researchers have more working robots, the robots could do all the required steps automatically, says jorg seyfried, head of micromechatronics and microrobotics at the university of karlsruhe, germany, the lead institution in the group. one robot might use an onboard digital camera ( developed during the project ) to locate the cells in a petri dish. another would find and hold one cell in place, while a third robot would perform the injection, guided


salvadoran civil war | | this article has multiple issues. please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. | salvadoran civil war | | part of the central american crisis | a reminder of one of many massacres that occurred during the civil war in el salvador, central america | salvadoran government forces | | fmln | commanders and leaders | | roberto d ' aubuisson jose guillermo garcia jose napoleon duarte | cayetano carpio † | casualties and losses | | 7, 000 dead | | 20, 000 dead4 | | 70, 000 – 80, 000 ( total dead ) ; 8, 000 disappeared56 | the salvadoran civil war ( 1979 – 1992 ) was a conflict between the military - led government of el salvador and the farabundo marti national liberation front ( fmln ), a coalition or ' umbrella organization ' of five left - wing guerrilla groups. on october 15, 1979 a coup, the first of three before the 1982 elections, led to the killings of anti - coup protesters by the government as well as anti - disorder protesters by the guerillas who also attacked the government. 7 by january 1980 the left - wing political organizations united to form the crm ( coordinated revolutionaries of the masses ) and a few months later the left - wing armed groups united to form the dru ( unified revolutionary directorate ) which, following its merging with the communist party in october 1980, was renamed the fmln7 the full - fledged civil war lasted for twelve years and was extremely violent. it included the use of death squads, heavy military equipment, the recruitment of child soldiers, the deliberate terrorizing and targeting of civilians, as well as other violations of human rights. the united states contributed to the conflict by providing large amounts of military aid to the government of el salvador during the carter8 and reagan administrations despite significant opposition from the american public. 9 in 1990 the un began peace negotiations and on january 16, 1992 a final agreement, the chapultepec peace agreement, was signed by the combatants in mexico city, formally ending the conflict. an unknown number of people " disappeared " during the conflict and the un reports that more than 75, 000 were killed. 10 el salvador is the smallest country in central america. as in many nations of latin america, the history of el salvador was characterized by marked socioeconomic inequality. 11 in the late 19th century, coffee became a major cash crop for el salvador, bringing in approximately 95 % of the country ' s income, which was confined within


of latin america, the history of el salvador was characterized by marked socioeconomic inequality. 11 in the late 19th century, coffee became a major cash crop for el salvador, bringing in approximately 95 % of the country ' s income, which was confined within only 2 % of the population. thus the population was sharply divided between a small powerful elite and an impoverished majority. 12 extreme tensions between the classes grew through the 1920s, which were only compounded by a drop in coffee prices following the stock - market crash of 1929. 1314 in 1932, augustin farabundo marti formed the central american socialist party and led peasants and indigenous people against the government. the government brutally suppressed the uprising in what became known as the 1932 salvadoran peasant massacre or simply " la matanza " ( the massacre ). in suppressing the uprising, the military murdered between 10, 000 and 40, 000 indians. marti was eventually arrested and put to death, and the military subsequently took power over the country. 15 the impact of " la matanza " lasted for decades, as the event served to engender and reinforce feelings of strong distrust and animosity towards the government, the military and the wealthy land elite among the majority of the population. on july 14, 1969, an armed conflict erupted between el salvador and honduras over immigration disputes caused by honduran land reform laws. the conflict ( known as the football war ) lasted only four days, but had major long term effects for salvadoran society. trade was disrupted between el salvador and honduras, causing tremendous economic damage to both nations. an estimated 300, 000 salvadorans were displaced due to battle, many of whom had been forcibly exiled from honduras or forced to flee their homes. the government subsequently proved unable to satisfy the economic needs of the refugees. the football war also served to reinforce the political power of the military in el salvador, stifling efforts at democratization in el salvador and leading to heightened corruption. in the years following the football war, the government increased military spending and expanded purchases of more modern and sophisticated weapons from sources such as israel, brazil, west germany, and the united states, which further consolidated the military ' s power and limited the availability of government funds to augment economic reforms. 16 the 1973 oil crisis led to rising food prices and decreased agricultural output due to the lack of obtainability of imported goods and petrol - based fertilizers. to stem the economic and political problems, a series of token land reform measures were implemented in the mid - 1970s by president arturo


food prices and decreased agricultural output due to the lack of obtainability of imported goods and petrol - based fertilizers. to stem the economic and political problems, a series of token land reform measures were implemented in the mid - 1970s by president arturo armando molina. the largest measure, implemented in june 1976, called for the redistribution of approximately 59, 000 hectares of land among 12, 000 peasant families. the subsequent failure of these reforms due to opposition from the land elite, coupled with rising levels of repression against workers unions and left - leaning political parties, only served to reinforce the already widespread discontent with the government. 17 in elections held on 20 february 1977, general carlos humberto romero, representing the national conciliation party ( pcn ), won against the center - left revolutionary party of democratic unification ( uno ). the elections had been marred by blatant fraud and voter intimidation by government - sponsored paramilitary forces. 18 with massive protest and civil disturbance from the popular movement. the short period between the election on 20 february 1977 and the formal inauguration of president romero on 1 july 1977 was characterized by high levels of social upheaval and state repression. on 28 february 1977, eight days after the elections, a crowd of political demonstrators gathered in an area of downtown san salvador near ' la plaza libertad ' to protest the electoral fraud. security forces arrived on the scene and opened fire on the demonstrators. a massacre ensued as the security forces spread out for several hours and indiscriminately killed demonstrators and bystanders alike. estimates of the number of civilians killed range as high as 1, 500. 19 president molina blamed the protests on " foreign communists, " and in the immediate aftermath of the massacre a number of top uno party members were exiled from the country. 20 repression continued after the inauguration of president romero, as the government implemented state - of - siege declarations, the suspension of civil liberties and systematic use of torture, death squads, forced disappearance and extrajudicial killing against the opposition. government forces regularly abducted, tortured and killed civilian opponents of the government. socorro juridico cristiano ( christian legal assistance, a legal aid office within the archbishop ' s office and el salvador ' s leading human rights group at the time ) documented the killings of 687 civilians by government forces in 1978. in 1979, the number of documented killings increased to 1, 796. 21 the repression further alienated the population and prompted many in the catholic church to denounce the government. the government responded to the


. economic measures and land tenure reforms were adopted. organizations within the popular movement subsequently came together to form the coordinadora revolucionaria de masas ( cr14 ). all three civilian members of the junta resigned on january 3, 1980, along with 10 of the 11 cabinet ministers. on march 9, 1980, jose napoleon duarte became a member of the junta when the christian democratic party expelled dada hizeri, ruben zamora and other leaders from its ranks. an unprecedented increase in death squad activities and government repression subsequently took place. on january 22, 1980, the salvadoran national guard attacked a massive cr14 demonstration, described as peaceful, killing up to 50 people and wounding hundreds more. 27 on february 6, us ambassador frank devine informed the state department that mutilated bodies were appearing on roadsides as they had done in the worst days of the romero regime and that the extreme right was arming itself and preparing for a confrontation in which it clearly expected to ally itself with the military. 28 in february 1980, amidst escalating violence and repression, archbishop oscar romero published an open letter to us president jimmy carter in which he pleaded with him to suspend its ongoing program of military aid to the salvadoran regime. he advised carter that " political power is in the hands of the armed forces. they know only how to repress the people and defend the interests of the salvadoran oligarchy. " romero warned that us support would only " sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect for their fundamental human rights. " 29 on 24 march 1980, the archbishop was assassinated while giving a mass — a month after his request, and the day after he called upon salvadoran soldiers and security force members ( national guard, treasury police, and national police ) not to follow orders of their commanders to kill salvadoran civilians, especially farm workers in connection with the newly announced phase i of government agrarian reform. at his funeral a week later, government - sponsored snipers in the national palace and / or posted on the periphery of the gerardo barrios plaza in front of the national cathedral, were responsible for the shooting deaths / trampling massacre of some forty - two mourners. on 7 may 1980, former army major roberto d ' aubuisson was arrested with a group of civilians and soldiers at a farm. the raiders found documents connecting him and the civilians as organizers and financiers of the death squad who killed archbishop romero, and of plotting a


