national laboratories, breaks renewable energy into five areas — hydro : energy from water ; solar : energy from the sun ; biofuel : energy from waste ; geothermal : energy from the earth ; and wind : energy from wind. “ one of the main impediments to renewable energy has been that it ’ s expensive. it hasn ’ t been cost competitive with fossil fuels. well, that ’ s changing, ” says gupta. at sandia national laboratories, gupta is working on new photovoltalic solar systems that will cost four times less to make and use 10 times less photovoltalic material than current models, yet produce the same amount of energy as what is currently available. “ we ’ re developing solar technology that can be readily integrated into things we are already familiar with, such as windows, or unrolled like carpet onto a flat roof. ” additionally, makower talks about billion - dollar projects in southern california ’ s mojave desert ( as well as in china and india ) to build enormous utility - sized solar plants, called concentrated solar plants. “ these cells don ’ t turn photons into electrons the way a portable panel on your roof would do, ” makower says. “ they basically concentrate the sunlight and focus it on a tower filled with some kind of special liquid that is used to boil water to make steam to run a turbine. ” gupta also points to innovative technologies happening in wind power. makani power is a company that is designing kite - like devices that fly up in the sky to harness wind energy. the higher up you go, the stronger and the steadier the wind and the more energy you can grab. “ these new, advanced type of wind energy technologies are becoming cheaper to deploy and can be deployed faster, ” says gupta. but in order for these projects to succeed, gupta says, our old - fashioned electric grid — the physical network that is currently utilized to send power to homes and businesses — has to be restructured. “ the electric grid was designed to do one - way flow of electricity from a centralized power plant to the end use, your electric dryer or your tv. that ’ s it, ” he says. gupta predicts a future power grid where you have a two - way flow, or multiple flows of electricity from various sources. for example, at your home or business you could be generating electricity on your roof, which then circulates on the grid and goes someplace else a few blocks down where it is used by someone else at


or multiple flows of electricity from various sources. for example, at your home or business you could be generating electricity on your roof, which then circulates on the grid and goes someplace else a few blocks down where it is used by someone else at a dry cleaners. job opportunities in renewable energy “ the thing that ’ s really fascinating about this opportunity, ” explains gupta, “ is that electricity is something that is not readily imported. we can ’ t get whole bunches of electricity from china, india or elsewhere. we have to generate it and use it in the united states. consequently, these are jobs that will be filled by americans. and that ’ s in contrast with the oil industry. it ’ s a huge difference. ” so what kinds of jobs are going to be created? “ the good news is that there ’ s [ a ] need for everybody, ” says makower. “ there ’ s a need for power engineers and biochemists and physicists, and there ’ s also a need for accountants, lawyers, writers and technicians of every description. when we talk about green jobs, the possibilities are limitless. ” gupta adds to the list a need for heavy lifters : “ for building all these things, for installing solar panels on rooftops, for putting up wind towers, for drilling geothermal wells, all these require people in the construction industry. you also need people with business degrees, with accounting and with legal [ degrees ] in order to craft agreements on how power is going to be purchased from these different types of distributive renewable power plants. ” hinrich eylers, the dean of the college of natural sciences at university of phoenix, couldn ’ t agree more. “ this country is in search [ of ] a new basis for our economy, ” says eylers, who grew up in germany. “ the united states used to be based on retail and housing, and that ’ s not happening now ; we need something new, and i think renewable energy has a good chance of being the new basis for job growth. ” when alternative goes mainstream the transition to renewable is not going to happen tomorrow. “ it ’ s going to take a while to get the technologies into place to replace an economy that is so totally and fully dependent on carbon fuel, ” how long will it take? “ how fast all of this grows and when exactly it is going to go mainstream is hard to predict, ” says gupta. “ one thing is clear — in contrast with coal, natural


fully dependent on carbon fuel, ” how long will it take? “ how fast all of this grows and when exactly it is going to go mainstream is hard to predict, ” says gupta. “ one thing is clear — in contrast with coal, natural gas and petroleum — if you look at renewables, the price of generating renewable electricity is continuing to decline year after year. we are going to see at least one or two of these [ types of energies ] go mainstream within our generation. ” for gupta and his colleagues, that ’ s a real blessing. “ everyone working in this field feels that one day renewable energy will become mainstream and fossil fuels will become the alternative. ” jenny jedeikin is a freelance writer and director of communications for national nonprofit cooltheearth. org. renewables around the world | biofuel in kristianstad, sweden this innovative swedish city with a population of 80, 000 uses no fossil fuels or gas, and instead burns wood, waste and scraps from flooring factories to power an underground district heating grid and provide fuel for cars. | small - scale solar systems in kiptusuri, kenya in rural kenya where 85 percent of people still live without electricity, villagers can now purchase small - scale solar systems for $ 80 to power their cell phones and lighting. as small - scale renewable energy becomes cheaper and more reliable, these tiny systems are playing a transformative role in people ’ s lives. | wind and hydropower in lisbon, portugal with rising living costs and no national source of fossil fuel, portugal was motivated to restructure its entire energy system to draw electricity from its abundant wind and hydro power. now, in cities such as lisbon, wind - driven turbines pump water uphill at night, the most blustery period ; then the water flows downhill by day, generating electricity. | geothermal power in the philippines this southeast asian country already receives 20 percent of its energy from wells drilled deep into the earth. the wells tap steam or hot water that can power turbines. in the philippines, geothermal heat is used directly for fish processing, salt production and drying coconuts and fruit. | tidal power in scotland deals are currently being brokered in the united kingdom to build the first commercial - scale tidal power systems, which will deliver enough energy to power more than 700, 000 homes in scotland within the next four years. tidal energy relies on large underwater turbines to capture the kinetic motion of the ebbing and surging of ocean tides in order to produce electricity.


there are certain materials which produce electric current when light falls on these items. this is known as the photovoltaic effect. these materials if made into plat panels would be able to convert direct sunlight into a huge amount to electricity. the photovoltaic solar power that can be generated in one square meter of land is 1 kilowatt however, that would vary depending on the cloud cover and angle of the sun. edmond becquerel first discovered it in 1839. the electrolytic cell set up by him produced more electrical energy when it got direct sunlight. you would see that silicon mixed with other elements if kept under direct sunlight would directly convert the energy of light into electricity. the amount of electricity generated by photovoltaic solar power, which uses thin sheet of silicon in solar cells, is 10 to 50 milliamps in bright sunlight. there are solar panels as well, which consists of several solar cells. these are attached in a common frame and are joined with wires electrically. this combination of several solar cells in one solar panel can produce a lot of electricity. it is very important to clean the panels that produce photovoltaic solar power in order to get better performance and electricity. this would also save your money from hiring utility company, which is quite expensive. you must clean dust and pollen once in two months at least so that it operates in its full potential. you can use a soft handled long brush in order to clean the dirt and debris with the help of a ladder. if there are stubborn stains, you need to use a garden hose along with dish soap, mild detergent or biodegradable household cleaner to keep it clean. also, clean the mounting brackets and support as well while ensuring that all the connections are tight. in order to clean the snow from the solar panels you need to use roof rake. if the panel is covered with then the cells would not be able to provide adequate photovoltaic solar power to your house. the roof rakes can be purchases from any home utility store and you should use it carefully so that you do not damage the panels. if you can spend some money, you can also opt for self - cleaning system. many companies manufacture cleaning systems, which will maintain the panels in a proper way. this system can be attached with your water lines or water sources like rain barrels. this is mainly used for solar panels, which are placed on high roof and cannot be reached at all times. in order to acquire and store photovoltaic solar power it is essential


this guide begins by describing the problem of animal cruelty and reviewing factors that increase its risks. it then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your local animal cruelty problem. finally, it reviews responses to the problem and what is known about these from evaluative research and police practice. animal cruelty is but one aspect of the larger set of problems related to animals. this guide is limited to addressing the particular harms created by animal cruelty. related problems not directly addressed in this guide, each of which requires separate analysis, include the following : nuisance or hazardous animals harm to animals incidental to other motives some of these related problems are covered in other guides in this series, all of which are listed at the end of this guide. for the most up - to - date listing of current and future guides, see www. popcenter. org. animal cruelty includes many kinds of mistreatment, from temporarily failing to provide essential care to the malicious killing or repeated torturing of an animal. every state defines animal cruelty differently, both in terms of the specific actions that are prohibited and the categories of animals that are protected. for example, hunting is exempted from animal cruelty laws and livestock are not protected, even though in both cases the animals are killed and quite often suffer. laws in some states protect wild animals from frivolous harm ( e. g., “ thrill killing ” ), although most animal cruelty laws are designed to only protect “ companion animals ” or pets. animal cruelty cases tend to span the jurisdictions of several state and local agencies and departments, and the agency officially responsible for handling animal cruelty cases varies. some jurisdictions have sophisticated programs within animal welfare organizations ( e. g., humane societies, societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, animal control ) with specially trained staff who respond to all complaints of animal cruelty. they may be called animal cruelty enforcement agents, humane law enforcement agents, cruelty investigators, or animal control officers, and while they may have the legal authority to investigate and enforce animal cruelty laws, the public often grants them less legitimacy than police. 1 in some jurisdictions, animal cruelty enforcement agents collaborate with police. in places without local animal welfare organizations, police may be solely responsible for enforcing all animal - protection laws. 2 where local humane agencies exist, police tend to refer complaints of animal cruelty to these agencies, even though they often lack the funding, expertise, and resources to investigate animal cruelty cases. 3 the intense public reaction to animal cruelty cases covered by the media suggests that the public is concerned about the treatment


