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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
E001 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-11-no_reviewer | topology-001 | candidate | images/comparison/E001.png | Invoice intake to payment approval/execution pipeline | Model a connected finance workflow where an invoice-handling agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment-relevant details, drafts payment actions, and forwards them into an approval and execution path. | [
"The invoice documents and any supporting evidence originate outside the trusted application zone.",
"The invoice intake agent can read external documents and produce structured payment drafts, but its internal validation, guardrails, and approval checks are unspecified.",
"An approval step and a payment-execut... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Invoice intake is a documented application workflow that accepts external invoice files, extracts fields into a draft record, and hands the draft onward; validation depth and guardrails are unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice documents",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice intake agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "P... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Payment draft record",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Invoice intake is a documented application workflow... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from the ordered flows: B1 for Z1↔Z2 and B2 for Z2↔Z3.",
"F2 is same-zone within Z2 and does not cross a trust boundary.",
"The architecture does not specify whether the approval reviewer is human or automated, so unauthorized disclosure or spoofing against that component remains unsuppor... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K3 already show that external invoices are ingested and transformed into drafts, but they do not specify effective guardrails. The downstream draft workflow exists, so this control would strengthen the existing... | |
E002 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | single_prompt | slot-06-single_prompt | topology-002 | candidate | images/comparison/E002.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified.",
"The support agent can query account data to prepare responses, but privileged access is not assumed beyond the stated workflow.",
"An attacker can influence external help documents or ticket ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Document and ticket inputs are passed through the drafting workflow without an explicit content-authentication or instruction-sanitization guarantee being stated.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F3",
"F1"
],
"id": "Ctrl1"
},
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Help Document Fetcher",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Response Drafti... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "response-generation workflow and agent tool authority",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C5",
"C2",
"C3",
"C1"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"Ctrl1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Doc... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned by first-seen zone pairs: B1 for External Sources to Support Application, B2 for Support Application to Account Data.",
"The architecture does not state whether the external help documents are authenticated, filtered, or sandboxed; unsupported assumptions should not be made.",
"The a... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C1"
],
"existing_control_effect": "Ctrl1 already indicates the workflow lacks a stated instruction-sanitization guarantee, so this mitigation addresses the identified gap.",
"recommendation": "Add a content-separation rule in the help f... | |
E003 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | full_workflow | slot-16-full_workflow | topology-003 | candidate | images/comparison/E003.png | Guarded multi-analyst incident triage with coordinator and case store | Two analyst agents independently review externally supplied incident evidence, then report normalized findings to a coordinator that consolidates results into a case store for response tracking. | [
"Externally supplied incident content may be adversarially crafted, but the attacker has no authenticated access to internal systems.",
"Analyst agents can only use bounded retrieval or parsing tools against approved sources and allowed actions.",
"The coordinator is authorized to write only case records, not a... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Evidence intake is restricted to approved incident sources, and analyst tool use is bounded to read-only retrieval and parsing of those sources.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_id... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst Agent A judgment and downstream findings",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Evidence intake is restricted to ap... | [
"No threat is asserted for direct unauthorized access to internal systems; the scenario explicitly says the attacker has no authenticated access to internal systems.",
"Boundary B1 covers flows between External Evidence (Z1) and Analysis Workspace (Z2); boundary B2 covers flows between Analysis Workspace (Z2) and... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already restricts intake to approved sources and limits analyst tools to read-only retrieval and parsing, which reduces arbitrary action and narrows the injection surface.",
"recommendation": "Add a prompt- and... | |
E004 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | full_workflow | slot-09-full_workflow | topology-004 | candidate | images/comparison/E004.png | Guarded invoice-to-payment assistant with approval handoff | Model a finance workflow where an invoice-reading agent ingests externally supplied documents, extracts payment-relevant details, drafts payment requests, and passes them to a separate approval and payment-execution path under enforced controls. | [
"External invoices and supporting evidence may be attacker-influenced and are treated as untrusted input.",
"The invoice agent runs with bounded tool authority and cannot directly execute payments.",
"Approval is a distinct control point with authorization checks; execution requires passing that gate.",
"Prov... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Document intake records provenance metadata before the invoice agent sees the content, and the agent reads only the stored invoice record rather than the supplier channel directly.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3"
],
"... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Document intake service",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Inv... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice records and payment drafts",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4",
"C3",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "T... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3, and B3 for Z1-Z3.",
"No direct threat path was identified for C6->C1 beyond ordinary payment confirmation/remittance notice delivery; that flow alone does not demonstrate disclosure or abuse.",
"The architecture does not describe aut... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4",
"C3",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K4 already notes reliance on provenance metadata and content extraction, and K1 stores provenance before agent access, which reduces direct supplier-channel tampering but does not guarantee det... | |
E005 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-18-full_workflow | topology-005 | candidate | images/comparison/E005.png | Incident evidence triage with dual analyst agents, coordinator, and case store | Support incident response by having two analyst agents review externally supplied evidence, consolidate findings via a coordinator, and persist case records in a shared store. | [
"External incident documents, logs, and attachments may be attacker-influenced, but the attacker has no privileged access to internal services or operator accounts.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified; no assumption is made that validation, sandboxing, approval, or authentication ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Unspecified evidence handling controls govern analyst ingestion of external files and logs; effectiveness is not assumed.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C5"
],... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst agent A reasoning and outputs",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "External evidence remains outside the trusted ... | [
"No direct unauthorized write path to the case store is shown; only the coordinator writes to C5.",
"No direct analyst-to-store disclosure path is shown; persistence occurs only through the coordinator.",
"Because control effectiveness is unspecified, ingestion hardening, sandboxing, and approval mechanisms can... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K4 keeps external evidence outside the trusted zone until C2 consumes it, and K1 indicates ingestion controls already govern the path, but their effectiveness is unspecified.",
"recommendation": "Enforce strict evidence sanit... | |
E006 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-05-full_workflow | topology-006 | candidate | images/comparison/E006.png | Support Agent with External Help Docs and Account Lookup | Draft customer-support replies by combining a user ticket, externally supplied help documents, and internal customer-account data within one agentic workflow. | [
"The assistant is one connected workflow that decides when to consult external documents and the account store.",
"External help documents are attacker-influenced inputs and are outside the trusted application zone unless later validated by the system.",
"The customer-account store is internal to the support en... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3",
"C4"
],
"fact": "The orchestrator and drafting step operate as a single support workflow that can combine ticket text, retrieved help content, and account facts before producing a reply; the exact validation and grounding checks are unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Customer Ticket Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help Document Source",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply generation and agent decision-making",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Ext... | [
"Boundary IDs inferred from the supplied flows: B1 covers Z1<->Z2 traffic on F1, F2, and F7; B2 covers Z2<->Z3 traffic on F4 and F5.",
"No direct unauthorized read from C6 alone was treated as disclosure; disclosure is only modeled where data can plausibly reach the external reply path.",
"No separate repudiati... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 and CTRL3 already indicate the workflow can combine external content with drafting, but validation effectiveness is unspecified; this means the current design may provide some parsing/sanitization without reliab... | |
