in 1844 - phillip zink, who landed in allegany ( allegheny ) county, pennsylvania in 1845 - carl zink, who landed in texas in 1846 - heinrich theodor zink, who arrived in america in 1854 - charles tadao " charlie " zink ( b. 1979 ), american major league baseball pitcher - nicolaus zink ( 1812 - 1887 ), german - born, american founder of sisterdale, texas - charles dewayne zink ( 1925 - 2006 ), american television personality and film actor - walter noble zink ( 1898 - 1964 ), american major league baseball pitcher - john jacob zink ( 1886 - 1952 ), american architect of movie houses - michel zink, french scholar of medieval history - lubor j. zink ( 1920 - 2004 ), czech - born, canadian writer and columnist - the making of an american family ( including zinc family ) by ann zink beck. - sink descendants, jacob zinck pioneer : zinck, zink, and sink. - steed, henry wickham. the hapsburg monarchy. london : constable and company, 1919. print. - rupp, daniel l. a collection of upwards of thirty thousand names of german, swiss, dutch, french and other immigrants to pennsylvania from 1727 to 1776. baltimore : genealogical publishing, 2000. print. ( isbn 978 - 0806303024 ). - egle, william henry. pennsylvania genealogies scotch - irish and german. harrisburg : l. s. hart, 1886. print. - weis, frederick lewis, walter lee sheppard and david faris. ancestral roots of sixty colonists who came to new england between 1623 and 1650 7th edition. baltimore : genealogical publishing, 1992. print. ( isbn 0806313676 ). - jones, george f. the germans of colonial georgia 1733 - 1783 revised edition. baltimore : genealogical publishing, 1986. print. ( isbn 0806311614 ). - siebmacher, j. j. siebmachers wappenbuch. munchen, battenberg : 1975. print. - colletta, john p. they came in ships. salt lake city : ancestry, 1993. print. - oswald, g. lexicon der heraldik. leipzig : 1984. print. - rolland, and h. v. rolland. illustrations to the armorial general by j. b. rietstap 6 volumes in 3. baltimore : heraldic book company, 1976. print. - tar


the story of the 112th infantry regiment of the 28th infantry division in the battle for schmidt, germany. by charles b. macdonald attack on vossenack the aachen front 1 november 1944 by october 1944, the first united states army in western europe had ripped two big holes in the siegfried line, at aachen and east of roetgen. 1 ( map v ) having captured aachen, the army was next scheduled to cross the roer river and reach the rhine. it planned to make its main effort toward dueren in the zone of vii corps south and east of aachen and thence toward bonn on the rhine. but east of roetgen, where the 9th infantry division had breached the siegfried line and parts of a forest mass known generally as the huertgen forest, 2 v corps was first to launch a limited flank operation. the 28th infantry division, under the command of maj. gen. norman d. cota, was ordered to make the v corps attack ; its initial objective was to be the crossroads town of schmidt. schmidt was an important objective. lying on a ridge overlooking the upper roer river, it also afforded a view of the schwammenauel dam, an important link in a series of roer dams which the germans might blow at any time. the rush of floodwaters thus unleashed would isolate any attack which had crossed the roer in the aachen vicinity. located in rear of the main siegfried line defenses in the area, schmidt was an important road center for supply of enemy forces. the capture of schmidt would enable the 28th division to advance to the southwest and attack from the rear the enemy ' s fortified line facing monschau, while a combat command of the 5th armored division hit the line frontally. thus v corps could complete the mission assigned by first army - - clearing the enemy from its area south to the roer river on a line monschau - roer river dams. in enemy hands the roer dams remained a constant threat to any major drive across the roer downstream to the north. the schmidt operation was expected to accomplish four things : gain maneuver space and additional supply routes for the vii corps attack to the north ; protect vii corps ' right flank from counterattack ; prepare the ground for a later attack to seize the roer river dams ; 3 and 28th division objectives 2 november 1944 attract enemy reserves from vii corps, thus preventing their employment against first army ' s main effort. because the permanent boundary between v corps and vii corps intersected the planned zone of operations, first army on 25 october designated a


28th division objectives 2 november 1944 attract enemy reserves from vii corps, thus preventing their employment against first army ' s main effort. because the permanent boundary between v corps and vii corps intersected the planned zone of operations, first army on 25 october designated a temporary boundary to run just south of kleinhau and north of huertgen. this would keep the schmidt operation entirely within the bounds of v corps. between the northernmost positions of the 28th division and the new corps boundary, the defensive line was being held with a series of road blocks in the huertgen forest by the 294th engineer combat battalion ; south of the planned zone of operations the line was being held by the 4th cavalry group. taking over the 9th infantry division ' s sector on 26 october, the 28th division found itself facing roller - coaster terrain that was to play an even more vital role than usual in the attack on schmidt. ( map vi ) its front lines extended generally along the huertgen - germeter - rollesbroich road from germeter through richelskaul to the vicinity of a forester ' s house, raffelsbrand. to the north and south lay dense forests, the southern forests hiding numerous enemy pillboxes and the town of simonskall. to the east from germeter ran a ridge topped by the town of vossenack, surrounded on three sides by deep, densely wooded draws with wooded fingers stretching up toward the town itself. to the northeast was the huertgen - brandenberg - bergstein ridge, dominating the vossenack ridge. ( in 9th division operations in this area, one battalion had attacked between these two ridges and secured positions in the woods north of vossenack, but a violent enemy counterattack in the woods southwest of huertgen had forced the advance battalion ' s withdrawal. ) through a precipitous wooded gorge to the east and southeast of vossenack ran the kall river, a small, swift - flowing stream emptying into the roer near nideggen. although a river road ran generally north - south alongside the kall, only a small woods trail, very difficult to locate on the available maps and aerial photographs, crossed the river in the direction of the 28th division ' s attack. that trail led across the river and up another ridge on which were seated the towns of kommerscheidt and schmidt. this ridge also dominated the vossenack ridge, and schmidt in turn commanded kommerscheidt. the brandenberg - bergstein ridge line, northeast


and up another ridge on which were seated the towns of kommerscheidt and schmidt. this ridge also dominated the vossenack ridge, and schmidt in turn commanded kommerscheidt. the brandenberg - bergstein ridge line, northeast of vossenack and north of kommerscheidt, was lower than the highest point of the schmidt - kommerscheidt ridge but overlooked its lower slopes where the towns of schmidt and kommerscheidt were situated. schmidt and kommerscheidt were also surrounded by dense woods and deep draws. two important considerations influenced the planners of the schmidt operation. first, air support could isolate the battlefield from large - scale intervention of enemy reserves, especially armored reserves. thus the schmidt action would remain an infantry action inasmuch as crossing tanks over the kall river was a doubtful possibility. the air task, extremely formidable because it involved neutralization of a number of roer river bridges - - and bridges are a difficult target for air - - was assigned to the ix tactical air command of the ninth air force. second, artillery support could deny the enemy the advantages of the dominating brandenberg - bergstein ridge. while the planners displayed great concern about enemy observation from this ridge, v corps had too few troops to assign the ridge as a ground objective. neutralization of the ridge by artillery would require almost constant smoking of approximately five miles and still could not be expected to eliminate the most forward enemy observation. but neutralization by artillery was apparently the only available solution. the 28th division was strongly reinforced for the operation. major attachments included the following units : the 707th tank battalion ( medium ) ; the 893d tank destroyer battalion ( self propelled ) ( minus one company ) ; the 630th tank destroyer battalion ( towed ) ; the 86th chemical battalion ( 4. 2 - inch mortars ) ; and the 1171st engineer combat group. the 1171st consisted of the 20th, 146th ( minus one company ), and 1340th engineer combat battalions. 4 artillery in direct support was to include the 28th division ' s organic artillery ( the 107th, 109th, and 229th field artillery battalions of 105 - mm. howitzers and the 108th field artillery battalion of 155mm. howitzers ) ; battery a, 987th field artillery battalion of 155 - mm. self - propelled guns ; 76th field artillery battalion of 105 - mm. howitzers ; 447th antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion ; and the attached tank destroyers and tanks.


battery a, 987th field artillery battalion of 155 - mm. self - propelled guns ; 76th field artillery battalion of 105 - mm. howitzers ; 447th antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion ; and the attached tank destroyers and tanks. two 155 - mm. howitzer battalions of the 187th field artillery group of v corps were later assigned in direct support and a battalion of 4. 5 - inch guns in general support. also to furnish general support were the 190th field artillery group of v corps, consisting of one 155 - mm. gun battalion and one 8 - inch howitzer battalion, and the 188th field artillery group of vii corps, consisting of one 155 - mm. gun battalion and one battalion ( less one battery ) of 4. 5 - inch guns. the 28th division ' s employment of its regiments was virtually dictated by v corps. 5 the 109th infantry was to attack north toward huertgen in order to prevent repetition of the enemy counterattack that had hit the 9th division from that direction. it was also to carry out a secondary mission of securing a line of departure overlooking huertgen from which another division might later capture the town. this later attack on huertgen was to be a part of the main first army attack by vii corps, and the securing of a line of departure for the later attack was specifically assigned by first army. the 110th infantry was to attack through the dense woods to the southeast to secure a road from schmidt to strauch that would ease the problem of the tenuous supply route from vossenack to schmidt. the road could be used also in the later phase of the operation, the planned co - ordinated attack to roll up enemy defenses facing monschau. one battalion of the 110th infantry was to be held out initially as the division ' s only infantry reserve. the 112th infantry was to make the division ' s main effort toward the east and southeast to schmidt. two major factors influenced this deviation from the tactical doctrine of a convergent attack : ( 1 ) the lack of troops available for the operation and ( 2 ) the necessity for performing the three initial missions : ( a ) protecting the north flank against counterattack and securing a line of departure overlooking huertgen, ( b ) clearing the main route south toward strauch in preparation for the latter phase of the attack, and ( c ) capturing the initial division objective, the town of schmidt. attached to the 112th infantry in the main effort to capture schmidt were : company c, 103d engineer


