the islamic warriors engaged in looting, burglary, kidnapping, and rape. the jehad had changed them, making them unsuited to ordinary life. they had led lives of deprivation. the islamic warriors “ lived on stale bread and tea. they slept on stones in the mountains. and they drove the soviets out. ” besides, they as well as the militias were used to destroying and killing. thus, they could not be restrained, especially when the rich city lay helpless before their eyes. the islamic party alone exhibited restraint ; others — that is, the militias of dostum, the supervisory council, the islamic unity, and the islamic union — played havoc with the helpless people of kabul. but each of these five groups had its share in the destructionof the city and the killing and displacement of hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants. i know of no other groups of people in history who have, in the course of their struggle for power, destroyed the capital city of their own country the way these groups have. evidently, their leaders cared more for securing state power than for their city and its inhabitants. had it not been so, once the soviet invaders had been expelled and the regime of their puppets overthrown, they should have opted for a modus vivendi at least among themselves. after the destruction they had wrought by their policies they should have given up politics, as men and women who respect moral values would. they would then have immortalized the heroism which they had shown in frustrating the designs of a superpower on their country. but it was not to be. much depended on ahmad shah mas ’ ud as the key military figure in the new state, but in the complicated environment of kabul this internationally known commander of the resistance period found himself embroiled with conflicting groups and interests ; thus taxed, he failed to establish law and order. consequently, the islamic government failed to bring peace to the city. the government failed because it failed to restrain the unruly armed bands in the first place. it failed because, strictly speaking, it was not a government : it was actually a commission established principally by foreigners, to transfer power in the course of two months, a short period for such a difficult task. it failed because the groups constituting it did not cooperate with it. they could not even restrain their own warriors. the islamic state thus failed in its early critical stage. the failure was the result primarily of the absence of an alternative government, which should have been set up during the resistance period. of course, leaders of the


could not even restrain their own warriors. the islamic state thus failed in its early critical stage. the failure was the result primarily of the absence of an alternative government, which should have been set up during the resistance period. of course, leaders of the afghan jehad groups were divided on this issue for various reasons ; as a leader of one faction said, “ [ the leadership ] of every group tries to grab power by force, and then use it as it pleases. ” however, the host government of pakistan did not seriously work toward establishing an alternative government, particularly at a time when the soviet union had disappeared and the situation seemed ripe for the setting up of such a government. at no time did pakistan exert influence on afghan leaders to work for an alternative national government. on the contrary, it discouraged afghan nationalists, royalists, and community and tribal elders when they worked for such a government. pakistan instead concentrated on the sunni islamic groups, and even then it pursued a policy of favoritism by distributing among them weapons, logistics, and cash that it received from donor countries. the absence of an alternative national government to replace the crumbling regime, one strong enough to ensure order and security in the initial critical stage, was the underlying cause of the destruction of the city and of the momentous failure of the islamic state. the destruction and the failure can properly be understood when the scene where it was played out is considered. by 1992 kabul had assumed the features of a cosmopolitan city whose three million inhabitants had adopted different lifestyles and held various ideologies and beliefs. although the secular rule of the communists, especially the relatively lax rule of najibullah, had in theory followed a policy of conformity, it had in fact encouraged this trend toward diversity. kabul was largely a modern city with liberated women working side by side with men. females outnumbered males in kabul. it differed in many respects from the tradition - bound countryside. the latter was medieval in features, and the difference between the two, the result of uneven development, became still sharper during the resistance period. kabul had been run by urban and urbanized persons, most of whom were communists, while the countryside was in the grip of the islamic groups whose leaders opposed secularism and imposed the puritanical ways of islam in their domains. the two had become worlds apart. the warriors entered kabul as the germanic warriors had entered rome. they treated the kabulis as if they were beings from a different planet, an attitude that led to the destruction of kabul. whither afghanistan is


. the two had become worlds apart. the warriors entered kabul as the germanic warriors had entered rome. they treated the kabulis as if they were beings from a different planet, an attitude that led to the destruction of kabul. whither afghanistan is a subject of speculation for futurologists. however, i wish to venture a few words about it, even though the subject is yet to become history, my particular field. to expect afghanistan to be a country with a government constituted by the participation of its own citizens, capable of extending its rule throughout the land and conducting its domestic and foreign policy independently remains a dream for the present. the changed correlation of forces of society, the absence of a national government, the disjointedness of the country, the bickering among the contenders for power, foreign interference in afghan affairs — all these militate against the reemergence of an independent nation - state. the educated and bureaucratic middle class, many of whose members have fled abroad, has become insignificant. the secular - minded community and tribal elders likewise have been weakened. “ in present - day afghanistan the groups of clergy, community elders, intelligentsia, and the military cannot be seen. ” the laity, the commanders, and the islamic fundamentalist groups — or, to put it differently, bearded men, veiled women, and armed warriors — now constitute the principal characters of afghan society. in particular, the young generation has changed. the fifteen years of war “ have almost totally changed the culture of the afghans under the age of thirty, who [ now ] know nothing but war, its ravages, and the power of the gun. ” with no education and no career to pursue, the kabul youth are, like mercenaries, sitting idly in military posts “ addicted to hashish ( chars ), heroine, homosexuality, sadism, and other kinds of moral degredation. ” also, as a result of the prevailing anarchy in kabul, the value the afghans cherish most has been hurt beyond imagination : because the gilam jam have injured people ’ s dignity and honor, adults wish not to have new babies, and when they want them they pray god to give them ugly ones. women hate themselves for being attractive. most provincial officials are illiterate. after the advent of the islamic state, unprofessional and illiterate persons in the samangan province headed all departments except the judiciary department, which was headed by a professional one. even the head of the education department


radical islamism, which is only a new current. also, afghanistan ’ s political structure, although far from perfect, was not exclusive to a particular ethnic group. on the contrary, in modern afghanistan an ethnic dynasty ruled principally with the help of persons drawn from various ethnic groups. in fact, as mentioned in the introduction, because of the extensive practice of intergroup marriages, the spread of bilingualism, the recent emphasis on islamic values, and the introduction of communistic values, ethnicity has lost much of its traditional sharpness, although it is still a dominant force. the present armed groups are still strong, deriving strength from their organizations, the vast arsenal of modern weapons at their disposal, and the backing of their foreign patrons. but their manpower has thinned, as noted. many of those who now fight for them are mercenaries, some even foreign mercenaries. the continuation of war politics is bound to weaken the groups further, discredit them further with their compatriots, and make them still more receptive to their foreign patrons. already they have become unpopular. for “ during their time afghanistan has been looted more than when the british and the soviets had occupied it. besides, these armed groups have injured the dignity and honor of a nation. ” it is a proof of their unpopularity that even “ though it is shameful people everywhere long for the days of najibullah and russia. ” the people have become so tired of the war that they now hate even iron. still, the armed groups remain adamant in their stands, and this rigidity is likely to perpetuate the crisis. the reverend mawlawi of tarakhel even holds that “ as long as they [ the leaders of the groups ] are on the scene, the afghan crisis will not be resolved. ” the danger to afghanistan ’ s national sovereignty lies here, and it is real in view of its encirclement by self - serving neighbors. still, all this is not cause for despair. afghanistan has experienced many critical periods in the past. the nineteenth century witnessed the transition of rule from the sadozay to the mohammadzay dynasty, as well as the two anglo - afghan wars. although each crisis lasted a long time, in every case afghanistan finally emerged as a nation - state. in the present crisis, if wars abound, so do peace efforts. because of widespread opposition to the war and to foreign interference, this peace movement is gaining momentum. even the ill - disposed neighbors approach the afghan problem in the name of peace,


in the present crisis, if wars abound, so do peace efforts. because of widespread opposition to the war and to foreign interference, this peace movement is gaining momentum. even the ill - disposed neighbors approach the afghan problem in the name of peace, whatever their real intentions. although they still promote their intentions through their afghan surrogates, their intelligence services know well the maxim : “ you can hire an afghan but you cannot buy him. ” so far the efforts of these neighbors have been aimed at setting up an afghan government amenable to them. the multiplicity of neighbors hinders efforts to monopolize the afghan issue and tends to promote the state of equilibrium among them that is likely to ensure afghan statehood. this in part explains why, despite the prolongation of the crisis and the schemes of the russians with respect to northern afghanistan, no group has emerged to advocate separatism. the rise of such a movement, particularly if incited by outsiders, is likely to become more menacing to the integrity of afghanistan ’ s major muslim neighbors. a stable, independent, nonaligned, and friendly afghanistan is to their advantage. after the breakup of the soviet union, afghanistan has become once again the most important link between south and central asia. it and pakistan have become as interdependent as they were in pre - soviet times. now, as much as afghanistan needs pakistan to reach the sea and the world beyond it, the latter needs the former to have access to central asia and russia. these considerations and the fact that despite the recent odds the afghans have remained loyal to their fatherland are signs that anation - state is going to be instituted in afghanistan. most important, unlike the nineteenth century, the current era is marked by the presence of the united nations. this organization has been especially concerned with the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and nonaligned status of afghanistan from the time the soviet union invaded it. the united nations for the third time has addressed the afghan problem, or what secretary - general boutros boutros - ghali has called this “ human tragedy. ” on the recommendation of the general assembly, on 11 february 1994 he commissioned mehmoud mestiri as his special envoy “ to canvas a broad spectrum of afghanistan ’ s leaders to solicit their views on how the un can best assist afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction. ” mestiri has concluded the first phase of his mission, and the united nations is now expected to adopt measures to help afghans end the tragedy.