E007 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-11-full_workflow | topology-007 | candidate | images/comparison/E007.png | Invoice-to-Payment Drafting Flow with External Document Intake | An invoice-handling agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents and supporting evidence, extracts billing details, drafts payment requests, and forwards them into an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Invoice documents and evidence originate outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The invoice agent can read external documents and can create or populate payment drafts from extracted content.",
"The approval and payment-execution path exists as a separate downstream function, b... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "External submissions are accepted through the supplier portal into the invoice agent; content validation and document-authenticity checks are present in design, but their effectiveness is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id":... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier Upload Portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Doc... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Draft payment request",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": "External submissions are accepted thro... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from flow order: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3.",
"Controls mention validation, storage limitation, and workflow gating, but their effectiveness is explicitly unspecified; this prevents stronger reduction claims.",
"No direct unauthorized read path from the document store is shown, so inform... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K3 indicate validation/authenticity checks and draft generation separation are present, but their effectiveness is unspecified, so they may reduce accidental errors yet do not establish reliable pre... | |
E008 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | full_workflow | slot-04-full_workflow | topology-008 | candidate | images/comparison/E008.png | Guarded support-assist workflow with external evidence and account lookup | A customer-support assistant drafts replies using externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store, while enforcing authorization, provenance checks, and bounded tool access. | [
"The assistant is connected to a ticketing front end that accepts customer messages and uploaded evidence.",
"Help documents may originate outside the trusted zone and can be attacker-influenced.",
"The account store is inside a separate trusted zone and requires authenticated, least-privilege read access.",
... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "Uploaded evidence is passed through a provenance and content filter before the assistant receives it; untrusted documents are not treated as authoritative without passing this gate.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F3"
],
"id": "CTL1"
},
{
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Ticket front end",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Evidence uploader",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Docume... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support assistant behavior and reply integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTL1",
"CTL4"
],
"evidence_quote"... | [
"Boundary IDs derived from the supplied zones and flows: B1 covers Z1<->Z2, B2 covers Z2<->Z3.",
"Unsupported or incomplete paths not analyzed as separate threats include direct modification of account records, because the design states the model cannot directly write account records.",
"Same-zone flows F3, F4,... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTL1 and CTL4 already place a provenance/content filter in front of the agent workspace, so the attack is screened before reaching the assistant, but the scenario notes incomplete effectiveness against adversarial tex... | |
E009 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-10-no_reviewer | topology-009 | candidate | images/comparison/E009.png | Guarded invoice-to-payment agent with approval gate | An invoice-handling AI reads externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment-relevant fields, prepares payment drafts, and passes them to a separate approval and execution path under constrained tool authority. | [
"Invoice documents arrive from outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The invoice agent has bounded read-only access to documents and a limited drafting tool, but cannot execute payments directly.",
"Approval and payment execution are separated from invoice intake by an explicit... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The invoice agent is configured for read-only document access and can only produce draft output, not settle payments.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "In... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Draft Review... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice intake and draft preparation",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Incoming invoices are subjected to ... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from the supplied flow order: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3.",
"No direct payment execution path exists from the invoice agent; F4 requires approval via C4.",
"Controls mention provenance checks and schema validation, but their effectiveness against crafted content is explicitly unspecified.... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K2 already provides provenance checks and schema validation at F1, which helps screen some nonconforming inputs, but resistance to crafted content is unspecified.",
"recommendation": "Harden the invoice intake pip... | |
E010 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-12-no_reviewer | topology-010 | candidate | images/comparison/E010.png | Invoice intake to draft payment approval pipeline | Model an invoice-processing flow where an agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment details, prepares payment drafts, and forwards them into an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"An external sender can influence invoice contents, attachments, or supporting evidence, but has no privileged internal access.",
"The invoice agent can read external documents and produce draft payment artifacts, but the effectiveness of any validation, sandboxing, approval checks, or execution controls is unspe... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "Invoice intake passes externally supplied documents into the finance workflow; document validation and agent-side filtering are present as configured behavior, but their effectiveness is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
]... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Invoice intake",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Draft payment recor... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "draft payment record and downstream payment instruction",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C6",
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CT... | [
"Boundary IDs inferred from the listed flows only: B1 for Z1↔Z2 and B2 for Z2↔Z3.",
"No explicit authentication, authorization, logging, nonrepudiation, or sandboxing mechanism is described; related impacts remain uncertain.",
"A data-store read or internal data flow alone does not establish unauthorized disclo... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTL1 already provides intake validation/filtering, and CTL2/CTL3 already place a review and execution step in the path, but their effectiveness is unspecified so they may only partially reduce ... | |
E011 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | single_prompt | slot-09-single_prompt | topology-011 | candidate | images/comparison/E011.png | finance_operations | An invoice agent reads externally supplied invoice documents, prepares payment drafts, and hands them to an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The supplier portal is attacker-influenced but not authenticated as trusted by default.",
"The invoice agent can invoke only the validation and ledger interfaces shown here; no direct bank or email tool access is assumed.",
"Approval remains a separate human st... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "Document Validation Service rejects unsigned or malformed invoices and records document provenance before returning a normalized invoice record.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier Portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Document Vali... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice draft integrity and downstream approval quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL2"
],
"evidence_quote": "T... | [
"Boundary IDs follow first-seen unordered zone pairs: F1/F2/F3/F4 create B1 between Z1 and Z2; F5 creates B2 between Z2 and Z3.",
"Unsupported paths remain possible where agent prompt isolation, document authenticity proofs, or approver visibility rules are not fully specified.",
"A data-store write to the Draf... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The agent is already limited to read-only ingestion and draft creation, and the validation service records document provenance.",
"recommendation": "Harden the Invoice Agent with strict instruction par... | |
E012 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-04-no_reviewer | topology-012 | candidate | images/comparison/E012.png | Guarded support-assist workflow with external evidence intake and account lookup | A support agent drafts customer replies by combining externally supplied help documents with customer-account data, while enforcing provenance checks, scoped account authorization, and bounded tool use. | [
"External help documents may be attacker-influenced or malformed.",
"The support agent can read help content and query a customer-account store through controlled tools.",
"Account access is limited to the minimum records needed for the active ticket, but some residual risk remains where document provenance or ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "Inbound help content is checked for source provenance and tagged before the agent can use it.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"fact": "The account lookup tool ac... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Provenance gate",... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply drafting process and customer-facing response quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C3",
"C2",
"C6"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
... | [
"Only public-facing evidence input and support-tool/account-lookup paths are in scope.",
"No direct write path to customer data is described; write or tamper threats against C5 are unsupported by the supplied architecture facts.",
"The architecture does not specify authentication, logging, replay resistance, or... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C2",
