essence of the holidays. as a family, plan an event which involves helping the less fortunate. spend time individually with each child so they get the attention they need during the busy holiday season. practicing stress management exercises will help control your stress, too. for a free on - line stress management workshop, go to : http : / / hillsboroughfcs. ifas. ufl. edu / stress - management. html tuesday, november 16, 2010 look at the difference between your expectations and your reality by assessing your current situation ( including time and money ) and acknowledge the limitations you and your family might have. is it reasonable to expect that you can put on a holiday dinner just like grandma used to make? is it reasonable for your children to expect the same amount of gifts under the tree this year if you have been out of a job for the past three months? adjust your plans and budget to be more realistic. aim for reasonable and reachable goals. be honest about your situation and your feelings with family members. a good start to a conversation might be : “ i need to stick to a tighter budget this year and would like to adjust our holiday spending. ” or “ i would like to cut back on the number of gifts we exchange this year, would you be willing to do this? ” discuss gift giving in advance – thanksgiving is a great time to talk about the december holiday plans. offer a gift of time or help instead of a purchased object. in fact, i would love a home - made coupon book for car washes, window cleaning, weed - pulling or a back massage in my stocking! children might like homemade coupons or gift certificates for one hour of monopoly playing, a bike ride together, or one day free from chores. remember to include fun activities for your family! monday, november 15, 2010 in our busy world, however, it ’ s not always realistic to continue some traditions. if an old family tradition doesn ’ t work for your family anymore, recognize the need for change. engage your family in the process of setting up new traditions that you can each participate in and enjoy together. establish your own traditions while keeping the customs that mean the most to you. make a list of your traditional holiday preparations – from holiday greeting cards, gift exchanges, holiday meal preparation, to decorating and “ clean up and take down ” day. then gather your family together and ask what is important to each of them and see if they are willing to help continue that tradition. all family members must “ buy into ”


meal preparation, to decorating and “ clean up and take down ” day. then gather your family together and ask what is important to each of them and see if they are willing to help continue that tradition. all family members must “ buy into ” the activities and at least lend a helping hand if not completely take over a task. if a tradition has become unimportant to you, or not worth the time, energy and money you would spend on it, feel free to cross it off your list – at least for this year. you can re - evaluate it later. pare down your to - do list and write names of the people who will take responsibility or help out. break large projects into several smaller steps. then use good organizational and time management techniques to plan ahead, delegate or accomplish tasks necessary for each holiday tradition. thursday, november 11, 2010 while is may seem harmless to add a little bit of honey to your child ’ s pacifier, honey often contains spores of bacterium that causes infant botulism. although these bacterial spores do not affect the digestive systems of adults, an infant ’ s digestive system is not fully developed, and can ’ t prevent the spores from germinating. when this happens, the bacteria produce a toxin that is often fatal. botulism toxin affects the neuromuscular system, leading to a weak and lethargic baby. an infected infant will first experience constipation, followed by a weak cry, poor feeding and sucking ability, droopy eyelids, and overall weakness. noticing these warning signs and seeking medical attention is the best way to ensure a safe recovery if the baby is infected. the most important thing to remember is that infant botulism is preventable. you can keep your baby safe by not feeding your baby honey, even in baked goods, and keeping honey away from your baby ’ s pacifier, water and medications. once the infant is over 12 months old, you can relax and allow your little one some honey. tuesday, november 9, 2010 limits are at the foundation of parenting responsibility. they protect youth from physical and psychological harm, protect property, and promote respect for others. limits also give children a sense of security. and usually, they like knowing an adult is in control. it ’ s wise to keep the number of limits or rule to the ones that really count. it is important to set limits, but also allow children the opportunity to choose. giving them a choice when you can, helps them develop independence, confidence and a


’ s wise to keep the number of limits or rule to the ones that really count. it is important to set limits, but also allow children the opportunity to choose. giving them a choice when you can, helps them develop independence, confidence and a sense of accountability for their actions. expecting too much can lower a child ’ s self - esteem and cause stress in your child. parents should use limits consistently so children aren ’ t likely to get confused. of course, as children grow older, their limits should change to reflect their developmental stage. in fact, as children grow, they often have wonderful ideas and opinions about limits. parents can move from being caregivers to nurturers, to encouragers, then counselors. by involving them in discussions, parents are more likely to gain their children ’ s cooperation in following rules. children will try to test their limits to see how parents respond. it ’ s a crucial part of their development. in testing the limits, children are testing their parent ’ s love as well as their commitment to their word and rules. all children need the security of limitations to their behavior, while at the same time needing to grow and explore their world. monday, november 8, 2010 the good news is that in about the past ten years, the percent of high school students in the u. s. who smoked regularly has dropped from about 35 to 23 percent – according to the centers for disease control. however, there are some teens who appear to be more at risk of picking up the bad habit. recent research published in the american journal of health promotion found that teenage girls who started diets were twice as likely to start smoking as their peers who did not diet. consistent with previous studies, the researchers found that dieting and weight concerns were not related to smoking among boys. additionally, boys who were not overweight were more likely to try smoking, but were not as likely to smoke regularly. the researchers suggested that health educators and practitioners should consider the link between initiation of dieting and regular smoking as they develop and use intervention and smoking prevention messages and programs. they also caution that parents need not panic if their child changes their diet. if, for example, your child begins eating healthier and more balanced meals, these changes should be celebrated as part of a healthier overall lifestyle. thursday, november 4, 2010 when you think of celebrities that are household names, you ’ re not likely to think of a fictional character – yet harry potter has certainly earned that distinction. and while the harry potter books and movies have


option. parents who use the internet with their teens are more likely to regulate internet use, although older teens are less likely to have many rules. you might be surprised that the research revealed that fathers are more likely than mothers to check the websites their children visit and parents with lower education are more likely to put monitoring software on their home computers. more information is needed to better understand the challenges of the internet for families. but, understanding the opportunities and the risks of the internet may help parents make decisions about the access they allow their teens. monday, november 1, 2010 these grandparents find themselves parenting their grandchildren when the adult child is unable to care for their own children and the grandparents step into help. research tells us that grandparents are also the most willing of any family member to take grandchildren into their home. additionally, grandparents can affect grandchildren even when they don ’ t live under the same roof. grandparents can make a difference “ from a distance ” by positively affecting a child ’ s development. recent findings have shown that grandparents buffer the negative effects of high risk circumstances on children. for example, a grandchild ’ s sense of emotional closeness to, frequency of contact with, and their view of grandparents as a source of social support can buffer the negative effects of poverty and family stress. the researchers also found that the closer grandchildren were to their grandparents, the less likely they were to be depressed as adults, particularly if their mother experienced depression during their childhood years. as we can see, keeping children involved in their grandparent ’ s lives for the sake of grandma and grandpa is only part of the picture. these studies show that it certainly goes both ways! grandparents are important in children ’ s lives, especially when facing difficult circumstances.


manliness and civilization : a cultural history of gender and race in the united states, 1880 - 1917 ( women in culture and society series ) when former heavyweight champion jim jeffries came out of retirement on the fourth of july, 1910 to fight current black heavywight champion jack johnson in reno, nevada, he boasted that he was doing it " for the sole purpose of proving that a white man is better than a negro. " jeffries, though, was trounced. whites everywhere rioted. the furor, gail bederman demonstrates, was part of two fundamental and volatile national obsessions : manhood and racial dominance. in turn - of - the - century america, cultural ideals of manhood changed profoundly, as victorian notions of self - restrained, moral manliness were challenged by ideals of an aggressive, overtly sexualized masculinity. bederman traces this shift in values and shows how it brought together two seemingly contradictory ideals : the unfettered virility of racially " primitive " men and the refined superiority of " civilized " white men. focusing on the lives and works of four very different americanstheodore roosevelt, educator g. stanley hall, ida b. wells, and charlotte perkins gilmanshe illuminates the ideological, cultural, and social interests these ideals came to serve. on theory and history by wuffles - march 23, 2006 of course bederman is " biased, " she is a human being trying to understand something with the mental tools she has available to her. so is everyone else. bederman is called biased because the tools that she chooses to apply are different from those some readers are used to or like. bederman very is very clear that her book is about applying particular theories and examining particular threads in history in order to make certain aspects of that history visible which are not visible under other frameworks. bederman ' s history will not explain everything that happened between 1880 and 1917, even everything that happened to or was done by the figures she chooses to highlight. it would be a mistake to wander around for all of one ' s life trying to make everything one encounters fit within bederman ' s historically specific argument, but by carefully examining the evidence available to her she does succeed in making what was merely assumed or unseen visible to modern readers. unique study on the changing meaning of " manliness " by mwreview " mwreview " - january 19, 2003 gail bederman writes a unique and impressive study regarding the changing views of american " manliness " during the decades