toward strauch in preparation for the latter phase of the attack, and ( c ) capturing the initial division objective, the town of schmidt. attached to the 112th infantry in the main effort to capture schmidt were : company c, 103d engineer combat battalion ( organic ) ; companies b and d, 86th chemical battalion ( 4. 2 - inch mortars ) ; and company c, 103d medical battalion ( organic ). in direct support were : the 229th field artillery battalion, reinforced by company c, 630th tank destroyer battalion ( towed ) ; the 20th engineer combat battalion ; and company c, 707th tank battalion ( medium ). the 893d tank destroyer battalion ( self - propelled ) and the remainder of the 707th tank battalion ( minus company d, which was to assist the 28th reconnaissance troop in maintaining contact with the 4th cavalry group in defensive positions to the south ) were to reinforce fires of the general support artillery. the artillery plan called for conventional fires on known and suspected enemy locations, installations, and sensitive points, the bulk of them in the huertgen area to the north. the preparation was to begin at h minus 60 minutes all along the v corps front and the southern portion of the vii corps front to conceal as long as possible the specific location of the attack. at h minus 15 minutes, fires were to shift to local preparation, and after h hour fires were to be supporting, chiefly prepared fires on call from the infantry. since weather limited air observation before the attack, counterbattery fires were based primarily on sound and flash recordings, which could not be considered accurate because of unfavorable weather and wooded, compartmented terrain. ammunition was limited but considered adequate, and antitank defense was also included in the artillery plan. artillery units were located in the general area zweifall - roett - roetgen, from which all expected targets would be within effective range. the engineer plan revolved around the attached 1171st engineer combat group. one battalion of this group was to support the 110th infantry and one was to work on rear area roads. the 20th engineer combat battalion, in support of the 112th infantry, was assigned the primary engineer mission of opening the trail from vossenack across the kall river to kommerscheidt and schmidt. in the planning phases, engineer responsibility for security of the kall river crossing was emphasized, but the engineer plan as issued by the 1171st group on 30 october did not charge any engineer unit with security of the crossing. the plan


and schmidt. in the planning phases, engineer responsibility for security of the kall river crossing was emphasized, but the engineer plan as issued by the 1171st group on 30 october did not charge any engineer unit with security of the crossing. the plan stated only that, because of the disposition of friendly troops, local security would be required. the written engineer plan, including this statement, was nevertheless approved by the 28th division commander, the division engineer, and the corps engineer. 6 the 28th division, whose men wore the red keystone shoulder patch that revealed the division ' s pennsylvania national guard background, had participated in the latter stages of the normandy battle and had pursued the enemy across france and belgium. rested after almost a month along a relatively inactive sector of the siegfried line to the south, the division was nearly at full strength, although there had been many replacements after an unsuccessful effort to penetrate the siegfried line opposite pruem at the close of the pursuit across belgium. the major supply shortage was in all types of artillery ammunition, chronic throughout first army since september when the siegfried line battles had begun. the supply of arctic overshoes was also far under requirements ; only about ten to fifteen men per infantry company were equipped with them. there was little patrolling before d day, partially because of the proximity of enemy lines and partially because of the limitations of the densely wooded terrain ; but intelligence information obtained in the area by the 9th division was turned over to the 28th. maps to be used were primarily the standard 1 : 25, 000 ( germany, revised ), which could be considered generally accurate, but aerial photographs were usually not available in lower echelons. when the 28th division moved into the area on 26 october, the men found themselves in a dank, dense forest of the type immortalized in old german folk tales. all about them they saw emergency rations containers, artillery - destroyed trees, loose mines along poor, muddy roads and trails, and shell and mine craters by the hundreds. the troops relieved by the 28th division were tired, unshaven, dirty, and nervous. they bore the telltale signs of a tough fight - - signs that made a strong impression on the incoming soldiers and their commanders. after the operation the 28th division commander himself, general cota, recalled that at the time he felt that the 28th ' s attack had only " a gambler ' s chance " of succeeding. 7 the 28th division g - 2 estimated that to the immediate front the enemy had approximately 3, 350 men, to the north 1, 940,


felt that the 28th ' s attack had only " a gambler ' s chance " of succeeding. 7 the 28th division g - 2 estimated that to the immediate front the enemy had approximately 3, 350 men, to the north 1, 940, and to the south 1, 850, all of whom were fighting as infantry. enemy reserves capable of rapid intervention were estimated at 2, 000 not yet committed and 3, 000 capable of moving quickly from less active fronts. the g - 2 estimate did not mention that holding schmidt and the roer river dams was an important fundamental in the german scheme for preventing an allied break - through to the rhine. the schwammenauel dam located southeast of schmidt. the holders of this dam controlled the flow of water along the roer river and could flood a wide area along its path. although the 28th ' s attack was originally scheduled to be launched on 31 october, rain, fog, and poor visibility necessitated postponement. despite continued bad weather, the attack was ordered for 2 november to avoid the possibility of delaying the subsequent vii corps attack. the 109th infantry was to initiate the action by launching its northerly thrust at 0900. 8 while the 110th infantry and two battalions of the 112th were not to attack until h plus 3 hours ( 1200 ), the 2d battalion, 112th, was to join the 109th in the h hour jump - off - - 0900, 2 november. 9 facing the planned american attack was an enemy determined to hold the huertgen - vossenack area for several reasons now apparent : the threat to the roer dams ; the dominating terrain of the ridges in the area ; the importance of dueren as a road and communications center ; the threat to plans already made for an ardennes counteroffensive ; and the neutralizing effect of the huertgen forest against american superiority in air, tanks, and artillery. the unit charged with the defense was the 275th infantry division of the lxxiv corps of the seventh army of army group b. that an attack was imminent was already known from obviously preplanned american artillery fires and from reports and observation of american troop movement in the rear of roetgen. it was also known that the new american unit in the area was the 28th infantry division, although the germans thought the division a part of vii corps instead of v corps. north of the 275th infantry division the line was held by the 12th volks grenadier division, and to the south by the 89th infantry division,


division, although the germans thought the division a part of vii corps instead of v corps. north of the 275th infantry division the line was held by the 12th volks grenadier division, and to the south by the 89th infantry division, which was scheduled to be relieved soon by the 272d volks grenadier division so that the 89th could be re - equipped. to the north, in army group b reserve in the muenchen - gladbach area, was the 116th panzer division. although the germans believed an american attack imminent in the vossenack area, no specific precautions had been taken in movement of troops, because timing and direction of attack were still unknown. 10 the 112th makes the main effort in the center of the 28th division zone the 112th infantry, making the division ' s main effort, was assigned the capture of kommerscheidt and schmidt. it had the secondary mission of protecting its own north flank by the capture and defense of vossenack and the vossenack ridge. after the planned artillery preparation beginning at h minus 60 minutes, the 2d battalion, 112th, was to attack at h hour ( 0900 ) to capture vossenack and the forward ( northeastern and eastern ) nose of the ridge. the 1st battalion, 112th, attacking at h plus 3 hours, was to move in a column of companies through defensive positions occupied by the same regiment ' s company a at richelskaul. then it was to attack southeast through the wooded draw south of vossenack, crossing the kall river in a cross - country move and taking kommerscheidt. the 3d battalion, 112th, was to follow the 1st battalion on order and capture the final objective, the town of schmidt. 11 the 2d battalion ' s plan for seizing vossenack and the vossenack ridge called for an attack with two companies abreast ( company g on the left, company f on the right ) from the line germeter - richelskaul east through vossenack. company g was to move along the open northern slope of the ridge to the nose attack on vossenack - jump - off 2 november 1944 northeast of vossenack ; company f was to take the town itself and the eastern nose of the ridge ; and company e was to follow and complete mopping up of the town. one platoon from company f was to protect the battalion ' s right flank by advancing along the open southern slope of the ridge and was to be followed by one platoon


the ridge ; and company e was to follow and complete mopping up of the town. one platoon from company f was to protect the battalion ' s right flank by advancing along the open southern slope of the ridge and was to be followed by one platoon of company e. 12 this 2d battalion attack was to be assisted by a company of medium tanks, company c, 707th tank battalion. the five tanks of company c ' s 1st platoon, plus two tanks from its 2d platoon, were to attack with company g, 112th, on the left ; the three other tanks of the 2d platoon were to attack with company f, 112th, on the right. the remaining tank platoon was to assist company e in its mop - up operations. two towed guns of company b, 630th tank destroyer battalion, and five 57 - mm. antitank guns of the antitank company, 112th, all in position around richelskaul, were to be prepared to assist the attack by fire. company b, 86th chemical battalion, equipped to fire high explosive shells, was to support the attack from positions along the weisser weh creek in the wooded draw west of germeter. the night before the attack company c, 103d engineers, was to clear paths through friendly mine fields to the east of germeter. 13 the regiment ' s eighteen 81 - mm. mortars were grouped under company h for preparation and supporting fires against vossenack. after capture of the town, they were to revert to their respective battalions. the company d mortars were to concentrate their fire on the draw south of vossenack, company h on the houses in the town, and company m on the wooded area north of the town, firing to begin twelve minutes before h hour. the company h machine guns were attached to the three rifle companies, the entire 2d platoon going to company g on the left, the 1st section of the 1st platoon to company f on the right, and the 2d section of the 1st platoon to company e for the mop - up. 14 before the attack company e, 112th infantry, was outposting the town of germeter, while the remainder of the 2d battalion was in an assembly area in the woods approximately 300 yards southwest of germeter. ( map vii ) on the left ( north ) the 3d battalion, 109th infantry, held wittscheidt on the huertgen road and was to attack almost due north at h hour. on the right ( south ) company


