unicorns as ( e. g. ) normal conditions is unproblematic since unicorn does not refer ( to anything actual ). arguably, non - modest theories deliver the correct referential content. it is a question whether a theory of referential content needs to determine the extension of a concept in all possible worlds. ( if the reader ' s view is that there are no unicorns in any possible worlds because unicorns are essentially fictional, the reader should here substitute another example of an actually empty but possibly non - empty concept, such as a concept of phlogiston or of entelechies. ) some theories of referential content do and some do not take on this task. the greatest challenge to those offering modest theories will be to explain how complex concepts can be composed out of or derived from simpler concepts. it might fairly be said that it is not the task of a fundamental theory of mental content per se to explain how complex concepts can be composed out of simpler ones, but it is a problem for modest theories if no such explanation is available. moreover, providing such an explanation is generally thought to be problematic. some say that “ modest ” theories have some seriously immodest consequences. one is alleged to be that there must be a principled analytic / synthetic distinction. see, for instance, fodor and lepore ( 1992 ), who argue that we must choose between three options : defending a principled analytic / synthetic distinction, accepting meaning holism or accepting that virtually no concepts of roughly the grain of the lexemes of a language are composed out of simpler concepts. they further argue that the first two options are not viable. however, some psychologists maintain that we must somehow “ bootstrap ” up from simple to sophisticated concepts ( see e. g., carey ( 2009 ) ). and some philosophers are anyway unconvinced by fodor and lepore ' s arguments. ( readers who would like to read more on concepts and conceptions might start with the introduction to and readings in margolis and laurence ( 1999 ) and the entries in this encyclopedia on concepts and on the analytic - synthetic distinction. ) to round out this survey of views, we return to informational theories, to look at some more recent work that is broadly in the tradition of stampe and dretske. these theories take seriously the idea that mental representations have informational functions. first, a response is offered to an argument that is intended to block all informational versions of teleosemantics. this argument is


of stampe and dretske. these theories take seriously the idea that mental representations have informational functions. first, a response is offered to an argument that is intended to block all informational versions of teleosemantics. this argument is that, because functions are selected effects, any appeal to representational functions must be an appeal to the effects of representations and not their causes ( millikan ( 1989b, 85 ), papineau ( 1998, 3 ) ). one response is to accept this argument ' s conclusion but to maintains that an additional informational requirement can nonetheless be added to an appeal to functions ; teleological theories of mental content can appeal to other things besides functions ( shea, 2007 ). an alternative response rejects the argument. neander ( 2012 ) claims that sensory - perceptual systems have what she calls “ response functions, ” where to respond to something is to be caused by it to do something else. for example, a visual system might be caused by a red instantiation to change into a red state, and it might have been selected ( in part ) for being disposed to change into a red state in response to red and have the function to do so. on neander ' s view, these state changes represent the causes to which the system is supposed to respond by producing the representation in question. they are, so to speak, the normal causes of the producer of the representation, rather than the normal conditions for the performance of the proper function of the representation ' s consumer. on this view, red has the content red if the visual system that produces it has the function to produce it in response to red, or more specifically in response to red being instanced in the receptive field of the perceptual processing pathways responsible for the red ' s production. this is the basic idea though further complications are added. one is intended to solve the problem of distal content as follows : a sensory - perceptual representation, r, in a sensory - perceptual system s, has the descriptive content c and not prox - c if : - s was selected for producing rs in response to cs and, - if s was selected for producing rs in response to both cs and prox - cs, it was selected for producing rs in response to prox - cs because this was a means to its producing rs in response to cs and not vice - versa. the second requirement is intended to determine appropriately distal content and is to be applied only after the first requirement is applied


producing rs in response to prox - cs because this was a means to its producing rs in response to cs and not vice - versa. the second requirement is intended to determine appropriately distal content and is to be applied only after the first requirement is applied. the first requirement on its own does not determine suitably distal content because there is a causal chain leading from c to r and, if the system had been selected for responding to cs by producing rs, it must also have been selected for responding to the proximal items in the causal chain ( such as the light reflected from cs toward the retina of the eye, in the case of visual perception ). these more proximal items in the causal chain carry information about c to the system and through the system to the r. there is, however, an asymmetry, to which the second requirement appeals. the system was selected for its disposition to respond to the proximal items because by that means it responded to the more distal items, but the system was not selected for responding to the more distal item because by that means it responded to the more proximal items. ( it does not respond to the more proximal items by means of its responding to the more distal items ; that is not how the means - end analysis pans out ). on this causal theory, a sensory - perceptual system need not have produced rs only in the presence of cs during selection of the system. there is no need to specify channel conditions or conditions in which representation is reliable. this is not a type - 1 teleological theory of content. the idea that representations are reliably caused by or correlated with their contents in some conditions does not figure in the proposal. the first requirement ensures different content ascriptions to those generated by benefit - based teleological theories. for example, consider again the kimu ( see section 3. 2 ). as stipulated by pietrosky, it is the presence of red and not the absence of snorf that causes the relevant mechanism in a kimu to produce a b - state. mechanisms of the type were not selected for a disposition to be caused by an absence of snorf to produce b - states. they had no such disposition, so they could not have been selected for it. the relevant mechanisms in the kimu were selected for a disposition to be caused by red to produce a b - state, as well as for further causing certain movements ( hill climbing of a morning ) thereby. they were selected for this


selected for it. the relevant mechanisms in the kimu were selected for a disposition to be caused by red to produce a b - state, as well as for further causing certain movements ( hill climbing of a morning ) thereby. they were selected for this because red correlated well enough with snorflessness in the kimu ' s habitat. however, on this proposal, that further fact becomes a background evolutionary fact that is not content constitutive. the candidate content fewer snorf this way fails to pass the first requirement. consider too the notorious case of the frog. plausibly, the relevant visual pathways in the frog ' s brain were selected for their disposition to be caused by a certain configuration of visible features ( roughly, something ' s being small, dark and moving ) to produce the sensory - perceptual representation in question, as well as for their disposition to initiate orienting and so on thereby. they were plausibly selected for this preferential response to the configuration of visible features because things with these features were often enough nutritious for the frog. the visual pathways in the frog were not selected for a disposition to respond to the nutritional value of a stimulus, however. for the normal frog ' s visual system has no causal sensitivity to the nutritional value of the stimulus and cannot have been selected for a causal sensitivity it did not have. so, on this proposal, the visual content of the representation is something small, dark, moving ( or something along these lines ) rather than frog food. according to neander ( 2006 ) the configuration of visible features is the right style of visual content to ascribe for the purpose of mainstream scientific explanations of an anuran ' s visual capacities. nor does this proposal seem to generate overly specific contents of the kind mentioned earlier in relation to benefit - based theories. on this informational theory, the frog does not represent the stimulus as not carrying an infectious disease, even if only those small, dark and moving things that were not carrying an infectious disease contributed to frog fitness when the frog was fed. sensory - perceptual systems can only have been selected for causal dispositions which past systems of the type possessed. since past systems had no disposition to respond preferentially to the absence of an infectious disease in visual stimuli that were small, dark and moving, the fact that contributions to fitness were made only on those occasions when an infectious disease was absent is, again, a background evolutionary fact that is not content - constitutive on this proposal. one possible concern


that were small, dark and moving, the fact that contributions to fitness were made only on those occasions when an infectious disease was absent is, again, a background evolutionary fact that is not content - constitutive on this proposal. one possible concern is whether sufficient room for misrepresentation has been made. some early discussions of teleological theories of content assumed that the content of the frog ' s representation must be frog food or fly or else misrepresentation would be impossible. the frog would not be in error when it snapped at something small, dark and moving that was not frog food, or not a fly. however, misrepresentation is possible on this proposal. a representation that is supposed to be produced in response to something that is small, dark and moving and is instead produced in response to something large and looming would count as misrepresenting and a neurologically damaged frog ( e. g., one with a damaged thalamus ) will indeed attempt to catch all sorts of inappropriate things ( e. g., an experimenter ' s hand or even the frog ' s own limbs ). this informational theory also entails that a kimu ' s b - state will misrepresent if it is tokened in response to anything that is not red. more importantly, perhaps, it seems to entail that human reds will misrepresent if tokened at something not - red, as could happen in red - green color blindness, in color contrast illusions or in unusual viewing conditions. as millikan ( 2012 ) and others have pointed out, there are representations that cannot be caused by their contents, such as tomorrow. no tomorrow has ever caused a thought about tomorrow. however, tomorrow is not a sensory - perceptual representation and so this is not an objection to this proposal per se. as with other modest theories, however, the challenge is explaining how to link this modest theory for some mental contents to a more comprehensive theory that accounts for all of the contents of all of our concepts ( see section section 3. 4 ). the preceding survey of teleological theories of content does not mention all of the extant teleological theories but it illustrates some of the commonalities and differences among them. now we turn to some objections that have been raised against the general idea of teleosemantics. this section looks at the objections that have been most influential. some have already been touched on in previous sections. there are several potential indeterminacy problems. aside from