modern readers. unique study on the changing meaning of " manliness " by mwreview " mwreview " - january 19, 2003 gail bederman writes a unique and impressive study regarding the changing views of american " manliness " during the decades spanning the turn of the century. in the victorian years, " manliness " was seen as sexual and physical restraint and moderation in all things. as the 20th century drew near, however, changes in society - - which included industrialization, economic instability, and rising immigration - - called for a different view of " manliness. " was mankind becoming soft? was this softness opening the door for the advancement of less " civilized " groups? it is important to note that by " manliness " and " civilization " the subjects of this book meant the " manliness " of whites and white " civilization. " this attitude was the reason jack johnson ' s ( black boxer ) defeat of jim jeffries ( white boxer ) in 1910 was such a socially explosive event. bederman offers chapters on several period thinkers on the subject including charlotte perkins gilman and theodore roosevelt. gilman saw women as... read more gender as a historical construction and analytical tool by j. w. went - april 19, 2004 after reading the reviews of this book i feel obligated to issue a contrasting view that many of the reviewers, oblivious to the gender system that invisibly yet inextricably contours their own behavior and sense of self, have missed ; incidently, their reviews provide interesting insights not in any regards to the book as they utterly misinterpret the text, but rather themselves and the political texture of contemporary society. bederman illustrates how fin de seicle white men marshalled tropes of masculinity - their conceptions of manhood - to question african - american manhood. the narration of ida b. wells simply illustrates how she and other reformers inverted the gender discourse against the predominant, middle - class anglo conception of manhood to crystallize their hypocrisy. moreover, in no way does her feminism subvert or in some other way negate the value of this book, as it was, and remains a most valuable contribution for gender studies simply because the book shows... read more finalist for the 2009 national book critics circle award in criticism : from agee to astaire, steinbeck to ellington, the creative energies of the depression against a backdrop of poverty and economic... americans overcome their disillusion


so, this is the legacy you want, john mccain? you did not start the race division between the republican and democratic parties, but you are feeding it generously. we can most likely find its birth in the moments after lyndon johnson had addressed congress, advocating for the voting rights act of 1965, and uttering three words that transformed the political divide for the next 43 years. he looked out at his colleagues and the nation and said, “ we shall overcome. ” [ lbj video ] how ’ s that for guts? could you have mustered such courage? it didn ’ t take long for the republican party to take advantage of the racist backlash johnson ’ s bold statement had caused in the once “ solid south. ” up to that point nearly every southerner had been a democrat because of racism, since the defeated south had succumbed under a republican president, abraham lincoln, whose worst ‘ sin ’ had been liberation of the nation ’ s slaves. [ wikipedia ] with local governments racist to the core, southern democrats nevertheless could scarcely imagine embracing republican beliefs. south carolina ’ s racist governor, strom thurmond, made the jump, in 1964, to the republican party [ about. com ], which first didn ’ t know what to do with him, as the gop had been dominated by moderate folks such as nelson rockefeller, charles percy, edward brooke, george romney, wayne morse and jacob javits. [ american prospect ] by 1970 the republicans knew exactly what to do with disgruntled southern democrats, and daniel patrick moynihan ( yes, the late ‘ liberal ’ senator from new york ), then a staff aide to nixon, wrote him a memo in which he recommended nixon adopt a policy of “ benign neglect ” of civil rights issues, leaving the slain martin luther king ’ s movement to carry on by itself, without presidential backing. [ answers. com ] this began nixon ’ s opportunistic gop campaign to politically ‘ take over ’ the south with his so - called ‘ southern strategy. ’ [ washington post ] the gop grip on the south was further cemented by the avuncular ronald reagan, who unashamedly announced his run for the presidency with a “ state ’ s rights ” speech in the small town of philadelphia, mississippi, infamously known as the scene of the vicious, terrorizing 1964 murder of three civil rights activists who had dared to drive south to register blacks to vote. [ black america today ] reagan gave us eight years of ‘ welfare queen cadillac ’ [ washington monthly ]


play ’ any kind of race card, when it is dealt to him every waking moment of every day ; when he looks in the mirror in the morning, and when almost every white person he is near looks back at him with ‘ that glance, ’ which is more of a stare, that says, “ what are you doing here? ”. he is black ; mccain is not. and to inject race into any campaign is to insert a needle filled with poison used to infect the public with the racist elements that too many white citizens either have buried in our souls, or alive and flaming in daily thoughts and deeds. mccain, once considered a ‘ moderate maverick ’ [ ny times ] in the republican party, now seems just another cynical politician, who arranged a meeting for a criminal savings and loan executive with five united states senators [ memphis commercial - appeal ], and who voted for a war when that action was exceedingly popular and knowingly wrong. how will he react from his ‘ straight talk express ’ seat when confronted with the well - established fact that at least one of his television ads is a cynical lie – the one in which the announcer states that obama did not visit wounded soldiers in germany, ‘ because he could not bring a television camera with him ’? [ media matters ] how will he face his god and his conscience with his decision to allow vicious and racist attacks on an honorable man, who simply happens to have black skin? many of us, myself included, once thought of john mccain as an honorable man. but when he tells an outright lie about his political opponent at this tenuous time in our nation ’ s history, when he gives the green light to television and radio commercials [ usa today ] that belittle and disrespect a fellow public servant, when he seems to have sold his soul to win a prize ; then he is not only not worthy of that prize, but he has also drug up from the slime of our past the one lasting evil stain on our national soul. and that act can only serve to divide us, when the need for unity is paramount. it is not up to us to forgive his sin ; it is up to him to absolve himself, and to refuse to rip this nation apart again, for the selfish sake of one more rich white man ’ s personal political gain. you don ’ t need a flag pin to say “ god bless america. ” but you should need decency and honor. end this, mr. mccain. tell your crafty team that you ’


( physorg. com ) - - on earth, helium is a gas used to float balloons, as in the movie " up. " in the interior of jupiter, however, conditions are so strange that, according to predictions by university of california, berkeley, scientists, helium condenses into droplets and falls like rain. helium rain was earlier proposed to explain the excessive brightness of saturn, a gas giant like jupiter, but one - third the mass. on jupiter, however, uc berkeley scientists claim that helium rain is the best way to explain the scarcity of neon in the outer layers of the planet, the solar system ' s largest. neon dissolves in the helium raindrops and falls towards the deeper interior where it re - dissolves, depleting the upper layers of both elements, consistent with observations. " helium condenses initially as a mist in the upper layer, like a cloud, and as the droplets get larger, they fall toward the deeper interior, " said uc berkeley post - doctoral fellow hugh wilson, co - author of a report appearing this week in the journal physical review letters. " neon dissolves in the helium and falls with it. so our study links the observed missing neon in the atmosphere to another proposed process, helium rain. " wilson ' s co - author, burkhard militzer, uc berkeley assistant professor of earth and planetary science and of astronomy, noted that " rain " - the water droplets that fall on earth - is an imperfect analogy to what happens in jupiter ' s atmosphere. the helium droplets form about 10, 000 to 13, 000 kilometers ( 6, 000 - 8, 000 miles ) below the tops of jupiter ' s hydrogen clouds, under pressures and temperatures so high that " you can ' t tell if hydrogen and helium are a gas or a liquid, " he said. they ' re all fluids, so the rain is really droplets of fluid helium mixed with neon falling through a fluid of metallic hydrogen. the researchers ' prediction will help refine models of jupiter ' s interior and the interiors of other planets, according to wilson. modeling planetary interiors has become a hot research area since the discovery of hundreds of extrasolar planets living in extreme environments around other stars. the study will also be relevant for nasa ’ s juno mission to jupiter, which is scheduled to be launched next year. militzer and wilson are among the modelers, using " density functional theory " to predict the properties of jupiter ' s interior, specifically what happens to the dominant constituents - hydrogen and helium - as temperatures


, which is scheduled to be launched next year. militzer and wilson are among the modelers, using " density functional theory " to predict the properties of jupiter ' s interior, specifically what happens to the dominant constituents - hydrogen and helium - as temperatures and pressures increase toward the center of the planet. these conditions are yet too extreme to be reproduced in the laboratory. even experiments in diamond - anvil cells can only produce pressures at the earth ' s core. in 2008, militzer ' s computer simulations led to the conclusion that jupiter ' s rocky core is surrounded by a thick layer of methane, water and ammonia ices that make it twice as large as earlier predictions. the two modelers embarked on their current research because of a discovery by the galileo probe that descended through jupiter ' s atmosphere in 1995 and sent back measurements of temperature, pressure and elemental abundances until it was crushed under the weight of the atmosphere. all elements seemed to be as slightly enriched compared to the abundance on the sun - which is assumed to be similar to the elemental abundances 4. 56 billion years ago when the solar system formed - except for helium and neon. neon stood out because it was one - tenth as abundant as it is in the sun. their simulations showed that the only way neon could be removed from the upper atmosphere is to have it fall out with helium, since neon and helium mix easily, like alcohol and water. militzer and wilson ' s calculations suggest that at about 10, 000 to 13, 000 kilometers into the planet, where the temperature about 5, 000 degrees celsius and the pressure is 1 to 2 million times the atmospheric pressure on earth, hydrogen turns into a conductive metal. helium, not yet a metal, does not mix with metallic hydrogen, so it forms drops, like drops of oil in water. this provided an explanation for the removal of neon from the upper atmosphere. " as the helium and neon fall deeper into the planet, the remaining hydrogen - rich envelope is slowly depleted of both neon and helium, " militzer said. " the measured concentrations of both elements agree quantitatively with our calculations. " saturn ' s helium rain was predicted because of a different observation : saturn is warmer than it should be, based on its age and predicted rate of cooling. the falling rain releases heat that accounts for the difference. jupiter ' s temperature is in accord with models of its cooling rate and its age, and needed no hypothesis of helium rain until the discovery of neon depletion in the atmosphere. interestingly, theoretician