views on how the un can best assist afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction. ” mestiri has concluded the first phase of his mission, and the united nations is now expected to adopt measures to help afghans end the tragedy. mestiri met afghan leaders in quetta, peshawar, kandahar, khost, mazar, herat, and bamian, where they expressed support for the un efforts. in peshawar, kandahar, and quetta, they held rallies for this purpose and also spoke out against the war and its perpetrators, for a loya jirga, and for the former king mohammad zahir. undoubtedly, these rallies reflected the sentiments of the greatest number of afghans. mestiri was so impressed by this sentiment that in a rally in peshawar he said, “ we hear there is war in kabul. let them make war ; we will make peace. ” ambassador mestiri has made an optimistic statement the like of which his predecessors, diego cordovez and benon sevan had not made. it seems that this time the united nations or, more correctly, boutros - ghali and mestiri, are serious about helping the afghans to cut their gordian knot. supporters have also urged the former king to come out of rome. mohammad aziz na ’ eem, his son - in - law and nephew of the former president mohammad daoud, has summed up the sentiment well : “ the time has come for the former king to put forward his platform and personally supervise its implementation to its logical conclusion. ” na ’ eem adds that this end cannot be achieved by the mere issuance of messages. the former king has issued statements suggesting that an interim government be set up by an emergency loya jirga under the supervision of the united nations. this delaying policy has led to speculation, as these words from rahimullah yusufzai indicate. “ the former king is keen on winning the support of western powers, led by the united states as well as russia, before making up his mind whether or not to play a role in forming a broad - based government in afghanistan. he is seeking guarantees of their support to be channeled through the united nations not only to ensure his personal safety but also to sustain his government in power in the face of threats by some of the radical islamist elements. ” if so, the former king is waiting for a political miracle. it is doubtful whether the united states and other major powers will effectively back the un plan.


sustain his government in power in the face of threats by some of the radical islamist elements. ” if so, the former king is waiting for a political miracle. it is doubtful whether the united states and other major powers will effectively back the un plan. robert oakley, the former u. s. ambassador to pakistan who was also concerned with afghan affairs, holds that “ the political future of afghanistan is no longer of interest to the u. s. ” this may or may not be the official line, but since the dissolution of the soviet union the u. s. administrations have shown no evidence to the contrary. the united states and other powers have even forgotten about the part that afghanistan played in the dissolution of the “ evil empire ” and the end of the cold war, events that made it possible for world governments to improve their economies for the first time in four decades. their afghanologists as well as men and women of the mass media have turned their backs on afghanistan. they all have left a former friendly people in their vulnerable moment to the mercy of their scheming neighbors. feeling betrayed, the disillusioned afghans have become bitter about them, particularly about the u. s. administrations, whereas during the resistance they lauded them for their support. the neglect is bound to endanger the lives of the innocent people of the world, especially those of the united states. since the soviet withdrawal, afghanistan has become connected to drug trafficking and the training of terrorists. because of the absence of a central government and the openness of its borders, “ thousands of islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some 40 countries have come to afghanistan to learn the lessons of jehad, … to train for armed insurrection, to bring the struggle back home. ” also, afghanistan is now the source of “ roughly a third of the heroin reaching the united states. ” afghan farmers have long grown opium poppies, which require only small landholdings and offer high monetary returns ; the absence of suitable substitute crops and the lack of other sources of livelihood have also led farmers to the cultivation of poppies. now, though, these traditional compulsions have been exacerbated by the presence of millions of mines in the country, which has greatly reduced the amount of arable land and thereby forced afghan farmers to grow more opium poppies than at any time before ; the opium is then sold to dealers who process it into hard drugs for sale abroad. thus, the legacy of the soviet war and the western response to it is not only a ravaged afghanistan


farmers to grow more opium poppies than at any time before ; the opium is then sold to dealers who process it into hard drugs for sale abroad. thus, the legacy of the soviet war and the western response to it is not only a ravaged afghanistan without a functioning national government but also a culture of guns, drugs, and terrorism that is as poisonous to others as it is to afghans. the world governments have a moral responsibility to the afghans, and it is now time for them to assist in transforming the poisonous culture into a healthy one by permitting the afghans to institute a national government. they can do so if regional powers are persuaded to keep their hands off afghan affairs. specifically, if world governments discourage russia from printing unsupported banknotes for kabul and encourage pakistan, iran, saudi arabia, and uzbekistan to cease supporting their afghan surrogates illegally, before long the war in afghanistan likely will end. the afghans then will be able to set up a government for themselves in accordance with their conventions, preferably under un supervision. by helping to establish such a government, the world governments, among other things, would secure millions of men and women throughout the world from the dangers of the poisonous culture. “ a lawful, massive and coordinated law enforcement response ” to the culture, as fbi director louis freeh, has suggested in another context, will be possible only when afghanistan has a stable, broad - based government. conversely, the continued absence of an actual government will allow the poisonous culture to flourish more rankly. in the end, the problem may grow too great to ignore. then, as commander abdul haq predicts, “ maybe one day they will have to send hundreds of thousands of troops to deal with that. and if they step in they will be stuck. we have a british grave [ yard ] in afghanistan. we have a soviet grave [ yard ]. and then we will have an american grave [ yard ]. ” 1. khan, untying the afghan knot, 86 - 87. [ back ] 2. ibid., 84 - 86. [ back ] 3. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 154. [ back ] 4. ibid. [ back ] 5. ibid. [ back ] 6. saikal and miley, soviet withdrawal from afghanistan, 16. [ back ] 7. mcclintock, instruments of statecraft, 32. [ back ] 8. khan, untying the afghan knot, 88. [ back ] 9. ibid.


miley, soviet withdrawal from afghanistan, 16. [ back ] 7. mcclintock, instruments of statecraft, 32. [ back ] 8. khan, untying the afghan knot, 88. [ back ] 9. ibid., 89. [ back ] 10. kornienko, “ afghan endeavor, ” 10. [ back ] 11. ibid. [ back ] 12. najibullah, quoted in khan, untying the afghan knot, 178. [ back ] 13. “ a. ” personal communication, kabul, 1987. [ back ] 14. kornienko, “ afghan endeavor, ” 11. [ back ] 15. ibid., 12. [ back ] 16. ibid. [ back ] 17. ibid., 13. [ back ] 18. khan, untying the afghan knot, 89. [ back ] 19. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 166 - 73. [ back ] 20. ibid., 174 - 79. [ back ] 21. khan, untying the afghan knot, 89, 90. [ back ] 22. kakar, geneva compromise on afghanistan, 138 ; kakar, afghans in the spring of 1987, 13. [ back ] 23. kakar, “ afghanistan on the eve of soviet withdrawal. ” [ back ] 24. to effect equality among afghan ethnic groups, kishtmand, a politburo member of pdpa, wrote that the state was to carve out “ autonomous administrative units ” on the basis of “ national characteristics ” within a “ federal structure. ” “ the constitution and the national problem in the republic of afghanistan, ” the truth about the saur revolution ( pdpa newspaper ), 9 qaus 1367 ( 30 november 1987 ), page unknown. kishtmand ’ s view was a replica of the soviet model, which is impracticable in afghanistan because of its highly mixed population. [ back ] 25. resolution of the second congress of the party, aims of the fatherland party ( maramnama - e - hizb - e - watan ), kabul, 1990. [ back ] 26. sharq, memoirs, 282. [ back ] 27. ibid., 256. [ back ] 28. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 42. [ back ] 29. sharq, memoirs, 272. [ back ] 30. khan, untying the afghan knot


. ibid., 256. [ back ] 28. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 42. [ back ] 29. sharq, memoirs, 272. [ back ] 30. khan, untying the afghan knot, 255. [ back ] 31. ibid., 285, 294. [ back ] 32. rais, “ afghanistan and regional security, ” 82. [ back ] 33. the departing soviet army handed over all of its heavy weapons and food supplies to the kabul regime ; in addition, it is believed that during the six months of 1989 the soviets delivered $ 1. 5 billion worth of weapons, including five hundred scud surface - to - surface missiles. every day from fifteen to eighty huge planes would bring weapons of all kinds to kabul. sharq, memoirs, 292 ; yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 227 ; khan, untying the afghan knot, 297. “ moreover in significant areas of military advice and intelligence support moscow ’ s direct invlovement in afghanistan ’ s internal affairs did not end with the formal withdrawal of soviet troops ” ; rais, “ afghanistan and regional security, ” 82. [ back ] 34. kornienko, “ afghan endeavor, ” 11. [ back ] 35. sharq, memoirs, 260, 257. [ back ] 36. khan, untying the afghan knot, 296. [ back ] 37. kornienko, “ afghan endeavor, ” 14 ; yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 234. [ back ] 38. khan, untying the afghan knot, 297. [ back ] 39. according to the cia, general akhtar of the isi promoted the idea of outright military victory for afghan islamists. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 234. [ back ] 40. ibid., 1, 22, 234. [ back ] 41. khan, untying the afghan knot, 200. [ back ] 42. ibid., 201. [ back ] 43. ibid. [ back ] 44. in 1987 the following broad percentages were allowed to the islamic groups : to hekmatyar, 18 - 20 percent ; to rabbani, 18 - 19 percent ; to sayyaf 17 - 18 percent ; to khalis, 13 - 15 percent ; to mohammadi, 13 - 15 percent ; to gailani, 10 - 11 percent ; and to mojaddidi, 3 -


- 19 percent ; to sayyaf 17 - 18 percent ; to khalis, 13 - 15 percent ; to mohammadi, 13 - 15 percent ; to gailani, 10 - 11 percent ; and to mojaddidi, 3 - 5 percent. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 105. [ back ] 45. kakar, “ afghanistan on the eve of soviet withdrawal. ” the information on the shura held in february 1989 are drawn from this source. i lived in peshawar at the time. i am grateful to mohammad qasim laghmani for giving me valuable information and some documents on the shura. laghmani was a member of the commissions of the shura that laid down electoral procedures for it. see also khalilzad, prospects for afghan interim government ; maley and saikal, political order in post - communist afghanistan. [ back ] 46. quoted in shahadat, newspaper of the islamic party ( peshawar ), 2 sunbula 1367 / 1988, 1. [ back ] 47. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 226 - 32. [ back ] 48. ibid., 230. [ back ] 49. ibid., 129, 231. [ back ] 50. ibid., 129. [ back ] 51. sharq, memoirs, 301. [ back ] 52. ibid. kakar, “ failed coup, ” 112. [ back ] 53. sharq, memoirs, 301. [ back ] 54. kakar, “ failed coup, ” 113. [ back ] 55. bisharat, “ stormy developments, ” 12. [ back ] 56. sharq, memoirs, 302. [ back ] 57. maley and saikal, political order in post - communist afghanistan, 27. [ back ] 58. ibid., 28. [ back ] 59. ibid., 24. [ back ] 60. kakar, “ central asia. ” [ back ] 61. maley and saikal, political order in post - communist afghanistan, 27. [ back ] 62. ibid., 26. [ back ] 63. ibid. [ back ] 64. ibid. [ back ] 65. ibid. [ back ] 66. ibid. [ back ] 67. kakar, “ the policy of intrigues, ” 12. [ back ] 68. kakar, “ the policy of intrigues, ” 12 ; yusufzai, “ dos