to refer complaints of animal cruelty to these agencies, even though they often lack the funding, expertise, and resources to investigate animal cruelty cases. 3 the intense public reaction to animal cruelty cases covered by the media suggests that the public is concerned about the treatment of animals and believes animal cruelty to be a social problem worthy of police attention. 4 because police routinely come into contact with people at their homes where their animals are ordinarily kept, the officers are in an ideal position to identify warning signs of animal cruelty and neglect. while some cases will be arduous, involving lengthy investigations, search warrants, and complex crime scenes, most cases of animal cruelty are not particularly complicated. particularly in cases of simple neglect, police who identify the signs of animal cruelty can offer information, suggestions for improving animal care, or warnings, which will usually rectify the situation before a serious tragedy occurs. 5 the following types of animal cruelty exist : while specialized training is desirable, particularly for complicated hoarding cases or cases of physical abuse that will be prosecuted, most police officers need only a basic familiarity with animals ’ health and normal states of being to identify the warning signs of animal cruelty. these signs may include the following : 7 national crime - reporting systems do not monitor animal cruelty. doing so would be very difficult, because enforcement authority is scattered across thousands of state and local agencies, laws vary across states, and standardized reporting structures have not been developed. the two major efforts to collect data on the prevalence of animal mistreatment rely primarily on media reports, rather than enforcement records, as the source. † one survey of school - aged children in the united states found that 30 percent admitted to committing some form of animal cruelty. 8 another survey found that 14 percent of the population had witnessed someone “ intentionally or carelessly inflicting pain or suffering on an animal in the past year. ” 9 this translates to over 15 million incidents of animal cruelty in a single year. over half of the respondents stated they reported the incident to a law enforcement or humane organization. one study estimated that approximately 5, 000 cases of hoarding are reported each year, with roughly 40 animals involved in each case. 10 despite the lack of national data, most researchers agree that cases of neglect constitute the vast majority of animal cruelty cases. 11 however, unless the neglect is extreme or involves a large number of animals, these cases are rarely discussed by the media. as a result, the public may not fully understand the prevalence and nature of animal cruelty. 12 † until 2004, the humane society of the


unless the neglect is extreme or involves a large number of animals, these cases are rarely discussed by the media. as a result, the public may not fully understand the prevalence and nature of animal cruelty. 12 † until 2004, the humane society of the united states collected data on animal cruelty cases covered in the media. it discontinued the project because of excessive demands on staff ( lockwood 2008 ). press clippings were also used build the animal abuse registry database administration system ( aardas ), a private system which was launched in 2002. while the website includes a search engine and crime - mapping capabilities, it includes only those cases with a media reference or that proceeded to court. as of april 18, 2011, the database included over 17, 000 cases in six countries. the most obvious harm caused by animal cruelty is the pain and suffering endured by the animal. in contrast to what is often presented by the media, happy endings in cases of physical cruelty are rare : the abuse is often ghastly and victim animals are rarely returned to good health or adopted by a loving family. 13 particularly in hoarding cases, severe crowding and a lack of socialization create health and behavior problems that may leave animals unadoptable and at risk of euthanasia. 14 one study of animal cruelty cases in the media in 2003 found that 62 percent of the animal victims were either killed by the perpetrator or euthanized because of their injuries. 15 long - term outcomes are better for victims of mild neglect, provided their owners change their approach to the animal ’ s care. in addition to the animal suffering inflicted in even the least sensational cases, the more complicated hoarding cases also generate significant public health concerns. homes of hoarders are generally filthy, with an accumulation of animal feces and urine on the floor, sometimes several inches deep. the resulting ammonia gas creates toxic air. utilities and major appliances usually do not work, and most of the basic activities for a functional and sanitary household ( e. g., showering, sleeping in a bed, preparing food ) are impaired. carcasses of dead animals are often found in hoarding locations, many of which are eventually condemned. 16 while animal cruelty is a serious social problem in its own right, interest in its association with other forms of violence has motivated a great deal of research. groups of researchers in both the united states and the united kingdom assert that people who harm or kill animals are at high risk of interpersonal violence. 17 these researchers assert that people who mistrea


other forms of violence has motivated a great deal of research. groups of researchers in both the united states and the united kingdom assert that people who harm or kill animals are at high risk of interpersonal violence. 17 these researchers assert that people who mistreat animals will do so habitually and are likely to be violent to their partners and children. further, they claim that victims of child abuse are likely to harm animals and are more likely to be violent toward humans as they mature. most of these studies examined the prevalence of animal cruelty among incarcerated, violent offenders. however, citing methodological flaws in the research and overly broad generalizations, a few researchers believe the link between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence has been overstated. 18 given that most people who have been cruel to animals have not gone on to commit increasingly violent acts towards humans, these researchers worry that assuming a direct link will cast the net too wide and result in misdirected resources. 19 the same set of external factors ( e. g., stress, poverty, substance abuse ) may underlie multiple forms of violence. however, cruelty to animals, alone, is not a particularly influential predictor of interpersonal violence, and animal cruelty may precede or follow other types of violent offenses. 20 understanding the factors that contribute to your problem will help you frame your own local analysis questions, determine effective measures in response, recognize key intervention points, and select appropriate responses. dogs and cats are the most frequent victims of neglect and physical cruelty, although birds, hamsters, gerbils, rabbits, and reptiles are sometimes abused. most victims of animal cruelty are pets, not wild animals. 21 a survey of veterinarians ’ experience with abused animals and suspected abusers revealed that offenders may physically abuse younger animals ( age 7 months to 2 years ), who are full of energy and sometimes difficult to train. 22 wild animals ( e. g., raccoons, possums, deer ) may be brutally attacked by poachers who intentionally hit the animal with a car or beat them with a club or bat. 23 the animals are killed not for their meat, but rather for sport or the thrill of causing harm. neglected animals are often found in households where residents have alcohol and drug problems and where residents are overwhelmed and have difficulty meeting their own basic needs. 26 further, some pet owners are simply ignorant of animals ’ basic needs and how to train them effectively. 27 even though their cruelty is unintentional, owners who lack this essential knowledge may severely neglect their animals


difficulty meeting their own basic needs. 26 further, some pet owners are simply ignorant of animals ’ basic needs and how to train them effectively. 27 even though their cruelty is unintentional, owners who lack this essential knowledge may severely neglect their animals. although a few studies have shown that a small proportion of violent adult criminals were chronic animal abusers as children, most children who are cruel to animals commit mild, infrequent acts of cruelty and eventually grow out of it. 28 their cruelty is motivated by curiosity, peer pressure, boredom, or a lack of knowledge about animals. 29 perpetrators are most likely to be older adolescents or young adults. males commit intentional acts of cruelty toward animals more often than females. 30 while abuse occurs at all socio - economic levels, it is concentrated in lower socioeconomic households. 31 physical cruelty is often motivated by unrealistic expectations about how animals should behave, and offenders cause pain and distress in an effort to control or retaliate against the animal. they may also express anger about other situations by abusing the animal. 32 in domestic violence situations, offenders may abuse animals in an effort to intimidate or control their human victims. 33 although far less common than physical abuse or simple neglect, hoarding has attracted a disproportionate amount of research. as a result, the profile of a typical hoarder is far more specific. hoarders are most frequently single females who live alone, do not work outside the home, and are socially isolated. however, hoarding cases also involve single males and couples of varying ages and living arrangements. research has identified several types of hoarders, including the following : 34 regardless of the motivation, without adequate treatment and limits on future pet ownership, nearly all hoarders reoffend. 35 research has not examined the specific locations where physical abuse or simple neglect occurs. we do know that although animal cruelty occurs at all socioeconomic levels and in all communities, it is concentrated in households of lower socioeconomic status. 36 media accounts suggest that animal cruelty occurs in or around private residences ( when a pet is the victim ) or in isolated public spaces ( when the victim is a wild or stray animal ). although research describes the characteristics of the households in which hoarding occurs, we do not know the geographic concentrations of hoarding cases. 37 although the seasonal patterns of animal cruelty have not been researched in depth, the research implies that simple neglect ( e. g., inadequate shelter ) may be more prevalent during seasons with extreme temperatures. the


know the geographic concentrations of hoarding cases. 37 although the seasonal patterns of animal cruelty have not been researched in depth, the research implies that simple neglect ( e. g., inadequate shelter ) may be more prevalent during seasons with extreme temperatures. the co - occurrence of animal cruelty with other forms of violence compounds the harms associated with it. although the link between the physical abuse of animals and interpersonal violence is unlikely to be as causal as some research suggests, the occurrence of either type of violence should cue police to check whether other forms of mistreatment may also be present. 38 the underlying conditions that create the opportunity for animal cruelty to occur ( e. g., stress, deprivation, aggression, mental illness, prior victimization, drug and alcohol use ) mirror the risk factors for interpersonal violence. as a result, people who abuse animals may be at risk of committing interpersonal violence, and vice versa. while presuming that people who abuse their pets also abuse their children or spouses is inappropriate, being vigilant about the potential co - occurrence of various forms of violence is only prudent. women in domestic violence situations may delay leaving a violent partner, in part because they are concerned about pets that would be left behind. 39 most domestic violence shelters do not accommodate animals. the social isolation and limited financial resources of domestic violence victims can prevent them from leaving their pets with family members, friends, or at a kennel. many women in shelters report that their pets have been threatened, injured, or killed by their abusive partners. batterers harm pets to exert control, prevent the victim from leaving, or coerce the victim to return. 40 finally, the chaos and filth that characterize hoarding locations have grave consequences for the health of the human inhabitants. hoarders generally have poor hygiene and limited access to a sanitary environment for eating, bathing, and sleeping. these problems with self - care are often compounded by untreated mental illnesses. you may order free bound copies in any of three ways : phone : 800 - 421 - 6770 or 202 - 307 - 1480 allow several days for delivery. send an e - mail with a link to this guide. error sending email. please review your enteries below.