objections that have been raised against the general idea of teleosemantics. this section looks at the objections that have been most influential. some have already been touched on in previous sections. there are several potential indeterminacy problems. aside from the problem of distal content, which has already been discussed above in relation to the different theories that treat it in different ways, there are two other indeterminacy problems. one concerns the fact that natural selection is extensional ( fodor, 1990b ) and the other concerns the fact that natural selection selects traits for complex causal roles ( neander, 1995 ). both problems can perhaps be attributed to dretske ( 1986 ), though dretske did not distinguish them from the problem of distal content, the problem he seems primarily to have been interested in solving. fodor once devised a teleological theory of mental content ( published years later, as fodor 1990a ). however, he quickly repudiated the idea and has since been one of the most vigorous critics of the general idea. his main objection was initially that teleological theories leave content indeterminate because functions are indeterminate. functional indeterminacy, according to fodor ( 1990b ), stems from the fact that natural selection is extensional in the following sense : if it is adaptive for an organism, o, to do something, m, in the presence of environmental feature, f, and f is reliably co - extensive with another feature, g, then it is equally adaptive for o to do m in the presence of g. fodor argues that teleological theories therefore cannot distinguish between candidate contents that are co - extensional in the environment in which a creature evolved. fodor ' s example is the frog that snaps at anything that is suitably small, dark and moving and thereby feeds itself. according to fodor, if it was adaptive for the frog to snap at flies then it was equally adaptive for it to snap at small, dark, moving things on the simplifying assumption that flies and small, dark, moving things were reliably co - extensive in the frog ' s natural habitat. according to fodor, we can equally well say that the function of the device is to detect flies and that its function is to detect small, dark, moving things. so, if we try to determine the content of the representation by reference to the function of the detection mechanism, the content remains indeterminate. we can choose


is to detect flies and that its function is to detect small, dark, moving things. so, if we try to determine the content of the representation by reference to the function of the detection mechanism, the content remains indeterminate. we can choose to describe the function one way or another but if the content depends on how we choose to describe the function it is not a naturalized content. note that the candidate contents fly and frog food and small, dark moving thing each license different assessments concerning misrepresentation. if the frog is representing the stimulus as a fly, for instance, it misrepresents something that is small, dark and moving that is not a fly, using the relevant representation. if it represents the stimulus as small, dark and moving, it does not. the standard response to this objection starts by pointing out that the function of a trait is what that type of trait was selected for and that the notion of selection for is a causal notion ( sterelny 1990, millikan 1991 ). a trait is selected for its possession of a certain property only if that property causally contributed to selection of traits of the type ( see sober 1984 ). the heart was selected for circulating blood but not for making a thumping noise even though the two co - occured. it was selected for pumping rather than thumping given that the pumping but not the thumping causally contributed to the inclusive fitness of ancestral creatures and thus causally contributed to the selection of hearts. functions can therefore distinguish between two properties that reliably co - vary as long as one but not caused the trait to be selected. this point has mostly been well - taken. however, appeal to selection for does not suffice to disambiguate content ( griffiths & goode 1995, neander 1995 ). in the case of the frog ' s detection device, its responding to small, dark, moving things and its helping the frog to catch and swallow something nutritious both played a causal role in selection of the relevant representation producing or consuming systems. it was by detecting small, dark moving things that the frog got fed. so neither the detecting of something small, dark and moving, nor the eating of something nutritious was a mere side - effect or mere piggy back trait. we return to this issue in a moment. fodor ( 1996 ) anyway continues to object that there is a remainder of a problem along these lines because content, he claims, is more fine - grained than selection histories can account for. he maintains that tel


this issue in a moment. fodor ( 1996 ) anyway continues to object that there is a remainder of a problem along these lines because content, he claims, is more fine - grained than selection histories can account for. he maintains that teleological theories cannot discriminate contents finely enough when there are properties that are logically or nomologically co - extensive. being triangular ( being a closed plane figure with three straight sides ) and being trilateral ( being a closed plane figure with three inner angles ) are logically co - extensive properties. being a renate ( a creature with a kidney ) and being a cordate ( a creature with a heart ) are ( fodor assumes ) nomologically co - extensive. according to fodor, we cannot distinguish between selection for adaptive responses in the presence of one versus the other of two such properties. we can represent each distinctly but, according to fodor, selection histories are not sufficiently fine - grained to distinguish such contents. consider the two options : either the causal powers of two co - extensional properties f and g are distinct or they are not distinct. suppose first that they are not distinct. on some plausible and medium - grained theories of property individuation, properties are individuated by their causal powers, so if there is no difference in the causal powers of f and g, they are the same property on such a theory. on this way of individuating properties, a representation that refers to the one must refer to the other too and so there is no problem here for a theory of referential content. on this way of thinking, if there is no distinction between the causal powers of triangularity and trilaterality, any difference in the mental representations triangular and trilateral must be a difference of a different sort. it might be a difference in representational vehicle, or in other words, the two might be different predicates denoting the same property. they might, consistent with this, differ in their cognitive roles. alternatively, modest theories can maintain that these two representations are semantically complex, in which case there might be a difference ( even a referential difference ) in the constituent concepts out of which triangular and trilateral are composed ( e. g., one mentions angles and one does not ). suppose, on the other hand, that f and g do have distinct causal powers. most would agree that this is in fact the case if x is the property of being a creature with a kidney and


, one mentions angles and one does not ). suppose, on the other hand, that f and g do have distinct causal powers. most would agree that this is in fact the case if x is the property of being a creature with a kidney and y is the property of being a creature with a heart. in that case, this version of the objection does not get off the ground. if the causal powers of the properties differ, they can play different roles in selection histories. consider, for example, the proposal that the contents of sensory - perceptual representations are ( so to speak ) their normal causes. a system can have a disposition to be caused by fs to do m, without having a disposition to be caused by gs to do m, if f and g have distinct causal powers even ( if they are co - extensive ). the system can be selected for the one disposition that it has but it cannot be selected for the disposition that it does not have. fodor ' s objection has evolved into a general objection to any adaptational explanation and to the very notion of selection for. it would take too much space to follow the trail further here. ( see fodor and piatelli - palmarini 2010 and see esp. block and kitcher 2010 and sober 2011 ( other internet resources ) for effective critical discussion ). we turn now to the second functional indeterminacy problem. it stems from the fact that organic systems are selected for complex causal roles, as indicated earlier. for example, a gene in an antelope might have been selected because it ( i ) altered the shape of hemoglobin, ( ii ) which increased oxygen uptake, ( iii ) which allowed the antelope to move to higher ground, ( iv ) which gave them access to richer pasture in summer, ( v ) and so improved their nutritional status, their immunity to disease, their vigor in avoiding predation, their attraction to mates and ( vi ) their chances of survival and reproduction ( neander, 1995 ). to determine the function of a trait, such as the altered shape of the hemoglobin, the etiological theory of functions tells us to ask, “ what did past instances do that was adaptive and that caused traits of that type to be selected? ”. in this case, the answer is ( ii ) through ( vi ). the altered shape of the hemoglobin did all of this, and all of this was adaptive, and all of this contributed to the selection of