. [ back ] 66. ibid. [ back ] 67. kakar, “ the policy of intrigues, ” 12. [ back ] 68. kakar, “ the policy of intrigues, ” 12 ; yusufzai, “ dostum. ” [ back ] 69. kakar, “ the policy of intrigues, ” 17. [ back ] 70. along with nawaz sharif, other foreign dignitaries who participated in the peshawar meeting were the governor of the northwest frontier province ; siddiq kanju, minister of state without portfolio ; general asif nawaz, pakistan ’ s chief of staff ; general javid nassir, chief of the isi ; mehr mosawi, iran ’ s roving ambassador ; the ambassdors of iran and saudi arabia in islamabad ; turkey al faisal, chief of the intelligence service of saudi arabia ; and benon sevan. after helal, hekmatyar ’ s representative, walked out of the meeting, the afghan leaders present were khalis, sayyaf, mohammadi, rabbani, gailani, and mojaddidi. [ back ] 71. kakar, “ the success of the failed babrak karmal, ” mujahid wolas ( newspaper ), june 1992, 4. [ back ] 72. rais, “ afghanistan and regional security, ” 82. [ back ] 73. a. shinwari, “ afghanistan — two years of mujahideen ’ s rule, ” afghanistan forum, july 1994, 7. the article first appeared in the frontier posts, 10 may 1994. marwat even holds that not only the peshawar accords but “ all accords proved to be the license given by vested interests to the mujahideen leaders for killing and [ destroying ] their own people and country. ” f. r. marwat, “ waiting for the u. n., ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, july - august 1994, 48. [ back ] 74. kakar, “ success of babrak karmal, ” 2. [ back ] 75. anonymous, “ from peshawar to kabul, ” rastgoyan, journal of the national salvation front 4, no. 4 ( 1992 ) : 3. [ back ] 76. ibid. [ back ] 77. s. m. maiwand, the maiwand trust ( new delhi ), 10 may 1992, 4. i have drawn throughout on this informative and trustworthy weekly newsletter


[ back ] 76. ibid. [ back ] 77. s. m. maiwand, the maiwand trust ( new delhi ), 10 may 1992, 4. i have drawn throughout on this informative and trustworthy weekly newsletter for the mojaddidi period. [ back ] 78. ibid. [ back ] 79. maiwand trust, 17 may 1992, 6. [ back ] 80. supreme court of the islamic state of afghanistan, “ fatwa on veil, ” kabul, 1993, 36. [ back ] 81. bebt, “ note on events in kabul ” ( in pashto ), december 1993. a manuscript by an insider, 7, 8. [ back ] 82. maiwand trust, 17 may 1992, 5. [ back ] 83. bebt, “ note on events in kabul, ” 8. [ back ] 84. h. azizi, “ guardianship or looting of a city? ” afghanistan [ journal ] ( peshawar ), april 1994, 66. [ back ] 85. for details, see s. kh. hashemyan, “ the end of two months of blood, and the start of four months of troubles, ” afghanistan mirror, special bulletin, 29 june 1992. [ back ] 86. a. r. dostum, statement in the constituent assembly of the national and islamic movement, mazar, 31 may 1992, 2. [ back ] 87. bisharat, “ stormy developments, ” 10. for a list of senior parchami officers in the army of the islamic state, see peace ( monthly newspaper ), december 1993, 4. [ back ] 88. interview with mawlawi m. zarif, mujahid wolas ( newspaper ), november - december 1993, 1. [ back ] 89. ermacora, “ human rights in afghanistan, ” 32. [ back ] 90. rashid, “ green revolutionary, ” 19. [ back ] 91. for comments on the islamabad accords, see kakar, “ time for choice, ” 2 - 9. [ back ] 92. for details, see gh. parwani, “ the jalalabad accords, ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, may 1993, 7 ; “ new peace accords concluded in jalalabad, ” afghanistan forum, july 1993, 6. [ back ] 93. “ strange calm in kabul, ” afghanistan forum, november 1993, 10. [ back ] 94. m. k.


; “ new peace accords concluded in jalalabad, ” afghanistan forum, july 1993, 6. [ back ] 93. “ strange calm in kabul, ” afghanistan forum, november 1993, 10. [ back ] 94. m. k. momand, “ my observations, ” sabawoon [ journal ] ( california ), july 1994, 21. in a letter sent in january 1994 from kabul the writer states : “ to the people of kabul there no longer exists either a lion [ mas ’ ud ] or an amiror a hero. they are all thieves and violators of people ’ s honor and property. mas ’ ud ’ s men are illiterate panjsheri youth who do not even know how to pray and observe the commands of islam. they know nothing else but to engage in homosexuality and make the boys and girls dance for them. they steal people ’ s property and kidnap their children. hekmatyar ’ s men, who are older than mas ’ ud ’ s men, respect people ’ s honor, but their rockets have destroyed much of kabul. in fact, their rockets and the aircraft and bombs of mas ’ ud have ravaged kabul. dostum ’ s men are all addicted to hashish ( chars ) ; they are all homosexuals, burglars, and criminals. even their officers cannot control them. just like mas ’ ud ’ s men, they also do as they please. ” qari abdullah in peace ( monthly newspaper ), 15 march 1994, 4. [ back ] 95. a. safi, former member of parliament from tagab, personal comunication, december 1993. in the tagab round of fighting mas ’ ud paid 100, 000 afghanis, and hekmatyar paid from 1, 200 to 2, 000 pakistani rupees a month to each of their recruits. one rupee equalled 95 afghanis. mas ’ ud had advantages over his rivals in money matters. according to a commander of mas ’ ud, “ i would spend 20 million afghanis on each of the military posts per week. ” also, according to him, “ once, shortly after 20 billion afghanis had arrived from moscow, these were all taken out of the bank for military purposes. ” anonymous, [ tb “ why and how the war in kabul started, ” afghanistan journal, april 1994, 10. [ back ] 96. d. sahari, “ afghanistan and the islamic world, ” mujahid wolas ( newspaper ), january - february 1994


“ why and how the war in kabul started, ” afghanistan journal, april 1994, 10. [ back ] 96. d. sahari, “ afghanistan and the islamic world, ” mujahid wolas ( newspaper ), january - february 1994, 2. [ back ] 97. afghanistan forum, january 1994, 7. [ back ] 98. “ why and how the war started, ” 72. [ back ] 99. ibid. [ back ] 100. afghanistan forum, march 1994, 13. [ back ] 101. “ why and how the war started, ” 72. [ back ] 102. interview with hekmatyar, shafaq ( newspaper ), may 1994, 3. for details see a. h. ahady, “ an evaluation of the four main peace plans for afghanistan, ” afghan millat ( newspaper ), peshawar ( 21 july 1994 ). [ back ] 103. statement by rabbani, jam ’ iyyat ( newspaper ), may 1994, 3. [ back ] 104. s. coll, “ the agony of victory, ” afghanistan forum, march 1994, 16. [ back ] 105. z. abbas, “ the battle for kabul ”, afghanistan forum, may 1994, 9. according to s. mojaddidi, “ mas ’ ud has gathered around him a number of companions who hold that the pashtuns have ruled over us for years, and now it was time we ruled over them ” ; shafaq ( newspaper ), may 1994, 3. [ back ] 106. abbas, “ battle for kabul, ” afghanistan forum, 9. [ back ] 107. ibid. in particular, the loss in november 1993 to dostum of the sher khan post on the oxus at the instigation of mas ’ ud by a commander of the islamic union became the last straw in the coalition between dostum and mas ’ ud. see “ why and how the war started, ” 9. [ back ] 108. b. rumer and e. rumer, “ who will stop the next yugoslavia? ” world monitor, november 1992, 38 ; malik, “ contemporary south and central asian politics, ” asian survey, october 1992, 901. masu ’ d, who “ dreams of a pan - tajik constituency for himself, ” is backing tajik rebels against the moscow - installed government in doshanbay, the capital of tajikistan. a. rashid, “ battle for the north, ” far eastern economic review


dreams of a pan - tajik constituency for himself, ” is backing tajik rebels against the moscow - installed government in doshanbay, the capital of tajikistan. a. rashid, “ battle for the north, ” far eastern economic review, 31 march 1994, 23. [ back ] 109. anonymous, “ central asia : the silk road catches fire, ” far eastern economic review, 26 december 1992, 45, 46. [ back ] 110. d. sahari, “ afghanistan and the islamic world, ” mujahid wolas ( newspaper ), no. 11 - 12 ( january - february 1994 ), 2. [ back ] 111. interview with rabbani, afghanistan forum, march 1994, 26. [ back ] 112. in kabul an official spokesman claimed, “ we have clear - cut evidence about direct interference by uzbekistan in the kabul fighting ” ; ibid., 20. [ back ] 113. a. r. safi, former member of parliament from shiberghan, personal communication, february 1994. [ back ] 114. ibid. [ back ] 115. “ message to the kunduz commanders, ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 4 may 1994, 1. [ back ] 116. yousaf and adkin, bear trap, 142. [ back ] 117. n. majruh, personal communication, june 1994. [ back ] 118. interview with q. m. a. wiqad, writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 30 march 1994, 8. [ back ] 119. bebt, “ note on events in kabul, ” 9. [ back ] 120. r. yusufzai, international news ( peshawar ), 3 november 1993, 21. [ back ] 121. t. weiner, “ blowback from the afghan battlefield, ” new york times magazine, 13 march 1994, 53. [ back ] 122. interview with q. m. a. wiqad, writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 30 march 94, 8. [ back ] 123. sahari, “ afghanistan and the islamic world, ” 2. [ back ] 124. s. yarzay, “ problems and fighting in kabul, ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 20 july 1994, 6 ; z. durani, “ what is going on in kabul? ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 2 august 1994, 7. [ back ] 125. momand, “ my observations, ” 21. [ back ] 126. m. shindan