woods north of vossenack ; fire from supporting 81 - mm. mortars was well co - ordinated and fell about a hundred yards in front of the attack formation. even as the tanks were having their difficulties, the company headquarters of company g and the attached machine guns from company h ran into trouble. either the light enemy mortar fire or harassing small arms fire from vossenack wounded the machine gun platoon leader shortly after the machine gunners left germeter, and the platoon sergeant took over. a few minutes later the last man in company g ' s headquarters group stepped on a booby trap or a mine. when a man from the machine gun platoon moved up to see if he could help, he stepped on still another booby trap or mine and was killed. the explosion set off about five antipersonnel mines simultaneously. of the twenty - seven men who had been in this group, twelve were injured or killed in the mine field. only two noncommissioned officers, both corporals, remained out of the machine gun platoon ' s leaders. although slightly wounded, they reorganized the platoon and continued forward. 19 the assault rifle platoons also suffered casualties, both the 1st and 3d platoon leaders being hit within approximately 400 yards of the line of departure. that the leaders should be wounded seemed ironic, for as the advance continued the only enemy opposition came from light mortar fire. the supporting tanks fired as they moved, and many of the germans in vossenack, already weakened by long days and nights of american artillery fire and now faced with a co - ordinated tank - infantry assault, fled north, east, and southeast. past outlying farms and through the open fields north of vossenack the company g assault pushed on quickly and soon reached its objective, the nose to the northeast of the town. in an attack for which the planners had allowed three hours, company g and its supporting tanks and machine gun platoon had taken only one hour and five minutes, gaining the objective shortly after 1000 hours. 20 having reached the nose of the ridge, the company began to reorganize and to dig in against counterattack. its assigned zone included a trail - - actually an extension of vossenack ' s main street - - northeast of the town. the trail was in the defensive sector of the 3d platoon, which planned to tie in later with company f on the right. the 1st platoon took up positions on the left of the 3d ; the 2d platoon, which had been in support in the attack, came up almost an hour


sector of the 3d platoon, which planned to tie in later with company f on the right. the 1st platoon took up positions on the left of the 3d ; the 2d platoon, which had been in support in the attack, came up almost an hour later and extended the semicircular perimeter to the left and left rear. the two light machine guns went into position with the 1st platoon to cover the company ' s front with cross fire. when the platoon of heavy machine guns came forward, it was placed in position with the 3d platoon on the right to fire across the company front in the other direction, thus forming a final protective line. the 60 - mm. mortars were moved up during the afternoon and placed in slight defilade about 200 yards behind the company. all defenses except the 60 - mm. mortars were on the exposed forward nose of the ridge, in accordance with the battalion order ; despite this exposed terrain, the men were virtually ignored by the enemy for the rest of the day. the six supporting tanks churned around on the forward slope of the ridge and fired to the northeast toward brandenberg - bergstein, as if the attack were going to continue in that direction. company g ' s advance had been surprisingly easy ; its principal casualties had been incurred in a mine field ; only minor casualties had resulted from the artillery shelling at the line of departure, light mortar fire, and the occasional harassing small arms fire. company f on the right while company g was launching its successful attack on the left, company f had also moved out at h hour in a column of platoons preceded by its three supporting tanks. the lead platoon, the 3d, under 1st lt. eugene s. carlson, was to advance along the open southern slope of the vossenack ridge as the battalion ' s right flank protection. since the area south of the richelskaul - vossenack road was deemed too exposed to suspected enemy positions in the southern woods in front of richelskaul, the 3d platoon and its three tanks planned to advance north of the road initially, then turn south on the outskirts of vossenack, cross the road, and resume their movement to the east. company f ' s 1st platoon was to follow the lead platoon closely until it turned south. the 1st platoon was to continue east through the town itself. the 2d platoon was to remain in germeter as support to move forward on call. the section of light machine guns and two 60 - mm. mortars were attached to the leading 3d platoon


1st platoon was to continue east through the town itself. the 2d platoon was to remain in germeter as support to move forward on call. the section of light machine guns and two 60 - mm. mortars were attached to the leading 3d platoon ; the other mortar was attached to the 1st platoon. also with the company was a section of heavy machine guns from company h. the three supporting tanks were under the command of 1st lt. james j. leming, the 2d tank platoon leader and acting company executive officer. the assault force moved out at h hour, the infantry platoon following so closely behind its column of spearheading tanks that for the first 500 yards the infantry platoon leader, lieutenant carlson, had his hand on the rear of lieutenant leming ' s tank. there was no resistance except from light enemy mortar fire. when the tanks and the lead riflemen passed the germeter - vossenack - richelskaul road fork, the column veered to the south across the main vossenack road as planned. beyond the road the third tank in the column continued too far to the south before turning east again and ran into surprise german opposition from the wooded draw to the south. a panzerfaust at the edge of the woods knocked it out. the two remaining tanks and the accompanying infantry platoon continued to the east, the tanks firing toward the southern woods line at possible enemy positions. they had gone approximately 300 yards past the first wooded finger pointing toward vossenack from the south when the 75 - mm. gun on lieutenant leming ' s tank jammed. the tank ' s coaxial machine guns and bow guns incurred stoppages that " immediate action " would not clear, and the antiaircraft gun also failed when its bolt jammed from overheating. the advance stopped. lieutenant leming radioed for 2d lt. joseph s. novak, platoon leader of the 3d tank platoon with company e in reserve, to come forward in his tank and lead leming ' s one remaining tank forward. 21 back nearer the line of departure, company f ' s 1st platoon had followed about 200 yards behind the lead platoon and its tanks. in an approach march formation with the 2d and 1st squads forward and the 3d in close support, the 1st platoon passed through the gap in the mine field and neared the germeter - richelskaul - vossenack road fork. at this point, a sudden burst of fire came from two or three hitherto undetected german machine guns emplaced near a group of


the mine field and neared the germeter - richelskaul - vossenack road fork. at this point, a sudden burst of fire came from two or three hitherto undetected german machine guns emplaced near a group of buildings at the road fork. the germans had evidently held their fire when the preceding tanks and infantry had passed. this first burst of enemy fire hit the 1st squad heavily, wounding or killing all but three men. although the 2d squad and the remnants of the 1st built up a base of fire, the germans continued to resist. to break the deadlock, the infantry platoon leader, 2d lt. john b. wine, crawled to within twenty - five yards of the position and knocked out at least one machine gun with a hand grenade. at the lieutenant ' s signal the two advance squads assaulted the position, overcame the german gunners, and captured four or five prisoners. reorganizing his platoon quickly, lieutenant wine continued without opposition into the outskirts of vossenack. one squad began to operate on each side of the main street. the men sprayed the entrances of the houses with fire, tossed in hand grenades, and assaulted each building in the wake of the grenade explosions. at least one company f man was wounded and another killed as the enemy threw in scattered artillery fire. 22 the company f commander, 1st lt. eldeen kauffman, had followed the 3d platoon to a point just past the gap in the mine field. he waited there for the 1st platoon and then followed it through the action at the road fork and on into vossenack. when he heard over his intracompany scr 536 that the 2d attack on vossenack - completion 2 november 1944 platoon, in support at the line of departure in germeter, was receiving intense enemy artillery fire, he ordered the platoon to join him in vossenack. lieutenant wine ' s 1st platoon, continuing its advance, had almost reached the main crossroads marked by the church in the center of vossenack. ( map viii ) at this point it was held up by small arms fire from the house on the left just short of the crossroads. supported by fire from the rest of the platoon, half of one squad assaulted the house and netted between thirty and fifty prisoners. the town of vossenack as far east as the crossroads was then in american hands. upon the arrival of the 2d ( support ) platoon, lieutenant kauffman, the company commander, ordered it to pass through lieutenant wine '


fifty prisoners. the town of vossenack as far east as the crossroads was then in american hands. upon the arrival of the 2d ( support ) platoon, lieutenant kauffman, the company commander, ordered it to pass through lieutenant wine ' s unit, which had become disorganized in its fight at the crossroads. except for three men lost to artillery fire in germeter, the 2d platoon was at full strength. the exchange in assault platoons was made about 1030 at the crossroads, approximately an hour and a half after the jump - off. though the advance had been rapid, the leading elements of company f had covered only a little more than half the distance to their objective, whereas elements of company g had already reached the northeastern nose of the vossenack ridge. 23 the 3d platoon was still waiting on the exposed slope south of the town for lieutenant novak to come forward with his tank from germeter to assist the one remaining operational tank of lieutenant leming ' s platoon. when the assistance arrived, it developed that lieutenant novak had evidently misunderstood the request and, instead of coming forward himself, had sent s. sgt. paul f. jenkins with the 3d tank platoon ' s 2d section, two tanks instead of one. the advance continued and the three tanks came abreast of the town ' s main crossroads. seeing what they suspected to be an enemy mine field ahead, the tankers changed their route of advance and moved north with their accompanying infantry through the center of vossenack. they followed the open northern slope over which the tanks with company g had passed earlier. without opposition the three tanks and company f ' s 3d platoon moved just to the right of company g on the eastern nose of the ridge. there the infantrymen began to dig in on their objective. 24 while the 3d platoon was taking its roundabout route forward, the 2d platoon under 1st lt. george e. scott continued its advance past the crossroads in vossenack. from a house on the left, two or three houses east of the crossroads, a german " burp gun " ( machine pistol ) opened fire and halted the americans with its first burst. as lieutenant scott moved up to one of his squads to meet the situation, another burst killed him instantly. the platoon sergeant then tried to organize a flanking force, but he too was hit and seriously wounded. a squad leader was killed and his second in command seriously wounded in an attempt to shift their squad to where it could flank the position from the north. back at the germeter