"C6"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already checks source provenance and tags inbound content, and K3 limits drafting inputs to the validated evidence summary plus authorized account results.",
"recommendation": "Keep provenance gatin... | |
E013 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-15-no_reviewer | topology-013 | candidate | images/comparison/E013.png | Guarded multi-agent incident triage with provenance-checked evidence flow | A guarded incident-response workflow where two analyst agents independently process externally supplied incident evidence, submit findings to a coordinator, and persist curated case notes into a case store under explicit authorization and provenance controls. | [
"External incident documents, logs, or attachments may be attacker-influenced but arrive without privileged system access.",
"Analyst agents can use bounded tools only through a coordinator-enforced policy layer; direct case-store writes are not allowed.",
"The coordinator verifies identity/authorization for in... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C5"
],
"fact": "Coordinator-only write path to the case store; direct analyst writes are disallowed by design and storage writes require authenticated application calls.",
"flow_ids": [
"F5",
"F6"
],
"id": "CTL1"
},
{
"component_ids... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent ... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "triage findings and downstream case notes",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTL2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Analyst tools ar... | [
"Boundary IDs inferred from the listed flow order: B1 covers Z1<->Z2 and B2 covers Z2<->Z3.",
"No direct analyst-to-case-store write flow is present; unsupported paths for that route are out of scope.",
"The architecture states provenance checks, but semantic correctness is explicitly not guaranteed, leaving re... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C4",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTL2 already bounds analyst tools through the coordinator, reducing direct abuse of agent capabilities and store access.",
"recommendation": "Add content-safety and provenance validation at the coordinator/provena... | |
E014 | comparison | customer_support | weak | single_prompt | slot-02-single_prompt | topology-014 | candidate | images/comparison/E014.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The attacker can influence external help documents but has no privileged access to the support app or customer store.",
"The support agent uses the workspace output to compose customer replies."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "The help document fetcher only accepts HTTPS URLs from an allowlist.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The response workspace shows source snippets and account fields... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Response Workspace",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Help Document Fetc... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "response preparation integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C3",
"C2",
"C1"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "The help document fetcher onl... | [
"Only one connected customer-support architecture is analyzed.",
"Boundary IDs follow first-seen zone pairs: B1 between External Sources and Support App; B2 between Customer Data and Support App.",
"Unsupported paths: the customer store is not shown as directly exposed outside the workspace, so disclosure beyon... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C3",
"C2"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The HTTPS allowlist already reduces source risk by limiting where documents can be fetched from.",
"recommendation": "Add content sanitization and instruction stripping in the help document fetcher, and render fet... | |
E015 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | single_prompt | slot-03-single_prompt | topology-015 | candidate | images/comparison/E015.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The attacker can influence external help documents but has no privileged access to the support app or customer-account store.",
"Tool calls from the drafting service are bounded to the listed retrieval and lookup flows."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "Provenance checks reject documents without an approved source label before excerpting.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "The drafting service can call only the doc... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help Document Repository",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Resp... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "response drafting behavior and response quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C4",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Provenance checks rej... | [
"Flow boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flow order: F1/F2 cross B1 between Z1 and Z2; F4/F5 cross B2 between Z2 and Z3.",
"The architecture does not specify whether user-entered case details are separately validated before reaching the drafting service.",
"No unsupported tool paths are modeled beyond t... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C4",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 already rejects documents without an approved source label before excerpting.",
"recommendation": "Keep provenance enforcement mandatory at C4 and require C3 to reject any excerpt set that lacks an approved ... | |
E016 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-05-no_reviewer | topology-016 | candidate | images/comparison/E016.png | Support agent with external docs and account lookup | A customer-support AI agent drafts replies by reading externally supplied help documents and querying a customer-account store, then composing a response for the human or customer-facing workflow. | [
"The support agent can ingest externally supplied help documents or evidence artifacts during case handling.",
"The agent has read access to a customer-account store for account context and history.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified; no assumption is made that validation, acce... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The support agent is configured to combine retrieved document snippets with account context when drafting case responses; how strongly it resists instruction injection or misleading evidence is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help document inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Reply dra... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply drafting and customer communication",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "The suppor... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1-Z2 and B2 for Z2-Z3.",
"No standalone repudiation, denial-of-service, or elevation-of-privilege path is supported by the supplied facts.",
"The customer-facing channel is described as a workflow destination; whether it is human-reviewed before sending... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already combines retrieved snippets with account context, so the attack path exists but is partially constrained by the fact that the output still passes through the support workflow and reply queue. However, resis... | |
E017 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-17-full_workflow | topology-003 | candidate | images/comparison/E017.png | Incident Evidence Triage with Dual Analyst Agents and Case Coordinator | Model an incident-response workflow where two analyst agents independently review externally supplied evidence, forward findings to a coordinator, and persist case material in a shared case store, with control effectiveness unspecified. | [
"Externally supplied documents, logs, or artifacts may be attacker-influenced before ingestion.",
"Two analyst agents are distinct processing components and both can receive the same external evidence stream.",
"A coordinator aggregates or reconciles analyst findings before writing to the case store.",
"Relev... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Analyst agents ingest the same external evidence stream; validation and sandboxing behavior is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "The coordinator compares... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst reasoning and coordinator reconciliation outputs",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K4"
],
... | [
"Boundary B1 covers flows between Z1 and Z2; boundary B2 covers flows between Z2 and Z3.",
"No supported repudiation, denial-of-service, or elevation-of-privilege path is explicit in the supplied facts.",
"The architecture does not specify read permissions for the case store, so disclosure from storage is incom... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already states the analyst agents ingest the same external evidence stream, but validation and sandboxing are unspecified; this means the path is recognized but not yet bounded by a stated control.",
... | |
E019 | comparison | incident_response | weak | full_workflow | slot-14-full_workflow | topology-017 | candidate | images/comparison/E019.png | Weakly controlled incident-evidence triage with two analyst agents and coordinator | Incident-response workflow where two analyst agents ingest attacker-influenced external evidence, produce findings, and relay them through a coordinator into a case store under weak control assumptions. | [
"External documents/evidence are attacker-influenced and arrive outside the trusted application zone.",
"Two analyst agents may share prompt context or retrieval/tooling with weak validation.",
"The coordinator accepts analyst findings and writes case records to a case store with permissive or weakly enforced c... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "External evidence is accepted into the triage workspace with weak content validation and no strong provenance enforcement.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst B",
"... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "triage findings and case records",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL2",
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quo... | [
"No direct read path from the case store back to the attacker is shown; disclosure from C5 is therefore unsupported here.",
"Reverse flows between the same zones are not present, and no additional boundaries beyond B1 and B2 are implied.",
"The scenario mentions weak validation and shared context, but does not ... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 already weakly validates incoming evidence, CTRL2 provides shared workspace processing, and CTRL3 gates writes; these controls reduce trivial passthrough but do not reliably stop instruction injectio... | |
E021 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | single_prompt | slot-16-single_prompt | topology-018 | candidate | images/comparison/E021.png | incident_response | Two analyst agents process externally supplied incident evidence and send findings through a coordinator to a case store. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Attacker can influence external documents and attachments delivered to the intake gateway, but has no privileged access to workspace or storage.",