. durani, “ what is going on in kabul? ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 2 august 1994, 7. [ back ] 125. momand, “ my observations, ” 21. [ back ] 126. m. shindanday, “ the tyrannized and powerless afghans, ” writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 20 july 1994, 6. [ back ] 127. sahari, “ afghanistan and the islamic world, ” 2. “ from the city of mazar to the frontier post in torkham the islamic groups have set up customs posts ( pataks ). in each of these posts each group levies tolls on a loaded truck, ranging from twenty thousand to over a million afghanis. because of insecurity trucks now go in caravans as the caravans of men, camels, and horses went in the middle ages. it now takes about twenty days for a caravan to reach torkham from mazar, whereas before the communist coup in 1978 it took only a day for a truck to make the journey. from mahipar, east of kabul, to torkham twenty - eight such posts are in place. this part, which is the worst, is called the looting highway ( shahrah - e - choor ). a man who had made the journey from mazar to torkham with a caravan has been quoted as saying ‘ the situation of the highway from the hydroelectric dam of mahipar to sarobi is totally disappointing. in each bend of the road one and even two customs posts operate. in these posts rusty, ruthless, and tyrannical men, seen often with wild and long hair and beards, have come together. to them it is useless to plead and implore. instead of god, the prophet, the quran, and the love of parents they recognize money. for them it is ordinary to curse, insult, and beat a passenger and bring down his belongings and food. an ordinary man of them can stop a truck and even a caravan with impunity for days and beat a passenger whom he dislikes to the limit of death. most of these posts belong to major groups. ’ some among them are, of course, pious, but the majority are such as described. it is because of the heavy tolls that in kabul a sack of wheat flour [ 70 kilograms ] is sold for one hundred thousand afghanis, a staggering amount. the pious muslims now say that doomsday is near. ” shahbaz, “


is because of the heavy tolls that in kabul a sack of wheat flour [ 70 kilograms ] is sold for one hundred thousand afghanis, a staggering amount. the pious muslims now say that doomsday is near. ” shahbaz, “ mazar - e - sharif — torkham, ” writers union of free afghanistan, 7 september 1994, 6. [ back ] 128. “ interview with the mawlawi of tarakhel, ” afghanistan ( journal ), april 1994, 41. the bickering among the islamic groups is harming afghanistan. internally, it acts as a divisive force, subverting the process of reunification and reconstruction. abroad, it is looked on as a symbol of islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, intolerance, and radicalism. this is why afghanistan has plummeted from a global flash point to a local affair. from a major catalyst that initiated the disintegration of the soviet union, it has developed into a “ self - destructive inter - afghan affair, threatening to split afghanistan. ” marwat, “ waiting for the u. n., ” 48. [ back ] 129. momand, “ my observations, ” 24. [ back ] 130. quoted in sahari, “ afghanistan and the islamic world, ” 2. [ back ] 131. statement by m. a. nae ’ em, writers ’ union of free afghanistan, 24 april 1994, 2. [ back ] 132. r. yusufzai, “ zahir shah option resurfaces in search for afghan peace, ” the breeze of freedom ( journal ), no. 4 ( mar. - apr. 1994 ) : 38. [ back ] 133. h. naweed, interview with r. oakley, writers ’ union of free afghanistan, nos. 22 - 23 ( 8 june 1994 ), 7. [ back ] 134. n. m. kamrany, personal communication, june 1994. kamrany is a professor of economics at the university of california, los angeles. [ back ] 135. weiner, “ blowback, ” 53. [ back ] 136. ibid. according to a u. s. satellite survey, 19, 470 hectares were cultivated in poppies during the 1991 - 92 season in afghanistan. the breeze of freedom ( journal ), no. 4 ( mar. - apr. 1994 ) : 63. [ back ] 137. quoted in the san diego union - tribune, 5 july 1994, a12. [ back ] 138


article : python resources if i might suggest an addition to the list, i found this tutorial a good synthetic reference : heres another great source from mit open course ware website to check out a whole semester intro to programming video lectures with python. you may want to post above i want to throw in a few more code editors, for people who don ' t want a full blown ide. the first two i think are great for beginners, and the third ( vim ) is for people who love the modal interface in rhino and want a scriptable command line interface for text editing. i would not recommend vim to a beginner. - notepad + + - a simple code editor for windows - e texteditor - comparable to textmate, but for windows - vim - a simple, powerful cross - platform text editor with a steep learning curve. i recommend gvim for windows or macvim for mac. here are two more similar to notepad + +, i ' m sure the list can go on and on but i thought they deserved to be listed. - ps pad - have used on many of my standard installs for years. - context - used this for a while also, but stopped using when i found ps pad. i recommend you to add an api to the editor. or do like processing, thus making any exterior editor workable for python in rhino.


seven states plan to sue the environmental protection agency. they want the federal government to regulate methane gas emissions from the nation ' s oil and gas wells. up to now, the epa has preferred to rely on existing state and regional regulations. if the epa continues with current policies, a legal battle will likely ensue, and that battle could reach the u. s. supreme court. but no matter what happens between the litigants, the industry will likely continue drilling and producing oil and natural gas. in their notice of intent to sue, the states of new york, connecticut, delaware, maryland, massachusetts, rhode island and vermont informed the epa administrator that they believe the epa failed to determine whether standards of performance are appropriate for the nation ' s methane emissions from oil and natural - gas operations. the states are demanding the epa establish such standards and related guidelines for new and existing sources. to provide perspective, methane is one of the most lethal greenhouse gases known. methane can do far more damage to the atmosphere than can carbon dioxide. some believe it is 25 times more lethal than carbon dioxide. either the epa acquiesces and begins regulating methane, or the states will follow through and file suit in the federal courts. if the states reach the point of filing the suit, they will likely win. how do we know they will win? because this suit is not the states ' first rodeo. some of the same states filed a similar suit against the epa in 2005 - - they won, and they won big. they demanded that a reluctant epa regulate carbon dioxide, and the supreme court agreed. in the suit, massachusetts v. epa, 12 states and several cities set a precedent to force the epa to regulate all greenhouse gases, which include methane gas. while some believe the recent flurry of epa ' s new rules regulating coal and greenhouse gases came about only because of political inclinations, the supreme court ' s decision in massachusetts v. epa required the new rules. of course, the u. s. congress could have amended the clean air act, making new rules unnecessary. but three congresses elected to do nothing, so the epa was forced to act. it appears new federal regulations are on the horizon. if those new regulations are implemented, it is clear that domestic exploration - and - production costs will climb. but new regulations controlling methane may not be as bad as they may sound. of course, they will affect all participants, but they will affect them equally. also, most major exploration - and - production companies, such as exxon mobil


| easton ' s bible dictionary | ( hebrews pered ), so called from the quick step of the animal or its power of carrying loads. it is not probable that the hebrews bred mules, as this was strictly forbidden in the law ( leviticus 19 : 19 ), although their use was not forbidden. we find them in common use even by kings and nobles ( 2 samuel 18 : 9 ; 1 kings 1 : 33 ; 2 kings 5 : 17 ; psalm 32 : 9 ). they are not mentioned, however, till the time of david, for the word rendered " mules " ( r. v. correctly, " hot springs " ) in genesis 36 : 24 ( yemim ) properly denotes the warm springs of callirhoe, on the eastern shore of the dead sea. in david ' s reign they became very common ( 2 samuel 13 : 29 ; 1 kings 10 : 25 ). mules are not mentioned in the new testament. perhaps they had by that time ceased to be used in palestine. noah webster ' s dictionary 1. ( n. ) a hybrid animal ; specifically, one generated between an ass and a mare, sometimes a horse and a she - ass. see hinny. 2. ( n. ) a plant or vegetable produced by impregnating the pistil of one species with the pollen or fecundating dust of another ; - - called also hybrid. 3. ( n. ) a very stubborn person. 4. ( n. ) a machine, used in factories, for spinning cotton, wool, etc., into yarn or thread and winding it into cops ; - - called also jenny and mule - jenny. int. standard bible encyclopedia mul ( peredh ( 1 kings 10 : 25 ; 1 kings 18 : 5 ezra 2 : 66 isaiah 66 : 20 zechariah 14 : 15 ), the feminine pirdah ( 1 kings 1 : 33, 38, 44 ), rekhesh, " swift steeds, " the king james version " mules " ( esther 8 : 10, 14 ), ' achashteranim, " used in the king ' s service, " the king james version " camels, " the revised version margin " mules " ( esther 8 : 10, 14 ), yemim, " hot springs, " the king james version " mules " ( genesis 36 : 24 ) ; hemionos, " half - ass, " " mule " ( 1 esdras