princeton - led team finds secret ingredient for the health of tropical rainforests posted december 9, 2008 ; 09 : 00 a. m. a team of researchers led by princeton university scientists has found for the first time that tropical rainforests, a vital part of the earth ' s ecosystem, rely on the rare trace element molybdenum to capture the nitrogen fertilizer needed to support their wildly productive growth. most of the nitrogen that supports the rapid, lush growth of rainforests comes from tiny bacteria that can turn nitrogen in the air into fertilizer in the soil. until now, scientists had thought that phosphorus was the key element supporting the prodigious expansion of rainforests, according to lars hedin, a professor of ecology and evolutionary biology at princeton university who led the research. but an experiment testing the effects of various elements on test plots in lowland rainforests on the gigante peninsula in the barro colorado nature monument in panama showed that areas treated with molybdenum withdrew more nitrogen from the atmosphere than other elements. " we were surprised, " said hedin, who is also a professor in the princeton environmental institute. " it ' s not what we were expecting. " the report, detailed in the dec. 7 online edition of nature geoscience, will be the journal ' s cover story in its print edition. molybdenum, the team found, is essential for controlling the biological conversion of nitrogen in the atmosphere into natural soil nitrogen fertilizer, which in turn spurs plant growth. " just like trace amounts of vitamins are essential for human health, this exceedingly rare trace metal is indispensable for the vital function of tropical rainforests in the larger earth system, " hedin said. molybdenum is 10, 000 times less abundant than phosphorus and other major nutrients in these ecosystems. the discovery has implications for global climate change policy, the scientists said. previously, researchers knew little about rainforests ' capacity to absorb the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. if molybdenum is central to the biochemical processes involved in the uptake of carbon dioxide, then there may be limits to how much carbon that tropical rainforests can absorb. the biological enzyme, nitrogenase, which converts atmospheric nitrogen into soil fertilizer, feeds on molybdenum, the researchers found. " nitrogenase without molybdenum is like a car engine without spark plugs, " said alexander barron, the lead author on the paper, who was a graduate student in he


feeds on molybdenum, the researchers found. " nitrogenase without molybdenum is like a car engine without spark plugs, " said alexander barron, the lead author on the paper, who was a graduate student in hedin ' s laboratory and earned his ph. d. in ecology and evolutionary biology from princeton in 2007 and who now is working on climate legislation in congress. other authors on the paper from princeton include : anne kraepiel, an associate research scholar in the department of chemistry ; nina wurzburger, a research associate in the department of ecology and evolutionary biology ; and jean philippe bellenger, an associate research scholar in the princeton environmental institute. s. joseph wright, who earned his bachelor ' s degree in biology from princeton in 1974 and now is a staff scientist at the smithsonian tropical institute in panama, is also a contributing author. molybdenum, a lustrous, silvery metal, is found in soil, rock and sea water and in a range of enzymes vital to human health. traces of the element have been found in japanese swords dating back to the 14th century. in modern times, its high strength, good electrical conductivity and anticorrosive properties have made molybdenum desirable as an element of rocket engines, radiation shields, light bulb filaments and circuit boards. the research was conducted with support from the national science foundation, the andrew w. mellon foundation, the smithsonian scholarly studies program, the smithsonian tropical research institute student fellowship program and the environmental protection agency student fellowship program.


weak land reform in south africa - - a failure the democratically elected south african government ( led by the african national congress ) committed itself to undertake broad and sweeping efforts to reverse the deprivations institutionalized by apartheid. these efforts were outlined in the reconstruction and development programme ( rdp ). the rdp is a policy framework developed through extensive consultation between the african national congress, its tri - partite alliance partners ( congress of south african trade unions and the south african communist party ) and other mass organizations in the broader civil society. three years after the promulgation of the reconstruction and development programme, its implementation has been both a spectacular success and an abysmal failure. the successes of the rdp can be measured in several accomplishments that concretely improve the health and well - being of south africa ' s poorest citizens. free healthcare has been instituted for women and children ; a nutrition program now reaches over 12, 000 schools ; over 550 new health clinics have been built and nearly 2500 have been or are in the process of being upgraded. more than 1. 3 million new electrical connections have been made and the one - millionth water connection was completed in early 1997. taken together, these are staggering accomplishments for a nation that teeters with one foot in the developing world and one foot in the developed. in sharp contrast to the rdp success stories stands the nation ' s experiment with land reform. the rdp ' s land reform goals had three broad thrusts. the first was the strengthening of tenure rights for the rural poor. second, land restitution was to be made to those who could prove that their or their family ' s land had been stolen under apartheid. and third, the nation was to redistribute 30 % of agricultural land to the rural poor. all three goals were to be achieved before the year 2000. to date, south africa is not on its way to achieving any of these goals. after two years of parliamentary wrangling, new laws were passed to protect the tenure rights of the rural poor but the government is finding them almost impossible to enforce. white farmers who fear the increased legal rights being given to those who they once dominated with impunity have turned to violence and intimidation. tens of thousands of labor tenants ( basically sharecroppers ) have found themselves illegally evicted. when they turn to the government for help they often find a bureaucrat who was appointed during the apartheid regime. many of these apartheid bureaucrats were allowed to keep their jobs so the new government wouldn ' t lose the intellectual capital of


themselves illegally evicted. when they turn to the government for help they often find a bureaucrat who was appointed during the apartheid regime. many of these apartheid bureaucrats were allowed to keep their jobs so the new government wouldn ' t lose the intellectual capital of their administrative expertise. that decision now haunts the rural poor who find that the face who is supposed to protect their tenure rights from unscrupulous white farmers is the same face who denied their very humanity under apartheid. the land restitution program has bogged down under the sheer weight of the task it is charged with. beginning with the 1913 natives land act, non - white south africans were subjected to periodic waves of land confiscations. by the time of the democratic transition in 1994, approximately 60, 000 white farmers owned over 80 % of agricultural land while 11 million non - whites lived in rural poverty. the department of land affairs estimates that over 3. 5 million people and their descendants were victims of racially - based land dispossession and forced removal during the apartheid era. currently the commission on restitution of land rights estimates it could take up to 15 years to complete the adjudication of the 13, 000 pending land claims affecting more than one million people. the final component of the rdp ' s land reform program is land redistribution. the rdp targeted 30 % of land for redistribution to the rural poor before the year 2000. as of june 1997, less than 2 % has changed hands. although the rdp calls for land expropriation " where appropriate, " only. 29 % of land has been transferred to the poor though this mechanism. instead, the government has relied upon a " willing - buyer / willing - seller " mechanism for land redistribution. the settlement / land acquisition grant is the primary instrument that the government relied upon to facilitate the land transfer visualized in the rdp. the grant program provides a 20 % subsidy for the purchase of land by the poor. this program has failed to effectuate its design because the rural poor have found it quite difficult to come - up with the other 80 % of the purchase price and even more difficult to find a willing seller of prime agricultural land. if the white farmers were content to own the farms while the non - white landless were forced by economic depravation to work for them under the apartheid system, why would they wish to change that relationship after the dismantling of apartheid? indeed, very few have. the willing - buyer / willing - seller approach to land reform is dependent


economic depravation to work for them under the apartheid system, why would they wish to change that relationship after the dismantling of apartheid? indeed, very few have. the willing - buyer / willing - seller approach to land reform is dependent upon the willingness of white farmers to divest themselves of their land. however, for the most part today ' s white farmers are the children and grandchildren of the white farmers who actively supported the apartheid policies that drove non - whites off of their land. such forced removals benefitted these white farmers by opening - up land for them to farm and providing an agricultural labor pool composed of the now landless non - whites. given the dismal results from the willing - buyer / willing - seller approach to land reform, it is clear that adhering to this approach is unrealistic if the goals of the rdp are to be achieved. as a broad policy framework, the rdp provides a wide channel through which the african national congress can steer the ship of state. however, so far the government ' s land reform efforts have steered well to the right. the rdp explicitly acknowledges that reliance upon market forces will not remedy the unjust wealth distribution created by apartheid and the government should amend its land reform program to acknowledge this reality. tepid market interventions such as providing 20 % subsidies on land acquisition are wholly inadequate to alter the maldistribution of agricultural capacity that is the result of apartheid. even if there is a willing - seller, the government may find that its subsidies simply contribute to land price inflation leading to further enrichment of the current property holders and providing little net benefit to the landless millions. the current stage of social transformation in south africa is ideal for land expropriation and redistribution. the populace is eager for substantial change. if the government delays this fundamental prerequisite to a successful land reform program, they may miss their chance to institute such a program with the minimum of negative consequences. domestic and foreign investors are made nervous by instability. however, everyone expects that fundamental economic restructuring will be necessary to fully dismantle apartheid. the time for such fundamental change is now. five to ten years in the future, land expropriation will not be perceived by the international community as the correct and just remedy for apartheid land policies. instead, delayed land expropriation will be perceived as destabilizing and threatening to international investment. there are currently 500, 000 subsistence farmers and an additional 11 million rural poor who are the potential beneficiaries of a successful land