"Analysts may use bounded tools for parsing and summarization, with coordinator-approved writes to case storage."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "External submissions are accepted only through the intake gateway, and analyst tools reject unsigned attachments unless provenance metadata is present.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTL1"
},
{
"com... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake Gateway",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst B",... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "analyst findings and downstream triage integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "External submissions ... | [
"No direct path from analysts to final case storage is shown; writes are mediated by the coordinator.",
"Boundary B1 covers flows from Z1 to Z2; B2 covers flows from Z2 to Z3, based on first-seen zone pairs.",
"The supplied controls describe provenance checks, read-only analyst access, coordinator authorization... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The current provenance check limits some untrusted inputs, but it does not address embedded instructions.",
"recommendation": "Require content sanitization and instruction-stripping at the intake gatew... | |
E022 | comparison | finance_operations | weak | full_workflow | slot-08-full_workflow | topology-019 | candidate | images/comparison/E022.png | Invoice intake to payment-approval pipeline with weak document controls | Process externally supplied invoices into payment drafts, then route them through human approval and payment execution under weak intake and validation controls. | [
"Externally supplied invoice documents and supporting evidence arrive from untrusted senders and may contain attacker-controlled text or attachments.",
"The invoice agent can read those documents and generate payment drafts, but it does not itself have privileged payment execution rights.",
"A separate approval... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "Inbound invoice handling accepts external documents with only weak validation; untrusted text and attachments are ingested into the agent workflow.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Approval queue... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "payment instruction and invoice case state",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K2",
"K3"
],
... | [
"Boundary IDs follow the supplied flow list: F1 crosses B1, F2 crosses B2, and F3/F4 are same-zone flows with no boundary.",
"No direct path to administrative credentials or internal payment-system access is described.",
"The architecture supports a weak review and shared case-state pattern, but it does not spe... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already provides weak inbound validation and K2/K3 provide a review gate, but they do not reliably prevent crafted content from altering extraction or being approved.",
"recommendation": "Enforce st... | |
E024 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-09-no_reviewer | topology-020 | candidate | images/comparison/E024.png | Guarded invoice-to-payment assistant with approval handoff | A single connected finance workflow where an invoice-reading agent ingests externally supplied documents, extracts payment details, prepares payment drafts, and forwards them into a separate approval and payment-execution path under explicit authorization and provenance controls. | [
"Externally supplied invoices and supporting evidence arrive from outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The invoice agent can read documents but has bounded tool authority: it can draft, classify, and route work, but cannot directly execute payments.",
"Approval and payment exe... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "Ingress accepts only provenance-tagged invoice submissions; the agent processes them in read-only mode and cannot call payment tools from the ingest path.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice intake gateway",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice reading agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"labe... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "payment case integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K2",
"K3",
"K4"
],
... | [
"No direct cross-boundary flow from the invoice agent to the payment executor exists; direct agent-issued payment commands are explicitly blocked.",
"The architecture does not specify whether the provenance-tagging check rejects forged documents or only records provenance.",
"The exact authorization logic and i... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K2 already limit the ingest path to provenance-tagged inputs and keep source notes in the shared case record, which helps review but does not by itself ensure the extracted values match the source c... | |
E025 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-12-full_workflow | topology-021 | candidate | images/comparison/E025.png | Invoice-to-Approval Payment Draft Workflow | Model a finance operations flow where an invoice-handling agent ingests externally supplied invoice documents, extracts payment-relevant details, drafts payment instructions, and passes them into an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Externally supplied invoice documents and supporting evidence are outside the trusted application zone.",
"The invoice agent can read documents and generate payment drafts, but the implementation and effectiveness of controls around parsing, validation, approval, and execution are unspecified.",
"The attacker ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Invoice intake and draft generation are separated from approval; the effectiveness of parsing and validation checks is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
]... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Draft Builder"... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "payment draft integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Invoice intake and draft generati... | [
"No candidate was added for unauthorized payment execution because the workflow requires an approval step before C5 and the enforcement strength is unspecified rather than clearly absent.",
"No same-zone flow boundary exists for F2, F4, or F5, so those paths were not treated as crossing trust boundaries.",
"The... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "Invoice intake and draft generation are separated from approval; the effectiveness of parsing and validation checks is unspecified.",
"recommendation": "Enforce strict document authentication, schema validation, a... | |
E026 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | full_workflow | slot-15-full_workflow | topology-022 | candidate | images/comparison/E026.png | Guarded multi-analyst incident triage with coordinator and case store | Two analyst agents examine externally supplied incident evidence, reconcile findings through a coordinator, and persist case records and evidence summaries with enforced authorization, provenance checks, and bounded tool use. | [
"Externally supplied incident documents may be attacker-influenced and are untrusted at ingress.",
"Analyst agents can read evidence and produce findings, but only the coordinator can commit records to the case store.",
"Tool access is scoped to specific retrieval and write actions; no unrestricted shell or net... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C5",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Tool gateway restricts analyst reads to scoped retrieval actions and passes provenance metadata with each evidence package; analysts do not receive direct shell or network access.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F3"
],
"i... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst B",
"... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "analyst reasoning and scoped evidence interpretation",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C5",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Ingr... | [
"No direct attacker path to C6 is shown; only coordinator-mediated writes cross B2.",
"No direct analyst-to-case-store write exists in the architecture; unsupported paths should not be inferred.",
"Effectiveness of provenance and authorization checks against malformed evidence is unspecified beyond the stated l... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C5",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL3 already performs provenance and authorization checks on ingress, and CTRL1 limits analysts to scoped retrieval with no shell or network access, reducing direct abuse paths.",
"recommendation": "A... | |
E027 | comparison | customer_support | weak | no_reviewer | slot-02-no_reviewer | topology-023 | candidate | images/comparison/E027.png | Agent-assisted support drafting with external docs and account lookup | A support agent reads externally supplied help documents and queries an internal customer-account store to draft a reply for review or sending. | [
"The help-document source is attacker-influenced and outside the trusted application zone.",
"The customer-account store is an internal trusted data source accessed by the support agent through a normal read API.",
"Control strength is weak: document authenticity checks are limited or absent, and the workflow r... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "External documents are accepted into the agent workspace with limited authenticity validation; the operator mainly judges plausibility before use.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help document source",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Drafting... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Support reply draft and operator decision-making",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": "External do... | [
"Boundary IDs were derived from the first-seen zone pairs in flow order: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3, B3 for Z2-Z4.",
"No direct threat was added for the account store alone because a read path does not by itself show unauthorized disclosure.",
"No denial-of-service or elevation path is supported by the supplied... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K3 already add limited operator judgment and keep the drafting tool from independently verifying evidence, which can slow casual misuse but does not stop document-shaped content from influencing the reply.",
... | |
E028 | comparison | incident_response | weak | no_reviewer | slot-13-no_reviewer | topology-005 | candidate | images/comparison/E028.png | Weakly controlled incident triage pipeline with two analyst agents | Model an incident-response workflow where two analyst agents review attacker-influenced evidence, exchange findings through a coordinator, and persist case state in a shared case store under permissive controls. | [
"Externally supplied incident documents, logs, or attachments can be attacker-crafted and enter outside the trusted application zone.",