a japanese man who says he invented the technology behind the context - based conversion of a sentence written solely in kana into one in both kanji and kana, as well as another related technology, filed suit against toshiba on december 7, seeking some us $ 2. 3 million in compensation from his former employer. shinya amano, a professor at shonan institute of technology, said in a written complaint that although the firm received patents for the technologies in conjunction with him and three others and paid him tens of thousands of yen annually in remuneration, he actually developed the technologies alone. amano is claiming 10 percent of an estimated ¥2. 6 billion in profit toshiba made in 1996 and 1997 — much higher than the roughly ¥230, 000 he was actually awarded for the work over the two - year span. his claim is believed valid, taking into account the statute of limitations and the terms of the patents. “ this is not about the sum of the money — i filed the suit for my honor, ” amano said in a press conference after bringing the case to the tokyo district court. “ japan is a technology - oriented country, but engineers are treated too lightly here, ” he said. toshiba said through its public relations office that it believes it paid amano fair compensation in line with company policy. the company declined to comment on the lawsuit before receiving the complaint in writing. amano claims that he invented the technology that converts a sentence composed of kana alone into a sentence composed of both kanji and kana by assessing its context, and another technology needed to prioritize kanji previously used in such conversions. using theories of artificial intelligence, the two technologies developed in 1977 and 1978 are still used today in most japanese word - processing software, he said. source : word - processor inventor sues toshiba over redress, kyodo news, via japan times, december 9, 2007


please read how you can help keep the encyclopedia free teleological theories of mental content teleological theories of mental content try to explain the contents of mental representations by appealing to a teleological notion of function. take, for example, the thought that blossoms are forming. on a representational theory of thought, this thought involves a representation of blossoms forming. a theory of content aims among other things to tell us why this representation has that content ; it aims to say why it is a thought about blossoms forming rather than about the sun shining or pigs flying or nothing at all. in general, a theory of content tries to say why a mental representation counts as representing what it represents. according to teleological theories of content, what a representation represents depends on the functions of the systems that produce or use the representation. the relevant notion of function is said to be the one that is used in biology and neurobiology in attributing functions to components of organisms ( as in “ the function of the pineal gland is secreting melatonin ” and “ the function of brain area mt is processing information about motion ” ). proponents of teleological theories of content generally understand such functions to be what the thing with the function was selected for, either by ordinary natural selection or by some other natural process of selection. - 1. broad aims - 2. teleological functions - 3. teleosemantic theories - 4. problems for teleosemantics - academic tools - other internet resources - related entries many ( perhaps all ) mental states are about things or are directed on to things in the way that a belief that spring is coming is about spring coming or in the way that a desire for chocolate is directed on to chocolate. the philosopher franz brentano ( 1838 – 1917 ) spoke of such mental states as involving presentations of the objects of our thoughts. the idea was that we couldn ' t desire chocolate unless chocolate was in some way presented to our minds. nowadays, we would say that chocolate must be represented in our minds if it is chocolate that we desire. teleological theories of content, like other theories of mental content, attempt to solve what is often referred to as brentano ' s problem : the problem of explaining intentionality, explaining how mental states can be about things or be directed on to things in this way. one version of the problem, often attributed to brentano but perhaps more correctly attributed to roderick chisholm ( 1957 ), concerns thoughts about non - existent objects. chisholm argued that the


things or be directed on to things in this way. one version of the problem, often attributed to brentano but perhaps more correctly attributed to roderick chisholm ( 1957 ), concerns thoughts about non - existent objects. chisholm argued that the aboutness ( or intentionality ) of mental states can not be a physical relation between a mental state and what it is about ( its object ) because in a physical relation each of the relata must exist whereas the objects of mental states might not exist. if andrew kisses kate both andrew and kate must exist and if the sun shines on a garden both the sun and the garden must exist too. in contrast, billy can love santa and search for unicorns even if santa does not exist and there are no unicorns. chisholm concluded that it is hard to see how intentionality can be a physical phenomenon, but those who offer teleological theories almost always adopt a physicalist framework to try to explain how intentionality is possible. they aim at what is often called a “ naturalistic theory ” : “ naturalistic ” because the aim is to give a theory that is consistent with the claim that the fundamental furniture of the universe is nothing but what the natural sciences describe. within that framework, it is a working hypothesis that intentionality is not ontologically fundamental, so most teleological theories try to show that intentionality is part of the natural world by showing how it can be understood in terms of other natural things. in effect, those who propose teleological theories of mental content try to say why a mental representation, r, represents what it represents, c, by filling in the blank in, “ r has the content c because ( in virtue of ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ”, without making ineliminable use of intentional terms. it also needs to account for the normative nature of mental representation. content is said to be normative because it legitimates certain evaluations. we evaluate beliefs as true or false, memories as accurate or inaccurate, perceptions as veridical or illusory and so on. we also evaluate desires as satisfied or not satisfied and motor instructions as correctly or incorrectly executed. content that is normative is sometimes described as truth - evaluable. representational states count as true or false ( etc. ) by virtue of their content as well as the state of the world. for example, the truth of my belief that today is sunny depends on whether it is sunny but it also depends on its being a belief that today


true or false ( etc. ) by virtue of their content as well as the state of the world. for example, the truth of my belief that today is sunny depends on whether it is sunny but it also depends on its being a belief that today is sunny. if the content of the belief were different ( e. g., if it were the belief that today is hot ) its truth value might be different. the normative nature of content poses a problem for naturalistic theories but those who propose teleological theories of mental content think that this problem is tractable. much attention is paid to the possibility of misrepresentation. this is because the distinction between correct and incorrect representation is often regarded as a central normative distinction and because a capacity to misrepresent is often thought to be essential for representing : no possibility of misrepresentation, no representing. consider a mental representation of a cat. if it is to have the content cat, so that all and only cats are in its extension, it must be that if it were used to label a non - cat ( e. g., a dog ) it would count as misrepresenting it. however, there may be exceptions to the general rule that all representations can misrepresent ( e. g., a representation that has the content something or nothing ). misrepresentation is also not possible in every kind of mental context ( e. g., in dreaming and, perhaps, desiring ). the possibility of misrepresentation also connects with chisholm ' s concern with non - existent objects because a capacity to misrepresent amounts to a basic capacity to represent non - existent objects. imagine a simple detection device that normally goes into a red - state in response to red. if the red - state has the content there is red then, if red could be tokened sometimes when nothing red is present, a token red could represent a non - existent instantiation of red. there is more to explaining our capacity to represent non - existent objects than explaining how misrepresentation is possible but explaining how misrepresentation is possible is a start. misrepresentation makes it clear that representing is often a three - place relation. suppose, for example, that i see some crumpled newspaper blown by the wind as a cat slinking down the street. there are at least three things involved. first, there is the representation ( or representational vehicle ) that has the content. in us, it is presumably some sort of


some crumpled newspaper blown by the wind as a cat slinking down the street. there are at least three things involved. first, there is the representation ( or representational vehicle ) that has the content. in us, it is presumably some sort of neurological state or event. here, such mental representations are denoted by capitalized english expressions ( e. g., cat ). second, there is the thing that the representation is aimed at representing, in this case this is the newspaper. cummins ( 1996 ) calls this the target of the representation. and third, there is the content of the representation. since i represent the newspaper as a cat, the content of the representation in this case is cat. misrepresentation has occurred in this case because the target of the representation is not in the extension of the representation ; the newspaper is not a cat. we can ask questions about each of these three places in the representation relation. first is the question of representational status : why does cat count as a representation? or, more generally, what is the difference between natural states that are representational states and natural states that are not? second is the question of target determination : what makes it the case that this token of cat has the newspaper as its target? or, more generally, what makes anything the target of any given representation? third is the question of content determination : what makes it the case that cat has the content cat? or, more generally, in virtue of what does any representation have the content that it has? teleological theories of mental content are primarily concerned with content determination, but a complete solution to brentano ' s problem will need to give answers to all three. a distinction is sometimes made between representation of and representation as. whether or not teleological theories of content are concerned with representation as or of depends on how those locutions are used. in one sense, referring back to the previous example, my cat - representation represents the newspaper as a cat, although it is a representation of the newspaper. on this way of speaking, teleological theories of content are theories of representation as. however, the words “ as ” and “ of ” are not always diagnostic of the contents / targets distinction. for example, we can also say that i used a representation of a cat to represent the newspaper. the teleological theories that are currently on offer are generally theories of referential content ( not theories of cognitive content or mode of presentation ). many philosophers would agree that referential content, which is normative