brains of people who suffer from schizophrenia may attempt to repair damage caused by the disease, suggesting an adult brain ' s capacity to change and grow. professor cyndi shannon weickert, dipesh joshi and their colleagues from neuroscience research australia studied the brains of 38 schizophrenic people and 38 normal people, focussing on one of the hardest - hit regions - - the orbitofrontal cortex, the part of the brain involved in regulating emotional and social behaviour. most neurons, brain cells that transmit information, are found in tissue near the surface of the brain. however, in the brains of people with schizophrenia, the team found a high density of neurons in deeper areas, the journal biological psychiatry reports. " for over a decade, we have known about the high density of neurons in deeper brain tissue in people with schizophrenia. researchers thought these neurons were simply forgotten by the brain and somehow didn ' t die off like they do during development in healthy people, " says weickert, according to a neuroscience statement. " what we now have is evidence that suggests these neurons are derived from the part of the brain that produces new neurons, and that they may be in the process of moving. we can ' t be sure where they are moving to, but given their location it is likely they are on their way to the surface of the brain, the area most affected by schizophrenia, " weickert concluded.


the museo della laguna ( museum of the lagoon ) constitutes a collection of findings, starting from the 1970s, which later merged with a small antiquarium and which is nowadays in the interior of the museum. the exhibition collection includes over five hundred articles, for the most part unparalleled, which were recovered, some by chance, in various localities in the lagoons of marano and grado, as well along the coastal stretch behind the lagoons. through the neolithic, bronze and roman ages, through to the middle ages and to the renaissance, the visitor is guided to rediscover the most important stages of the settlement ' s development, and of the landscape changes of the peri - lagoonar strip. an introductory section illustrates the geological evolution of the laguna di marano ( marano lagoon ) and the distribution within the territory of the ancient settlements. a glass showcase dispays findings datable to pre - and proto - history originating from two main sites : bonifica di muzzana and ara del gorgo. the bronze age is represented by an interesting winged axe, datable to the later phase of the medium bronze age ( 1700 - 1350 b. c. ), and by a nucleus of fragments of ceramic vases of different shapes and functions, datable to the recent bronze age ( 1350 - 1200 b. c. ). it includes numerous artefacts which are evidence of daily life in that time : from eating and cooking ceramics to oil lamps, from glassware to objects of common use in bronze, and coins.


traumatic brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder traumatic brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder our returning military veterans remind us dramatically of the importance to consider traumatic brain injury ( tbi ) as a potential comorbid illness in cases of posttraumatic stress disorder ( ptsd ). the common causes of comorbid tbi and ptsd are assault and battery to the head, head trauma ( personal or work - related injuries ), civilian or military explosions, inflicted head trauma in children, motor vehicle accidents, and suicide attempts by jumping. prevalence figures for comorbid tbi and ptsd historically have been lacking. this article discusses the association between tbi and ptsd with a review of the possible mechanisms that link tbi and ptsd. strategies for assessing and treating ptsd are also provided. tbi and comorbid psychiatric disorders the american neuropsychiatric association committee on research recently published a critical review of the literature and noted that psychiatric disorders frequently complicate recovery and rehabilitation from tbi. 1 this study reviewed the literature from 1978 to 2006 on psychosis, depression, ptsd, mania, and aggression following nonpenetrating tbi. studies included in that report were reviewed using the american academy of neurology ’ s criteria for classification of articles on diagnostic methods ( i is the highest classification ; iv, the lowest ). of the 66 studies reviewed, none was found to be class i or ii ; the majority were class iv. there are significant gaps in the literature on post - tbi psychiatric conditions with respect to nosology, epidemiology, and risk factors. larger multicenter prospective studies using standardized diagnostic instruments are needed to further clarify these topics. 1 bombardier and colleagues2 studied the rate at which ptsd symptoms developed without other psychiatric illness during the first 6 months after tbi in a group of 124 civilians. the cumulative incidence of meeting partial dsm - iv - tr criteria for ptsd at 6 months was 11 % and of meeting full criteria, 5. 6 %. prevalence peaked at 1 month ( 10 % ). a large percentage of the participants ( 86 % ) had another psychiatric disorder ; 29 % had a history of ptsd. a recent prevalence study from the cdc found that symptoms consistent with severe ptsd increased from 11 % at 6 months to 16 % at 12 months after the injury. the cdc concluded that regardless of severity, survivors with tbi are at risk for symptoms consistent with ptsd. amnesia regarding the injury event did not protect against the development of these symptoms.


at 6 months to 16 % at 12 months after the injury. the cdc concluded that regardless of severity, survivors with tbi are at risk for symptoms consistent with ptsd. amnesia regarding the injury event did not protect against the development of these symptoms. 3 clearly, it is difficult to accrue large cohorts of civilians with comorbid tbi and ptsd to study prevalence of the disorders. however, findings from a comprehensive study of a large military population with comorbid tbi and ptsd were reported by hoge and colleagues. 4 in the study, 4618 soldiers in 2 brigades of the us army were offered an anonymous neuropsychiatric questionnaire : 2714 soldiers ( 59 % ) completed the questionnaire. of the 2525 soldiers who met inclusion criteria for the study, 124 ( 4. 9 % ) reported an injury with loss of consciousness that lasted between a few seconds to 3 minutes after injury ; 260 ( 10. 3 % ) reported an injury with altered mental status not involving loss of consciousness ; 253 soldiers said they had been dazed, confused, or saw stars after an injury. four additional soldiers reported loss of consciousness lasting longer than 30 minutes. ptsd was strongly associated with mild tbi. overall, 43. 9 % of soldiers who reported loss of consciousness following an injury met the criteria for ptsd, compared with 27. 3 % of those reporting altered mental status. after complex statistical analysis, only loss of consciousness and combat intensity remained significantly associated with ptsd compared with other physical injuries at multiple anatomical locations ( odds ratio for loss of consciousness, 2. 98 ). overall, nearly 15 % reported an injury during deployment that involved loss of consciousness or altered mental status. these findings were defined as mild tbi. the soldiers who had mild tbi were significantly more likely to report high combat exposure and blast mechanism of injury than were the 17 % of soldiers who reported other injuries. those with mild tbi reported significantly higher rates of physical and mental health problems than did soldiers with other injuries. mild tbi was significantly associated with psychiatric symptoms, notably ptsd. this association remained significant after combat experiences had been controlled for. 4 the data indicate that a history of mild tbi in the combat environment, particularly when associated with loss of consciousness, reflects exposure to an intense traumatic event that threatens loss of life and significantly increases the risk of ptsd. 5 the authors of that study concluded that the mechanisms between mild tbi and ptsd are complex. 4 studies have not confirmed any direct causative link between


an intense traumatic event that threatens loss of life and significantly increases the risk of ptsd. 5 the authors of that study concluded that the mechanisms between mild tbi and ptsd are complex. 4 studies have not confirmed any direct causative link between ptsd and injury to brain tissue from the concussion itself, although this is an important area of research. there is evidence that implicit processing of traumatic memories and fear conditioning, both mechanisms for the development of ptsd, occur even in persons with severe tbi who have amnesia about the traumatic event. 6 biomechanics and pathophysiology of tbi as it relates to ptsd at the time of impact, the kinetic energy of blunt force trauma, or blast - overpressure trauma, produces a mechanical loading. this loading is dynamic to the head. brain deformation caused by tissue strain is the proximate cause of injury whether induced by massive inertia or by contact. the strain to tissue is a result of compression, tension, and shear. characteristically, the brain withstands strain better if the tissue is deformed slowly rather than quickly. therefore, the velocity of mechanical loading covaries positively with the level of tissue injury. 7 the 4 pillars of cellular damage that cause injury are presented in table 1. cellular brain damage is a dynamic and evolving process that occurs over several hours and may go on for a few days. 8 the 4 pillars of cellular damage cause enzyme modulation and gene modulation in brain tissue, which results in apoptosis ( programmed cellular death ), necrosis, or if gene modulation is sufficient, repair. either apoptosis or necrosis leads to cellular death. 8 many mechanisms are likely to underlie ptsd, but specific pathophysiology is not yet clear. exposure to extreme stress activates the hypothalamic - pituitary - adrenal axis and increases autonomic reactivity, stress responses produce a reactive cell - mediated immune response, sleep physiology is disturbed, and perception of symptoms is psychologically altered. 4 functional mri studies have shown that trauma modulates the amygdala and medial prefrontal areas as a response to consciously attended fear. 9