"Two analyst agents have tool access to read evidence and write findings to an internal coordinator, but they do not have privileged administrative access.",
"The coordinator a... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Analyst inbox parsing allows rich text and attachments; basic file-type checks exist, but sanitization and prompt-injection filtering are incomplete and inconsistently applied.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
}... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "analyst triage reasoning and downstream case updates",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL4"
],
"evidenc... | [
"No direct external path to the case store is described; only the coordinator writes to it, so direct-store disclosure or tampering paths are unsupported.",
"No explicit privilege escalation mechanism is described for agents beyond influencing their outputs; E is not separately supported.",
"Reverse flows from ... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 and CTRL4 already provide basic file-type checks and acknowledge evidence as untrusted, which reduces simple injection attempts but leaves incomplete sanitization and end-to-end redaction gaps.",
... | |
E029 | comparison | finance_operations | guarded | full_workflow | slot-10-full_workflow | topology-024 | candidate | images/comparison/E029.png | Guarded invoice-to-payment assistant | Process externally supplied invoices, draft payment requests, and route them through separate approval and execution steps with bounded tool use and authorization controls. | [
"Invoice inputs originate outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The invoice agent can read documents and generate drafts, but cannot directly execute payments.",
"Approval is performed by a separate step with role-based authorization and audit logging.",
"Tool use is bounded ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "The invoice agent is configured for read-only document ingestion plus predefined parsing and draft-generation tools; payment execution is not available in this zone.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F4"
],
"id": "K1"
},
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice intake agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Document parsing service",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Payme... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice processing workflow and generated payment draft",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C6",
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_q... | [
"The model shows no direct path from the invoice agent zone to payment execution; execution requires the separate approval path.",
"No explicit rate limiting, schema validation depth, or parser hardening is provided for external invoice inputs.",
"Audit logging is present, but the integrity and retention proper... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already limits the zone to read-only ingestion plus predefined parsing and draft tools, and K3 adds provenance checks. These reduce direct tool abuse and block payment execution from this zone, but do n... | |
E030 | comparison | finance_operations | unspecified | single_prompt | slot-12-single_prompt | topology-025 | candidate | images/comparison/E030.png | finance_operations | An invoice agent reads externally supplied invoice documents, prepares payment drafts, and hands them to an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The attacker can influence externally supplied invoice documents and attached evidence, but has no privileged access to internal systems.",
"Control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified unless explicitly stated in a control fact."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "The agent and parser perform MIME and schema validation before accepting invoice content.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C5"
],
"fact": "Approval Service requires a... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Supplier Document Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Invoi... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice drafting workflow and payment draft integrity",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "The agent and p... | [
"Boundary IDs follow the listed flow order: B1 covers the first external-to-internal zone crossing on F1; B2 covers the first cross-zone transfer between processing and approval on F4 and is shared by reverse-direction or later flows between those same zones.",
"The architecture does not state whether validation ... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The MIME and schema validation already filters accepted content formats, which lowers malformed-input risk but does not specifically address instruction manipulation.",
"recommendation": "Constrain the agent and p... | |
E031 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | full_workflow | slot-03-full_workflow | topology-026 | candidate | images/comparison/E031.png | Guarded support-assist workflow with external document retrieval and account lookup | Model a support agent workflow that drafts customer replies from retrieved help content and customer-account data, while enforcing provenance checks, role-based access, and bounded tool use. | [
"The support agent operates inside a trusted application zone with access only to approved tools.",
"External help documents and customer-submitted evidence may be attacker-influenced and are treated as untrusted until provenance checks pass.",
"The account store enforces authorization for read access and retur... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C3",
"C6"
],
"fact": "Account lookup is role-authorized and returns only support-approved fields from the internal store.",
"flow_ids": [
"F5",
"F6"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C5"
],
"fact": "Retrieve... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Retrieval tool",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Account lookup service... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply drafting behavior",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Retrieved help content is subject to provenance chec... | [
"Boundary IDs assigned from the listed flow order: B1 for Z1<->Z2, B2 for Z1<->Z3, B3 for Z1<->Z4.",
"No direct write-back to customer accounts is assumed, which limits tampering and privilege-escalation paths through the account store.",
"The review step exists, but its blocking strength is unspecified; do not... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4",
"C7"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K2 already adds provenance checks before forwarding help content into draft generation, which reduces but does not eliminate instruction-manipulation risk.",
"recommendation": "Enforce strict content-i... | |
E032 | comparison | finance_operations | weak | no_reviewer | slot-07-no_reviewer | topology-027 | candidate | images/comparison/E032.png | Invoice-to-Payment Assistant with Weak Review Gates | Ingest externally supplied invoices, extract payment details, draft payment requests, and pass them through approval into payment execution under weak content and tool controls. | [
"External invoice files and supporting evidence are attacker-influenceable but arrive through ordinary intake channels, not privileged system access.",
"The invoice processor can read document contents and may follow embedded instructions or malformed prompts because document sanitization and instruction separati... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Inbound invoice files are accepted through a normal intake channel with only limited sanitization before parsing.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "The... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Invoice Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Evidence Store",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Pro... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "invoice processing and draft creation",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Inbound invoice files are accep... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3, and B3 for Z1-Z3; no separate threat was added for F8 because the control fact does not specify a concrete exploit path from the execution receipt back into payment control.",
"The architecture mentions attacker-influenceable external ... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "Current intake allows the normal channel with limited sanitization, so the path is reachable but partially filtered rather than blocked.",
"recommendation": "Harden intake and parsing so invoice files ... | |
E033 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | single_prompt | slot-04-single_prompt | topology-028 | candidate | images/comparison/E033.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Attacker can influence externally supplied help documents but has no privileged access to the support workspace or customer store.",
"Response drafting uses bounded retrieval and policy review before a human sends the final reply."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The ingestion step strips active content and preserves source metadata before forwarding excerpts.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C3"
],
"fact": "The drafting tool only accepts ac... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Doc Ingest Service",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Response Drafting ... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "support response quality and agent tool authority",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C2",
"C3",
"C1"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K2"
],
"evidence_quote":... | [
"Boundary B1 covers traffic between External Sources (Z1) and Support Workspace (Z2) via F1/F2; B2 covers traffic between Support Workspace (Z2) and Customer Data Zone (Z3) via F4/F5.",
"Unsupported paths remain possible if the human agent copies external text outside the drafting workflow; that behavior is outsi... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C6"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The ingestion step strips active content and preserves source metadata before forwarding excerpts; drafts are already routed to policy review.",
"recommendation": "Keep the ingestion sanitizer mandator... | |
E034 | comparison | customer_support | weak | full_workflow | slot-01-full_workflow | topology-029 | candidate | images/comparison/E034.png | Support Agent with External Docs and Account Lookup | A customer-support assistant drafts replies using retrieved help articles and customer-account data, while accepting externally supplied documents or evidence from customers and public sources. | [
"The support agent operates with weakly enforced prompt/tool controls and can be influenced by retrieved external text.",
"The customer-account store is read-only for the assistant, but its access policy is permissive enough to return customer records for lookup.",