be selected? ”. in this case, the answer is ( ii ) through ( vi ). the altered shape of the hemoglobin did all of this, and all of this was adaptive, and all of this contributed to the selection of the trait ( i. e., it was selected for all of this ). so all of this would seem to be the trait ' s function. its function is the complex causal role for which it was selected. the problem for content can be seen when we consider mechanisms that produce or consume representations. for instance, the frog ' s detection device was selected because it ( a ) responded to small, dark, moving things and ( b ) that helped the frog catch these things, and ( c ) that provided the frog with nutrients and ( d ) that contributed to the frog ' s chances of survival and reproduction in various ways. thus ancestral detection devices contributed to the selection of that type of device by way of a complex causal route in which the visible configuration of the stimulus and the nutritional properties of the stimulus both play a role. note that this does not depend on these features of the environment being co - extensional. even if not all small, dark and moving things were nutritious and not all nutritious things were small, dark and moving in the frog ' s natural habitat, this problem of complex causal roles would still remain. the problem is that the systems responsible for the production and the consumption of representations were selected for complex causal roles in which a number of environmental features were involved. agar ( 1993 ) supports the idea that the frog ' s representation represents small, dark, moving food, a content intended to incorporate all of the properties causally responsible for the selection. price ( 1998, 2001 ) claims that, contrary to what has just been said, there is a unique, correct function ascription for each trait and she elaborates a number of principles to isolate the unique, correct function ascription. enc ( 2002 ) endorses price ' s claim that function ascriptions must be determinate if any teleological theory of content is to succeed but raises problems for her attempt to show that function ascriptions are suitably determinate. however, teleological theories of content do not merely gesture toward functions and leave it at that. consider again the causal theory discussed in the preceding section. the content of the frog ' s sensory - perceptual representation is not indeterminate between the configuration of visible features and something nutritious on that


functions and leave it at that. consider again the causal theory discussed in the preceding section. the content of the frog ' s sensory - perceptual representation is not indeterminate between the configuration of visible features and something nutritious on that theory, since the frog ' s visual system was not selected for producing the relevant sensory - perceptual representation in response to the nutritional value of the stimulus. a frog ' s visual system is not causally sensitive to the presence or absence of nutrients and could not have been selected for a causal sensitivity it did not have. the general point here is that teleological theories of content appeal to functions in certain ways and one must examine the particular theory to see if the theory isolates a sufficiently determinate content. in responding to the indeterminacy problem, millikan ( 1991 ) might be thought to rely on the fact that, on her theory, it is the proper function of the consumer and not that of the producer of the representation that determines its content. for instance, in discussing dretske ' s magnetesome example she says that, “ [ t ] he mechanisms that use the magnetesome ' s offerings don ' t care at all whether the magnet points to magnetic north, geomagnetic north or, say, to the north star. the only one of the conditions dretske mentioned that is necessary for the user ' s proper functioning is that the magnet point in the direction of lesser oxygen ” ( millikan ( 1991, 163 ) original emphasis ). however, it seems ( to this author ) that millikan ' s emphasis here does not put the emphasis in the right place for her theory. recall that one consumer of the frog ' s perceptual representation is the motor control system which controls the frog ' s orienting toward the stimulus. we can describe its function as controlling the frog ' s orienting toward frog food, but we could also describe it as controlling the frog ' s orienting toward small, dark, moving things. a mere appeal to consumers would seem to shift the problem without solving it. however, it does not follow that millikan ' s theory leaves content indeterminate. it is millikan ' s appeal to normal conditions that does more work in disambiguating the content for her. finally, some proponents of teleological theories do not think that content is determinate in the cases used to illustrate the alleged problem. dennett ( 1995 ) maintains that such content indeterminacy


disambiguating the content for her. finally, some proponents of teleological theories do not think that content is determinate in the cases used to illustrate the alleged problem. dennett ( 1995 ) maintains that such content indeterminacy is unproblematic. papineau ( 1997 ) maintains that content is indeterminate in the case of a creatures that lacks a belief - desire psychological structure. whether a creature lacks a belief - desire structure will in part depend on how we construe this requirement. it is not straightforward whether frogs lack a belief - desire psychological structure given that they have both informational and motivational states. nonetheless, papineau is probably right that the informational and motivational states are not so distinct as ours and he might also be right that content indeterminacy at this level is unproblematic. we will, however, need to resolve related content indeterminacy problems for human mental states. another objection that has been influential is the swampman objection. swampman - style examples have been around for some time. boorse ( 1976 ) imagines a population of rabbits accidentally coalescing into existence as a counter - example to wright ' s etiological theory of functions. boorse ' s claim was that we could ascribe functions to the rabbits ' parts even if the rabbits lacked any selection - history. swampman in particular was raised by davidson ( 1987 ) as a potential objection to his own historical ( but not teleological ) theory of content. when swampman comes into existence he is a synchronic ( at a time, but not extended over time ) physical replica of davidson at a certain point in time ( t ). swampman ' s history differs radically from davidson ' s because he comes into existence as a result of a purely accidental collision of elementary particles. crucially, he does not partake in our evolutionary history or have any other evolutionary history or any developmental history of his own. nor is he created by god or copied from davidson by a machine. the resemblance between davidson and swampman is nothing but a stupendous coincidence. swampman ' s appearance of design is deceptive because he in no way derives from any design process, natural or intentional. swampman ' s component parts have no functions according to an etiological theory of function and so his “ brain ” states have no contents according to a teleological theory of mental content. many people find these results highly counter - intuitive, especially the result that swampman


parts have no functions according to an etiological theory of function and so his “ brain ” states have no contents according to a teleological theory of mental content. many people find these results highly counter - intuitive, especially the result that swampman lacks all intentional states. assuming physicalism, we could substitute swampman for davidson and no one, including his most intimate friends and family, would detect a difference. swampman would make noises that his friends and family would interpret as witty, interesting and meaningful but, according to teleological theories ( and davidson ' s own theory of content ) swampman has no ideas about philosophy, no perceptions of his surroundings and no beliefs or desires about anything at all. there are two broad strategies in responding to this objection. one is to try to loosen the grip of the intuition that swampman has intentional states and the other is to argue that any intuitions that remain do not show that teleological theories are wrong. in either case, it is important to isolate the relevant intuition because, by all accounts, swampman would have much that davidson had at t. all of the chemical activity in davidson ' s brain when he understood words, for example, would occur in swampman ' s brain - analog and certain descriptions of this activity will apply to both equally : e. g., physical, chemical and formal descriptions of it. further, it is trivial that swampman has narrow content if “ narrow content ” is defined as whatever most closely approximates content that nonetheless supervenes on just the narrow physical states of an individual at a time and “ from the skin in. ” by definition, whatever narrow content davidson ' s mental states had at t, swampman ' s inner states had too, since swampman is at t physically indistinguishable “ from the skin in ” from davidson at t. what teleological theories entail is that swampman, no matter what narrow content he has, lacks regular normative content. the intuition that conflicts with teleological theories, therefore, is that swampman ' s inner states, which are narrowly identical to davidson ' s, are true, false, accurate or inaccurate in the usual sense. it is clear that, if swampman ' s inner states do have truth - evaluable contents, they cannot always have the same truth values as davidson ' s. everyone will probably agree that, at t, swampman cannot remember his past life since at most he could only have pseudo - memories of davidson ' s. everyone will also agree


contents, they cannot always have the same truth values as davidson ' s. everyone will probably agree that, at t, swampman cannot remember his past life since at most he could only have pseudo - memories of davidson ' s. everyone will also agree that swampman cannot correctly think that he is returning home to his wife and sitting in his house, since the house and the wife are not his. further, it should be kept in mind that many think that putnam ( 1975 ) has shown that the contents of natural kind concepts do not supervene on just what is “ in the head. ” if putnam - style twin cases can be constructed for other mental representations and their contents as well ( see burge 1979, 1986 ) then swampman ' s lack of history might anyway be an issue even before considering the further complication of a teleological theory. it thus requires careful analysis with respect to controversial issues to determine just what intuitions about swampman would tell against the externalism of teleological theories in particular. those who try to dislodge any remaining intuitions against teleological theories argue that an appearance of design can be misleading. ( recall that “ design ” here includes the mechanical design - work of natural selection. ) consider, for example, boorse ' s swamprabbits. it might be intuitive to attribute functions to their eye - analogs. but in nature nothing so intricately organized as if for the performance of a function fails to be the result of a design process. it is argued that habits of thought, which usually take us from an appearance of design to a function ascription, lead to false ascriptions in purely hypothetical unrealistic cases ( neander 1991 ). dretske ( 1996 ) argues the case with another imaginary example. twin - tercel, a random replica of his old tercel, comes about as the result of a freakish storm in a junk yard. it is molecule - for - molecule identical to his old tercel, except that its “ gas - gauge ” does not move in relation to the amount of gas in its “ tank ”. we might be tempted to say that the thing is broken, but dretske says that there is no basis for saying that it does not work because to say that it does not work implies that it was designed to do something it cannot do and it was not designed to do anything. if we should reform our intuitions in the one case, perhaps we should also reform them in the case of swampman ' s