of a cat to represent the newspaper. the teleological theories that are currently on offer are generally theories of referential content ( not theories of cognitive content or mode of presentation ). many philosophers would agree that referential content, which is normative in the aforementioned sense, is not narrow content. by definition, two individuals who are physical replicas at time t “ from the skin in ” must have the same narrow - content states at t. proponents of teleological theories do not believe that referential content is narrow. this view is also shared by other philosophers who think that referential content supervenes ( in part ) on things that are external to individual thinkers, such as on features of their social and physical environment and / or their history ( for the kinds of reasons raised by putnam ( 1975 ) and burge ( 1979, 1986 ) ). in general, the proponents of teleological theories of content have shown little interest in the notion of narrow content, since they tend to reject the claim that cognitive science should restrict itself to using narrow notions. still, a teleological theory of mental content could be combined with the view that cognitive science needs a narrow notion of content. a teleological theory of content tries to explain the nature of psycho - semantic norms ( i. e., semantic norms insofar as they apply to mental representations ). it is to some extent a separate question whether such norms play a role in cognitive science and whether a narrow notion is needed instead or in addition. a further point about broad aims is that teleological theories of mental content are not usually intended as theories about how we grasp meanings or are conscious of them. to grasp a meaning is plausibly a sophisticated intentional state that involves representations of meanings and not just representations with meanings. to understand how we grasp meanings, we might turn to psychological theories of concept possession and introspective access to conceptual structures. such theories presuppose that there are representations with content, whereas teleological theories of mental content try to explain the nature of intentionality at its most fundamental ; they aim to say how we can, to begin with, have any representations with content. a final point about broad aims is that teleological theories of mental content are usually intended as real nature theories. these theories do not try to describe the criteria that we use in everyday life to identify the beliefs and desires of people, the criteria used in folk psychological intentional ascriptions ( though price ( 2001 ) is an exception ). those who offer real nature


these theories do not try to describe the criteria that we use in everyday life to identify the beliefs and desires of people, the criteria used in folk psychological intentional ascriptions ( though price ( 2001 ) is an exception ). those who offer real nature theories of mental content think that our everyday ability to recognize intentional states does not make us experts on the fundamental nature of intentional states, any more than our everyday ability to recognize water makes us experts on the fundamental nature of water. the idea is that we can recognize instances of a kind on the basis of the superficial appearances of things of the kind, while remaining ignorant of their essential nature. so, most teleological theories of mental content do not entail that, if bill thinks that mavis knows that today is tuesday then bill must be thinking about the teleological functions of mavis ' s representation producing or using systems. as noted in the previous section, a crucial feature of content is that it legitimates semantic evaluations. while teleological theories of mental content come in a variety of forms, they all share the idea that the norms that underwrite these evaluations depend, in part at least, on functions. the next section explains various ideas about the nature of this dependence. this section describes the notion of function that is employed. it is generally thought to be in some sense teleological and normative but both “ teleological ” and “ normative ” need qualifying. let ' s take the first term first. talk of biological functions often has a teleological flavor. for example, when we say that it is the function of the heart to pump blood this seems equivalent to saying that hearts are for pumping blood or that hearts are there in order to pump blood. there is a closely related concept of an artifact ' s function that is purposive : for example, when we say that moving the cursor is the function of the computer ' s mouse or trackpad we seem to mean that this is what it is for, that it is there in order to do this, that this is what its designers designed it to do. along analogous lines, when biologists say that pumping blood is the heart ' s function, they seem to mean that hearts were selected for, adapted for and in that sense designed for pumping blood. in the latter case, however, the selection is “ natural ” or, better, it is a non - intentional process. some who favor teleological theories of mental content claim that mother nature is intentional or purposive.


pumping blood. in the latter case, however, the selection is “ natural ” or, better, it is a non - intentional process. some who favor teleological theories of mental content claim that mother nature is intentional or purposive. in the case of millikan ( 2002 ), it is unclear whether there is a genuine as opposed to terminological disagreement with the substance of the preceding paragraph. the transition from metaphor to dead metaphor to literal use of such terms as “ design ” and “ purpose ” is a matter of degree and millikan seems to use “ function ” and “ biological purpose ” as synonyms. however, dennett ' s ( 1988 ) claim is that there is no mind - independent determinate fact of the matter about meanings or functions and that the functions of artifacts, the functions of biological systems and the contents of the thoughts of people are all dependent on interpretation, on our adopting either the design stance or the intentional stance toward them. in dennett ' s view, nature leaves functions and meanings similarly indeterminate. there are some who would prefer to reserve the term “ teleological ” for genuinely purposive contexts in the most literal sense of “ purposive ” and to refer to biological functions as “ teleonomic. ” but, on a broader construal of what it means for a concept to be teleological, a concept might be counted as teleological if it concerns what something is for, and the notion of what something was selected for counts as teleological in that sense. this is the sense of the term “ teleological ” used in this entry. intuitively, the relevant concept of function seems to be normative as well, for biologists routinely talk about systems functioning normally or properly, as well as about malfunctioning, dysfunction, functional impairment and so on. those who offer teleological theories of mental content agree that the relevant notion of function permits the possibility of malfunction ; it allows that a token trait could have a function to do z even if it lacks the disposition to do z. for example, joe ' s pineal gland could have the function to secrete melatonin even if it cannot secrete melatonin because it is malfunctioning. whether it is appropriate to describe this as “ normative ” is more controversial but the disagreement is more terminological than substantial among those offering teleological theories of mental content, since all that is usually meant by saying that the notion is


genotype, of which x is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection. etiological theories of biological function need to allow for the fact that ancestral traits might have been selected for something other than the present function of descendent traits. for example, a penguin ' s flippers and an emu ' s vestigial wings no longer have the function of flight, even though ancestral forelimbs were selected for flight. griffiths ( 1993 ) and godfrey - smith ( 1994 ) offer “ modern history ” versions of the etiological theory, according to which functions are determined by recent selection. note that selection does not cease when traits “ go to fixation ” if on - going maintenance selection is still weeding out fresh harmful mutations as they arise. however, selection does require some variation and schwartz ( 1999 ) suggests that a continuing usefulness supplement is needed, which kicks in if variation is absent for a time. in the absence of any variation, the trait retains its function if it is still adaptive. a further issue is whether the etiological theory is circular ( see e. g., nanay ( 2011 ) ). the worry is that, if a trait token is typed by its function and if a trait ' s function depends on the selection history that pertains to the relevant type, the analysis is circular. neander and rosenberg ( forthcoming ) respond that the function of a trait and its function - specific type co - supervene on the history of selection and that there is only a superficial appearance of circularity. to figure out if token trait x has the function to z, they say, first identify the lineage of traits to which x belongs ; a lineage of traits connects ancestral and descendent traits by the mechanisms responsible for inheritance. then segment the lineage at those places where selection for z stops and starts. x has the function to z only if there was selection for x - ing in x ' s segment of the lineage. this procedure does not presuppose prior knowledge of x ' s function or prior knowledge of x ' s membership in a function - specific classification of traits. this is also an alternative proposal for handling vestigiality. to play a role in a naturalistic account of mental content, the relevant selection process must be non - intentional but it need not be natural selection operating over an evolutionary span of time. millikan ( 1984 ) offers an etiological theory of functions on which functions can also result from meme selection. papineau ( 1984 ) speaks


non - intentional but it need not be natural selection operating over an evolutionary span of time. millikan ( 1984 ) offers an etiological theory of functions on which functions can also result from meme selection. papineau ( 1984 ) speaks of learning and dretske ( 1986 ) invokes functions that depend on recruitment by conditioning. garson ( 2011 ) argues that the notion of selection should be loosened so that differential retention without differential replication could count as selection, in which case neural selection could count as a form of selection that could underwrite the functions that underwrite content. while the contents of sensory - perceptual representations might be determined by the functions that derive from natural selection operating over an evolutionary span of time, the role of learning in concept acquisition suggests that other kinds of functions that derive from other kinds of selection might be needed for the contents of learned concepts. there is, though, no established agreement about how best to more broadly define the relevant class of functions. while etiological theories dominate the discussion of normative functions in philosophy of biology, the etiological theory is not uncontroversial. some question whether teleology can be naturalized ( e. g., bedau ( 1991 ) ). others support other theories for other reasons. perhaps the systemic theory is the most popular alternative ( see esp. cummins ( 1975 ) ). systemic theories of function emphasize the role of function ascriptions in functional analyses of systems. functional analyses of systems conceptually decompose complex activities of whole systems into the activities of their contributing parts. the function of a part is its contribution to the complex activity of the system that is under analysis. proponents of the etiological theory have no objection to the idea that biologists give functional analyses of systems but contend that the systemic analysis, on its own, fails to naturalize the normativity of functions or to do so successfully. some who support a systemic theory argue that biology has no need for a naturalistic notion of malfunction ( e. g., davies, 2001 ), while others argue that abnormal functioning is statistically atypical ( boorse ( 2002 ), craver ( 2001 ), lewens ( 2004 ) ). ( readers who would like to read more on this and other theories of function could turn to several volumes of readings that have appeared : see esp. allen, bekoff & lauder ( 1998 ), buller ( 1999 ) and ariew, cummins & perlman ( 2002 ).