army major roberto d ' aubuisson was arrested with a group of civilians and soldiers at a farm. the raiders found documents connecting him and the civilians as organizers and financiers of the death squad who killed archbishop romero, and of plotting a coup d ’ etat against the jrg. their arrest provoked right - wing terrorist threats and institutional pressures forcing the jrg to release maj. d ’ aubuisson. in 1993, a u. n. investigation confirmed that maj. d ' aubuisson ordered archbishop romero assassinated. 30 in addition to repression and violence in cities, rural violence began to escalate. exactly one week after the arrest of roberto d ' aubuisson for the assassination of oscar romero, the national guard and the newly reorganized paramilitary organizacion nacional democratica ( orden ), with the cooperation of the military of honduras, carried out a large massacre at the sumpul on may 14, 1980, in which an estimated 600 civilians were killed, mostly women and children. when the villagers were attempting to escape violence by crossing the river they were prevented from reaching the other side by the honduran armed forces " and then killed by salvadorian troops who fired on them in cold blood. " 31 assigning responsibility for the repression became the source of intense ideological polarization in the united states. an internal us state department memo from 1981 stated that the " death squads " were " usually a euphemism for the security or military forces. " 32 over the course of 1980, the salvadoran army and three main security forces ( national guard, national police and treasury police ) killed 11, 895 people. 21 most of the victims were peasants, trade unionists, teachers, students, journalists, human rights advocates, priests, and anyone working in the interest of the poor majority. more people were killed due to state repression in el salvador in 1980 than in all other nations of latin america combined. the salvadoran government subsequently gained recognition among human rights organizations as the hemisphere ' s most errant violator of human rights. 33 the us bureau of affairs later stated " the immediate goal of the salvadoran army and security forces — and of the united states in 1980, was to prevent a takeover by the leftist - led guerrillas and their allied political organizations. at this point in the salvadoran conflict the latter were much more important than the former. the military resources of the rebels were extremely limited and their greatest strength, by far, lay not in force of arms but in their " mass organizations " made up of labor


point in the salvadoran conflict the latter were much more important than the former. the military resources of the rebels were extremely limited and their greatest strength, by far, lay not in force of arms but in their " mass organizations " made up of labor unions, student and peasant organizations that could be mobilized by the thousands in el salvador ' s major cities and could shut down the country through strikes. " 34 critics of us military aid charged that " it would legitimate what has become dictatorial violence and that political power in el salvador lay with old - line military leaders in government positions who practice a policy of ' reform with repression. ' " a prominent catholic spokesman insisted that " any military aid you send to el salvador ends up in the hands of the military and paramilitary rightest groups who are themselves at the root of the problems of the country. " 35 on december 2, 1980, the salvadoran national guard raped and murdered four american nuns and a laywoman. maryknoll missionary nuns maura clarke, ita ford, and ursuline nun dorothy kazel, and laywoman jean donovan were on a catholic relief mission providing food, shelter, transport, medical care, and burial to death squad victims. u. s. military aid was briefly cutoff in response to the murders, but would be renewed within six weeks. 36 as government - sanctioned violence increased in both rural and urban settings, previously non - militant mass political groups metamorphosed into guerrilla fronts. the five main insurgent groups subsequently formed unity agreements and merged, while increasing the scale of their attacks. in may 1980, the salvadoran revolutionary leadership met in havana, forming the consolidated politico - military command, the dru — direccion revolucionaria unificada ( unified revolutionary directorate ). in october, they founded the farabundo marti national liberation front ( comprising the frente farabundo marti de liberacion nacional [ fmln ] and the frente democratico revolucionario [ fdr ] ) honoring insurgent hero farabundo marti, whom the salvadoran national guard killed in 1932. in late - 1980, the fmln announced plans for an insurrection against the government of el salvador. the insurrection began on 10 january 1981 with the fmln ' s first major attack. the attack established fmln control of most of morazan and chalatenango departments for the war ' s duration. attacks were launched on military targets throughout the country, leaving hundreds of people dead. government


the fmln ' s first major attack. the attack established fmln control of most of morazan and chalatenango departments for the war ' s duration. attacks were launched on military targets throughout the country, leaving hundreds of people dead. government sources reported that " at least 500 extremists " had died in the final offensive. after the onset of the offensive, united states operational planning and assistance teams ( opats ) took over the training of the salvadoran armed forces, logistics procedures, and command and control planning. at the salvadoran high command, u. s. military advisers prosecuted the war operationally and with intelligence. 3738 in addition, the outgoing carter administration increased military aid to the salvadoran armed forces to $ 10 million which included $ 5 million in rifles, ammunition, grenades and helicopters. in justifying these arms shipments, the administration claimed that the regime had taken " positive steps " to investigate the murder of four american nuns but this was disputed by us ambassador, robert e. white, who said that he could find no evidence the junta was " conducting a serious investigation. " 39 during the same month, the jrg strengthened the state of siege, imposed by president carlos humberto romero in may 1979, by declaring martial law and adopting a new set of curfew regulations. 40 between january 12 and february 19, 1981, 168 persons were killed by the security forces for violating curfew. 41 in its effort to defeat the insurgency, the salvadoran armed forces carried out a " scorched earth " strategy adopting tactics similar to those being employed by the counterinsurgency in neighboring guatemala. these tactics where primarily derived and adapted from u. s. strategy during the vietnam war, and taught by american military advisors. 42 an integral part of the salvadoran army ' s counterinsurgency strategy entailed " draining the sea " or " drying up the ocean, " that is, eliminating the insurgency by eradicating it ' s support base in the countryside. the primary target was the civilian population – displacing them in order to remove any possible base of support for the rebels. the concept of " draining the sea " had its basis in a doctrine by mao zedong which emphasized that " the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. " 43 aryeh neier, the executive director of americas watch wrote in a review of 1984 : " this may be an effective strategy for winning the war. it is, however, a strategy that involves the use


fish swims in the sea. " 43 aryeh neier, the executive director of americas watch wrote in a review of 1984 : " this may be an effective strategy for winning the war. it is, however, a strategy that involves the use of terror tactics — bombings, strafings, shellings and, occasionally, massacres of civilians. " 44 beginning in 1983, guerrilla strongholds were found by u. s. reconnaissance planes that relayed intelligence to the salvadoran military. 4546 the repression in rural areas resulted in the displacement of large portions of the rural populace, and many peasants fled. of those who fled or were displaced, some 20, 000 resided in makeshift refugee centers on the honduran border in conditions of poverty, starvation and disease. 47 the army and death squads forced many of them to flee to the united states but most were denied asylum. 48 on january 17 – 18, 1981, a us congressional delegation visited the refugee camps in el salvador on a fact finding mission and submitted a report to congress. the delegation concluded that " the salvadoran method of ' drying up the ocean ' is to eliminate entire villages from the map, to isolate the guerrillas, and deny them any rural base off which they can feed. " 49 the government ' s systematic use of terror - tactics and violent repression against the civilian population escalated through 1981. sources estimate that the army and security forces killed 16, 000 civilians in total over the course of that year. 5051 in its report covering 1981, amnesty international identified " regular security and military units as responsible for widespread torture, mutilation and killings of noncombatant civilians from all sectors of salvadoran society. " the report also stated that the killing of civilians by state security forces became increasingly systematic with the implementation of more methodical killing strategies, which allegedly included use of a meat packing plant to dispose of human remains. 52 between august 20 and august 25, 1981, eighty - three decapitations were reported. the murders were later revealed to have been carried out by a death squad using a guillotine. 53 in late - 1981, the atlacatl battalion, organized in 1980 at the us army school of the americas in panama, was deployed in the morazan department in the northeastern part of the country, a major stronghold for the fmln. on december 11, 1981, the atlacatl battalion occupied the village of el mozote and massacred at least 733 and possibly up to 1, 000 unarmed civilians in what became known as the


a major stronghold for the fmln. on december 11, 1981, the atlacatl battalion occupied the village of el mozote and massacred at least 733 and possibly up to 1, 000 unarmed civilians in what became known as the el mozote massacre. 54 the atlacatl soldiers accused the adults of collaborating with the guerrillas. the field commander said they were under orders to kill everyone, including the children, who he asserted would just grow up to become guerrillas if they let them live. " we were going to make an example of these people, " he said. 55 despite having been initially denied by the reagan administration, details became more widely known and the event became recognized as one of the worst atrocities of the conflict. in 1982, the fmln began calling for a peace settlement that would establish a " government of broad participation. " the reagan administration said they wanted to create a communist dictatorship. 56 elections were interrupted with right - wing paramilitary attacks and fmln - suggested boycotts. el salvador ' s national federation of lawyers, which represented all of the country ' s bar associations, refused to participate in drafting the 1982 electoral law. the lawyers said that the elections couldn ' t possibly be free and fair during a state of siege that suspended all basic rights and freedoms. the news - gazette, the country ' s english - language conservative newspaper supported the national bar association ' s stand. 57 pursuant with measures put in place by the jrg on october 18, 1979, elections for an interim government were held on april 29, 1982. the legislative assembly voted on three candidates nominated by the armed forces, alvaro alfredo magana borja, leader of the moderate democratic action and thus effectively politically independent, was elected by 36 votes to 17, ahead of the nationalist republican alliance ( arena ) and party of national conciliation candidates. roberto d ' aubuisson accused jaime abdul gutierrez avendano of imposing on the assembly " his personal decision to put alvaro alfredo magana borja in the presidency " in spite of a " categorical no " from the arena deputies. magana was sworn into office on 2 may. decree no. 6 of the national assembly suspended phase iii of the implementation of the agrarian reform, and was itself later amended. the apaneca pact was signed on 3 august 1982, establishing a government of national unity, whose objectives were peace, democratization, human rights, economic recovery, security and a strengthened international position. an attempt was made to form a transitional government which would establish a democratic