it does not work implies that it was designed to do something it cannot do and it was not designed to do anything. if we should reform our intuitions in the one case, perhaps we should also reform them in the case of swampman ' s intentionality, he says. we might grant dretske his claim about twin - tercel and yet resist the move from functions to intentionality. the problem for theories of content, as opposed to theories of function, is exacerbated by the relation between intentionality and consciousness. many philosophers find it plausible that an individual ' s phenomenal consciousness at a time supervenes on just the inner physical properties of that individual at that time. if this narrow supervenience thesis is true, then swampman will have phenomenal consciousness when he comes into existence, assuming davidson did at t. however, it is hard to see how we can attribute phenomenal consciousness to swampman without also attributing some intentional states to him. suppose, for example, that swampman has a red - sensation. then presumably it will seem to him that he is seeing something red. but it seeming to him that he is seeing something red is presumably an intentional state. here we connect with another important issue that lies outside of the scope of this entry. however, a couple of points can be made. first, some proponents of teleological theories of content are not troubled by this line of argument because they reject the view that consciousness supervenes on narrow states and hold theories of phenomenal consciousness that deny consciousness to swampman. according to some, phenomenal consciousness supervenes on ( non - narrow ) content, so if swampman lacks content he must also lack phenomenal consciousness on this view ( see esp. dretske 1995 ). if, though, any proponents of teleosemantics accept the narrow supervenience thesis for phenomenal consciousness, they cannot deny that swampman would have phenomenal consciousness. in that case, the objection remains in force. then there appear to be just two options. one is to maintain that swampman can have a red sensation without it seeming to him that he sees something red. the other is to maintain that, although it seems to swampman that he sees something red, this seeming is not truth - evaluable in the usual sense. this last option fits with the traditional idea that seemings have a special epistemic status ; it fits with the idea that we cannot be mistaken about how things seem to us and that, in


not truth - evaluable in the usual sense. this last option fits with the traditional idea that seemings have a special epistemic status ; it fits with the idea that we cannot be mistaken about how things seem to us and that, in that context, misrepresentation is not possible. it does not, however, fit with the idea that a person is, in principle, always fallible with respect even to how things seem. the second broad strategy is to argue that swampman intuitions cannnot show that teleological theories are incorrect because they are irrelevant. they are, it can be argued, not to the point if a teleological theory is offered as a real - nature theory ( millikan ( 1996 ), neander ( 1996 ) ). the analogy with an a posteriori analysis of the nature of water is thought to be helpful here. recall that xyz is an imaginary liquid that is superficially indistinguishable from water ( h2o ), although it has a different molecular constitution ( dubbed “ xyz ” ). we can, it is argued, agree that “ water ” and water can refer to h2o exclusively, even if all of the members of the relevant community would classify xyz as water were they to find some, given their ignorance of water ' s chemical composition. following kripke and putnam, many have been persuaded that “ water ” and water might have referred to h2o exclusively, even before it was known that water is h2o, because there was deference to an unknown nature that explained the superficial properties by means of which we usually recognise instances of the liquid. on this view, it was ( in 1700 ) an epistemological possibility that water was not h2o, but it was not a metaphysical possibility, given that water is in fact h2o. along similar lines, it can be argued that it is only an epistemological and not a genuine metaphysical possibility that swampman might have intentionality. note that this last claim is not the claim that it is merely an epistemological possibility that swampman might exist. rather, the crucial claim is that, even if he did exist, it would remain a mere epistemological possibility that he would have genuine intentionality. this parallels the claim regarding water and xyz. even if xyz were to exist on twin - earth and twin - earth were in our universe, it would not be water. superficial appearances would


possibility that he would have genuine intentionality. this parallels the claim regarding water and xyz. even if xyz were to exist on twin - earth and twin - earth were in our universe, it would not be water. superficial appearances would be on the side of swampman ' s having intentionality, just as they would be on the side of xyz ' s being water, but it may turn out that swampman ' s “ intentionality ” is not intentionality, just as it would turn out that xyz is not water ( it is just twin - water ). intuitions about swampman, it is claimed, cannot decide the issue of what the correct analysis of intentionality is. rather, the decision about swampman ' s intentionality should be driven by the theory of content that best accounts for the real kind. that in turn should be driven by other considerations, such as which theory delivers correct content ascriptions for us and other existing creatures. of course, in the case of intentionality, unlike the case of water, the hidden nature or essence cannot be an inner structure, if a teleological theory is correct. on such a theory, intentionality is alleged to be an historical kind, so the previously hidden nature is alleged to be a matter of history. as proponents of teleological theories point out, there is an apparent need for other historical kinds in biology ( e. g., offspring, homologs and species ). ( braddon - mitchell and jackson ( 1997 ) have argued that this “ real nature ” response is not available to proponents of teleological theories of content. see papineau 2001 for a response. ) the methodological individualism debate is also relevant here, since it questions whether science should have any historical kinds. if those who favor methodological invidualism are correct, teleological theories of content do not provide us with a good scientific way to individuate psychological states ( fodor 1991 ). one argument for methodological individualism involves the claim that science should individuate kinds on the basis of causal powers. in brief, the idea is that, since science is in the business of causal explanations and causal powers are what are relevant for causal explanations, science should classify items on the basis of similarities and differences in causal powers. since there are no differences in causal powers between davidson ' s kidney or beliefs at t and swampman ' s kidney - analog and belief - analogs when he first pops into existence, davidson


items on the basis of similarities and differences in causal powers. since there are no differences in causal powers between davidson ' s kidney or beliefs at t and swampman ' s kidney - analog and belief - analogs when he first pops into existence, davidson ' s kidney and swampman ' s kidney - analog should belong to all of the same scientific kind and davidson ' s beliefs and swampman ' s belief - analogs should belong to all of the same scientific kinds. ( for discussion of this issue, see heil & mele eds. 1993. ) one problem with methodological individualism is that it is radically revisionary, for biology at least. moreover, if we classify kidneys on the basis of actual causal powers, we include swampman ' s kidney - analog at the cost of excluding many real kidneys, such as the kidneys of people on dialysis. while the arguments given in favor of methodological individualism may seem plausible, they are not usually accompanied by any attempt to understand the role that historical classifications play in biology or elsewhere. that being the case, we have reason to worry that the understanding of scientific classification that supports methodological individualism is too simple. further, it must be kept in mind that the proponents of teleological theories claim that a historical theory of content is needed to capture psycho - semantic norms. perhaps this is wrong. but if it is right, and if cognitive science needs such a normative notion, then methodological individualism must be wrong. thus the debate must turn on the more specific issues of whether normative content involves history and whether cognitive science needs normative content. the weightiest objection to teleological theories of content and the hardest to assess is that it is unclear how such theories could explain our most sophisticated concepts and cognitive capacities. no naturalistic theory of content at this time yet makes perfectly clear how we think about democracy, virtue, quarks or perhaps even tomorrow, and so this is not a problem that is peculiar to teleo - functional theories. however, it is sometimes argued that teleological theories of content have a special problem in this respect ( e. g., peacocke ( 1992 ) ). the thought is that they may have some hope of working for contents that concern things that impact on fitness — food, shelter, mates, etc. — but that they are, in principle, unable to deal with contents that cannot have impacted on fitness, or not in any suitably selective way. some contents cannot have impacted on fitness because they belong to the