"Externally supplied documents and evidence ar... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"fact": "Help retrieval is allowed from a preconfigured article source, but query filtering is weak and retrieved text is passed back into the agent context with limited instruction sanitization.",
"flow_ids": [
"F3",
"F4"
],
"id": "... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Customer Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Drafting Work... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support reply drafting workflow",
"boundary_ids": [
"B2",
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C5",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K3",
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "Uploaded evidenc... | [
"No threat is claimed for help-article retrieval alone because the provided control describes weak filtering but still confines retrieval to a preconfigured article source; impact depends on how retrieved text is used.",
"The architecture does not specify whether account records are filtered by field or redacted ... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K3 already marks uploaded evidence as untrusted, and K4 keeps drafting inside the support workspace with basic policy checks; this reduces risk but does not reliably prevent external text from influencing the agent co... | |
E035 | comparison | customer_support | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-03-no_reviewer | topology-030 | candidate | images/comparison/E035.png | Guarded Support Agent with Provenanced Knowledge Retrieval and Scoped Account Lookup | Customer-support workflow where an AI agent drafts replies using externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store under explicit authorization, provenance checks, and bounded read-only tool use. | [
"The support agent can retrieve from a help-document repository and a customer-account store under explicit service permissions.",
"External help documents, attachments, or evidence can be attacker-influenced but are not trusted by default.",
"The customer-account store enforces authenticated access and record-... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4",
"C6"
],
"fact": "The orchestrator only issues read-only retrieval calls and scoped account lookups; write operations are not exposed in this workflow.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2",
"F3",
"F6"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_i... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Customer Portal",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Support Orchestrator",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Drafti... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support drafting context and response quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B3"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C7",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "Externally supplied attach... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1<->Z2, B2 for Z2<->Z3, and B3 for Z2<->Z4.",
"No direct write-back to customer accounts is in scope; the design states read-only retrieval and draft generation only.",
"The architecture does not specify whether the draft output is automatically sent to... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K4 already sanitizes uploaded evidence before inclusion in the drafting context, which reduces direct injection content but does not by itself guarantee instruction removal or authenticity.",
"recommendation": "En... | |
E036 | comparison | finance_operations | weak | single_prompt | slot-07-single_prompt | topology-031 | candidate | images/comparison/E036.png | finance_operations | An invoice agent reads externally supplied invoice documents, prepares payment drafts, and hands them to an approval and payment-execution path. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The external sender can influence invoice content and attached evidence but has no privileged internal access.",
"The approver portal is intended to require human review, but the strength of content validation is unspecified beyond basic workflow handling."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "The invoice agent uses a permissive prompt template that instructs it to extract invoice fields and continue when fields are missing if the document appears otherwise readable.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F3"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"c... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Vendor Invoice Source",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Docu... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "payment draft accuracy and downstream payment handling",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "The invoice ag... | [
"Boundary B1 is the external-to-internal crossing between Z1 and Z2 via F1.",
"Boundary B2 is the internal-to-approval-zone crossing between Z2 and Z3 via F4 and F5.",
"Unsupported paths remain incomplete for the document store access model and the exact approval audit trail.",
"The architecture does not stat... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 currently allows the agent to continue on incomplete or loosely formed documents, so the path is only weakly constrained.",
"recommendation": "Constrain the invoice agent to treat invoice text as data only, ... | |
E037 | comparison | customer_support | weak | no_reviewer | slot-01-no_reviewer | topology-032 | candidate | images/comparison/E037.png | Support drafting agent with external docs and account lookup | Assist support staff by drafting customer replies from externally supplied help documents and customer-account records, under weak control over untrusted inputs and tool outputs. | [
"Support agents can ingest externally supplied help documents from outside the trusted application zone.",
"The agent has read access to a customer-account store for case context.",
"Control is weak or permissive: input sanitization, provenance checks, and instruction filtering are limited or inconsistently enf... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "External documents are accepted with only basic format checks; provenance labeling is present but not consistently enforced before drafting.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help Document Feed",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Drafting Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "R... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Support drafting workflow and outbound customer reply quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B3"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C5",
"C6"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
... | [
"Boundary B2 covers both C2<->C4 flows; the exact query shape and returned fields are not specified.",
"The architecture does not specify whether drafts may contain raw customer-data excerpts, redactions, or citations only.",
"No direct evidence shows unauthorized access to the case store beyond the agent's sco... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C5",
"C6"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 provides only basic format checks and inconsistent provenance enforcement; K3 review is advisory; K4 sends without extra gating, so current controls reduce but do not reliably stop injection... | |
E038 | comparison | incident_response | weak | single_prompt | slot-13-single_prompt | topology-017 | candidate | images/comparison/E038.png | incident_response | Two analyst agents process externally supplied incident evidence and send findings through a coordinator to a case store. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Attacker can supply crafted external documents or evidence, but has no privileged access to internal systems.",
"Analyst agents may follow embedded instructions in received evidence unless constrained by local handling rules."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "External evidence is routed to the analyst agents without a malware-sandbox requirement.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "The coordinator appends analys... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "External Evidence Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Malware Analyst Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": ... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "analysis integrity and downstream case findings",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CL1"
],
"evidence_quote": "External evidence is ro... | [
"Boundary B1 covers traffic from Z1 to Z2 for F1 and F2; B2 covers traffic from Z2 to Z3 for F5 and also the same zone handoff inside the analysis workspace is not a boundary.",
"No privileged internal access is assumed; threats rely on attacker-controlled external content rather than direct system compromise.",
... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The existing routing control is weak: external evidence reaches the analyst agents without a malware-sandbox requirement.",
"recommendation": "Add strict content-isolation rules at the analyst agents and require t... | |
E039 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-18-no_reviewer | topology-033 | candidate | images/comparison/E039.png | Incident Evidence Triage with Dual Analysts and Case Coordinator | Model an incident-response workflow where two analyst agents review externally supplied evidence, consolidate findings through a coordinator, and persist case data in a shared store. | [
"Two analyst agents independently process attacker-influenced incident documents, logs, or attachments.",
"A coordinator receives analyst findings and writes case records to a case store.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified; no assumption is made that validation, sandboxing, or ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1"
],
"fact": "External evidence is routed through a dedicated intake component before reaching either analyst; the exact validation and filtering behavior is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2",
"F3"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst B",
"zone": "... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "incident evidence and resulting case record",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C6",
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL2",
... | [
"Boundary B1 is the only cross-zone boundary; flows F2-F6 stay within Z2 and have no boundary IDs.",
"No unsupported direct access from the external source to the case store is shown; any such path would be speculative.",
"The architecture does not specify whether analyst outputs are validated, whether the coor... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 already places all external evidence through C1, and CTRL3 keeps writes to C5 behind the coordinator, which limits direct tampering paths but does not specify validation strength.",
"recommendati... | |
E040 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | no_reviewer | slot-16-no_reviewer | topology-034 | candidate | images/comparison/E040.png | Guarded multi-agent incident triage with provenance-filtered evidence handling | Model an incident response workflow where two analyst agents review externally supplied evidence, relay findings through a coordinator, and persist case notes in a shared store under enforced authorization and bounded tool access. | [