pact was signed on 3 august 1982, establishing a government of national unity, whose objectives were peace, democratization, human rights, economic recovery, security and a strengthened international position. an attempt was made to form a transitional government which would establish a democratic system. lack of agreement among the forces that made up the government and the pressures of the armed conflict prevented any substantive changes from being made during magana ' s presidency. 58 the activities of the insurgency continued during the period of interim government, as did government repression. the fmln attacked the ilopango air force base, destroying six of the air forces 14 bell uh - 1 iroquois helicopters, five of its 18 dassault ouragan aircraft and three c - 47s. 59 the guerrillas stepped up their activities against economic targets. between february and april, a total of 439 acts of sabotage were reported. 60 the number of acts of sabotage involving explosives or arson rose to 782 between january and september. 61 the united states embassy estimated the damage to the economic infrastructure at us $ 98 million. 62 fmln also carried out large - scale operations in the capital city and temporarily occupied urban centres in the countrys interior. according to some reports, the number of rebels ranged between 4, 000 and 5, 000 ; other sources put the number at between 6, 000 and 9, 000. 63 systemic and widespread human rights violations by the salvadoran military and security forces continued at high levels during the period of interim government. the inter - american commission on human rights reported that on may 24, 1982, a clandestine cemetery containing the corpses of 150 disappeared persons was discovered near puerta del diablo, panchimalco, approximately twelve kilometers from san salvador. 64 on june 10, 1982, almost 4, 000 salvadoran troops carried out a " cleanup " operation in the rebel - controlled chalatenango province. over 600 civilians were reportedly massacred during the army sweep. the salvadoran field commander acknowledged that an unknown number of civilian rebel sympathizers or " masas " were killed, while declaring the operation a success. 65 19 days later, the army massacred 27 unarmed civilians during house raids in a san salvador neighborhood. the woman were raped and murdered. everyone was dragged from their homes into the street and then executed. " the operation was a success, " said the salvadoran defense ministry communique. " this action was a result of training and professionalization of our officers and soldiers. " 66 during 1982 and 1983, government forces killed approximately 8, 000 civilians a


the operation was a success, " said the salvadoran defense ministry communique. " this action was a result of training and professionalization of our officers and soldiers. " 66 during 1982 and 1983, government forces killed approximately 8, 000 civilians a year. 67 although the figure is substantially less than the figures reported by human rights groups in 1980 and 1981, targeted executions as well as indiscriminate killings nonetheless remained an integral policy of the army and internal security forces, part of what professor william stanley of the university of new mexico has described as a “ strategy of mass murder ” designed to terrorize the civilian population as well as opponents of the government. 68 general adolfo blandon, the salvadoran armed forces chief of staff during much of the 1980s, has stated, " before 1983, we never took prisoners of war. " 69 by january 1984, americas watch observed that the human rights situation was " as bad as ever " and that " the principal reason that those abuses continue at such a high rate at a point when — one would guess — the armed forces should have run out of politically suspect persons to murder is that the murders instill terror. terror is the means whereby the armed forces maintain their authority. " 70 on february 7, 1984, nine labor leaders, including all seven top officials of one major federation, were arrested by the salvadoran national police and sent to a military court. the arrests were part of duarte ' s moves to crackdown on labor unions after more than 80 trade unionists were detained in a raid by the national police. the police confiscated the union ' s files and took videotape mugshots of each union member. during a 15 day interrogation, the nine labor leaders were beaten during late night questioning and were told to confess to being guerrillas. they were then forced to sign a written confession while blindfolded. they were never charged with being guerrillas but the official police statement said they were accused of planning to " present demands to management for higher wages and benefits and promoting strikes, which destabilize the economy. " a u. s. official said the embassy had " followed the arrests closely and was satisfied that the correct procedures were followed. " 71 in february, u. s. military advisers instructed the salvadoran air force to intensify bombing raids in conflictive and rebel - held zones. the air force was aided by new u. s. reconnaissance flights that supply it with improved intelligence. in april, the roman catholic church ' s human rights office, the tute -


were rebel sympathizers ( masas ). although, the practice was later terminated by u. s. advisers after protests by americas watch. 7576 in 1984, the u. s. embassy had characterized the civilians residing in fmln zones as " masas, " a term that originated with the guerrillas. according to the embassy, these masas were " something other than innocent civilian bystanders " because it said they provided " logistical support " for the guerrillas and " mingled " with them. as best the americas watch could determine, the " logistical support " consisted principally in maintaining their traditional subsistence farming, thereby providing themselves and the guerrillas with a source of food. " mingling " consisted principally in trying to remain in or near their original communities and not joining the vast refugee and displaced person populations. accordingly, americas watch criticized the embassy ' s stand. we said that calling these civilians " something other than innocent civilian bystanders " implied they were legitimate targets for attack. moreover, salvadoran and u. s. officials continue to attempt to justify attacks on civilians. — americas watch, 198577 in 1984 elections, christian democrat jose napoleon duarte won the presidency ( with 54 % of the votes ) against army major roberto d ’ aubuisson, of the nationalist republican alliance ( arena ). the elections were held under military rule amidst high levels of repression and violence, however, and candidates to the left of duarte ' s brand of christian democrats were excluded from participating. 78 fearful of a d ’ aubuisson presidency for public relations purposes, the cia financed duarte ' s campaign with some two million dollars. 79 after president jose napoleon duarte ' s election in 1984, human rights abuses at the hands of the army and security forces continued, but declined due to modifications made to the security structures. the policies of the duarte government attempted to make the country ' s three security forces more accountable to the government by placing them under the direct supervision of a vice minister of defense, but all three forces continued to be commanded individually by regular army officers, which, given the command structure within the government, served to effectively nullify any of the accountability provisions. 8081 the duarte government also failed to decommission personnel within the security structures that had been involved in gross human rights abuses, instead simply dispersing them to posts in other regions of the country. 82 while reforms were being made to the security forces, the army continued to massacre unarmed civilians in the country side. an americas watch report noted that


in gross human rights abuses, instead simply dispersing them to posts in other regions of the country. 82 while reforms were being made to the security forces, the army continued to massacre unarmed civilians in the country side. an americas watch report noted that the atlacatl battalion killed 80 unarmed civilians in cabanas in july, 1984 and carried out another massacre one month later, killing 50 displaced people in the chalatenango province. 83 the woman were raped and then everyone was systematically executed. 84 through 1984 and 1985, the salvadoran armed forces enacted a series of " civic - action " programs in chalatenango province. this consisted of the establishment of " citizen defense committees " to guard plantations and businesses against attacks by insurgents and the establishment of a number of free - fire zones. these measures were implemented under the command of lieutenant colonel sigifredo ochoa perez, a former director of the treasury police and political ally of major roberto d ' aubuisson who had previously been exiled to the us army war college for mutiny. 85 by january 1985 ochoa ' s forces had established 12 free - fire zones in chalatenango in which any inhabitants unidentified by the army were deemed to be insurgents. ochoa stated in an interview that areas within the free fire zone were susceptible to indiscriminate bombings by the salvadoran air force. ochoa referred to this strategy as the " israeli solution, " as it was adapted from israeli strategy employed in south lebanon in 1982. ochoa ' s forces were implicated in a massacre of about 40 civilians in an army sweep through one of the free fire zones in august 1985. ochoa refused to permit the red cross to enter these areas to deliver humanitarian aid to the victims. 86 ochoa ' s forces reportedly uprooted some 1, 400 civilian rebel supporters with mortar fire between september and november 1984. 87 by 1985, military repression had succeeded in disarticulating most of the trade unions and mass political organizations. many of the survivors from within these organizations were forced to flee the country or join the rebels. 88 a national opinion poll conducted in 1986 by the catholic university showed that 10 % of the population believed that the country was advancing to democracy ; 28 % said conditions had improved but that repression continued ; 45 % thought there was no significant change ; and 18 % believed freedom and democracy were diminishing. 89 in february 1986, tens of thousands of salvadorans marched through the streets of san salvador to protest duarte ' s economic austerity plan. the economic package


was no significant change ; and 18 % believed freedom and democracy were diminishing. 89 in february 1986, tens of thousands of salvadorans marched through the streets of san salvador to protest duarte ' s economic austerity plan. the economic package included a currency devaluation, increases in gas prices, import taxes, import restrictions and a few price freezes on basic goods. the austerity measures were designed by u. s. economic advisers who warned american aid might be withheld if the programs were not implemented. 90 during the central american peace accords in 1987, the fmln demanded that all death squads be disbanded and the members be held accountable. in october 1987, the salvadoran assembly approved an amnesty for civil - war related crimes. the amnesty law required the release of all prisoners suspected of being guerrillas and guerrilla sympathizers. pursuant with these laws, 400 political prisoners were released. insurgents were given a period of fifteen days to turn themselves over to the security forces in exchange for amnesty. 91 despite amnesty being granted to guerillas and political prisoners, amnesty was also granted to members of the army, security forces and paramilitary who were involved in human rights abuses. 92 overall levels of state repression began to escalate again following the 1987 amnesty, reaching levels comparable to the pre - 1985 period. as had occurred in the 1970s, the 1988 elections were followed by escalated government violence, as part of a deliberate campaign to terrorize voters and influence election results. an amnesty international report published in october 1988 titled, el salvador death squads : a government strategy, concluded that " forces involved include all branches of the salvadorian security apparatus, including the navy, air force and army and the security services, - - - including the national guard, the national police and the treasury police. personnel from these units have carried out torture and extrajudicial execution and have been responsible for " disappearances " - both while in uniform and in plain clothes. the death squad style is to operate in secret but to leave mutilated bodies of victims as a means of terrifying the population. victims are customarily found mutilated, decapitated, dismembered, strangled or showing marks of torture or rape. " the report also concluded that clandestine paramilitary units were used so the government wouldn ' t take the heat for state terrorism. 93 according to maria julia hernandez, director of the roman catholic church ' s human rights office, death squad killings always escalated when opposition activity increased and the government couldn ' t control it. 94 angered by