chapter 9 : conformity to social norms ( pp. 309 – 314 ) - what is the influence of other group members ' opinions on the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of an individual? - what is the difference between privately and publicly conforming? - are there cultural differences in the views on conformity and the degree of conformity? in this topic - the formation of social norms ( pp. 309 – 312 ) public versus private conformity ( pp. 312 – 314 ) - conformity and false confessions in the interrogation room - conformity and culture the formation of social norms groups have influence on ambiguous ( sherif, 1936, see sp p. 309 ) and unambiguous situations ( asch, 1951, 1955, see sp p. 310 ) ; people often adopt the opinion of other group members and converge to social norms. these social norms reflect group evaluations of what is right and wrong. as a result of converging to groups ' opinions, people become more alike when interacting in groups. public versus private conformity conformity is the term used for the convergence of individuals ' thoughts, feelings, and behavior towards a group ' s norms. private conformity occurs when people truly believe that the group is right and even occurs in the absence of group members. public conformity occurs when we are pressured and feel we do not have a choice other than to conform to group norms. when publicly conforming, people pretend to agree, but privately think the group is wrong. conformity and false confessions in the interrogation room uncertain people are more likely to conform, even when it means confessing to a crime. public conformity is more likely to occur when a witness also agrees. people can privately conform without realizing it. conformity and culture in individualistic cultures, conformity is seen as something negative ; whereas in collectivistic cultures, conformity is seen as a social glue. accordingly, the degree of conformity is higher in collectivistic cultures than it is in individualistic cultures. case study : conformity and culture so what does this mean? people conform to the opinion of other group members and converge to social norms, because of their need to master the world and the need to be connected by others. private conformity occurs when people truly believe that the group is right, whereas public conformity occurs when we are pressured to conform to group norms. when publicly conforming, people still privately think the group is wrong. the degree of conformity is higher in collectivistic cultures, where they view conformity as a


telomeres are the protective caps on chromosome ends found in eukaryotic cells. they consist of dna and associated proteins that are essential for chromosome integrity and stability. in human chromosomes, but also in other species, the telomeres consist of thousands of copies of 6 base repeats ( ttaggg ) or very closely related repeats. broken chromosomes lacking telomeres undergo fusion, rearrangement and translocation. in somatic cells, telomere length is progressively shortened with each cell division, both in vivo and in vitro due to the inability of the dna polymerase complex to replicate the very 5 ` end of the lagging strand of dna. in humans, telomerase, the enzyme that maintains the ends of chromosomes, is absent from the majority of somatic cells but is present and active in most tumors. telomerase is a ribonucleoprotein that synthesises and directs the telomeric repeats onto the 3 ` end of existing telomeres using its rna component as a template. telomerase activity has been shown to be specifically expressed in immortal cells, cancer cells, and germ cells, where it compensates for telomere shortening during dna replication and thus stabilises telomere length. these observations have led to a hypothesis that telomere length may function as a mitotic clock to sense cell aging and eventually signal replicative senescence or programmed cell death. therefore, expression of telomerase activity in cancer cells is seen as a necessary and essential step for tumor development introduction of the telomerase catalytic protein component into normal telomerase - negative human cells may result in restoration of telomerase activity and extension of cellular life span. human cells with introduced telomerase maintain a normal chromosome complement and continue to grow in a normal manner. therefore induction of telomerase activity is nowadays used to immortalize cell lines. telomerase - induced manipulations of telomere length may thus be important not only for cell and tissue engineering but also for dissecting the molecular mechanisms underlying inherited genetic diseases, as well as defining the genetic pathways leading to cancer. because almost all human tumors express telomerase activity, inhibition of telomerase may result in gradual erosion of telomeres and eventual cessation of cell proliferation or induction of apoptosis. thus telomerase may also be a promising target for cancer therapy. trap assay – the development of a sensitive and efficient pcr - based telomerase activity detection method, trap ( telomeric repeat amp


" rebound exercise is the most efficient, effective form of exercise yet devised by man. " a. carter summarized a nasa study in 1979, a study which nasa published in 1980 in the journal of applied physiology. nasa says, "... for similar levels of heart rate and oxygen consumption, the magnitude of the bio mechanical stimuli is greater with jumping on a trampoline than with running, a finding that might help identify acceleration parameters needed for the design of remedial procedures to avert deconditioning in persons exposed to weightlessness. “ when rebounding, three natural forces are at work : gravity, acceleration and deceleration. in the up and down movement of bouncing, your body is subjected to these three forces and each time you bounce into the mat ( at its deepest point ) your body comes into a g - force ( gravity force ) of two to three. as a consequence, literally each cell of your body experiences a g - force which is two or three times stronger than normally. it is as if your weight would double or triple for a fraction of a second when you hit the deepest point of the rebounder mat. this exposure to a higher g - force is what strengthens the body ; and as it is only for a fraction of a second, this does not fatigue the body.. during the movement up to the highest point of your bounce, you come to nearly weightlessness and your body can relax completely.


the ‘ arab spring ’ of early 2011 brought about a dramatic change to the political landscape of the middle east. in tunisia, egypt, and libya, longstanding dictators were forced out of office by popular uprisings fueled by civil discontent. the fall of these regimes were historic moments, marking the end of a long reign of oppression and political stagnation. however, the governmental transitions which followed, and which continue to this day, are vitally important in determining the political future of these countries and the ultimate result of the ‘ arab spring ’. for many in the middle east and across the world, the overthrow of autocratic regimes offers the hope for democracy and new freedoms. those who have guided and participated in these transitions have espoused democratic ideals and voiced commitments to the creation of new, democratic states. the circumstances and reality of the situation, however, means that these transitions have faced and will continue to face challenges and struggles in their attempt to bring about the creation of liberal democracy. tunisia, egypt, and libya each have a set of issues which could hinder, slow, or even prevent the formation of functional, liberal democracy, and these issues need to be addressed and resolved in order to guarantee long - term political stability. while these issues are unique to their countries in their characteristics, they are not without parallels. past democratic transitions in other regions of the world have suffered problems comparable to what the middle east does today and have struggled through their own difficulties in forming democracy. thus, by looking at the successful development of these other democracies possible solutions to the problems being faced now can be found and applied. additionally, it is possible to derive from the democratic development of these other regions a prediction as to what the result of transitions in the middle east may produce. the political situation in tunisia, egypt, and libya holds great promise for the development of democracy, but only if these difficult issues and challenges can be dealt with and solved. prior to discussing the challenges facing these transitions, it would be useful to analyze whether democracy has any requisites required for its formation and, if so, whether they have any bearing on the development of middle eastern democracy. democracy grows best when begun and incubated in a country which possess institutional mechanisms such as the acceptance of rule of law, a functional civil society and culture, impartial administrative bodies, open news media, and a viable education system1. prior to the ‘ arab spring ’, the conditions in egypt, libya, and tunisia appeared, compared to these requisites, antithetical


society and culture, impartial administrative bodies, open news media, and a viable education system1. prior to the ‘ arab spring ’, the conditions in egypt, libya, and tunisia appeared, compared to these requisites, antithetical to the formation and development of democracy : civil society was weak and thus an ineffective champion of democracy, labor unions were empty shells, literacy rates were low, economic control was in state hands, islam is presumed to be inhospitable to democracy, and the region was remote from the epicenter of democratization2. according to this reality and the stated requisites for democracy, the ‘ arab spring ’ revolutions lacked the basis for democracy and, accordingly, any democratic experiment was doomed for failure. this is, however, an unsatisfying and, according to historical precedent, incorrect assumption. the middle east isn ’ t unique in its poor endowment with the prerequisites of democracy. other regions facing similar difficulties nonetheless managed to successfully begin and complete transitions to democracy. in sub - saharan africa, civil society is notoriously weak but yet 23 of 42 countries carried out some measure of democratic transition between 1988 and 1994 ; poverty and inequality as well as geographic remoteness from a democratic epicenter plagued india, yet it managed to fully embrace democracy ; catholicism has at times been accused of incompatibility with democracy yet did not prevent countries in latin america and southern europe from democratizing3. this indicates that democratization is an outcome so complex that no variable will prove to be universally necessary for it. while failure to achieve the perquisites of democracy might undermine the consolidation of it, it cannot explain a failure to carry out democratic transition. as such, it should not and cannot be assumed that the democratic transitions in tunisia, egypt, and libya are doomed to failure because their societies failed to meet perquisites for democracy. it is true they face significant hurdles and issues in their transitions, in part because of this failure, but the resolution of these issues can lead to full democratization as it has in countries with similar circumstances in the past. what issues, then, do these transitions face? what challenges lay ahead which tunisians, egyptians, and libyans will need to deal with in order to develop and solidify liberal democracy? in order to draw parallels to the transitions in the middle east and those in other regions, the problems facing the new arab democracies should be studied and understood. some issues apparent in all of these countries include economic problems, the role of islam in the political system