food, shelter, mates, etc. — but that they are, in principle, unable to deal with contents that cannot have impacted on fitness, or not in any suitably selective way. some contents cannot have impacted on fitness because they belong to the future or are non - existent. others cannot affect fitness in any suitably selective way because, although they have an impact, their impact is too non - specific : for example, quarks have an impact but because they are omnipresent in our environment they cannot qualify as the content of a representation by virtue of some simple selectional story. this objection is hard to assess for a number of reasons. one is that there are many different kinds of sophisticated concepts and capacities and accounting for them all is a large task. another is that, while the objection is posed as an objection to all teleosemantic theories, different versions will address it in different ways. yet another is that we might allow that it is still early days with respect to the development of teleological ( and other ) naturalistic theories of mental content. it has really only been since the advent of cognitive science in the middle of the last century and the general acceptance of a broadly physicalist perspective on the mind in the decades that followed that philosophers of mind have devoted much effort to trying to give a naturalistic theory of mental content. in view of all of this, the present section can do little more than offer a few remarks about how some versions of teleosemantics make some inroads on the issue. most of the points that follow have been touched on in earlier sections. it should be emphasized that those who favor teleosemantic theories rarely restrict the relevant functions to those that derive from natural selection operating over an evolutionary span of time. as remarked earlier, there might be non - intentional selection processes that operate over the span of a culture or over the span of an individual ' s own development or life. meme selection, conditioning or some other forms of learning and neural selection are considered to be relevant kinds of selection by some proponents of teleosemantics. those who favor modest teleo - functional theories would also emphasize that conceptual atomism is highly controversial. conceptual atomism is the view that every concept of roughly the grain of a lexeme of a natural language derives its content, constitutively speaking, independently of every other such concept ' s content. many psychologists and some philosophers believe that some complex concepts are somehow composed out of or are anyway learned through the use of simpler


lexeme of a natural language derives its content, constitutively speaking, independently of every other such concept ' s content. many psychologists and some philosophers believe that some complex concepts are somehow composed out of or are anyway learned through the use of simpler concepts. crucially, to deny that conceptual atomism is true does not commit one to the view that complex concepts are simply defined in terms of simpler concepts ( a fuller discussion of concepts and whether conceptions can play any role in determining reference is outside of the scope of this entry ). millikan would in this context ask us to take note of her notions of derived and adapted proper functions. what millikan refers to as a “ direct proper function ” belongs to a mechanism for which there has been selection. the mechanisms that produce camouflage patterns on the surface of the octopus have the direct proper function to do so. the patterns that the mechanisms produce by means of which they perform this function possess what millikan calls a “ derived proper function, ” derived from the function of the mechanism to provide camouflage. further, a pattern produced on a particular occasion has an “ adapted derived proper function, ” which is a relational function, in this case to provide camouflage in that particular setting in which the octopus is situated. millikan makes use of these extended senses in which items may have functions to try to explain the contents of novel representations and representations that are produced as a result of learning. learning mechanisms have certain functions and when they perform their functions in particular circumstances their products can have adapted derived proper functions in relation to those circumstances, whether or not the circumstances obtained during the history of our species. millikan ( 2000 ) gives an extensive treatment of concepts. in brief, her view is that conceptions play no role in determining the extensions of the concepts with which they are associated. millikan ' s theory presupposes innate learning mechanisms that are tuned to identify substances of different sorts in accord with certain principles. the relevant sort of substance is that which accounts for the past selective success of the learning mechanisms. for instance, some mental mechanisms might have been selected for recognizing faces of individuals in accord with certain principles of operation, and others might have been selected for recognizing animals of different species in accord with other principles of operation. these mechanisms can acquire the “ purpose ” to recognize something more specific, such as a particular individual ' s face or animals of a particular species, because the mechanisms were selected for recognizing things in that domain ( faces or animals ) in accord with certain principles of operation and,


the “ purpose ” to recognize something more specific, such as a particular individual ' s face or animals of a particular species, because the mechanisms were selected for recognizing things in that domain ( faces or animals ) in accord with certain principles of operation and, in accord with those principles, it is a particular individual ' s face or animals of a particular species that it now has the “ purpose ” to recognize. the extension of a substance concept, she tells us, is what substance it was selected to recognize. large issues relevant to assessing the different teleological theories of content remain to be settled. on a hopeful note, much good work has been done in exploring the possible range of such theories, in producing interesting in - principle objections and in responding to such objections in ways that have resulted in better developed or better defended versions. we should also keep in mind that serious work on naturalistic theories of content has only been going on for decades rather than centuries and that, on a philosophical timescale, that is quite a short time. - agar, n., 1993, “ what do frogs really believe? ”, in australasian journal of philosophy, 71 : 1 – 12. - allen, c., bekoff, m. & lauder, g. ( eds. ), 1998, nature ' s purposes : analyses of function and design in biology, cambridge, mass : bradford, mit. - ariew, a., cummins, r., & perlman, m., ( eds. ), 2002, functions : new readings in the philosophy of biology and psychology, oxford : oxford university press. - ayala, f., 1970, “ teleological explanations in evolutionary biology ”, in philosophy of science, 37 : 1 – 15. - bedau, m., 1991, “ can biological teleology be naturalized? ”, in journal of philosophy, 88 : 647 – 55. - block, n., 1986, “ advertisement for a semantics for psychology ”, in p. french, t. uehling, and h. wettstein ( eds. ), studies in the philosophy of mind, midwest studies in philosophy ( volume 10 ) : minneapolis : university of minnesota press : minneapolis. - block, n., & kitcher, p. 2010, “ misunderstanding darwin : natural selection ' s secular critics get it wrong ”, in boston review : march / april, 29 – 32. - boorse, c., 1976, “ wright on functions ”, in


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documentfragment is a " lightweight " or " minimal " document object. it is very common to want to be able to extract a portion of a document ' s tree or to create a new fragment of a document. imagine implementing a user command like cut or rearranging a document by moving fragments around. it is desirable to have an object which can hold such fragments and it is quite natural to use a node for this purpose. while it is true that a document object could fulfill this role, a document object can potentially be a heavyweight object, depending on the underlying implementation. what is really needed for this is a very lightweight object. documentfragment is such an object. furthermore, various operations — such as inserting nodes as children of another node — may take documentfragment objects as arguments ; this results in all the child nodes of the documentfragment being moved to the child list of this node. the children of a documentfragment node are zero or more nodes representing the tops of any sub - trees defining the structure of the document. documentfragment nodes do not need to be well - formed xml documents ( although they do need to follow the rules imposed upon well - formed xml parsed entities, which can have multiple top nodes ). for example, a documentfragment might have only one child and that child node could be a text node. such a structure model represents neither an html document nor a well - formed xml document. when a documentfragment is inserted into a document ( or indeed any other node that may take children ) the children of the documentfragment and not the documentfragment itself are inserted into the node. this makes the documentfragment very useful when the user wishes to create nodes that are siblings ; the documentfragment acts as the parent of these nodes so that the user can use the standard methods from the node interface, such as insertbefore and appendchild. direct base classes : abstractcontainernode inherited functions : addeventlistener, appendchild, attributes, autorelease, bubbleevent, captureevent, childnodes, clonenode, copynode, dispatchattrmodified, dispatchcharacterdatamodified, dispatchevent, dispatchnodeinserted, dispatchnodeinsertedintodocument, dispatchnoderemoved, dispatchnoderemovedfromdocument, dispatchsubtreemodified, duplicate, events


dispatchevent, dispatchnodeinserted, dispatchnodeinsertedintodocument, dispatchnoderemoved, dispatchnoderemovedfromdocument, dispatchsubtreemodified, duplicate, events, eventssuspended, findattribute, findelement, findnode, firstchild, getnodebypath, getnodebypathns, getnodevalue, hasattributevalue, hasattributes, haschildnodes, innertext, insertbefore, issupported, lastchild, localname, namesareequal, namespaceuri, nextsibling, nodename, nodetype, nodevalue, normalize, ownerdocument, parentnode, prefix, previoussibling, release, removechild, removeeventlistener, replacechild, setnodevalue, setownerdocument const xmlstring & nodename ( ) const ; see also : poco : : xml : : abstractnode : : nodename ( ) unsigned short nodetype ( ) const ; see also : poco : : xml : : node : : nodetype ( ) see also : poco : : xml : : abstractnode : : copynode ( )