esther 8 : 10, 14 ), yemim, " hot springs, " the king james version " mules " ( genesis 36 : 24 ) ; hemionos, " half - ass, " " mule " ( 1 esdras 5 : 43 ; judith 15 : 11 ) ) : mules are mentioned as riding animals for princes ( 2 samuel 13 : 29 ; 2 samuel 18 : 9 1 kings 1 : 33, 38, 44 ) ; in the tribute brought to solomon ( 2 chronicles 9 : 24 ) ; as beasts of burden ( 2 kings 5 : 17 1 chronicles 12 : 40 ) ; horses and mules are obtained from the " house of togarmah " in the distant north ( ezekiel 27 : 14 ). the injunction of psalm 32 : 9, " be ye not as the horse, or as the mule, which have no understanding, " need not be understood as singling out the horse and mule as more in need of guidance than the rest of the brute creation, but rather as offering familiar examples to contrast with man who should use his intelligence. at the present day mules are used as pack animals and for drawing freight wagons, rarely for riding. one does not often see in palestine mules as large and fine as are common in europe and america. this may be because most of the mares and many of the donkeys are small. alfred ely day mule ( 9 occurrences ) luke 10 : 34 he went to him, and dressed his wounds with oil and wine and bound them up. then placing him on his own mule he brought him to an inn, where he bestowed every care on him. ( wey ) 2 samuel 13 : 29 the servants of absalom did to amnon as absalom had commanded. then all the king ' s sons arose, and every man got him up on his mule, and fled. ( web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) 2 samuel 18 : 9 absalom happened to meet the servants of david. absalom was riding on his mule, and the mule went under the thick boughs of a great oak, and his head caught hold of the oak, and he was taken up between the sky and earth ; and the mule that was under him went on. ( web kjv jps asv bbe dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) 1 kings 1 : 33 the king said to them, " take with you the servants of your


mule that was under him went on. ( web kjv jps asv bbe dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) 1 kings 1 : 33 the king said to them, " take with you the servants of your lord, and cause solomon my son to ride on my own mule, and bring him down to gihon. ( web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) 1 kings 1 : 38 so zadok the priest, and nathan the prophet, and benaiah the son of jehoiada, and the cherethites and the pelethites, went down, and caused solomon to ride on king david ' s mule, and brought him to gihon. ( web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) 1 kings 1 : 44 the king has sent with him zadok the priest, nathan the prophet, benaiah the son of jehoiada, and the cherethites and the pelethites ; and they have caused him to ride on the king ' s mule. ( web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) 1 kings 18 : 5 ahab said to obadiah, " go through the land, to all the springs of water, and to all the brooks. perhaps we may find grass and save the horses and mules alive, that we not lose all the animals. " ( root in web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) psalms 32 : 9 don ' t be like the horse, or like the mule, which have no understanding, who are controlled by bit and bridle, or else they will not come near to you. ( web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv ) zechariah 14 : 15 so will be the plague of the horse, of the mule, of the camel, and of the donkey, and of all the animals that will be in those camps, as that plague. ( web kjv jps asv dby wbs ylt nas rsv niv )


earth talk : the cost of losing tropical rainforests from the editors of e / the environmental magazine dear earthtalk : do you have current facts and figures about how much rainforest is being destroyed each day around the world, and for what purpose ( s )? — teri, via e - mail pinning down exact numbers is nearly impossible, but most experts agree that we are losing upward of 80, 000 acres of tropical rainforest daily, and significantly degrading another 80, 000 acres every day on top of that. along with this loss and degradation, we are losing some 135 plant, animal and insect species every day — or some 50, 000 species a year — as the forests fall. according to researcher and writer rhett butler, who runs the critically - acclaimed web site, mongabay. com, tropical rainforests are incredibly rich ecosystems that play a key role in the basic functioning of the planet. they help maintain the climate by regulating atmospheric gases and stabilizing rainfall, and provide many other important ecological functions. rainforests are also home to some 50 percent of the world ’ s species, butler reports, “ making them an extensive library of biological and genetic resources. ” environmentalists also point out that a quarter of our modern pharmaceuticals are derived from rainforest ingredients, but less than 1 percent of the trees and plants in the tropics have been tested for curative properties. sadly, then, we don ’ t really know the true value of what we ’ re losing as we slash, burn and plant over what was once a treasure trove of biodiversity. according to the united nations ’ food and agriculture organization ( fao ), overall tropical deforestation rates this decade are 8. 5 percent higher than during the 1990s. while this figure pertains to all forests in the world ’ s tropics, researchers believe the loss of primary tropical rainforest — the wildest and most diverse swaths — has increased by as much as 25 percent since the 1990s. despite increased public awareness of the importance of tropical rainforests, deforestation rates are actually on the rise, mostly the result of activities such as commercial logging, agriculture, cattle ranching, dam - building and mining, but also the result of subsistence agriculture and collection of fuel wood. indeed, as long as commercial interests are allowed access to these economically - depressed areas of the world, and as long as populations of poor, rural people continue to expand, tropical rainforests will continue to fall. some scientists see light at the end of the tunnel. joseph wright of the panama - based


to these economically - depressed areas of the world, and as long as populations of poor, rural people continue to expand, tropical rainforests will continue to fall. some scientists see light at the end of the tunnel. joseph wright of the panama - based smithsonian tropical research institute says the tropics now have more protected land than in recent history, and believes large areas of tropical forest will remain intact through 2030 and beyond : “ we believe that the area covered by tropical forest will never fall to the exceedingly low levels that are often predicted and that extinction will threaten a smaller proportion of tropical forest species than previously predicted. ” only time will tell whether wright ’ s optimistic predictions ring true, or whether a more doomsday scenario will play out. to stay informed and be part of the solution, stay tuned to the web sites of rainforest action network, rainforest alliance, the rainforest site and, of course, mongabay. com. contacts : mongabay, www. mongabay. com ; rainforest alliance, www. rainforestalliance. org ; rainforest action network, www. ran. org ; rainforest site, www. rainforestsite. com ; fao, www. fao. org. send your environmental questions to : earthtalk, p. o. box 5098, westport, ct 06881 ; firstname. lastname @ example. org. read past columns at : www. emagazine. com / earthtalk / archives. php. earthtalk is now a book! details and ordering information at : www. emagazine. com / earthtalkbook. from the december 2 - 8, 2009 issue print this article


posts tagged ‘ virtual tour ’ two extraordinary repositories ; two extraordinary new web visualization tools … from the smithsonian institution ’ s national museum of natural history, the 3d collection : date of discovery : 1961 discovered by : hisashi suzuki age : about 41, 000 years old fossil name : amud location of discovery : wadi amud, israel the purpose of this collection [ of 3d fossils and artifacts ] is to allow you to view your favorite objects from our david h. koch hall of human origins and to help you share your museum experience with your friends and family. before our exhibit opened, the objects on display were either ct or laser scanned. the scanning process enabled human origins progam staff to generate 3d models of each object that you can view, rotate, and interact with online. it may take a minute or two to load depending on your computer, but after it is loaded you will be able to move the 3d object around by holding down the left - click button and moving your mouse. and from the vatican, the virtual reality tour of the sistine chapel : a virtual tour of michelangelo ’ s masterwork — move around the space and inspect from any angle, using your mouse – designed by the augustinian computer scientists at villanova university. as we marvel at time, at space, and at the technology that aims to tame them, we might recall that it was on this date in 1979 that operators failed to notice that a relief valve was stuck open in the primary coolant system of three mile island ’ s unit 2 nuclear reactor following an unexpected shutdown. consequently, enough coolant drained out of the system to allow the core to overheat and partially melt down – the worst commercial nuclear accident in american history. 182 years earlier, on this date in 1797, nathaniel briggs ( of new hampshire ) patented the first “ washing machine, ” known as the box mangler – a heavy frame containing a large box filled with rocks, resting on a series of long wooden rollers. washing was laid flat on a sheet and wound round one of the rollers, then two people pulled on levers to move the heavy box back and forth over the rollers. while it was expensive, heavy, difficult to operate, and even then, jammed often, its failures never led to the evacuation of major population centers.


the world ’ s first bionic eye has been approved by america ’ s food and drug administration ( fda ). the futuristic retinal prosthesis will be used to treat a certain type of blindness. the product, which has been named argus ii, was designed by california - based second sight – which focuses on developing, manufacturing, and marketing implantable visual prosthetics. it ’ s a fitting name for a company which will soon give blind people a second chance at seeing the world around them. while the bionic eye isn ’ t a cure - all for every type of blindness, it will potentially change the lives of people afflicted with retinitis pigmentosa – a disorder which damages and kills light - processing cells in the retina. the disease causes vision to become increasingly blurry until patients can ’ t see at all. around 100, 000 people in the us suffer from the condition. the potentially life changing bionic eye, which was approved by the fda on february 14, aids patients through a four - step process. first, video cameras mounted on the patient ’ s glasses capture visual information in the form of light. the data is then wirelessly transmitted to the implant to trigger electrodes in the chip. those electrodes stimulate pixels of light on the retina. finally, the information is sent to the brain and processed normally as an image. it ’ s a revolutionary concept which has impressed professionals throughout the health industry. " ten or twenty years ago, people wouldn ' t think of the possibility of a bionic eye, and now it ' s something that is possible, " director of the retinal diseases program at the national eye institute, grace shen, told technewsdaily. those who have tested the device in clinical trials have reported significant improvements in their eyesight. the device allowed most patients to see well enough to locate objects, doors and windows in a room and turn in the direction of motion. about a quarter of people regained enough sight to read alphanumeric characters the size of headline letters. " the fact that many patients can use the argus implant in their activities of daily living such as recognizing large letters, locating the position of objects, and more, has been beyond our wildest dreams, ” mark humayun, a doctor and medical professor at the university of southern california who was involved in creating the device, told the wall street journal. but the device didn ’ t come without technical hurdles. one of those challenges was developing a way to add enough electrodes into the tiny


there are two types of judges, de jure and de facto. de jure means “ in law ” while de facto means “ in practice ”. de facto judges are judges that have never signed their oaths of office and are acting as judges only in practice, but not under the law. their judgments are not legally binding or binding only so far as a person chooses to personally follow their rulings. most people are not aware of it, but as many as 90 % of judges in america fall into this category. they have purposely refused or otherwise neglected to affirm their status as judges. many thought that by doing so, they avoided prosecution under rico laws. in 2004, the oaths project in new york state discovered that, not only had judges refused or neglected to sign and file the oaths and / or bonds required, but so had district attorneys and other elected or appointed officials that are responsible for making and upholding our laws. the supreme court has upheld that judgments rendered by de facto judges are, in fact, no judgment. officials are still attempting to sort out the mess in new york caused by these fake judges. the solution to the problem is for every american involved in the courts to check their judge ’ s oath before entering the courtroom. if you are involved with any arm of government, regardless of the position, check first. how do you know if the person who is responsible for voting in your community is acting de jure or de facto? these papers are filed with your secretary of state. if they cannot or will not produce them, run, don ’ t walk to file a complaint with your magistrate. but than, how do you know they have signed, either? the answer may lie in the commission of private attorney ’ s general. i am registering as one. it gives me all the powers of attorney general under 42 u. s. c. 1988 and the powers of a qualified criminal investigator under 18 u. s. c. 1510 as well as protection from harassment under the federal witness program 18 u. s. c. 1512. you can rest assured, i will sign and file my oath of office.