draw parallels to the transitions in the middle east and those in other regions, the problems facing the new arab democracies should be studied and understood. some issues apparent in all of these countries include economic problems, the role of islam in the political system, security concerns, and a lack of experience with democracy. of course, there also exist further problems whose characteristics and presence are unique to each of these countries. before any solution to these problems can be found, the problems must be studied and analyzed. tunisia was the first country in the arab world to witness the protests of the ‘ arab spring ’, and was also the first to witness the overthrow of a regime. since then, the transition in tunisia has brought about free and fair elections in october 2011 and the seating of a constituent assembly in january 2012. many of the possible worst - case outcomes of the early transition, such as the reemergence of an autocratic regime, ideological polarization, or mass unrest have been avoided. still, there are a number of issues ahead which tunisia must deal with before it can ensure stability in its new democracy4. first, tunisian society is highly depoliticized. this depoliticized nature of tunisian society is a result to the political reality prior to the revolution where outcomes were largely preordained and many tunisians disenfranchised5. this electoral manipulation led to a disaffection among tunisians with politics which has and will continue to complicate the political transition, as it impedes the function of civil society and participation. a new tunisian government will need to change the political culture of tunisians and their perceptions of their role in the democracy, which will be a long and difficult task. an additional concern is of the role of political islam in tunisia. al - nahda, the dominant islamist party within tunisia, has frightened many tunisian seculars and liberals who are uneasy with the prospects of a more islamic government. in october 2011, it won 88 of the 217 seats in tunisia ’ s constituent assembly that will draft tunisia ’ s constitution6, demonstrating its popularity among many tunisians and greatly increasing its clout. as such, it is in a position to influence the direction of the transition and determine the nature of the new state. at the root of the debate are questions of how tunisia ’ s new democracy will interpret certain democratic principles in relation to islamic tenets and the role of sharia in the judiciary. whether the tunisian political system will incorporate an islamist party and whether all tunisians will accept a more islamic version


questions of how tunisia ’ s new democracy will interpret certain democratic principles in relation to islamic tenets and the role of sharia in the judiciary. whether the tunisian political system will incorporate an islamist party and whether all tunisians will accept a more islamic version of government remains to be see, but the issue is that it could lead to a polarization of tunisian society between two competing visions for tunisia and fragment the government. fortunately, al - nahda has thus far demonstrated moderation in its islamic orientation, and has stated that it won ’ t seek too heavy of an incorporation of sharia into the tunisian constitution7. tunisians must also contend with a sprawling internal security apparatus built by the previous regime which has been associated with repressive practices and is perceived by the public as an instrument of regime control. tunisian police have continued to utilize heavy - handed responses since the revolution, and this suggests that the changing of mentalities and culture within the security apparatus will be a slow process8. it is necessary, however, to bring the security forces under governmental oversight and force them to exercise reasonable practices in order to preserve the rule of law and to ensure the function of safe and free society. the status of the economy within tunisia is also a major concern and issue. for many tunisians, the 2011 uprising was motivated by socioeconomic grievances as much as a desire for political change9. since the revolution, however, youth unemployment, regional disparities in wealth, and growing personal indebtedness has continued unabated10. poor economic conditions could remain a source of political restiveness in tunisia, and a failure by the new government to improve the economy could weaken its legitimacy and thus the transition as a whole. this mismatch between the hopes of tunisians during the revolution and the difficult reality of the present economy will be perhaps the biggest challenge to stability in tunisia going forward11. it should be noted that, despite these challenges, tunisia ’ s success so far in its democratic transition has brought it across the threshold of becoming an electoral democracy. if these issues can be resolved and democracy deepen in tunisia, it will serve as a model for the other transitional governments and the rest of the arab world. the revolution in libya took much longer and was a much bloodier struggle than in egypt and tunisia. mummar gaddafi was overthrown and killed following months of civil war and an international intervention on the side of the rebels. still, following his fall the country has begun its own transition into democracy. nevertheless, as a result of gaddafi ’


and tunisia. mummar gaddafi was overthrown and killed following months of civil war and an international intervention on the side of the rebels. still, following his fall the country has begun its own transition into democracy. nevertheless, as a result of gaddafi ’ s rule and the manner of his ouster, the challenges facing libya in its development of democracy are markedly different than those of its neighbors. first, libya faces a severely weakened internal cohesion as a result of its population ’ s tribal nature and because of regional splits between east and west. leaders from the east and south of libya seek a more decentralized state, while those from the west favor centralization12. this, coupled with strong regional identities, could potentially cause a split in the country or turn regions against each other in a fight to determine the nature of the future government. of course, the issue about what level of centralization the new libya will possess demonstrates that there are mutually exclusive competing visions for its future, and this could lead to instability or struggles down the road. even more worrisome is that there exists an array of militias that are tied to different tribes and locales, each of which claims ownership of the revolution and demands a share of the political spoils. ethnic divisions between berbers and arabs are surfacing as well13. such divisions could reinforce ethnic and regional loyalties at the expense of national identification, and thus harm the social and civil cohesiveness of the national state. going forward, libya ’ s leaders will need to negotiate some sort of balance between the role of the central government, its power, and the role of regional administrations. they will also need to foster the development of national identity and dispel regional and ethnic identification ; otherwise, the function of a national democracy seeking to represent all libyans will be severely hampered. another major challenge facing libya is building a democratic state in a country systematically depoliticized by the former regime. gaddafi ’ s rule saw the absence of competitive elections, political parties, and creation of tight regulations on civic life14. this had depraved libyans of any avenue for genuine political participation, and its effects have and will continue to be felt. having lacked any experience with civil society or any institutions for it, the new libyan state and libyan people will need to create fresh mechanisms for democratic participation and learn civil culture. this, of course, will be a difficult endeavor, and will necessarily take some time15. until then, libyan democracy will be shaky at best and undoubtedly fail to encompass the entire libyan population


to create fresh mechanisms for democratic participation and learn civil culture. this, of course, will be a difficult endeavor, and will necessarily take some time15. until then, libyan democracy will be shaky at best and undoubtedly fail to encompass the entire libyan population. another massive difficulty facing the libyan transition is the tenuous state of security in the country. tens of thousands of armed revolutionaries form a patchwork pattern of control over various parts of the country. the libyan transitional government has tried to reign in these militia groups and incorporate them into security forces or integrate them into local governments16. still, armed groups not under oversight by the libyan government pose a direct challenge to the transition and its ability to keep security and stability during a tenuous time. the proliferation of arms from the civil war means that organizations seeking to subvert the government or who disagree with the direction of the transition could inflict damage or forcefully impede its progress. this is especially dangerous as a national, government controlled army and security apparatus is still in formation and is dwarfed by the number of armed rebels and the territorial size of libya17. despite the difficulties that lay in the way of a successful transition, there is optimism to be had about the prospects of a democratic libya : tribal and regional differences are less virulent than the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have fueled prolonged conflict in some other regions of the middle east, libya ’ s geopolitical environment is fairly positive, there is a widespread pride in gaddafi ’ s overthrow, and there is the fact that libya has a copious oil revenue which, if properly managed, can help to rapidly rebuild and form state and national institutions18. on february 11th, 2011, president hosni mubarak of egypt was forced to cede power, making him the second arab leader to be ousted in less than a month because of sweeping protests. his swift ouster marked the beginning of what promised to be a much longer and more difficult political transition. on june 24th, 2012, mohamed morsi won the egyptian presidential elections, marking a significant step forward in egypt ’ s transition. however, the challenges it faces going further are significant. one of the largest issues facing egypt now is the overreach of egypt ’ s dominant political party, the islamist muslim brotherhood19. egypt now has only two nationally elected bodies, the presidency and the upper house, both of which the brotherhood controls. furthermore, the brotherhood has control in the constituent assembly, the body tasked with drafting a new constitution. there is serious concern that the muslim brotherhood could build itself a


nationally elected bodies, the presidency and the upper house, both of which the brotherhood controls. furthermore, the brotherhood has control in the constituent assembly, the body tasked with drafting a new constitution. there is serious concern that the muslim brotherhood could build itself a monopoly on the system and guarantee its supremacy. if it does, democracy in egypt could very well take on an illiberal tint and one form of dictatorship be replaced with another. a similar concern is of the growing powers of the egyptian presidency. on the 22nd of november, morsi made a decree that placed him above oversight of any kind, including the courts20. this move sparked massive protests, demonstrating that it faces significant opposition, but the potential for morsi morphing the egyptian presidency into a dominant office, one that enjoys powers even more substantial than under mubarak, is worrisome for those who fear the return of authoritarianism. related to these issues is the role of political islam within egypt. the muslim brotherhood and other islamic parties have a control of egyptian politics during the formative period of the new egyptian state. this is especially worrisome for liberals and seculars in egypt, groups which participated in the revolution and ouster of mubarak but who now are being pushed out of the process of drafting a constitution and thus out of the formation of the new state. this represents the struggle between competing visions for egypt ’ s future, and there are concerns among some egyptians that an islamic government would be hostile to liberal democracy or roll back freedoms21. indeed, it is unclear whether the results of this islamist hegemony over the egyptian transition may produce or if it will satisfy the aspirations and hopes of the protesters who filled tahrir square last february. a disconnect between results and the initial vision could lead to a return to street politics and an erosion of domestic stability22, and the recent protests against morsi indeed does demonstrate this. an additional major concern for egypt is status of the economy, which has regressed significantly since the revolution. while many of the economic issues the ‘ new ’ egypt faces are challenges it inherited such as high unemployment, an education system ill - suited to the job market, and wealth inequality, the additional challenges of the revolution have exacerbated these issues and the prospect for future growth is austere23. if economic decline continues, the new government could face serious issues of legitimacy and could face public anger over the differences between hopes at the beginning of the revolution and the economic reality of the present. indeed, there are fears that