are your conflicts important and interesting? it is no secret that conflict drives stories. the conflict may be clear and specific ( a meteor is going to destroy the planet! ) or understated and perhaps not even overtly discussed ( ed feels like a failure ). whatever the case, conflict is at the core of any story. something should be or absolutely needs to be resolved, and dealing with that conflict is what the story is about. because of the central conflict, a number of smaller conflicts emerge. here are some central points to consider when approaching conflict in a story : why does it matter? what about the conflict in the story makes it important, both to the characters and to the reader? when the meteor is approaching earth, there ’ s a pretty good reason to try to resolve the conflict. death is on the line. a planet in peril is a major conflict.. but most story conflicts aren ’ t quite that easily identified with. for example, if you write about a forty - year old man who is committed to losing fifty pounds and running in a marathon, you have to come up with a reason why it is important to the man. perhaps he has started to feel as if his life is routine and that he running out of time to accomplish something. that is the conflict. you also have to come up with a reason and why it is important to the reader. should they like this guy? do they think accomplishing the goal will be meaningful to him? what can be gained or lost? when you start out with a simple desire, such as the marathon, there has to be consequences and rewards. there are obvious benefits to the man getting in shape and running in the marathon. there is a sense of accomplishment to be had, and there are clear health benefits. there should also be consequences both for success and for failure. clearly there is an emotional cost to failure. not managing to accomplish this goal could mean that the man feels more like a failure than when he started on the journey. he may also risk physical injury. there is also the genuine risk that accomplishing his goal may not be as satisfying or life - changing as the man initially thought it would be. what are the smaller conflicts that result from the central conflict? when you have an overall conflict, such as self esteem issues and a lack of interest in life, which a person is trying to solve ( by running in a marathon ) there are going to be other conflicts that occur as a result of the central conflict. for example, the man ’ s wife


self esteem issues and a lack of interest in life, which a person is trying to solve ( by running in a marathon ) there are going to be other conflicts that occur as a result of the central conflict. for example, the man ’ s wife might be overweight and resent the fact that he is trying to improve. she may be indignant or she may even try to sabotage his attempts by bringing home sugary or fatty foods or trying to find other ways to occupy his time. there may also be conflicts at work because the man isn ’ t working the overtime hours that he used to. there are also the aches and pains of running as well as the temptations of abandoning his goal in favor of an easier life. how will the conflict be resolved? the resolution of a central conflict can make or break a novel. there is, of course, the possibility of defeat. not every conflict gets resolved favorably, even if the expected outcome arrives. we ’ ve already discussed the idea of consequences for victory as well. the man may complete the marathon but lose his wife or his job, for example. the resolution must matter to the reader. if the reader has stuck around for 50, 000 words, only to meet up with a resolution that either doesn ’ t make sense or doesn ’ t feel earned, the reader is going to be upset. if the conflict matters, than the resolution must feel logical and earned.


social structure of ancient china let ' s learn about china ' s social structure description : peasants of ancient china image copyright : www. haikudesign. com a. which groups made up china ’ s social structure? * in first class were the kings and nobles ; they were at the highest level. * then came the lords and warriors, they were in the second class. * lastly were the peasants, they were in the lowest class. b. what were the rights and responsibilities of each group? * the kings lead the government and gave land to different lords. * the lords ’ responsibilities were to pay the taxes to the king and provided warriors to protect the land. * peasants farmed the nobles land and worked for the nobles and kings. c. why were some groups more powerful than others? * they were more powerful because they were wealthy and known. * they had a lot more resources than others. d. why were boy children highly valued in ancient china ’ s society? * boys were valued girls more because they were the ones that passed down the family names to their families. * when their parents got old, the boys were the ones that took care of their parents. e. compare and contrast ancient china ’ s social structure with the united states ( our country ) * they are similar because the kings and president are in the highest class. * in the second class in the u. s. are educated adults like lawyers and surgeons and people in the army like marines. while in china it is the warriors. * in the lower class are the homeless and the citizens of the u. s. in ancient china it is the servants and the slaves.


a new canadian program is reducing school - based bullying behavior by changing attitudes in the classroom. university of alberta researchers use the educational program to rid schools of bullying behavior specifically directed at students who stutter. the program has been so effective at changing attitudes in the classroom that researchers say the template could be used to modify other undesirable behaviors. currently, the teasing and bullying unacceptable behavior ( tab ) program is taught province - wide to students in grades 3 to 6 to reduce teasing and bullying directed at children with differences — particularly children who stutter. a new study by tab creator marilyn langevin, ph. d., shows the program is getting bullies, victims and bystanders to recognize bullying behavior and deem it unacceptable. “ attitudes predict behaviors. if we ’ re going to get behavior to change, a first - level intervention is changing attitudes in the classroom, ” said langevin. “ tab program is one of the building blocks of change. ” children who stutter are at three times greater risk of being bullied at school compared with peers who speak fluently. in this study, langevin and her team surveyed more than 600 students who participated in the tab program to evaluate its effectiveness at changing attitudes about stuttering. researchers have learned that children who know someone that stutters — a family member, friend or peer — generally have more positive attitudes toward them. however, for individuals with little exposure to stuttering, it ’ s a different story as stuttering is an unpredictable disorder characterized by repetitions, prolonged sounds or complete blocks that can be accompanied by head jerks, nods and facial grimaces. a key finding of the study was that the intervention had the most impact on students who previously did not know anyone who stutters. investigators found that these children displayed more positive attitudes and were more likely to engage in social interaction. these students were also more likely to resist peer pressure to socially isolate stuttering children. “ it ’ s the children who don ’ t know someone who stutters that generally have more negative attitudes toward kids who stutter. we ’ re very pleased to see this group had the highest change scores since they ’ re the group we wanted to target. ” children surveyed were also more likely to take a dim view of such behavior after completing the tab program, and had more knowledge of appropriate ways to respond. the survey also showed that children who bullied were most resistant to the tab program itself, compared with victims and “ dually involved ” students — those who have bullied but have also been bullied.


so far in this tutorial, we ' ve looked at some of the ways in which you can create pages with lists, image maps and a few other features, which should give you the basis of some fairly clever pages. but look around the web, and you ' ll see that there are a lot more tricks that can be done, like pages where you can fill in all your details, and click on the send button to request a catalogue, or search a database. the way all this is handles is with two important features - forms and scripts. we ' ve already seen how a script is called when you use an imagemap, but the scripting system for web pages is much more sophisticated than that. it ' s based around something called cgi - the common gateway interface - which is designed to make sure that you don ' t have to learn a different way of writing scripts depending on which type of web server that you ' re using. if a script was written for the ncsa web server, it should work with the cern one, and vice - versa. if you ' re using a web server that ' s running on a different type of computer, like os / 2, windows or macintosh, there may be some differences, but the basic principles are pretty much the same. whatever sort of web server you ' re using, scripts have one important thing in common - whatever the script prints out on the screen when it ' s run as a program is what will be sent back to the browser when someone clicks on a link that activates it. so, you ' ll often be able to test your script before installing it on a web site, to make sure that it produces the right messages. however, there ' s one important thing that any script has to do before it can send information destined for the browser - it has to say what sort of information is being sent back - which can be either text or html. that ' s all done by including lines at the start of your script that specify the content - type. here ' s an example, which would work as both a dos batch file or a unix shell script, and tells the browser that the rest of the information should be treated as pre - formatted text echo content - type text / plain echo the second ' echo ' is important - there must be a blank line between the content - type header and the rest of the output from your script. if you want it to display html, just change the content type from text / plain to text / html.