organize a flanking force, but he too was hit and seriously wounded. a squad leader was killed and his second in command seriously wounded in an attempt to shift their squad to where it could flank the position from the north. back at the germeter line of departure, the remaining three tanks of lieutenant novak ' s 3d tank platoon had started forward shortly after sergeant jenkins left with the platoon ' s 2d section. novak ' s tanks, scheduled to assist company e in the vossenack mop - up, moved too quickly for the infantry to keep pace and reached the crossroads ahead of the reserve company. there lieutenant kauffman seized the opportunity and commandeered one of the tanks to help in demolishing the burp gun resistance. the tanker fired two rounds at the building indicated by lieutenant kauffman, and the f company commander and his runner, pfc. bud kern, charged the house close behind the tank fire. inside they found seven men and two german officers, one of whom was already wounded. kauffman and kern killed the other officer, and the german enlisted men promptly surrendered. lieutenant novak, meanwhile, had turned south with his tank, apparently intending either to use the southern slope and so avoid the town as he moved eastward or to help knock out the burp gun by firing on the house from another direction. as he neared the southern edge of the town, his tank struck a mine and was immobilized. since it could still be used as a stationary firing point, lieutenant novak stayed with his vehicle, while his two remaining tanks went on with lieutenant kauffman and company f. with the german burp gun resistance now out of the way, the advance continued. lieutenant kauffman tossed a grenade into the basement of the next house as a routine precaution, with the result that a group of germans, who proved to be staff members of the battalion charged with the defense of vossenack, came out in surrender. when questioned, one of the german officers pointed out the town ' s defensive positions on a map. there had been five thirty - man companies in vossenack, he said, and despite high losses another company had the mission of counterattacking to retake the town. lieutenant kauffman shifted company f ' s 1st platoon, now reorganized, back into the attack echelon and returned the 2d platoon to its original support role. accompanied by the two tanks of lieutenant novak ' s tank platoon, lieutenant wine ' s men continued down the main


company f ' s 1st platoon, now reorganized, back into the attack echelon and returned the 2d platoon to its original support role. accompanied by the two tanks of lieutenant novak ' s tank platoon, lieutenant wine ' s men continued down the main street, charging each building close behind assault fire from the tanks. the germans fired only a few desultory shots in return, and by 1230 the 1st and 2d platoons had joined the 3d platoon on the final objective, the bald eastern nose of vossenack ridge. 25 lieutenant kauffman set up his company f command post in the last house on the right ( south ) side of vossenack ' s main street. the 2d platoon began to dig in on the left next to company g ' s right flank. on the 2d ' s right was the 1st platoon, its depleted 1st and 2d squads combined into one and designated to defend a wooded draw that stretched up toward the town from the kall river valley. the 3d platoon dug in on the 1st ' s right on a little exposed nose projecting east between two draws. the section of light machine guns dug in with the 2d platoon on the left, the 1st ( machine gun ) platoon from company h with the right platoon, and the provisional. 50 - caliber machine gun platoon alone on the ridge farther to the southwest. one section of company h 81 - mm. mortars had moved up to firing positions to the north of vossenack as soon as company g had reached its objective ; after company f completed its advance, the other sections displaced to the vicinity of the church. through this day and the next, forward observers from the mortar platoon were with all three rifle companies. later, because of enemy shelling, observers were pulled back to a central observation post in a house near the eastern end of the town. 26 company e mops up the mission of company e was to follow company f at an interval of approximately 300 yards to vossenack. there it would complete the mopping up of german resistance in the town. one platoon was to move along the edge of the woods on the south behind the right platoon of company f in order to assist in protecting the battalion ' s right flank. the 3d tank platoon under lieutenant novak was to precede company e into vossenack and assist in mopping up. one section of machine guns from company h was also attached. when the acting company commander of company e, 1st lt. james a. condon, saw company f moving out at 0830 in preparation for


remnants, " evacuate the wounded, and follow the tail of the company through vossenack. bart returned to his men, but the enemy fire blocked evacuation. not until about noon, when the 1st battalion attacked southeast from richelskaul and thus relieved the pressure against company e ' s 1st platoon, did two men, sergeant bart and pfc. clyde wallace, manage to work around behind the german machine guns and take them from the rear. private wallace went back to the battalion command post in germeter with two prisoners, and the remainder of the platoon, reduced now to about thirteen men, continued into vossenack. 28 while the 1st platoon was still pinned down in the open field, the remainder of company e and its attached machine gun section continued on the mission to mop up in vossenack. ( see map viii. ) in a column of twos on either side of the main road, the men advanced cautiously, checking all buildings and cellars and taking occasional prisoners. only one man was wounded, a 2d platoon rifleman, hit in the arm by a shell fragment. 29 lieutenant novak ' s three tanks, which were supposed to accompany company e in the mop - up, soon outdistanced the riflemen and instead assisted company f in clearing the eastern portion of vossenack. about 1040, shortly after company e must have first entered the outskirts of the town, captain west, the tank company commander, who had moved with company g to the northeastern nose of the ridge, received a radio message asking for tank support for company e. on his way back via the southern route to help out, his command tank hit a mine just south of the church, probably in the mine field which lieutenant leming ' s tanks had previously suspected and avoided. captain west dismounted and found that his battalion headquarters tank had come up. it was near by performing forward observation for the tank battalion ' s assault gun platoon. west took over the headquarters tank to assist company e in completing its mop - up. back on the northeastern nose of the ridge, the tanks that had reached the objective maneuvered around in rear of the infantry positions. there lieutenant quarrie ' s tank threw a track, and the crew could not replace it. 30 about 1530 company e finished its attack mission in vossenack and began to prepare for the defense. lieutenant condon placed his 3d platoon on the left ( north ) of town, generally along the line of houses on the northern side of the street, and his 2d platoon


finished its attack mission in vossenack and began to prepare for the defense. lieutenant condon placed his 3d platoon on the left ( north ) of town, generally along the line of houses on the northern side of the street, and his 2d platoon similarly on the right ( south ) side of town. the remaining men of the 1st platoon faced to the west in a defense within the town itself, denying the battalion rear. light enemy artillery fire fell as the company was going into position, and two men were killed, one of them private wallace, who had assisted sergeant bart in overcoming the german resistance southeast of germeter and had returned after taking two prisoners to the battalion cp. 31 during the afternoon a tank retriever that was sent into vossenack to tow out lieutenant novak ' s damaged tank near the church was itself damaged by a direct hit from enemy artillery. with his own tank lieutenant leming tried to tow out lieutenant quarrie ' s tank, but his efforts were unsuccessful. the tank company received permission about 1600 to draw back to bivouac positions in the western edge of vossenack and there went into a circle defense for the night and effected gasoline and ammunition resupply. 32 the forward battalion command group had followed the attack closely and by 1630 had established a command post in a house approximately 300 yards east of the church in vossenack on the south side of the main street. the rear battalion command post moved up after dark, every available man being pressed into service to carry an extra load of ammunition for resupplying the companies. 33 artillery in the vossenack attack the 229th field artillery battalion in direct support of the 112th infantry fired a total of 1, 346 rounds from 0800 to 1200 on 2 november, thus providing continuous artillery support on call during the entire vossenack attack. in addition to the preparation fires, missions were harassing, counterbattery, and targets of opportunity. company b, 86th chemical battalion, fired 274 high explosive and 225 white phosphorous rounds with its 4. 2 mortars, and at various times during the day vossenack was reported burning and covered with a haze of smoke. company d, 86th chemical battalion, did not fire, having pulled out of firing position to be prepared to follow the 1st and 3d battalions, 112th infantry, to schmidt. 34 the 1st battalion attacks at h plus 3 hours when the 28th division moved into the vossenack - schmidt area, the 1st battalion, 112th infantry, had


be prepared to follow the 1st and 3d battalions, 112th infantry, to schmidt. 34 the 1st battalion attacks at h plus 3 hours when the 28th division moved into the vossenack - schmidt area, the 1st battalion, 112th infantry, had initially been in regimental reserve, but on 1 november company a had relieved elements of the 110th infantry in defense of the junction of the richelskaul - rollesbroich road with the simonskall road to the south. the rest of the battalion had remained in an assembly area a few hundred yards west of richelskaul. ( see map vii. ) the 112th infantry ' s attack plan for 2 november designated the 1st and 3d battalions to attack cross country at h plus 3 hours ( 1200 ) in a column of battalions, the 1st leading. they were to move generally through the wooded part of the southern slope of vossenack ridge, cross the kall river, and seize kommerscheidt. the 3d battalion was then to take schmidt, and both were to to be prepared to continue the attack toward the southwest and steckenborn. this was the division ' s main effort. 35 the 1st battalion, under the command of maj. robert t. hazlett, was to lead the attack in a column of companies, company b leading and passing through company a ' s richelskaul defenses. company c was to follow company b on order, and, after company c had passed through, company a was then to leave its defenses to follow. attached to company b for spearheading the attack was the 1st ( machine gun ) platoon of company d. the 2d ( machine gun ) platoon was to support the attack by firing up the wooded draw to the east from positions with company a at richelskaul. the 81 - mm. mortars were to support on call from a position in a draw in the woods 900 yards behind the line of departure. 36 no preparatory artillery barrage preceded the men of company b as they passed through the richelskaul defenses shortly after noon in a column of platoons - - 1st, 3d, 2d, weapons. the first phase line had been designated as a generally north - south trail, some 400 yards east of richelskaul, which ambled, south from vossenack ' s western outskirts to a juncture in the southern woods with the road to simonskall. as the 1st platoon advanced toward that trail, it was fired upon from woods in the vicinity of the trail and pinned to the ground


from vossenack ' s western outskirts to a juncture in the southern woods with the road to simonskall. as the 1st platoon advanced toward that trail, it was fired upon from woods in the vicinity of the trail and pinned to the ground by intense enemy fire from small arms and entrenched automatic weapons. the 1st platoon leader, 1st lt. ralph spalin, acting as point for his platoon, was instantly killed. capt. clifford t. hackard, the company b commander, committed his 3d platoon to assist the 1st, but in the attempted advance the 3d platoon leader, 2d lt. gerald m. burril, was hit by the enemy fire. despite a broken leg, lieutenant burril dragged himself into a hole from which he directed mortar fire with his scr 536. he was not evacuated until after dark when one of the men of his platoon and an aid man brought him out on a litter. either the loss of its platoon leader or the enemy small arms fire, or both, kept the 3d platoon from advancing farther. about one and one - half hours after the jump - off, captain hackard committed his 2d platoon to the action. one squad from the 2d platoon managed to work its way far enough forward to cross the trail ; there it too was stopped by the intense small arms fire. despite heavy supporting fire from company d ' s 81 - mm. mortars, the attack was stalemated. at 1510 one concentration of twenty - four rounds was fired by the 229th field artillery battalion at enemy machine guns along the trail just south of company b ' s attack route. this was seen by a forward observer and reported as " excellent, " but no further mission was recorded as having been fired in this area during the day. company b still could not advance. 37 the 1st battalion commander, major hazlett, went to the regimental command post about 1500 and talked with colonel peterson, the regimental commander. on his return, major hazlett announced that most of the gain of the day would be held. because of plans he had received 28th division front evening, 2 november 1944 for the next day, however, he did not want to leave company b " stuck so far out front. " 38 when captain hackard made his way back about dusk, major hazlett told him to pull back his advance elements ( evidently the 2d platoon ) to the remainder of the company, which now was in a small patch of woods about 200 to 250 yards in front of the line of departure, and to