in our last post we discussed our generally favorable impression of damon acemoglu and james robinson ’ s why nations fail. as we indicated, we ’ re not economic historians or political economists, so we ’ re not quite in a position to pass judgment on the relative merits of a & r ’ s arguments. but they seem to explain quite a lot about the historical development of countries purely in terms of their economic and political systems, irrespective of cultural and environmental considerations. as we indicated, we don ’ t necessarily think this precludes multi - layered explanations, but we give a & r points for trying to develop a relatively straightforward theory about why some countries are rich, and some countries are poor. so, what about the united states? it has clearly been one of the most successful experiments in country - building in human history, as a result of a number of factors — inclusive political and economic institutions in particular. a & r note in their book that this was not necessarily guaranteed or intended — early english settlers in virginia, massachusetts and rhode island initially attempted to duplicate the spanish model — and failed. so alternative models, empowering both in terms of economic and political rights, necessarily evolved — where they did not, in fact, colonies perished. moreover, there have been significant developments along the way — the civil rights act, for example, which redressed the political inequalities created by the preservation of the extractive economic and political institutions of the south after the civil war. but they are not sanguine. as they note on their blog : there are clear and present dangers for us institutions : increasing economic inequality ; increasing political inequality ; super pacs and all that ; failing educational institutions ; huge incarceration rates, especially for african - americans ; and erosion of civil liberties. as a & r discuss in their book and on their blog, there is no necessary guarantee that political institutions, once they become inclusive, will stay that way. and economic institutions will tend towards being extractive if political institutions do not remain inclusive. as they point out, it is quite possible to have inclusive economic institutions but extractive political institutions — look at china, for example. so how likely is it that the us could evolve to more extractive economic and political systems? or, say, an inclusive economic system but an extractive political system? actually, there are concerns on both fronts, as a & r suggest above, but, as they point out elsewhere, the us has been here before — in the 19th century, and it moved


an inclusive economic system but an extractive political system? actually, there are concerns on both fronts, as a & r suggest above, but, as they point out elsewhere, the us has been here before — in the 19th century, and it moved ahead. so this could certainly happen again. but that doesn ’ t mean that there aren ’ t some real concerns out there. let ’ s take the ones a & r mention first, and then add one they seem to have missed. ( 1 ) first, increasing income inequality. we ’ ve heard quite a lot about this over the past two years thanks to the occupy movement, but it ’ s been a multi - decade problem, mainly since the 1980s. the problem appears to be intensifying. more ominously, the share of income from labor is falling, and stands at a record low percentage, according to the federal reserve bank of cleveland, which provides us with this handy little graph : what is labor? that ’ s anyone who takes home a paycheck for anything — truck drivers, supermarket clerks, dentists, traders, bible salesmen, whatever. there are two take - aways here — first, labor ’ s share is declining. in fact, since 2000 it has plummeted, and it ’ s not improving. moreover, labor income is growing at a slower rate than total income. the cleveland fed article has a pretty good discussion of the various factors that may explain what ’ s going on here. the second is that capital ’ s share seems to be increasing — but this is actually a bit misleading, since this may mask a growth in indirect tax subsidies. what is capital? corporate profits, rental income, depreciation, indirect tax subsidies, and interest income. why these people feel threatened by obama is a bit unclear, because like nearly all democratic presidents, stock market performance under obama has boomed, and corporate profits have been improving. capital income looks like it ’ s never had it so good. anyway, this sort of data would suggest that in a & r ’ s terminology, the us economic system is becoming more extractive, and the process appears to be accelerating. in a & r ’ s approach to the world, extractive economic systems are those that concentrate wealth at the top. we know from other sources ( cited by a & r ) that this trend is firmly in place, and there ’ s nothing in the data portrayed above that ’ s inconsistent with that fact. it ’ s one for which no easy solution appears imminent — we ’ re


other sources ( cited by a & r ) that this trend is firmly in place, and there ’ s nothing in the data portrayed above that ’ s inconsistent with that fact. it ’ s one for which no easy solution appears imminent — we ’ re probably in for a long period of stagnant labor income, even if it stabilizes at current levels. but that ’ s probably unlikely — the one thing about money is the more you have, the easier it is to get more. ( 2 ) increasing political inequality. there are several trends here, which a & r detail in their link. actually, i would include two of their other concerns in with this one — the increasing power of pacs, and the very high rates of incarceration for black males, which of course tends to disenfranchise them as voters. it ’ s no accident that the various republican attempts at voter suppression are funded in large part by koch money. and it ’ s not an accident that the media is completely useless here. it ’ s all of a piece and it ’ s designed to solidify the political control of the political system by the rich — to make the political institutions as extractive as the economic institutions. ( 3 ) i would add a third issue — the subversion of property rights, which, surprisingly, i have not seen a & r discuss anywhere. as a & r ( and david landes in the wealth and poverty of nations ) emphasize, securing property rights is a necessary condition for the emergence of inclusive economic institutions. extractive economic institutions remain that way in part because of the lack of secure property rights for all. so the subversion of property rights by banks and mortgage companies during the past decade would, one would have thought, triggered more alarm. in fact, it did, and a number of bloggers, particularly yves smith over at naked capitalism and barry ritholtz at the big picture, have been banging on about this issue for years. ( others have as well, of course — it ’ s just that ritholtz and smith have probably been the longest and loudest. ) the short version is essentially this — since the banks made their money not on the mortgages they wrote, but rather by packaging them into securitized vehicles such as cdos to sell on to investors as quickly as possible, they streamlined the title process so that titles were no longer registered as they had been registered for hundreds of years. so tens of thousands of real estate transactions where people had bought homes to which they thought


##os to sell on to investors as quickly as possible, they streamlined the title process so that titles were no longer registered as they had been registered for hundreds of years. so tens of thousands of real estate transactions where people had bought homes to which they thought they had title turned out to have a different outcome — no one could actually determine who held title. the recent national mortgage settlement between all 50 state attorneys general and the banking industry was not a perfect solution, and the banks have been spending the past several years untangling the mess they made. but the more general point is that the system that was designed to secure property rights in the form of title turned out to be surprisingly easy to circumvent, and the penalties have been, in many ways, disproportionately lighter than one would have expected, to put it mildly. the lack of interest by obama ’ s justice department in pursing this issue has been surprising — but, taken with their lack of interest in prosecuting anyone involved in the creation of the worst global financial crisis since the great depression, maybe not so much. none of this is to suggest that these issues are insurmountable. but they are issues, and they need to be addressed. it ’ s a virtue of the a & r approach that it gives us some tools to analyze these trends with. as indicated above, they ’ re optimists — they point out that we ’ ve been there before, in the age of the robber barons, and successfully turned back a very unpleasant tide. but doing it again in the face of an indifferent media and an increasingly stacked political deck may be harder. on the other hand, social networking is a huge boon here, as is the internet in general — it ’ s just so much easier to find stuff out than it was, say, 30 years ago. information wants to be free, and it ’ s a darn good thing. we ’ re going to need all we can get.


digital memory cards, such as usb flash drives and sd memory cards, are used to store content ranging from computer files to photos. however, the files on the digital cards, just like other files on your computer, are susceptible to become lost or damaged. in order to access the files again, you need to recover the files and return the files to their native settings. connect the digital memory card to your computer. if you have a flash, drive simply insert the flash drive into a usb port. if using an sd memory card, you need to use an sd card reader and connect the card reader to a usb port. launch the file recovery software on your computer. many programs have this feature including norton 360. however, if you do not have file recovery software installed, you can obtain a free version from cnet. com. select " downloads, " " windows " and finally type " file recovery. " a list of the most popular file recovery programs will load. download and install one of the available programs. select the digital memory card as the area you want to scan for recoverable files. click " start " and the file recovery software will scan the connected flash drive or sd memory card. once complete, a list of all the files it can recover appears. select the lost files you want to recover and click " restore. " the software will now recover your lost files and place them back onto the digital card. - usb flash drive image by bosko martinovic from fotolia. com


examples of student research results 1 - 10 of 21 matches natural disaster risk at home part of example students analyze the natural disaster threat and potential mitigation techniques of their ( family ) home. west texas : guadalupe mountains, carlsbad caverns, big bend part of nagt : teaching resources : teaching in the field : field trip collection neil haywood, kevin hefferean university of wisconsin - stevens point geology / geography 393 : field trip - southwestern usa intended audience : geology and geography undergraduate students location : guadalupe... sem / eds beach sands part of example students pose a question that can be answered using the sem and sand they have previously collected from beach profiles. petrology in the field and laboratory part of example in this multi - week project, students collect samples in the field, analyze them using various tools and instruments, then present their results and interpretations. family economy of 19th - century industrial workers part of example this activity teaches students how to formulate research questions and perform empirical analysis. students analyse family budgets from late 19th - century industrial workers. economics senior thesis part of example research on economics of population part of example research paper on the economics of population using international census data. taking - risks while driving : are there sex differences part of example students carry out a naturalistic observation study in order to test the hypothesis that there are sex differences in risk - taking. students collect and analyze data and prepare apa style research report. who gets help : a field experiment? part of example students carry out a field experiment in order to test the hypothesis that able bodied individuals receive less help than those perceived to have an injury. students collect and analyze data and write an apa style research report. research paper in introductory econometrics part of example