"Externally supplied incident documents, logs, or attachments may be attacker-influenced but arrive outside the trusted application zone.",
"Analyst agents can read evidence and produce findings, but only the coordinator can approve writes to the case store.",
"Tool use is bounded to predefined retrieval and no... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Evidence intake applies provenance tagging and content filtering before analyst consumption; analysts only receive the filtered bundle from the external zone.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Evidence Intake Filter",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent ... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst reasoning and downstream case notes",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C6",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K2",
"K4... | [
"No direct spoofing, repudiation, or elevation path is clearly supported by the supplied flows and controls.",
"Boundary IDs inferred from the declared trust zones: F1/F2 cross B1; F5/F6 cross B2; same-zone flows have no boundary.",
"The scenario does not specify whether provenance checks reject prompt-injectio... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C6",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already filters and tags inbound evidence, K2 limits tool use to scoped retrieval, and K4 creates an approval gate before storage; these reduce but do not eliminate content-driven manipulation.",
"r... | |
E041 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | full_workflow | slot-06-full_workflow | topology-035 | candidate | images/comparison/E041.png | Agent-assisted support response assembly | A support agent drafts replies by combining externally supplied help documents with customer-account data in a response workspace before preparing an outbound response. | [
"The support agent operates in a separate application zone from the external content source and the customer-account store.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified; no assumption is made that filtering, sandboxing, or approval gates are absent or effective.",
"The attacker can influ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "The agent reviews externally supplied help content in the drafting workspace before composing a reply; specific validation or content-filter behavior is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids":... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help document feed",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Response d... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Support response integrity and agent decision quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3",
"K4"
],
"... | [
"Boundary B1 covers the external content source to support workspace path; B2 covers the account service to support workspace path.",
"No dedicated logging, approval, or content provenance mechanism is modeled in the provided controls.",
"Downstream message delivery after reply preparation is explicitly outside... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 shows external content is already reviewed in the workspace, and K3/K4 keep drafting and preparation inside the support zone; these controls reduce direct cross-boundary injection but do not specify con... | |
E042 | comparison | finance_operations | weak | full_workflow | slot-07-full_workflow | topology-036 | candidate | images/comparison/E042.png | Invoice-to-Payment Drafting with Weakly Controlled Document Intake | Model a finance workflow where an invoice-handling agent ingests externally supplied documents, extracts payment details, drafts payment requests, and forwards them into approval and payment execution under weak control assumptions. | [
"Externally supplied invoice files and supporting evidence can be attacker-influenced before ingestion.",
"The invoice agent can parse attachments and may follow embedded instructions unless blocked by weak or unspecified controls.",
"Approval and payment-execution steps are connected to the same workflow, but ... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2"
],
"fact": "Document trust is permissive at intake; externally supplied invoices are accepted for parsing, with only weak screening of attachment content.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Vendor Invoice Upload",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Invoice Intake Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "payment draft integrity and workflow execution",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Document trust is permiss... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1-Z2, B2 for Z2-Z3, and B3 for Z1-Z3.",
"Unsupported paths not modeled as threats: same-zone flows F2 and F4 do not cross a trust boundary, and the architecture does not state unauthorized internal access.",
"The exact contents of the approval review an... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 provides only weak screening at C2, and K2 shows direct use of extraction output; these controls reduce accidental issues but do not reliably stop agentic instruction injection or content steering.",
"recommend... | |
E043 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | single_prompt | slot-05-single_prompt | topology-037 | candidate | images/comparison/E043.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Attacker can influence externally supplied documents or evidence but has no privileged access.",
"Control implementation and effectiveness for validation, filtering, authorization, and logging are unspecified."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "Draft response tool applies document parsing and attachment handling before presenting content to the agent.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4",
"C6"
],
"fact": "Support wor... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help document feed",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence upload channel",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"l... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "agent decision quality and reply content",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C4",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Draft response tool... | [
"Boundary B1 is the external-sources to support-workspace crossing for F1, F2.",
"Boundary B2 is the support-workspace to account-data crossing for F5, F6.",
"Control effectiveness is unspecified except where the facts explicitly say parsing, lookup usage, or agent review occur.",
"Unsupported paths such as d... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C4",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "Draft response tool applies document parsing and attachment handling before presenting content to the agent; the agent reviews retrieved material before sending a reply.",
"recommendation": "Add explicit prompt/co... | |
E046 | comparison | incident_response | guarded | single_prompt | slot-15-single_prompt | topology-018 | candidate | images/comparison/E046.png | incident_response | Two analyst agents process externally supplied incident evidence and send findings through a coordinator to a case store. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"Attackers can influence externally supplied evidence content but have no privileged access to analysis systems or case store.",
"Analyst agents are permitted to read evidence and submit drafted findings, but not to directly modify stored cases.",
"The coordinat... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Evidence intake validates source identity and attaches a submission identifier before routing to analysts.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake API",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Log Analyst Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Artifac... | [
{
"assessment": "reduced",
"asset": "case findings and triage disposition",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B2"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL2",
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quote": "Analy... | [
"Unsupported read access paths to the case store are not described; only coordinator writes are controlled.",
"Whether signed findings prevent forged content from a compromised analyst agent is unspecified.",
"No direct evidence export component is shown, so disclosure depends on downstream access not modeled h... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "Existing controls already reduce this path by marking evidence untrusted and requiring signed analyst findings.",
"recommendation": "Keep analyst-side untrusted-text handling enabled, add a coordinator... | |
E047 | comparison | incident_response | weak | no_reviewer | slot-14-no_reviewer | topology-005 | candidate | images/comparison/E047.png | Analyst-assisted incident evidence triage with coordinator and case store | Model a single incident-response workflow where two analyst agents review externally supplied evidence, forward findings through a coordinator, and persist case records in a shared store under weak trust controls. | [
"External incident documents, attachments, and messages originate outside the trusted application zone and may be attacker-influenced.",
"The two analyst agents are separate processing roles that both consume external evidence and can emit findings to a coordinator.",
"The coordinator aggregates, routes, or nor... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "External evidence is accepted through a permissive intake path with limited pre-validation; analyst agents can directly open and process the supplied content.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "analyst reasoning and downstream case records",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "T",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K2"
],
"evidence_quote": "External evide... | [
"Boundary B1 is the only trust boundary and applies to F1 and F2 in the listed order.",
"No direct external write to the case store is shown; store compromise is only inferred through the coordinator write path.",
"No explicit authentication, authorization, or audit controls are described for the analyst-to-coo... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already provides a permissive intake path with limited pre-validation, so this control gives basic access but does not prevent content manipulation or prompt injection.",
"recommendation": "Add stri... | |
E049 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | single_prompt | slot-18-single_prompt | topology-017 | candidate | images/comparison/E049.png | incident_response | Two analyst agents process externally supplied incident evidence and send findings through a coordinator to a case store. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"The attacker can influence external documents or evidence, but has no privileged access.",
"Relevant control implementation and effectiveness are unspecified."