, major hazlett told him to pull back his advance elements ( evidently the 2d platoon ) to the remainder of the company, which now was in a small patch of woods about 200 to 250 yards in front of the line of departure, and to dig in there for the night. this move was accomplished after nightfall. 39 thus, the 28th division ' s main effort had been halted after its one attacking company had hit stiff german resistance. except for one mission, artillery support had not been utilized, and neither the other two rifle companies of the 1st battalion nor any part of the 3d battalion had been committed. the battalion and regimental commanders apparently decided that, in view of the stiff opposition encountered by company b and the comparative ease with which the 2d battalion had taken vossenack, the attack should be shifted to pass through vossenack and avoid the resistance facing richelskaul. at any rate, those were the plans for the next day. 40 109th and 110th infantry regiments attack to the north of the 112th infantry ' s divisional main effort, the 109th infantry had jumped off at h hour in its attack to protect the division ' s left flank and secure a line of departure overlooking huertgen. ( map 20 ) by 1400 the 1st battalion, on the left, had two companies on its objective, the woods line west of the germeter - huertgen road. the 3d battalion had attacked generally up the huertgen road and committed all three rifle companies. they gained only about 300 to 500 yards before being stopped by a wide enemy mine field. after two companies of the regiment ' s 2d battalion had moved up to a close reserve position a few hundred yards behind the 1st battalion, ostensibly to cover a gap between the 1st and 3d battalions, the regiment buttoned up for the night. 41 the 110th infantry in the woods to the south had attacked at 1200, its 3d battalion moving generally southeast in the cross - country direction of simonskall and its 2d battalion aiming for eight or ten pillboxes astride the main road south toward rollesbroich. these pillbox defenses later became known as the raffelsbrand strong point. both battalions were stopped after almost no gain by determined resistance and heavily fortified pillboxes. the 1st battalion, 110th infantry, was the division ' s infantry reserve and was not committed. the 110th ' s attack to reach the strauch - schmidt road and thus open the way for the latter phase of the schmidt operation ( the capture of the strauch


infantry, was the division ' s infantry reserve and was not committed. the 110th ' s attack to reach the strauch - schmidt road and thus open the way for the latter phase of the schmidt operation ( the capture of the strauch - steckenborn area ) had made virtually no progress. 42 a vital mission in the schmidt operation, that of isolating the vossenack - schmidt battlefield from large - scale intervention of enemy armor, had been assigned to the aircraft of the ix tactical air command. although the ix tac was to continue its usual large - scale offensive against enemy transportation and communications, its main single effort was to be support of the 28th division. the air plan involved use of five fighter bomber groups - - the 365th, 366th, and 368th ( p - 47 ' s ), and 370th and 474th ( p - 38 ' s ) - - and the 422d night fighter group ( p - 61 ' s ). on the first day of the 28th division attack, a third of the ix tac aircraft were to perform armed reconnaissance on all roads leading out of schmidt to a limit of 25 miles, and another third were to attack special targets and drop leaflet bombs in support of the division. but weather conditions prevented the first planes from taking off from their base at verviers, belgium, until 1234. two of five group missions were canceled and two others were vectored far afield in search of targets of opportunity. one mission did succeed : twelve p - 38 ' s of the 474th fighter bomber group attacked bergstein at 1445 and continued on to hit barges on the roer river, a roer bridge at heimbach, and two factories east of nideggen. the 28th division air control officer reported that one squadron mistakenly bombed an american artillery objective : pillboxes. troops of the 110th infantry, on 2 november, moving through the woods ( above ). one of the heavily fortified pillboxes near rollesbroich ( below ). position near roetgen and caused twenty - four american casualties ( including seven killed ) before attacking schmidt. 43 the enemy situation on 2 november staff officers of army group b, the fifth panzer and seventh armies, and several corps and divisions, including the 116th panzer division, were meeting with generalfeldmarschall walter model, army group b commander, at schlenderhan castle, near quadrath, west of cologne, for a map study. the subject of the study was a


the 116th panzer division, were meeting with generalfeldmarschall walter model, army group b commander, at schlenderhan castle, near quadrath, west of cologne, for a map study. the subject of the study was a theoretical american attack along the boundary of the two armies in the huertgen area. not long after the meeting began, a telephone call from the chief of staff of the lxxiv corps told of actual american attacks north of germeter and in the direction of vossenack. the message said the situation was critical and asked for reserve troops from seventh army because lxxiv corps did not have the men available to close the gaps already opened up by the american attacks. field marshal model directed the lxxiv corps commander to return to his command and ordered the other officers to continue the map study with the actual situation as subject. as the map study continued, reports of the 28th division ' s attack continued to come in, and it was decided to commit immediately a kampfgruppe of the 116th panzer division to assist local reserves in a counterattack against the 109th infantry ' s penetration north of germeter. the remainder of the 116th panzer division was to follow later from its rest area near muenchen - gladbach. the chance presence of the various major commanders at the map conference facilitated preparations for this counterattack. it was designed to hit at dawn on 3 november to eliminate the 109th infantry ' s northern penetration and to push farther south so as to cut off the vossenack penetration of the 112th infantry. this was virtually the same type of counterattack which had threatened the 9th infantry division when it had held this area. 44 summary for 2 november and night of 2 - 3 november beginning with a heavy artillery barrage at 0800 on 2 november, the 28th division attack on schmidt had met varying degrees of success. the 2d battalion, 112th infantry, had made one of the more notable advances of the day in seizing vossenack and the vossenack ridge. although the 1st battalion, 112th infantry, had attempted an attack southeast from richelskaul toward kommerscheidt and schmidt, its one committed company had been held up by small arms fire and the attack not pursued, although the remainder of that battalion, plus the entire 3d battalion and a company of medium tanks, had been available. during the night plans were issued for a new attack the next morning to take the same objectives via a different route. to the north one battalion of the 109th infantry had


plus the entire 3d battalion and a company of medium tanks, had been available. during the night plans were issued for a new attack the next morning to take the same objectives via a different route. to the north one battalion of the 109th infantry had reached the woods line overlooking huertgen, while another had been held up by a previously unlocated mine field. to the south the 110th infantry in a two - battalion attack had gained nothing except comparatively heavy casualties and the knowledge that its opposition was much stiffer than had been expected. although artillery support had been excellent, except in the attack of the 1st battalion, 112th infantry, where it was not requested, air support had been negligible. attached engineers had concerned themselves primarily with maintenance of roads in rear areas, although company c, 103d engineers, had cleared mines east of germeter and had gone into vossenack after dark for road clearance. after dark all three regiments buttoned up for the night, evidently confining themselves to resupply, for there was no record of any patrolling. meanwhile, the germans, their defense facilitated by a chance map conference at army group b headquarters, were planning a dawn counterattack to eliminate both the 109th and 112th infantry penetrations. the 28th division ' s main effort for kommerscheidt and schmidt had on 2 november been pushed with a surprising lack of vigor, presumably because a decision was made somewhere in command channels that the original attack plan would not be followed. although this decision was probably based on success in vossenack as compared with stiff opposition on the original route of advance, it had nevertheless set back considerably the hour by which schmidt might be taken. but on 3 november the 112th infantry would make another attempt to capture the objective. 1. although the official german name for the fortified belt along the western german frontier was westwall, it was known to american troops as the siegfried line. 2. a misnomer. the " huertgen forest " was actually only a small part of a forest mass extending from southeast of eschweiler ( meroder wald ) to the area lammersdorf - rollesbroich - steckenborn. it included the wenau forest, the roetgen forest, and other subdivisions. since the entire forest mass was known to american troops as the " huertgen forest, " this term is used throughout this narrative. 3. although this objective has come to be considered one of the more important of the schmidt operation, neither v corps nor 28th division


forest mass was known to american troops as the " huertgen forest, " this term is used throughout this narrative. 3. although this objective has come to be considered one of the more important of the schmidt operation, neither v corps nor 28th division attack orders mentioned it. according to an interview with col carl l. peterson ( formerly co, 112th inf ), bradford, pa., 21 - 22 - 23 sep 48, the roer dams " never entered the picture. " while the first united states army report of operations - - 1 august 1944 - 22 february 1945 ( hereafter cited as fusa rpt ) does say that the schmidt attack was " a preliminary phase of a plan by v corps to seize the two large dams on the roer river..., " 28th division troops probably did not consider the dams an objective. just when the american command fully realized the importance of the dams is not clear. the german command thought the 28th division attack was aimed at them, and the violent german reaction was based primarily on fear of losing the dams. see postwar german accounts, mss # a - 891 and a - 892 by generalmajor rudolf freiherr von gersdorff ( formerly cofs of seventh army ) ; ms # c - 016 by general der infanterie erich straube ( formerly cg of lxxiv corps ) ; european theater historical interview ( hereafter cited as ethint ) 53 of gersdorff ; ethint 56 of gersdorff and generalmajor siegfried von waldenburg ( formerly cg of 116th panzer division ). for a fuller discussion of the question, see the siegfried line, a volume under preparation in the series united states army in world war ii. 4. the 1171st engr ( c ) gp also included the following : the 502d engr lt pon co, the 668th engr top co ( detached during this opn ), the 993d engr tdwy br co, and the 2d plat, 610th engr lt equip co. these units performed rear area duties and are not mentioned further in this narrative. 5. combat interv 77 with cota. this dictation by v corps was apparently based on the limitations of terrain, number of troops involved, and missions of the attack as originally decided by first army and 12th army group. ( all combat interviews on the schmidt operation are by the 2d information and historical service and were conducted in november