although blight is often referred to as a fungal spore, it can also be a protozoa, bacteria or virus as well. it ' s almost a catch all term for what often inflicts vegetation during damp or humid and windy conditions. it affects a wide variety of plants, from carrots to potatoes and apple trees to squash. it ' s hard on a plant, and even harder to get a harvest once your plant is infected. after planting over 60 tomatoes, i was on the verge of loosing every single one of them to blight. i searched online for organic home remedies and found some, such as epsom salt dissolved in water. unfortunately, i did not find that this particular solution made any noticeable difference to my plants. fermented foods are incredibly good for us. they provide loads of good bacteria to help fight and overpopulate the bad. it makes sense to reason then that fermented formulas would help us fight microbial pests in the garden too. after all, the soil could be likened to the human digestive system, with beneficial bacteria working hard to make nutrients available for use while keeping dangerous pathogens in check. i recalled reading about a fermented garlic and ginger recipe to deal with fungal problems in the garden a long time ago. since i ' m learning to incorporate fermented foods in my diet, it felt appropriate to try this for my tomatoes as well. the results to date have been amazing. my tomato plants are looking incredible and the tomatoes themselves are ripening quickly without any signs of being infected. i have been spraying this solution weekly to continue to keep the tomato plants healthy and to harvest what tomatoes remain on the plants. what follows is the protocol and recipe i used : fermented ginger & garlic spray ( makes 2 gallons ) 2 small garlic bulbs 2 small ginger roots ( equivalent in size to the garlic ) 1 / 2 cup cane sugar ( do not use white sugar ) 2 gallon mason jar with lid sprayer or mister peel, crush, chop and mince your garlic and place it into your mason jar. do the same with your ginger. fill with purified water, leaving one inch of head space. do not use chlorinated water, as it will inhibit bacterial growth. place lid on loosely. let steep at room temper for 24 hours. add the cane sugar, stir and set the lid on top of the jar. i used a glass lid, which provides weight, but still allows air to bubble out as it ferments. place


. let steep at room temper for 24 hours. add the cane sugar, stir and set the lid on top of the jar. i used a glass lid, which provides weight, but still allows air to bubble out as it ferments. place in a warm spot for five days. the solution will turn cloudy when it is ready to use. strain and refrigerate until you ' re ready to spray. remove all yellow leaves and any leaves touching the fruit on your tomato plants. remove any additional leaves that may be inhibiting air circulation around your plants. use a ratio of approximately 1 / 10 solution to 9 / 10 water ( rain barrel water preferably ). spray the plants and fruit thoroughly. i continued to spray everything in my garden - except my lettuce - with this solution. store leftover solution in a cold cellar or fridge until you need it again. when you ' re down to one batch left, start another jar fermenting. note : when i started experimenting with this solution, my aim was to save what was left of my harvest, and so i snapped off all new growth on my plants. i do not know if this solution would have allowed me to continue developing new fruit or not. linked to fight back friday, barn hop, tomato tuesday, traditional tuesday, real food wednesday, wfmw, health2day simple lives thursday, pennywise platter thurdsay, living well blog hop.


middle east roundtable edition 18 volume 6 - may 08, 2008 the middle east in an asian century • a japanese viewpoint - kentaro hirayama will the day ever come when a sports event is held under the " israel - palestine " logo? • an indian perspective - jasjit singh will this century be like that last, the most violent in human history, or will mankind change? • two asias - yin gang east asia ' s reliance on energy from west asia will not decrease in the asian century. • china ' s energy security - weiming zhao it is unfair to ascribe the increase in oil prices to the economic rise of china. a japanese viewpoint during the oil crisis that followed the yom kippur war in 1973, japan ' s government spokesman susumu nikaido announced in the clearest way possible japan ' s firm commitment to un security council resolutions 242 and 338 and acknowledged the palestinians ' political rights. the event was reported as reflecting japan ' s heavy dependence on middle east oil and gas - - then 70 percent of its needs ; now 90 percent. this was and still is one of the main motives for the frequent " pro - arab " stance of japanese governments regarding the arab - israel conflict. but there are other factors as well. one is that japan has her own occupied territories, the southern half of the kuril archipelago northeast of hokkaido, an area the size of lebanon. these islands were occupied illegally by soviet forces in the very last days of world war ii in the pacific. the resulting dispute has been the core factor hindering a peace treaty between japan and the soviet union / russia. japan believes in the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and expects russia - - the same russia that has been urging israel to return occupied arab territories - - to behave accordingly. in a way, the west bank and kuril islands are linked in the japanese mind. another factor is japan ' s bitter experience with " occupation " and " annexation " in its modern history. beginning in the late nineteenth century, japan ' s military victories over china, russia and ( in wwi ) germany brought her new territories ( taiwan, korea and many pacific islands ). this territorial expansion produced animosity and alarm among neighboring countries and caused international criticism of japan ' s imperial intent that eventually culminated in the devastating defeat of 1945, as a result of which japan lost all annexed territories and abandoned militarism. this change has gradually improved japan ' s relations with her neighbors to the point where japan has


japan ' s imperial intent that eventually culminated in the devastating defeat of 1945, as a result of which japan lost all annexed territories and abandoned militarism. this change has gradually improved japan ' s relations with her neighbors to the point where japan has obtained recognition from the world community as a peace - loving industrial nation. japan will feel very happy if israel follows suit. japan understands israel ' s " existential anxiety " quite well and doubtlessly will continue trying to persuade israel ' s hostile neighbors, including iran, to support lasting peace and prosperity in the region. in 2002, when japan and the republic of ( south ) korea jointly hosted the football world cup, i happened to be in israel. at the knesset i met former israeli foreign minister shlomo ben - ami. i presented him with a ballpoint pen inscribed with a " korea - japan 2002 " logo and explained to him that the japanese occupation of korea had lasted 35 years - - then incidentally the same duration as israel ' s occupation of the west bank and gaza - - and that it took more than half a century to restore relations to the point of co - hosting the world cup. the imposition of international rule led by america would be the only possible solution, but there is an end to everything, prof. ben - ami replied with a wry smile. i hope that end comes sooner rather than later. then too, will the day ever come when a sports event is held under the " israel - palestine " logo? - published 8 / 5 / 2008 © bitterlemons - international. org kentaro hirayama is professor at the hakuoh university research institute. he is a former nhk middle east commentator. an indian perspective nearly a decade of the 21st century has passed and we need to ask a basic question : will this century be like that last, the most violent in human history, or will mankind change? paradoxically, the middle east might hold the key - - even though the region itself lacks the power to make the changes, ambitions notwithstanding, and the " great " powers ( new and old ) will continue to act to shape the future. three mega - trends need to be considered in this context. first, a shift in global power balances ( the second in a hundred years ) will shape the overall landscape in which we are going to live. while it is obvious that the model that would suit the world best is a non - polarized, polycentric and non - hegemonic one, the cruel reality is of a clear trend toward


overall landscape in which we are going to live. while it is obvious that the model that would suit the world best is a non - polarized, polycentric and non - hegemonic one, the cruel reality is of a clear trend toward polarization, where there appears to be little effort to transcend national interests in favor of human interests. the end of the cold war - - which maintained peace in the euro - atlantic region with horrendously destructive militarization and was fought out in vicious wars across the rest of the world - - has opened up unlimited opportunities to redirect global energies toward a century different from the last. but the united nations, for example, always hobbled by the polarization of the cold war, miserably failed to provide any conceptual direction toward a better world and further marginalized itself in the process. the un may be further reduced in effectiveness before it gets reformed sufficiently to be more representative. it may still be possible to stall if not prevent this polarization - - especially since polarization is expanding beyond national interests to social, religious, cultural and ideological dimensions while terrorism employing the most modern tools is proliferating. and tragically, the middle east has become a major hub for this process of polarization, which extends all the way to indian border regions and threatens to expand beyond. in india we have tried hard to follow the concepts of tolerance, multiculturalism and an " inclusive society ". but for these to expand requires a global non - polarized environment. second, the issue of globalization is no longer up for debate : globalization is a reality that has its positive and negative aspects. the challenge is how to manage these effects and in which direction. one of the less recognized effects of globalization has been to trigger a revolution of rising expectations in asia and beyond, especially through information - technology advances. this has increased the general awareness of people and in the process made them far more conscious of the gap between expectations and realities. in most asian countries those realities have enhanced a sense of relative deprivation. in turn, asian societies have become vulnerable to ideological and political exploitation driving many of them toward violence and crime. this side of globalization, with its diffusion of sophisticated weapons and technology, is part of the debris of the cold war making the process extremely lethal. a century that legitimized targeting civilians has tragically resulted in making transnational terrorism almost an instrument of foreign policy and coercion. the challenge here is conceptual and ideological and it has to be met at that plane. mere force will


. a century that legitimized targeting civilians has tragically resulted in making transnational terrorism almost an instrument of foreign policy and coercion. the challenge here is conceptual and ideological and it has to be met at that plane. mere force will not bring about stability or eliminate terrorism. this is where the conceptual flaw in the us strategy of " war against terrorism " becomes obvious : you can prosecute a war against an entity, but not against a phenomenon like terrorism. third, globalization has also created interdependence. one effect is that we are already returning to medieval and older trade and demographic patterns in asia and the middle east. the middle east, with its enormous and vital resources, especially of hydrocarbons, is crucial to the rapidly rising economies of india and china, while expatriate populations in the middle east ( there are over 4. 2 million indians in gulf countries ) are integral to the region ' s economies. these are clear examples of the deepening of national interdependence - and hence also a deepening of vulnerabilities to negative trends. this makes the issue of middle east security ( especially for india ) so critical in the coming decades. the stability of the middle east, however, already imperfect and discriminatory, has been further fractured by the us war in iraq. no stable framework for regional security is possible as long as all countries of the region are not part of it. iran, of course, must reform and moderate its policies in tune with international law and commitments. but that applies to all countries. and the practical challenge of restructuring middle eastern political relations within the region and with the wider world still needs to be resolved. one serious question that demands an objective answer is whether the containment policy the us has pursued has produced the kind of results conducive to peace, development and security in the middle east, or whether it has further aggravated the problems. - published 8 / 5 / 2008 © bitterlemons - international. org jasjit singh is director of the center for strategic studies in new delhi. in discussing the " asian century ", people talk most about the overall development of the south and east asian countries, including china, india, korea and japan. the gnp of the region, which has jumped to 30 percent of the world total from less than four percent half a century ago, is maintaining the momentum of rapid development. the concept of " chindia " highlights the dominant role played by china and india in this development. although west asia is part of