' echo ' is important - there must be a blank line between the content - type header and the rest of the output from your script. if you want it to display html, just change the content type from text / plain to text / html. for example, if you include a link that looks like this then the script below will produce a display like the one shown in the screenshot. echo content - type : text / html echo echo " < html > < head > < title > the time is now... < / title > < / head > < body > " echo " < h1 > current time on this server < / h1 > " date echo " < p > thank you for calling. have a nice day < p > " echo " < / body > < / html > " exit to make the script run, you ' ll have to put it in the scripts directory on your web server ; the / cgi - bin / at the beginning of the url for the script is a shorthand, which the server automatically translates to the real name of the directory ( and on an ncsa server, you might need to use ' / htbin / ' instead ). depending on the way your server has been set up, that might be a shared directory, or it could be a directory in your own private web - space. if you rent web space on a commercial server, remember that you might not always have permission to run scripts, so if you want to use them to spice up your pages, check before signing on the dotted line. so, now you know how to send output from the script to the browser, what about the opposite direction? it ' s not quite so straightforward, but once you ' ve got the hang of it, things should be pretty simple. when information is sent from a browser to a script via cgi, it ' s built up into a query string ( sometimes saved in a variable called query _ string ). you ' ll probably have seen a few query strings without realising, when you ' ve clicked on some types of link, and seen your browser display a url that looks something like everything after the question mark is the query string, which consists of a series of variables and their values, separated by & symbols. your script can use those variables to control what it does - which could be displaying a personalised message on the browser, or simply making an entry in a file to log who ' s been accessing your pages. depending on which web server


| int. standard bible encyclopedia | ma ' - a - ka ( ma ` akhah ; septuagint : codex vaticanus mocha ; codex alexandrinus maacha ) : a small syrian kingdom adjoining that of geshur on the western border of bashan, the inhabitants of which are called maachathites ( the revised version ( british and american ) " maacathites " ), whose territory was taken by jair ( deuteronomy 3 : 14 joshua 12 : 5 ). the border of the geshurites and the maacathites and all mt. hermon were given to the half - tribe of manasseh ( joshua 13 : 11 ). the inhabitants of these kingdoms, however, were not driven out by israel ( joshua 13 : 13 ), and at a later day the children of ammon hired mercenaries from maacah for their encounter with david. the armies met near medeba when the " syrians " from maacah found themselves opposed to joab. that famous captain completely routed them ( 2 samuel 10 : 6 ; the septuagint has " amalek " ). in 1 chronicles 19 : 6 it is called aram - maacah, syria - maachah ( the king james version ) ; and in 1 chronicles 2 : 23 " aram " appears instead of " maacah. " it evidently lay between geshur on the south and hermon on the north, being probably bounded by jordan on the west, although no certain indication of boundaries is now possible. they would thus be hemmed in by israel, which accounts for ` geshur and maacath dwell in the midst of israel " ( joshua 13 : 13 ). it is possible that abel - beth - maacah may have been a colony founded by men from maacah. ( 1 ) septuagint : codex vaticanus mocha ; codex alexandrinus mocha, daughter of nahor, borne to him by reumah ( genesis 22 : 24 ). ( 2 ) septuagint : codex vaticanus maacha ; codex alexandrinus maachath, the one wife of david who was of royal rank, the daughter of talmai, king of geshur, who became the mother of absalom ( 2 samuel 3 : 3 1 chronicles 3 : 2 ). ( 3 ) maacha, father of achish, king of gath ( 1 kings 2 :


, king of geshur, who became the mother of absalom ( 2 samuel 3 : 3 1 chronicles 3 : 2 ). ( 3 ) maacha, father of achish, king of gath ( 1 kings 2 : 39 ). he is probably referred to as " maoch " in 1 samuel 27 : 2. ( 4 ) the daughter of absalom, the favorite wife of rehoboam, and mother of abijah ( 1 kings 15 : 2 2 chronicles 11 : 20, etc. ). evidently " daughter " must here be understood as " granddaughter, " according to a common oriental usage. tamar was the only daughter of absalom. if tamar married uriel of gibeah ( 2 chronicles 13 : 2 ), then maacah was her daughter. in that case the name micaiah in this passage would be either a copyist ' s error or a variant of maacah. she must have been a woman of strong personality. unfortunately, her influence was cast upon the side of idolatry. she maintained her position in the palace, however, till the reign of her grandson asa. possibly she acted as regent during his minority. ultimately, she was degraded by him for an act of peculiar infamy ( 1 kings 15 : 13 2 chronicles 15 : 16 ). ( 5 ) concubine of caleb, son of hezron ( 1 chronicles 2 : 48 ). ( 6 ) sister of huppim and shuppim the benjamites, who became the wife of machir the manassite, the " father " of gilead ( 1 chronicles 7 : 12, 15 f ). ( 7 ) wife of jeiel, the " father " of gibeon, an ancestress of king saul ( 1 chronicles 8 : 29 ; 1 chronicles 9 : 35 ). ( 8 ) father of hanan, one of david ' s mighty men ( 1 chronicles 11 : 43 ). ( 9 ) father of shephatiah, ruler of the simeonites under david ( 1 chronicles 27 : 16 ). maacah ( 30 occurrences ) genesis 22 : 24 his concubine, whose name was reumah, also bore tebah, gaham, tahash, and maacah. ( web jps asv bbe dby nas niv ) joshua 12 : 5 and ruled in mount hermon, and in salcah, and in all bashan, unto the border


, tahash, and maacah. ( web jps asv bbe dby nas niv ) joshua 12 : 5 and ruled in mount hermon, and in salcah, and in all bashan, unto the border of the geshurites and the maacathites, and half gilead, even unto the border of sihon king of heshbon. ( see niv ) joshua 13 : 11 and gilead, and the border of the geshurites and maacathites, and all mount hermon, and all bashan unto salcah ; ( see niv ) joshua 13 : 13 nevertheless the children of israel drove not out the geshurites, nor the maacathites ; but geshur and maacath dwelt in the midst of israel unto this day. ( see niv ) 2 samuel 3 : 3 and his second, chileab, of abigail the wife of nabal the carmelite ; and the third, absalom the son of maacah the daughter of talmai king of geshur ; ( web kjv jps asv bbe wbs ylt nas niv ) 2 samuel 10 : 6 when the children of ammon saw that they were become odious to david, the children of ammon sent and hired the syrians of beth rehob, and the syrians of zobah, twenty thousand footmen, and the king of maacah with one thousand men, and the men of tob twelve thousand men. ( web kjv jps asv bbe dby wbs ylt nas niv ) 2 samuel 10 : 8 the children of ammon came out, and put the battle in array at the entrance of the gate : and the syrians of zobah and of rehob, and the men of tob and maacah, were by themselves in the field. ( web kjv jps asv bbe dby wbs ylt nas niv ) 2 samuel 20 : 14 he went through all the tribes of israel to abel, and to beth maacah, and all the berites : and they were gathered together, and went also after him. ( web jps asv bbe dby nas niv ) 2 samuel 20 : 15 they came and besieged him in abel of beth maacah, and they cast up a mound against the city, and it stood against the rampart ; and all the people


asv bbe dby nas niv ) 2 samuel 20 : 15 they came and besieged him in abel of beth maacah, and they cast up a mound against the city, and it stood against the rampart ; and all the people who were with joab battered the wall, to throw it down. ( web jps asv bbe dby nas niv ) 1 kings 2 : 39 it happened at the end of three years, that two of the servants of shimei ran away to achish, son of maacah, king of gath. they told shimei, saying, " behold, your servants are in gath. " ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 1 kings 15 : 2 three years reigned he in jerusalem : and his mother ' s name was maacah the daughter of abishalom. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 1 kings 15 : 10 forty - one years reigned he in jerusalem : and his mother ' s name was maacah the daughter of abishalom. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 1 kings 15 : 13 also maacah his mother he removed from being queen, because she had made an abominable image for an asherah ; and asa cut down her image, and burnt it at the brook kidron. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 1 kings 15 : 20 ben hadad listened to king asa, and sent the captains of his armies against the cities of israel, and struck ijon, and dan, and abel beth maacah, and all chinneroth, with all the land of naphtali. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 2 kings 15 : 29 in the days of pekah king of israel came tiglath pileser king of assyria, and took ijon, and abel beth maacah, and janoah, and kedesh, and hazor, and gilead, and galilee, all the land of naphtali ; and he carried them captive to assyria. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 1 chronicles 2 : 48 maacah, caleb ' s concubine, bore sheber and tirhanah. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 1 chronicles 3 : 2 the third, absalom the son of maacah the daughter of talmai king of geshur