apparently based on the limitations of terrain, number of troops involved, and missions of the attack as originally decided by first army and 12th army group. ( all combat interviews on the schmidt operation are by the 2d information and historical service and were conducted in november 1944 or early december 1944. ) 6. engr story is from the following : v corps factual study, opns of the 28th inf div, engr sec, 2 - 9 nov 44 ( hereafter cited as v corps study ) ; engr plan, 30 oct 44, 28th div g - 3 jnl file, oct 44. for a further discussion of the security problem, see below, ch. iii, n. 10. 7. interv with cota, washington, d. c., 15 sep 48. 8. all clock time given is that officially designated by the allies ; during this period it was british summer time. 9. unless otherwise noted, this introduction is based on the following sources : fusa rpt ; v corps opns in the eto, 6 jan 42 to 9 may 45 ; v corps study ; v corps fo 30, 21 oct 44, and v corps ltrs of instn, 23 oct 44 and 30 oct 44, v corps g - 3 jnl and file, oct 44 ; 28th div g - 3 jnl and file, 26 oct - 2 nov 44 ; combat interv 77 with cota ; combat interv 74, general notes on 28th ' s opns ; 28th div aar, nov 44 ; v corps g - 2 jnl and file, oct 44 ; fo 25, 28th div g - 3 file, 29 oct 44 ; intervs with peterson and with cota. 10. ms # a - 891 ( gersdorff ) ; ms # a - 905 ( waldenburg ) ; ethint 53 ( gersdorff ) ; ethint 56 ( gersdorff and waldenburg ) ; ethint 57 ( gersdorff ) ; i c ( g - 2 ) sit map, 1 nov 44, found in ob west kriegstagebuch, anlagen ( war diary annexes ), befehle and meldungen, 1. - 10. xi. 44 ( hereafter cited as ob west ktb anlagen 1. - 10. xi. 44 ). ob west was the abbreviation of the headquarters of oberbefehlshaber west, commander in chief in the west. see


44 ( hereafter cited as ob west ktb anlagen 1. - 10. xi. 44 ). ob west was the abbreviation of the headquarters of oberbefehlshaber west, commander in chief in the west. see also relief schedule, abloesungsplan, 28 oct 44, found in ob west ktb anlage 50 1. vii. - 31. xii. 44., vol. i, 24. x. - 31. xii. 44. 11. no copy of 112th inf fo 30 can be found. this information is based on 112th inf atk overlays, 31 oct 44, 28th div g - 3 file ; 28th div g - 3 jnl, oct 44 ; 112th inf atk overlay, 1st bn plan of attack, 31 oct 44, 112th inf s - 3 file, nov 44 ; all combat intervs for the period. the general plan is supported by fo 25, 28th div g - 3 file, 29 oct 44. 12. combat interv 75 with the following : maj richard a. dana, s - 3, 112th inf ; capt john d. pruden, ex off and later co, 2d bn, 112th inf ; 1st lt james a. condon, ex off, co e, 112th inf ; 1st lt eldeen kauffman, co, co f, 112th inf. the attack overlays dated 31 october 1944 in the 28th division g - 3 file indicate that another platoon of company e was to advance through the edge of the woods north of vossenack to protect the battalion ' s left flank, but this plan evidently did not develop. no mention of it is made in the ocmh combat interviews or unit journals, and the interview with colonel peterson indicates that he recalls no such arrangement. 13. combat interv 76 with the following : 1st lt james j. leming, 2d lt william d. quarrie, s sgt paul f. jenkins, and 1st lt james j. ryan. all of company c, 707th tk bn. see also v corps study ; combat interv 75 with condon. 14. combat interv 75 with capt charles l. crain, co, co h, 112th inf. 15. combat interv 75 with condon and capt john t. nesbitt, s - 1, 2d bn, 112th inf ; 112


75 with capt charles l. crain, co, co h, 112th inf. 15. combat interv 75 with condon and capt john t. nesbitt, s - 1, 2d bn, 112th inf ; 112th inf atk overlay, 31 oct 44. information on the 112th infantry cannon company is meager. maj. albert l. berndt, 112th infantry surgeon, in a letter to the historical division, 18 oct 48, says the company continued to support the operation from its original positions throughout the attack. records show that in later stages of the operation cannon company, 112th, was attached to the 109th infantry. 16. interv with peterson ; v corps opns in the eto ; v corps arty s - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. 17. combat interv 75 with 112th inf personnel ; combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan. 18. combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan ; combat interv 75 with 1st lt clyde r. johnson, co g, 112th inf. 19. combat interv 75 with crain ; combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan. 20. combat interv 75 with johnson ; 112th inf s - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. 21. combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan ; combat interv 75 with kauffman. 22. combat interv 75 with kauffman and s sgt charles w. cascarano, co f, 112th inf. see also 28th div citation recommendation for lt wine in combat interv 75 file. 23. combat interv 75 with kauffman. 24. combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan. 25. combat interv 77 with kauffman, condon ; combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan ; 112th inf s - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. 26. combat interv 75 with kauffman, crain, cascarano. there is no available information on placement of company f ' s 60 - mm. mortars. 27. combat interv 75 with condon, crain, pruden, 1st lt clifton w. beggs, co e, 112th inf ; combat interv 76 with leming -


' s 60 - mm. mortars. 27. combat interv 75 with condon, crain, pruden, 1st lt clifton w. beggs, co e, 112th inf ; combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan. 28. combat interv 75 with condon and col gustin m. nelson, co ( after 7 nov 44 ), 112th inf. 29. combat interv 75 with condon. 30. combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan. 31. combat interv 75 with condon. 32. combat interv 76 with leming - quarrie - jenkins - ryan. 33. combat interv 75 with nesbitt. 34. 28th div arty jnl, 2 nov 44 ; 28th div g - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44 ; hq and hq co, 28th div arty, aar, nov 44 ; 86th cml bn aar, nov 44. 35. combat interv 75 with the following : dana ; s sgt nathanuel m. quinton, 1st sgt harvey b. hausman, t sgt george a. lockwood, s sgt stephen j. kertes, and sgt travis c. norton. last five of co a, 112th inf. see also 112th inf atk overlay, 31 oct 44. 36. combat interv 75 with the following : s sgt eugene holden, 2d bn hq co, 112th inf ; s sgt joseph r. perll, co c, 112th inf ; capt richard gooley, s - 1, 1st bn, 112th inf ; 1st lt jack e. kelly and sgt thomas g. hunter. last two from co d, 112th inf. 37. combat interv 75 with s sgt roy w. littlehales and pfc clarence j. skain. both of co b, 112th inf. see also combat interv 75 with holden, kelly - hunter ; 28th div arty jnl, 2 nov 44. the combat interviews do not specifically state the commitment of the 2d platoon, although they do state that one squad of this platoon worked its way across the trail. no mention is made of the use of company b ' s attached heavy machine gun platoon from company d. 38. combat interv 75 with holden. 40. 112th inf s - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. there is little mention


no mention is made of the use of company b ' s attached heavy machine gun platoon from company d. 38. combat interv 75 with holden. 40. 112th inf s - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. there is little mention of this attack in either combat interviews or unit journals, and some combat interviews indicate that some men even thought it was a " limited objective " attack. general cota knows of no reason why this attack was not pushed with more vigor ; it was not his intention that it be abandoned. see interv with cota. according to colonel peterson, it was not to be a major attack. see interv with peterson. the applicable fo is missing ( see n. 11 above ), but the attack overlays agree with the version as herein presented and are substantiated by ltr, brig gen george a. davis ( formerly asst div comdr, 28th div ) to hist div, 27 dec 49, which says, " this was definitely the main effort and it was not to pass through vossenack. " 41. combat interv 77 with 109th inf personnel ; 109th inf s - 2 and s - 3 jnls, 2 nov 44 ; 28th div g - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. 42. combat interv 77 with 110th inf personnel and notes on opns of the 110th inf ; 110th inf, s - 2 and s - 3 jnls, 2 nov 44 ; 28th div g - 3 jnl, 2 nov 44. 43. fusa and ix tac sum of air opns, 2 nov 44, in unit history, ix fighter command and ix tac, 1 - 30 nov 44 ( hereafter cited as fusa and ix tac sum ) ; v corps study, g - 3 air sec ; combat interv 74 with maj edwin m. howison, air ln off from ix tac to 28th div ; 28th div g - 3 air jnl, nov 44. 44. mss # a - 891 and a - 892 ( gersdorff ) ; ms # a - 905 ( waldenburg ) ; ethint 53 ( gersdorff ) ; noon sit rpt, 3 nov 44, found in ob west ktb anlagen 1. - 10. xi. 44.


by malini hariharan saudi arabia ' s growing oil demand is rapidly becoming a matter of concern for the country ' s planners. a new report forecasts that the kingdom could fail to meet domestic demand in 2030 if current consumption trends are maintained. saudi arabia, the world ' s largest crude oil exporter, is already consuming a third of its output and has one of the highest per capita consumption levels. and demand is projected to grow rapidly in the coming years especially from the power sector which is expected to expand at 7 - 8 % annually for the next ten years. how the government responds to this challenge has implications for the rest of the world and also extends to the petrochemicals industry. the efforts so far are focused on boosting crude oil production and investing in alternatives such as solar and nuclear power which would free up oil for lucrative exports. plans have already been made to build 16 nuclear reactors over the next 20 years at a cost of more than $ 300bn and nuclear power is projected to meet 20 % of the kingdom ' s power needs. the saudi oil minister ali - al - naimi has very confidently stated that the country has the potential to produce enough solar power by 2020 to meet more than four times global demand. and the government ' s seriousness to promote this alternative is source is evident in saudi aramco ' s decision to form a joint venture with saudi electric co and show shell sekiyu to develop a 500kw solar plant on farasan island. but going solar or nuclear will only partly solve the problem. the saudi government spends nearly $ 13bn a year to subsidize power and water consumption for citizens. the bigger challenge will be to manage demand growth by raising domestic prices of electricity and gasoline to international levels - a sensitive task given the social unrest that the middle east and arab world has been seeing.