30 percent of the world total from less than four percent half a century ago, is maintaining the momentum of rapid development. the concept of " chindia " highlights the dominant role played by china and india in this development. although west asia is part of asia, there is a dispute as to whether the asian century includes the middle east - - a europe - centered concept of political geography that only half a century ago was also called the near east. this oil - rich region, dominated by muslims, with nearly a century - old arab - israel conflict and the recent rise of iran, is fundamentally different from the south and east asian countries in political, social and economic development. compared with religious and ethnic relations in the middle east, those in south and east asian countries are less tense. although pakistan is also dominated by muslims, conflicts in south and east asia are between countries instead of religious and ethnic groups, e. g., the kashmir dispute between india and pakistan, the territorial dispute between india and china and the disputes between china and japan over historical issues and the east china sea. there is no doubt these conflicts of interest between two countries can at present be controlled. therefore, in the asian century there is far less possibility of war in the south and east asian regions than in the middle east. perhaps we can also say that there are two different asias : west asia and east asia. there is also south asia, including pakistan, india and afghanistan, which has some characteristics of west asia in population structure and religious affiliation but displays obvious differences from middle east countries due to its close geopolitical and economic relations with east asia. strictly speaking, south asia is a transition region between east and west asia in terms of both geopolitical and economic relations. moreover, south east asia is on the whole closer to east asia because of india, while southeastern countries like singapore, myanmar, vietnam, thailand and cambodia should be categorized as east asian in cultural and economic development. the nuclear balance maintained between india and pakistan, the peaceful rise repeatedly pledged by china and the lesson japan learned from world war ii on the whole guarantee that the asian century will be characterized by asia ' s economic rise and political solutions to conflicts of interest between countries. indeed, the preconditions for ensuring an asian century are the avoidance of war and steady economic development. but in the middle east we cannot see the same prospects. although the possibility of a war between arab countries and israel is decreasing, it appears very difficult to avoid a new war based on complicated religious and ethnic conflicts of interest in


and steady economic development. but in the middle east we cannot see the same prospects. although the possibility of a war between arab countries and israel is decreasing, it appears very difficult to avoid a new war based on complicated religious and ethnic conflicts of interest in the region. bearing in mind the increasing impact of shi ' ite iran, the rise of islamic extremists and the intervention of western christian forces in recent years, the chances of avoiding war in the region in the asian century are very small. in short, we shall witness an east asia filled with the spirit of cooperation and a west asia continuing its confrontations. until recently, the two asias did not have any reciprocal relations. but dense population growth and rapid economic development in east asia have brought about a great need for energy, while the economic powers in the region, japan and korea, are not energy - producing countries. the per capita energy reserve of china, india and pakistan combined, accounting for one - fourth of the world ' s population, lags far behind their needs ; hence their reliance on oil and liquefied natural gas from the middle east, or west asia. in recent years, japan and china have made great efforts toward diversifying energy imports, yet russian and african oil can never meet all their needs. east asia ' s reliance on energy from west asia will not decrease in the asian century. in contrast, although commodities from east asia are popular and necessary at present in west asia, east asia is not a source of industrial goods that are badly needed by west asia and trade between east and west through the silk road and the sea silk road does not involve daily necessities. historic mediterranean trade routes make it possible for west asia to survive without any relations with east asia. as part of the flourishing economic development of west asia in the asian century, the gulf countries are making efforts to diversify their unitary oil economy. accordingly, the importance of industrial goods for west asia may decrease. in other words, west asia may need east asia but it is not reliant on it. to conclude, in the asian century the status of the middle east has grown. in order to satisfy the needs of their own societal development, east asian " countries on the rise, " including china and india, will strengthen their political and economic relations with middle east countries and increase their economic input there while maintaining a pragmatic posture of " sitting on the fence " on middle east political issues. japan has been a pioneer in this aspect. another conclusion is that regarding energy security the east


economic relations with middle east countries and increase their economic input there while maintaining a pragmatic posture of " sitting on the fence " on middle east political issues. japan has been a pioneer in this aspect. another conclusion is that regarding energy security the east asian countries have identical interests with the oil - importing countries of the west and even need the united states to protect oil passageways. considering that most gulf oil is exported to east asia and only ten percent to the united states, the east asian countries will not confront the united states in the region at the risk of their energy security. neither china, japan or india will be as interested in political reform in middle east countries as are western christian countries. - published 8 / 5 / 2008 © bitterlemons - international. org yin gang is a research professor of the institute of west asian and african studies, under the chinese academy of social sciences. he also serves as deputy secretary general of the chinese association of middle east studies. china ' s energy security energy consumption in china is growing as fast as the rapidly growing chinese economy. china has changed from a net oil exporter to a net oil importer. in recent years, 40 to 50 percent of the oil that china consumes is imported. of that 60 percent comes from the middle east. saudi arabia, iran, qatar and sudan are the main suppliers. therefore china has a significant interest in the middle east, and any changes in the situation there will affect china ' s energy security. it is only natural for energy factors to play a role in china ' s policy toward the middle east. although china ' s opposition to the iraq war and to the use of force to resolve the iranian nuclear issue is not purely based on considerations of energy security, this is a key factor. in a word, energy diplomacy constitutes an important part of china ' s diplomacy. similarly, energy security is also regarded as a strategically significant part of china ' s national security. china ' s energy security strategy comprises a number of requirements, of which the first is to increase domestic oil production. at the end of march last year, china announced that a new oil field with an estimated reserve of 2200 million barrels had been found in bohai bay. the daily output of this field is expected to reach 200, 000 barrels in three years. at present, the oil yielded in china satisfies about 50 percent of domestic need ; in future, china ' s oil self - sufficiency rate should remain no lower than the present level. a second requirement is to restructure


years. at present, the oil yielded in china satisfies about 50 percent of domestic need ; in future, china ' s oil self - sufficiency rate should remain no lower than the present level. a second requirement is to restructure the energy mix. from now on, china will give priority to the development and exploitation of coal, wind power, water energy and bio - energy. third, china must establish a national system of energy reserves. china ' s current oil reserve mainly depends on the business reserves of three government - owned oil companies, china petrochemical corporation, china national petroleum corporation and china national offshore oil corporation. their reserve capacity is equal to only 21 days ' consumption of the entire country. added to the newly - established national energy reserve bases, the total reserve capacity in china can meet only 30 days ' consumption needs. the petroleum reserve capacity of china is only one - sixth that of japan, one - fifth of the united states, one - fourth of germany and one - third of france. thus, in this field china still has a lot of work to do. fourth, china needs to conserve energy more efficiently. according to the international energy agency, the energy consumption per unit gdp in china is as high as nine times that in japan, 5. 6 times that of the european union, 3. 3 times that in the us and 2. 7 times that in korea. so there is much room for china to develop energy conservation. finally, china needs to explore overseas energy resources so as to realize the multi - model approach to petroleum supplies. in recent years, oil prices have been rising steadily. this is the product of a number of factors such as the growth of the world economy, a decline in oil production, a reduction of oil reserves, the devaluation of the us dollar, the impact of geopolitics and unexpected events and speculating in oil trading. another factor worthy of mention is that the economy is developing very fast in some major petroleum - exporting countries, such as indonesia, mexico and russia. in these countries, increased domestic energy consumption results in a decrease in exports. some petroleum - exporting countries provide their citizens with plentiful gasoline allowances and offer prices as low as seven cents per gallon. such policies unfortunately foster waste. the consumption per capita in some middle eastern petroleum - exporting countries has even exceeded that of the us. another phenomenon that merits keen attention is that in the current round of oil price rises, one power has taken no measures to control the price of oil


the consumption per capita in some middle eastern petroleum - exporting countries has even exceeded that of the us. another phenomenon that merits keen attention is that in the current round of oil price rises, one power has taken no measures to control the price of oil as before but rather has added fuel to the fire and is enjoying the financial result. some critics assume that the short - term strategic energy target of this power is to raise the oil price rapidly in order to strike at china ' s economy, lure china into capital outlays for overseas petroleum industries and then suppress the oil price to create a dilemma for china ' s economy. it is unfair to ascribe the increase in oil prices to the economic rise of china. china ' s oil imports account for only six percent of the total volume of oil trade in the world. china ' s oil consumption is only eight percent of the world total. energy consumption per capita in china is only three - fourths of the world average, one - fourth that of japan and one - seventh that in the us. yet china to a large extent shares much of the burden of high oil prices insofar as it has replaced the west as the world ' s factory and the prices of exported goods from china remain the same as before the rise of oil prices. this means that china is in effect granting a subsidy to consumers of goods made in china all over the world. although the multi - model approach to petroleum resources is one of the key aims of china ' s energy strategy, china is likely to depend even more on oil imports from the middle east in the coming years. according to the institute for the analysis of global security in washington, 70 percent of china ' s imported petroleum will come from the middle east by 2015. therefore, it will remain the basic posture of china ' s diplomacy for a long time to come to pay more attention to the development of the situation in the middle east, to be more concerned with middle east affairs and to establish closer relations with middle east countries. - published 8 / 5 / 2008 © bitterlemons - international. org weiming zhao is professor of international relations, middle east studies institute, shanghai international studies university. he was a fulbright research scholar at princeton university during 2000 - 2001. bitterlemons - international. org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the middle east and its specific concerns. it aspires to engender greater understanding about the middle east region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and