] | [
{
"component_ids": [
"P1"
],
"fact": "The coordinator records analyst findings before writing the consolidated case record to the case store.",
"flow_ids": [
"F3",
"F4",
"F5"
],
"id": "C1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"A2",
"A3",
"P1"
],
"... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "A1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Malware Evidence Ingestor",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "A2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Triage Analyst Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "A3",
"kind": "agent",
"label":... | [
{
"assessment": "unknown",
"asset": "analyst reasoning and downstream case findings",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"A2",
"A3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"C2"
],
"evidence_quote": "Relevant control implementation and e... | [
"Boundary B1 covers the external source zone to analysis zone flows F1 and F2.",
"Boundary B2 covers the analysis zone to case management zone flow F5.",
"Unsupported paths remain: no explicit authentication, sanitization, or access-control mechanism is described for analyst inputs or the case store.",
"Contr... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"A2",
"A3",
"P1"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The coordinator already records analyst findings before writing the consolidated case record to the case store, but effectiveness against instruction manipulation is unspecified.",
"recommendation": "A... | |
E050 | comparison | customer_support | weak | single_prompt | slot-01-single_prompt | topology-038 | candidate | images/comparison/E050.png | customer_support | A support agent uses externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store to prepare responses. | [
"Synthetic design; no actual production data.",
"External documents may be influenced by an attacker with ordinary submission capability.",
"The support agent can access the drafting tool and customer account store for case handling.",
"Document screening is permissive and does not guarantee malicious content... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
],
"fact": "The drafting tool previews retrieved documents before rendering them into the response workspace.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C5"
],
"fact": "The customer account store requires authent... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Customer Help Submitter",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "data_store",
"label": "Help Document Inbox",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "response quality and agent tool authority",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4",
"C3"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quote": "... | [
"Boundary IDs were assigned from the flow order: F1 has no boundary, F2 crosses Z1->Z2 as B1, F3 crosses Z3->Z2 as B2, and F4 has no boundary.",
"The architecture does not specify content sanitization, provenance checks, or explicit data minimization for help documents or customer records.",
"No direct unauthor... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C4",
"C3"
],
"existing_control_effect": "The existing preview and agent review provide a partial checkpoint, but they do not guarantee instruction isolation.",
"recommendation": "Add strict document provenance checks and treat retrieved help text as untr... | |
E051 | comparison | customer_support | weak | full_workflow | slot-02-full_workflow | topology-039 | candidate | images/comparison/E051.png | AI-assisted customer support response preparation | Draft customer support replies by combining externally supplied help materials with customer-account records, under weakly controlled agent/tool handling. | [
"Customer messages and uploaded help documents arrive from an untrusted external zone.",
"The support agent can query a customer-account store through a tool with read access only.",
"Weak control facts: document content is not strongly authenticated or sanitized before agent consumption; prompt/tool-instructio... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Uploaded help documents are ingested directly into the assistant context with only basic formatting checks; no strong authenticity gate is present.",
"flow_ids": [
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C3",
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Customer message intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Uploaded help documents",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Support-agent drafting context and reply quality",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B3"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C6"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3"
],
"evidence_quote": ... | [
"No unsupported write-path or data tampering path to the customer-account store is shown; the tool is read-only.",
"The architecture does not specify the content of the final sent reply, only the draft and human review loop, so external disclosure impact is incomplete.",
"No direct evidence of spoofing identiti... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C6"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already provides direct ingestion controls only at formatting level, and K3 adds human review; these reduce but do not prevent prompt injection because authenticity and instruction separation remain wea... | |
E052 | comparison | incident_response | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-17-no_reviewer | topology-040 | candidate | images/comparison/E052.png | Incident Evidence Triage with Dual Analyst Agents and Coordinator | Model a connected incident-response workflow where two analyst agents independently inspect externally supplied evidence, then submit findings through a coordinator into a case store for later review. | [
"Externally supplied incident evidence can include attacker-influenced documents, logs, or attachments.",
"Two analyst agents are distinct components but may share the same evidence source and coordination channel.",
"The coordinator routes findings into the case store and may reconcile or normalize submissions... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Analyst agents consume externally supplied evidence from the evidence source; control effectiveness for content filtering or sandboxing is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C4"
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence Ingest",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst Agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "Analyst Agent A reasoning and downstream triage output",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1"
],
"evidence_quote": "Analyst agents consume extern... | [
"Unsupported direct write paths from analysts to the case store are not modeled; only the coordinator writes to C5.",
"No explicit disclosure path from the case store to external parties is shown, so information disclosure is not asserted here.",
"No direct analyst-to-coordinator trust bypass or privilege escal... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C1"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 already indicates C2 consumes external evidence; however, filtering/sandboxing effectiveness is unspecified, so current controls may limit exposure but do not clearly prevent instruction injection.",
"recommend... | |
E053 | comparison | incident_response | weak | full_workflow | slot-13-full_workflow | topology-005 | candidate | images/comparison/E053.png | Incident evidence triage with two analyst agents and permissive coordinator workflow | Model a small incident-response workflow where two analyst agents review attacker-influenced evidence, pass findings to a coordinator, and the coordinator writes case records to a shared store under weak access control. | [
"External incident documents, logs, or attachments can be attacker-influenced before ingestion.",
"The two analyst agents operate in a trusted application zone but consume untrusted evidence from an external intake zone.",
"The coordinator accepts analyst findings and can invoke a case-store write action with p... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3"
],
"fact": "Analyst agents accept external evidence directly from the intake zone; content validation is present but unspecified and not described as strong.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1",
"F2"
],
"id": "K1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Evidence intake",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst agent A",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Analyst agent... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "triage findings and case records",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"K1",
"K3",
"K4"
],
"evidence_quote": "Ana... | [
"Boundary B1 applies to flows between Z1 and Z2, so F1 and F2 cross the trust boundary while F3-F5 do not.",
"The shared case store read model is not described; unauthorized internal read access is unspecified.",
"No explicit integrity check, sanitization, or approval gate is described for analyst-to-coordinato... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
"C4",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "K1 and K4 already indicate untrusted intake handling and some validation, and K2 provides a second review step, but these controls are informal and insufficient to prevent prompt/context manipu... | |
E054 | comparison | customer_support | unspecified | no_reviewer | slot-06-no_reviewer | topology-041 | candidate | images/comparison/E054.png | Support Agent with External Docs and Account Lookup | A customer-support assistant drafts replies by consulting externally supplied help documents and a customer-account store, then returns a response to an operator or customer-facing channel. | [
"The support agent is an AI-assisted workflow component inside the trusted application zone.",
"Externally supplied help documents and evidence can be influenced by an attacker, but they originate outside the trusted zone.",
"The customer-account store is inside the trusted data zone and is reachable only throu... | [
{
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"fact": "External documents are ingested through the normal document input path; any content screening or instruction filtering is unspecified.",
"flow_ids": [
"F1"
],
"id": "CTRL1"
},
{
"component_ids": [
"C2",
"C3",
... | {
"components": [
{
"id": "C1",
"kind": "external_entity",
"label": "Help Document Feed",
"zone": "Z1"
},
{
"id": "C2",
"kind": "agent",
"label": "Support Agent",
"zone": "Z2"
},
{
"id": "C3",
"kind": "process",
"label": "Account Lo... | [
{
"assessment": "exposed",
"asset": "support-agent reply drafting behavior",
"boundary_ids": [
"B1",
"B3"
],
"category": "A",
"component_ids": [
"C1",
"C2"
],
"evidence_control_ids": [
"CTRL1",
"CTRL3"
],
"evidence_quote": "External documen... | [
"Boundary IDs are assigned from the listed flows: B1 for Z1↔Z2, B2 for Z2↔Z3, and B3 for Z2↔Z4.",
"No unsupported direct path from external sources to the customer-account store is shown; F3 and F4 remain within Z3.",
"The architecture does not specify whether reply recipients are customers, operators, or both,... | [
{
"enforcement_component_ids": [
"C2",
"C5"
],
"existing_control_effect": "CTRL1 already routes external documents through the normal input path, and CTRL3 shows replies leave only through the reply channel, but neither control states that prompt-injection screening or human review is enforc... |
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