is austere23. if economic decline continues, the new government could face serious issues of legitimacy and could face public anger over the differences between hopes at the beginning of the revolution and the economic reality of the present. indeed, there are fears that continued economic decline could lead to a reversion to authoritarianism or force the government to rush to fulfill populist economic demands with little consideration of their long term economic consequence24. egypt ’ s democratic transition thus faces a number of significant and dangerous challenges, and some of these have come to a head in the very recent past. as one of the leading arab states, the ultimate results of the egyptian transition will undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping and influencing the future of the broader arab political environment. it should be remembered that, despite their current conflict, the disparate groups which seek to influence the direction of the transition and the future of the egyptian government have come together in past in order to oust mubarak. with that in mind, there is hope that national reconciliation between these groups can happen in the future and a liberal egyptian democracy can form. as can be seen, the issues facing the transitions in tunisia, egypt, and libya are numerous and significant in the challenges they pose. solutions to these problems can be found and implemented, but that does not mean that they necessarily will, or whether the ‘ proper ’ solution can be found. furthermore, unexpected events, circumstances, or issues may arise which could also jeopardize the formation of liberal democracy in these countries. thus, as a result of these challenges and the unpredictable nature of democratic transitions, the changes currently underway in the arab world may indeed lead to various possible destinations that differ from liberal democracy. nevertheless, an analysis of past experiences with democratic transitions from throughout the world can provide examples of how the arab experience might proceed and what some possible results of the current transitions could be. additionally, these past experiences can provide lessons for the current arab transitions and solutions to the problems which they currently posses. a brief history of the recent ‘ third wave ’ of democratic transition should be thus be provided. the ‘ third wave ’ of democratic transitions began in southern europe in the mid 1970s, continued in latin america in the 1980s and into the 1990s, and spread throughout eastern europe and the post - soviet ‘ sphere ’ following the breakup of the soviet union in 198925. in southern europe, spain experienced a regime - initiated transition whose speed and success hinged on a high degree of consent and consensus. greece was eased into its transition with considerable


- soviet ‘ sphere ’ following the breakup of the soviet union in 198925. in southern europe, spain experienced a regime - initiated transition whose speed and success hinged on a high degree of consent and consensus. greece was eased into its transition with considerable and recent experience with democratic rule. in portugal, a transition was slowed because of political and ideological divisions26. the southern european countries had an important advantage in that they were eligible for membership in european institutions, which provided a framework and incentive for the transitions as well as a yardstick for measuring progress towards the establishment of democratic rule. in latin america, the argentine government was delegitimized and brought down because of the falklands war and guided by the military through a democratic transition. in chile, the democratic transition was carried out within a constitutional framework set up by an authoritarian regime with past experiences with democracy27. these transitions reflected strong continent - wide trends towards democratic governance, the free market, and trade liberalization. these trends strengthened the role of civil society and elected officials while transforming the political role of the military28. in eastern europe, the regime changes in hungary and poland represented examples of regime - initiated transitions which were characterized by considerable consensus and compromise. civil society and independent institutions had developed well before the onset of these transitions, which facilitated the ease of transition. romania and kyrgyzstan were examples of society - initiated transition. they both lacked well - developed civil society and the transition process was characterized by considerable social unrest and turmoil29. the transitions in romania and kyrgyzstan are perhaps most similar to the transitions in the arab world, as they came from pressures from society rather than from the regime to launch reforms. additional parallels exist, such as the repressive nature of the regimes, the failure for civil society or independent institutions to develop, and the presence of a limited circle of aristocrats who enjoyed the benefits and spoils of rule30. additional comparisons between the arab transitions into democracy and other democratic transitions exist. popular expectations and continued pressure among revolutionaries and the public will be more important to the outcomes of the arab spring than in some previous transitions. in egypt, for example, protesters have continuously put pressure against those managing the transition to maintain momentum towards democracy, and this is especially evident in the recent protests against morsi ’ s decree. in contrast, transitions in southern europe, latin america, and eastern europe were generally sustained by elite consensus, developed before the transitions opening or in its early stages, and the populations were less abrasive with their demands. a result of popular protests and ‘ transition from


transitions in southern europe, latin america, and eastern europe were generally sustained by elite consensus, developed before the transitions opening or in its early stages, and the populations were less abrasive with their demands. a result of popular protests and ‘ transition from below ’ may force the transitions to move more quickly than those initiated from above, such as in latin america31. on the other hand, in the absence of the elite and intergroup consensus which helped push forward transitions in some latin american and european countries, the egyptian, libyan, and tunisian transitions may remain contested for protracted periods of time. what lessons and past experiences, then, can be derived from these other transitions and applied to the arab transitions? are there solutions to the problems which inhibit the development of liberal democracy in the middle east? first, the role of islam in arab politics can be examined. with the rise of democracy, parties and espousing islamic views either came into existence or began to operate within the political system, and the powerful performance of various islamist parties such as the muslim brotherhood in egypt and al - nahda in tunisia demonstrates that islamism will play a significant role in the future of these states. the question is whether these parties will be able to develop political and social agendas within a democratic system alongside parties with secular orientations, and whether transitional leaders can integrate islamist parties and values into largely secular conceptions of the state. it is possible that the transitions will follow paths similar to turkey and indonesia, where socially conservative muslim parties play active roles in electoral politics within the democratic system32. past experience with religion in transitions have demonstrated that it need not necessarily be an issue or be incompatible with liberal democracy. the evolution of the catholic church in latin america demonstrates how religious actors can evolve to operate within new political paradigms. throughout much of history, it was considered antithetical to democracy, but following vatican ii the catholic church came to be widely regarded as a champion of democracy and human rights, especially in brazil and chile ’ s democratic transitions33. the question whose answer remains to be seen is whether the arab states in transition will be able to reinterpret their islamic traditions and whether the more conservative or radical elements will moderate their positions once integrated into the system. if they do not, a significant concern is that the deep schisms between secular groups and islamic groups will fracture the new democratic systems or spark conflict over the future of the state. despite this concern, previous democratic transitions demonstrate that the threat to democratization that social cohesion problems pose comes less from the problems


schisms between secular groups and islamic groups will fracture the new democratic systems or spark conflict over the future of the state. despite this concern, previous democratic transitions demonstrate that the threat to democratization that social cohesion problems pose comes less from the problems themselves, in this case the role of islam, and more from how the government responds to them34. they test a government ’ s capacity and commitment to responding in way that are consistent with norms associated with democracy, and poor responses to cohesion problems could manifest or reinforce weakness in democracy. polarization is brought to the surface in the democratization process by enabling parties that reflect differing views to wield new influence. lack of consensus on the nature of the state can be an obstacle in constitutional negotiations, law reform, establishment of new governance structures, and setting of policy priorities35. these, however, are all issues with the conduct of government, and the government does not need to let these societal cohesion problems create these issues. previous transitions have demonstrated that this is possible : in indonesia, the government successfully brokered agreements between muslim and christian communities and responded to violence between these groups with police deployment and negotiations, and in spain an escalation of violence linked to basque and catalan nationalism threatened to derail the transition process, but the government negotiated autonomy arrangements so that the problem was defused. on the other hand, turkey ’ s transitional example demonstrates a government ’ s response that can weaken or reflect weaknesses in its democracy. the turkish government responded to kurdish nationalism with repressive measures directed at segments of its own population and resistance to cultural and political autonomy for the kurdish area36. thus, societal cohesion problems such as the split between seculars, liberals, and islamists need not necessarily thwart the development and consolidation of democracy, but the way the government responds to these problems could. another important lesson from past democratic transitions is that few cases of successful democratic transitions have not suffered from turbulence such as this, indicating that political instability and turbulence alone does not derail democratization, and that the difficulty of managing high popular expectations or perceptions about future direction after regime change was not a prominent factor in the reversal of transitions. indeed, romania ’ s transition process was prolonged and disorderly, with ideological differences rife between segments of society. nevertheless, romania managed to successfully democratize, demonstrating that tumult early in a transition does not doom the democratic process, provided that there are sufficient countervailing forces to keep democratization on track. 38 rather, a failure to reform institutions, insufficient commitment to democrat