wouldn ' t take the heat for state terrorism. 93 according to maria julia hernandez, director of the roman catholic church ' s human rights office, death squad killings always escalated when opposition activity increased and the government couldn ' t control it. 94 angered by the results of the 1988 elections and the military ' s use of terror tactics and voter intimidation, the fmln launched a major offensive with the aim of unseating the christiani government on november 11, 1989. this offensive brought the epicenter of fighting into the wealthy suburbs of san salvador for essentially the first time in the history of the conflict, as the fmln began a campaign of selective assassinations against political and military officials, civil officials, and upper - class private citizens. the government retaliated with a renewed campaign of repression, primarily against activists in the democratic sector. 95 the non - governmental salvadoran human rights commission ( cdhes ) counted 2, 868 killings by the armed forces between may 1989 and may 1990. 96 in addition, the cdhes stated that government paramilitary organizations illegally detained 1, 916 persons and disappeared 250 during the same period. 97 as in the early 1980s, the university of central america fell under attack from the army and death squads. on 16 november 1989, five days after the beginning of the fmln offensive, the atlacatl battalion entered the campus of the university of central america in uniform and summarily executed six jesuit priests — ignacio ellacuria, segundo montes, ignacio martin - baro, joaquin lopez y lopez, juan ramon moreno, and amando lopez — and their housekeepers ( a mother and daughter, elba ramos and celia marisela ramos ). in the middle of the night, the six priests were dragged from their beds on the campus, machine gunned to death and their corpses mutilated. the mother and daughter were found shot to death in the bed they shared. 98 the atlacatl battalion was reportedly under the tutelage of u. s. special forces just 48 hours before the killings. 99 the liberation theology bishops were declared an enemy of the state for speaking out against state terror and working for the " preferential option of the poor. " 100 by the late 1980s, 75 % of the population lived in poverty. 101 the living standards of most salvadorans declined by 30 % since 1983. unemployment or underemployment increased to 50 %. 102 most people, moreover, still didn ' t have access to clean water or healthcare. the armed forces were feared, inflation


living standards of most salvadorans declined by 30 % since 1983. unemployment or underemployment increased to 50 %. 102 most people, moreover, still didn ' t have access to clean water or healthcare. the armed forces were feared, inflation rose almost 40 %, capital flight reached an estimated $ 1 billion, and the economic elite avoided paying taxes. 103 despite nearly $ 3 billion in american economic assistance, per capita income declined by one third. 101 american aid was distributed to urban businesses although the impoverished majority received almost none of it. 103 the congressional research service said the " esf [ u. s. economic support fund ] in central america is basically a security / military program undertaken to prop up the existing regimes and the elites who support them.. " 104 the united states had been providing most of the country ' s budget and underwriting almost all government policies. 103105 the concentration of wealth was even higher than before the u. s. - administered land reform program. the agrarian law generated windfall profits for the economic elite and buried the cooperatives in debts that left them incapable of competing in the capital markets. the oligarchs often took back the land from bankrupt peasants who couldn ' t obtain the credit necessary to pay for seeds and fertilizer. 106 although, " few of the poor would dream of seeking legal redress against a landlord because virtually no judge would favor a poor man. " 103 by 1989, 1 % of the landowners owned 41 % of the tillable land, while 60 % of the rural population owned 0 %. 101 after 10 years of war, more than one million people had been displaced out of a population of 5, 389, 000. 40 % of the homes of newly displaced people were completely destroyed and another 25 % were in need of major repairs. 107 death squad activities further escalated in 1990, despite a u. n. agreement on human rights signed july 26 by the cristiani government and the fmln. 108 in june 1990, u. s. president george bush announced an " enterprise for the americas initiative " to improve the investment climate by creating " a hemisphere - wide free trade zone. " 109 " for the first time, all five of the countries are led by presidents who were elected in contests widely considered free and fair, " the washington post reported from guatemala city. it is true, the post continues, that " conservative politicians in central america traditionally represented the established order despite their countries ' grossly distorted income patterns. but the wave of democracy that has swept the


fair, " the washington post reported from guatemala city. it is true, the post continues, that " conservative politicians in central america traditionally represented the established order despite their countries ' grossly distorted income patterns. but the wave of democracy that has swept the region in recent years appears to be shifting politicians ' priorities, " while observing that, " the new leaders... are committed to free - market economics. " the post explains, " neither in the plan nor in the declaration of antigua ' was there any mention of land reform or suggestion of new government social welfare programs to help the poor. " rather, they are adopting " a trickle - down approach to aid the poor. " " the idea is to help the poor without threatening the basic power structure, " a central american economist observes. 110 archbishop arturo rivera y damas said he believed president cristiani was committed to maintaining the system, favoring neoliberal programs that had been increasing poverty. 111 president bush authorized the release of $ 42. 5 million in military aid to the salvadoran armed forces on january 16, 1991. 112 in late january, the usulutan offices of the democratic convergence, a coalition of left - of - center parties, were attacked with grenades. on february 21, a candidate for the democratic national unity ( udn ) party and his pregnant wife were assassinated after ignoring death squad threats to leave the country or die. on the last day of the campaign, another udn candidate was shot in her eye when arena party gunmen opened fire on campaign activists putting up posters. despite fraudulent elections orchestrated by arena through voter intimidation, sabotage of polling stations by the arena - dominated central elections council and the disappearing of tens of thousands of names from the voting lists, the official u. s. observation team declared them " free and fair. " 113 death squad killings and disappearances remained steady throughout 1991 as well as torture, false imprisonment, and attacks on civilians by the army and security forces. opposition politicians and members of church and grassroots organizations representing peasants, women and repatriated refugees suffered constant death threats, arrests, surveillance and break - ins all year. the fmln killed two wounded u. s. military advisers and carried out indiscriminate attacks, kidnappings and assassinations of civilians. the war intensified in mid - 1991, as both the army and the fmln attempted to gain the advantage in the united nations - brokered peace talks prior to a cease - fire. indiscriminate attacks and executions by the armed forces increased as a result.


mid - 1991, as both the army and the fmln attempted to gain the advantage in the united nations - brokered peace talks prior to a cease - fire. indiscriminate attacks and executions by the armed forces increased as a result. 114 eventually, by april 1991, negotiations resumed, resulting in a truce that successfully concluded in january 1992, bringing about the war ' s end. citation needed on 16 january 1992, the chapultepec peace accords were signed in chapultepec castle, mexico city, to bring peace to el salvador. 115 the armed forces were regulated, a civilian police force was established, the fmln metamorphosed from a guerrilla army to a political party, and an amnesty law was legislated in 1993. 116 the peace process set up under the chapultepec accords was monitored by the united nations from 1991 until june 1997 when it closed its special monitoring mission in el salvador. during the 2004 elections, white house special assistant otto reich gave a phone - in press conference at arena party headquarters. he reportedly said he was worried about the impact an fmln win could have on the country ' s " economic, commercial, and migratory relations with the united states. " in february 2004, assistant secretary of state roger noriega told voters to " consider what kind of a relationship they want a new administration to have with us. " he met with all the candidates except schafik handal, the fmln candidate. this prompted 28 us congress members to send a letter to secretary of state colin powell saying mr. noriega " crossed a boundary " and that his remarks were perceived as " interference in salvadoran electoral affairs. " a week later, two us congressmen blasted reich ' s comments as inflammatory. 117 at war ' s end, the commission on the truth for el salvador registered more than 22, 000 complaints of political violence in el salvador, between january 1980 and july 1991, 60 percent about summary killing, 25 percent about kidnapping, and 20 percent about torture. these complaints attributed almost 85 percent of the violence to the salvadoran army and security forces alone. the salvadoran armed forces were accused in 60 percent of the complaints, the security forces ( i. e. the national guard, treasury police and the national police ) in 25 percent, military escorts and civil defense units in 20 percent of complaints, the death squads in approximately 10 percent, and the fmln in 5 percent. the truth commission could collect only a significant sample of the full number