| | | what your doctor is saying | | | last reviewed by faculty of harvard medical school on january 13, 2011 by robert h. shmerling, m. d. beth israel deaconess medical center it is likely that your doctor routinely uses words or phrases when speaking with other doctors that would sound foreign to you unless you have a medical background. although it might sound like a jumble of long words and phrases, many of the terms have common roots, prefixes or suffixes. knowing a few of these can go a long way in deciphering what may otherwise be incomprehensible " medicalese. " when your doctor is saying less consider the following : hypothyroid, hypotension, hypocalcemia. the suffix " hypo - " in each of these words means " too little " of whatever follows. consider " aplastic ", " anovulatory " or " avascular. " the " a " ( or " an " ) that begins each of these means " lacking " whatever follows. so, these terms translate as follows : - hypothyroid an underactive thyroid gland - hypotension low blood pressure - hypocalcemia low blood calcium level - aplastic not developed or non - functioning, as in aplastic anemia - anovulatory not ovulating - avascular without a blood supply why it matters it is important that you understand your health care professional for several reasons : to know why you have symptoms, to know how to take your medicines and why they were prescribed, and to know what to expect. that means you both must use the same language, whether it is medical and technical, or the language of the layperson. i favor the latter that is, i believe it is usually best if a doctor speaks the language of the patient rather than the other way around. invariably, however, medical terms will appear in written reports, communication between doctors, and often in the explanations doctors give to patients. if the information is not understood, it makes the worry over one ' s health even greater. anything you or your doctor can do to reduce that worry is worth the effort. your doctor can use language that you understand. and you can learn a bit of your doctor ' s language. the bottom line some words are the same in more than one language. for example, " carton " is the same in english as in spanish. unfortunately, that seems to occur rarely in " medicalese.


bit of your doctor ' s language. the bottom line some words are the same in more than one language. for example, " carton " is the same in english as in spanish. unfortunately, that seems to occur rarely in " medicalese. " so learn what you can about your medical conditions and the terms that describe it ; if you do not understand something your doctor has said, ask for a clarification. many people assume the worst when they hear a term they don ' t understand, and there are already plenty of things to worry about without that caused by an ill - chosen phrase. there is almost always a perfectly acceptable " translation " that can inform you without losing any of the term ' s meaning. insist on that translation if you don ' t understand ; but just in case, learn what you can of the medical lingo that applies to your health or to the health of those who are close to you. robert h. shmerling, m. d., is associate physician at beth israel deaconess medical center and associate professor at harvard medical school. he has been a practicing rheumatologist for over 20 years at beth israel deaconess medical center. he is an active teacher in the internal medicine residency program, serving as the robinson firm chief. he is also a teacher in the rheumatology fellowship program.


islamic slavery has been the most horrible, yet the least known slavery in history. so, author m. a. khan decided to publish the chapter " islamic slavery " from his book " islamic jihad : a legacy of forced conversion, imperialism and slavery ". this part contains : 1 ) introduction, 2 ) the quranic sanction of slavery, 3 ) the prophetic model of slavery. ( part 2 ) " allah sets forth ( another ) parable of two men : one of them dumb, with no power of any sort ; a wearisome burden is he to his master ; whichever way he directs him, he brings no good : is such a man equal with one who commands justice, and is on a straight way? " - - - allah, in quran 16 : 76 " ( allah ) brought those of the people of the scripture … and cast panic into their hearts. some ( adult males ) ye slew, and ye made captive some ( women and children ). " - - - allah, in quran 33 : 26 – 27 " it is written in the quran that all nations who should not have acknowledged their ( muslims ’ ) authority were sinners ; that it was their right and duty to make war upon whoever they could find and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners ; and that every mussulman who should be slain in battle was sure to go to paradise. " - - - tripoli ’ s london ambassador abd al - rahman to thomas jefferson & john adams ( 1786 ) on by what right the barbary states enslaved american seamen. the cover image shows muhammad & his followers on a jihad raid, in which he used to plunder and capture the women and children as slaves. slavery is a socio - economic institution, in which some human individuals, called slaves, become property of others, called masters or owners. devoid of freedom and liberty, slaves are expected to provide loyal and diligent service for the comfort and economic well - being of their masters. deprived of any human rights, slaves are the unconditional possession of their owners : mere chattels, having no right to leave, refuse work, or receive compensation for their labor. the position of slaves in society in many respects is akin to that of domesticated animals. just as cows, horses and other beasts of burden are trained and utilized for economic advantage, such as for pulling carts or plowing fields — slaves are exploited for the benefit, comfort and economic well - being of the owner. slave - trade, integral to slavery,


, horses and other beasts of burden are trained and utilized for economic advantage, such as for pulling carts or plowing fields — slaves are exploited for the benefit, comfort and economic well - being of the owner. slave - trade, integral to slavery, involves buying and selling of human beings as a commodity like any other commercial transaction. slavery, in essence, is the exploitation of the weak by the strong and has a very long history. one major criticism of the west by all, and particularly by muslims, pertains to the trans - atlantic slave ‑ trade by european powers and their mindless exploitation and degrading treatment of slaves in the americas and west indies. muslims are often quick to point fingers at the european slave - trade ; they often claim that the exploitation of slaves enabled countries like the united states to amass the huge wealth they enjoy today. one young muslim, born in america, wrote : ‘ do you know how the american slave - hunters went to africa, seized the black people and brought them to america as slaves? america ’ s economic power owes a great deal to the labor of those slaves ’ ( personal communication ). terming the 350 - year trans - atlantic slave - trade ‘ the worst and most cruel slavery ’ in history, the nation of islam minister louis farrakhan claims that some white americans do not know that ‘ they are in the privileged position … today based on what happened to us ( blacks ) ’ in the past. an overwhelming majority of muslims believe that islamic history is devoid of the abhorrent practice of slavery. rocky davis ( aka shahid malik ), an australian aboriginal convert to islam, told the abc radio that ‘ christianity were the founders of slavery. not islam. ’ when muslims in india talk about the practice of slavery in the subcontinent — they talk about the harrowing tales of how the portuguese transported slaves from coastal areas of goa, kerala and bengal in terrible conditions. it is already noted that history books in pakistan teach that before islam, there was exploitation and slavery, which vanished with the coming of islam. they will never talk about the slavery that muslim invaders and rulers practiced on a grand scale in india. this muslim silence about the widespread practice slavery under islamic rules, such as in india, likely results from their ignorance of historical facts. in modern history writing in india, there is extensive whitewashing of the atrocities that took place during the muslim invasions and the subsequent islamic rule. such distortions of the true picture of islamic history compound muslims ’ ignorance about islamic atrocities in medieval india and create an


history writing in india, there is extensive whitewashing of the atrocities that took place during the muslim invasions and the subsequent islamic rule. such distortions of the true picture of islamic history compound muslims ’ ignorance about islamic atrocities in medieval india and create an erroneous perception amongst them about the extensive slavery practised by muslim rulers. as recounted throughout this book, slavery was regrettably a prominent institution throughout the history of islamic domination everywhere. it also had unique features, namely large - scale concubinage, eunuchs, and ghilman ( described below ). the quranic sanction of slavery the institution of slavery in islam was formalized in the following quranic verse, in which allah distinguishes free human beings or masters, who exercise justice and righteousness, from the dumb, useless and burdensome ones, the slaves : allah sets forth ( another ) parable of two men : one of them dumb, with no power of any sort ; a wearisome burden is he to his master ; whichever way he directs him, he brings no good : is such a man equal with one who commands justice, and is on a straight way? [ quran 16 : 76 ] allah warns the believers against taking the slaves as equal partner in status and in sharing their wealth, lest they have to fear them as anyone else : … do ye have partners among those whom your right hands possess ( i. e., slaves, captives ) to share as equals in the wealth we have bestowed on you? do ye fear them as ye fear each other? [ quran 30 : 28 ] allah recognizes some human beings, namely the masters, as more blessed by himself than the less favored slaves as part of his divine plan. he warns muslims against sharing his gifts to them equally with their slaves. those who would take slaves as equal, warns allah, would deny him : allah has bestowed his gifts of sustenance more freely on some of you than on others : those more favoured are not going to throw back their gifts to those whom their right hands possess, so as to be equal in that respect. will they then deny the favours of allah? [ quran 16 : 71 ] allah does not only sanction the institution of slavery, he also gave divine blessing to masters ( muslim men only can own slaves ) to have sex with the female slaves : and those who guard their private parts, except in the case of their wives or those whom their right hands possess — for these surely are not to be blamed [ quran 70 : 29 – 30 ] and who


) to have sex with the female slaves : and those who guard their private parts, except in the case of their wives or those whom their right hands possess — for these surely are not to be blamed [ quran 70 : 29 – 30 ] and who guard their private parts, except before their mates or those whom their right hands possess, for they surely are not blameable [ quran 23 : 5 – 6 ] therefore, if there are women amongst the captives or slaves, muslims are divinely sanctioned to have sex with them as they do with their wives. this verdict of allah founded the institution of sex - slavery or slave - concubinage in islam, which was widespread in the pre - colonial muslim world and continued well into the mid - twentieth century. as far as legal marriage is concerned, there is a limitation of four wives for a man at one time [ quran 4 : 3 ], but no such limitation on the number of sex - slaves. allah also gave a divine sanction to muslims for acquiring female slaves for sexual engagement by waging wars against the infidels : o prophet! surely we have made lawful to you your wives whom you have given their dowries, and those whom your right hand possesses out of those whom allah has given to you as prisoners of war … [ quran 33 : 50 ] muslims can engage in sex with the captured slave women even if they are married, but not with the married free muslim women : also ( prohibited are ) women already married, except those whom your right hands possess … [ quran 4 : 24 ]. there are other verses in the quran that talks approvingly of slaves and capturing them in wars. thus, according to the divine commands of the islamic god as enshrined in the holy quran, muslims are allowed to keep slaves. they can amass slaves by waging wars, have sex with the female slaves, and of course, use them as they wish. for muslims, having sex with female slaves is as legal as having sex with their married wives. slavery appears to be one of the most desired divine privileges in islam, since allah took the pain of reminding muslims about this divine right time and again in so many verses. the prophetic model of slavery allah did not rest with repeatedly reminding muslims to engage in slavery, but also took the initiative to guide prophet muhammad on how to enslave the infidels, such as in the following verse : and he ( allah ) brought those of the people of the scripture ( i. e., banu qurayza