this and other theories of function could turn to several volumes of readings that have appeared : see esp. allen, bekoff & lauder ( 1998 ), buller ( 1999 ) and ariew, cummins & perlman ( 2002 ). ) it is usual to note that etiological ( teleological ) functions are distinct from the causal - role functions involved in what is usually called “ functionalism ” in philosophy of mind. causal - role functions are often defined as a select subset of a trait ' s actual causal dispositions, and functionalism is often defined as the view that mental states are individuated or classified into types on the basis of such dispositions ( see, e. g., block ( 1984 ) ). if causal - role functions are a subset of dispositions actually possessed by token traits then they do not permit the possibility of malfunction because a trait cannot have the causal - role function to z and at the same time lack the disposition to z. that said, the distinction between functionalism and what might be termed “ teleo - functionalism ” is less stark than might be thought. one reason is that formulations of classical functionalism often spoke of the characteristic or normal causal roles of mental states. sometimes this was explicitly to allow for pathology ( see, e. g., lewis 1980 ). another reason is that, although teleological functions are often said to be selected effects or effects for which traits were selected, such functions can also be described as selected dispositions or dispositions for which traits were selected. both forms of functionalism also permit multiple physical realizability of traits that perform the same functions. what all teleological ( or “ teleosemantic ” ) theories of mental content have in common is the idea that psycho - semantic norms are ultimately derivable from functional norms. beyond saying this, it is hard to give a neat definition of the group of theories that qualify. consider, for instance, some theories that are clearly intended as alternatives to teleosemantics, such as fodor ' s ( 1990b ) asymmetric dependency theory or theories that appeal to convergence under ideal epistemic conditions ( see rey 1997 for an outline ). elaboration of these theories is beyond the scope of this entry but we can note that they both seem to need a notion of normal or proper functioning. fodor ' s theory adverts to the “ intact ” perceiver and thinker. presumably this is someone whose percept


scope of this entry but we can note that they both seem to need a notion of normal or proper functioning. fodor ' s theory adverts to the “ intact ” perceiver and thinker. presumably this is someone whose perceptual and cognitive systems are functioning properly ( this is covered under the ceterus paribus part of the laws to which fodor ' s theory refers ). the idea of convergence under ideal epistemic conditions also involves a notion of normal functioning, for epistemic conditions are not ideal if perceivers and thinkers are abnormal in certain respects, such as if they are blind or psychotic. if normal or proper functioning is analyzed in terms of an etiological theory, which says that a system functions normally or properly only if all of its parts possess the dispositions for which they were selected, then these theories would qualify as teleological theories of mental content under the characterization provided in the first paragraph of this section. those who propose these theories might reject an etiological theory of functions, but they need some analysis of them. there could anyway be etiological or teleological versions of theories of this sort. an appeal to teleological functions can also be combined with a variety of other ideas about how content is determined. for example, there can be both isomorphic and informational versions of teleosemantics. in the former case, the proposal might be that the relevant isomorphism is one that cognitive systems were adapted to exploit. an alternative idea is that the isomorphism does not need to be specified given that the targets of representations are determined by teleological functions. this appears to be the view of cummins ( 1996, see esp. p. 120 ) although cummins is generally critical of teleological functions in biology. a teleological version of an informational theory is given when content is said to depend on information carrying, storing or processing functions of mechanisms. the relevant notion of information is variously defined but ( roughly speaking ) a type of state ( event, etc. ) is said to carry natural information about some other state ( event, etc. ) when it is caused by it or corresponds to it. it is sometimes said that the role of functions in a teleological theory of content is to explain how error is possible, rather than to explain how content is determined, but the two go hand in hand. to see this, it helps to start with the crude causal theory of content and to see how the problem of error arises for


is to explain how error is possible, rather than to explain how content is determined, but the two go hand in hand. to see this, it helps to start with the crude causal theory of content and to see how the problem of error arises for it. according to the crude causal theory, a mental representation represents whatever causes representations of the type ; rs represent cs if and only if cs cause rs. one problem with this simple proposal is its failure to provide for the possibility of misrepresentation, as fodor ( 1987, 101 – 104 ) points out. to see the problem, recall the occasion on which crumpled paper is seen as a cat. the crude causal theory does not permit this characterization of the event because, if crumpled paper caused a tokening of cat then crumpled paper is in the extension of cat, according to the crude causal theory. since cats also sometimes cause cats, cats are in the extension too. however, the problem is that crumpled paper is included in the extension as soon as it causes a cat to be tokened and so, on this theory, there is no logical space for the possibility of error since candidate errors are transformed into non - errors by their very occurrence. note that the problem is simultaneously one of ruling in the right causes without also ruling in the wrong ones. cat cannot have the content cat unless non - cats ( including crumpled paper ) are excluded from its content. so explaining how content is determined and how the possibility of error are accommodated are not separate tasks. the error problem is an aspect of what ( after fodor ) is often called “ the disjunction problem. ” with respect to the crude causal theory, the name applies because the theory entails disjunctive contents when it should not. for example, it entails that cats have the content cats or crumpled paper in the case just considered. the disjunction problem is larger than the problem of error, however, because it is not only in cases of error that mental representations are caused by things that are not in their extensions ( fodor, 1990c ). suppose, for example, that mick ' s talking about his childhood pet dog reminds scott of his childhood pet cat. in this case no misrepresentation is involved but the crude causal theory again entails inappropriate disjunctive contents. now it entails that scott ' s cats has a content along the lines of cats or talk of pet dogs. this last aspect of the disjunction problem might be called the problem of representation in


entails inappropriate disjunctive contents. now it entails that scott ' s cats has a content along the lines of cats or talk of pet dogs. this last aspect of the disjunction problem might be called the problem of representation in absentia : how do we explain our capacity to think about absent things? how do mental representations retain or obtain their contents outside of perceptual contexts? asking how to alter the crude causal theory to allow for error is one place to begin looking for a more adequate proposal. one approach would be to try to describe certain situations in which only the right causes can produce the representation in question and to maintain that the content of the representation is whatever can cause the representation in such situations. this is sometimes referred to as a “ type 1 theory. ” a type 1 theory distinguishes between two types of situations, ones in which only the right causes can cause a representation and ones in which other things can too. a type - 1 theory says that the first type of situation is content - determining. a type 1 teleological theory might state, for example, that the content of a perceptual representation is whatever can cause it when the perceptual system is performing its proper function, or when conditions are optimal for the proper performance of its function. the content of representations in abstract thought might then, it might be proposed, be derived from their role in perception. not all teleological theories of content are type 1 theories, however. the theory described in the next section is arguably a variant of a type 1 theory but some of the theories described in later sections are not. the following sub - sections describe some key differences among teleological theories. it is not possible to describe all extant theories but some different approaches are sketched, along with a brief review of some of their strengths and weaknesses. general objections to teleological theories are discussed later, in section 4. stampe ( 1977 ) was one of the first philosophers in modern times to suggest a theory of content according to which content is a matter of reliable causes. dretske ' s book, knowledge and the flow of information ( 1981 ) has also been very influential. the theory dretske develops in that book is not a teleological theory of mental content but dretske ( 1986, 1988, 1991 ) later offers a teleo - functional version of indicator - semantics. he begins with a notion of information - carrying, which he calls “ indicating ”, and suggests that a representation ' s content is what it


something else then it is supposed to indicate it but, since items don ' t always perform their functions, room for error has been made. dretske appears to rely on an etiological analysis of functions ( see e. g., dretske 1995, p. 7 ). he speaks of states acquiring a function to indicate by being selected or recruited for indicating. roughly, dretske suggests that rs represent cs iff rs were recruited for indicating cs and for causing a bodily movement, m. dretske ( 1995, p. 2 ) says, “ [ t ] he fundamental idea is that a system, s, represents a property, f, if and only if s has the function of indicating ( providing information about ) the f of a certain domain of objects. the way s performs its function ( when it performs it ) is by occupying different states s1, s2, … sn corresponding to the different determinate values f1, f2 … fn, of f. ” for example, part of the visual system might represent the orientation of lines in a region of the visual field. if so, it does so because it has the function of carrying information about the orientation of lines in that region and it performs this function ( when it performs it ) by entering into different states when different orientations of lines are present in that region. this account of representation seems to make room for error, because it implies that representations need only indicate their contents during recruitment or in the environment and given the channel conditions in which recruitment took place ; error being possible after that time or in other environments or circumstances. however, dretske ( 1986 ) sees a problem with this suggestion. he illustrates the problem with the case of ocean - dwelling anaerobic bacteria that have tiny magnets ( magnetesomes ) that are attracted to magnetic north, which serve to direct the bacteria downwards into the relatively oxygen - free sediment on the ocean floor. plausibly, the function of the magnetesomes is to direct the bacteria to anaerobic conditions. if we “ fool ” the bacteria by holding a bar magnet nearby and lead the bacteria upward to their death, this looks like a case of natural misrepresentation. we were, in dretske ' s words, looking for “ nature ' s way of making a mistake ” and we seem to have found it. the problem, says dretske, is that it is indeterminate how we should describe the function of the magnetesomes. we can