and the national police ) in 25 percent, military escorts and civil defense units in 20 percent of complaints, the death squads in approximately 10 percent, and the fmln in 5 percent. the truth commission could collect only a significant sample of the full number of potential complaints, having had only three months to collect it. 118 the report concluded that more than 70, 000 people were killed, many in the course of gross violation of their human rights. more than 25 per cent of the populace was displaced as refugees before the u. n. peace treaty in 1992. 119120 the statistics presented in the truth commission ' s report are consistent with both previous and retrospective assessments by the international community and human rights monitors, which documented that the majority of the violence and repression in el salvador was attributable to government agencies, primarily the national guard and the salvadoran army. 121122123 a 1984 amnesty international report stated that that many of the 40, 000 people killed in the preceding five years had been murdered by government forces, who openly dumped the mutilated corpses, in an apparent effort to terrorize the population. 124125 despite mostly killing peasants, the government readily killed any opponent they suspected of sympathy with the guerrillas — clergy ( men and women ), church lay workers, political activists, journalists, labor unionists ( leaders, rank - and - file ), medical workers, liberal students and teachers, and human - rights monitors. 126 the state ' s terrorism was affected by the security forces, the army, the national guard, and the treasury police ; 127128 yet it was the paramilitary death squads who gave the government plausible deniability of, and accountability for, the political killings. typically, a death squad dressed in civilian clothes and traveled in anonymous vehicles ( dark windows, blank license plates ). their terrorism comprised publishing future - victim death lists, delivering coffins to said future victims, and sending the target - person an invitation to his / her own funeral. 129130 cynthia arnson, a latin american - affairs writer for human rights watch, says : the objective of death - squad - terror seemed not only to eliminate opponents, but also, through torture and the gruesome disfigurement of bodies, to terrorize the population. 131 in the mid - 1980s, state terror against salvadorans became open — indiscriminate bombing from military airplanes, planted mines, and the harassment of national and international medical personnel ; all indicate that, although death rates attributable to the death squads have


- 1980s, state terror against salvadorans became open — indiscriminate bombing from military airplanes, planted mines, and the harassment of national and international medical personnel ; all indicate that, although death rates attributable to the death squads have declined in el salvador since 1983, non - combatant victims of the civil war have increased dramatically. 132 though the violations of the fmln accounted for five percent or less of those documented by the truth commission, the fmln continuously violated the human rights of many salvadorans and other individuals identified as right - wing supporters, military targets, pro - government politicians, intellectuals, public officials, and judges. these violations included kidnapping, bombings, rape, and killing. 118 in accordance with the peace agreements, the constitution was amended to prohibit the military from playing an internal security role except under extraordinary circumstances. during the period of fulfilling of the peace agreements, the minister of defense was general humberto corado figueroa. demobilization of salvadoran military forces generally proceeded on schedule throughout the process. the treasury police and national guard were abolished, and military intelligence functions were transferred to civilian control. by 1993 — nine months ahead of schedule — the military had cut personnel from a wartime high of 63, 000 to the level of 32, 000 required by the peace accords. by 1999, esaf strength stood at less than 15, 000, including uniformed and non - uniformed personnel, consisting of personnel in the army, navy, and air force. a purge of military officers accused of human rights abuses and corruption was completed in 1993 in compliance with the ad hoc committee ' s recommendations. citation needed the new civilian police force, created to replace the discredited public security forces, deployed its first officers in march 1993, and was present throughout the country by the end of 1994. as of 1999, the pnc had over 18, 000 officers. the pnc faced many challenges in building a completely new police force. with common crime rising dramatically since the end of the war, over 500 pnc officers had been killed in the line of duty by late 1998. pnc officers also have arrested a number of their own in connection with various high - profile crimes, and a " purification " process to weed out unfit personnel from throughout the force was undertaken in late 2000. 133 in 1986, a major earthquake punctuated the war ; and for three years fighting lessened and calls for negotiation grew within the context of the rising social movement, the national debate for peace ; also the human rights commission of el salvador - non


. 133 in 1986, a major earthquake punctuated the war ; and for three years fighting lessened and calls for negotiation grew within the context of the rising social movement, the national debate for peace ; also the human rights commission of el salvador - non governmental ( cdhes ) published a 165 - page report documenting the routine use of forty types of torture applied to political prisoners in the mariona men ' s prison, and that u. s. military advisers often supervised and sometimes participated in said interrogations. 134135 on 26 october 1987, herbert ernesto anaya, head of the cdhes, was assassinated. his killing provoked four days ' of political protest — during which his cadaver was displayed before the u. s. embassy and then before the salvadoran armed forces headquarters. the national union of salvadoran workers said : those who bear sole responsibility for this crime are jose napoleon duarte, the u. s. embassy... and the high command of the armed forces. in its report the commission on the truth for el salvador, established as part of the el salvador peace agreement, stated that it could not establish for sure whether the death squads, the salvadoran army or the fmln was responsible for anaya ' s death. moreover, the fmln and the revolutionary democratic front ( fdr ) also protested mr. anaya ' s assassination by suspending negotiations with the duarte government on 29 october 1987. the same day, reni roldan resigned from the commission of national reconciliation, saying : the murder of anaya, the disappearance of university labor leader salvador ubau, and other events do not seem to be isolated incidents. they are all part of an institutionalized pattern of conduct. mr. anaya ' s assassination evoked international indignation : the west german government, the west german social democratic party, and the french government asked president duarte to clarify the circumstances of the crime. united nations secretary general, javier perez de cuellar, americas watch, amnesty international, and other organizations protested against the assassination of the leader of the human rights commission of el salvador. 136 groups seeking investigation or retribution for actions during the war have sought the involvement of other foreign courts. in 2008 the spanish association for human rights and a california organization called the center for justice and accountability jointly filed a lawsuit in spain against former president cristiani and former defense minister larios in the matter of the 1989 slaying of several jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter. the lawsuit accused cristiani of a cover -


jointly filed a lawsuit in spain against former president cristiani and former defense minister larios in the matter of the 1989 slaying of several jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter. the lawsuit accused cristiani of a cover - up of the killings and larios of participating in the meeting where the order to kill them was given ; the groups asked the spanish court to intervene on the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. 137 long after the war, in a u. s. federal court, in the case of ford vs. garcia the families of the murdered maryknoll nuns sued the two salvadoran generals believed responsible for the killings, but lost ; the jury found gen. carlos eugenio vides casanova, ex - national guard leader and duarte ' s defense minister, and gen. jose guillermo garcia — defense minister from 1979 to 1984, not responsible for the killings ; the families appealed and lost, and, in 2003, the u. s. supreme court refused to hear their final appeal. a second case, against the same generals, succeeded in the same federal court ; the three plaintiffs in romagoza vs. garcia won a judgment exceeding us $ 54 million dollars compensation for having been tortured by the military during el salvador ' s civil war. the day after losing a court appeal in october, 2009, the two generals were put into deportation proceedings by the immigration and customs enforcement ( ice ), at the urging of u. s. senators richard durbin ( democrat ) and tom coburn ( republican ), according to the center for justice and accountability ( cja ). those deportation proceedings as of may, 2010 have been stalled, however ; one of the plaintiffs in the case believes the u. s. cia / dod — protecting its " assets " — has stymied the obama justice department, for now. the spanish judge who issued indictments and arrest warrants for 20 former members of the salvadoran military, charged with murder, crimes against humanity and terrorism requested that us agencies declassify documents related to the killings of the jesuits, their housekeeper and her daughter but were denied access. in his report, judge velasco writes : " the agencies in charge of making the information public have identified 3, 000 other documents that remain secret and are not available ; the reasoning given is that privacy is needed to protect sources and methods. many of the documents, from the cia and the defense department, are not available … " 138 - command responsibility - el mozote massacre - history of


and are not available ; the reasoning given is that privacy is needed to protect sources and methods. many of the documents, from the cia and the defense department, are not available … " 138 - command responsibility - el mozote massacre - history of el salvador - human rights abuse - international law - weapons of the salvadoran civil war - peace accords - voces inocentes ( film ) - romero ( film ) - salvador ( film ) | | constructs such as ibid., loc. cit. and idem are discouraged by wikipedia ' s style guide for footnotes, as they are easily broken. please improve this article by replacing them with named references ( quick guide ), or an abbreviated title. ( july 2012 ) | - uppsala conflict data program conflict encyclopedia, el salvador, in depth, negotiating a settlement to the conflict, http : / / www. ucdp. uu. se / gpdatabase / gpcountry. php? id = 51®ionselect = 4 - central _ americas #, "... us government increased the security support to prevent a similar thing to happen in el salvador. this was, not least, demonstrated in the delivery of security aid to el salvador ", viewed on may 24, 2013 - " inevitable revolutions : the united states in central america " by walter lafeber, 1993 - uppsala conflict data expansion. non - state actor information. codebook pp. 215 - 219. - irvine, reed and joseph c. goulden. " u. s. left ' s ' big lie ' about el salvador deaths. " human events ( 9 / 15 / 90 ) : 787. - dictionary of wars, by george childs kohn ( facts on file, 1999 ) - britannica, 15th edition, 1992 printing - uppsala conflict data program conflict encyclopedia, el salvador, in depth : negotiating a settlement to the conflict, http : / / www. ucdp. uu. se / gpdatabase / gpcountry. php? id = 51®ionselect = 4 - central _ americas #, viewed on may 24, 2013 - uppsala conflict data program conflict encyclopedia, el salvador, in depth : negotiating a settlement to the conflict, http : / / www. ucdp. uu. se / gpdatabase / gpcountry. php? id = 51®ionselect = 4 - central _ americas #, " while nothing of the aid delivered from the us in 1979 was ear