also took the initiative to guide prophet muhammad on how to enslave the infidels, such as in the following verse : and he ( allah ) brought those of the people of the scripture ( i. e., banu qurayza ) who supported them ( i. e., the quraysh ) down from their strongholds, and cast panic into their hearts. some ( adult males ) ye slew, and ye made captive some ( women and children ) … [ quran 33 : 26 – 27 ] in this verse, allah charged the banu qurayza jews with supporting the quraysh of mecca " from their strongholds " against muslims in the battle of the trench ( 627 ). based on this unsubstantiated accusation, allah commanded that some of the jews, the adult males, were to be slain, and the rest, the women and children, enslaved. the prophet duly complied with this divine command. he distributed the enslaved women and children among his disciples, himself acquiring one - fifth of them. the young and pretty ones amongst the female captives were made sex - slaves ; the prophet himself took beautiful rayhana, whose husband and family members had been slain in the massacre. he took her to bed on the same night. after conquering khaybar the following year, muhammad carried away their women and children as slaves. in many other attacks, the prophet and his followers enslaved and carried away the women and children of the vanquished. therefore, after aggressively attacking and defeating the infidels, enslaving the women and children became a model of muhammad ’ s wars. some of the slaves could be sold or ransomed for generating revenues. the young and pretty ones amongst the female captives became sex - slaves. since emulating muhammad in action and deed is central to living a good muslim life in islamic thought, muslims duly embraced his model of slavery ( comprising enslavement, slave - trade and slave - concubinage ) and perpetuated it during the later centuries of islamic domination. muhammad ’ s example of dealing with the jews of banu qurayza or khaybar became the standard template for capturing slaves. this led to a massive rise in enslavement, sex - slavery and slave - trade in medieval islamdom. after muhammad ’ s death, muslims — armed with sanctions of the quran and sunnah — embarked on an unbridled mission of waging holy war to conquer the world for the purpose of spreading islam and expanding islamic rule


trade in medieval islamdom. after muhammad ’ s death, muslims — armed with sanctions of the quran and sunnah — embarked on an unbridled mission of waging holy war to conquer the world for the purpose of spreading islam and expanding islamic rule. as islam burst out of arabia, muslim invaders became adept at capturing the vanquished infidels, particularly the women and children, in large numbers as slaves. in islamic thoughts ( as noted already ), the civilizations preceding and outside of islam are jahiliyah or erroneous in nature, invalidated with the coming of islam. only muslims were in the sole possession of truth in the form of the true faith of islam. in their thoughts, the world outside the boundary and religion of islam, notes bernard lewis, ‘ was inhabited by the infidels and barbarians. some of these were recognized as possessing some form of religion and a tincture of civilization. the remainder, polytheists and idolaters, were seen primarily as sources of slaves. ’ muslims captured slaves in such great numbers that slave - trade became a booming business enterprise ; markets across the muslim world became teeming with slaves. accordingly, ‘ it goes to the credit of islam to create slave trade on a large scale, and run it for profit like any other business, ’ writes lal. ( complete bibliography will be posted in the last part ). farrakhan l, what does america and europe owe?, final call, 2 june 2008. abc radio, aboriginal da ’ wah - " call to islam ", 22 march 2006 ; http : / / www. abc. net. au / rn / talks / 8. 30 / relrpt / stories / s1597410. htm. famous scholar abu ala maududi in his interpretation of this verse notes : “ when you do not make your own slaves partners in your wealth, how do you think and believe that allah will make his creatures partner in his godhead? ” [ maududi aa, towards understanding the quran, markazi muktaba islami publishers, new delhi, vol. viii ]. in other words, associating partners with allah, which is the most abhorrent thing to do in islam, is tantamount for a man to take his slaves as equal partner.. ibn ishaq, the life of muhammad, oxford university press, karachi, p. 461 - 70. lewis b ( 1966 ) the arabs in history, oxford university press, new york p. 42. lal ks


six natural wonders declared world heritage sites 02 july 2012 | news story st. petersburg, russia, 2 july, 2012 ( iucn ) – sangha trinational - shared between cameroon, the central african republic and the republic of congo ; lakes of ounianga in chad and chengjiang fossil site in china have been inscribed on the world heritage list, following the recommendations of iucn ( international union for conservation of nature ). lena pillars nature park in russia and western ghats in india were also added to the prestigious list by the world heritage committee, a 21 - nation panel. iucn, the official world heritage advisory body on nature, presented the findings of its comprehensive evaluations of the natural values of nine sites to the world heritage committee. chad is joining the world heritage family for the first time. sangha trinational is a chain of national parks shared between cameroon, the central african republic and the republic of congo. forming a broad network of well preserved and diverse landscapes, the forests and rivers are home to an outstanding diversity of plants and animals. the area hosts the largest intact populations of forest elephants and great apes, including the critically endangered western lowland gorilla and the endangered chimpanzee. “ sangha trinational is not a fragment but part of a much larger intact environment with good conservation prospects, and harbouring critically endangered species, ” says tim badman, director of iucn ’ s world heritage programme. “ we welcome the fact that this globally significant forest landscape has been recognized by the world heritage committee. ” the lakes of ounianga consist of a series of 18 mostly freshwater lakes in the heart of the sahara desert in northeastern chad. relics of a single, much larger lake occupying the basin less than 10, 000 years ago, these lakes are an exceptional example of permanent lakes in a desert. “ the lakes of ounianga are a jewel of the sahara, not only of overwhelming natural beauty, but a testimony to the fragile and unique equilibrium of life on earth, ” says youssouph diedhiou of iucn ’ s protected areas programme in central and western africa. “ iucn is delighted that chad ’ s first outstanding natural area is joining the prestigious world heritage list. ” the rocks of the chengjiang fossil site, near the city of kunming in the yuann province of china, are evidence of the rapid appearance and diversification of species and evolutionary development, also known as the cambrian explosion, which took place over 530 million years ago. the exceptional remains of species recorded at chengjiang are key to understanding the early evolution of life on


are evidence of the rapid appearance and diversification of species and evolutionary development, also known as the cambrian explosion, which took place over 530 million years ago. the exceptional remains of species recorded at chengjiang are key to understanding the early evolution of life on earth. “ the inscription of the chengjiang fossil site on the world heritage list recognises this iconic site, which provides direct evidence of the origin of animal diversity, ” says tim badman. “ the preservation of this exceptional window on the earliest stages of the evolution of biodiversity on our planet is of great scientific importance for the future. ” lena pillars nature park, known for the spectacular natural rock formations along the lena river, is home to a wide range of rare plants and animals, including the siberian musk deer, the red deer, the siberian chipmunk, and 99 species of nesting birds. located in the central part of the sakha republic ( yakutia ), it is an area with an extreme continental climate with an annual temperature range of almost 100º c, ranging from around - 60º c in winter to around + 40º c in summer. a series of protected areas across the western ghats in india were added to unesco ’ s list of iconic places after a persistent campaign for world heritage status by the indian government. mountains, rainforests, rivers and waterfalls are all part of the 160, 000 km² area, recognised as a global biodiversity hotspot. the western ghats are home to a number of flagship mammals including the endangered endemic lion - tailed macaque, the endangered asian elephant and tiger. “ the western ghats and lena pillars are certainly regions that hold spectacular natural values, but iucn ’ s evaluations considered that more work was needed on these nominations to meet the standards the convention has set in its operational guidelines. ” says tim badman. “ we welcome these sites to the world heritage list, but note the conservation challenges that they face will need additional monitoring by the world heritage committee to ensure that these sites meet the requirements that accompany listing as flagships for global conservation. iucn is ready to assist the states in that task. ” two days ago the exceptional marine site of rock islands southern lagoon became palau ’ s first world heritage site, following iucn ’ s recommendation. with the new additions announced in st. petersburg today, the number of natural and mixed ( natural and cultural ) sites is 217. for more information or to set up interviews, please contact : • borjana pervan, iucn media relations officer, m + 41 79


posted : friday, february 24, 2012 - 11 : 39am updated : thursday, march 1, 2012 - 9 : 21am brownsville — is it a kid being a kid? or is it something more? a child may be easily distracted, has trouble staying on task, and even talks out of turn, things that just about every kid experiences at one time or another, but these are also just a few signs of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. so when does this behavior cross over from being a normal kid to being a child that ' s suffering from a neurological disorder? “ parents come in under a tremendous amount of pressure ; it ' s not unusual for the parent to say, " the teacher can ' t take it anymore, " says pediatrician, dr. carmen rocco. the center for disease control reports that over five million children have been diagnosed with adhd. to put that into perspective, that ' s about one in every ten school aged children ; kids between the ages of four and seventeen. " it ' s a neurological deficit. it ' s an area of the brain that is impacted. it ' s not able to function correctly, so it ' s like that area of the brain, from my understanding, shuts down, " says bisd special services school psychology specialist, cyndi trevino. this impairment prevents a child from paying attention, causes him or her to be hyperactive, and very impulsive. here ’ s a list of some of the common characteristics of a child suffering from adhd, this list is directly from the center for disease control : - squirms and fidgets - talks too much - does not play quietly - acts and speaks without thinking - has trouble taking turns cyndi trevino, who works for bisd special services, accesses children who are referred to her, by either parents or teachers, for these characteristics. “ this is something that is within the brain, it ' s neurological, it will never go away. it will be with this child all the way through adulthood. the responsibility placed on the child ' s shoulders, the parents shoulders and on the teachers shoulders is how we can help the child learn to compensate and be successful, " says trevino. while trevino does not diagnose, she simply helps in making recommendations on whether a child could benefit from further services or what changes can be made in the classroom and even at home to provide structure for the child. the diagnosis comes from a psychologist or a pediatrician, but a proper diagnosis takes time.