looking for “ nature ' s way of making a mistake ” and we seem to have found it. the problem, says dretske, is that it is indeterminate how we should describe the function of the magnetesomes. we can plausibly say that they have the function of indicating the oxygen - free sediment. but we can also plausibly say that they have the function of indicating geo - magnetic or even local magnetic north. if we say the latter, no misrepresentation has occurred. so dretske ' s interim conclusion is that we cannot count this as an unambiguous case of error, on his theory as outlined so far. a number of distinct problems go under the name of “ the functional indeterminacy problem ” ( section 4. 1 ) and the magnetesome example can be used to illustrate several of them. however, dretske ' s response to the indeterminacy problem that he raised suggests that his main concern was with what is known as the problem of distal content. his problem, then, is this. suppose that we have a simple system that has just one way of detecting the presence of some feature of the environment. we have just seen a case of this for the anaerobic bacteria have just one way of detecting anaerobic conditions ( via the local magnetic field ). in such a case, if an inner state indicates the distal feature ( anaerobic conditions ) it will also indicate the more proximal feature ( local magnetic north ). moreover, if there was selection for indicating the distal feature, there will also have been selection for indicating the more proximal feature ( since it is by indicating the latter that it indicates the former ). dretske further points out that, even if a creature has several routes by which it can detect a given distal feature ( e. g., even if the bacteria can detect anaerobic conditions by means of light sensors as well ) there would still be a disjunction of more proximal features that the representation could count as representing, since it could still count as having the function of indicating the disjunction of more proximal features ( i. e., local magnetic north or reduced light ). while we might be perfectly willing to allow that the magnetesomes in anaerobic bacteria do not represent or misrepresent, the problem of distal content generalizes. when you see a chair across the room as a chair across the room, you represent it


perfectly willing to allow that the magnetesomes in anaerobic bacteria do not represent or misrepresent, the problem of distal content generalizes. when you see a chair across the room as a chair across the room, you represent it as a solid 3d object at a distance from you and not as a stream of light reflected from it or as a pattern of firings in your retinas. otherwise you would not try to walk to the chair and sit on it. an informational theory of content must therefore explain how mental representations represent distal features of the world, as opposed to the more proximal items that carry information about those distal features to the representations that represent them. dretske ( 1986 ) therefore modifies his proposal and maintains that a creature that is capable of representing determinate content must be capable of learning any number of new epistemic routes to the same distal feature. in that case, he says, there is no closed disjunction of more proximal stimuli that the representation could count as representing. he speaks of conditioning in this context. the relevant representation is recruited by conditioning to indicate the distal feature rather than the disjunction of more proximal features, because there is no finite time - invariant disjunction of more proximal stimuli that it has the function of indicating. loewer ( 1987 ) points out that conditioning ends at death, at which point no further epistemic routes can be acquired. so, at the death of a creature, there will be a closed disjunction of proximal features that each of the creature ' s representations was recruited to indicate. ( loewer comments that dretske might appeal to epistemic routes that could possibly be acquired by a creature but is unsure if this succeeds. ) the claim that misrepresentation is impossible without learning anyway seems problematic, since it seems to preclude representations produced by innate input systems, such as innate sensory - perceptual systems. some psychologists also claim that some core concepts are innate ( e. g., see carey 2009 ). later, dretske ( 1988 ) drops his conditioning requirement insofar as it is a requirement on content possession but he keeps it as a requirement for the kind of content that can explain behavior. ( for discussion of dretske ' s account of the causal efficacy of content, see the essays in mclaughlin ( 1991 ). ) this re - raises the question of how representations produced by innate input analyzers have distal


content that can explain behavior. ( for discussion of dretske ' s account of the causal efficacy of content, see the essays in mclaughlin ( 1991 ). ) this re - raises the question of how representations produced by innate input analyzers have distal content. dretske ' s strict characterization of indication is thought by some to be troublesome. one reason is that there can be no non - intentional process of selection for something to do z unless that thing, or things of that type at least, did do z. hearts cannot be selected for pumping blood by natural selection unless some hearts pump blood. similarly, no mechanism can be selected for producing rs because they indicate cs unless some rs indicate cs. however, all rs must indicate cs in a region of space - time if any are to do so, given the strict characterization of indication ( for if rs indicate cs in that region, then in that region it must be the case that c being the case, given an r - tokening, has a probability of one ). hence, where and while recruitment continues, rs cannot occur without cs. fodor ( 1990b ) questions whether this requirement would be met or met often enough, given that misrepresentation can occur later. perhaps dretske ' s appeal to channel conditions can help him out of this apparent difficulty. however, specifying channel conditions without being ad hoc or circular or adverting to intentional phenomena ( such as that a perceiver is not distracted ) could prove difficult. there are some hints in dretske ' s writings of a willingness to use a less strict notion of indication for he sometimes speaks of the content of a representation as the “ maximally indicated state. ” this suggests that there are more minimally indicated states, which would be an oxymoron on the strict interpretation. however, this looser interpretation is not developed in dretske ' s writings and his ( 1981 ) offers several arguments against loosening the requirement. a further argument against indicator - semantics involves the claim that something qualifies as a representation only if it is used as a representation. millikan ( 1989, pp. 84 – 90 ) argues that a representation ' s content must therefore be determined by its use or else something could count as a representation without representing anything, which would be nonsense. the thought seems to be this : if representational status and representational content are determined separately, they could come apart and, if they could came apart, something could count as a representation by satisfying the requirement for representational


, which would be nonsense. the thought seems to be this : if representational status and representational content are determined separately, they could come apart and, if they could came apart, something could count as a representation by satisfying the requirement for representational status, without representing anything in particular by at the same time failing to satisfy the requirement for representational content. however, there are ways to block this conclusion. suppose that dretske is right that something is a representation only if, ( a ) the mechanisms that produce it were in part recruited for producing it because it indicates something and also because ( b ) it plays a certain role ( e. g. ) in causing bodily movements. note that ( a ) concerns production and is also most directly relevant to content determination on dretske ' s theory. note as well that ( b ) concerns use. whether these two requirements are adequate to characterize representational status is debatable. but the point here is that even if millikan is right that representational status is determined by use ( as it is, in part, on dretske ' s proposal ) it does not follow that the the production of representations is irrelevant to determining their content ( as it is not on dretske ' s proposal ). on dretske ' s proposal, the production of a representation determines its content but something does not count as a representation unless it also has a use - related function. millikan ( 2004, ch. 6 ) also argues that no system can have the function to produce states that carry correlational information, even if the correlation need not be one hundred percent reliable. on millikan ' s view, although representation producing systems do produce representations that carry a form of natural information when they function properly, they do not have the function to do so. ( recall that, while hearts produce thumping sounds when they are functioning properly, they do not have the function to produce thumping sounds ; it is a side effect of their proper functioning. ) she points out that it cannot be the function of her visual system to ensure a general correlation between representations of a certain type ( e. g., all reds produced by human visual systems ) and contents of a certain type ( e. g., all red instantiations ). her visual system, for instance, cannot have the function to ensure that your visual system produces reds only in the presence of red. if this objection succeeds, it still leaves open the possibility that an alternative notion of natural information, such as a causal notion,


visual system, for instance, cannot have the function to ensure that your visual system produces reds only in the presence of red. if this objection succeeds, it still leaves open the possibility that an alternative notion of natural information, such as a causal notion, could be used ( as discussed in section 3. 5 ). despite some problems with the detailed articulation of dretske ' s indicator semantics, his central insight seems important and appealing. it is plausible that sensory - perceptual systems have the function to produce representations that carry information and that this bears on their content. an alternative attempt to elaborate this insight is sketched later. millikan ( 1984 ) and papineau ( 1984 ) were the first to offer non - informational, “ benefit - based ” or “ consumer - based, ” versions of teleological theories of mental content. millikan ' s theory is described in this section and papineau ' s in the next. millikan ' s view is richly elaborated in her ( 1984 ), her ( 1989 ) provides a compressed version, while her ( 2004, part iv ) is somewhere between the two in terms of detail. at least in her earlier work, millikan ' s theory of content focussed heavily on the “ consumers ” of representations, where the consumers of representations are the systems that have historically used the mapping between the representations and their contents to perform their ( the consumers ' ) proper functions. in her ( 1989 ) millikan maintains that the production of mental representations is irrelevant to their contents. she has claimed that attention to the consumers is crucial for solving a certain functional indeterminacy problem, a claim to be discussed in section 4. 1. on millikan ' s theory, when the relevant representation is used to communicate between creatures, the producer and the consumer of the representation are different creatures. one of millikan ' s examples is of a beaver splash : the beaver that splashes its tail is the producer of the representation and the consumers are the nearby beavers that dive for cover, having been warned of danger. in the case of internal representations, it is less clear what counts as the producer and consumer. millikan sometimes speaks as if they are different sub - systems and sometimes as if they are different time - slices of the same system, before and after the representation is tokened. in either case, a consumer is a system that normally exploits the mapping between a representation and its represented in the performance of its proper function, where ' normally '