. ucdp. uu. se / gpdatabase / gpcountry. php? id = 51®ionselect = 4 - central _ americas #, " while nothing of the aid delivered from the us in 1979 was earmarked for security purposes the 1980 aid for security only summed us $ 6, 2 million, close to two - thirds of the total aid in 1979 ", viewed on may 24, 2013 - pbs, enemies of the war, http : / / www. pbs. org / itvs / enemiesofwar / elsalvador2. html, viewed may 24, 2013 - " report of the un truth commission on el salvador " united nations, 1 april 1993 - " inevitable revolutions : the united states in central america " by walter lafeber, 1993 - haggerty, richard a. ( 1990 ). el salvador : a country study. headquarters, department of the army. p. 49. - " el salvador en los anos 1920 – 1932 ". archived from the original on 15 september 2008. retrieved september 14, 2008. ( spanish ) - armed forces of el salvador. " revolucion 1932 ". archived from the original on june 19, 2008. retrieved september 14, 2008. ( spanish ) - university of california, san diego ( 2001 ). " el salvador elections and events 1902 – 1932 ". archived from the original on may 21, 2008. retrieved august 12, 2008. - haggerty, richard a. ( november 1988 ). el salvador : a country study. foreign military influence and assistance : federal research division library of congress. - walter, williams ( 1997 ). militarization and demilitarization in el salvador ’ s transition to democracy. p. 90. - armstrong, robert / shenk, janet. el salvador : the face of revolution ( boston : south end press, 1982 ), 163. - stanely ( 1996 ). pp. 109 – 110. missing or empty - dunkerley, james ( 1982 ). the long war : dictatorship and revolution in el salvador. pp. 106 – 107. - socorro juridico cristiano ( stanley 1996, 1 - 2, 222 ) - library of congress. country studies. el salvador. background to the insurgency. - dissent paper on el salvador and central america : written with the participation of members of the national security council, the department of state, the department of defense, the central intelligence agency, and congress u. s. committee in solidarity with the


insurgency. - dissent paper on el salvador and central america : written with the participation of members of the national security council, the department of state, the department of defense, the central intelligence agency, and congress u. s. committee in solidarity with the people of el salvador, 1980 - " the aid for el salvador is called nonlethal " the new york times, june 15, 1980 - " u. s. aid to salvador army : bid to bar ' another nicaragua ' ; news analysis action criticized by left christian democrats in junta sent military equipment " new york times, february 23, 1980 - report of the un truth commission on el salvador. april 1, 1993. p. 27. - ibid 2. - united states embassy in san salvador, cable 02296, 31 march 1980. the washington post, 31 march 1980. op. cit., national security archives, el salvador : the making of us policy, 1977 - 1984, p. 34. - " learn from history ", 31st anniversary of the assassination of archbishop oscar romero " the national security archive, march 23, 2011 - report of the un truth commission on el salvador, april 1, 1993, from the equipo nizkor / derechos site. retrieved 2008 - 07 - 16. - " sumpul river ( 1980 ) 121 " report of the un truth commission on el salvador, 1 april 1993 - detailed evidence of government violence against non - guerrilla elements. 1981. p. 2. - " guatemala and el salvador : latin america ' s worst human rights violators in 1980 " the council on hemispheric affairs - " central america, us policy " bureau of public affairs, dept. of state, 1985 - " crossroads : congress, the president, and central america, 1976 - 1993 " by cynthia arnson, 1993 - the american connection : state terror and popular resistance in el salvador by michael mcclintock, 1985 - " expanding roles and missions in the war on drugs and terrorism : el salvador and colombia " the u. s. army professional writing collection - " us military advisers in salvadoran civil war, 1980 - 1992 " us congressional and senate hearings, 1981, 1986, 1988 - " the world in summary ; guerrillas regroup as carter switches on salvador arms " the new york times, january 25, 1981 - national security archive 1989, p. 25 - 72 - amnesty international. amnesty international report 1982 ( london : ai, 1981 ) - " instruments of statecraft : u. s. guerilla warfare,


new york times, january 25, 1981 - national security archive 1989, p. 25 - 72 - amnesty international. amnesty international report 1982 ( london : ai, 1981 ) - " instruments of statecraft : u. s. guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism, 1940 - 1990 " by michael mcclintock, 1992 - weinberg 1991 : 62 - 3 - " draining the sea " americas watch, 1985 - " el salvador intensifies its air war against guerrillas " los angeles times, july 17, 1985 - " salvadoran air force taking bigger role in war " associated press, may 19, 1984 - " el salvador ; intimidation, strong army blamed as revolt fizzles " the boston globe, jan 27, 1981 - " central americans feel sting of new u. s. immigration law " the new york times, april 19, 1997 - " central america, 1981 : report to the committee on foreign affairs, u. s. house of representatives " gerry e. studds, william woodward, united states. congress. house. committee on foreign affairs, 1981 - amnesty international. amnesty international report 1984 - amnesty international. amnesty international report 1982 ( london : ai, 1981 ), p. 133. - national security archive 1989, p. 43 - raymond bonner ( january 27, 1982 ). " massacre of hundreds reported in salvador village ". the new york times. - " the truth of el mozote " mark danner, new yorker, 1993 - " salvador rebels adapt to long war with new strategy. they focus on getting civilian support and exploiting duarte ' s problems for political gains " christian science monitor, november 26, 1986 - " weakness and deceit : u. s. policy and el salvador " by raymond bonner, 1984 - report of the un truth commission on el salvador. 1993. p. 30. - the new york times, 7 february 1982. - centro universitario de documentacion e informacion, proceso, ano 3, no. 98, february – april 1982. - united nations, report of the special representative of the commission on human rights, 1982, p. 33 - united states embassy in san salvador ( cable 02165 ), 3 march 1983. - united states embassy in san salvador ( cable 00437 ), 3 december 1982. - oas - iachr, annual report, 1981 - 1982, pp. 115 - 116. - " u. s. tactics fail to prevent salvadoran civilian


states embassy in san salvador ( cable 00437 ), 3 december 1982. - oas - iachr, annual report, 1981 - 1982, pp. 115 - 116. - " u. s. tactics fail to prevent salvadoran civilian deaths " washington post, jun 10, 1982 - " salvadoran troops massacre civilians " the associated press, jan 29, 1982 - stanley, william. the protection racket state : elite politics, military extortion, and civil war in el salvador ( philadelphia : temple university press, 1996 ), p. 3 - ( stanley, 1996, p. 225 ) - danner, mark. the massacre at el mozote ( new york : vintage books, 1994 ). - " as bad as ever : a report on human rights in el salvador, january 31, 1984 " americas watch, 1984 - " 9 salvador unionists face trial on charges of being guerrillas " boston globe, feb 7, 1984 - " u. s. reconnaissance helps el salvador increase bombing " washington post, apr 12, 1984 - " salvador raiding villages? " christian science monitor, april 6, 1984 - " el salvador using napalm, civilians charge " pacific news service, april 27, 1984 - " el salvador military said to bomb red cross aid sites " christian science monitor, march 26, 1984 - " free fire : a report on human rights in el salvador, august 1984, fifth supplement " americas watch, 1984 - " settling into routine : human rights abuses in duarte ' s second year " americas watch, 1985 - " observing el salvador : the 1984 elections " by pc chitnis - " salvador ' s duarte backs down on peace talks, further weakening his influence " christian science monitor, january 25, 1985 - amnesty international. amnesty international report 1985 ( london : ai, 1985 ), p. 143. - new york times. lemoyne, james. “ a salvador police chief vows an end to abuses ” ( san salvador : 1 july 1984 ). - amnesty international. amnesty international ’ s current concerns in el salvador ( london : amr 29 / 09 / 85, june 1985 ), p. 3. - " a year of reckoning : el salvador a decade after the assassination of archbishop romero " americas watch, 1990 - " salvadoran army accused of massacres " associated press, mar. 28, 1985 - " salvador colonel who mutinied is back in war " christian science monitor, september 26, 1984 - " u. s. - backed strategy creates militias, free


salvadoran army accused of massacres " associated press, mar. 28, 1985 - " salvador colonel who mutinied is back in war " christian science monitor, september 26, 1984 - " u. s. - backed strategy creates militias, free - fire zones " dallas morning news, january 21, 1985 - " salvador colonel runs province as a warlord " christian science monitor, march 21, 1985 - " bach and war in el salvador " the spectator, m ~ ~ ~ ~ ay 10, 1986 - " central america update, volume 7, issues 4 - 9 " catholic university, 1986 - " thousands of salvadorans march to protest duarte ' s economic austerity plan " the los angeles times, february 22, 1986 - manuel, anne ( september 1988 ). nightmare revisited, 1987 - 1988 : tenth supplement to the report on human rights in el salvador. background to the deterioration : human rights watch. pp. 5 – 7. - " salvadoreans attack amnesty law. they criticize new bill for absolving death squads " christian science monitor, october 29, 1987 - " el salvador : " death squads " - - a government strategy " amnesty international, 1988 - " violent incidents again on rise in el salvador " the sun sentinel, july 12, 1987 - a. hilsdon ( 2000 ). p. 193. missing or empty - central america report 14 sept. 1990, 277 - central america report 31 aug. 1990 - " 6 priests killed in a campus raid in san salvador " the new york times, november 17, 1989 - " salvadoran justice wears out patience " the new york times, may 13, 1990 - " a year of reckoning : el salvador a decade after the assassination of archbishop romero " human rights watch, 1990 - " inevitable revolutions : the united states in central america " by walter lafeber, 1993 - " rightists deal u. s. - backed duarte a crushing defeat " march 27, 1988 - " after parades and promises, duarte flounders in salvador " new york times, february 16, 1987 - " inevitable revolutions : the united states in central america " by walter lafeber, 1993 - " nightmare revisited, 1987 - 88 : tenth supplement to the report on human rights in el salvador " americas watch, 1988 - " land for salvador ' s poor : to many, bitter victory " new york times, september 28, 1987 - " central america ' s health plight " christian science monitor, march 22, 1990 - " amnesty reports increase in death squad