niv ) 1 chronicles 27 : 16 furthermore over the tribes of israel : of the reubenites was eliezer the son of zichri the ruler : of the simeonites, shephatiah the son of maacah : ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 2 chronicles 11 : 20 after her he took maacah the daughter of absalom ; and she bore him abijah, and attai, and ziza, and shelomith. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 2 chronicles 11 : 21 rehoboam loved maacah the daughter of absalom above all his wives and his concubines : ( for he took eighteen wives, and sixty concubines, and became the father of twenty - eight sons and sixty daughters. ) ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 2 chronicles 11 : 22 rehoboam appointed abijah the son of maacah to be chief, even the prince among his brothers ; for he was minded to make him king. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv ) 2 chronicles 13 : 2 he was king in jerusalem for three years ; his mother ' s name was maacah, the daughter of uriel of gibeah. and there was war between abijah and jeroboam. ( bbe niv ) 2 chronicles 15 : 16 also maacah, the mother of asa the king, he removed from being queen, because she had made an abominable image for an asherah ; and asa cut down her image, and made dust of it, and burnt it at the brook kidron. ( web jps asv bbe nas niv )


march 27, 2011 sunday school lesson 1timothy 5 : 1 - 8, 17 - 22 the apostle paul taught timothy to confront sin wherever and in whomever it occurred. in 2 timothy 4 : 2, paul wrote that the young preacher should “ reprove, rebuke, exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine. ” to rebuke someone is to confront a person about his sins. however, there are special considerations when we rebuke. for example, those considerations include where the rebuke is made. sometimes it is best done privately, and at other times it is better that it be done publicly. another consideration regards the age of the person who is being rebuked for his sins. god ’ s word is clear that respect is due to elderly people. the writer of proverbs said, “ whoso curseth his father or his mother, his lamp shall be put out in obscure darkness. ” with this is in mind, there is perhaps a better understanding of paul when he wrote, “ rebuke not an elder, but intreat him as a father. ” if an elderly person sins, a younger person should speak gently to him as if he were speaking to his own father. when rebuking younger men, paul said to treat them as if they are brothers. a brother would know that he was being rebuked in a godly way because timothy had his best spiritual interest at heart. in the same way treat the women with the same rules of consideration as the men, paul said. deal with an elderly woman as if she were your mother and younger women as if they were your sisters. this is wisdom, that if practiced, will always be sufficient for every circumstance. in those days, there were some widows who lived under the care of the church. those were women without means of support. honor, them, paul wrote, because they needed the compassion and concern of the church. there was, however, a distinction among widows since some had no families and others had families who were able contribute to their support. let those families practice charity toward their widowed mother or aunt, supporting her financially, and not leaving this to the church. it is good for family members to help the widow, and paul wrote that it is “ good and acceptable before god. ” to ignore the needs of family members who cannot provide for themselves is a denial of the faith. paul told timothy to “ observe these things without preferring one before another, doing nothing by partiality. ” christians


the custom of kindling bonfires on the first sunday in lent has prevailed in belgium, the north of france, and many parts of germany. thus in the belgian ardennes for a week or a fortnight before the day of the great fire, as it is called, children go about from farm to farm collecting fuel. at grand halleux any one who refuses their request is pursued next day by the children, who try to blacken his face with the ashes of the extinct fire. when the day has come, they cut down bushes, especially juniper and broom, and in the evening great bonfires blaze on all the heights. it is a common saying that seven bonfires should be seen if the village is to be safe from conflagrations. if the meuse happens to be frozen hard at the time, bonfires are lit also on the ice. at grand halleux they set up a pole called makral, or the witch, in the midst of the pile, and the fire is kindled by the man who was last married in the village. in the neighbourhood of morlanwelz a straw man is burnt in the fire. young people and children dance and sing round the bonfires, and leap over the embers to secure good crops or a happy marriage within the year, or as a means of guarding themselves against colic. in brabant on the same sunday, down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, women and men disguised in female attire used to go with burning torches to the fields, where they danced and sang comic songs for the purpose, as they alleged, of driving away the wicked sower, who is mentioned in the gospel for the day. at paturages, in the province of hainaut, down to about 1840 the custom was observed under the name of escouvion or scouvion. every year on the first sunday of lent, which was called the day of the little scouvion, young folks and children used to run with lighted torches through the gardens and orchards. as they ran they cried at the pitch of their voices : bear apples, bear pears, and cherries all black to scouvion! 1 at these words the torch - bearer whirled his blazing brand and hurled it among the branches of the apple - trees, the pear - trees, and the cherry - trees. the next sunday was called the day of the great scouvion, and the same race with lighted torches among the trees of the orchards was repeated in the afternoon


of the apple - trees, the pear - trees, and the cherry - trees. the next sunday was called the day of the great scouvion, and the same race with lighted torches among the trees of the orchards was repeated in the afternoon till darkness fell. 2 in the french department of the ardennes the whole village used to dance and sing around the bonfires which were lighted on the first sunday in lent. here, too, it was the person last married, sometimes a man and sometimes a woman, who put the match to the fire. the custom is still kept up very commonly in the district. cats used to be burnt in the fire or roasted to death by being held over it ; and while they were burning the shepherds drove their flocks through the smoke and flames as a sure means of guarding them against sickness and witchcraft. in some communes it was believed that the livelier the dance round the fire, the better would be the crops that year. 3 in the french province of franche - comte, to the west of the jura mountains, the first sunday of lent is known as the sunday of the firebrands ( brandons ), on account of the fires which it is customary to kindle on that day. on the saturday or the sunday the village lads harness themselves to a cart and drag it about the streets, stopping at the doors of the houses where there are girls and begging fora faggot. when they have got enough, they cart the fuel to a spot at some little distance from the village, pile it up, and set it on fire. all the people of the parish come out to see the bonfire. in some villages, when the bells have rung the angelus, the signal for the observance is given by cries of, to the fire! to the fire! lads, lasses, and children dance round the blaze, and when the flames have died down they vie with each other in leaping over the red embers. he or she who does so without singeing his or her garments will be married within the year. young folk also carry lighted torches about the streets or the fields, and when they pass an orchard they cry out, more fruit than leaves! down to recent years at laviron, in the department of doubs, it was the young married couples of the year who had charge of the bonfires. in the midst of the bonfire a pole was planted with a wooden figure of a cock fastened to the top. then there were races


the department of doubs, it was the young married couples of the year who had charge of the bonfires. in the midst of the bonfire a pole was planted with a wooden figure of a cock fastened to the top. then there were races, and the winner received the cock as a prize. 4 in auvergne fires are everywhere kindled on the evening of the first sunday in lent. every village, every hamlet, even every ward, every isolated farm has its bonfire or figo, as it is called, which blazes up as the shades of night are falling. the fires may be seen flaring on the heights and in the plains ; the people dance and sing round about them and leap through the flames. then they proceed to the ceremony of the grannas - mias. a granno - mio is a torch of straw fastened to the top of a pole. when the pyre is half consumed, the bystanders kindle the torches at the expiring flames and carry them into the neighbouring orchards, fields, and gardens, wherever there are fruit - trees. as they march they sing at the top of their voices, granno my friend, granno my father, granno my mother. then they pass the burning torches under the branches of every tree, singing. brando, brandounci tsaque brantso, in plan panei! that is, firebrand burn ; every branch a basketful! in some villages the people also run across the sown fields and shake the ashes of the torches on the ground ; also they put some of the ashes in the fowls nests, in order that the hens may lay plenty of eggs throughout the year. when all these ceremonies have been performed, everybody goes home and feasts ; the special dishes of the evening are fritters and pancakes. here the application of the fire to the fruit - trees, to the sown fields, and to the nests of the poultry is clearly a charm intended to ensure fertility ; and the granno to whom the invocations are addressed, and who gives his name to the torches, may possibly be, as dr. pommerol suggests, no other than the ancient celtic god grannus, whom the romans identified with apollo, and whose worship is attested by inscriptions found not only in france but in scotland and on the danube. 5 the custom of carrying lighted torches of straw ( brandons ) about the orchards and fields to fertilise them on the first sunday of lent seems to have