different time - slices of the same system, before and after the representation is tokened. in either case, a consumer is a system that normally exploits the mapping between a representation and its represented in the performance of its proper function, where ' normally ' is understood in a teleological and not a statistical sense. consumers might or might not be cognitive systems ; millikan does not seem to require them to be cognitive systems. consider the often mentioned case of the frog, which responds to anything appropriately small, dark and moving past its retinas by darting out its tongue. in this case, one relevant consumer of the frog ' s sensory - perceptual representation might be the frog ' s digestive system. the performance of its function of feeding the frog depends on and in that sense exploits the mapping between the frog ' s sensory - perceptual representation and its content, which is ( millikan says ) frog food. to find out the content of a representation, says millikan, we look at the functions of its consumers, which are co - adapted with the producing systems. if a consumer system has a function then past systems of the type did something adaptive that contributed to the preservation or proliferation of such systems in the population. ancestral frogs had ancestral digestive systems, for example, and these did things that contributed to the preservation and proliferation of such digestive systems in frogs. it is the explanation of this selection of the consumer system that most nearly concerns the content of the representation, says millikan. to determine the content of a representation, we consider those past occasions on which consumer systems of the type contributed to selection of that type of system and we ask what mapping between the representation and the world was required for this contribution. according to millikan, the frog ' s visual representation represents frog food, since it was only when there was frog food where the frog snapped that the frog was fed and so it was only then that the frog ' s digestive system contributed to the selection of systems of that type through the use of the representation. millikan calls that which must have mapped on to the representation in this way the normal condition for the performance of the proper function of the consumer ( in the normal way ). the normal condition is the content of the representation. an issue worth considering is whether a multiplicity of consumers ( e. g., the frog ' s motor control system employed in orienting toward the stimulus, the digestive system that digests the food, the circulatory system


representation. an issue worth considering is whether a multiplicity of consumers ( e. g., the frog ' s motor control system employed in orienting toward the stimulus, the digestive system that digests the food, the circulatory system that circulates the digested nutrients and so on ) for a given representation will lead to inappropriate content ambiguity. this will depend on whether different consumers have different normal conditions for the use of the same representation. if the normal conditions for the functions of various systems that consume a representation in an individual routinely coincide one might wonder if the normal conditions for the functions of producing systems will also coincide and, if so, why we need to focus on consumers in particular. this might be one reason why, in later writings, millikan does not emphasize the consumer ' s functions over the producer ' s to the same extent. some argue that millikan ' s theory has advantages in comparison with dretske ' s indicator semantics ( see e. g., godfrey - smith 1989 and millikan 2004 ). on millikan ' s theory, a representation, r, can represent some environmental feature, c, even if it was never entirely reliable that if there was an r then there was a c. it is enough, on her theory, that rs mapped on to cs often enough for the representation ' s consumers to have ( so to speak ) benefited from that mapping. there is no need to provide independently specifiable channel conditions or to distinguish between recruitment and post - recruitment environments. it can also be argued that millikan has solved the problem of distal content for innate as well as learned concepts. neither retinal images nor light reflected from prey feed a frog. so it can be argued that the normal condition for the performance of the proper function of the consumer of the frog ' s perceptual representation is frog food, not light reflected from the prey or retinal images. however, whether millikan ' s solution to the problem of distal content survives closer scrutiny is not clear. a solution must exclude inappropriately proximal items, as well as include appropriately distal items. food is included in the content of the frog ' s perceptual representation, on millikan ' s theory, but the issue is whether the proximal items that carry information about the food to the frog are excluded. frog food is of no use to a frog if the frog cannot detect it and a frog can only normally detect its prey if light is reflected from it and


is whether the proximal items that carry information about the food to the frog are excluded. frog food is of no use to a frog if the frog cannot detect it and a frog can only normally detect its prey if light is reflected from it and an appropriate retinal image results. so a worry is whether the normal condition includes the more proximal links in the causal chain as well. millikan considers a related objection to do with omnipresent beneficial background conditions, the prima facie worry being whether her theory excludes them. to stay with the same example, consider that other things besides frog food were required for a contribution to fitness on past occasions when the frog ' s perceptual representation was used ( e. g., oxygen and gravity ). does her theory entail that the frog ' s perceptual representation means, not frog food, but something more like frog food in the presence of oxygen and gravity. millikan excludes such background conditions on the grounds that they do not explain the success of the systems that consume the representation. this entry refers to millikan ' s theory as a “ benefit - based ” theory, since it links content to the benefit to the creatures ( or to the consuming systems ) that accrues from the use of a representation. that to which a representation refers is not necessarily beneficial ; it might instead be its avoidance that is beneficial ( e. g., the avoidance of danger, in the case of the beaver splash ). while gravity is beneficial, being tied to earth by gravity is not a benefit that accrues to frogs due to the use of their prey - representations. the ingestion of nutritional substances, on the other hand, is something that results from the use of the prey - representations. benefit - based theories need not be consumer - based theories, however, since we could speak of benefits to producing systems or ( when the relevant selection is natural selection operating over an evolutionary span of time ) to the inclusive fitness of the creature as a whole. one objection to millikan ' s normal conditions is that they are overly specific for plausible contents. consider the fact that all sorts of circumstances could prevent a contribution to fitness : for example, an infected fly or a crow standing nearby could spell disease or death instead of nutrition for the frog ( hall, 1990 ). it has been argued that millikan ' s theory has the unintended consequence that the frog ' s representation has the content food that is not infected, when no crow


disease or death instead of nutrition for the frog ( hall, 1990 ). it has been argued that millikan ' s theory has the unintended consequence that the frog ' s representation has the content food that is not infected, when no crow is standing by … etc.. pietroski ( 1992 ) also argues that millikan ' s theory provides implausible intentional explanations. his tale of the kimu is intended to press the point. the kimu are color - blind creatures, until a mutation arises which results in a mechanism that produces a brain state, b, in response to red. those who inherit this mechanism enjoy the sensation, which leads them to climb to the top of the nearest hill every morning ( to see the rising sun or some flowers ). the result is that they avoid the dawn - marauding predators, the snorf, who hunt in the valley below and, solely as a result of this, there is selection for the mutation. as pietroski wants to describe the case, bs have the content red ( or there is some red ) and the kimu enjoy the sight or red and seek out the sight of red things. the point of the story is that millikan ' s theory does not allow the story to be told this way. on her theory, the kimu do not see a visual target as red or desire the sight of red, given that it was not the mapping between bs and red but between bs and snorf - free - space that was crucial for the fitness of the kimu ( and so for the selection of any relevant consumers of the representation ). on millikan ' s theory, bs mean snorf - free - space and there is no representation of red in a kimu ' s brain. pietroski argues that biting the bullet is radically revisionist in this case. behavioral tests, he says, could support his claim. plant a red flag among a crowd of snorf and the kimu will eagerly join them. it is consistent with his story that contemporary kimu might never have seen a snorf and might be unable to recognise one were it stood smack in front of their faces. intuitively, we want to say that they might know nothing of snorf, he says. pietroski suggests that this might be a problem for all teleological theories of content. however, it is more specifically an objection to a benefit - based version ( some other teleological theories of content imply that the kimu represent red, see section


content ascriptions are suitable for some theoretical purposes and others for others. one might agree that folk psychological ascriptions of intentional mental states are meant to rationalize behavior but question whether this is their role in cognitive science. in the latter case, the aim is to explain the psychological capacities of humans and ( in the case of cognitive neuroethology ) other creatures. thus a question to ask is what content ascriptions would serve the explanatory purposes of the mind and brain sciences, rather than our folk psychological intuitions. neander ( 2006 ) and schulte ( forthcoming ) argue that benefit - based theories generate the wrong contents for mainstream ( information - processing ) theories of perception in relation to the simple system cases discussed in the philosophy literature. a principle of such mainstream theories is is that, in vision, the invisible properties of objects are only represented after the visible surface features of objects are first represented ( see, e. g., palmer 1999 ). the worry is that benefit - based theories can entail that it is only the invisible but beneficial property that are represented in perception. further afield, shapiro ( 1992 ) discusses the role of content ascriptions in foraging theory, which raises a different set of theoretical considerations. millikan occasionally makes it clear that her theory is intended as a version of an isomorphism theory. according to an isomorphism theory, representation is a matter of mirroring the relations among the elements in the represented domain in the relations among elements in the representing domain. since the relevant resemblances are relational, there is no requirement that representations share properties other than abstract relational properties with their representeds. this makes isomorphism theories more plausible than crude resemblance theories. however, this aspect of millikan ' s theory is not much developed. ( see shea 2012 for discussion of the role of isomorphism in her theory. ) to a large extent, millikan ' s theory has been responsible for the great interest, both positive and negative, that philosophers have shown in this general class of theories. her writings on the topic are extensive and this section has only touched on the basics of her view. a further way in which teleological theories of content can differ is with respect to the contents that they aim to explain. david papineau ' s theory, developed at the same time as millikan ' s, will help illustrate this point. papineau ( 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1993 ) develops a theory that is top - down, or non - combinatorial, ins