, 1988 - " land for salvador ' s poor : to many, bitter victory " new york times, september 28, 1987 - " central america ' s health plight " christian science monitor, march 22, 1990 - " amnesty reports increase in death squad killings " the orlando sentinel, october 24, 1990 - " bush asks hemisphere - wide free trade " chicago tribune, june 28, 1990 - " central americans to employ trickle - down strategy in war on poverty " washington post, jun 20, 1990 - " central america newspak, volume 5 " the center, 1990 - " bush to free el salvador military aid " associated press, january 16, 1991 - " rightist intimidation wins in el salvador " in in these times, april 3, 1991 - " human rights watch world report 1992 - el salvador " human rights watch, 1 january 1992 - the el salvador accords : a model for peace keeping actions - amnesty law biggest obstacle to human rights, say activists by raul gutierrez, inter press service news agency, may 19, 2007 - " el salvador vote recalls cold - war power play " the christian science monitor, march 19, 2004 - from madness to hope : the 12 - year war in el salvador, part iv. cases and patterns of violence, truth commissions digital collection : reports : el salvador, united states institute of peace. retrieved 2008 - 07 - 16. - el salvador ’ s decade of terror, 107. - " u. s. role in salvador ' s brutal war, " bbc news, march 24, 2002. - el salvador ’ s decade of terror, americas watch, human rights watch books, yale university press, 1991. - el salvador : ' death squads ' — a government strategy. new york : amnesty international, 1988. - from madness to hope : the 12 - year war in el salvador : report of the commission on the truth for el salvador. - extrajudicial executions in el salvador : report of an amnesty international mission to examine post - mortem and investigative procedures in political killings, 1 - 6 july, 1983. amnesty international publications. 5 / 1984. - amnesty international report. amnesty international publications. 1985. p. 145. - el salvador ’ s decade of terror, vii. - mcclintock, mchael, the american connection : state terror and popular resistance in el salvador, zed books, 308. - el salvador ’ s decade of terror, 47. - martin, gus. understanding terrorism : challenges, perspectives and issues, sage publications, 2003, 110. - el salvador


state terror and popular resistance in el salvador, zed books, 308. - el salvador ’ s decade of terror, 47. - martin, gus. understanding terrorism : challenges, perspectives and issues, sage publications, 2003, 110. - el salvador ’ s decade of terror, 21. - arnson, cynthia j. " window on the past : a declassified history of death squads in el salvador, " in death squads in global perspective : murder with deniability, campbell and brenner, eds., 86. - lopez, george a. " terrorism in latin america, " in the politics of terrorism, michael stohl, ed. - profile, el salvador - " torture in el salvador : from la esperanza ( mariona ) prison, san salvador, el salvador, c. a. " comision de derechos humanos de el salvador, 1986 - " beat the devil ; after the press left " the nation, 1987 - jose gutierrez : the killing of herbert anaya sanabria green left online, 7 april 1993 ( english ) - daniel woolls, associated press. " el salvador massacre case filed in spanish court, " november 13, 2008. retrieved 2008 - 11 - 14. - " the right to information is the right to justice : declassified documents and the assassination of the jesuits in el salvador " the national security archive, november 16, 2009 - americas watch ( 1993 ). el salvador ' s decade of terror : human rights since the assassination of archbishop romero. new haven, london : yale university press. - bonner, raymond ( 1984 ). weakness and deceit : u. s. policy and el salvador. new york, ny : times books. - commission on the truth for el salvador ( 1993 ). from madness to hope : the 12 - year war in el salvador. un security council. - federal research division ( 1988 ). a country study : el salvador. washington, dc : us library of congress. - leogrande, william m. ( 1998 ). our own backyard : the united states in central america, 1977 - 1992. chapel hill, nc : university of north carolina press. - montgomery, tommie sue ( 1995 ). revolution in el salvador : from civil strife to civil peace. boulder, co : westview press. - whitfield, teresa ( 1995 ). paying the price : ignacio ellacuria and the murdered jesuits of el salvador. philadelphia, pa : temple university press. - binford, leigh ( 1996 ).


, co : westview press. - whitfield, teresa ( 1995 ). paying the price : ignacio ellacuria and the murdered jesuits of el salvador. philadelphia, pa : temple university press. - binford, leigh ( 1996 ). the el mozote massacre. university of arizona press. - wright, barbara. white hands ( novel excerpt ). stony brook, ny : southampton review, vol. iv, no. 1, spring 2010. - lafeber, walter ( 1993 ). inevitable revolutions : the united states in central america. new york city, ny : w. w. norton & company. - fish, joe ( 1988 ). el salvador : testament of terror. london : zed books. - carothers, thomas ( 1993 ). in the name of democracy : u. s. policy toward latin america in the reagan years. university of california press. - lowenthal, abraham ( 1991 ). exporting democracy : the united states and latin america : themes and issues. johns hopkins university press. - anderson, scott ( 1986 ). inside the league : the shocking expose of how terrorists, nazis, and latin american death squads have infiltrated the world anti - communist league. dodd mead. - grandin, greg ( 2007 ). empire ' s workshop : latin america, the united states, and the rise of the new imperialism. holt paperbacks. - mcclintock, michael ( 1985 ). the american connection : state terror and popular resistance in el salvador. zed books. - mcclintock, michael ( 1992 ). instruments of statecraft : u. s. guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, and counter - terrorism, 1940 - 1990. pantheon books. - unhcr refworld search for fmln - report of the commission on the truth for el salvador ( 1993 ) - cia world factbook on el salvador - un general assembly resolution on the " situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in el salvador " - cia threat assessment of el salvador in 1979 - questionnaire for the new york times on its central america coverage, fair ( fairness and accuracy in reporting ), february 1998 - the houses are full of smoke - el salvador by allan francovich, 1987 - in the name of the people by frank christopher & alex drehsler ; narrated by martin sheen, 1985 - war on democracy by john pilger, 2007 - el salvador and the school of the americas school of the americas watch - labor movement in el salvador 1987 - human rights in el salvador (


most bumps on the eyelid are styes. a stye is an inflamed oil gland on the edge of your eyelid, where the lash meets the lid. it appears as a red, swollen bump that looks like a pimple. it is tender, especially to the touch. bump on the eyelid ; stye ; hordeolum causes, incidence, and risk factors : a stye is caused by bacteria from the skin that get into the oil glands in the eyelids that provide lubrication to the tear film. styes are similar to common acne pimples that occur elsewhere on the skin. you may have more than one stye at the same time. styes usually develop over a few days and may drain and heal on their own. a stye can become a chalazion - - this is when an inflamed oil gland becomes fully blocked. if a chalazion gets large enough, it can cause trouble with your vision. if you have blepharitis ( see eye redness ), you are more likely to get styes. other possible eyelid bumps include : xanthelasma - - raised yellow patches on your eyelids that can happen with age. these are harmless, although they are occasionally a sign of high cholesterol. - papillomas - - pink or skin - colored bumps. they are harmless, but can slowly grow, affect your vision, or bother you for cosmetic reasons. if so, they can be surgically removed. - cysts - - small fluid - filled sacs that can affect your vision. in addition to the red, swollen bump, other possible symptoms include : signs and tests : a doctor can diagnose a stye just by looking at it. special tests are usually not necessary. - styes and chalazions can be treated by applying warm compresses. apply for 10 minutes. do this four times a day. - do not attempt to squeeze a stye or any other type of eyelid bump. let it drain on its own. - antibiotic creams may help recurrent or persistent styes. some large styes need to be lanced to drain the infection. styes often get better on their own. however, they may recur. the outcome is generally excellent with simple treatment. - recurrence of a stye - spread of infection to other eyelash follicles - spread of infection to the tissue of the eyelid ( eyelid cellulitis