to successfully democratize, demonstrating that tumult early in a transition does not doom the democratic process, provided that there are sufficient countervailing forces to keep democratization on track. 38 rather, a failure to reform institutions, insufficient commitment to democratization on the part of leaders, and other internal power struggles were more powerful factors39. outcomes can hinge on whether the regime change involved the rejection of the former political system, not just the rejection of the former regime. thus, the role of political islam itself might not be of concern, but instead the way that the transitioning states form their governments to cope with or incorporate it could be. tunisia and libya could, therefore, overcome their issues and still develop liberal democracies : tunisia ’ s has rejected the mechanisms of ben ‘ ali ’ s state and has developed new democratic institutions, and libya has begun the process of developing a new democratic framework from scratch. in egypt, however, the consolidation of power under the muslim brotherhood and morsi ’ s grabbing of power for the office of the presidency is similar to tactics used by past dictatorial regimes and could pave the way for the reappearance and entrenchment of authoritarianism, thus potentially spelling disaster for the prospect of a democratic egypt. of course, the protests in response to morsi ’ s decree and the growing clout of the muslim brotherhood represents a significant countervailing pressure, and thus perhaps the tumult that egypt is experiencing will, like in the case of romania, not derail the long term democratic transition. the economic conditions in tunisia, libya, and egypt are of major concern because of the difficulties they present to the transitions. poor economic conditions were a trigger for the ‘ arab spring ’, and they were as well in many countries which have experienced political transitions in the past. eastern european regimes had based their legitimacy on ensuring satisfactory standards of living, for example, and saw it fracture when undermined by poor economic performance. chile ’ s 1982 financial crises reinforced a trend towards gradual democratization. a major lesson from these transitions, however, is that failure to improve living standards has not caused democratization to fail40. spain suffered sharp economic deterioration after regime change, but democratization proceeded and enjoyed strong public support. in argentina, a dire economic situation during the regime change prompted the new civilian government to adopt an austerity program, and while strong public backlash led to the new president ’ s early resignation it did not dissolve the political transition. thus, economic problems, however troublesome for government leaders,


the regime change prompted the new civilian government to adopt an austerity program, and while strong public backlash led to the new president ’ s early resignation it did not dissolve the political transition. thus, economic problems, however troublesome for government leaders, are not necessarily determinative of the course of democratization. of course, the transitions in the arab world are especially fragile and could be more vulnerable to economic strains than in many past cases. considering that the main motivator for revolution was poor economic conditions, it is entirely possible that failure to improve the economy could delegitimize these new regimes and damage the democratic framework which the transitions are trying to produce. if anything, these lessons learned from previous transitions demonstrate that the arab transitions, though facing many issues and challenges, are not facing an impossible task in developing liberal democracy. the emergence of a democracy in tunisia, whose transition has gone by largely successfully, could increase the probability of reform and successful transitions in the other arab countries. after all, the transitions in latin america demonstrate that regional factors and diffusion about the role of democracy influenced democratization more than any other factor41. furthermore, though the current situation in these transitioning states may appear fragile, that does not mean that they are doomed. the climate for democratization in latin america during the 1970s was also similarly ‘ negative ’, and few would have predicted that these states would have developed liberal democracies over the long term42. history has proven that, if the transitions in the arab states are able to overcome their issues and struggles, then it is entirely possible that democracy will be built and consolidated over the long term. whether they will, however, remains to be seen. still, arab democracy should not be disavowed just yet. 1. david sorenson. “ some democratic requisites ”, transitions in the arab world, spring or fall? strategic studies quarterly, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. au. af. mil / au / ssq / 2011 / fall / sorenson. pdf 2. eva bellin. “ prerequisites : a useful approach? ”, the robustness of authoritarianism in the middle east : exceptionalism in comparative perspective. comparative politics, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. jstor. org / stable / 4150140? seq = 3 4. maria paciello. “ tunisia : changes and challenges of political transition ”, sustainable development, medpro technical papers, accessed november 26, 2012. http :


. jstor. org / stable / 4150140? seq = 3 4. maria paciello. “ tunisia : changes and challenges of political transition ”, sustainable development, medpro technical papers, accessed november 26, 2012. http : / / www. ceps. eu / book / tunisia - changes - and - challenges - political - transition 5. lisa miller et al. “ the regime transition in tunisia and emerging challenges ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 7. alexis arieff. “ islam, politics, and the state ”, political transition in tunisia. congressional research service, accessed november 26, 2012. http : / / www. fas. org / sgp / crs / row / rs21666. pdf 8. lisa miller et al. “ the regime transition in tunisia and emerging challenges ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 9. alexis arieff. “ the economy ”, political transition in tunisia. congressional research service, accessed november 26, 2012. http : / / www. fas. org / sgp / crs / row / rs21666. pdf 10. lisa miller et al. “ the regime transition in tunisia and emerging challenges ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 12. paul salem. “ federalism and decentralization ”, libya ’ s troubled transition. carnegie endowment for international peace, accessed november 26, 2012. http : / / carnegieendowment. org / 2012 / 06 / 14 / libya - s - troubled - transition / bzw4 # 13. lisa miller et al. “ implications for libya, yemen, and syria ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 16


democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed november 25, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 16. paul salem “ the security challenge ”, libya ’ s troubled transition. carnegie endowment for international peace, accessed november 26, 2012. http : / / carnegieendowment. org / 2012 / 06 / 14 / libya - s - troubled - transition / bzw4 # 17. “ resurrecting the governments forces ” ibid 19. thomas carothers. “ the real danger for egyptian democracy ”, carnegie endowment for international peace, accessed november 28, 2012. http : / / www. carnegieendowment. org / 2012 / 11 / 12 / real - danger - for - egyptian - democracy / eg5z # 20. leila fadel. “ is morsi morphing into authoritarian he opposed? ” npr, accessed november 28, 2012. http : / / www. npr. org / 2012 / 12 / 03 / 166426850 / is - morsi - morphing - into - authoritarian - he - opposed 21. david sorenson. “ might arab transitions change the politics of religion? ”, transitions in the arab world, spring or fall? strategic studies quarterly, accessed november 28, 2012. http : / / www. au. af. mil / au / ssq / 2011 / fall / sorenson. pdf 22. lisa miller et al. “ the regime transition in egypt and emerging challenges ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed november 28, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 24. ibrahim saif. “ challenges of egypt ’ s economic transition ”, carnegie endowment for international peace, accessed november 29, 2012. http : / / carnegieendowment. org / 2011 / 11 / 09 / challenges - of - egypt - s - economic - transition / 8kir 25. “ how does arab spring compare to third wave transitions? ”, democracy digest, accessed december 1, 2012. http : / / www. demdigest. net / blog / 2012 / 07 / how - does - arab - spring - compare - to - third - wave - transitions / 26. lisa miller et al. “ southern europe ”, democratization in


/ / www. demdigest. net / blog / 2012 / 07 / how - does - arab - spring - compare - to - third - wave - transitions / 26. lisa miller et al. “ southern europe ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed december 1, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 27. “ latin america ”, ibid 28. “ how does arab spring compare to third wave transitions? ”, democracy digest, accessed december 1, 2012. http : / / www. demdigest. net / blog / 2012 / 07 / how - does - arab - spring - compare - to - third - wave - transitions / 29. lisa miller et al. “ eastern europe and the post - soviet space ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed december 2, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 31. “ lessons from past transitions and policy implications ”, ibid 33. david cortright, “ is islam the issue? ”, the tipping point : transitions to democracy in latin america and the middle east ”, kellogg institute for international studies, accessed december 2, 2012. http : / / kellogg. nd. edu / about / tipping % 20point - arab % 20spring. pdf 34. lisa miller et al. “ lessons from past transitions and policy implications ”, democratization in the arab world. national defense research institute, accessed december 2, 2012. http : / / www. rand. org / content / dam / rand / pubs / monographs / 2012 / rand _ mg1192. pdf 41. david cortright, “ conclusion? ”, the tipping point : transitions to democracy in latin america and the middle east ”, kellogg institute for international studies, accessed december 2, 2012. http : / / kellogg. nd. edu / about / tipping % 20point - arab % 20spring. pdf


atlanta ( ap ) - - don ' t pet the pigs. that ' s the message state and county fair visitors got thursday from health officials who reported a five - fold increase of cases of a new strain of swine flu that spreads from pigs to people. most of the cases are linked to the fairs, where visitors are in close contact with infected pigs. this flu has mild symptoms and it ' s not really spreading from person to person. " this is not a pandemic situation, " said dr. joseph bresee of the centers for disease control and prevention. but any flu can be a risk for some people, and people should be cautious when they can, he added. the case count jumped from 29 a week ago to 158 this week, thanks to a wave of new cases in indiana and ohio, said bresee, the agency ' s chief of influenza epidemiology. most of the infected patients are children - - probably because many were working closely with raising, displaying and visiting pigs at the agricultural fairs, bresee said. the recent cases include at least 113 in indiana, 30 in ohio, one in hawaii and one in illinois, bresee said in a conference call with reporters. the count is changing rapidly. indiana health officials on thursday afternoon said they had seven more confirmed cases than bresee noted. that would raise the grand total to 165 so far. also, diagnosis of cases has become quicker in the last week. cdc no longer must confirm a case with its own lab. now states are using cdc test kits to confirm cases on their own on, speeding the process along. the newly reported cases were likely infected a week or two ago. the cdc has been tracking cases since last summer. a concern : the new strain has a gene from the 2009 pandemic strain that might let it spread more easily than pig viruses normally do. the good news is the flu does not seem to be unusually dangerous. almost all of the illnesses have been mild and no one has died. two of the recent cases were hospitalized, but both recovered and were discharged, bresee said. more good news is that all of the recent cases appear to have spread from pigs to humans, meaning it ' s not very contagious, at least between people. but there probably will be more cases in the weeks ahead, and it won ' t be surprising if at least a few of them involve person - to - person transmission, bresee said. pigs spread flu virus just like people do, with coughing