s theory, developed at the same time as millikan ' s, will help illustrate this point. papineau ( 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1993 ) develops a theory that is top - down, or non - combinatorial, insofar as the representational states to which his theory most directly applies are whole propositional attitudes ( e. g., beliefs and desires ). in early writings, millikan sometimes seems to hold a similar view and some objections initially raised against her theory are based on this interpretation of her view ( see, e. g., fodor 1990b, 64 – 69, where he raises some of the following points ). in papineau ' s theory, the contents of desires are primary and those of beliefs are secondary in terms of their derivation. according to papineau, a desire ' s “ real satisfaction condition ” is “ … that effect which it is the desire ' s biological purpose to produce ” ( 1993, 58 – 59 ), by which he means that “ [ s ] ome past selection mechanism has favored that desire — or, more precisely, the ability to form that type of desire — in virtue of that desire producing that effect ” ( 1993, 59 ). so desires have the function of causing us, in collaboration with our beliefs, to bring about certain conditions, conditions that enhanced the fitness of people in the past who had these desires. desires, in general, were selected for causing us to bring about conditions that contributed to our fitness, and particular desires were selected for causing us to bring about particular conditions. these conditions are referred to as their satisfaction conditions and they are the contents of desires. the “ real truth condition ” of a belief, papineau tells us, is the condition that must obtain if the desire with which it collaborates in producing an action is to be satisfied by the condition brought about by that action. a desire that has the function of bringing it about that we have food has the content that we have food, since it was selected for bringing it about that we have food, and if this desire collaborates with a belief to cause us to go to the fridge, the content of the belief is that there is food in the fridge if our desire for food would only be satisfied by our doing so if it is true that there is food in the fridge ( papineau ' s example ). this seems to reject the language of thought hypothesis, according to which thought employs a combinatorial semantics. language is combinatorial to


our doing so if it is true that there is food in the fridge ( papineau ' s example ). this seems to reject the language of thought hypothesis, according to which thought employs a combinatorial semantics. language is combinatorial to the extent that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of the words in the sentence and their syntactic relations. “ rover attacked fluff ” has a combinatorial meaning if its meaning is a function of the meaning of “ rover ”, the meaning of “ attacked ” and the meaning of “ fluff ”, along with their syntactic relations ( so that “ rover attacked fluff ” differs in meaning from “ fluff attacked rover ” ). according to some philosophers ( see esp. fodor 1975 ) the content of propositional attitudes is combinatorial in an analogous sense. that is, for instance, the content of a belief is a function of the contents of the component concepts employed in the proposition believed, along with their syntactic relations. a teleological theory of content can be combinatorial, for it can maintain that the content of a representation that expresses a proposition is determined by the separate histories of the representations for the conceptual constituents of the proposition ( and, perhaps, by the selection history of the syntactic rules that apply to their syntactic relations ). papineau ' s theory is not combinatorial, at least for some propositional attitudes. instead, the proposal is that the contents of concepts are a function of their role in the beliefs and desires in which they participate. papineau ' s theory is a benefit - based theory, and some issues discussed in the previous sub - section are relevant to an assessment of it. for instance, it is unclear that what we desire is always what is beneficial to fitness. one might want sex, not babies or bonding, and yet it might be the babies and the bonding that are crucial for fitness. however, this section will not attempt an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of this theory but will focus on issues peculiar to non - combinatorial accounts. any non - combinatorial theory must face certain general objections to non - combinatorial theories, such as the objection that it cannot account for the productivity and systematicity of thought ( fodor 1981, 1987 ). this entry will not rehearse that argument ( see the entry on the language of thought hypothesis ) but special problems for a teleological version of a non - combinatorial theory


systematicity of thought ( fodor 1981, 1987 ). this entry will not rehearse that argument ( see the entry on the language of thought hypothesis ) but special problems for a teleological version of a non - combinatorial theory need to be mentioned. consider, for example, the desire to dance around a magnolia tree when the stars are bright, while wearing two carrots for horns and two half cabbages for breasts. probably no - one has wanted to do this. but now suppose that someone does develop this desire ( to prove papineau wrong, say ) so that it is desired for the first time. we cannot characterize the situation in this way, according to a non - combinatorial teleological theory. since it has never been desired before, it has no history of selection and so no content on its first occurrence, on that style of theory. it is also a problem for this kind of theory that some desires do not or cannot contribute to their own satisfaction ( e. g., the desire for rain tomorrow or the desire to be immortal ) and that some desires that do contribute to their own satisfaction will not be selected for doing so ( e. g., the desire to smoke or to kill one ' s children ). in contrast, teleological theories that are combinatorial have no special problem with novel desires, desires that cannot contribute to bringing about their own satisfaction conditions or desires that have satisfaction conditions that do not enhance fitness, as long as their constitutive concepts have appropriate selection histories or are somehow built up from simpler concepts that have appropriate selection histories. papineau can respond by agreeing that some concessions to a combinatorial semantics have to be made. once some desires and beliefs have content, the concepts involved acquire content from their role in these and they can be used to produce further novel, or self - destructive or causally impotent desires. however, it needs to be shown that such a concession is not ad hoc. the problem is to justify the claim that the desire to blow up a plane with a shoe explosive is combinatorial, whereas the belief that there is food in the fridge is not. in contrast to papineau ' s theory, some teleological theories are combinatorial theories. according to these theories, a teleological theory directly accounts for the contents of just the representational simples and combinatorial processes are in addition involved in determining the content of more complex representations. there are two kinds of possible combinatorial processes


according to these theories, a teleological theory directly accounts for the contents of just the representational simples and combinatorial processes are in addition involved in determining the content of more complex representations. there are two kinds of possible combinatorial processes that might be involved. one operates at the level of a proposition, or at the level of entire map - like or pictorial representations. this type of combinatorial process is thought to play a role that is roughly analogous to the role of a grammar in a spoken language, or a role that is roughly analogous to the principles of map - formation in cartography or pictorial composition in picturing. for example, it might allow us to combine the concepts cat, on and mat to produce the thought ( belief, desire, etc. ) that the cat is on the mat. a second kind of combinatorial process that might be involved operates at the level of single concepts and their associated conceptions. some think that simpler concepts could be combined in conceptions to formulate more sophisticated concepts or to fix the reference of more sophisticated concepts that remain at roughly the grain of the lexemes of a language. most simply, the concepts male, adult and not married might be combined to form the concept bachelor by means of a definitional conception. or there might be other types of conceptions involved, such as wittgensteinian family resemblance conceptions or prototype - style conceptions. teleological theories can be more or less modest in their scope. a modest theory only aims to directly account for the contents of representational simples. dretske ( 1986 ), expresses a “ modest ” view when he gives voice to the hope that more sophisticated representations can be built out of the simple sensory - perceptual representations his theory accommodates. however, there is as yet no clear agreement among philosophers or psychologists as to which the representational simples are. one modest view is that a teleological theory should directly apply to sensory - perceptual and motor representations and to innate concepts only ( i. e., those that can be produced without learning ). however, even this needs qualifying, since it is controversial which of our concepts are innate. on a radical nativist view, such as that of fodor ( 1981 ), all or almost all of the concepts expressed by the lexical morphemes ( the smallest meaningful components ) of a language are innate ( not learned, only triggered ). if that were really so, a theory that aimed to account for the


, all or almost all of the concepts expressed by the lexical morphemes ( the smallest meaningful components ) of a language are innate ( not learned, only triggered ). if that were really so, a theory that aimed to account for the contents of all innate concepts would need to be quite ambitious. those who propose genuinely modest teleological theories of content do not hold this view, for they claim that some mental representations that correspond to lexical morphemes are sophisticated, in the sense that they are somehow composed out of or acquired through the use of other representations. sterelny ( 1990 ) describes his teleological theory as “ modest ” because it only attempts to give an account of innate representations and he assumes these to be a relatively small subset of the complete set of our mental representations. as for giving an account of the human propositional attitudes, sterelny maintains that a teleological theory of content will face “ appalling difficulties. ” he believes that a teleological theory for the representational simples will be part of the complete psycho - semantic theory but not the whole of it. this contrasts with papineau ' s theory, which most directly applies to propositional attitudes. it also contrasts with millikan ' s ( 1984 ) highly ambitious attempt to directly account, not only for the contents of all mental representations, but also for the meanings of all linguistic utterances via a teleological theory. a modest teleological theory might claim some advantages. most obviously, unless some concepts can be derived from other concepts, teleological theories would seem to have trouble accounting for empty concepts. for example, no unicorns were ever indicated by unicorns, the presence of a unicorn was never a normal condition for the performance of the proper function of a consumer of unicorns, and the desire to find a unicorn has never been satisfied so that the conditions involved in the satisfaction of this desire could not have contributed to selection of the mechanisms that produce desires of the type. this problem is avoided by a teleological theory that aims to directly account for the contents of just the representational simples, on the assumption that no representational simple expresses an empty concept. ( rey ( 2010 ) questions that assumption. ) it is sometimes argued that the lack of unicorns as ( e. g. ) normal conditions is unproblematic since unicorn does not refer ( to anything actual ). arguably, non - modest theories deliver the correct referential content. it is a question whether a theory of referential