they may recur. the outcome is generally excellent with simple treatment. - recurrence of a stye - spread of infection to other eyelash follicles - spread of infection to the tissue of the eyelid ( eyelid cellulitis ) calling your health care provider : call your doctor if : - you have problems with your vision. - the eyelid bump worsens or does not improve within a week or two of self - care. - the eyelid bump or bumps become very large or painful. - you have a blister on your eyelid. - you have crusting or scaling of your eyelids. - your whole eyelid is red, or the eye itself is red. - you are very sensitive to light or have excessive tears. - a stye comes back soon after successful treatment of another one. - your eyelid bump bleeds. always wash your hands thoroughly before touching the skin around your eye. if you are susceptible to styes, it may help to carefully clean off excess oils from the edges of your lids. wright jl, wightman jm. red and painful eye. in : marx ja, ed. rosen ’ s emergency medicine : concepts and clinical practice. 7th ed. philadelphia, pa : mosby elsevier ; 2009 : chap 32. neff ag, carter kd. benign eyelid lesions. in : yanoff m, duker js, eds. ophthalmology. 3rd ed. st. louis, mo : mosby elsevier ; 2008 : chap 12. 9. | review date : 8 / 3 / 2010 | reviewed by : linda j. vorvick, md, medical director, medex northwest division of physician assistant studies, university of washington, school of medicine. also reviewed by david zieve, md, mha, medical director, a. d. a. m., inc. the information provided herein should not be used during any medical emergency or for the diagnosis or treatment of any medical condition. a licensed medical professional should be consulted for diagnosis and treatment of any and all medical conditions. call 911 for all medical emergencies. links to other sites are provided for information only - - they do not constitute endorsements of those other sites. © 1997 - a. d. a. m., inc. any duplication or distribution of the information contained herein is strictly prohibited.


this article has been corrected since it was published in the print magazine. my father was a child of the great depression. born in newark, new jersey, in 1921 to italian immigrant parents, he experienced the economic crisis head - on. he took a job working in an eyeglass factory in the city ’ s ironbound section in 1934, at age 13, combining his wages with those of his father, mother, and six siblings to make a single - family income. when i was growing up, he spoke often of his memories of breadlines, tent cities, and government - issued clothing. at christmas, he would tell my brother and me how his parents, unable to afford new toys, had wrapped the same toy steam shovel, year after year, and placed it for him under the tree. in my extended family, my uncles occupied a pecking order based on who had grown up in the roughest economic circumstances. my uncle walter, who went on to earn a master ’ s degree in chemical engineering and eventually became a senior executive at colgate - palmolive, came out on top — not because of his academic or career achievements, but because he grew up with the hardest lot. multimedia : " reshaping america " an interactive map of america ' s new geography. interview : " the great reset " urban theorist richard florida explains why recession is the mother of invention. my father ’ s experiences were broadly shared throughout the country. although times were perhaps worst in the declining rural areas of the dust bowl, every region suffered, and the residents of small towns and big cities alike breathed in the same uncertainty and distress. the great depression was a national crisis — and in many ways a nationalizing event. the entire country, it seemed, tuned in to president roosevelt ’ s fireside chats. the current economic crisis is unlikely to result in the same kind of shared experience. to be sure, the economic contraction is causing pain just about everywhere. in october, less than a month after the financial markets began to melt down, moody ’ s economy. com * published an assessment of recent economic activity within 381 u. s. metropolitan areas. three hundred and two were already in deep recession, and 64 more were at risk. only 15 areas were still expanding. notable among them were the oil - and natural - resource - rich regions of texas and oklahoma, buoyed by energy prices that have since fallen ; and the greater washington, d. c., region, where government bailouts, the nationalization of financial companies, and fiscal


- and natural - resource - rich regions of texas and oklahoma, buoyed by energy prices that have since fallen ; and the greater washington, d. c., region, where government bailouts, the nationalization of financial companies, and fiscal expansion are creating work for lawyers, lobbyists, political scientists, and government contractors. no place in the united states is likely to escape a long and deep recession. nonetheless, as the crisis continues to spread outward from new york, through industrial centers like detroit, and into the sun belt, it will undoubtedly settle much more heavily on some places than on others. some cities and regions will eventually spring back stronger than before. others may never come back at all. as the crisis deepens, it will permanently and profoundly alter the country ’ s economic landscape. i believe it marks the end of a chapter in american economic history, and indeed, the end of a whole way of life. “ one thing seems probable to me, ” said peer steinbruck, the german finance minister, in september 2008. as a result of the crisis, “ the united states will lose its status as the superpower of the global financial system. ” you don ’ t have to strain too hard to see the financial crisis as the death knell for a debt - ridden, overconsuming, and underproducing american empire — the fall long prophesied by paul kennedy and others. big international economic crises — the crash of 1873, the great depression — have a way of upending the geopolitical order, and hastening the fall of old powers and the rise of new ones. in the post - american world ( published some months before the wall street meltdown ), fareed zakaria argued that modern history ’ s third great power shift was already upon us — the rise of the west in the 15th century and the rise of america in the 19th century being the two previous sea changes. but zakaria added that this transition is defined less by american decline than by “ the rise of the rest. ” we ’ re to look forward to a world economy, he wrote, “ defined and directed from many places and by many peoples. ” that ’ s surely true. yet the course of events since steinbruck ’ s remarks should give pause to those who believe the mantle of global leadership will soon be passed. the crisis has exposed deep structural problems, not just in the u. s. but worldwide. europe ’ s model of banking has proved no more resilient than america ’ s,


those who believe the mantle of global leadership will soon be passed. the crisis has exposed deep structural problems, not just in the u. s. but worldwide. europe ’ s model of banking has proved no more resilient than america ’ s, and china has shown that it remains every bit the codependent partner of the united states. the dow, down more than a third last year, was actually among the world ’ s better - performing stock - market indices. foreign capital has flooded into the u. s., which apparently remains a safe haven, at least for now, in uncertain times. it is possible that the united states will enter a period of accelerating relative decline in the coming years, though that ’ s hardly a foregone conclusion — a subject i ’ ll return to later. what ’ s more certain is that the recession, particularly if it turns out to be as long and deep as many now fear, will accelerate the rise and fall of specific places within the u. s. — and reverse the fortunes of other cities and regions. by what they destroy, what they leave standing, what responses they catalyze, and what space they clear for new growth, most big economic shocks ultimately leave the economic landscape transformed. some of these transformations occur faster and more violently than others. the period after the great depression saw the slow but inexorable rise of the suburbs. the economic malaise of the 1970s, on the other hand, found its embodiment in the vertiginous fall of older industrial cities of the rust belt, followed by an explosion of growth in the sun belt. the historian scott reynolds nelson has noted that in some respects, today ’ s crisis most closely resembles the “ long depression, ” which stretched, by one definition, from 1873 to 1896. it began as a banking crisis brought on by insolvent mortgages and complex financial instruments, and quickly spread to the real economy, leading to mass unemployment that reached 25 percent in new york. during that crisis, rising industries like railroads, petroleum, and steel were consolidated, old ones failed, and the way was paved for a period of remarkable innovation and industrial growth. in 1870, new england mill towns like lowell, lawrence, manchester, and springfield were among the country ’ s most productive industrial cities, and america ’ s population overwhelmingly lived in the countryside. by 1900, the economic geography had been transformed from a patchwork of farm plots and small mercantile towns to a landscape increasingly dominated by giant factory cities like chicago, cleveland, pittsburgh,


industrial cities, and america ’ s population overwhelmingly lived in the countryside. by 1900, the economic geography had been transformed from a patchwork of farm plots and small mercantile towns to a landscape increasingly dominated by giant factory cities like chicago, cleveland, pittsburgh, detroit, and buffalo. how might various cities and regions fare as the crash of 2008 reverberates into 2009, 2010, and beyond? which places will be spared the worst pain, and which left permanently scarred? let ’ s consider how the crash and its aftermath might affect the economic landscape in the long run, from coast to coast — beginning with the epicenter of the crisis and the nation ’ s largest city, new york. at first glance, few american cities would seem to be more obviously threatened by the crash than new york. the city shed almost 17, 000 jobs in the financial industry alone from october 2007 to october 2008, and wall street as we ’ ve known it has ceased to exist. “ farewell wall street, hello pudong? ” begins a recent article by marcus gee in the toronto globe and mail, outlining the possibility that new york ’ s central role in global finance may soon be usurped by shanghai, hong kong, and other asian and middle eastern financial capitals. this concern seems overheated. in his sweeping history, capitals of capital, the economic historian youssef cassis chronicles the rise and decline of global financial centers through recent centuries. though the history is long, it contains little drama : major shifts in capitalist power centers occur at an almost geological pace. amsterdam stood at the center of the world ’ s financial system in the 17th century ; its place was taken by london in the early 19th century, then new york in the 20th. across more than three centuries, no other city has topped the list of global financial centers. financial capitals have “ remarkable longevity, ” cassis writes, “ in spite of the phases of boom and bust in the course of their existence. ” the transition from one financial center to another typically lags behind broader shifts in the economic balance of power, cassis suggests. although the u. s. displaced england as the world ’ s largest economy well before 1900, it was not until after world war ii that new york eclipsed london as the world ’ s preeminent financial center ( and even then, the eclipse was not complete ; in recent years, london has, by some measures, edged out new york ). as asia has risen, tokyo, hong kong, and singapore have become major financial centers — yet